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Carlyle A. Thayer, “Terrorism Studies and South East Asia: Crippled by Paradigm Paralysis?” Seminar presentation to Defence and Security Research Applications Centre, University College, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, July 13, 2007.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Terrorism Studies and South East Asia: Crippled by Paradigm Paralysis?” Seminar presentation to Defence and Security Research Applications Centre, University College, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, July 13, 2007.
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Carlyle A. Thayer, “Terrorism Studies and South East Asia: Crippled by Paradigm Paralysis?” Seminar presentation to Defence and Security Research Applications Centre, University College, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, July 13, 2007.
Droits d'auteur :
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Formats disponibles
Téléchargez comme PDF, TXT ou lisez en ligne sur Scribd
School of Humanities and Social Sciences Seminar Presentation to Defence and Security Applications Research Centre July 13, 2007 Terrorism Studies z Nota recognised discipline z Weak research methods z Nearly half of terrorism literature written by political scientists z 80% of all research based on English- language secondary sources (mainly media reports) z 13% of articles rely on interviews (but only 1% are systematic or structured) z 6% of articles give no sources Terrorism Studies z Weak research methods z Patternsand relationships not being studied by use of inferential statistics z Research influenced by Government agenda and ‘terrorism industry’ z Media simplification z Phenomenon of ‘celebrity analysts’ Greg Sheridan’s 1st Proposition There has been an institutional failure by Australian universities and strategic community to seriously address the threat of terrorism, especially in Southeast Asia. 1. “there is not a single Australian researcher on Southeast Asian terrorism of international repute” “much of what they [universities] have come up with in terrorism research is rubbish. Much of it is postmodern theoretical nonsense…” Greg Sheridan’s 2nd Proposition
2. “The strategic community has failed because of
its continued paradigm paralysis, its chronic inability to regard terrorism as a serious strategic issue”. “Universities and think tanks can take comfort in the chummy common room embrace of dead paradigms. But, in doing so, they offer suboptimal service to their nation”. Universities z ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security z Griffith University + ANU and University of Queensland z Macquarie University z Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT) z Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (Postgraduate Study Pattern) z Monash University z Global Terrorism Research Centre z Research Network for a Secure Australia z Administered by the University of Melbourne z University of Wollongong z Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention Think Tanks z Australian Strategic Policy Institute z Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia (2005) z Lowy Institute z Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia (2005) z Mindanao A Gamble Worth Taking? (2006) z Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU) z The Complexities of Dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: A Case Study of Jemaah Islamiyah Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 149 (2003) Sheridan’s 3 Specialists z Rohan Gunaratna z Singapore-government funding, head, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research z Zachary Abuza z Funding from U.S. think tanks – Smith Richardson Foundation, United States Institute for Peace z Sidney Jones z Southeast Asia Project Director, International Crisis Group (ICG) Rohan Gunaratna Review of Inside Al Qaeda The most disappointing book [of 5 under review] is Rohan Gunaratna’s Inside Al Qaeda. Gunaratna… offers many interesting but poorly substantiated details. The book itself is more a data dump than a comprehensive analysis. Daniel L. Byman, World Politics (Oct 2003), 141. Review of Inside Al Qaeda Of the five [books under review], Gunaratna’s book is the most problematic. Although it often overwhelms the reader in detail, many of its key claims…are unsupported. In addition, it often relies on intelligence reporting without so much as a hint of whether the material is from an interview, a document, or a media leak. Other claims advanced by Gunaratna deserve additional substantiation… Daniel L. Byman, World Politics (Oct 2003), 141. Review of Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand “Some are likely to see this book especially as just another output in Gunaratna's terror- mongering academic exercises… Too many terror mongers are better than too few”. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Chulalongkorn University, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Arabinda Acharya, Sabrina Chua April 2006 and Rohan Gunaratna, eds. Review of Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand z Significant factual and interpretive errors undermine the credibility of the book z “Overall, the critique demonstrates that various interpretations of what is happening in the South of Thailand remain plausible, and the article concludes that the authors of Conflict and Terrorism were too poorly equipped to deal with these competing interpretations to offer any insights into the conflict.” z Michael Connors, ‘War on Error and the Southern Fire’, Critical Asian Studies, 38(1), 2006, 151-175. Zachary Abuza Review of Militant Islam It takes knowledge of language, history and, of course, Islam to conduct academic research on militant Islam. Sadly, Abuza has a minimum mastery of the relevant areas, and he is a fish out of water in this academic area… His minimal knowledge of Islam, and ignorance of Arabic, Indonesian or Malay and of Islam in Southeast Asia, led him to cull information for the book from secondary sources... This analysis has too many mistakes to serve as a reference book. Solahudin, Jakarta Post, December 7, 2003 Review of Militant Islam “According to some observers such as the Indonesian journalist Solahudin, Militant Islam is weakened considerably by Abuza's lack of familiarity with Islam, Arabic, Indonesian and Malay. It may be too harsh, however, as Solahudin does, to call the entire thesis of Militant Islam into question because of these shortcomings. Abuza's study, as long as read not in isolation but in tandem with other works, will still prove useful to counter-terrorism analysts and practitioners”. -Kumar Ramakrishna, Contemporary Southeast Asia, April 2004 Review of Militant Islam “However, while such arguments contribute to the debate on terrorism and counter-terrorism in southeast Asia, overall, this book is a disappointment. It reads largely like a rough, unedited first draft, replete with inappropriate and factual inaccuracies. Regrettably, these serious, multiple shortcomings – many of which could have been mitigated by greater editorial diligence – imply that Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, as it stands, does not qualify as the authoritative reference on the subject that had been widely anticipated”. Tim Huxley, IISS, Survival, 46(3), 184. Review of Militant Islam “It is tedious to recount the numerous errors of fact, spelling, and interpretation that plague Abuza’s work. This may explain why there has been so little published criticism of it. For country specialists, these errors expose a weak grounding in the history, geography, and culture of the peoples described. Unfortunately, the errors are reproduced by other regionalists drawing on Abuza”. -Kit Collier, Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, 35. Sidney Jones z Studied at university in Iran z M.A. International Politics z Asia Director, Human Rights Watch/Asia for 14 years z Southeast Asia Project Director, International Crisis Group (ICG) since 2002 Greg Fealy & Kit Collier
ANU, ex-ONA ANU, ICG
Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker Anthony Bubalo Malcolm Cook and Greg Fealy and Kit Collier Greg Barton & David Wright-Neville
Monash, ex-APCSS Monash, ex-ONA
Marika Vicziany, Greg Barton David Wright-Neville, and Pete Lentini Methodology
z Google search using “name” + terrorism
z Scholar search using “name” + terrorism z Impact = Number of Google Hits divided by the number of Scholar hits (I = GH/SH) z Popular impression only z Dose not assess academic quality Classification z A = Australian academics who write on terrorism generally (N= 40) z ASEAS = Australian Southeast Asian specialists who write on regional terrorism (N= 12) z MPA – Most Prolific Authors (N = 30) z O = Overseas academics who write on terrorism generally (N = 14) z SEA = academics in Southeast Asia who write on regional terrorism (N = 8) z Total N = 104 Comparison of Sheridan’s 3 Specialists with Thayer’s 4 (sorted by impact)
Academic Classification Google Scholar Impact
Abuza, Zachary O 30,500 120 254 Jones, Sidney SEA 24,700 118 209 Gunaratna, Rohan SEA 76,200 535 142 Barton, Greg ASEA 1,320 51 26 Collier, Kit ASEA 257 10 26 Wright-Neville, David ASEA 695 49 14 Fealy, Greg ASEA 535 82 7 Comparison of Sheridan’s 3 with Australian Southeast Asian Specialists Academic Google Scholar Impact Thayer, Carl/Carlyle 14,328 47 305 Abuza, Zachary 30,500 120 254 Jones, Sidney 24,700 118 209 Gunaratna, Rohan 76,200 535 142 Connors, Michael K. 646 14 46 Kingsbury, Damien 33 1 33 Barton, Greg 1,320 51 26 Collier, Kit 257 10 26 Wright-Neville, David 695 49 14 Martin Jones, David 916 90 10 Average Academic Output on Terrorism Measured by Impact (July 5, 2007) Category Google Scholar Impact
Most Prolific Authors 11565 202 41
Australian Southeast Asian specialists 1729 49 42 Southeast Asian terrorism specialists 13174 149 50
Australian terrorism specialists 1050 34 55
All categories 8334 119 58
Overseas terrorism specialists 25112 228 119
Top Ten Global Rankings by Google Hits
Academic Classification Google
Hoffman, Bruce MPA 101,000
Bergen, Peter O 93,700 Gunaratna, Rohan SEA 76,200 Lacqueur, Walter O 61,900 Wilkinson, Paul MPA 57,100
Pape, Robert O 57,000
Burke, Jason O 51,300 Abuza, Zachary O 30,500 Ranstorp, Magnus MPA 30,500 Sageman, Marc O 29,700 Top 11th-20th Global Rankings by Google Hits Academic Clalssification Google Chalk, Peter MPA 26,900 Jones, Sidney SEA 24,700 Sandler, Todd MPA 21,800 Richardson, Louise O 20,300 Horgan, John MPA 19,000 Crenshaw, Martha MPA 18,100 Thayer, Carl/Carlyle ASEA 14,328 Williams, Clive A 13,900 White, Robert MPA 13,800 Israeli, Raphael MPA 12,800 Top 15 Global Rankings by Impact Academic Classification Scholar Impact Kara-Ali, Mustapha A 1 514 Bergen, Peter O 226 415 Williams, Clive A 41 339
Thayer, Carl/Carlyle ASEA 47 305
Burke, Jason O 183 280 Richardson, Louise O 75 271 Abuza, Zachary O 120 254 Townsend, Jacob A 4 222 Williams, Don A 3 218 Jones, Sidney SEA 118 209 Ranstorp, Magnus MPA 146 209 Pape, Robert O 328 174 Gunaratna, Rohan SEA 535 142 Horgan, John MPA 139 137 Moore, Andrew A 82 127 Falsifying Sheridan’s Proposition 1 z Australia does have researchers on Southeast Asian terrorism of international repute z Michael Connors, Greg Fealy, Greg Barton, Kit Collier, David Wright-Neville, David Martin Jones z Harold Crouch, Virginia Hooker, Anthony Milner, John Funston, Damien Kingsbury z Australian academic terrorism specialists and Australian regional specialists regularly punch above their weight in terms of impact on the world wide web z Andrew Moore, Carl Thayer, Jacob Townsend, Clive Williams, Don Williams Greg Sheridan’s 2nd Proposition
2. “The strategic community has failed because of
its continued paradigm paralysis, its chronic inability to regard terrorism as a serious strategic issue”. “Universities and think tanks can take comfort in the chummy common room embrace of dead paradigms. But, in doing so, they offer suboptimal service to their nation”. What Hugh White Wrote z “I think terrorism poses a serious threat of death and injury to individuals in our society and governments have an important responsibility to respond effectively to it. But the nature and scale of the threat have been seriously exaggerated since 9/11. z “Terrorism, even nuclear terrorism, appalling though that would be, does not endanger the international system. It does not constitute a global Islamist insurgency and it cannot be effectively addressed by a Long War, as our failure in Iraq has made clear. Reshaping the Australian Defence Force to fight terrorism would therefore lead us up a blind alley whose dead end is already in plain view.” z Hugh White, ‘Neighbourhood Watch’, Australian Literary Review, The Australian, June 6, 2007. Al-Qaeda-Centric Paradigm Three Key Questions
1. How to characterize al Qaeda
2. How to account for change over time 3. How to assess the question of agency in al Qaeda’s relationship with militant and extremist groups in Southeast Asia Three Approaches z International Terrorism Experts z Rohan Gunaratna, Peter Bergen, Jason Burke z Regional security specialists z Zachary Abuza z ‘Singapore School’ z RAND affiliates z Country Studies Specialists z Sidney Jones, Greg Fealy, Greg Barton, Kit Collier, Michael Connors Al Qaeda-Centric Paradigm • AQ paradigm has and continues to dominate the analysis of regional and international terrorist linkages • Pyramidal structure + global terrorist network + Afghan base + loose coalition of terrorist groups (Gunaratna 2002) • Central leadership + international network + front companies + membership cells in sixty countries (Abuza 2003) The Al Qaeda Paradigm • Three common elements: • Al Qaeda hardcore • Scores of other militant Islamic groups • Others who subscribe to “the idea, worldview, ideology of ‘al-Qaeda’” -Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (2003) Change Over Time • International and regional experts employ an approach characterized as ‘back to the future’ • 1988-91 Al Qaeda penetrated Southeast Asia • 1993 World Trade Center bombing • 1995 Operation Bojinka • organised by Ramsi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad • Start point: Darul Islam (1948-mid-1960s) The Question of Agency • Southeast Asia as al Qaeda’s ‘second front’? • Who or what represented ‘al Qaeda’ in its dealings with Southeast Asia in the formative period? • Who represented Southeast Asia? • Post-2001 initiative for terrorism in indigenous hands with al Qaeda remnants Is Jemaah Islamiyah a threat to the Indonesian government? zI don’t think it has any capacity to overthrow the government. Nor do I think it has any mass base support of any significance in Indonesia, although it certainly has some. For most Indonesians, it really is a radical fringe and one that most people would steer clear of. But it does have the capacity to engage in further terror (Sidney Jones, 2003). JI and Global Jihad z “Insum, JI has been able to survive because it has been able to link its jihad with that of other militant organizations in the region. JI has been able to forge a common cause, in the name of a global jihad, and this has led to exchanges of techniques, training, money and support.” z Z.Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (2007), p. 60. JI - Net Assessment z "In 2002, JI was probably at its height.” z The Australian JI cell was "effectively dismantled" after the 2002 Bali bombings. z JI lives on but it is "far weaker" confined to Indonesia with international contacts severed. z "I don't think the threat to Australia comes from JI as an organisation but it is the most important recruiting group for young people.” z "But we can't rule out another attack and that is likely to come from a splinter group." z -Sidney Jones, Adelaide Advertiser, July 7, 2007. Conclusion z Sheridan errs when he asserts that Australia’s strategic community does not take the threat of terrorism seriously z Terrorism is not a strategic threat to the international system in Southeast Asia z The threat of terrorism in our region is highly localised z JI splinter groups and other extremists z Australia is better placed to rely on its own regional specialists rather than ‘celebrity analysts’ Terrorism Studies and South East Asia: Crippled by Paradigm Paralysis?