University Notes - Junior Year, 1st Semester

Table of Contents
Keith Parker’s Notes from USC

Volume 2 of 5
Junior Year, First Semester

Page Content
IR-210
1 Course Documents
21 Class Notes
82 Assignments
109 Exam Questions
111 UN Report
183 UN Report Analysis
IR-324
211 Class Notes
244 Assignments
251 Midterm
256 Final Essay
IR-383
267 Syllabus
275 Class Notes
285 Midterm Questions and Answers
326 Final Questions and Answers
352 Final Paper
WRIT-340
370 Short Assignments
378 Assignment #1
395 Assignment #3
401 Assignment #4
406 Final Portfolio
420 Sailing Class Review

IR-210: Course Documents
Page 1
Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Page 2

Page 3

Page 4

Page 5

Page 6

Page 7

Page 8

Page 9

Page 10

Page 11

Page 12

Page 13

Page 14

Page 15

Page 16

Page 17

Page 18

Page 19

Page 20

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210
Page 21
10/12/05 10:01 AM
International Relations as a theoretical study during the cold war was

grounded in European history and relegated the rest of the world to lower
ontological status. The third world was characterized by overgeneralizations
if not ignorance. –K. Holsti
Announcements:
• Review Sessions started today- schedule on blackboard
Return to waves of IR theory
Cold war thinking

• A mix of realism and Wilsonian liberal int’l
• Triad: democracy, capitalism, rule of law, multilateralism
• US Goal- organize the west in our interests- led creation of UN and
Bretton woods system
• Funded European Union
• NATTO and defense alliances to contain USSR
• Nuke weapons to deter enemies- Regimes to control proliferation
What is the Cold War Operational Code dominant policy belief system that
shaped other world leaders
-System is anarchic
-Self-help
-National interest over human interest
-Limits to cooperation
-Duality of morality
-Power= Force
-Conflict Endemic (Don’t try to wish it away, it is part of the system)
-Stability with BOPO not peace
-Cold War = A constant state of war and competition for the hearts and
minds of all human beings
-The hearts and minds of all human beings
-FOPO sextant – National Security Council (NSC) 68
-Building an economic system to serve US and Western interests- Bretton
Woods system

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 22
-Study of IR heavily influenced by Cold War: Area and language studies

-High Politics vs. low politics
-Research funds
Who was bringing socialism in the 80s: the south, where capitalism wasn’t
working for them
The structure of the system is analyzed by neo-realism
Neo-liberalism
Rationalists: economists, et cetera
-Wave VI: Academic World: how we study debate issues – Qualitative vs.
qualitative or counters vs. poets
-Desire to have the certainty of the sciences
US IR: Neo-realism or structural realism – Can focus on one variable – good;

but if a question can’t be analyzed by a computer, the question isn’t asked
Liberal institutionalism
Outside US: English school, neo-marxist as a structural treaty,

integrationists

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210
Page 23
10/14/05 10:14 AM
Reformist ideas: NIEO and NWIO
Wave VII: Globalization, governance and human security
Real debate in both policy and theory
Policy debates: economic world = neoliberal vs. neomercantalism
Political/military = realism and democratic peace liberalism
Cultural = critical voices like post colonial theories, neomarxist and WOMP
Social world: Feminists, ecotopians, utopians, anarchists and other

marginalized voices
Key issues: how to protect the state and how to manage globalization
Kant 1783 essay contest:

• Sapere Aude – Have the Courage to Know
• Written in an essay contest for a newspaper
• We all need skepticism
• All ideas must face skepticism
• Tolerance: Consider and honor all legitimate ideas
• Guarded optimism: Through reason (knowledge) human beings –
regardless or traditions and culture – can discover the universal
rules by which we should live our lives
Need to consider how each approach contributes to scholarship
Handout #21, in folder
II. How we study IR: Explaining and understanding
How can we be certain a fact is a fact
How do we develop and then test our hunches or theories about the world

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 24
Explaining = social scientists – middle range theories – objectivity –

standing outside and make generalizations
Causes of war, poverty, et cetera
Explanations for Nixon policies – look at it from his worldview he is a

maintainer et cetera
If a leader has a realist point of view, they will take advantage of

opportunities to increase their power
We know what we have to explain – in search of the independent variable:

why did he/she do it?
Explaining second handout
Second handout is an assignment, don’t know when it is due
Not due until after the midterm
Study this handout, though
Assignment explanation
• A puzzle
• Foreign policy puzzles

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210
Page 25
10/17/05 10:10 AM
Back to levels of analysis and how we study IR

• Historian- traditional approach, qualitative, descriptive, area studies
• Constructivist- ideas, norms, beliefs shape our choices and our
“construction” of a situation
• Social scientist- explaining, testable propositions, quanititative or
qualitative research
E in our Depp skills
Goal = good middle range theory
If X then Y
X independent variable
Y dependent variable
How do we know the above quote to be true?
What is his hypothesis? If X then Y
Y is the condition or behavior you are trying to explain
X is the possible case
Midterm Question:
What are three ways of studying IR? How would scholars using
these three methodological approaches explain the US decision to
withdraw from the Kyoto treaty?
The theories/hypothesis you suggest are first
Hunches or intuitive theories
Put in testable form:

• Empirical or Causal

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 26
If it raises moral questions and is prescriptive:

• Normative theories
Some theories help us construct the world – theories we accept set the
rules:
• Constructive theory
What is a good hypothesis/theory?

• Fruitful: Large explanatory power
• Simplicity/parsimony: Clearly framed
• Elegant: Prescriptive richness
• Satisfies our curiosity
• Powerful: focuses on important issues
• Commonsensical
For midterm: know Mann: the state, and war
Transcends time-culture-personality
Your confirmed hypothesis never equals the truth; Nothing is ‘proven’
Why care about theory?
From Readings:
Agnew and Pyke:
• Order out of complexity
• Simplify Decision making (DMaking)
• Putting puzzles together
• Predicting and prescribing
• Communicating across disciplines and cultures
Rosenau:
• Order out of chaos
• Classifications and patterns
Van Evra:
• Describe and explain causes and effects of classes of phenomena
Martin Wight:

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 27
• No theory no understanding
• Insights into core ideas of era/ pragmatic and normative
Levels of analysis handout #21
Which level to select? When level 1?

• Dictatorship, few people in power
• Emergency, quick acting event: few people involved in the decision
Leaders make decisions – other factors move decision-maker away from

rationality or provide options
Bounded rationality: Herbert Simon
In FOPO, rationality not probable. Cannot know all options or values
Goal is satisfying not maximizing
Previous experience – interests-intuition – Help to eliminate numbers of

options
Muddling through – simplify the process
Cybernetics: John Steinbruner – Dmaking (Decision making) is an adaptive

process. What has worked before minimize complexity
(Tool) Biological explanations
Tension between reason and passion – behavior is linked to biological traits
Instincts (aggression, sex and hunger) drive decision-making
The end of every act is the self-preservation of the actor. Spinoza
Lorenz on aggression – 1967

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 28
Aggressive behavior more dangerous in a world with push-button warfare
Instinct and biological explanations - heart of realism
Reason does not overwhelm passion - original sin
Passion directs humans to be first among all
Hans Morganthau:
Man is born seeking power and because there exists no authority over him in
the international sphere, the use of force and violence results
-Some Guy
Robert Andrey - The territorial imperative - defense of homeland and

territory
Freud and Dollard writing about frustration and aggression
Also frustration leads to apathy, withdrawl, repression, and resignation

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210
Page 29
10/19/05 10:12 AM
Less inclined to be an empire builder due to concern for others
Need for achievement
Takes only moderate risks – fears greater loss
Study of US presidents – Winter and Stewart
Power: affiliated with war and fewer treaties
Need and affiliation: Less war and cooperation
High motivation for power – the more activist prone
High motivation for affiliation

• Want to do things with other
High motivation for achievement: neo-isolationism
Tool: Personality types

• Adorno’s F-scale: authoritarianism-fascism; authoritarian
personality
o Tendency to dominate subordinates
o Deference toward superiors
o Sensitivity to power
o Need for a structured world
o Excessive use of stereotypes
o Nationalistic/ ethnocentric
o Hates ambiguity
Rokeach: close-minded or dogmatic personality

• Unlikely to see all options
• Perceive conspiracies and stereotypes of the enemy in crisis
• Reject information that contradicts their belief system
• Tend to use force to close situation
• Low self-esteem = hostile and uncooperative

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 30
• High self-esteem = trust
Hawk-Dove-Owls
• Hawk: power, force
• Dove: Peaceful, cooperative, discuss thing
• Owl; Academic scholar, apply theories
Barber's studies of presidents:
Level of energy in office

• Active-passive
Like/dislike for office

• Positive-negative
John Kennedy was active as a president, very positive
Eisenhower was passive and negative
Hermann’s studies of 10 leaders: levels of nationalism, cognitive complexity,

control, dogmatism
More nationalistic – tend to get involved in conflict
More cognitively complex - more cooperative
Tool: perceptions and images – How we see the world
Lens (That we look at the world through) based on traditions, experiences,

and beliefs
Mirror images - images of the enemy
Holsti's study of J.F. Dulles = view of Soviets of an evil empire led to goal of
retaining military superiority – one of the most important viewpoint of the
Cold War

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 31
All moves are seen as negative
Image - shapes our perceptions of individuals and event
We see the world through that lens/image and beliefs = we process info and
we seek cognitive consistency and avoid or reduce cognitive dissonance
Images of world = stereotypes, myths and misperceptions
New importance in a world of ethnic conflict and the clash of civilizations

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210 Page 32
10/26/05 10:14 AM
Choice of foreign policy
Small states can be active but tend to limit the scope of their activities
Consider a develping state like Thailand… How influenced by size and

resource base?
Location- Geopolitics
Karl Haushofvr – Lebensraum
Isiah Bowan – American Empire
National attributes: size, location, et cetera
FOPO of New Zealand
Small and Wealthy
Regionally: Major power in South Pacific
New Zealand: declared a Nuke-free zone in the south pacific to add to their
image. Also decided: ODA (Official development assistance) focused their
attention on the small islands
Globally
• Low bilateral action with larger powers
• Connected with former colony
• Narrow scope of activity with foreign policy
Economic focus
• Multilateralism and activism in all global FORA
Moral emphasis on big global issues
Influenced more by NGOs and public opinion

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 33
Tend to have a more informed and active public
Resource base
• Oil, water, food, forests…
• Shaping policy choices and reactions from other states
Political Structure:
• Constitutional Power Map
• Federal system or centralized political party structure; Parliament or
Congress
How might these influence FOPO? Propositions?
Ex: Democracy = Peaceful; Authoritarian = Warlike
Economic System: Most of the world is capitalist but which production and
trade sectors lead?
Agrarian - Industrial – Service
Hamilton/list - Never become vulnerable in core industries
EH Carr: Military, economics, and control over public opinion

• Sources of power in each world
o Hard power vs. soft power
 Hard power: force power
 Soft power: ideological power
Domestic Politics
• Two elements- Desire to be elected/re-elected and desire to build
policy coalitions to pass other laws and programs
• FOPO deals - Bush supporting intervention in Sudan to get support
of Christian groups
• Rejection of Kyoto-business support

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 34
Tool: Decision style and structures

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210 Discussion
Page 35
10/27/05 9:14 AM
Discussion on assignment handed out about a week ago
Difference between GDP and GNP
Foreign aid
• Norway gives more than 1% of its foreign aid
o Middle range theory: Political culture; Level two analysis; in
the political or cultural world
Level three
• Political: level of interest in power
Middle range theories

• Fitting one’s hypothesis into a level (i.e. Level II theory)
• Grand theories
Specific climate factors will be state level, while a hole in the ozone over a
country will be a level IV, the global level
Theories about middle powers, et cetera
Keep questions 1 and 3 to one page each
Due a week from today

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210 Page 36
10/28/05 10:11 AM
(Independent variables)
One hypothesis
Tool: Decision style and decision structure
(political culture and structure shape these)
How we do things or SOP
Style: How decisions are made – precedent important also depends on

leader’s personality
Expert deference model
Janis group think
George's multiple advocacy model

• Bring people in who disagree with you
• Not many presidents do this- especially Dubya
Decision Structure: Where are decisions made and how organizations shape
decisions and choices
Bureaucratic organizations – conservative and protective of their interests
Michael Barnett – Identity and indifference in UN
Allison's classic work explaining JFK decision in the Cuban Missile crisis
Model 1: RAM (Rational Actor Model)
Model 2: Organizational (SOP [Standard Operating Procedure])
Model 3: Bureaucratic

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 37
Hybrid analytical approaches: Combine levels
Tool: Second image - Domestic attributes
How domestic factors influence international relations
Now reverse it:
How do system changes influence domestic politics?
Gourevitich: How international regimes influence domestic policies
Kahlker: How decolonization influenced domestic elections in France and UK
Tool: Two level games
Robert Putnam: Playing Texas Hold-um at two tables with one hand
Great analytical tool to explain negotiations between states or other actors
FR Leaders ----- Game 2 ------ US Leaders

| |
Game 1 Bargaining Game 1
| |
Domestic Domestic
Level 3: International system = created by the interactions of states
Neorealists Waltz: Structure of the system explains the most and most
powerful tool of analysis
All states must react to anarchy in the system
Tool: nature of anarchy and order or governance in the system
Anarchy ------------------------------- World Government

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 38
Walktz: Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states...
JJ Rousseau: States must arm themselves to prepare for the contingency…
Anarchy – Security Dilemma
Anarchy - Lack of control
Tool: Distribution of power

• Classic Balance of Power: Uncertain, dangerous, difficult – keeping
together a coalition of independent states
• Cold War tight bipolarity
• Loose bipolarity
• Multipolarity
• Regionalism
• Concert
• Hegemony/ empire
Consider how states will act in each system
For Wednesday: How does a system shape FOPO?
Which

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210
Page 39
11/2/05 10:03 AM
How does this system shape foreign policy?
Which is…
Regionalism: countries located in the same part of the world have formed
regional governments which control resources, industry, and trade within
each region. Relations between regions are governed by regional interests.
Bi-polar: Two superpowers have divided the world. Each controls a large
group of countries, and controls the resources, industry, and trade within its
bloc. Relations between the two blocs are determined by the superpowers
to serve their own interests.
• Cold War tight bipolarity

• Loose bipolarity
• Multipolarity
• Regionalism
• Concert
• Hegemony/ Empire
Hypothesis
• More bipolar system states follow lead of great powers
• More multipolar system more independent FOPO
• More interdependent system more cooperation
• Less independent more conflict
Tool: International obligations: Formal = treaties, alliances; informal =

traditions, cultural connections – kinship
Informal also includes – rules of right or wrong – ethical norms discovered

by reason – obligations of global community

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 40
Hypothesis
• More inflexible alliance structure great chance for conflict
• More system is governed by formal treaties greater chance for
cooperation
• Greater the sense of community among the great powers more
chance for reciprocity in interactions
Tool: Regimes or governing arrangements
Usually govern in specific issue areas – research to regulation
Regimes work when the big powers want them to work
Maintained by the state and non-state actors – promoting certain behavior

and making regulations
Regimes that matter today:

• WTO Free trade regimes
• Human rights regimes
• Arms control regimes
• Global environment regimes: manage global commons areas, e.g.
Oceans
Level four: Global
Natural conditions - weather patters, global warming
Factors resulting from human actions
Global factors that might shape foreign policy choices:

• Tool: Global social movements TSMOS/ TANS – Use their sources of
power including expertise and media to shape policy
One Campaign - Jubilee movement

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 41
New focus of human security movement is protecting aid workers and

journalists
Funded by Trudeau foundation
Focus on governments to change policies
How will global warming shape foreign policies?
Could an earthquake or tsunami help change conflict situations?
Sri Lanka
Cyprus-Greece and Turkey
Kashmir
Can be a motivating factor and provide an opportunity to act but conditions

need to be right for the “Warm and Fuzzy” feeling to be more than temporal
• Tool: Global Media and information technology – A major force of

change
CNN effect framing strategies - knowledge factors – WAG the Dog

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210 Discussion Page 42
11/3/05 9:32 AM
Going over midterm
Neopluralism: less variety, more elites
Number 10 on Midterm: reference the readings
Number 11: Would want to bring an article into this answer from each of the
four worlds
Depends on your worldview
For questions on grade on midterm, or questions on midterm, go to early 8

AM session
Read case for tomorrow- can be found on the website listed on the syllabus
• Some Georgetown site
• Address on syllabus is slightly wrong, but case can be found
through that site with some effort

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210
Page 43
11/7/05 10:04 AM
Why world-views – How these core assumptions help us construct the world?
Three traditions: SM-SR-ST

• Images of humankind, society, rights, laws, war, system order and
problem solving
Wednesday: “Melian Dialogue”
DEPPP chart
Main thing on final: be able to DEPPP issues
The people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do
not respond to the objective facts of the situation – whatever that may
mean, but their image of the situation. It is what we think the world is like
not what it is really like – that determines out behavior.
A. Why Worldviews?
Prism that we use to assess the world
Worldview = images of the world/operational code = research or info

gathering strategy = theory = facts = ordering priorities = evaluation of
policy options = selection of policy = strategy = action
Worldviews: Beliefs, norms, values and acceptable practices
Essential for scholarship – considering all relevant voices
Are not all decision-makers rational actors?
Lamy: Worldviews matter because people do not act according to laws of

logic or economic self-interest. We respond to what we believe is reason
and reality…

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 44
Worldviews: screening, sorting, defining, salience, evaluation, legitimate,

rationalize
Holsti: The mind is a belief seeking and not a fact seeking device…
Fisher: in/out basket – uses: agenda of priorities, constrains behavior,

stability and continuity, rationalizing policy decisions, cope with complexity,
enhance national unity…
Vertzberger: The world in their minds
WVS (Worldviews) critical for info processing
A framework of mental constructs with cognitive and effective side

• Beliefs – images/perceptions – stereotypes – assumptions – values
– attitudes – habits…
• People strive to lighten the burden of info processing by avoiding
comprehensive expenditures of thought and energy. Our belief
systems and eventually our worldview is used to pigeon-hole info…
Dominant WV category
System maintainer
• Realism, neorealism and neoliberalism
• Recessive (Marginalized)
System transformers
• Utopians (WOMP)
• Marxist/ Neomarxist
• Critical theorists
Middle Path
System Reformers
Reform internationalists

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 45
C. Remind me why should I care about worldview analysis?

• Avoid dogmatism – rejecting others as irrelevant
• Rigidity/ close minded
• With one WV, less creativity and less aware of world around you
• Tend to exaggerate your distance between you and others
• With one WV, acceptance narrows and rejection broadens
I. Foundational realism key voices: Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes
As we go through these voices consider their contributions to present day

thinking.
What are four or five contributions from Thucydides and St. Augustine that
you see as relevant today?
Develop your own tradition on each author.
Machiavellian tradition: Man? State? Place of war? Ethics? Role of leaders?

Chances of peace? World order? World government?
Thucydides born 460 BC
Classical historian
Peloponnesian wars 431-404
Major Influence on many realists from Hobbes to Morgenthau
Less fundamental than Machiavelli – not just about evil and self-interest
• Not just about anarchy (structure) must look at all three levels:
Man-State-System
Melian Dialogue
Contributions to the realist tradition? (Lamy found 11! Woohoo!)

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 46
States are confronted with external necessities and driven by internal

compulsions that impel them to violate moral principles in foreign affairs.

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210
Page 47
11/14/05 10:02 AM
Realist Tradition – foundational voices
Fourth voice: Thomas Hobbes
1651 The Leviathan
Ten contributions to realist thinking
Left with #5 – strong states and alliances may prevent some conflicts
State provides defining activities and addresses issues of wealth, trust and
fear
Other factors that prevent conflict?

• Prudence (Main factor) – Moral convictions – altruism
Do not count too much on morality…

• Kings whose power is greatest, turn their endeavors to assuring it
at home by laws or abroad by wars
6. Is the international system in a constant state of war?

• People use violence for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different
opinion, and many other signs of undervalue
7. In a system of anarchy - any way of avoiding war?

• Prudence (Morgenthau borrows from this): Fear of costs and fear of
defeat
8. What about cooperation? Alliances to prevent war?

• Alliances based on the adaptation of independent wills easily fall
apart when it comes to implementation
Cooperation is not part of human nature
9. Any chance for peace?

• Not without a central power

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 48
• BOPO and economic linkages may cause caution – Prudence
Covenants without swords are but mere words.
Alliances should never be based on morality or altruism

• Countries should seek peace and be fair and forgiving but because
self-interest rules and survival is a higher value – no country should
take risks to achieve these duties
10. What about the security dilemma? Can we overcome that insecurity
with alliances or collective security arrangements like NATO?
• No… Foresight, prepare for war and bolster one’s capacity to
defend…
Modern realism
• Modern realism ruled from 1648-1920
• Assumptions
o No common power
o Strong state
o Normative ideal – democracy and capitalism
o National interests over global or human interests
o War is a constant possibility
o Cooperation is limited
o Self assertion
J.J. Rousseau's stag hunt:

• No state is prepared to give up the possibility of gaining individual
advantage over the rest. Sovereignty and independence get in the
way of rational world peace.
Modern voices: E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau
Both influential in post war situations – grotain moments
Carr = post WWI – critical of utopian schemes that left tyrants unchecked…
BOPO or an effective league would have worked

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 49
Morgenthau = Post WWII – with Kennan convinced us leaders of the need to

be strong and need to lead to secure national interests
Rekindle Roosevelt era of US expansion and exceptionalism
US foreign policy – global, interventionary and costly
Voice: #1 E.H. Carr journalist and diplomat
Woodrow Wilson professor of IR from 1936-47
Complex and inconsistent realist: actually advocated more integration and

an early European Union
Concern with social injustice
Influenced by failure of liberal internationalism to establish peace post WWI
Counteracting the dangerous and glaring defect of nearly all thinking –

neglect of power
Bankruptcy of liberalism - The twenty years crisis (1939) – This is where he

trashes Wilson, peace advocates and others
Utopian world order designed by the winners - excessive idealistic
All fields start out idealistic - need a blend of utopian and realist thinking
• Example of medicine
Middle ground - democracies should take some of the good lessons from
communism
E.H. Carr = Main contribution to realists – avoid extreme positions
No universal solutions – go for moderation and prudence

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 50
Life is about opposites: left vs. right; good vs. evil
Key is to find a path of theory and practice in the middle
May have led him to support appeasement policy toward Hitler
His five objections to utopian thought
Examples of his criticism of utopian/ liberal international

• Assumptions that leaders have a broad range of choices –
rationalism – and domestic policies will work internationally
• Harmony of interests among all people of the world
• Faith in human reason
• Laws/ moral code apply equally to all
• War is irrational behavior
Carr agreed with utopians on the dangers of nationalism = called for going
beyond the state-EU type of organization
Sought some morality in politics:

• Fatal in politics to ignore power…

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210
Page 51
11/16/05 10:03 AM
Teach for America Presentation
We do not possess our ideas, they posses us, and force us into the arena to
fight for them. At times, to be martyred by them. -Jane Addams
Announcements
• Speaker on Friday – Gillian Sorensen – UN Foundation. Public talk
at noon, please be on time!
• Last TA session this week – a discussion on the Last Best Chance
assignment – not formal presentations
Primary question is how should we respond to this challenge?

Strategy/prescription?
Today: Finish Carr, Kennan and Morgenthau
What about neorealists?
Wight’s grotain tradition
E.H. Carr - seeking a middle path between idealism and realism
What is power? 3 Dimensions
IR is a zero-sum game so always accommodate those with power
Morality? State is not a person – 10 commandments do not apply to a state

– duality argument
Why states will not honor moral codes

• States will not set aside power interests
• Patriotism/ Nationalism – usually very militaristic
• Lack of an enforcer
No moral code because no community!

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 52
Why no community?
• Failure to treat others as equals
• No loyalty and identity with international community
• All behavior encourages "I over We"
Are we going to always be controlled by those with power?
Rule-maker vs. rule taker?
Yup... Just hope for altruism and restraint
What about international law?
Minimal function - keeps the weak in line
No enforcer
Simply does not match up to force!
Kennan and Morgenthau echo many of his views in the post WWII era –
shaped the new rules and the new rule-maker
George Kennan – Diplomat – soviet something FOPO advisor – academic

• Considered author of US “containment” policy
• Did not support militarization of “containment”
• Was opposed to legalistic and moralistic FOPO
• It is the belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and
dangerous aspiration of governments by them acceptance of some
system of legal rules and restraints. –Kennan
Pursuit of moralistic goals incompatible with limited national objectives
A pragmatic voice that urged leaders to focus on National Interest (NI) and
not moralistic plans
Friends with Hans Morgenthau 1904-1980

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 53
Came to the US in 1937
Books that he wrote

• Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (1946)
• Politics among nations (1948)
IR is all about power
Criticized by many in US as presenting a Germanic way of looking at things
Too much focused on the pursuit of power
Did say this pursuit must be kept in socially tolerable bounds
Moral principles and national interests are not opposing forces
But moral principles must be applied with: Realism, prudence and full regard
of the political situation

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210 Page 54
11/21/05 10:05 AM
Announcements
• Check course announcements page for review sessions, etc.
• Review questions – on course documents soon
Politics among nations
Not a criticism of idealism – develop a theory to explain/guide relations

between states
Ideas embraced by US leaders

• No isolation
• No idealism
• Active leadership
• Using power to secure national interest
• Confront USSR
A few critical ideas:

• Human nature: constant, egoistic, self-serving
• Political relations: struggle for power
• Remember, he was criticized for being ‘too German’
• Duality of morality: separate ethics for pubic and private spheres
One can be ethical if it serves interests and enhances power and security
• Separate spheres for human activity
• Rejects the “end justifies the means” argument
Influenced by Weber – use moral judgment to select most effective and least
Evil
Criticism of US FOPO
Neorealism
I. Analytical side
Waltz’s structural realism

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 55
Anarchy shapes interests of states
Also, rational choice theorists fit here
Instrumental thinking: maximum benefit and minimum costs
II. Security Side

• Offensive – Mearsheimer: Increase relative power – expand and
improve position in world; wary of all states seek hegemony
• Read Chapter 9 for Final
• Defensive – Jervis, Synder more concerned with absolute power –
preserve BOPO; cooperation likely among friends; possible to create
security institutions
Bush II Doctrine: Primacy and empire? Preemption and not containment
Which is the Bush Doctrine?

• For defensive realists, the international structure provides states
with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead
it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of power.
Preserving power rather than increasing it, is the main goal of
states.
• Offensive realists seek to enhance power at the expense of rivals.

A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemony in the system. –
Mearsheimer
Second worldview category
System reformers/ reform internationalist
International social democrats
Rationalist tradition

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 56
Grotian tradition
More Kant and less Machiavelli

• Guarded optimists; Man is sociable and cooperative
• Communal values over individualism
We over the I
• Political culture
• Associational
• Compromise and accommodation diplomacy over force
• Legalistic; equity
• International governance; Rule-based society develops through
reciprocity of needs and hopes of mutual gain
Regimes and institutions as problem-solving not only as managers

• States share stage with other actors – still primary
Goal is to make the state system better and…
Huig De Groot – Hugo Grotius 1583-1645 King of France called him the
“Miracle of Holland”
• Dutch legal scholar
• Context and background
• Not really father of international law
Critical contributions- the Grotian tradition:

• Sovereignty of states
• Right to wage just war
• Existence of shared values
• Necessity for rules
Particularly important as we wage war in Iraq and Afghanistan
1625 he codified this notion of war
Law of the Sea - Written to protect Dutch East Indies ships

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 57
Modern day Grotians - English school - Two groups:

• Pluralists: Bull, Wight (Hobbesian)
• Solidarists

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210 Page 58
11/28/05 10:06 AM
In any particular situation, we have an unconditional obligation to do only

what we can honestly wish all other people…
Kant’s categorical Imperative – not optional – a universal rule of ethical

behavior that can discovered by reason
Last 4 lectures! Read Chapters 8, 9, and 10 in B & S
Kantian Tradition:
Clearly informed by liberal ideas = commercial, republican, sociological

(Community)
Influenced Wilson and modern liberal internationalism:

• States best formed on basis of democratic self-determination
• Open – free trade economies (Not ever complete, we always
interfere in economics)
• Anti-imperialism
• International organizations (IOs) to keep peace
• US leadership
ST criticism of Wilson: too much capitalism, big power interests in IOs, euro-
centrism
Realist criticism: idealistic, moralistic, and utopian
Smokescreen to rally public opinion
Peace movement shapes policy: Three types of idealism

• Traditional views – some form of world government or European
senate to answer problem of war: Dante, De Monarchia WM Penn-
Quaker, Abbe St.
o Pierre-European senate
• Liberalism-capitalism: Bentham and Cobden
• Kant's Idealism more republican-democratic peace, cosmopolitan
rights, a federation of small republics

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 59
Also champion of individual freedoms – real problem is absolute power

• Freedom from arbitrary authority
• Free speech and press
• Political participation
• Private property
• Equality of opportunity
Inspired modern idealists like G. Lowes Dickson (1920)
Possibility of an international community and life is not a constant struggle

for power
Key voice: J.A. Hobson Towards International Government (1915)

• Saw Woodrow Wilson as someone who gave idealists a bad name
In the spirit of our UN reform assignment = saw sovereignty as obsolete

move from NI to HI
• Interdependence = more common problems and more need for
common action
• Good domestic legal systems model for international law
• International law cannot be voluntary – backed with force
• Traditional diplomacy - elitist - class-based and militaristic. Sought
popular control over FOPO!
• BOPO a war system because of security dilemma
One quick decision leads to war
Hobson favored some form of IO with a strong collective security system
Other Kantian Ideas:

• Key Factor: Moral Freedom=
o The right to be treated and the duty to treat others as ethical
subjects
Elements of a contemporary Kantian tradition:
• Human security must be part of national security

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 60
• IR is not just about survival of the state-protection of basic rights

and provision of BHN (Basic Human Needs)
• Trade and interdependence lead to cooperation and spread of
ethical ideas
• Explored why war – used levels
• Democratic states less likely to go to war with other democracies
• Knowledge - discovery will lead to solutions to global problems like
war and Have the courage to know
• Reason will lead to truth and in democracies those with higher
values will socialize others
Progeny = Mitrany/Functionalism basis for the European Union
Global commissions, reports and global conferences environmental summits

sustainable development/ N-S
Other assumptions that make up the tradition:

• Eliminate standing armies – Fuels arms race – expensive – negative
political force at home
• Deal with anarchy - federation of states as opposed to world
government
• Moral interdependence – increase connections among citizens

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210
Page 61
11/30/05 10:07 AM
According to me… should be such that no..

• Ghandi
Review schedule is on the announcement page
Make-up lecture on Monday 10-10:50 in SGM 123
Good luck to Andrea and Deborah in NCAA fro VBall
Today: Kant and modern day Kantians?
Friday case study – use to find out how much you have grown intellectually
• Bring worksheet – filled in or empty! Your choice. Reference case!
Be clear, concise, neat and on that sheet. Cannot read – no points
What are these transformers complaining about?
Persistence of war and inequality – we have not solved the issues of

structural violence
J. Galtung’s Cruise Liner
Yearly average children killed in conflict: 1990-2000 = 200,000
Yearly average children made homeless: 1990-2000 = 1.2 million
Number of people undernourished declined from 816 million to 798 million,

17% of the world’s population
113 million children do not attend school
1 billion people live on less than $1 a day
1 billion have no safe drinking water

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 62
Millennium development goals are targeted for 2015.. promises began in

1970. UN development decades
For Wompers - what is the problem?
Marxists – neomarxists?
Return to Kantian tradition:

• Idea of community – Kant believed economic interdependence and
linkages
• Links to moral interdependence
• Universalists – cosmopolitan right – apply to all
• States must protect the rights of all
• Cannot ignore utopian ideas and goals
Plan for moral improvement:

• Abolish war
• Education
• Deal with anarchy
• Eliminate standing armies
• Increase moral interdependence
Key point: states should base their FOPO on the categorical imperative: Act
according to a maxim you can at the same time will that it shall become a
general or universal law
All worldviews have views on human security… approaches and providers
Freedom from fear/safety of peoples; freedom from want/social justice;

liberty rights and rule of law
Kantian cosmopolitans = TSMOS, TANS and GCS
Liberal institutions = stronger IOS and regimes
Minilateralists = hegemonic leaders…

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 63
A worldview…
World order models project
Normative FOPO – peace, social justice, economic well-being, ecological

balance
Modern Kantian – WOMP

• Richard Falk (1968) concerns:
o The cartography of human suffering
o Recognizes his permanent marginalization
o ALL politics involves normative concerns
o Problems cannot be solved by states alone
o Distrust of centralization
o Rejection of all violence that does not respect innocence of
civilians
o Activism – we are all guilty
Every child is born with the message that god is not yet discouraged with
humanity – R. Tagore
Five ways:
• State centrism – power/conflict
• High politics and not trans-disciplinary
• Claim of objectivity
• Disregard realities that suggest the system is not working
• Power game and not basic human needs
Falk - 20 years later... a normative project to achieve humane governance

• First, tame war
• Rid world of war system
• Accountability
• Collective security
• Rule of Law
• Nonviolent revolutionary politics

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 64
• Human rights

IR-210: Class Notes
IR-210 Midterm Review
Page 65
10/16/05 3:01 PM
Difference between levels 2 and 3

• 2: Right inside the state
• 3: Interaction of international community, systemic issues
Nature of international system

• Realist: its anarchic
• Reformer: much more multilateral, more regime based
Maintainer English school- what’s the nature of the system?

• Headley Bull in an English school: How he would see the
international system
o See the system as pluralistic
o It’s an international society
o It’s not anarchic- formal and informal treaties
Formal constraint in the system

• Treaty, alliance
Informal constraint
• Informal constraint
• Past behavior
The system is not anarchic: Belief of the English school
Notre Dame game last Saturday (Yesterday)
First big challenge to Realism

• Westphalia
o If we have a state system rather than empires, we can create
a less-anarchic system
o States are the principle actors
End of WWI was the next big challenge

• Grecian moments: time to go to a rule-based system
o Too-idealistic
o There weren’t enough powers to start this: who will be first?

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 66
Things become embedded in our institutions

• Things such as the cold war, it still lingers on
• There's always an enemy in our system
• Key leaders never lost their construction of the world as realists
• Wouldn’t change their world view until they can be assured that
they won’t lose power
Why would somebody choose to be a middle power

• They get more power from alliances, et cetera
• Define power differently: see it as prestige, image, whatever niche
they can find to emphasize their strengths
Why would somebody want to transform the system?

• Because they are left out
The list of rule-makers hasn’t changed much
What would cause the world to move? The major powers would have to
change their viewpoint
Rule-maker vs. rule-taker
Who gives the most aid: middle powers. That is their niche
• Rule makers, but not the great powers
The main goal in the system is to enhance one’s state’s power
Your foreign policy will follow one of four paths

• Intransigence: Challenge the system; North Korea; Iran; Venezuela
• Promotive: If you benefit from the system; Soviets in Cold War
• Acquiescent: Want to be noticed
• Preservative: Losing power and want to hold on to it; European
powers

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 67
Blair is taking the stance of: we are a major power like the United States,
but we do things a bit differently than the US
Economic world: Promotive policy in EU, China, Oil Producing economies
Accepting a theory and seeing the world through that theory
Rules one accepts: interpret these rules and this is called ‘practices’
• “Conflict is endemic in the system”
• “Complete peace cannot exist”
Rules as a realist
• Power is force
• Always on guard, don’t trust people
• Flood at the gates
• Who has agency?
Rules as a reformer
• People aren’t inherently evil
• Can create rules and regulations
• International law
• Cooperation
• Who has agency? United Nations, Regional organizations, et cetera
UN doesn’t have their “foreign policy act together” because they don’t have
force
• Two different sets of rules from which nations develop their
perspective
The US is dominated by realists

• Doesn’t matter if you have a democratic or republican president
When do theories/paradigms change and shift?

• Sometimes by discovery of new information
Why is realism still dominant? Not enough “fossils” (evidence against it)

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 68
Why hasn’t the EU model worked in Africa, among other places?

• Must be fairly successful to give up something
• Who paid for the EU? The US. The US protected them from the
soviets
• If African Union takes off and starts to work- there’s more fossils for
you
• Realist assumptions haven’t been replaced by workable plans
• No historical examples of idealism working
• Many historical examples where idealists took realists down the
wrong paths
Idealism: World order models project

• How do we make the system more transparent and democratic
• What perpetuates inequalities
• Peace, well-being, social justice, economic well-being for all,
environment-friendly
• Large academic group working on these things, designing systems
that are more regional and decentralized
• How do we break down foreign policy so people have more access
to it
• Look at their plans and they seem too idealistic
• NGOs tend to be more representative
• Idealism is a transformative world-view
Realism is an incomplete theory…. How would realists respond to this… (In

handout, number 5)
• Realists believe that everything that goes on inside a state is the
responsibility of the state
What has changed the world is globalization

• Now foreign policy and domestic policy
• We face an ‘inter-mestic’ world
• A 'Glocal' community
• Realism says: there is a separation between domestic and
international policies

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 69
Morality in IR is choosing a path that is the least costly with the most
benefits. Can be moral at home, then bomb everyone else if it benefits you
most.
Biggest problem realists have with globalization is that it threatens security

• Open borders, et cetera
• Internet and all that
• Security
Liberal
• Globalization is an economic problem
Reformer
• Globalization is a inequity problem, don’t want more people to
become transformers
How do you make globalization fair, and a positive change
Transformer
• Challenge of globalization is that things are coming from above.
Also, how do you use the forces of globalization to make the world
a better place.
Maintainer viewpoint
• Problem: now we can possibly destroy the entire world (Because of
the proliferation of nuclear weapons)
• The problems we face: very few can be solved unilaterally
Countries that are best prepared for globalization: reformers

• Exemplified by first gulf war
Sample midterm questions
Do not repeat the question

• Don’t waste your time

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 70
Outline your response

• The question has three elements… et cetera
Break the question down, spit it into elements
If you have a question, ask
Standard advice for taking a midterm
1) How would you define power…

• Open ended question
• Realists: force
• Reformer: economy
• Neo-liberal: having control over the institutions that manage the
global economy
• Diplomatic skills
• Transformer: Value of your ideas, convincing people that you’ve got
the best idea
• Another way of answering the question:
o Four worlds: how this is seen through each of the four worlds
o Is the US the most powerful? Depends on which world is the
most important
o Of all four worlds, where is the US? Number one with
political-military; top five in world economy;
traditional/cultural world, not too prominent; political world
US-based; consumer world US-based; social world, not in a
good position, the US doesn’t share power
2) What is critical...
• Learning to do things from three world-view perspectives
• Described in detail in the syllabus
• Why study IR? Depends on your world-view
o Maintainer: to know the rules in order to maintain their power
o Reformer: learn as much as possible to solve the global
problems

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 71
 IR could be argued to have been born from Reformers

o What is the natural US view?
o Transformer: learn to change the system, emancipation,
emancipator globalists
3) How do you think...

• First chapter of Bailey’s and Smith
• Change in theory of IR since 9/11
o A small group can change the world, states don’t control
everything
o Non-state actors can change things immensely
o Policy world
o Reformers: we have to ask the question: why are these
people terrorists
 IR theory has to emphasize different things
o Realists: more weapons, “we need to get those people over
there before they get us here,” more intelligence, et cetera
o Peace, social justice, economic well-being, ecological: four
goals on world-views
o Chapter #1 on world views: very, very important
Possible 15 to 20 years of occupation for everything to go through
4) With Lamy’s world-view…

• Requires that you read that CH. #1, on blackboard I think
5)You have a tool box…

• Handout #21, almost completely
• Puzzle: unexpected behavior: North Korea abandoning publicly their
nuclear missile program
o Looking for the independent variable: NK gives up nuclear
weapons
o Individual rationality: maximize benefits for lowest cost
o Man is inherently evil
o Focus on the individuals in this case: because it is a
dictatorship

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 72
o Maybe its his personality type

o Hawks, doves, owls
o Maybe leader of NK wants to belong, or have power, but none
of these really make much sense
o Need for aid is a big factor: Level two on handout #21
 Put this together in a hypothesis: If a country has great
economic needs it will set aside national interests for
international interests
 So we're assuming that the motivating factor is great
economic needs
 Change it to make it more precise: If a country has
great economic needs, the greater the leverage the
international community possesses
 Can be revised in many different ways, even to
represent different levels of Handout #21
Low range theory defines individuals. If we used the word ‘North Korea’
instead of ‘country’ in the previous hypothesis, it would be low range. Using
countries makes in middle range. Using ‘world community’ or something
that applies universally, it would be a grand theory.
Is conflict endemic in the system?

• The belief system
• Analogical reasoning
o Based on previous experiences in your head: have I been in
this situation before?
• Fuzzy analog: one that doesn’t really apply to many cases
• Persona analog: Hitler: if he’s like Hitler, I don’t like him
• Movies: He’s an Al Bundy type or Archie Bunker type
How do you explain that Denmark is the #1 aid giver?

• Best explanation: Level 2 (Handout #12) tools. National belief
system
• Denmark: political culture is a social democracy
• Middle power, political culture

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 73
If international community is anarchic, middle powers will develop
Why does NK need weapons

• In an anarchic international system, all states seek weapons
(Hypothesis)
The fourth level: very rarely causal, usually just affects the previous three
levels
Pandemic is a fourth level: Bird flu, weather patterns, et cetera
As pandemics increase, instability in countries also increase. Aids decreases

stability, which results in poverty, et cetera. This is a fourth level causation
Don’t choose a question that references a article which you have not read:
there will be choice on the exam
Samuel Burger and Condoleezza Rice articles for some of the questions
First article in the political world about International community
Cultural World
Number 8: waves of IR theory: should we cover every single wave? No.

Tell him what the major developments are in the field. Of all the waves
there are debates between five different traditions, some traditions overlap,
every period of human activity falls under maintainer/reformer/transformer,
debates between the three groups
• Ideas that effect debating on everything
o Realism
o Rationalism
o National Law
o Fideism
o Historicism
• Because of events, certain people come out on top
o Events in human activity cause the switch

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 74
o Enlightenment period
• Something like: “I want to focus on this and the group of realists,
Europeans, et cetera”
Preemption is a very good thing to do in an exam
Know Martin Wight
Very important questions for the exam:
Numbers 1, 4, 5, 7, 11, 13 on five point questions
Numbers 3 (Very important), 4, 7, 9 on ten point questions
Responding to challenges (Question number 5) depends on one’s world view

• Maintainer: Force
• Reformer: Establish international regimes
• Transformer: Change the system
Overcome constraints
• Trying to avoid vulnerability
• Reformer: create dependencies, et cetera
Constant search for order

• BOPO (balance of power)
• Reformer: concert
• Transformer: won't have problems of order if there weren't
competing states, so create a world democracy
o Global governance

IR-210: Class Notes
Midterm Review #2
Page 75
10/17/05 2:08 PM
Constructivist
Critical
Conventional
Culture – Rules – Practices

• Institution – Agency
The institution exists regardless of who is president

• The Cold War is more of a security institution
Setting up a Regime to govern an area
USC students are all under a regime, a ‘governing arrangement’
Landmine campaign was an attempt to create a regime
Question #5 on five-point questions

• Denmark is a puzzle, level two might be the reason for the decision
(to give large amounts of aid, or other things)
• France’s decision to not support the United States
o Why is this a puzzle?
o We would assume that the French would support us
o French are independent, also a member of NATO
o Looking for an explanation
o Not a crisis situation
o Probably a level two: the issue was discussed by a group of
leaders, who had time to decide
o Domestic politics: all politicians are concerned about two
thing: re-election and making sure their ideas are pushed
through and passed
o France has the largest Muslim population of European
countries
o Long history of not liking the United States
o Sold well to the French population for them to be independent
• Germany resisted the US as well
• How could one use level 3 or 4?

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 76
o Why is Iran developing nuclear weapons?

 Iran wants to make nuclear weapons
 Anarchy in the system (system level)
 In an anarchic system, states will always pursue the
development of arms to strengthen security
 Anarchic middle east
o Level 4 is rarely causal
 Tends to be more intervening or secondary variable
 Avian flew will influence foreign policy, but it won’t
cause somebody to attack another country or
completely change policy (usually)
 AIDS is another one
 Droughts
 Has nothing to do with the interaction of states
o Third level has more to do with the interaction of states
o Media falls into the global level
 The internet, et cetera
If a political culture is social-democratic, you can expect certain decisions

from its leaders
Distribution of power
• Hegemony – One power, not much distribution here
• BOPO system, states tend to follow one of the two major powers
• Bipolar system, states tend to follow one of the two poles
How would one explain the coalition of the willing

• Denmark sent troops to Iraq: why??
• Why would Poland join the coalition of the willing
• Less flexibility in a tight hegemonic system
o More constraints
• In a bi-polar there’s a little more flexibility
Canada’s decision to lead the landmine campaign

• Why is this a puzzle?
o The US is one of the leading landmine producers and users

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 77
o The US is Canada’s leading trading partner

o Why would Canada lead a campaign that might upset the US?
• All nations want to develop a niche
The more powerful the military in a bureaucratic structure, this a level two
Never talk about the Cuban missile crisis
Bureaucratic politics; international rational actor idea
Standard operating procedures

• Sample gets 50 million, then gives it to the engineering school to
decide where it goes
• Cuban missile crisis, if the president had told the defense
department to deal with the crisis, they probably would have
bombed Cuba to no end
The kinds of theory that are dealt with

• Constitutive
• More…
Make the argument that politics are shifting away from the state
• Shifting power away from the state: who would disagree and who
would agree
• Could answer this question using the three world views
• Disagree, Agree, Explore
• SM – State, International organizations, temporary coalitions
• Many of these guys participate in regimes
• States are the only groups who can legitimately use power to get
what it wants
• System reformers believe that the state is losing power
o in some sectors, states are losing power
o Power is shifting away if states cannot organize to hold onto
power and cooperate
• Who thinks that this is really happening (agrees)?
• Shifting attention away from NGOs and TSMOs

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 78
• Could answer this question: three perspective

o Hyperglobalists
o Skeptics
o Transformationalists
Dominant idea in the international system are idealists
SM, SR, ST (System Maintainer, Reformer, Transformer) – These are the

three major categories created by Martin Wight
• SM: Mach: Pessimistic
• SR: Grotian: Pessimistic/Optimistic
• ST: Kantian: Optimistic
How do you see the world?

• SM: System is anarchic, no common power. Build up arms,
security dilemma. Use arms to mitigate anarchy.
• SR: Develop a rule based system to mitigate the effects of anarchy
• ST: Move towards a world government. They see the SMs as the
problem. Get people involved in the system, effectively moving
towards global governance
Sovereignty is so important… maintainers would say it is not our

responsibility to take care of problems in other states, unless its in our
national interest
The OZ case: who's responsibility was that? Reformer and transformer

view: it is humanities responsibility. Maintainer Australia says, “Not out
problem”
Social scientists are shooting for a theory so deep that the government will
fund them further
Discussion of theories as they occur in different subjects
Puzzle why did the US invade Grenada

• Small island in the Caribbean

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 79
• Monroe doctrine: stay out of the western hemisphere

• Monroe’s doctrine and how it affects politics
Roosevelt corollary: nobody can have a government in our
hemisphere that we don’t like
How America was losing power to the Soviets in Central America
Regan wanted to show that he was tough, because Carter wasn’t tough
Three years before elected, Regan broadcast shows on his radio program
about Soviets coming into ‘Our Lake’
Ford screwed up huge trying to recover a freighter off of Cambodia, but his
popularity in the polls were the highest in his presidency because he used
force
Distribution of power
Everything was always attributed to the Cold War
Early 1950, US decided to start giving aid. Why? The Cold War
States are losing power because of

• Crisis of legitimacy, authority, efficiency
• State nationalists to ethnic nationalists
• Solution: network states
o states open themselves up to working with other actors
• Emanuel Castels: need to know (In notes somewhere)
OZ case: big issue is sovereignty – Human rights issues also colliding
Make sure to give a sense in the essays that you know what the four worlds
are
Emphasis on human rights is a part of political culture

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 80
What were the key issues in the case?
The golden straight jacket

• Friedman suggests that after the end of the Cold War we built up a
world where there is only one economic system. He would not
agree that there are three different systems. Only one highway:
Neo-liberal highway
• Within liberalism there are a few different kinds of liberalism
• Create institutions and make the state pay for them
• IMF, World Bank; Created regimes to make it easier for people to
make money
• Neo-liberal: not 100% liberal, because 100%’s don't support any
kind of government interference
• Neo-liberals want the state to create institutions to make money
• If you put on the jacket and go with it, you'll get rich. Straight
jacket, because there's only one way to go. Don't try to play with
the system, go with it
Know the critical differences between each of the three world views
• Biggest difference is the difference between the maintainers and
transformers
• Key controversies of the four worlds
• Foreign affairs reader
Know reading in foreign affairs reader for references in essay
Is it possible to win the war on terrorism? Any broad question like this,
explain from the perspective of each world view
Final exam is cumulative
Universal view is held usually by transformers who think that we all have
universal rights, states can’t take these away. Other view says that the
state provides us with rights
Positivism is a social science, someone who is positive all the time

IR-210: Class Notes
Page 81
Bailey’s and Smith’s chapter on critical theory

• Problem solving theory
• Critical theory: start with the assumption that the system is
corrupt
We don’t challenge paradigms, until evidence piles up and one can no longer
accept the paradigm. “fossils’ idea
Post-modernist
We can create capitalism with a 'human face' (Reformers)
Marxists say ‘all your doing is pushing the veggies around the plate’

IR-210: Assignments
Page 82
Keith Parker
IR-210
Analytical Exercise
Why Did It Happen?
The Indian and Pakistani governments have continually tested nuclear weapons,
despite pressure from most of the rest of the world not to do so. This dispute over the
Kashmir area has almost led to a nuclear war between the two nations a few times, the
most recent being only a few years ago in 2002 after an attack on the Indian parliament.
The two states have attempted peace talks numerous times, but have never come to a
viable solution in dealing with the Kashmir area. Recently, deals have made possible a
somewhat stable Kashmir area. This year, a bus service was opened between the two
regions, in a landmark move. Nonetheless, the two states have continued nuclear testing.
Why does nuclear testing continue despite world pressure? (BBC World News, 2005)
The US continues to trade extensively with China, and sign trade agreements.
NGOs, though, have accused China of human rights violations on many occasions.
NGOs and human rights groups argue that the US should not be promoting China’s
actions by signing trade agreements. China, though, is the US’s largest trade partner.
China has been the most attractive location for FDI for many years now. Why would the
US continue to trade despite opposition from major groups? (BBC World News, 2005)
Despite being a major trade partner with the US and usually being in good
standing with the US, France opposed the US plan to subjugate Iraq. Even after pressure
from much of the EU and especially the US, France would not budge in its stance. While
trade with France has not faltered since the beginning of the US conquering of Iraq, a
political opposition seemed to be in bad taste. Why would France risk bad relations with
the US by opposing the Iraqi takeover? (BBC World News, 2005)

IR-210: Assignments
Page 83
Puzzle Hypotheses
Pakistani and Indian Governments’ reluctance to end nuclear testing
1) In an anarchic international system, if a state has nuclear technology, its
neighboring states will seek the same for defense.
2) If two or more states believe that they have a religious right to a piece of land,
then they will seek out all options for securing that land, including military
superiority.
3) If two states with opposing ideologies share a border, then they will both seek
defense equal to that of their neighboring state.
4) If a state is structured upon a religion, then it will seek to assert its political
power over neighboring populations of the same religion, especially if those
populations are under the control of a state based on a differing religion.
5) If the international community is pressing for change in a state’s policy,
namely over the occupation of territory, then that state will seek a military
with similar power to those pressing for change.
US Trade with China
1) If it is in the best interest of a state to trade with another state, then minor
moral issues will be disregarded.
2) If a state is considering increased trade relations with another state, then issues
that do not affect the actual trade agreement are of no concern.
3) If human rights violations in a foreign state are out of the home state’s
public’s sight, then trade relations between the two countries will not be
influenced.

IR-210: Assignments
Page 84
4) If human rights violations are a natural part of a state’s social structure, then
foreign trade partners will be reluctant to push for an end to the human rights
violations.
5) If there is a massive overpopulation of a state with incredibly low income per
capita, then human rights violations will be less of a concern to foreign trade
partners
France’s opposition to the US takeover of Iraq
1) If a state’s presence in the international world in diminishing, then they will
cease to be acquiescent to the world’s superpowers.
2) If a state has a history of independent thinking in its social system (France was
home to the first university in the modern sense of the word), then that state
will be less likely to change its stance because of international pressure.
3) If a large portion of a state’s population is of a religion that is threatened by
the conquests of a foreign state, then that state will oppose the foreign state’s
actions.
4) If a state is well developed and its government feels no need to be acquiescent
to the world’s superpowers, then that state will feel less obligated to support
another state’s self-interests.
5) If a state’s economic interests are affected by another state’s self-interested
military actions (Iraq had many oil trade agreements with France, which might
have dissolved after a US occupation of Iraq), then that state will oppose the
military actions of the other state.

IR-210: Assignments
Page 85
Hypotheses with most powerful explanations
The most plausible explanation for the nuclear proliferation in both India and
Pakistan is found in the second hypothesis mentioned above: If two or more states believe
that they have a religious right to a piece of land, then they will seek out all options for
securing that land, including military superiority. In the case of India and Pakistan, the
land for which nuclear weapons are being developed to secure is in dispute because of
religious presence in the region. Of course, the original reason for dispute was somewhat
careless decolonization; the current debate, though, is based largely on the presence of
dominant religions in certain areas of Kashmir.
The US decision to continue trade relations with China and sign major trade
agreements can be explained best by the first hypothesis mentioned above: If it is in the
best interest of a state to trade with another state, then minor moral issues will be
disregarded. As trade with China is such an important piece of the US economy, and
without it the US would be an unimaginably different place, minor issues of human rights
aren’t enough to put pressure on China and potentially disrupt the currently positive
political relations with China. If there were larger human rights issues in China, such as
genocide, one can safely assume that the US would not overlook the possibility of putting
mammoth pressure on China.
France’s opposition to the US subjugation of Iraq can best be explained by the
third hypothesis listed above: If a large portion of a state’s population is of a religion that
is threatened by the conquests of a foreign state, then that state will oppose the foreign
state’s actions. As France has a very large Muslim population, it is thus likely that
France will not support the US in its plan to conquer the Muslim nation of Iraq. France’s
opposition to the takeover merely appeases its Muslim population.

IR-210: Assignments
Page 86

IR-210: Assignments
Page 87

IR-210: Assignments
Page 88

IR-210: Assignments
Page 89

IR-210: Assignments
Page 90

IR-210: Assignments
Page 91

IR-210: Assignments
Page 92
The problem embodied by the potential nuclear threat to the United States can be
articulately solved through the ideas of a system transformer. Many transformationalist
ideas have clear flaws that are solvable only by synthesizing these ideas with those of the
system maintainer and reformer; nonetheless, it is important to clearly lay out the
perspective of a transformer before borrowing from it ideas for a final solution.
The issue with which the international community, namely the United States,
must confront in this case is presented in the short drama Last Best Chance. For the most
part, the problem lies in the ability, or inability, of the international community to control
the proliferation and potential use of WMDs, specifically among those in the terrorist
community. From a strictly transformationalist point of view, the nature of the problem
lies in society’s inability to view the world as an international state with individuals
concerned with human security across the globe, not only among their own culture and
society. The international community is far too centered on the all-too-common power-
politics system that dominates nearly every state’s political culture across the world. It is
known that nuclear proliferation is incredibly difficult to control, mostly because there
are many venues from which terrorists could gather materials needed and the ability to
create WMDs. Further, the international community does not know exactly where and
how active many of these venues are. It is presumed that, given the proper fiscal
resources, terrorists are able to access the materials and processing methods needed to
build WMDs. The problem has developed largely from the result of increased terrorist
activity and funding over the past few years, after an overall drop in terrorism in the
decade prior to 9/11. The root of the problem arose from the proliferation of the power-
politics system, when nations were building as many deadly weapons as they could to
Keith Parker
IR-210: Assignments
Page 93
stay ahead in the arms race. Russia’s inability to secure their WMDs supplies in entirety
has added to the problem significantly.
Richard Falk, a proponent of transformationalist propositions, might recommend
a variety of responses to this problem. First, an overall decrease of WMDs across the
world, including rule-making states, would be advised. The end goal would be the
extinction of WMDs. According to Falk, “We oppose on principle and for reasons of
prudence, the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, by
any country.” Further, more interaction with individual terrorists or potential terrorists
would be advised. By lowering borders between states, individuals and states would tend
to feel as if they were more a part of an international community rather than an anarchic
group of power-hungry states. With a lowering of borders, states would be on a more
equal playing field with other states. Thus, any increase in the power of one state would
be an increase in the power of all states. If this goal were accomplished, individuals and
whatever state governments are left would feel less of a need to gain a power advantage
over other states. Though this prospect sounds solid, there are a few gaps in the plan that
have yet to be solved. First, no state is willing to be the first to give up their supply of
WMDs, for the fear of being susceptible to other states. Further, the maintainer
perspective of ‘securing national interests first’ is too widespread. With this worldview
being most dominant in the political system, it will be hard to convince states to lower
borders and become more vulnerable to security threats.
Keith Parker
IR-210: Assignments
Page 94
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
kaparker@usc.edu
GIN Assignment
TA: Daniel Tauss
Massive Step-up in the fight against poverty
To tackle the fight against poverty worldwide, a combination of public, private,
and civil society actors must be aligned strategically and uniformly for success to be
achieved. In order to break down the elements of this ‘Global Issues Network’ (GIN), I
have broken down each actor piece into three segments. First, I will list the actors to be
involved, the sector under which they fall, then an explanation of why that actor was
chosen. The explanation will detail the resources, expertise, and experience that each
will bring to the process of solving the problem, one-by-one.
Global Issues Network
 US Government – Public/ Civil Society Actor – The US Government has an
enormous amount of capital for which to use in the fight against poverty. Of all the
actors who may potentially be involved in this fight, the US has the largest pool or
resources. The American media often places the issue of global poverty in the
spotlight, thus raising the issue to a higher level on the American peoples’ agenda of
concerns periodically. While many other governmental operations compete for this
pool, Americans’ will to fight poverty has kept the government devoted to setting
funds aside for this issue. Further, the government has a great track record in the
fight against poverty. The amount of time this actor has devoted to the issue of global
poverty has placed it at the forefront of the fight against poverty, in terms of
experience. In direct input to the fight against poverty, the US government leads the
world in contributions. In 2000, the US donated US$10 billion to Official

IR-210: Assignments
Page 95
development assistance. Most importantly, though, the US has led the international
community in bringing good governance and sound economic policies to developing
countries through political interaction. As the US Government also donates to civil
society actors, I have included it as an actor in the civil society sector as well.
 Russia – Public Actor – Russia has access to a large amount of resources, just as the
US Government does. With capital to work with, Russia has much to offer the
international community in the fight against poverty. In the years between 1998 and
2004, Russia wrote off US$16.5 Billion worth of African countries’ foreign debt.
Many of the most impoverished states in the world are located on the African
continent. Russia, during much of the liberating of states in Africa in the 1960s and
70s, had worked closely with many of the nations now needing international help.
Through this interaction, Russia has gained the first-hand knowledge and experience
needed to successfully bring about the lessening of poverty in this region. Further,
being one of the world’s most powerful states, Russia has the diplomatic pull needed
to push though important economic changes that could have a profound effect in
many of these states.
 European Union – Public Actor – “The European Union, European Commission and
other member states of the EU provide half the aid to the developing nations” (Benn,
Hilary). To stress again the importance of capital in the fight against poverty, the EU
has made arrangements to increase the supply of foreign aid to impoverished African
states by US$25 billion by 2010. Further, the EU has a geographic advantage to
providing foreign aid to Africa, where many of the world’s impoverished nations are
located, as mentioned earlier. This strategic location has provided the EU the
Parker, 2 of 5
IR-210: Assignments
Page 96
opportunity to help with the development of economies and stable governments many
times in recent history, such as Italy’s contribution to the establishment of a stable
infrastructure in Mozambique.
 United Nations – Public Actor – One of the United Nations’ most important goals is
the reduction of poverty around the world. The United Nations, while it may lack the
enormous amount of capital available to some of the world’s most powerful states,
has a very strong political and diplomatic position in the world. As far as the UN’s
direct fight against poverty goes, member states provide funding that goes directly to
the development of impoverished states. The UN also provides direct aid in the form
of food or other living necessities to the world’s impoverished peoples. Further, the
UN has the political leverage to promote the contribution of member states to
developing countries in the form of monetary aid or political support and
development.
 War on Want – Civil Society Actor – The War on Want organization provides a
segway for society to make donations to promote the development of underdeveloped
states. This actor provides the GIN with a very strong public stance on the issue of
lessening poverty: to stop it at its core through the elimination of inequality and
injustice. The organization mostly works directly with the developing states in order
to achieve its goal. The War on Want organization was founded in 1951, and its long
history has provided it the valuable experience needed to succeed in its goal. Further,
this actor lobbies for its cause with governments around the world who have the
power to bring down global poverty.
Parker, 3 of 5
IR-210: Assignments
Page 97
 Red Cross – Public/ Private/ Civil Society Actor – The Red Cross is supported
financially and politically by every sector of the GIN. The Red Cross has a very
extensive history in the promotion of poverty diminishment, thus greatly enhancing
their current ability to deal with complex situations involving the fight on poverty.
The Public sector, i.e. governments around the world, donates directly to Red Cross
in order to perpetuate their cause. Individuals in the Civil Society sector donate for
various reasons, often for personal moral reasons or tax incentives. The private sector
donates for yet another reason: good publicity, among other things. The Red Cross
does most of its work through direct material donations to impoverished peoples,
though it has plenty of political roots as well.
 CARE – Civil Society Sector – This actor is supported almost solely by individual
civil society donors. The organization has a strong history, giving it the experience
credentials needed to succeed. The resources provided by individual donors doesn’t
quite compare to those of large governments or many private organizations, but
including an organization which has fewer political and private ties is essential to the
GIN. Most of CARE’s work is done on the ground in Africa, providing goods and
services directly to the people who need it.
 Pfizer – Private Sector – This private company has continually donated to important
causes around the world, specifically the War on Poverty. Among its recent large
donations, Pfizer donated US$10 Million to aid in development after the tsunami hit
Southeast Asia in 2004. It is important to include an actor that is specific to the
private sector of the GIN largely because of the efficiency that big businesses tend to
bring with them. Large corporations are often as successful as they are because of
Parker, 4 of 5
IR-210: Assignments
Page 98
how well they do their job, specifically they are known for great efficiency. In order
for a development program to work successfully, it must be efficient in both
dispersing the funds made available by the big capital donors, as well as allocating
resources to political development in developing states.
Parker, 5 of 5
IR-210: Assignments
Page 99
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
kaparker@usc.edu
Searching for Academic Resources
(Using MLA format)
TA: Daniel Tauss
1) Articles in Academic Journals

a. Malik, Mohan. “Nuclear Proliferation in Asia: The China Factor.”
Australian Journal of International Affairs 53.1 (1999): 31-41
(Reformer)
b. Klingebiel, Stephen, Huria Ogbamichael. “Poor Performers in Sub-
Saharan Africa.” African Security Review 13.1 (2004): 13-19
(Maintainer)
c. Quille, Gerrard. “The European Security Strategy: a framework for EU
security interests?” International Peacekeeping 11.3 (2004): 422-438
(Reformer)
d. Owen, Tyler. “Human Security - Conflict, Critique and Consensus:
Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition.”
Security Dialogue 35.3 (2004): 373-387
(Maintainer)
e. Wade, Robert Hunter. “Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and
Inequality?” International Journal of Health Services 34.3 (2004): 381-414
(Reformer)
f. Smith, Steve. “Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations
Theory and September 11.” International Studies Quarterly 48.3 (2004):
499
(Transformer)
2) Sources to keep informed
a. Public views on terrorism:
i. Waheed, Imran. “Viewpoints: Islam and London Bombings.” BBC
News 7/19/05 World Edition
ii. Scroope, Heather. “Sept. 11: Four Years Later.” Fox News 9/11/05

IR-210: Assignments
Page 100
iii. Ethan, Rose. “Viewpoint: Self-fulfilling Prophesies.” Middle East

News 9/15/05 International Edition
b. Latin American views on U.S. foreign policy:
i. Brasil, Agência. “BNDES has US$ 2.6 billion to finance exports to
South America.” Agencia Brasil 8/28/05
ii. Toothaker, Christopher. “Chavez Raises His Profile at U.N.
Summit.” Guardian Unlimited 9/20/05
iii. James, Deborah. “Time for a New Foreign Policy Toward
Venezuela: When Apologies are Not Enough.” Venezuela Analysis
8/25/05
c. The Role of the African Union in Sudan:
i. Eibner, John. “Sudanese Hope Relies on American Hope.” Sudan
Tribune 9/21/05
ii. Lazarus Antoinette. “Additional SA contingent deployed to
Sudan.” SABC News 9/14/05
iii. Gantz, Peter H. “The UN Summit: U.S. Spoiler Role Weakens
Draft Outcome Document.” Refugees International 9/14/05
3) News Magazines
a. Pachauri, R.K. “The Black Gold’s Curse.” Outlook India Magazine. 28
Apr. 2005: 12
b. Gustave, Speth James. “The Kyoto No-Show Can Still Go Green.” Yale
Global Magazine. 16 Feb. 2005
4) Television and Radio sources
a. U.S. public opinion related to the reform of the UN:
i. CSPAN (TV) – Maintainer
ii. CNN (TV) – Reformer
iii. Air America (Radio) – Transformer
b. Should the U.S. and its allies get involved in Darfur?
i. Fox (TV) – Maintainer
ii. Radio Left (Radio) – Reformer
iii. Counterspin (Radio) – Transformer
Parker, 2 of 6
IR-210: Assignments
Page 101
c. Is the idea of an American Empire a good one?

i. Jim Hightower (Radio) – Maintainer
ii. BBC News (TV) – Reformer
iii. KCNA of DPRK (North Korean News) (Radio) – Transformer
5) Research Paper
a. Primary Sources:
i. Boron, Atilio. Interview with Noam Chomsky. Rec. 14 June
1003. What’s Happening? ZNet Online.
ii. Larson, Alan P. Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. Rec. 4 June 2003. UNSC Resolution 1483: A
Framework for Reconstruction. US Department of State.
iii. United Nations. Security Council. Spain, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America:
Draft Resolution. S/2003/556, 2003.
b. Secondary Sources, Books:
i. United Nations Association USA. Global Agenda: Issues Before
the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations. New York:
United Nations Association of the USA, 2004.
ii. Hunt, Scott. The Future of Peace: On the Front lines with the
World’s Great Peacemakers. New York: HarperCollins, 2004.
iii. Malone, David M. The UN Security Council: From the Cold War
to the 21st Century. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.
c. Secondary Sources, Academic Journals:
i. Tharoor, Shashi. “Why America Still Needs the United Nations.”
Foreign Affairs 82.5 (2003): 67-80
ii. Albright, Madeleine. “Think Again: The United Nations.”
Foreign Policy September/October (2003): 1-6
iii. Weiss, Thomas G. “The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform.”
The Washington Quarterly 26.4 (2003): 147-161
6) ‘Favorites’ list Websites for sources
a. Foreign policy debates in your home country:
Parker, 3 of 6
IR-210: Assignments
Page 102
i. Maintainer: http://www.brookings.edu - The Brookings Institute

focuses mostly on domestic issues, and refers to foreign states
usually only in reference to their impact on the US.
ii. Reformer: http://www.foreignpolicy.com - This website represents
the reformer view by condemning rich nations’ tendency to put up
trade barriers against foreign firms, especially in the article
“Ranking the rich 2005.”
iii. Transformer: http://www.opednews.com - Many articles in
OpEdNews focus primarily on the need for the US to open up
trade, and end it’s concern for domestic development, which
according to the site is already thriving well enough.
b. The status of major environmental concerns:
i. Maintainer: http://earthjustice.org - This site focuses on the
general gaining of support for domestic lobbying against
environmental damage, and focuses very little on the international
aspect of it all.
ii. Reformer: http://www.wetland.org - Most prominent is education
about damage to the environment, and how damage can be
lessened from the bottom up.
iii. Transformer: http://www.eco-pros.com/globalchange.htm - This
site includes links to many environmental sites advocating large-
scale change to environmental policies. The site itself is dedicated
to major change through the masses to create change.
c. The human security movement:
i. Maintainer: http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/ - Developed with
the United Nations, the information on this site is delivered
through the eyes of a large organization attempting to solve human
security problems.
ii. Reformer: http://www.humansecuritybulletin.info - This Canadian
site provides relatively liberal information on the most recent
occurrences having to do with human security.
Parker, 4 of 6
IR-210: Assignments
Page 103
iii. Transformer: http://www.fcnl.org/ - This site promotes the idea of

putting pressure on the government through the masses in order to
keep peace in the world, mostly in relation to human security.
d. EU-Russian Relations:
i. Maintainer: http://www.upi-fiia.fi/ - This Finnish site provides
somewhat critical information about EU-Russian relations, and
how lowering borders may be harmful in the end.
ii. Reformer: http://www.europaworld.org - This site provides
information that focuses on the opening of relations with Russia,
but not completely taking down borders.
iii. Transformer: http://www.euractiv.com - Some of the articles in this
site strongly support the opening of relations with Russia to the
strongest degree possible.
e. The possibility of war with North Korea:
i. Maintainer: http://www.cnn.com - This US site tends to promote
the dismantling of North Korea, rather than promote diplomatic
resolutions.
ii. Reformer: http://news.bbc.co.uk - This globally centered site
provides information on North Korea which is neither extremely
liberal nor does it promote lessening relations with the state.
iii. Transformer: http://www.antiwar.com - Clearly an anti-war site,
the information here promotes the development of diplomatic
relations rather than war.
f. The control of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs):
i. Maintainer: http://www.frontpagemag.com - The articles featured
here focus on tough control of WMDs around the world.
ii. Reformer: http://www.armscontrol.org/ - This site promotes the
control of WMDs, but still realizes nations incentives to break the
demands of control coming from other nations.
iii. Transformer: http://www.alternet.org - Many of the articles on this
site criticize the current administration’s focus on strict control of
Parker, 5 of 6
IR-210: Assignments
Page 104
WMDs and stress alternative methods to merely controlling the

world’s stock of WMDs.
g. Women’s rights in the developing world:
i. Maintainer: http://www.peacewomen.org - This site promotes the
idea of working through specific governments to develop the cause
of women’s rights from within the state.
ii. Reformer: http://www.hri.ca - This site works closely with many
NGOs and other civil society organizations. The information
provided here promotes the development of human rights in the
developing world, but doesn’t have a radical stance on the
implementation of this.
iii. Transformer: http://www.cwluherstory.com/ - The information on
this site focuses on the lack of women’s rights from the bottom-up,
and promotes change from the voices of the people.
7) Talking Heads:
a. Maintainer: Daniel W. Drezner – This author strongly supports the
importance of concern for the homeland over concern for the international
community. His blog has recently been focused on the low number of
workers in US manufacturing.
b. Reformer: David Laws – David focuses on the development of the
international community one step at a time (By developing close ties to
economic partners, but not by completely opening up world trade).
c. Transformer: James P. Cannon – James writes mostly on reforming the
way the world’s economic and political system works, mostly form a
Marxist point of view. He stresses change from the bottom-up.
Parker, 6 of 6
IR-210: Assignments
Page 105
Summary of
‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’
By Anna Baxter
One World Trust
December 2004
On the 2nd December a High-Level Panel of the United Nations (UN) released the
Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, called A more
secure world: our shared responsibility. The report contained recommendations on
changes that could be made within the UN system so that it might better address today’s
security challenges. It was commissioned by the Secretary General to attempt to address
the deep divisions among Member States on the nature of the security threats faced today,
and the appropriateness of the use of force to address those threats. (For more
information on the composition of the Panel see Note A)
When the United Nations was created in 1945 its main concern was to ensure that the
horrors of the World Wars would never be repeated. Accordingly, its attention was
primarily devoted to the threat of aggressive wars between states. The past sixty years,
however, have witnessed massive changes in political geography. Whilst progress on life
expectancy and per capita income has been made in some areas of the developing world,
large areas of the world continue to experience life threatening poverty as a daily reality.
In recognition of the impact that these changes have had on security, the report calls for a
broader, more all-encompassing conception of the threats and challenges that we face.
The report has a number of sections addressing key security concerns, the most important
of which are summarized below.
Collective security:
One of the aspirations of the UN, as expressed in the Charter, is to provide collective
security for all. The report highlights the continuing relevance of the idea of collective
security today, emphasizing the mutual vulnerability of weak and strong that results from
increasing global economic integration. Whilst the duty of the State to protect and
provide for the welfare of its own people is recognized, historical evidence demonstrating
that the state can also be unable or unwilling to perform this role is taken into account.
The report insists that the principles of collective security require the international
community to step in to assist in the provision, or development of the capacity to provide,
necessary protection where needed. Past failures of collective action are recognized, with
the report noting that ‘early warning is only effective when it leads to early action for
prevention.’
A broader conception of security:
In stark contrast to more traditional conceptions of security the report identifies six
clusters of threats with which the world must now be concerned as elements that can feed

IR-210: Assignments
Page 106
into each other to produce deadly cycles of civil violence. (For more information see
Note B)
Sustainable development and security:
Emphasis is placed on the importance of promoting development as the ‘indispensable

foundation for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously.’ The report
calls on all States to recommit to the goals of eradicating poverty, achieving sustained
economic growth and promoting sustainable development. More specifically it calls for
donor countries to establish a timetable for reaching the 0.7 per cent gross national
product target for Overseas Development Assistance, for greater debt relief and improved
access to global markets for poorer countries, for more resources to be channeled to
stemming the AIDS pandemic, and for new initiatives to assist in the development of
public health systems and to help tackle global warming.
Conflict prevention:
The Panel emphasizes the need for conflict prevention efforts by UN to be improved.
One of their most significant recommendations is for the Security Council to be more
ready to use the authority invested in it by the Rome Statute to refer cases to International
Criminal Court. They also recommend that more resources be channeled through the
Department of Political Affairs for diplomacy and mediation, and that sanctions be used
to better effect. National leaders and parties to conflict are encouraged to make
constructive use of the option of preventative deployment.
The use of force:
On the question of the use of force in cases where there is a perceived threat, but that
threat is not immediately imminent, the Panel make it clear that they consider Article 51
of the UN Charter to provide adequate guidance. They recommend that in such cases the
evidence should be presented to the Security Council, which can then decide whether or
not to authorize action. If they decide not to authorize action, other options should be
explored further, before potentially revisiting the military option. The Panel are clear that
they do not endorse unilateral preventative action.
Collectively endorsed military action, on the other hand, when all other preventative
efforts have failed, is seen by the panel as a cornerstone of effective collective security.
The report defines five criteria of legitimacy to govern the use of force (for more
information see Note C). The Panel recognizes the need to develop the capacity of the
Security Council to respond when a decision has been taken to use force, and makes
recommendations to those Member States that have significant military capacity to place
it at the disposal of the UN. Recommendation

IR-210: Assignments
Page 107
Peacekeeping:
Recognizing the central importance of peacekeeping efforts to long-term, lasting peace,

the report highlights the need for more effective coordination between the various bodies
engaged in peacekeeping. The Panel recommends that national authorities be at the heart
of coordination efforts, and that robust donor coordination efforts be made.
Making the UN more effective:
The report recommends changes to the structure of the Security Council (for more
information see Note D here)It also recommends the establishment of a Peacebuilding
Commission. This commission would address the lack of any place in the UN system
specifically designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war, or to assist countries in
their transition from war to peace. It should, they propose, work in partnership with
national governments to provide proactive assistance in such cases.
Terrorism:
The Panel suggest a definition of terrorism that emphasizes that acts of terrorism
constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity (for more information see Note E). The
report emphasizes the need to address the causes of terrorism and extremism as well as
strengthening prevention efforts.
Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons:
The Panel recommends that new enthusiasm be directed towards disarmament, and that
efforts be made to reduce the supply of nuclear weapons. They also recommend
improvements to the enforcement capacity of the Security Council and better public
health defenses to combat the threat of biological weapons.
Footnotes
Note A) Composition of the High Level Panel:
Anand Panyarachum, former Prime Minister of Thailand CHAIR, Robert Badinter

(France), João Baena Soares (Brazil), Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Mary Chinery
Hesse (Ghana), Gareth Evans (Australia), David Hannay (United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland), Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay), Amre Moussa (Egypt), Satish
Nambiar (India), Sadako Ogata (Japan), Yevgeny Primakov (Russian Federation), Qian
Qiqian (China), Salim Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Nafis Sadik (Pakistan) and
Brent Scowcroft (United States of America).
Note B) A Broader Conception of Security (Synopsis to Part two)

The six clusters of threats, identified in the report, as elements that can feed into each
other to produce deadly cycles of civil violence are;

IR-210: Assignments
Page 108
• Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases and

environmental degradation
• Inter-state conflict
• Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide, and other large-scale atrocities
• Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons
• Terrorism
• Transnational Organised Crime
Note C) Criteria to define the use of force (207)
• seriousness of threat
• proper purpose
• last resort
• proportional means
• balance of consequences
Note D) Reform of the Security Council (251-254)
The Panel offer two suggestions, Models A and B, of how the Security Council might be
reformed. Their suggestions are guided by a desire to increase the involvement in
decisionmaking of those who contribute most to the UN financially, militarily and
diplomatically (in line with Article 23 of the Charter) and make the decision-making
process more democratic, accountable and representative of the broader membership.
• Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created and three
new two-year non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas.
• Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight
fouryear
renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat,
divided among the major regional areas.
Note E) Description of Terrorism (164 (d))
‘Any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on

aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566
(2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-
combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain
from doing any act.’

IR-210: Exam Questions
Page 109

IR-210: Exam Questions
Page 110

Page 111
A more secure world:

Our shared responsibility
Report of the High-level Panel on Threats,

Challenges and Change
IR-210: UN Report
United Nations
2004

Contents
Paragraphs Page
Foreword by
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Transmittal letter from
Panel Chair Anand Panyarachun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The United Nations gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the
United Nations Foundation for the printing of this publication. Part 1
Towards a new security consensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
I. Different worlds: 1945 and 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16 . . . . . . . . . . 10
II. The case for comprehensive collective security . . 17-43 . . . . . . . . . . 14
Designed by the Graphic Design Unit A. Threats without boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-23 . . . . . . . . . . 14
United Nations Department of Public Information B. The limits of self-protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-28 . . . . . . . . . . 16
C. Sovereignty and responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . 29-30 . . . . . . . . . . 17
D. Elements of a credible collective
security system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31-43 . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32-36 . . . . . . . . . . 17
2. Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37-39 . . . . . . . . . . 18
3. Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-43 . . . . . . . . . . 19
Part 2
Collective security and the challenge of prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
III. Poverty, infectious disease and
environmental degradation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44-73 . . . . . . . . . . 24
IR-210: UN Report
A. The threats we face . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44-58 . . . . . . . . . . 24

B. Meeting the challenge of prevention . . . . . . . 59-73 . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. More resources and action . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59-65 . . . . . . . . . . 27
2. New initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66-73 . . . . . . . . . . 29
IV. Conflict between and within States . . . . . . . . . . 74-106 . . . . . . . . . . 31
A. The threat of inter-State conflict . . . . . . . . . . 74-83 . . . . . . . . . . 31
B. The threat of internal conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . 84-88 . . . . . . . . . . 33
C. Meeting the challenge of prevention . . . . . . 89-106 . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Better international regulatory
frameworks and norms . . . . . . . . . . . . 89-97 . . . . . . . . . . 35
2. Better information and analysis . . . . . . . . 98-99 . . . . . . . . . . 37
3. Preventive diplomacy and mediation . . 100-103 . . . . . . . . . . 37
4. Preventive deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . 104-106 . . . . . . . . . . 38
iii

Page 112
Page 113
A more secure world: Our shared responsibility
Paragraphs Page Paragraphs Page
V. Nuclear, radiological, chemical and X. Peace enforcement and peacekeeping

biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107-144 . . . . . . . . . . 39 capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210-220 . . . . . . . . . . 67
A. The threats we face . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107-116 . . . . . . . . . . 39 Regional cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 . . . . . . . . . . 69
1. Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107-112 . . . . . . . . . . 39 XI. Post-conflict peacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221-230 . . . . . . . . . . 70
2. Radiological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 . . . . . . . . . . 40 A. The role of peacekeepers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221-223 . . . . . . . . . . 70
3. Chemical and biological weapons . . . . 114-116 . . . . . . . . . . 41 B. The larger peacebuilding task . . . . . . . . . . 224-230 . . . . . . . . . . 71
B. Meeting the challenge of prevention . . . . . 117-144 . . . . . . . . . . 41
XII. Protecting civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231-239 . . . . . . . . . . 72
1. Better strategies to reduce demand . . . 118-126 . . . . . . . . . . 42
United Nations staff security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 . . . . . . . . . . 74
2. Better strategies to reduce supply . . . . . 127-138 . . . . . . . . . . 43
3. Better enforcement capability . . . . . . . . 139-141 . . . . . . . . . . 46
4. Better public health defences . . . . . . . . 142-144 . . . . . . . . . . 46 Part 4
VI. Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145-164 . . . . . . . . . . 47 A more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century . . . . . 75
A. The threat we face . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145-146 . . . . . . . . . . 47
XIII. The General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240-243 . . . . . . . . . . 78
B. Meeting the challenge of prevention . . . . . 147-164 . . . . . . . . . . 48
1. A comprehensive strategy . . . . . . . . . . . 147-148 . . . . . . . . . . 48 XIV. The Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244-260 . . . . . . . . . . 79
2. Better counter-terrorism instruments . . 149-153 . . . . . . . . . . 49
XV. A Peacebuilding Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261-269 . . . . . . . . . . 83
3. Assisting States in confronting terrorism 154-156 . . . . . . . . . . 50
Peacebuilding Support Office . . . . . . . . . . . 266-269 . . . . . . . . . . 84
4. Defining terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157-164 . . . . . . . . . . 51
XVI. Regional organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270-273 . . . . . . . . . . 85
VII. Transnational organized crime . . . . . . . . . . . . .165-177 . . . . . . . . . . 52
A. The threat we face . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165-170 . . . . . . . . . . 52 XVII. The Economic and Social Council . . . . . . . . . . 274-281 . . . . . . . . . . 86
B. Meeting the challenge of prevention . . . . . .171-177 . . . . . . . . . . 54 Achieving policy coherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280-281 . . . . . . . . . . 88
1. Better international regulatory XVIII. The Commission on Human Rights . . . . . . . . 282-291 . . . . . . . . . . 88
frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .172-176 . . . . . . . . . . 54
2. Better State capacity-building . . . . . . . . . . . .177 . . . . . . . . . . 55 XIX. The Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292-296 . . . . . . . . . . 90
A. Strengthening support for the
VIII. The role of sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .178-182 . . . . . . . . . . 55
Secretary-General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293-294 . . . . . . . . . . 91
B. A competent and professional Secretariat . . 295-296 . . . . . . . . . . 91
IR-210: UN Report
Part 3 XX. The Charter of the United Nations . . . . . . . . . 297-302 . . . . . . . . . . 92

Collective security and the use of force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
IX. Using force: rules and guidelines . . . . . . . . . . .183-209 . . . . . . . . . . 62 Annexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A. The question of legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .185-203 . . . . . . . . . . 62
1. Article 51 of the Charter of the I. Summary of recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
United Nations and self-defence . . . .188-192 . . . . . . . . . . 63 II. Panel members and terms of reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
2. Chapter VII of the Charter of the III. Panel secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
United Nations and external threats . .193-198 . . . . . . . . . . 63
IV. Panel meetings, regional consultations and issue workshops . . . . . . . 123
3. Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, internal threats
and the responsibility to protect . . . .199-203 . . . . . . . . . . 65
B. The question of legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . .204-209 . . . . . . . . . . 66
iv v

Foreword by the
United Nations Secretary-General
Historians may well look back on the first years of the twenty-first century as a deci-
sive moment in the human story. The different societies that make up the human fam-
ily are today interconnected as never before. They face threats that no nation can hope
to master by acting alone - and opportunities that can be much more hopefully
exploited if all nations work together.
The purpose of this report is to suggest how nations can work together to meet
this formidable challenge. It is the work of a panel of sixteen eminent and expe-
rienced people, drawn from different parts of the world, whom I asked a year ago
to assess current threats to international peace and security; to evaluate how well
our existing policies and institutions have done in addressing those threats; and to
recommend ways of strengthening the United Nations to provide collective secu-
rity for the twenty-first century.
The Panel has met, and even surpassed, my expectations. This is a report of great
range and depth, which sets out a broad framework for collective security, and indeed
gives a broader meaning to that concept, appropriate for the new millennium. It sug-
gests not only ways to deal with particular threats, but also new ways of understand-
ing the connections between them, and explains what this implies in terms of shared
policies and institutions. In so doing, it also offers a unique opportunity to refashion
and renew the United Nations, which world leaders defined four years ago, in the
Millennium Declaration, as “the indispensable common house of the entire human
family”.
Findings and recommendations

I wholly endorse the report’s core argument that what is needed is a comprehensive sys-
IR-210: UN Report
tem of collective security: one that tackles both new and old threats, and addresses the
security concerns of all States - rich and poor, weak and strong. Particularly impor-
tant is the report’s insistence that today’s threats to our security are all interconnected.
We can no longer afford to see problems such as terrorism, or civil wars, or extreme
poverty, in isolation. Our strategies must be comprehensive. Our institutions must
overcome their narrow preoccupations and learn to work across the whole range of
issues, in a concerted fashion.
The report argues that the front line in today’s combat must be manned by capa-
ble and responsible States. I agree. The task of helping States improve their own
capacities to deal with contemporary threats is vital and urgent. The United Nations
must be able to do this better. The Panel tells us how.
vii

Page 114
Page 115
A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Foreword
Other findings of the report that I consider particularly important include of domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilitities, and calls for a
the following: voluntary time-limited moratorium on the construction of any such facilities.
• Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only These suggestions, if implemented swiftly and firmly, offer us a real chance to
possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop. Extreme poverty and reduce the risk of a nuclear attack, whether by States or non-State actors. They
infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile should be put into effect without delay.
breeding-ground for other threats, including civil conflict. Even people in rich • No less important are the recommendations for adapting the United Nations
countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat for the twenty-first century. The report criticizes several areas of the United
poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Nations performance and - however implicitly - United Nations management,
• We need to pay much closer attention to biological security. Our response to for which I take responsibility. These criticisms deserve to be taken seriously,
HIV/AIDS was, as the report says, “shockingly late and shamefully ill- and acted upon.
resourced”, and donors are still not providing anything like the amount of aid • All the United Nations principal organs are in need of change, including the
needed to halt the pandemic. But the report goes further. It calls attention to Security Council. The report offers two alternative formulae for expanding the
the overall deterioration of our global health system, which is ill-equipped to Council’s membership, which I hope will make it easier for Governments to
protect us against existing and emerging infectious diseases; and it highlights reach a decision in 2005.
both the promise and the peril of advances in biotechnology. It calls for a major • The report rightly identifies post-conflict peacebuilding as an area of vital
initiative to rebuild global public health, beginning with a concerted effort to concern, and offers new ideas for improving our performance in this area -
build public health capacity throughout the developing world, at both local including a new inter-governmental body, the ’Peacebuilding Commission’,
and national levels. This will not only yield direct benefits by preventing and whose task would be to help States make a successful transition from the
treating disease in the developing world itself, but will also provide the basis immediate post-conflict phase to longer-term reconstruction and development.
for an effective global defence against bio-terrorism and overwhelming natural
• The report also recommends changes to the Commission on Human Rights.
outbreaks of deadly infectious disease.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights remains one of the United Nations
• While our principal aim should be to prevent threats from emerging, when greatest achievements, and we should all be proud of the Organization’s work in
they do emerge we must be better prepared to respond. Two of the tools we developing international human rights norms and standards. But we cannot move
have for this are sanctions and mediation. The Panel recommends ways to forward without restoring the credibility and effectiveness of our human rights
strengthen both. I urge Governments to adopt them. mechanisms and refocusing ourselves on the protection of individual rights.
• When all else fails, it may be necessary and legitimate to use force. The report • Finally, the report makes recommendations, which I welcome, for strengthen-
makes a crucial contribution to the search for common criteria, by which to ing the Secretariat. The world needs, and is entitled to expect, an effective
decide when the use of force is justified. I hope Governments will consider its
IR-210: UN Report
United Nations Secretariat, which can attract and retain the best people from
recommendations very carefully. A new consensus on this issue is essential if all parts of the world.
our collective security system is ever to be truly effective.
• The United Nations must make better use of its assets in the fight against ter- Conclusion
rorism, articulating an effective and principled counter-terrorism strategy that
is respectful of the rule of law and universal human rights. One of the obstacles I hope people all over the world will read this report, discuss it, and urge their
to this up to now has been the inability of United Nations members to agree on Governments to take prompt decisions on its recommendations. I believe the great
a definition of terrorism. The report offers a definition which, I believe, will majority of them will share my feeling that there is an urgent need for the nations of
help build the consensus we need if we are to move forward quickly. the world to come together and reach a new consensus - both on the future of collec-
tive security and on the changes needed if the United Nations is to play its part.
• There is a real danger that we could see a cascade of nuclear proliferation in For my part, I will move quickly to consider and implement, as appropriate, those
the near future. The report recommends ways of strengthening the non- recommendations that are within my purview. I urge the other organs of the United
proliferation regime by creating incentives for States to forego the development
viii ix

Nations to do the same. And on those issues - such as the rules and norms governing Transmittal letter addressed to the Secretary-General
the use of force - which go to the very heart of who we are as the United Nations and
what we stand for, I believe decisions should be taken by world leaders next from the Chair of the High-level Panel on Threats,
September, when they meet for a special summit at United Nations Headquarters in Challenges and Change
New York. In March 2005 I shall submit a report of my own, which I hope will help I have the privilege to transmit to you the report of the High-level Panel on Threats,
to set the agenda for that summit. Challenges and Change, entitled “A more secure world: our shared responsibility.”
Finally, I would like to express my sincere admiration for the work of the Chair The report puts forward a new vision of collective security, one that addresses all
and members of the Panel in producing this report. They did not shrink from tack- of the major threats to international peace and security felt around the world. Our
ling the toughest issues that divide us. That such a diverse group, composed of such research and consultations revealed that ours is an age of unparalleled interconnection
experienced people, could reach consensus on such farsighted, yet workable, recom- among threats to international peace and security, and mutual vulnerability between
mendations gives me hope that the nations of the world can do the same, thereby giv- weak and strong. We found that the United Nations has been much more effective in
ing new meaning and resonance to the name “United Nations”. addressing the major threats to peace and security than it is given credit for, but that
nonetheless major changes are needed if the United Nations is to be effective, efficient
and equitable in providing collective security for all in the twenty-first century.
Our mandate from you precluded any in-depth examination of individual con-
flicts and we have respected that guidance. But the members of the Panel believe it
Kofi A. Annan
would be remiss of them if they failed to point out that no amount of systemic
Secretary-General of the United Nations
changes to the way the United Nations handles both old and new threats to peace
and security will enable it to discharge effectively its role under the Charter if efforts
are not redoubled to resolve a number of long-standing disputes which continue to
fester and to feed the new threats we now face. Foremost among these are the issues of
Palestine, Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula.
The members of the Panel may not be in full agreement with every specific point
and detail of the report, but they all endorse the report and generally agree with its
findings. I undertake to draw to your attention, however, that the members of the
Panel disagree about the models put forth for Security Council expansion and the
method for determining criteria for Security Council membership. Some members of
the Panel believe strongly that only the model involving expansion of permanent
IR-210: UN Report
membership, albeit without a veto, will equip the Security Council to deal with the
new century’s threats. Others believe equally strongly that the alternative model
involving elected, long-term but non-permanent members is the better way to pro-
ceed. We all agree, however, that it would be a major error to allow the discussions
needed to move towards a decision between the two options to divert attention from
decisions on the many other necessary proposals for change, the validity and viability
of which do not depend on Security Council enlargement.
Our report is addressed to you, but many of our recommendations will require
commitment from and action by heads of Government. Only through their leadership
can we realistically forge the new consensus required to meet the threats described in
our report.
x xi

Page 116
Page 117
Our deliberations drew on inputs from a wide range of sources, including Synopsis
Governments, academic experts and civil society organizations across the globe. None
of our work would have been possible were it not for the extensive support we Towards a new security consensus
received. The following Governments made generous financial contributions to our The United Nations was created in 1945 above all else “to save succeeding genera-
work: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Greece, tions from the scourge of war” - to ensure that the horrors of the World Wars were
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, never repeated. Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest security
Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, threats we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging aggres-
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and United Kingdom. The following foundations and sive war. They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation;
think tanks made financial or in-kind contributions to our work: Carnegie war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological,
Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, International Peace Academy, John D. chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. The
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, New York University Center on threats are from non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as
International Cooperation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Rockefeller Foundation, State security.
Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanley The preoccupation of the United Nations founders was with State security. When
Foundation, United Nations Foundation and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. they spoke of creating a new system of collective security they meant it in the tradi-
I should like to conclude by thanking you most warmly on my own behalf and tional military sense: a system in which States join together and pledge that aggres-
that of other members of the Panel for the honour of entrusting to us this important sion against one is aggression against all, and commit themselves in that event to react
task. I also wish to register our gratitude to all those who have contributed over the collectively. But they also understood well, long before the idea of human security
past year to our process of reflection, and above all to our Research Director, Stephen gained currency, the indivisibility of security, economic development and human free-
Stedman, and the Secretary of the Panel, Loraine Rickard-Martin, and their staff, dom. In the opening words of the Charter, the United Nations was created “to reaf-
without whose hard work and intellectual contributions the present report would not firm faith in fundamental human rights” and “to promote social progress and better
have seen the light of day. standards of life in larger freedom”.
The central challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a new and broader
understanding, bringing together all these strands, of what collective security means
- and of all the responsibilities, commitments, strategies and institutions that come
Anand Panyarachun with it if a collective security system is to be effective, efficient and equitable.
Chairman
If there is to be a new security consensus, it must start with the understanding that
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
the front-line actors in dealing with all the threats we face, new and old, continue to be
individual sovereign States, whose role and responsibilities, and right to be respected,
IR-210: UN Report
are fully recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. But in the twenty-first cen-
tury, more than ever before, no State can stand wholly alone. Collective strategies, col-
lective institutions and a sense of collective responsibility are indispensable.
The case for collective security today rests on three basic pillars. Today’s threats
recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global
and regional as well as the national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by
its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be
assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to
protect its own peoples and not to harm its neighbours.
We must not underestimate the difficulty of reaching a new consensus about the
meaning and responsibilities of collective security. Many will regard one or more of
xii 1

A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Synopsis
the threats we identify as not really being a threat to international peace and security. nent and those that are imminent do not actually become destructive. This requires a
Some believe that HIV/AIDS is a horrible disease, but not a security threat. Or that framework for preventive action which addresses all these threats in all the ways they
terrorism is a threat to some States, but not all. Or that civil wars in Africa are a resonate most in different parts of the world. Most of all, it will require leadership at
humanitarian tragedy, but surely not a problem for international security. Or that the domestic and international levels to act early, decisively and collectively against all
poverty is a problem of development, not security. these threats - from HIV/AIDS to nuclear terrorism - before they have their most dev-
Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as the astating effect.
gravest threats to our survival and well-being. Differences of focus lead us to dismiss In describing how to meet the challenge of prevention, we begin with develop-
what others perceive as the gravest of all threats to their survival. Inequitable responses ment because it is the indispensable foundation for a collective security system that
to threats further fuel division. Many people believe that what passes for collective secu- takes prevention seriously. It serves multiple functions. It helps combat the poverty,
rity today is simply a system for protecting the rich and powerful. Such perceptions pose infectious disease and environmental degradation that kill millions and threaten
a fundamental challenge to building collective security today. Stated baldly, without human security. It is vital in helping States prevent or reverse the erosion of State
mutual recognition of threats there can be no collective security. Self-help will rule, mis- capacity, which is crucial for meeting almost every class of threat. And it is part of a
trust will predominate and cooperation for long-term mutual gain will elude us. long-term strategy for preventing civil war and for addressing the environments in
What is needed today is nothing less than a new consensus between alliances which both terrorism and organized crime flourish.
that are frayed, between wealthy nations and poor, and among peoples mired in mis-
trust across an apparently widening cultural abyss. The essence of that consensus is Collective security and the use of force
simple: we all share responsibility for each other’s security. And the test of that con-
sensus will be action. What happens if peaceful prevention fails? If none of the preventive measures so far
described stop the descent into war and chaos? If distant threats do become imminent?
Or if imminent threats become actual? Or if a non-imminent threat nonetheless becomes
Collective security and the challenge of prevention very real and measures short of the use of military force seem powerless to stop it?
Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and We address here the circumstances in which effective collective security may
undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to interna- require the backing of military force, starting with the rules of international law that
tional security. So defined, there are six clusters of threats with which the world must must govern any decision to go to war if anarchy is not to prevail. It is necessary to
be concerned now and in the decades ahead: distinguish between situations in which a State claims to act in self-defence; situations
in which a State is posing a threat to others outside its borders; and situations in which
• Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environ-
the threat is primarily internal and the issue is the responsibility to protect a State’s
mental degradation
own people. In all cases, we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly
• Inter-State conflict
IR-210: UN Report
understood and applied, is equal to the task: Article 51 needs neither extension nor
• Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities
restriction of its long-understood scope, and Chapter VII fully empowers the Security
Council to deal with every kind of threat that States may confront. The task is not to
• Terrorism
find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work
• Transnational organized crime
better than it has.
In its first 60 years, the United Nations has made crucial contributions to reduc-
That force can legally be used does not always mean that, as a matter of good con-
ing or mitigating these threats to international security. While there have been major
science and good sense, it should be used. We identify a set of guidelines - five crite-
failures and shortcomings, the record of successes and contributions is underappreci-
ria of legitimacy - which we believe that the Security Council (and anyone else
ated. This gives hope that the Organization can adapt to successfully confront the new
involved in these decisions) should always address in considering whether to author-
challenges of the twenty-first century.
ize or apply military force. The adoption of these guidelines (seriousness of threat,
The primary challenge for the United Nations and its members is to ensure that, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences) will not
of all the threats in the categories listed, those that are distant do not become immi- produce agreed conclusions with push-button predictability, but should significantly
2 3

Page 118
Page 119
A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Synopsis
improve the chances of reaching international consensus on what have been in recent and diplomatically should participate more in Council decision-making, and
years deeply divisive issues. those who participate in Council decision-making should contribute more to
We also address here the other major issues that arise during and after violent the Organization. The Security Council needs greater credibility, legitimacy
conflict, including the needed capacities for peace enforcement, peacekeeping and and representation to do all that we demand of it.
peacebuilding, and the protection of civilians. A central recurring theme is the neces- • There is a major institutional gap in addressing countries under stress and
sity for all members of the international community, developed and developing States countries emerging from conflict. Such countries often suffer from attention,
alike, to be much more forthcoming in providing and supporting deployable military policy guidance and resource deficits.
resources. Empty gestures are all too easy to make: an effective, efficient and equitable • The Security Council has not made the most of the potential advantages of
collective security system demands real commitment. working with regional and subregional organizations.
• There must be new institutional arrangements to address the economic and
social threats to international security.
A more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century • The Commission on Human Rights suffers from a legitimacy deficit that casts
The United Nations was never intended to be a utopian exercise. It was meant to doubts on the overall reputation of the United Nations.
be a collective security system that worked. The Charter of the United Nations • There is a need for a more professional and better organized Secretariat that is
provided the most powerful States with permanent membership on the Security much more capable of concerted action.
Council and the veto. In exchange, they were expected to use their power for the The reforms we propose will not by themselves make the United Nations more
common good and promote and obey international law. As Harry Truman, then effective. In the absence of Member States reaching agreement on the security consen-
President of the United States, noted in his speech to the final plenary session of sus contained in the present report, the United Nations will underachieve. Its insti-
the founding conference of the United Nations Organization, “we all have to rec- tutions will still only be as strong as the energy, resources and attention devoted to
ognize - no matter how great our strength - that we must deny ourselves the them by Member States and their leaders.
licence to do always as we please”.
In approaching the issue of United Nations reform, it is as important today as it
was in 1945 to combine power with principle. Recommendations that ignore under-
lying power realities will be doomed to failure or irrelevance, but recommendations
that simply reflect raw distributions of power and make no effort to bolster interna-
tional principles are unlikely to gain the widespread adherence required to shift inter-
national behaviour.
Proposed changes should be driven by real-world need. Change for its own sake
IR-210: UN Report
is likely to run the well-worn course of the endless reform debates of the past decade.
The litmus test is this: does a proposed change help meet the challenge posed by a
virulent threat?
Throughout the work of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, we have looked for institutional weaknesses in current responses to threats.
The following stand as the most urgently in need of remedy:
• The General Assembly has lost vitality and often fails to focus effectively on
the most compelling issues of the day.
• The Security Council will need to be more proactive in the future. For this to
happen, those who contribute most to the Organization financially, militarily
4 5

IR-210: UN Report
Page 120
Towards a new security consensus

Part 1

Page 121
Part 1
Towards a new security consensus
Synopsis
The United Nations was created in 1945 above all else “to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war” - to ensure that the horrors of the World Wars were never
repeated. Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest security threats we face
now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging aggressive war. They extend
to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within
States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological
weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. The threats are from non-State
actors as well as States, and to human security as well as State security.
The preoccupation of the United Nations founders was with State security. When
they spoke of creating a new system of collective security they meant it in the tradi-
tional military sense: a system in which States join together and pledge that aggres-
sion against one is aggression against all, and commit themselves in that event to react
collectively. But they also understood well, long before the idea of human security
gained currency, the indivisibility of security, economic development and human free-
dom. In the opening words of the Charter, the United Nations was created “to reaf-
firm faith in fundamental human rights” and “to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom”.
The central challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a new and broader
understanding, bringing together all these strands, of what collective security means -
and of all the responsibilities, commitments, strategies and institutions that come with
it if a collective security system is to be effective, efficient and equitable.
If there is to be a new security consensus, it must start with the understanding that
the front-line actors in dealing with all the threats we face, new and old, continue to be
IR-210: UN Report
individual sovereign States, whose role and responsibilities, and right to be respected, are
fully recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. But in the twenty-first century,
more than ever before, no State can stand wholly alone. Collective strategies, collective
institutions and a sense of collective responsibility are indispensable.
The case for collective security today rests on three basic pillars. Today’s threats
recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global
and regional as well as national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its
own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be assumed
that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to protect its
own peoples and not to harm its neighbours.
We must not underestimate the difficulty of reaching a new consensus about the
meaning and responsibilities of collective security. Many will regard one or more of

A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Part 1: Toward a new security consensus
the threats we identify as not really being a threat to international peace and security. formed a majority in the General Assembly and through it gained a voice in
Some believe that HIV/AIDS is a horrible disease, but not a security threat. Or that international politics largely denied to them outside the institution.
terrorism is a threat to some States, but not all. Or that civil wars in Africa are a 3. The second half of the twentieth century was a struggle for the viability of these
humanitarian tragedy, but surely not a problem for international security. Or that new States and the well-being of their citizens. They inherited arbitrary colo-
poverty is a problem of development, not security. nial boundaries and colonial economies designed to serve the needs of the
Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as metropole. Independence was the start of a race to educate and develop the pro-
the gravest threats to our survival and well-being. Differences of focus lead us to dis- fessional, scientific and technological expertise to run modern States and
miss what others perceive as the gravest of all threats to their survival. Inequitable economies. All of this took place in an era of huge expectations about what
responses to threats further fuel division. Many people believe that what passes for States could and should deliver, when most models of economic growth relied
collective security today is simply a system for protecting the rich and powerful. on heavy State control.
Such perceptions pose a fundamental challenge to building collective security today. 4. In the last 40 years, life expectancy in developing countries has increased by
Stated baldly, without mutual recognition of threats there can be no collective secu- 20 years, and per capita income has doubled in such countries as Botswana,
rity. Self-help will rule, mistrust will predominate and cooperation for long-term Brazil, China, the Republic of Korea and Turkey in less than a third of the time
mutual gain will elude us. it took to do so in the United Kingdom or the United States a century or more
What is needed today is nothing less than a new consensus between alliances that earlier. Despite such progress, however, large parts of the world remained mired
are frayed, between wealthy nations and poor, and among peoples mired in mistrust in life-threatening poverty. Between 1975 and 1999, sub-Saharan Africa saw no
across an apparently widening cultural abyss. The essence of that consensus is simple: overall increase in its per capita income.
we all share responsibility for each other’s security. And the test of that consensus will 5. By the 1980s, many of these new States faced crises of State capacity and legit-
be action. imacy, reflected in the rise of internal wars as the dominant form of warfare in
the second half of the twentieth century (see figure below).
I. Different worlds: 1945 and 2005
Wars
1. The United Nations was created in a spirit of optimism fuelled by the end of 1946-2002
the Second World War and the will to avoid a repeat of its horrors and those
of its predecessor. For many of the States most traumatized by two world wars, Number of ongoing civil wars
50
the experiment has been successful. Over the subsequent 60 years, many parts Number of ongoing inter-State wars
of the world have enjoyed unparalleled peace and prosperity. The dynamics and
tensions that led to the Second World War were laid to rest, war between the 40
IR-210: UN Report
great Powers was avoided and a stable peace emerged in Europe. Japan,
Germany and Italy were successfully integrated into the family of nations and 30
are currently the second, third and sixth largest financial contributors to the
United Nations. 20
2. In the first 30 years of the United Nations, dozens of new States emerged from
colonial systems that, until recent times, tied half of mankind to a handful of 10
capitals. Assisting new States into being was a seminal contribution of the
United Nations during this period. Decolonization in turn transformed the 0
United Nations. At the creation of the United Nations in 1945, there were 1946 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
51 members; today there are 191. The General Assembly was transformed from
Source: Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University; and International Peace
a body composed of States that largely resembled one another to one whose Research Institute, Oslo.
membership varied dramatically. By the mid-1960s, developing countries
10 11

Page 122
Page 123
6. As we enter the twenty-first century, these struggles are far from over. More Council authorized the use of force against Iraq to liberate Kuwait. The
than a billion people lack access to clean water, more than two billion have no Security Council broadened the interpretation of threats to international peace
access to adequate sanitation and more than three million die every year from and security to authorize an intervention for humanitarian purposes in Somalia.
water-related diseases. Fourteen million people, including six million children, The United Nations helped bring to an end several protracted wars in Central
die every year from hunger. There were 842 million undernourished people in America and Southern Africa.
2000; 95 per cent lived in poor countries. 13. The moment was short-lived. It quickly became apparent that the United
7. Almost 30 million people in Africa now have HIV/AIDS. In the worst-affected Nations had exchanged the shackles of the cold war for the straitjacket of
States, middle-aged urban elites are heavily afflicted, eroding State capacity and Member State complacency and great Power indifference. Although the United
decimating the economic activity of what should be a State’s most productive Nations gave birth to the notion of human security, it proved poorly equipped
group. The increasing number of infected women and girls is threatening food to provide it. Long-standing regional conflicts, such as those involving
and agricultural production. If trends are not reversed, some of these States face Israel/Palestine and Kashmir, remained unresolved. Failures to act in the face of
collapse under the combined weight of poverty and HIV/AIDS. ethnic cleansing and genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia eroded international sup-
8. Decolonization was only one of the forces that shaped the United Nations. The port. Optimism yielded to renewed cynicism about
United Nations founders did not anticipate that the United States and the former the willingness of Member States to support the The attacks of 11 September
Organization. 2001 revealed that States,
Soviet Union would soon embark on a global rivalry, developing and deploying tens
as well as collective security
of thousands of nuclear weapons capable of destroying the world many times over. 14. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on New
institutions, have failed to
9. Controlling the destructive capability of nuclear technology and harnessing its York and Washington, D.C., brought with them a
keep pace with changes in
promise became central to the work of the United Nations. The very first reso- glimpse of the potential for renewed collective secu-
the nature of threats.
lution adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 called for the disarmament of rity. On 12 September 2001, France introduced and
“weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1368 (2001), which con-
10. The cold war shaped much of global politics for the next 45 years. The rivalry demned the attacks and opened the way for United States-led military action
between the United States and the former Soviet Union blocked the Security against the Taliban regime in self-defence. On the same day, the General
Council from playing a dominant role in maintaining international peace and Assembly condemned terrorism and the attacks. On 28 September 2001, the
security. Nearly all armed conflicts and struggles for liberation were viewed Security Council adopted resolution 1373 (2001), which obligates all Member
through the prism of East-West rivalry until the historic collapse of the former States, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to take specific
Soviet Union and the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe. actions to combat terrorism. Three months later, the United Nations presided
over the Bonn Agreement, which created an interim government to replace the
11. Nonetheless, without the United Nations the post-1945 world would very deposed Taliban regime. The United Nations stood behind the interim govern-
IR-210: UN Report
probably have been a bloodier place. There were fewer inter-State wars in the ment in Afghanistan as custodian of the peace process and helped to draft the
last half of the twentieth century than in the first half. Given that during the country’s new constitution.
same period the number of States grew almost fourfold, one might have
expected to see a marked rise in inter-State wars. Yet that did not occur and the 15. This spirit of international purpose lasted only months and was eroded by divi-
United Nations contributed to that result. The United Nations diminished the sions over the United States-led war in Iraq in 2003.
threat of inter-State war in several ways. Peace was furthered by the invention 16. The attacks of 11 September 2001 revealed that States, as well as collective
of peacekeeping; diplomacy was carried out by the Secretary-General; disputes security institutions, have failed to keep pace with changes in the nature of
were remedied under the International Court of Justice; and a strong norm was threats. The technological revolution that has radically changed the worlds of
upheld against aggressive war. communication, information-processing, health and transportation has eroded
12. The dramatic but peaceful end of the cold war opened an opportunity for col- borders, altered migration and allowed individuals the world over to share
lective security to flourish. The first years after the end of the cold war seemed information at a speed inconceivable two decades ago. Such changes have
to point towards a new role for the United Nations. In 1990, the Security brought many benefits but also great potential for harm. Smaller and smaller
12 13

numbers of people are able to inflict greater and greater amounts of damage, absence of human rights and democracy; by religious and other intolerance; and
without the support of any State. A new threat, transnational organized crime, by civil violence - a witch’s brew common to those areas where civil war and
undermines the rule of law within and across borders. regional conflict intersect. In recent years, terrorists have helped to finance their
Today, more than ever before, a Technologies designed to improve daily life can be trans- activities and moved large sums of money by gaining access to such valuable
threat to one is a threat to all. formed into instruments of aggression. We have yet to commodities as drugs in countries beset by civil war.
The mutual vulnerability of fully understand the impact of these changes, but they 22. Poverty, infectious disease, environmental degradation and war feed one another in
weak and strong has never herald a fundamentally different security climate - one a deadly cycle. Poverty (as measured by per capita gross domestic product (GDP))
been clearer. whose unique opportunities for cooperation are matched is strongly associated with the outbreak of civil war (see figure below). Such dis-
by an unprecedented scope for destruction. eases as malaria and HIV/AIDS continue to cause large numbers of deaths and rein-
force poverty. Disease and poverty, in turn, are connected to environmental degra-
II. The case for comprehensive collective security dation; climate change exacerbates the occurrence of such infectious disease as
malaria and dengue fever. Environmental stress, caused by large populations and
A. Threats without boundaries shortages of land and other natural resources, can contribute to civil violence.
17. Today, more than ever before, threats are interrelated and a threat to one is a threat
to all. The mutual vulnerability of weak and strong has never been clearer. The link between poverty and civil war
18. Global economic integration means that a major terrorist attack anywhere in
the developed world would have devastating consequences for the well-being 12%
of millions of people in the developing world. The World Bank estimates that
the attacks of 11 September 2001 alone increased the number of people living 10%
in poverty by 10 million; the total cost to the world economy probably
8%
exceeded 80 billion dollars. These numbers would be far surpassed by an inci-
dent involving nuclear terrorism. 6%
19. Similarly, the security of the most affluent State can be held hostage to the abil-
ity of the poorest State to contain an emerging disease. Because international 4%
within five years (percentage)
flight times are shorter than the incubation periods for many infectious dis-
2%
Predicted probability of civil war onset
eases, any one of 700 million international airline passengers every year can be
an unwitting global disease-carrier. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 0%
IR-210: UN Report
spread to more than 8,000 people in 30 countries in three months, killing $250 $1,000 $2,000 $3,000 $4,000 $5,000
almost 700. The influenza pandemic of 1919 killed as many as 100 million GDP per capita (in US$)
people, far more than the First World War, over a period of a little more than
Source: Research undertaken by Macartan Humphreys (Columbia University), based on data provided by
a year. Today, a similar virus could kill tens of millions in a fraction of the time. the World Bank, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.
20. Every threat to international security today enlarges the risk of other threats.
Nuclear proliferation by States increases the availability of the materiel and
technology necessary for a terrorist to acquire a nuclear weapon. The ability of 23. Transnational organized crime facilitates many of the most serious threats to
non-State actors to traffic in nuclear materiel and technology is aided by in- international peace and security. Corruption, illicit trade and money-laundering
effective State control of borders and transit through weak States. contribute to State weakness, impede economic growth and undermine democ-
21. International terrorist groups prey on weak States for sanctuary. Their recruit- racy. These activities thus create a permissive environment for civil conflict. The
ment is aided by grievances nurtured by poverty, foreign occupation and the prospect of organized criminal groups providing nuclear, radiological, chemical
and biological weapon to terrorists is particularly worrying. Increasing drug
14 15

Page 124
Page 125
trade partly accounts for rapidly increasing levels of HIV/AIDS infections, espe- C. Sovereignty and responsibility
cially in Eastern Europe and parts of Asia. And organized criminal activities
undermine peacebuilding efforts and fuel many civil wars through illicit trade 29. In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit from the priv-
in conflict commodities and small arms. ileges of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities. Whatever perceptions may
have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State
sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the
B. The limits of self-protection welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international com-
24. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself munity. But history teaches us all too clearly that it cannot be assumed that every
invulnerable to today’s threats. Every State requires the cooperation of other State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own
States to make itself secure. It is in every State’s interest, accordingly, to coop- people and avoid harming its neighbours. And in those circumstances, the princi-
erate with other States to address their most pressing threats, because doing so ples of collective security mean that some portion of those responsibilities should
will maximize the chances of reciprocal cooperation to address its own threat be taken up by the international community, acting in accordance with the Charter
priorities. of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to help
build the necessary capacity or supply the necessary protection, as the case may be.
25. Take, as one example, the threat of nuclear terrorism. Experts estimate that terror-
ists with 50 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), an amount that would 30. What we seek to protect reflects what we value. The Charter of the United
fit into six one-litre milk cartons, need only smuggle it across borders in order to Nations seeks to protect all States, not because they are intrinsically good but
create an improvised nuclear device that could level a medium-sized city. Border because they are necessary to achieve the dignity, justice, worth and safety of
controls will not provide adequate defence against this threat. To overcome the their citizens. These are the values that should be at the heart of any collective
threat of nuclear terrorism requires the cooperation of States, strong and weak, to security system for the twenty-first century, but too often States have failed to
clean up stockpiles of HEU, better protect shipping containers at ports and agree respect and promote them. The collective security we seek to build today asserts
on new rules regulating the enrichment of uranium. Cooperation in the sharing a shared responsibility on the part of all States and international institutions,
of intelligence by States is essential for stopping terrorism. and those who lead them, to do just that.
26. Similarly, in order to stop organized crime States must cooperate to fight money-
laundering, trafficking in drugs and persons, and corruption. International efforts D. Elements of a credible collective security system
to stem the problem are only as strong as the weakest link. Ineffective collective 31. To be credible and sustainable a collective security system must be effective, effi-
security institutions diminish the security of every region and State. cient and equitable. In all these respects, the multilateral system as we now know
27. The most robust defence against the possible terrorist use of nuclear, chemical it, in responding to the major security threats which the world has confronted in
or biological weapons would seek to control dangerous materials, deter and cap- recent decades, has shown that it can perform. But it must be strengthened to per-
IR-210: UN Report
ture terrorists, and address the broader threats that increase the risk of terrorist form better - in all the ways we spell out in the present report.
action. Civil war, disease and poverty increase the likelihood of State collapse
and facilitate the spread of organized crime, thus also increasing the risk of ter-
rorism and proliferation due to weak States and weak collective capacity to exer- 1. Effectiveness
cise the rule of law. Preventing mass-casualty terrorism requires a deep engage- 32. Whether by reducing the demand for nuclear weapons, mediating inter-State
ment to strengthen collective security systems, ameliorate poverty, combat conflict or ending civil wars, collective security institutions have made critical
extremism, end the grievances that flow from war, tackle the spread of infec- contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security, although
tious disease and fight organized crime. those contributions are often denigrated, both by those who would have the
28. Thus all States have an interest in forging a new comprehensive collective secu- institutions do more and by those who would have them do less.
rity system that will commit all of them to act cooperatively in the face of a 33. Collective security institutions are rarely effective in isolation. Multilateral
broad array of threats. institutions normally operate alongside national, regional and sometimes civil
16 17

society actors, and are most effective when these efforts are aligned to common failure to invest time and resources early in order to prevent the outbreak and
goals. This is as true of mediation as it is of post-conflict reconstruction, poverty- escalation of conflicts leads to much larger and deadlier conflagrations that are
reduction strategies and non-proliferation measures. much costlier to handle later.
34. States are still the front-line responders to today’s threats. Successful interna-
tional actions to battle poverty, fight infectious disease, stop transnational crime, 3. Equity
rebuild after civil war, reduce terrorism and halt the spread of dangerous mate-
rials all require capable, responsible States as partners. It fol- 40. The credibility of any system of collective security also depends on how well it
Monitoring and verification promotes security for all its members, without regard to the nature of would-
lows that greater effort must be made to enhance the capac-
work best when they are be beneficiaries, their location, resources or relationship to great Powers.
ity of States to exercise their sovereignty responsibly. For all
treated as complements to, not
those in a position to help others build that capacity, it 41. Too often, the United Nations and its Member States have discriminated in
substitutes for, enforcement.
should be part of their responsibility to do so. responding to threats to international security. Contrast the swiftness with
35. Collective action often fails, sometimes dramatically so. Collective instruments which the United Nations responded to the attacks
The credibility of any system
are often hampered by a lack of compliance, erratic monitoring and verification, on 11 September 2001 with its actions when con-
of collective security also
and weak enforcement. Early warning is only effective when it leads to early fronted with a far more deadly event: from April to
depends on how well it
action for prevention. Monitoring and verification work best when they are mid-July 1994, Rwanda experienced the equivalent
promotes security for all its
treated as complements to, not substitutes for, enforcement. of three 11 September 2001 attacks every day for
members, without regard to
100 days, all in a country whose population was one
36. Collective security institutions have proved particularly poor at meeting the the nature of would-be
thirty-sixth that of the United States. Two weeks into
challenge posed by large-scale, gross human rights abuses and genocide. This beneficiaries, their location,
the genocide, the Security Council withdrew most of
is a normative challenge to the United Nations: the concept of State and inter- resources or relationship to
its peacekeepers from the country. It took almost a
national responsibility to protect civilians from the effects of war and human great Powers.
month for United Nations officials to call it a geno-
rights abuses has yet to truly overcome the tension between the competing cide and even longer for some Security Council members. When a new mission
claims of sovereign inviolability and the right to intervene. It is also an opera- was finally authorized for Rwanda, six weeks into the genocide, few States
tional challenge: the challenge of stopping a Government from killing its own offered soldiers. The mission deployed as the genocide ended.
civilians requires considerable military deployment capacity.
42. Similarly, throughout the deliberation of the High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, we have been struck once again by the glacial speed at
2. Efficiency which our institutions have responded to massive human rights violations in
37. Some collective security instruments have been efficient. As the institutional Darfur, Sudan.
IR-210: UN Report
embodiment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and 43. When the institutions of collective security respond in an ineffective and
of considerable long-term success in preventing widespread proliferation of inequitable manner, they reveal a much deeper truth about which threats mat-
nuclear weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - with its ter. Our institutions of collective security must not just assert that a threat to
regular budget of less than $275 million - stands out as an extraordinary bar- one is truly a threat to all, but perform accordingly.
gain. Similarly, the Secretary-General’s mediation efforts, though grossly
underresourced, have helped reduce international tensions.
38. But more collective security instruments have been inefficient. Post-conflict
operations, for example, have too often been characterized by countless ill-
coordinated and overlapping bilateral and United Nations programmes, with
inter-agency competition preventing the best use of scarce resources.
39. The biggest source of inefficiency in our collective security institutions has sim-
ply been an unwillingness to get serious about preventing deadly violence. The
18 19

Page 126
IR-210: UN Report
Page 127
Collective security and the

challenge of prevention
Part 2

Part 2
Collective security and the challenge of prevention
Synopsis
Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and
undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to interna-
tional security. So defined, there are six clusters of threats with which the world must
be concerned now and in the decades ahead:
• Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environ-
mental degradation
• Inter-State conflict
• Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities
• Terrorism
• Transnational organized crime
In its first 60 years, the United Nations has made crucial contributions to reduc-
ing or mitigating these threats to international security. While there have been major
failures and shortcomings, the record of successes and contributions is underappreci-
ated. This gives hope that the Organization can adapt to successfully confront the new
challenges of the twenty-first century.
The primary challenge for the United Nations and its members is to ensure that,
of all the threats in the categories listed, those that are distant do not become immi-
nent and those that are imminent do not actually become destructive. This requires a
framework for preventive action which addresses all these threats in all the ways they
resonate most in different parts of the world. Most of all, it will require leadership at
the domestic and international levels to act early, decisively and collectively against all
these threats - from HIV/AIDS to nuclear terrorism - before they have their most dev-
IR-210: UN Report
astating effect.
In describing how to meet the challenge of prevention, we begin with develop-
ment because it is the indispensable foundation for a collective security system that
takes prevention seriously. It serves multiple functions. It helps combat the poverty,
infectious disease and environmental degradation that kill millions and threaten
human security. It is vital in helping States prevent or reverse the erosion of State
capacity, which is crucial for meeting almost every class of threat. And it is part of a
long-term strategy for preventing civil war, and for addressing the environments in
which both terrorism and organized crime flourish.
23

Page 128
Page 129
A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Part 2: Collective security and the challenge of prevention
III. Poverty, infectious disease and environmental Global Programme on AIDS, came only in 1987, six years after the first cases
of HIV were identified and after it had infected millions of people worldwide.
degradation Nine years and 25 million infections later, the Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) was created to coordinate United
A. The threats we face Nations agencies working on HIV/AIDS. By 2000, when the Security Council
44. Since 1990, while developing countries’ per capita income has increased an aver- first discussed HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security, the
age of 3 per cent annually, the number of people living in extreme poverty has number of deaths per year from HIV/AIDS in Africa had outstripped the num-
increased in some regions by more than 100 million people. In at least 54 coun- ber of battle deaths in all the civil wars fought in the 1990s. By 2003, when the
tries, average per capita income has declined over the same period. Every year, Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was created, there were
almost 11 million children die from preventable diseases and more than half a more than 11 million children orphaned by HIV/AIDS in Africa.
million women die during pregnancy or childbirth. Increasing poverty is accom- 49. That Africa has borne the brunt of the HIV/AIDS pandemic raises the troubling
panied by an increase in global inequality and income inequality in many poor question of whether international response would have been so slow if the dis-
countries. In parts of Latin America, for example, the income of the wealthiest ease had reduced life expectancy by 30 years in non-African countries.
fifth of households is 30 times greater than that of the poorest fifth. Worldwide,
women and youth are disproportionately poor. 50. Progress in stemming other lethal infectious diseases remains elusive. The global
drive to control tuberculosis has shown significant advances, including
45. When poverty is added to ethnic or regional inequalities, the grievances that improvements in political commitment, financing, strategy formulation, access
stoke civil violence are compounded. While it may not to medication and medical research. Yet more than 8.5 million new cases of
International response to reach the level of war, the combination of a surging youth tuberculosis emerge and more than two million people die of tuberculosis every
HIV/AIDS was shockingly population, poverty, urbanization and unemployment has year. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that, if current trends
slow and remains shamefully resulted in increased gang violence in many cities of the continue, between now and 2020 nearly one billion people will be newly infected,
ill-resourced. developing world. As one woman poignantly asked during 150 million will develop the disease and 36 million will die. Further improve-
the Panel’s consultation with civil society organizations in ments in the affordability and accessibility of medicines - not just for tubercu-
Africa, “How have we let what should be our greatest asset, youth, become a losis - are still sorely needed.
threat to our security?”
51. The recent international experience in combating SARS shows how the spread of
46. The continent hardest hit by poverty is Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, average infectious disease can be limited when effective global institutions work in close
life expectancy has declined from 50 to 46 since 1990. Whereas in the devel- partnership with capable national institutions. Rapid response by WHO and
oped world less than one in 100 children die before age five, in most of sub- national agencies contained the spread of the disease and prevented a far more serious
Saharan Africa that number is one in 10, and in 14 countries it is one in five. outbreak that could have threatened thousands of lives on several continents. No
IR-210: UN Report
In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people living on less than $1 a day has State could have achieved this degree of containment of the disease in isolation.
increased since 1990. While undernourishment decreased worldwide in the
1990s, it increased in Africa. 52. Current trends indicate persistent and possibly worsening food insecurity in
many countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Population growth in the
47. Over the past three decades, the world has seen the emergence of new infec- developing world and increased per capita consumption in the industrialized
tious diseases, a resurgence of older diseases and a spread of resistance to a world have led to greater demand for scarce resources. The loss of arable land,
growing number of mainstay antibiotic drugs. Recent outbreaks of polio water scarcity, overfishing, deforestation and the alteration of ecosystems pose
threaten to undermine its near eradication, which was one of the great accom- daunting challenges for sustainable development. The world’s population is
plishments of the twentieth century. These trends signify a dramatic decay in expected to increase from 6.3 billion today to 8.9 billion in 2050, with nearly
local and global public health capacity. all of that growth occurring in the countries least equipped to absorb it. Feeding
48. International response to HIV/AIDS was shockingly slow and remains shame- such a rapidly growing population will only be possible if agricultural yields
fully ill-resourced. The first major international initiative on HIV/AIDS, the can be increased significantly and sustainably.
24 25

53. Environmental degradation has enhanced the destructive potential of natural Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa, and the International
disasters and in some cases hastened their occurrence. The dramatic increase in Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico, have led
major disasters witnessed in the last 50 years provides worrying evidence of this to global understanding and ambitious programmes for alleviating poverty, pro-
trend. More than two billion people were affected by such disasters in the last viding food security, growing economies and protecting the environment in ways
decade, and in the same period the economic toll surpassed that of the previous that benefit future generations. The United Nations Millennium Declaration con-
four decades combined. If climate change produces more acute flooding, heat tains an ambitious but feasible set of agreed targets and benchmarks, later consol-
waves, droughts and storms, this pace may accelerate. idated into the Millennium Development Goals, ranging from halving extreme
54. Rarely are environmental concerns factored into security, development or human- poverty and protecting the environment to achieving greater gender equality and
itarian strategies. Nor is there coherence in environmental protection efforts at the halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015.
global level. Most attempts to create governance structures to 58. In 2002, world leaders agreed at Monterrey that aid donors and aid recipients
International institutions and tackle the problems of global environmental degradation both have obligations to achieve development. The primary responsibility for
States continue to treat have not effectively addressed climate change, deforestation economic and social development lies with Governments, which must create a
poverty, disease and environ- and desertification. Regional and global multilateral treaties conducive environment for vigorous private-sector-led growth and aid effective-
mental degradation as stand- on the environment are undermined by inadequate imple- ness by pursuing sound economic policies, building effective and responsible
alone threats. mentation and enforcement by the Member States. institutions and investing in public and social services that will reach all of their
55. International institutions and States have not organized themselves to address people. In return for substantive improvements in the policies and institutions
the problems of development in a coherent, integrated way, and instead con- of developing countries, donor nations agreed to renew their efforts to reduce
tinue to treat poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation as poverty, including by reducing trade barriers, increasing development assistance
stand-alone threats. The fragmented sectoral approaches of international insti- and providing debt relief for highly indebted poor countries.
tutions mirror the fragmented sectoral approaches of Governments: for exam-
ple, finance ministries tend to work only with the international financial insti- B. Meeting the challenge of prevention
tutions, development ministers only with development programmes, ministers
of agriculture only with food programmes and environment ministers only 1. More resources and action
with environmental agencies. Bilateral donors correctly call for better United 59. With the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, the interna-
Nations coordination but show little enthusiasm for similar efforts on their own tional community committed itself to dramatically reduce poverty by 2015.
account. Assessments by the Millennium Project indicate that, while some regions of the
56. Existing global economic and social governance structures are woefully inade- world are on track to reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than
quate for the challenges ahead. To tackle the challenges of sustainable develop- $1 a day, other regions have regressed. In the area of reducing child mortality and
IR-210: UN Report
ment countries must negotiate across different sectors and issues, including for- increasing primary education enrolment, the world continues to lag behind its
eign aid, technology, trade, financial stability and development policy. Such commitments. Little has been done to address the gender aspects of the
packages are difficult to negotiate and require high-level attention and leader- Millennium Development Goals. Although poor and rich countries have pledged
ship from those countries that have the largest economic impacts. At the to take action to address social and economic threats, pledges have not material-
moment, there is no high-level forum which provides leaders from large indus- ized into resources and action and long-term commitments are scant. All States
trial and developing economies a regular opportunity for frank dialogue, delib- must recommit themselves to the goals of eradicating poverty, achieving
eration and problem-solving. sustained economic growth and promoting sustainable development.
57. The United Nations comparative advantage in addressing economic and social 60. We believe that the Millennium Development Goals should be placed at the
threats is its unparalleled convening power, which allows it to formulate common centre of national and international poverty-reduction strategies. The dramatic
development targets and rally the international community around a consensus shortfall in resources required to meet the Millennium Development Goals
for achieving them. In recent years, the World Summit on Sustainable must be redressed, and the commitments to sound policies and good govern-
26 27

Page 130
Page 131
ance at all levels must be fulfilled. For the least developed countries, official where Governments have refused to acknowledge the gravity of the threat and
development assistance (ODA) will be crucial and should be structured to sup- failed to address the problem, countries have experienced a dramatic turn for the
port countries’ Millennium Development Goal-based poverty reduction strate- worse and international efforts to address the problem have been hampered.
gies. The many donor countries which currently fall short of the United Leaders of affected countries need to mobilize resources, commit funds and
Nations 0.7 per cent gross national product (GNP) target for ODA engage civil society and the private sector in disease-control efforts.
should establish a timetable for reaching it.
61. After years of debate on whether to develop innovative approaches to financing 2. New initiatives
for development, such as the International Financial Facility, donors have
66. Despite all we know about the human toll of HIV/AIDS - the numbers of infec-
shifted to discussions of how to do so. We welcome this and encourage donors
tions, the deaths, the children who are orphaned - we are left to guess what the
to move quickly to decisions on this issue.
long-term effect of the pandemic will be on the States most afflicted by the dis-
62. In Monterrey and Johannesburg, leaders agreed that poverty alleviation is ease. While HIV/AIDS depletes the capacity of States and economies in Africa
undermined by continuing inequities in the global trading system. Seventy per faster than it can be replenished, we do not know the cumulative effects of loss
cent of the world’s poor live in rural areas and earn their income from agricul- of government officials, skilled health professionals, teachers, service providers,
ture. They pay a devastating cost when developed countries impose trade bar- caregivers, police, soldiers and peacekeepers. In the absence of good research
riers on agricultural imports and subsidize agricultural exports. In 2001, the into these questions, we cannot begin to develop a strategy for countering the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Declaration explicitly committed sig- long-term effects of HIV/AIDS on governance and State stability.
natories to put the needs and interests of developing countries at the heart of
67. The Security Council, working closely with UNAIDS, should host a sec-
negotiations over a new trade round. WTO members should strive to con-
ond special session on HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and
clude the Doha development round at the latest in 2006.
security, to explore the future effects of HIV/AIDS on States and soci-
63. Governance reforms and improvements in trading opportunities will not by eties, generate research on the problem and identify critical steps
themselves bring about meaningful poverty alleviation in a significant number towards a long-term strategy for diminishing the threat.
of the least developed countries - many of them in sub-Saharan Africa - where
68. The fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria depends on capable,
development efforts are undermined by poor infrastructure, low productivity
responsible States with functioning public health systems. The absence of
agriculture, endemic disease and crippling levels of external debt. Developed
health facilities is the primary factor spurring the proliferation of malaria.
countries will also have to do more to address the challenge in the poorest coun-
Funding gaps are preventing health-sector reforms in many heavily burdened
tries of debt sustainability - which should be redefined as the level of debt con-
countries, particularly those in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Inconsistent
sistent with achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Lender
or partial treatment, resulting from insufficient funding, has allowed new
Governments and the international financial institutions should provide
IR-210: UN Report
strains of tuberculosis to develop that are far more difficult to treat. Even when
highly indebted poor countries with greater debt relief, longer resched-
programme funding for HIV/AIDS is available, inadequate or non-existent
uling and improved access to global markets.
health facilities in the poorest areas of sub-Saharan Africa hinder programmes
64. Despite major international initiatives, the spread of HIV/AIDS is still ram- from being effectively or sustainably implemented. International donors, in
pant. In the most affected countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the impact of the partnership with national authorities and local civil society organiza-
pandemic is becoming more acute. In Asia, the number of infections exceeds tions, should undertake a major new global initiative to rebuild local and
seven million and is increasing rapidly. Although international resources national public health systems throughout the developing world.
devoted to meeting the challenge of HIV/AIDS have increased from
69. Such efforts should be undertaken simultaneously with improving global dis-
about $250 million in 1996 to about $2.8 billion in 2002, more than
ease monitoring capabilities. This is triply imperative - as a means of fighting
$10 billion annually is needed to stem the pandemic.
new emerging infectious disease, defending against the threat of biological ter-
65. The experience of some countries shows that properly funded and institutionalized rorism and building effective, responsible States. Members of the World
efforts can yield remarkable successes in the fight against HIV/AIDS. By contrast, Health Assembly should provide greater resources to the WHO Global
28 29

Outbreak Alert and Response Network to increase its capacity to cope 73. The United Nations and the international financial institutions should also do
with potential disease outbreaks. more to assist those States most vulnerable to severe natural disasters, the effects
70. In extreme cases of threat posed by a new emerging infectious disease or inten- of which can be destablizing as they were in 2004 in Haiti. The World
tional release of an infectious agent, there may be a need for cooperation Meteorological Association has estimated that investments in vulnerability
between WHO and the Security Council in establishing effective quarantine reduction could drastically reduce the number of deaths associated with natural
measures (see section V below). disasters. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank should work
71. In order to address problems of climate change modern economies need to
in a more integrated fashion - and in partnership with Governments and outside
reduce their dependence on hydrocarbons and should undertake a special effort
research institutions - to improve vulnerability assessments and work with the
to devise climate-friendly development strategies. Member States should place
most affected Governments to strengthen their adaptive capacity.
special attention on the development of low-carbon energy sources, including
natural gas, renewable power and nuclear power, and should place special
emphasis on the development of low-greenhouse-gas technologies. The Kyoto IV. Conflict between and within States
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has
encouraged the development of renewable energy sources that could gradually A. The threat of inter-State conflict
correct today’s excessive dependency on fossil fuels. To further encourage this, 74. Although the world has seen few inter-State wars over the past 60 years, the
States should provide incentives for the further development of renew- threat of inter-State war has not vanished. Unresolved regional disputes in
able energy sources and begin to phase out environmentally harmful South Asia, North-East Asia and the Middle East continue to threaten interna-
subsidies, especially for fossil fuel use and development. tional peace and security. These disputes may unravel 40 years of efforts to pre-
72. The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol after ratification by the Russian vent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and more than 75 years of efforts to
Federation is a positive development, even though the Protocol by itself is banish the scourge of biological and chemical weapons. In turn, inter-State
not sufficient to solve the challenge of limiting greenhouse gas emissions. rivalry in some regions fuels and exacerbates internal wars, making them more
The Protocol has encouraged the development of renewable energy sources difficult to bring to a close. Such rivalry, by promoting conventional weapons
that could gradually correct today’s excessive dependency on fossil fuels. Yet build-ups, diverts scarce resources that could be used to reduce poverty, improve
problems remain. Some advanced industrialized nations are on track to meet health and increase education.
their Kyoto targets for reasons outside the realm of climate policy, e.g., a 75. War and ongoing instability in Iraq and Palestine have fuelled extremism in
sharp reduction in their industrial production. The United States, which parts of the Muslim world and the West. This issue is complex and multidi-
accounts for about one quarter of world emissions of greenhouse gases, refuses mensional and defies any simplistic categorization. Nonetheless, one cannot
to ratify the Protocol. At the same time, developing countries, which now
IR-210: UN Report
ignore the ability of extremist groups to foster perceptions within the West and
account for almost half of today’s net emissions of greenhouse gases (but only within the Muslim world of cultural and religious antagonism between them,
one tenth of per capita emissions), have been opposed to accepting any bind- the dangers of which, if left unchecked, are profound.
ing emission caps, which they perceive to be impediments to economic
growth. Industrialized nations are likely to be more resistant to accepting 76. In the past, the United Nations helped to reduce the threat of inter-State con-
costly reductions without increased developing country participation. Most flicts through the Secretary-General’s “good offices”, or quiet diplomacy aimed
importantly, the Protocol does not contain any obligations beyond 2012. We at defusing crises and providing hostile parties the opportunity to talk freely
urge Member States to reflect on the gap between the promise of the and test intentions. Successive Secretaries-General have played this role despite
Kyoto Protocol and its performance, re-engage on the problem of little capacity within the Organization to support it.
global warming and begin new negotiations to produce a new long- 77. With the end of the cold war, the Security Council became increasingly active
term strategy for reducing global warming beyond the period covered in addressing international threats. The average annual number of resolutions it
by the Protocol. passed increased from 15 to 60, or from one resolution a month to one a week.
Before 1989, the Council applied sanctions twice; since then it has imposed
30 31

Page 132
Page 133
sanctions 14 times and for an increasingly diverse range of stated purposes, with its resolutions. Others argue Security Council irrelevance because the
including to reverse aggression, restore democratic Governments, protect Council did not deter the United States and its coalition partners from waging
human rights, end wars, combat terrorism and support peace agreements. war. Still others suggest that the refusal of the Security Council to bow to United
78. Several of these sanctions regimes were at least partially effective. In some cases, States pressure to legitimate the war is proof of its relevance and indispens-
they helped to produce negotiated agreements. In others, they combined with ability: although the Security Council did not deter war, it provided a clear and
military pressure to weaken and isolate rebel groups and States in flagrant vio- principled standard with which to assess the decision to go to war. The flood of
lation of Security Council resolutions. Foreign Ministers into the Security Council chambers during the debates, and
widespread public attention, suggest that the United States decision to bring the
79. Sanctions failed when they were not effectively targeted and when the Security
question of force to the Security Council reaffirmed not just the relevance but the
Council failed to enforce them. Weak enforcement results
centrality of the Charter of the United Nations.
Sanctions failed when they from the strategic interests of powerful States; a lack of clar-
were not effectively targeted ity about the purpose of sanctions; “sanctions fatigue”
and when the Security Council brought about by concern over their humanitarian impact; B. The threat of internal conflict In the last 15 years, more
failed to enforce them. insufficient support from the respective sanctions commit- 84. Since the end of the cold war, peacemaking, peace- civil wars were ended
tees; and insufficient State capacity to implement sanctions. keeping and post-conflict peacebuilding in civil wars through negotiation than in
80. As a result of growing concern over the humanitarian impact of comprehensive have become the operational face of the United the previous two centuries
sanctions, the Security Council stopped imposing them after the cases of Iraq, for- Nations in international peace and security. in large part because the
mer Yugoslavia and Haiti, and turned exclusively to the use of financial, diplo- United Nations provided
85. The rapid growth of United Nations activity in civil
matic, arms, aviation, travel and commodity sanctions, targeting the belligerents leadership, opportunities for
wars coincides with a sharp decline in their numbers
and policy makers most directly responsible for reprehensible policies. negotiation, strategic co-
(see figure below). Since 1992, civil wars have
81. Increased activity does not necessarily produce increased results. Not all situa- ordination, and the resources
declined steadily, and by 2003 had dropped by
tions that justified Security Council attention received it and not all its resolu- needed for implementation.
roughly 40 per cent to less than 30 wars. In the last
tions were followed by effective enforcement action. Yet two trends of the 1990s
indicate increasing effectiveness in regulating international conflict. First, with Ending civil wars and building peace
1970-2002
the Council increasingly active and willing to use its powers under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations, the balance between unilateral use of force Number of ongoing civil wars
and collectively authorized force has shifted dramatically. Collectively author- Number of ongoing UN
50 peace-keeping and peacebuilding
ized use of force may not be the rule today, but it is no longer an exception. operations deployed in civil wars
IR-210: UN Report
Second, and perhaps the most striking indicator of the growing importance of
the role of the United Nations in regulating international conflict, is the recent 40
expectation that the Security Council should be the arbiter of the use of force.
30
82. Many people assumed it was quite natural that the United States should seek
Security Council support for going to war against Iraq in 2003. Superpowers,
20
however, have rarely sought Security Council approval for their actions. That
all States should seek Security Council authorization to use force is not a time-
10
honoured principle; if this were the case, our faith in it would be much
stronger. Our analysis suggests quite the opposite - that what is at stake is a rel-
0
atively new emerging norm, one that is precious but not yet deep-rooted.
70 72 76 80 84 86 88 90 92 96 98 00 02
19 74 19 78 19 82 19 19 19 94 19 20
83. The case of Iraq prompted much difference of opinion. Some contend that the 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20
Security Council was ineffective because it could not produce Iraqi compliance
Source: Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University; and International
Peace Research Institute, Oslo.
32 33

15 years, more civil wars were ended through negotiation than in the previ- C. Meeting the challenge of prevention
ous two centuries in large part because the United Nations provided leader-
ship, opportunities for negotiation, strategic coordination, and the resources 1. Better international regulatory frameworks and norms
needed for implementation. Hundreds of thousands of lives were saved, and 89. The role of the United Nations in preventing wars can be strengthened by giv-
regional and international stability were enhanced. ing more attention to developing international regimes and norms to govern
86. This unprecedented success, however, was also coupled with major failures. some of the sources and accelerators of conflict. A very wide range of laws,
Mediation produced settlement in only about 25 per cent of civil wars and norms, agreements and arrangements are relevant here, covering legal regimes
only some of those attracted the political and material and dispute resolution mechanisms, arms control and disarmament regimes,
If the 1991 Bicesse resources necessary for successful implementation. As a and dialogue and cooperation arrangements. Some examples are set out below.
Agreement for Angola and the result, many implementation efforts failed, sometimes 90. In the area of legal mechanisms, there have been few more important recent
1993 Arusha Accords for with disastrous consequences. If two peace agreements, developments than the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal
Rwanda, had been successfully the 1991 Bicesse Agreement for Angola and the 1993 Court. In cases of mounting conflict, early indication by the Security Council
implemented, deaths Arusha Accords for Rwanda, had been successfully that it is carefully monitoring the conflict in question and that it is willing to
attributable to war in the implemented, deaths attributable to war in the 1990s use its powers under the Rome Statute might deter parties from committing
1990s would have been would have been reduced by several million. If the crimes against humanity and violating the laws of war. The Security Council
reduced by several million. Security Council had been seriously committed to con- should stand ready to use the authority it has under the Rome Statute to
solidating peace in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, more refer cases to the International Criminal Court.
lives could have been saved, the Taliban might never have come to power
and Al-Qaida could have been deprived of its most important sanctuary. 91. More legal mechanisms are necessary in the area of natural resources, fights
over which have often been an obstacle to peace. Alarmed by the inflamma-
87. The biggest failures of the United Nations in civil violence have been in tory role of natural resources in wars in Sierra Leone, Angola and the
halting ethnic cleansing and genocide. In Rwanda, Secretariat officials failed Democratic Republic of the Congo, civil society organizations and the
to provide the Security Council with early warning of extremist plans to kill Security Council have turned to the “naming and shaming” of, and the
thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. When the genocide started, troop imposition of sanctions against, individuals and corporations involved in
contributors withdrew peacekeepers, and the Security Council, bowing to illicit trade, and States have made a particular attempt to restrict the sale of
United States pressure, failed to respond. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, “conflict diamonds”. Evidence from Sierra Leone and Angola suggests that
United Nations peacekeeping and the protection of humanitarian aid such efforts contributed to ending those civil wars. A new challenge for the
became a substitute for political and military action to stop ethnic cleansing United Nations is to provide support to weak States - especially, but not lim-
and genocide. In Kosovo, paralysis in the Security Council led the North ited to, those recovering from war - in the management of their natural
IR-210: UN Report
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to bypass the United Nations. Only resources to avoid future conflicts.
in one instance in the 1990s - in East Timor - did the Security Council,
urged on by the Secretary-General, work together with national 92. The United Nations should work with national authorities, interna-
Governments and regional actors to apply concerted pressure swiftly to halt tional financial institutions, civil society organizations and the private
large-scale killing. sector to develop norms governing the management of natural
resources for countries emerging from or at risk of conflict.
88. The large loss of life in such wars and outbreaks of mass violence obliges the
international community to be more vigilant in preventing them. When pre- 93. There should also be a focus on the development of rules, for example through
vention fails, there is urgent need to stop the killing and prevent any further the International Law Commission, for the use of transboundary resources, such
return to war. as water, oil and gas.
94. The United Nations should seek to work closely with regional organizations
that have taken the lead in building frameworks for prevention. The United
Nations can benefit from sharing information and analysis with regional
34 35

Page 134
Page 135
early-warning systems, but more importantly regional organizations have reporting. All Member States should report completely and accurately on
gone farther than the United Nations in setting normative standards that all elements of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and
can guide preventive efforts. For example, the Organization of American the Secretary-General should be asked to report annually to the General
States (OAS) and the African Union (AU) agree on the need to protect elected Assembly and Security Council on any inadequacies in the reporting.
Governments from coups. The Organization of Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) has developed operational norms on minority rights. The
United Nations should build on the experience of regional organiza-
2. Better information and analysis
tions in developing frameworks for minority rights and the protection 98. Prevention requires early warning and analysis that is based on objective and
of democratically elected Governments from unconstitutional over- impartial research. Although the United Nations has some early-warning and
throw. analysis capacity scattered among different agencies and departments, the
95. In the area of arms control and disarmament regimes, much more needs to be Secretary-General has not been able to establish any properly-resourced unit
done, not only in the context of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (see able to integrate inputs from these offices into early-warning reports and strat-
section V below) but in relation to the proliferation of small arms and light egy options for purposes of decision-making. The best option for creating a
weapons. In the 1990s, small arms, light weapons and landmines were the pri- coherent capacity for developing strategic options is to strengthen the Office of
mary weapons in most civil wars. While concerted action by civil society organ- the Secretary-General through the creation of a Deputy Secretary-General for
izations and concerned Member States led to a ban on landmines, efforts to limit Peace and Security (see section XIX below).
the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons have barely moved 99. Although some field-based agencies participate in early-warning mechanisms
beyond rhetoric to action. and international non-governmental organizations have played a major role in
96. A comprehensive approach to the small arms problem emerged in the late recent years in providing timely information, analysis and advocacy, the
1990s and seeks to create international action to limit their production and Secretary-General’s access to local analysis of conflict is sharply limited. Greater
spread. The key global instrument for this approach is the United Nations interaction by United Nations political, peacekeeping and humanitarian
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in departments with outside sources of early-warning information and of local
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, a comprehensive set of rec- knowledge of conflicts would enhance United Nations conflict management.
ommendations aimed at preventing and eradicating the illicit manufacture, Also, in the past few years, research institutions (in academia and in other inter-
transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons. The Programme of national organizations) have begun to compile both the necessary data and
Action makes innovative use of regional bodies, such as the Nairobi Secretariat, sophisticated analysis of various causes and accelerators of different kinds of con-
which, inter alia, monitors the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol for the flict. United Nations policy sections should engage more actively with local
Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the sources of knowledge and outside sources of research.
IR-210: UN Report
Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, to report, monitor and verify State
compliance. It should be considered a start rather than an end-point for United 3. Preventive diplomacy and mediation
Nations efforts. Member States should expedite and conclude negotiations
100. United Nations efforts to prevent outbreaks of internal violence have met with
on legally binding agreements on the marking and tracing, as well as the
less success than its efforts to prevent inter-State wars, and they are often inhib-
brokering and transfer, of small arms and light weapons.
ited by the reluctance of Member States to see their domestic affairs internation-
97. The United Nations can also help to prevent inter-State conflict by increasing alized. But more effort could and should be made in this area, particularly
the transparency of Member States’ conventional weapons holdings and acqui- through the appointment of skilled, experienced and regionally knowledgeable
sitions. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, established in envoys, mediators and special representatives, who can make as important a
1991, enhances military transparency by soliciting annual declarations of contribution to conflict prevention as they do to conflict resolution.
Member States on their sale and purchase of conventional weapons and existing
101. In making such appointments, the Secretary-General should place high-level
weapons holdings, as well as their defence postures, policies and doctrines.
competence above all other criteria and do more to nurture internal and exter-
However, the Register is marred by incomplete, untimely and inaccurate
36 37

nal expertise in this respect. This would be made easier by the establish- 106. Good communication between mediators and peacekeeping planners can also help
ment of a facility for training and briefing new or potential special rep- identify opportunities for preventive deployments. The now occasional practice of
resentatives and other United Nations mediators, and we so recommend. peacekeeping planners sitting in on mediation processes should be standardized.
102. Mediators and negotiators need adequate support. Although the demand for
United Nations mediation has skyrocketed in the past 10 years, resources
devoted to this function have remained minimal. The deliberate underre-
V. Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological
sourcing of the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations weapons
Secretariat by Member States is at odds with these same States’ professed
desire for a strong United Nations. The Department of Political Affairs A. The threats we face
should be given additional resources and should be restructured to
1. Nuclear weapons
provide more consistent and professional mediation support.
107. Any use of nuclear weapons, by accident or design, risks human casualties and
103. While the details of such a restructuring should be left to the Secretary-
economic dislocation on a catastrophic scale. Stopping the proliferation of such
General, it should take into account the need for the United Nations to have:
weapons - and their potential use, by either State or non-State actors - must
(a) A field-oriented, dedicated mediation support capacity, com- remain an urgent priority for collective security.
prised of a small team of professionals with relevant direct expe- 108. The threat posed by nuclear proliferation - the spread of nuclear weapons among
rience and expertise, available to all United Nations mediators; States - arises in two ways. The first and most immediate concern is that some
(b) Competence on thematic issues that recur in peace negotiations, countries, under cover of their current Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
such as the sequencing of implementation steps, the design of Nuclear Weapons membership, will covertly and illegally develop full-scale
monitoring arrangements, the sequencing of transitional arrange- weapons programmes, or that - acting within the letter but perhaps not the
ments and the design of national reconciliation mechanisms; spirit of the Treaty - they will acquire all the materials and expertise needed for
(c) Greater interaction with national mediators, regional organiza- weapons programmes with the option of withdrawing from the Treaty at the
tions and non-governmental organizations involved in conflict point when they are ready to proceed with weaponization.
resolution;
109. The second longer-term, concern is about the erosion and possible collapse of
(d) Greater consultation with and involvement in peace processes of
the whole Treaty regime. Almost 60 States currently operate or are construct-
important voices from civil society, especially those of women,
ing nuclear power or research reactors, and at least 40 possess the industrial and
who are often neglected during negotiations.
scientific infrastructure which would enable them, if they chose, to build
nuclear weapons at relatively short notice if the legal and normative constraints
IR-210: UN Report
4. Preventive deployment of the Treaty regime no longer apply.

104. In cases of mounting tensions, the early deployment of peacekeepers can reas- 110. Both concerns are now very real: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
sure parties seeking peaceful resolution to a conflict and deter would-be aggres- Nuclear Weapons is not as effective a constraint as it was. In 1963, when only
sors. It is notable that the only clear case of preventive deployment to date, in four States had nuclear arsenals, the United States Government predicted that
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, was requested by the national the following decade would see the emergence of 15 to 25 nuclear-weapon
authorities and was manifestly a success. We encourage national leaders and States; others predicted the number would be as high as 50. As of 2004, only
parties to conflict to make constructive use of the option of preventive eight States are known to have nuclear arsenals. The strong non-proliferation
deployment. regime - embodied in IAEA and the Treaty itself - helped dramatically to
slow the predicted rate of proliferation. It made three critical contributions:
105. The Security Council should also note that in countries that have emerged from
it bolstered a normative prohibition against the ownership, use and prolifer-
conflict, the deployment of small numbers of peacekeepers to train national
ation of these weapons; it ensured that States could benefit from nuclear
armed forces can serve an important preventive function.
technologies, but with oversight; and it reassured States about the capacities
38 39

Page 136
Page 137
of neighbours and potential rivals, allowing them to avoid unnecessary arms 3. Chemical and biological weapons
races.
114. Chemical and biological materials also pose a growing threat: they share with
111. But the nuclear non-proliferation regime is now at risk because of lack of compli- nuclear weapons the awful potential of being used in a single attack to inflict mass
ance with existing commitments, withdrawal or threats of withdrawal from the casualties. Chemical agents are widespread and relatively easy to acquire and
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to escape those commit- weaponize. There are almost 6,000 industrial chemical facilities worldwide, pos-
ments, a changing international security environment and the diffusion of tech- ing potential targets and opportunities for the acquisition of materials. Chemical-
nology. We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation weapon States have lagged behind in the destruction of chemical weapons sched-
regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation. uled by the Chemical Weapons Convention: of the 70,000 metric tons of declared
112. Regardless of whether more States acquire nuclear weapons, there are also grave weapons agents, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
risks posed by the existence of large stockpiles of nuclear and radiological mate- (OPCW) has verified the destruction of only 9,600, and if the current pace per-
rials. Today 1,300 kilograms of highly enriched uranium exist in research reac- sists, the Convention’s goal of the complete destruction of chemical weapons
tors in 27 countries. The total volume of HEU stockpiles agents will not be met even by the agreed extended
... the nuclear non-proliferation is far greater, and many HEU storage sites in the world are deadline of 2012. While scientific advances in the
regime is now at risk ... inadequately secured. States have publicly confirmed 20 biotechnology sector hold out
115. While rapid growth and scientific advances in the
cases of nuclear material diversion and more than 200 inci- the prospect of prevention and
biotechnology sector hold out the prospect of preven-
dents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear materials have been documented cure for many diseases, they
tion and cure for many diseases, they also increase
over the past decade. Scientists have repeatedly warned of the ease with which also increase opportunities for
opportunities for the development of deadly new
terrorists could, with parts from the open market, assemble a simple “gun- the development of deadly new
ones. Dramatic advances in recombinant DNA tech-
type” nuclear device that simply collides two quantities of HEU. Experts sug- ones.
nology and direct genetic manipulation raise the
gest that if a simple nuclear device were detonated in a major city, the number spectre of “designer bugs”, which may be developed to reconstruct eradicated
of deaths would range from tens of thousands to more than one million. The diseases and to resist existing vaccinations, antibiotics and other treatments.
shock to international commerce, employment and travel would amount to at There are countless fermentation, medical and research facilities equipped to
least one trillion dollars. Such an attack could have further, far-reaching impli- produce biological agents. Meanwhile, the biological toxin ricin has been dis-
cations for international security, democratic governance and civil rights. covered in several terrorist workshops. Unlike anthrax, which can be treated by
antibiotics, ricin has no antidote and is lethal to humans in quantities smaller
2. Radiological weapons than the size of a pinhead. Use of similar materials to cause deliberate outbreaks
of infectious disease could prove equally if not more lethal than a nuclear det-
113. A different threat is posed by radiological weapons, which are more weapons of
onation. Under worst-case assumptions, an attack using only one gram of
IR-210: UN Report
mass disruption than mass destruction. Radiological weapons can use plutonium
weaponized smallpox could produce between 100,000 and 1,000,000 fatalities.
or highly enriched uranium but can rely simply on radioactive materials, of which
there are millions of sources used in medical and industrial facilities worldwide. 116. That a high-damage attack has not occurred is not a cause for complacency but
The immediate destructive effect of a radiological or “dirty” bomb is only as great a call for urgent prevention.
as its conventional explosive, and even the radiation effects of such a bomb are
likely to be limited. The more harmful effects of disruption and economic dam- B. Meeting the challenge of prevention
age would be prompted by public alarm and the necessity of evacuating and
117. Multilayered action is required. The first layer of an effective strategy to pre-
decontaminating affected areas. The ubiquity of radiological materials and the
vent the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons
crude requirements for detonating such a device suggest a high likelihood of use.
should feature global instruments that reduce the demand for them. The sec-
This puts a premium on educating the public about the limited consequences of
ond layer should contain global instruments that operate on the supply side -
radiological weapons in order to mitigate some of the alarm and uncertainty that
to limit the capacity of both States and non-State actors to acquire weapons and
would be unleashed in the event of an attack.
40 41

the materials and expertise needed to build them. The third layer must consist 122. In addition, we believe it would be valuable if the Security Council explic-
of Security Council enforcement activity underpinned by credible, shared infor- itly pledged to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the
mation and analysis. The fourth layer must comprise national and internation- threat of such attack on a non-nuclear-weapon State.
al civilian and public health defence. 123. Given the challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime posed by States
not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and rec-
1. Better strategies to reduce demand ognizing the impact of that challenge on regional insecurity, we recommend
that negotiations to resolve regional conflicts include confidence-
118. Lacklustre disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States weakens the diplomatic building measures and steps towards disarmament.
force of the non-proliferation regime and thus its ability to constrain prolifera-
124. States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
tion. Despite Security Council commitment to the contrary (resolution 984
Weapons should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disar-
(1995)), these nuclear-weapon States are increasingly unwilling to pledge assur-
mament, demonstrating their commitment by ratifying the
ances of non-use (negative security assurances) and they maintain the right to
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and supporting negotiations
retaliate with nuclear weapons against chemical or biological attack.
for a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of which are open to nuclear-
119. Despite the end of the cold war, nuclear-weapon States earn only a mixed grade weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We recommend that
in fulfilling their disarmament commitments. While the United States and the peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear disarma-
Russian Federation have dismantled roughly half of their nuclear weapons, ment talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free
committed to large reductions in deployed strategic warheads and eliminated zones in those regions similar to those established for Latin America and
most of their non-strategic nuclear weapons, such progress has been overshad- the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific and South-East Asia.
owed by recent reversals. In 2000, the nuclear-weapon States committed to
125. For biological and chemical weapons, there is both an obligation and a his-
13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, which were all but renounced
toric opportunity to fully eliminate all declared chemical weapons stockpiles:
by them at the 2004 meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005
all chemical-weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date
Nuclear Weapons.
of 2012.
120. The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarma-
126. Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention should also be further
ment:
strengthened, and the long-standing impasse over a verification mechanism for
(a) They must honour their commitments under article VI of the Treaty the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which has undermined confi-
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards dis- dence in the overall regime, should be overcome. States parties to the
armament and be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfilment
IR-210: UN Report
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay return

of those commitments; to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active
(b) They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear participation of the biotechnology industry. States parties to the Biological
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, to further diminish the and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention must
perceived value of nuclear weapons, and secure robust international cooper- increase bilateral diplomatic pressure to universalize membership.
ation to staunch proliferation, formalizing such commitments in pending
and future nuclear-weapon-free zones agreements.
2. Better strategies to reduce supply
121. The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear-weapon
States and States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 127. We recognize that nuclear energy, in the view of many, is an important source
Nuclear Weapons should commit to practical measures to reduce the of power for civilian uses and may become even more crucial in the context of a
risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progres- worldwide effort to reduce dependency on fossil fuels and emissions of green-
sive schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons. house gases. At the same time, the mounting tension between the goals of
42 43

Page 138
Page 139
achieving a more effective non-proliferation regime and the right of all signato- 132. Recent experience of the activities of the A.Q. Khan network has demonstrated the
ries of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to develop civil- need for and the value of measures taken to interdict the illicit and clandestine trade
ian nuclear industries needs to be addressed and defused. in components for nuclear programmes. This problem is currently being addressed
128. Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons guaran- on a voluntary basis by the Proliferation Security Initiative. We believe that all
tees States parties’ rights to develop the research, production and use of nuclear States should be encouraged to join this voluntary initiative.
energy for peaceful purposes; this right must be preserved. The Treaty also spec- 133. In order to reinforce international legal provisions against the illicit trafficking
ifies that this right must be used in conformity with its articles I and II; this of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials, ongoing negotia-
obligation also must be respected. In recent years, it has become clear that the tions at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to amend the 1988
proliferation risks from the enrichment of uranium and from the reprocessing Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
of spent fuel are great and increasing. These two processes in particular provide Navigation should be completed in a timely manner. The Security Council may
a route by which Treaty signatories can (and in some cases have) clandestinely need to be prepared to consider mandatory action if progress in the Convention
pursued activities not in conformity with the Treaty and designed to give them negotiations is unsatisfactory.
the option of acquiring a nuclear-weapon capability. 134. While the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provides the right
129. Two remedies are required. First, the inspection and verification rules that have of withdrawal from the Treaty, States should be urged not to do so. Those who
governed IAEA through the mid-1990s have proven increasingly inadequate. withdraw should be held responsible for violations committed while still a party to
IAEA initiated more stringent inspection rules in the Model Additional the Treaty. A State’s notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-
Protocol, but as yet only one third of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should prompt immediate verification of
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have ratified the Protocol. The IAEA Board its compliance with the Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security
of Governors should recognize the Model Additional Protocol as today’s Council. The IAEA Board of Governors should resolve that, in the event of
standard for IAEA safeguards, and the Security Council should be pre- violations, all assistance provided by IAEA should be withdrawn.
pared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance with non- 135. Urgent short-term action is needed to defend against the possible terrorist use
proliferation and safeguards standards. of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons. High priority must
130. Second, we urge that negotiations be engaged without delay and carried be accorded to consolidating, securing, and when possible eliminating poten-
forward to an early conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing tially hazardous materials, and implementing effective export controls. To that
provisions of articles III and IX of the IAEA statute, which would enable end, we welcome the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which facilitates
IAEA to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian (a) the reduction of global highly enriched uranium stockpiles, (b) the conver-
nuclear users. Such an arrangement would need to put the Agency in a posi- sion of HEU research reactors to “proliferation-resistant” reactors, and (c) the
tion to meet, through suppliers it authorized, demands for nuclear fuel supplies “downblending” of existing HEU. The proposed timeline for implement-
IR-210: UN Report
of low enriched uranium and for the reprocessing of spent fuel at market rates ing the Global Threat Reduction Initiative should be halved from 10 to
and to provide a guarantee of uninterrupted supply of these services, as long as 5 years.
there was no breach of safeguard or inspection procedures at the facilities in 136. The Security Council, acting under its resolution 1540 (2004), can offer States
question. model legislation for security, tracking, criminalization and export controls, and
131. While that arrangement is being negotiated, States should, without by 2006 develop minimum standards for United Nations Member State imple-
surrendering the right under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of mentation. To achieve that goal, the implementation committee of Council res-
Nuclear Weapons to construct such facilities, voluntarily institute a olution 1540 (2004) should establish a permanent liaison with IAEA, OPCW
time-limited moratorium on the construction of any further enrich- and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
ment or reprocessing facilities, with a commitment to the moratorium 137. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should
matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile materials by the current also negotiate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biologi-
suppliers at market rates. cal agents and establish binding international standards for the export of
44 45

such agents. Within a designated time frame, States parties to the Convention ment). Well-prepared societies may thus be able to avoid the worst-case scenar-
should refrain from participating in such biotechnology commerce with non- ios of biological attacks.
members. 143. However, at present, international aid for infectious disease monitoring, detec-
138. IAEA member States should increase funding for its programmes that help to tion and response is lacking, security planning and spending are poorly coordi-
locate and secure radioactive sources and that assist States in establishing perti- nated with health-care policies and budgets, and there is insufficient under-
nent domestic legislation. Moreover, the Conference on Disarmament standing that an inevitable, new biological future makes active bio-defence the
should move without further delay to negotiate a verifiable fissile mate- most viable option against the likelihood of attack.
rial cut-off treaty that, on a designated schedule, ends the production of 144. Given the potential international security threat posed by the intentional release
highly enriched uranium for non-weapon as well as weapons purposes. of an infectious biological agent or an overwhelming natural outbreak of an infec-
tious disease, there is a need for the WHO Director-General, through the
3. Better enforcement capability Secretary-General, to keep the Security Council informed during any suspicious
or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease. In such an event, the Security
139. The Security Council today has few arrows in its quiver other than sanctions and
Council should be prepared to support the work of WHO investigators or to
military force to enforce non-proliferation agreements. Moreover, a special refer-
deploy experts reporting directly to the Council, and if existing International
ral to the Security Council that results in no action is worse than no referral. The
Health Regulations do not provide adequate access for WHO investigations and
ability of the Security Council to generate credible information about potential
response coordination, the Security Council should be prepared to mandate
instances of proliferation should be strengthened.
greater compliance. In the event that a State is unable to adequately quarantine
140. To that end, links between IAEA and OPCW and the Security Council must large numbers of potential carriers, the Security Council should be prepared to
also be strengthened. The Directors-General of IAEA and OPCW should support international action to assist in cordon operations. The Security
be invited by the Security Council to report to it twice-yearly on the sta- Council should consult with the WHO Director-General to establish the
tus of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on any serious necessary procedures for working together in the event of a suspicious or
concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
VI. Terrorism
141. The Security Council should also be prepared to deploy inspection capacities for
suspected nuclear and chemical violations, drawing on the capacities of IAEA and A. The threat we face
OPCW. Until multilateral negotiations yield a Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention verification mechanism, the Security Council should avail itself of the 145. Terrorism attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United
IR-210: UN Report
Secretary-General’s roster of inspectors for biological weapons, who should remain Nations: respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules of war that protect civil-
independent and work under United Nations staff codes. This roster of inspectors ians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of con-
should also be available to advise the Council and liaise with WHO authorities in flict. Terrorism flourishes in environments of despair, humiliation, poverty,
the event of a suspicious disease outbreak, as discussed below. political oppression, extremism and human rights abuse; it also flourishes in
contexts of regional conflict and foreign occupation; and it profits from weak
State capacity to maintain law and order.
4. Better public health defences
146. Two new dynamics give the terrorist threat greater urgency. Al-Qaida is the first
142. Scientific advancements in biotechnology and the ubiquity of facilities capable instance - not likely to be the last - of an armed non-State network with global
of producing biological agents circumscribe prospects for the elimination of reach and sophisticated capacity. Attacks against more than 10 Member States
biological weapons and complicate verification efforts. But unlike nuclear on four continents in the past five years have demonstrated that Al-Qaida and
weapons, many (though not all) biological agents can be countered by vaccina- associated entities pose a universal threat to the membership of the United
tions and effective responses (including rapid diagnosis, quarantines and treat- Nations and the United Nations itself. In public statements, Al-Qaida has sin-
46 47

Page 140
Page 141
gled out the United Nations as a major obstacle to its goals and defined it as (b) Efforts to counter extremism and intolerance, including through
one of its enemies. Second, the threat that terrorists - of whatever type, with education and fostering public debate. One recent innovation by
whatever motivation - will seek to cause mass casualties creates unprecedented UNDP, the Arab Human Development Report, has helped catalyse a wide
dangers. Our recommendations provided above on controlling the supply of ranging debate within the Middle East on the need for gender empower-
nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological materials and building robust ment, political freedom, rule of law and civil liberties;
global public health systems are central to a strategy to prevent this threat. (c) Development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism
cooperation, all within a legal framework that is respectful of civil lib-
erties and human rights, including in the areas of law enforcement;
B. Meeting the challenge of prevention
intelligence-sharing, where possible; denial and interdiction, when
1. A comprehensive strategy required; and financial controls;
(d) Building State capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and opera-
147. Throughout the Panel’s regional consultations, it heard concerns from tions;
Governments and civil society organizations that the current “war on terrorism” (e) Control of dangerous materials and public health defence.
has in some instances corroded the very values that terrorists
Terrorism attacks the values target: human rights and the rule of law. Most of those who
that lie at the heart of the expressed such concerns did not question the seriousness of 2. Better counter-terrorism instruments
Charter of the United Nations: the terrorist threat and acknowledged that the right to life is
149. Several United Nations anti-terrorist conventions have laid important norma-
respect for human rights; the the most fundamental of human rights. They did, however,
tive foundations. However, far too many States remain outside the conventions
rule of law; rules of war that express fears that approaches to terror focusing wholly on mil-
and not all countries ratifying the conventions proceed to adopt internal
protect civilians; tolerance itary, police and intelligence measures risk undermining
enforcement measures. Also, attempts to address the problem of terrorist financ-
among peoples and nations; efforts to promote good governance and human rights, alien-
ing have been inadequate. While in the three months after 11 September 2001
and the peaceful resolution ate large parts of the world’s population and thereby weaken
$112 million in alleged terrorist funds were frozen, only $24 million were
of conflict. the potential for collective action against terrorism. The cru-
frozen in the two years that followed. Seized funds represent only a small frac-
cial need, in relation to the States in the regions from which tion of total funds available to terrorist organizations. While many States have
terrorists originate, is to address not only their capacity but their will to fight ter- insufficient anti-money-laundering laws and technical capacity, the evasion
ror. To develop that will - with States drawing support rather than opposition from techniques of terrorists are highly developed and many terrorist funds have a
their own publics - requires a broader-based approach. legal origin and are hard to regulate.
148. A thread that runs through all such concerns is the imperative to develop a global 150. Member States that have not yet done so should actively consider signing
strategy of fighting terrorism that addresses root causes and strengthens responsi-
IR-210: UN Report
and ratifying all 12 international conventions against terrorism, and

ble States and the rule of law and fundamental human rights. What is required is should adopt the eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing
a comprehensive strategy that incorporates but is broader than coercive measures. issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
The United Nations, with the Secretary-General taking a leading role, (OECD)-supported Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering
should promote such a comprehensive strategy, which includes: and the measures recommended in its various best practices papers.
(a) Dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, 151. The Security Council has played an important role in filling gaps in counter-
including through promoting social and political rights, the rule of terrorism strategy. Since the early 1990s, the Security Council has attempted to
law and democratic reform; working to end occupations and address weaken State support for and strengthen State resistance to terrorism. From 1992
major political grievances; combating organized crime; reducing onwards, the Security Council applied sanctions against individuals and States that
poverty and unemployment; and stopping State collapse. All of the supported terrorism - including, in 1999 and 2000, Osama Bin Laden and Al-
strategies discussed above for preventing other threats have secondary ben- Qaida and the Taliban. The initial response by the Security Council to the terror-
efits in working to remove some of the causes or facilitators of terrorism; ist attacks of 11 September 2001 was swift and impressive. Security Council reso-
48 49

lution 1373 (2001) imposed uniform, mandatory counter-terrorist obligations on measures to ensure compliance, and should devise a schedule of predeter-
all States and established a Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor compliance mined sanctions for State non-compliance.
and to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to States.
152. However, the Security Council must proceed with caution. The way entities or 4. Defining terrorism
individuals are added to the terrorist list maintained by the Council and the
absence of review or appeal for those listed raise serious accountability issues and 157. The United Nations ability to develop a comprehensive strategy has been con-
possibly violate fundamental human rights norms and conventions. The Al- strained by the inability of Member States to agree on an anti-terrorism conven-
Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee should institute a process for tion including a definition of terrorism. This prevents the United Nations from
reviewing the cases of individuals and institutions claiming to have been exerting its moral authority and from sending an unequivocal message that ter-
wrongly placed or retained on its watch lists. rorism is never an acceptable tactic, even for the most defensible of causes.
153. Sanctions imposed by the Security Council and the work of its Counter-Terrorism 158. Since 1945, an ever stronger set of norms and laws - including the Charter of
Committee have played an important role in ending the support of some States the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute for the
for terrorism and mobilizing other States in the fight against it. However, Council International Criminal Court - has regulated and constrained States’ decisions
sanctions against Al-Qaida and Taliban suffer from lagging support and imple- to use force and their conduct in war - for example in the requirement to dis-
mentation by Member States and affect only a small subset of known Al-Qaida tinguish between combatants and civilians, to use force proportionally and to
operatives, while a number of States are lagging behind in their compliance with live up to basic humanitarian principles. Violations of these obligations should
the directives of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. We believe that further continue to be met with widespread condemnation and war crimes should be
action is needed to achieve full implementation of these directives. prosecuted.
159. The norms governing the use of force by non-State actors have not kept pace
with those pertaining to States. This is not so much a legal question as a politi-
3. Assisting States in confronting terrorism cal one. Legally, virtually all forms of terrorism are prohibited by one of 12 inter-
154. Because United Nations-facilitated assistance is limited to technical support, national counter-terrorism conventions, international customary law, the
States seeking operational support for counter-terrorism activities have no alter- Geneva Conventions or the Rome Statutes. Legal scholars know this, but there
native but to seek bilateral assistance. A United Nations capacity to facilitate is a clear difference between this scattered list of conventions and little-known
this assistance would in some instances ease domestic political constraints, and provisions of other treaties, and a compelling normative framework, understood
this can be achieved by providing for the Counter-Terrorism Executive by all, that should surround the question of terrorism. The United Nations must
Directorate to act as a clearing house for State-to-State provision of military, achieve the same degree of normative strength concerning non-State use of force
police and border control assistance for the development of domestic counter- as it has concerning State use of force. Lack of agreement on a clear and well-
IR-210: UN Report
terrorism capacities. The Security Council, after consultation with affected known definition undermines the normative and moral stance against terrorism
States, should extend the authority of the Counter-Terrorism Executive and has stained the United Nations image. Achieving a comprehensive conven-
Directorate to perform this function. tion on terrorism, including a clear definition, is a political imperative.
155. Non-compliance can be a matter of insufficient will but is more frequently a 160. The search for an agreed definition usually stumbles on two issues. The first is
function of lack of capacity. United Nations members and specialized bodies the argument that any definition should include States’ use of armed forces
should increase their efforts to provide States with access to effective legal, against civilians. We believe that the legal and normative framework against
administrative and police tools to prevent terrorism. To aid this process, the State violations is far stronger than in the case of non-State actors and we do not
United Nations should establish a capacity-building trust fund under the find this objection to be compelling. The second objection is that peoples under
Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate. foreign occupation have a right to resistance and a definition of terrorism should
156. If confronted by States that have the capacity to undertake their obligations but not override this right. The right to resistance is contested by some. But it is
repeatedly fail to do so, the Security Council may need to take additional not the central point: the central point is that there is nothing in the fact of
occupation that justifies the targeting and killing of civilians.
50 51

Page 142
Page 143
161. Neither of these objections is weighty enough to contradict the argument that the direct threat to State and human security, and also constitutes a necessary step
strong, clear normative framework of the United Nations surrounding State use of in the effort to prevent and resolve internal conflicts, combat the spread of
force must be complemented by a normative framework of equal authority sur- weapons and prevent terrorism.
rounding non-State use of force. Attacks that specifically target innocent civilians 166. One of the core activities of organized criminal groups - drug trafficking - has
and non-combatants must be condemned clearly and unequivocally by all. major security implications. It is estimated that criminal organizations gain
162. We welcome the recent passage of Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), $300 to $500 billion annually from narcotics trafficking, their single largest
which includes several measures to strengthen the role of the United Nations in source of income. In some regions, the huge profits generated through this activ-
combating terrorism. ity even rivals some countries’ GDP, thus threatening State authority, economic
163. Nevertheless, we believe there is particular value in achieving a consen- development and the rule of law. Drug trafficking has fuelled an increase in intra-
sus definition within the General Assembly, given its unique legitimacy venous heroin use, which has contributed in some parts of the world to an alarm-
in normative terms, and that it should rapidly complete negotiations on ing spread of the HIV/AIDS virus. There is growing evidence of a nexus between
a comprehensive convention on terrorism. terrorist groups’ financing and opium profits, most visibly in Afghanistan.
164. That definition of terrorism should include the following elements: 167. States and international organizations have reacted too slowly to the threat of
organized crime and corruption. Statements about the seriousness of the threat have
(a) recognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against civilians rarely been matched by action. Three basic impediments stand in the way of more
is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, effective international responses: insufficient cooperation among States, weak coor-
if of sufficient scale, constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned dination among international agencies and inadequate compliance by many States.
or a crime against humanity;
168. Effectiveness in tackling specific incarnations of organized crime varies. Anti-
(b) restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti-terrorism conven-
corruption efforts suffer from a lack of commitment and understanding about
tions are terrorism, and a declaration that they are a crime under
the types, levels, location and cost of corruption. In the effort to curb the sup-
international law; and restatement that terrorism in time of armed
ply of narcotics, successes in some countries are often offset by failures in others.
conflict is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols;
National demand-reduction initiatives in the industrialized world have been
(c) reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International
similarly ineffective, and the total number of opium and heroin users has
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and
remained relatively stable over the last decade.
Security Council resolution 1566 (2004);
(d) description of terrorism as “any action, in addition to actions already 169. Responses to organized crime during and after conflict have been decentralized
specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the and fragmented. In the post-war period, former belligerents seek to exploit
Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), criminal connections and know-how developed during the war, thus undermin-
IR-210: UN Report
that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or ing international peacebuilding efforts. Entrenched corruption, the use of vio-
non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or con- lence to protect criminal activities and close ties between criminal enterprises
text, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an and political elites hinder establishing the rule of law and effective State insti-
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”. tutions. International efforts in curbing arms trafficking have been insufficient
and sanctions regimes are insufficiently enforced.
170. Organized crime is increasingly operating through fluid networks rather than
VII. Transnational organized crime more formal hierarchies. This form of organization provides criminals with
diversity, flexibility, low visibility and longevity. Connections among different
A. The threat we face
networks became a major feature of the organized crime world during the
165. Transnational organized crime is a menace to States and societies, eroding 1990s, thus creating networks of networks. The agility of such networks stands
human security and the fundamental obligation of States to provide for law and in marked contrast to the cumbersome sharing of information and weak coop-
order. Combating organized crime serves the double purpose of reducing this eration in criminal investigations and prosecutions on the part of States.
52 53

B. Meeting the challenge of prevention should sign and ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and parties to
171. Combating organized crime requires better international regulatory frameworks
the Protocol should take all necessary steps to effectively implement it.
and extended efforts in building State capacity in the area of the rule of law.
Concerted efforts against human trafficking are also required. 176. The United Nations should further promote technical cooperation among coun-
tries and international law enforcement agencies to secure the protection of and
support for victims of trafficking in countries of origin, transit and destination.
1. Better international regulatory frameworks In particular, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the
172. Several recent international conventions hold the potential to level the playing International Labour Organization (ILO) should aggressively promote the
field by allowing quicker, closer cooperation by States. Such conventions, how- human rights of women and children, and should integrate specific strategies to
ever, lack universal adherence and suffer from inadequate implementation and assist them into their programmes and help protect them against becoming vic-
observance by participating States. There is a need for mechanisms to monitor tims of human trafficking.
Member States’ compliance with their commitments and to identify and remedy
legislative and institutional deficiencies. The collective response to organized
2. Better State capacity-building
crime depends on the consolidation and strengthening of the international
treaty framework. More than half of the Member States of the United Nations 177. Lagging implementation is also a function, in some cases, of limited State
have not yet signed or ratified the 2000 United Nations Convention against capacity. In order to address this problem international organizations, most
Transnational Organized Crime and its three Protocols and the 2003 United prominently the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, have set up tech-
Nations Convention against Corruption, or adequately resourced the monitor- nical assistance and training programmes aimed at the building of effective
ing provisions of these Conventions and Protocols. Member States that have national law enforcement and judicial institutions. However, these activities are
not signed, ratified or resourced these Conventions and Protocols should insufficiently resourced. The United Nations should establish a robust
do so, and all Member States should support the United Nations Office capacity-building mechanism for rule-of-law assistance. Regional organiza-
on Drugs and Crime in its work in this area. tions and multinational financial institutions should actively join these efforts.
173. Organized crime groups move freely across borders; legal cooperation is impeded
by them. Member States should establish a central authority to facilitate VIII. The role of sanctions
the exchange of evidence among national judicial authorities, mutual legal
178. In dealing preventively with the threats to international peace and security,
assistance among prosecutorial authorities and the implementation of
sanctions are a vital though imperfect tool. They constitute a necessary middle
extradition requests.
ground between war and words when nations, individuals and rebel groups vio-
174. Unlike terrorists, criminals are motivated by financial gain. The single best
IR-210: UN Report
late international norms, and where a failure to respond would weaken those
strategy for weakening organized crime is to eliminate its ability to launder money. norms, embolden other transgressors or be interpreted as consent.
Transnational organized crime generates income of about $500 billion a year, with
179. Targeted sanctions (financial, travel, aviation or arms embargoes) are useful for
some sources estimating triple that amount. In 2000, between $500 billion and
putting pressure on leaders and elites with minimal humanitarian conse-
$1.5 trillion were laundered. Despite the magnitude of these sums and their role
quences, provide a less costly alternative to other options and can be tailored to
in furthering organized crime, many States do not regulate money-laundering.
specific circumstances. By isolating violators of international standards and
Indiscriminate enforcement of bank secrecy and the rapid development of financial
laws, even modest sanctions measures (including sports embargoes) can serve an
havens remains a serious obstacle to tackling this problem. A comprehensive
important symbolic purpose. The threat of sanctions can be a powerful means
international convention on money-laundering that addresses these issues
of deterrence and prevention.
needs to be negotiated, and endorsed by the General Assembly.
180. The Security Council must ensure that sanctions are effectively imple-
175. The most obscene form taken by organized crime is the traffic in human beings,
mented and enforced:
and all Member States should take decisive action to halt it. Member States
54 55

Page 144
Page 145
(a) When the Security Council imposes a sanctions regime - including

arms embargoes - it should routinely establish monitoring mecha-
nisms and provide them with the necessary authority and capacity to
carry out high-quality, in-depth investigations. Adequate budgetary
provisions must be made to implement those mechanisms;
(b) Security Council sanctions committees should be mandated to
develop improved guidelines and reporting procedures to assist
States in sanctions implementation, and to improve procedures for
maintaining accurate lists of individuals and entities subject to tar-
geted sanctions;
(c) The Secretary-General should appoint a senior official with sufficient
supporting resources to enable the Secretary-General to supply the
Security Council with analysis of the best way to target sanctions and
to assist in coordinating their implementation. This official would
also assist compliance efforts; identify technical assistance needs and
coordinate such assistance; and make recommendations on any
adjustments necessary to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions;
(d) Donors should devote more resources to strengthening the legal,
administrative, and policing and border-control capacity of Member
States to implement sanctions. These capacity-building measures
should include efforts to improve air-traffic interdiction in zones of
conflict;
(e) The Security Council should, in instances of verified, chronic
violations, impose secondary sanctions against those involved in
sanctions-busting;
(f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council,
should ensure that an appropriate auditing mechanism is in place to
oversee sanctions administration.
IR-210: UN Report
181. Sanctions committees should improve procedures for providing

humanitarian exemptions and routinely conduct assessments of the
humanitarian impact of sanctions. The Security Council should continue
to strive to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of sanctions.
182. Where sanctions involve lists of individuals or entities, sanctions com-
mittees should establish procedures to review the cases of those claiming
to have been incorrectly placed or retained on such lists.
56

IR-210: UN Report
Page 146
Collective security and the use of force

Part 3

Page 147
Part 3
Synopsis
What happens if peaceful prevention fails? If none of the preventive measures so far
described stop the descent into war and chaos? If distant threats do become imminent?
Or if imminent threats become actual? Or if a non-imminent threat nonetheless
becomes very real and measures short of the use of military force seem powerless to
stop it?
We address here the circumstances in which effective collective security may
require the backing of military force, starting with the rules of international law that
must govern any decision to go to war, if anarchy is not to prevail. It is necessary to
distinguish between situations in which a State claims to act in self-defence; situations
in which a State is posing a threat to others outside its borders; and situations in which
the threat is primarily internal and the issue is the responsibility to protect a State’s
own people. In all cases, we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly
understood and applied, is equal to the task: Article 51 needs neither extension nor
restriction of its long-understood scope, and Chapter VII fully empowers the Security
Council to deal with every kind of threat that States may confront. The task is not to
find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work
better than it has.
That force can legally be used, does not always mean that, as a matter of good con-
science and good sense, it should be used. We identify a set of guidelines - five criteria of
legitimacy - which we believe the Security Council (and anyone else involved in these
decisions) should always address in considering whether to authorize or apply military
force. The adoption of these guidelines (seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort,
proportional means and balance of consequences) will not produce agreed conclusions
IR-210: UN Report
with push-button predictability, but should significantly improve the chances of reach-
ing international consensus on what have been in recent years deeply divisive issues.
We also address here the other major issues that arise during and after violent con-
flict, including the needed capacities for peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace-
building, and the protection of civilians. A central recurring theme is the necessity for
all members of the international community, developed and developing States alike,
to be much more forthcoming in providing and supporting deployable military
resources. Empty gestures are all too easy to make: an effective, efficient and equitable
collective security system demands real commitment.
61

A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Part 3: Collective security and the use of force
IX. Using force: rules and guidelines 1. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and
self-defence
183. The framers of the Charter of the United Nations recognized that force may be
necessary for the “prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the 188. The language of this article is restrictive: “Nothing in the present Charter shall
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace”. Military force, impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
legally and properly applied, is a vital component of any workable system of col- attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security
lective security, whether defined in the traditional narrow sense or more broadly Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security”.
as we would prefer. But few contemporary policy issues cause more difficulty, or However, a threatened State, according to long established international law,
involve higher stakes, than the principles concerning its use and application to can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other
individual cases. means would deflect it and the action is proportionate. The problem arises
where the threat in question is not imminent but still claimed to be real: for
184. The maintenance of world peace and security depends importantly on there
example the acquisition, with allegedly hostile intent, of nuclear weapons-
being a common global understanding, and acceptance, of when the application
making capability.
of force is both legal and legitimate. One of these elements being satisfied with-
out the other will always weaken the international legal order - and thereby put 189. Can a State, without going to the Security Council, claim in these circumstances
both State and human security at greater risk. the right to act, in anticipatory self-defence, not just pre-emptively (against an
imminent or proximate threat) but preventively (against a non-imminent or
non-proximate one)? Those who say “yes” argue that the potential harm from
A. The question of legality some threats (e.g., terrorists armed with a nuclear weapon) is so great that one
185. The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 2.4, expressly prohibits Member simply cannot risk waiting until they become imminent, and that less harm
States from using or threatening force against each other, allowing only two may be done (e.g., avoiding a nuclear exchange or radioactive fallout from a
exceptions: self-defence under Article 51, and military measures authorized by reactor destruction) by acting earlier.
the Security Council under Chapter VII (and by extension for regional organi- 190. The short answer is that if there are good arguments for preventive military
zations under Chapter VIII) in response to “any threat to the peace, breach of action, with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security
the peace or act of aggression”. Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to. If it does not so choose,
186. For the first 44 years of the United Nations, Member States often violated these there will be, by definition, time to pursue other strategies, including persua-
rules and used military force literally hundreds of times, with a paralysed sion, negotiation, deterrence and containment - and to visit again the military
Security Council passing very few Chapter VII resolutions and Article 51 only option.
rarely providing credible cover. Since the end of the cold war, however, the 191. For those impatient with such a response, the answer must be that, in a world
IR-210: UN Report
yearning for an international system governed by the rule of law has grown. full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of
There is little evident international acceptance of the idea of security being best non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the
preserved by a balance of power, or by any single - even benignly motivated - legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed
superpower. action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all.
187. But in seeking to apply the express language of the Charter, three particularly 192. We do not favour the rewriting or reinterpretation of Article 51.
difficult questions arise in practice: first, when a State claims the right to strike
preventively, in self-defence, in response to a threat which is not imminent; sec-
ondly, when a State appears to be posing an external threat, actual or potential, 2. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and
to other States or people outside its borders, but there is disagreement in the external threats
Security Council as to what to do about it; and thirdly, where the threat is pri- 193. In the case of a State posing a threat to other States, people outside its borders
marily internal, to a State’s own people. or to international order more generally, the language of Chapter VII is inher-
ently broad enough, and has been interpreted broadly enough, to allow the
62 63

Page 148
Page 149
Security Council to approve any coercive action at all, including military 198. The Security Council is fully empowered under Chapter VII of the
action, against a State when it deems this “necessary to maintain or restore Charter of the United Nations to address the full range of security
international peace and security”. That is the case whether the threat is occur- threats with which States are concerned. The task is not to find alterna-
ring now, in the imminent future or more distant future; whether it involves tives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make the
the State’s own actions or those of non-State actors it harbours or supports; or Council work better than it has.
whether it takes the form of an act or omission, an actual or potential act of
violence or simply a challenge to the Council’s authority.
3. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
194. We emphasize that the concerns we expressed about the legality of the pre- internal threats and the responsibility to protect
ventive use of military force in the case of self-defence under Article 51 are
not applicable in the case of collective action authorized under Chapter VII. 199. The Charter of the United Nations is not as clear as it could be when it comes
In the world of the twenty-first century, the international community does to saving lives within countries in situations of mass atrocity. It “reaffirm(s)
have to be concerned about nightmare scenarios combining terrorists, faith in fundamental human rights” but does not do much to protect them, and
weapons of mass destruction and irresponsible States, and much more besides, Article 2.7 prohibits intervention “in matters which
which may conceivably justify the use of force, not just reactively but preven- are essentially within the jurisdiction of any State”. The principle of non-
tively and before a latent threat becomes imminent. The question is not There has been, as a result, a long-standing argument intervention in internal
whether such action can be taken: it can, by the Security Council as the inter- in the international community between those who affairs cannot be used to
national community’s collective security voice, at any time it deems that there insist on a “right to intervene” in man-made catastro- protect genocidal acts or
is a threat to international peace and security. The Council may well need to phes and those who argue that the Security Council, large-scale violations
be prepared to be much more proactive on these issues, taking more decisive for all its powers under Chapter VII to “maintain or of international humanitarian
action earlier, than it has been in the past. restore international security”, is prohibited from law or large-scale ethnic
authorizing any coercive action against sovereign cleansing
195. Questions of legality apart, there will be issues of prudence, or legitimacy, about States for whatever happens within their borders.
whether such preventive action should be taken: crucial among them is whether
there is credible evidence of the reality of the threat in question (taking into 200. Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
account both capability and specific intent) and whether the military response Genocide (Genocide Convention), States have agreed that genocide, whether
is the only reasonable one in the circumstances. We address these issues further committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law
below. which they undertake to prevent and punish. Since then it has been understood
that genocide anywhere is a threat to the security of all and should never be tol-
196. It may be that some States will always feel that they have the obligation to their erated. The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to
own citizens, and the capacity, to do whatever they feel they need to do, un-
IR-210: UN Report
protect genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as large-scale violations of inter-

burdened by the constraints of collective Security Council process. But how- national humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing, which can properly
ever understandable that approach may have been in the cold war years, when be considered a threat to international security and as such provoke action by
the United Nations was manifestly not operating as an effective collective secu- the Security Council.
rity system, the world has now changed and expectations about legal compli-
ance are very much higher. 201. The successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Rwanda, Kosovo and now Darfur, Sudan, have concentrated attention not on the
197. One of the reasons why States may want to bypass the Security Council is a lack immunities of sovereign Governments but their responsibilities, both to their own
of confidence in the quality and objectivity of its decision-making. The Council’s people and to the wider international community. There is a growing recognition
decisions have often been less than consistent, less than persuasive and less than that the issue is not the “right to intervene” of any State, but the “responsibility to
fully responsive to very real State and human security needs. But the solution is protect” of every State when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastro-
not to reduce the Council to impotence and irrelevance: it is to work from phe - mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and
within to reform it, including in the ways we propose in the present report. deliberate starvation and exposure to disease. And there is a growing acceptance
64 65

that while sovereign Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their objectively best outcome will always prevail. It is rather to maximize the possi-
own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so bility of achieving Security Council consensus around when it is appropriate or
that responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community - not to use coercive action, including armed force; to maximize international
with it spanning a continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if neces- support for whatever the Security Council decides; and to minimize the possi-
sary, and rebuilding shattered societies. The primary focus should be on assisting bility of individual Member States bypassing the Security Council.
the cessation of violence through mediation and other tools and the protection of 207. In considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force,
people through such measures as the dispatch of humanitarian, human rights and the Security Council should always address - whatever other considera-
police missions. Force, if it needs to be used, should be deployed as a last resort. tions it may take into account - at least the following five basic criteria of
202. The Security Council so far has been neither very consistent nor very effective legitimacy:
in dealing with these cases, very often acting too late, too hesitantly or not at (a) Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human secu-
all. But step by step, the Council and the wider international community have rity of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie
come to accept that, under Chapter VII and in pursuit of the emerging norm of the use of military force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve
a collective international responsibility to protect, it can always authorize mili- genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious vio-
tary action to redress catastrophic internal wrongs if it is prepared to declare that lations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently
the situation is a “threat to international peace and security”, not especially dif- apprehended?
ficult when breaches of international law are involved. (b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed
203. We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing other purposes or motives may be involved?
military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other (c) Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in
large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that
humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless other measures will not succeed?
or unwilling to prevent. (d) Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed
military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
(e) Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the military
B. The question of legitimacy
action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the
204. The effectiveness of the global collective security system, as with any other legal consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences
order, depends ultimately not only on the legality of decisions but also on the of inaction?
common perception of their legitimacy - their being made on solid evidentiary
208. The above guidelines for authorizing the use of force should be
IR-210: UN Report
grounds, and for the right reasons, morally as well as legally.

embodied in declaratory resolutions of the Security Council and
205. If the Security Council is to win the respect it must have as the primary body General Assembly.
in the collective security system, it is critical that its most important and influ-
209. We also believe it would be valuable if individual Member States, whether or
ential decisions, those with large-scale life-and-death impact, be better made,
not they are members of the Security Council, subscribed to them.
better substantiated and better communicated. In particular, in deciding
whether or not to authorize the use of force, the Council should adopt and sys-
tematically address a set of agreed guidelines, going directly not to whether X. Peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability
force can legally be used but whether, as a matter of good conscience and good
sense, it should be. 210. When the Security Council makes a determination that force must be author-
ized, questions remain about the capacities at its disposal to implement that
206. The guidelines we propose will not produce agreed conclusions with push-
decision. In recent years, decisions to authorize military force for the purpose of
button predictability. The point of adopting them is not to guarantee that the
enforcing the peace have primarily fallen to multinational forces. Blue helmet
66 67

Page 150
Page 151
peacekeepers - in United Nations uniform and under direct United Nations absence of a commensurate increase in available personnel, United Nations peace-
command - have more frequently been deployed when forces are authorized keeping risks repeating some of its worst failures of the 1990s.
with the consent of the parties to conflict, to help implement a peace agreement 216. At present, the total global supply of personnel is constrained both by the fact
or monitor ceasefire lines after combat. that the armed forces of many countries remain configured for cold war duties,
211. Discussion of the necessary capacities has been confused by the tendency to refer with less than 10 per cent of those in uniform available for active deployment
to peacekeeping missions as “Chapter VI operations” and peace enforcement at any given time, and by the fact that few nations have sufficient transport and
missions as “Chapter VII operations” - meaning consent-based or coercion- logistic capabilities to move and supply those who are available. For peace-
based, respectively. This shorthand is also often used to distinguish missions keeping, and in extreme cases peace enforcement, to continue to be an effective
that do not involve the use of deadly force for purposes other than self-defence, and accepted instrument of collective security, the availability of peacekeepers
and those that do. must grow. The developed States have particular responsibilities here,
212. Both characterizations are to some extent misleading. There is a distinction and should do more to transform their existing force capacities into suit-
between operations in which the robust use of force is integral to the mission able contingents for peace operations.
from the outset (e.g., responses to cross-border invasions or an explosion of vio- 217. Prompt and effective response to today’s challenges requires a dependable
lence, in which the recent practice has been to mandate multinational forces) capacity for the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment for peacekeep-
and operations in which there is a reasonable expectation that force may not be ing and law enforcement. States that have either global or regional air- or sea-
needed at all (e.g., traditional peacekeeping missions monitoring and verifying lift capacities should make these available to the United Nations, either free of
a ceasefire or those assisting in implementing peace agreements, where blue hel- charge or on the basis of a negotiated fee-based structure for the reimbursement
mets are still the norm). of the additional costs associated with United Nations use of these capacities.
213. But both kinds of operation need the authorization of the Security Council 218. Member States should strongly support the efforts of the Department of
(Article 51 self-defence cases apart), and in peacekeeping cases as much as in Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations Secretariat, building on
peace-enforcement cases it is now the usual practice for a Chapter VII mandate the important work of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
to be given (even if that is not always welcomed by troop contributors). This is (see A/55/305-S/2000/809), to improve its use of strategic deployment
on the basis that even the most benign environment can turn sour - when spoil- stockpiles, standby arrangements, trust funds and other mechanisms to
ers emerge to undermine a peace agreement and put civilians at risk - and that meet the tighter deadlines necessary for effective deployment.
it is desirable for there to be complete certainty about the mission’s capacity to 219. However, it is unlikely that the demand for rapid action will be met through
respond with force, if necessary. On the other hand, the difference between United Nations mechanisms alone. We welcome the European Union decision
Chapter VI and VII mandates can be exaggerated: there is little doubt that to establish standby high readiness, self-sufficient battalions that can reinforce
peacekeeping missions operating under Chapter VI (and thus operating with-
IR-210: UN Report
United Nations missions. Others with advanced military capacities should

out enforcement powers) have the right to use force in self-defence - and this be encouraged to develop similar capacities at up to brigade level and to
right is widely understood to extend to “defence of the mission”. place them at the disposal of the United Nations.
214. The real challenge, in any deployment of forces of any configuration with any role,
is to ensure that they have (a) an appropriate, clear and well understood mandate,
applicable to all the changing circumstances that might reasonably be envisaged,
Regional cooperation
and (b) all the necessary resources to implement that mandate fully. 220. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a trend towards a variety of regional- and
215. The demand for personnel for both full-scale peace-enforcement missions and subregional-based peacekeeping missions. This trend holds the promise of
peacekeeping missions remains higher than the ready supply. At the end of 2004, developing regional capacity to address shortfalls in the numbers of peacekeep-
there are more than 60,000 peacekeepers deployed in 16 missions around the ers, and it should augment and not detract from the ability of the United
world. If international efforts stay on track to end several long-standing wars in Nations to respond when blue helmets are requested. This poses a challenge for
Africa, the numbers of peacekeepers needed will soon substantially increase. In the the Security Council and regional organizations to work closely with each other
68 69

and mutually support each other’s efforts to keep the peace and ensure that assessments and organize the start-up of police components of peace
regional operations are accountable to universally accepted human rights stan- operations, and the General Assembly should authorize this capacity.
dards. We address this question in part four below.
B. The larger peacebuilding task
XI. Post-conflict peacebuilding 224. Deploying peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces may be essential in ter-
minating conflicts but are not sufficient for long-term recovery. Serious atten-
A. The role of peacekeepers tion to the longer-term process of peacebuilding in all its multiple dimensions
221. It is often necessary to build confidence among former adversaries and provide is critical; failure to invest adequately in peacebuilding increases the odds that
security to ordinary people trying to rebuild their lives and communities after a country will relapse into conflict.
conflict. The mediation and successful implementation of a peace agreement 225. In both the period before the outbreak of civil war and in the transition out of
offers hope for breaking long-standing cycles of violence war, neither the United Nations nor the broader international community,
Resources spent on implemen-
that haunt many war-inflicted countries. Resources spent including the international financial institutions,
tation of peace agreements and When peacekeepers leave a
on implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding are well organized to assist countries attempting to
peacebuilding are one of the country, it falls off the radar
are one of the best investments that can be made for con- build peace. When peacekeepers leave a country, it
best investments that can be screen of the Security
flict prevention - States that have experienced civil war face falls off the radar screen of the Security Council.
made for conflict prevention Council.
a high risk of recurrence. While the Economic and Social Council has created
222. Implementing peace agreements to end civil wars poses unique challenges several ad hoc committees to address specific cases, results have proven
for peacekeepers. Unlike inter-State wars, making peace in civil war requires mixed and even the proponents of these committees acknowledge that they
overcoming daunting security dilemmas. Spoilers, factions who see a peace have not succeeded in generating crucial resources to assist fragile transi-
agreement as inimical to their interest, power or ideology, use violence to tions. What is needed is a single intergovernmental organ dedicated to
undermine or overthrow settlements. Peacekeeping fails when resources and peacebuilding, empowered to monitor and pay close attention to countries
strategies are not commensurate to meeting the challenge they pose - as at risk, ensure concerted action by donors, agencies, programmes and finan-
occurred repeatedly in the 1990s, for example in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. cial institutions, and mobilize financial resources for sustainable peace. We
When peacekeeping operations are deployed to implement peace agree- address this need in part four below.
ments, they must be equipped to repel attacks from spoilers. Contingency 226. Similarly, at the field level, many different elements of the United Nations sys-
plans for responding to hostile opposition should be an integral part of the tem and the broader international community engage in some form of peace-
mission design; missions that do not have the troop strength to resist building, but they work too slowly and without adequate coordination.
IR-210: UN Report
aggression will invite it. In some contexts, opposition to a peace agreement Effective coordination is critical. National authorities should be at the heart of
is not tactical but fundamental. We must learn the lesson: peace agreements this coordination effort, and should be supported by coherent United Nations
by Governments or rebels that engage in or encourage mass human rights and international presences. Robust donor coordination mechanisms at the
abuses have no value and cannot be implemented. These contexts are not field level, involving Governments, bilateral donors, the international financial
appropriate for consent-based peacekeeping; rather, they must be met with institutions and the United Nations coordinator (special representative of the
concerted action. The Secretary-General should recommend and the Secretary-General or resident coordinator) representing the United Nations
Security Council should authorize troop strengths sufficient to deter funds, programmes and agencies, have proved their value for ensuring effective
and repel hostile factions. peacebuilding. Special representatives should have the authority and
223. Most peacekeeping situations also require policing and other law and order guidance to work with relevant parties to establish such mechanisms, as
functions, and the slow deployment of police contingents has marred successive well as the resources to perform coordination functions effectively,
operations. The United Nations should have a small corps of senior police including ensuring that the sequencing of United Nations assessments
officers and managers (50-100 personnel) who could undertake mission and activities is consistent with Government priorities.
70 71

Page 152
Page 153
227. Given that many peace operations can expect resource shortfalls, the efficient use more are displaced internally or across borders. Human rights abuses and gen-
of resources is all the more important. Demobilizing combatants is the single der violence are rampant.
most important factor determining the success of peace operations. Without 232. Under international law, the primary responsibility to protect civilians from
demobilization, civil wars cannot be brought to an end and other critical suffering in war lies with belligerents - State or non-State. International
goals - such as democratization, justice and development - have little chance humanitarian law provides minimum protection and standards applicable to
for success. In case after case, however, demobilization is not accorded priority the most vulnerable in situations of armed conflict, including women, children
by funders. When peace operations are deployed, they must be resourced to and refugees, and must be respected.
undertake the demobilization and disarmament of combatants; this is a priori-
ty for successful peace implementation. These tasks should be integrated into 233. All combatants must abide by the provisions of the Geneva
the assessed budget of peacekeeping operations, under the authority of the head Conventions. All Member States should sign, ratify and act on all
of mission. The Security Council should mandate and the General treaties relating to the protection of civilians, such as the Genocide
Assembly should authorize funding for disarmament and demobilization Convention, the Geneva Conventions, the
programmes from assessed budgets. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Particularly egregious
Court and all refugee conventions. violations, such as occur
228. But these programmes will be ineffective without the provision of resources for when armed groups
reintegration and rehabilitation. Failure to successfully implement such pro- 234. Humanitarian aid is a vital tool for helping Govern-
militarize refugee camps,
grammes will result in youth unemployment and fuel the development of crim- ments to fulfil this responsibility. Its core purpose is
require emphatic responses
inal gangs and violence and ultimately a relapse into conflict. A standing fund to protect civilian victims, minimize their suffering
from the international
for peacebuilding should be established at the level of at least $250 mil- and keep them alive during the conflict so that when
community, including
lion that can be used to finance the recurrent expenditures of a nascent war ends they have the opportunity to rebuild shat-
from the Security Council
Government, as well as critical agency programmes in the areas of reha- tered lives. The provision of assistance is a necessary
bilitation and reintegration. part of this effort. Donors must fully and equitably
fund humanitarian protection and assistance operations.
229. Along with establishing security, the core task of peacebuilding is to build effec-
tive public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society, can estab- 235. The Secretary-General, based in part on work undertaken by the United
lish a consensual framework for governing within the rule of law. Relatively Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and strong advocacy efforts by non-
cheap investments in civilian security through police, judicial and rule-of-law governmental organizations, has prepared a 10-point platform for action for the
reform, local capacity-building for human rights and reconciliation, and local protection of civilians in armed conflict. The Secretary-General’s 10-point plat-
capacity-building for public sector service delivery can greatly benefit long- form for action should be considered by all actors - States, NGOs and interna-
term peacebuilding. This should be reflected in the policies of the United tional organizations - in their efforts to protect civilians in armed conflict.
IR-210: UN Report
Nations, international financial institutions and donors, and should be given 236. From this platform, particular attention should be placed on the question of
priority in long-term policy and funding. access to civilians, which is routinely and often flagrantly denied. United
230. To address this task, United Nations field representatives (including heads of Nations humanitarian field staff, as well as United Nations political and peace-
peacekeeping operations) require dedicated support on the broader aspects of keeping representatives, should be well trained and well supported to negoti-
peacebuilding strategy, especially in the area of rule of law. The creation of a ate access. Such efforts also require better coordination of bilateral initiatives.
Peacebuilding Support Office (see part four below) would address this need. The Security Council can use field missions and other diplomatic measures to
enhance access to and protection of civilians.
237. Particularly egregious violations, such as occur when armed groups militarize
XII. Protecting civilians refugee camps, require emphatic responses from the international community,
231. In many civil wars, combatants target civilians and relief workers with including from the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter
impunity. Beyond direct violence, deaths from starvation, disease and the col- of the United Nations. Although the Security Council has acknowledged that
lapse of public health dwarf the numbers killed by bullets and bombs. Millions such militarization is a threat to peace and security, it has not developed the
72 73

capacity or shown the will to confront the problem. The Security Council
should fully implement resolution 1265 (1999) on the protection of civil-
ians in armed conflict.
238. Of special concern is the use of sexual violence as a weapon of conflict. The
human rights components of peacekeeping operations should be given explicit
mandates and sufficient resources to investigate and report on human rights vio-
lations against women. Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women,
peace and security and the associated Independent Experts’ Assessment provide
important additional recommendations for the protection of women. The
Security Council, United Nations agencies and Member States should
fully implement its recommendations.
United Nations staff security

239. The ability of the United Nations to protect civilians and help end conflict is
directly related to United Nations staff security, which has been eroding since
the mid-1990s. To be able to maintain presence, and operate securely and effec-
tively, the United Nations needs four things: the capacity to perform its man-
dated tasks fully; freedom from unwarranted intrusion by Member States into
operations; full respect by staff of United Nations codes of impartiality; and a Part 4
professional security service, with access to Member States’ intelligence and
threat assessments. The Secretary-General has recommended the creation of A more effective United Nations
such a service, headed by a Director who will report directly to him. Member
States should support and fully fund the proposed Directorate of for the twenty-first century
Security and accord high priority to assisting the Secretary-General in
implementing a new staff security system in 2005.
IR-210: UN Report
74

Page 154
Page 155
Part 4
A more effective United Nations
for the twenty-first century
Synopsis
The United Nations was never intended to be a utopian exercise. It was meant to
be a collective security system that worked. The Charter of the United Nations
provided the most powerful States with permanent membership on the Security
Council and the veto. In exchange, they were expected to use their power for the
common good and promote and obey international law. As Harry Truman, then
President of the United States, noted in his speech to the final plenary session of
the founding conference of the United Nations Organization, “we all have to rec-
ognize - no matter how great our strength - that we must deny ourselves the
license to do always as we please”.
In approaching the issue of United Nations reform, it is as important today as it
was in 1945 to combine power with principle. Recommendations that ignore under-
lying power realities will be doomed to failure or irrelevance, but recommendations
that simply reflect raw distributions of power and make no effort to bolster interna-
tional principles are unlikely to gain the widespread adherence required to shift inter-
national behaviour.
Proposed changes should be driven by real-world need. Change for its own sake
is likely to run the well-worn course of the endless reform debates of the past decade.
The litmus test is this: does a proposed change help meet the challenge posed by a vir-
ulent threat?
Throughout the Panel’s work, we have looked for institutional weaknesses in
current responses to threats. The following stand as the most urgently in need of
IR-210: UN Report
remedy:
• The General Assembly has lost vitality and often fails to focus effectively on the
most compelling issues of the day.
• The Security Council will need to be more proactive in the future. For this to
happen, those who contribute most to the Organization financially, militarily
and diplomatically should participate more in Council decision-making, and
those who participate in Council decision-making should contribute more to
the Organization. The Security Council needs greater credibility, legitimacy
and representation to do all that we demand of it.
• There is a major institutional gap in addressing countries under stress and
countries emerging from conflict. Such countries often suffer from attention,
policy guidance and resource deficits.
77

A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Part 4: A more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century
• The Security Council has not made the most of the potential advantages of community. Smaller, more tightly focused committees could help sharpen
working with regional and subregional organizations. and improve resolutions that are brought to the whole Assembly.
• There must be new institutional arrangements to address the economic and 243. We believe that civil society and non-governmental organizations can provide
social threats to international security. valuable knowledge and perspectives on global issues. We endorse the recom-
• The Commission on Human Rights suffers from a legitimacy deficit that casts mendation of the recently released report of the Panel of Eminent
doubts on the overall reputation of the United Nations. Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations (see A/58/817) that the
• There is a need for a more professional and better organized Secretariat that is General Assembly should establish a better mechanism to enable system-
much more capable of concerted action. atic engagement with civil society organizations.
The reforms we propose will not by themselves make the United Nations more
effective. In the absence of Member States reaching agreement on the security consen-
sus contained in the present report, the United Nations will underachieve. Its insti- XIV. The Security Council
tutions will still only be as strong as the energy, resources and attention devoted to 244. The founders of the United Nations conferred primary responsibility on the
them by Member States and their leaders. Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. The
Security Council was designed to enable the world body to act decisively to prevent
XIII. The General Assembly and remove threats. It was created to be not just a representative but a responsible
body, one that had the capacity for decisive action. The five permanent members
240. The General Assembly is, first and foremost, a universal body, representing
were given veto rights but were also expected to shoulder an extra burden in pro-
almost every State in the world. Its unique legitimacy must be used to move us
moting global security. Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations established
towards global consensus on the policy issues of greatest contemporary impor-
that membership in the Council as a whole was explicitly linked not just to geo-
tance. We cannot overestimate the importance of holding a general debate every
graphical balance but also to contributions to maintaining peace and security.
year in which the view of every Government is presented, providing a crucial
opportunity to gauge the pulse of the international community. The General 245. Since the Council was formed the threats and challenges to international peace
Assembly provides a unique forum in which to forge consensus. Members should and security have changed, as has the distribution of power among members.
use the opportunity provided by the Millennium Review Summit in 2005 But the Security Council has been slow to change. Decisions cannot be imple-
to forge a new consensus on broader, more effective collective security. mented just by members of the Security Council but require extensive military,
financial and political involvement by other States. Decisions taken and man-
241. The keys to strengthening the General Assembly’s role are focus and structure.
dates given have often lacked the essential components of realism, adequate
Its norm-making capacity is often squandered on debates about minutiae or
resources and the political determination to see them through. The Secretary-
thematic topics outpaced by real-world events. Its inability to reach closure on
General is frequently holding out a begging bowl to implement Security
IR-210: UN Report
issues undermines its relevance. An unwieldy and static agenda leads to repet-
Council decisions. Moreover, the paucity of representation from the broad mem-
itive debates. Although some resolutions, such as the 1948 Universal
bership diminishes support for Security Council decisions.
Declaration of Human Rights and the 2000 United Nations Millennium
Declaration, are highly significant, many others are repetitive, obscure or inap- 246. Since the end of the cold war, the effectiveness of the Council has improved, as has
plicable, thus diminishing the credibility of the body. But detailed procedural its willingness to act; but it has not always been equitable in its actions, nor has it
fixes are not going to make the General Assembly a more effective instrument acted consistently or effectively in the face of genocide or other atrocities. This has
than it is now. That can only be achieved if its members show a sustained deter- gravely damaged its credibility. The financial and military contributions to the
mination to put behind them the approach which they have applied hitherto. United Nations of some of the five permanent members are modest compared to
their special status, and often the Council’s non-permanent members have been
242. Member States should renew efforts to enable the General Assembly to
unable to make the necessary contribution to the work of the Organization envis-
perform its function as the main deliberative organ of the United Nations.
aged by the Charter. Even outside the use of a formal veto, the ability of the five
This requires a better conceptualization and shortening of the agenda,
permanent members to keep critical issues of peace and security off the Security
which should reflect the contemporary challenges facing the international
Council’s agenda has further undermined confidence in the body’s work.
78 79

Page 156
Page 157
247. Yet recent experience has also shown that the Security Council is the body in 251. Models A and B both involve a distribution of seats as between four
the United Nations most capable of organizing action and responding rapidly major regional areas, which we identify respectively as “Africa”, “Asia
to new threats. and Pacific”, “Europe” and “Americas”. We see these descriptions as
248. Thus, the challenge for any reform is to increase both the effectiveness and the helpful in making and implementing judgements about the composition
credibility of the Security Council and, most importantly, to enhance its capac- of the Security Council, but make no recommendation about changing
ity and willingness to act in the face of threats. This requires greater involve- the composition of the current regional groups for general electoral and
ment in Security Council decision-making by those who other United Nations purposes. Some members of the Panel, in particu-
... the challenge for any lar our Latin American colleagues, expressed a preference for basing any
contribute most; greater contributions from those with
reform is to increase both the distribution of seats on the current regional groups.
special decision-making authority; and greater consulta-
effectiveness and the credibility
tion with those who must implement its decisions. It also 252. Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being cre-
of the Security Council and,
requires a firm consensus on the nature of today’s threats, ated, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among
most importantly, to enhance
on the obligations of broadened collective security, on the the major regional areas as follows:
its capacity and willingness to
necessity of prevention, and on when and why the Council
act in the face of threats
should authorize the use of force. Regional Number Permanent Proposed new Proposed Total
249. We believe that reforms of the Security Council should meet the follow- area of States seats permanent seats two-year seats
(continuing) (non-renewable)
ing principles:
(a) They should, in honouring Article 23 of the Charter of the United Africa 53 0 2 4 6
Nations, increase the involvement in decision-making of those Asia and Pacific 56 1 2 3 6
who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily Europe 47 3 1 2 6
and diplomatically - specifically in terms of contributions to
United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace Americas 35 1 1 4 6
operations, contributions to voluntary activities of the United Totals
Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic model A 191 5 6 13 24
activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates.
Among developed countries, achieving or making substantial
253. Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category
progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of
of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-
GNP for ODA should be considered an important criterion of con-
permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional
tribution;
IR-210: UN Report
areas as follows:
(b) They should bring into the decision-making process countries more
representative of the broader membership, especially of the develop- Regional Number Permanent Proposed Proposed Total
ing world; area of States seats four-year two-year seats
(c) They should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council; (continuing) renewable seats (non-renewable)
(d) They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the Africa 53 0 2 4 6
body.
Asia and Pacific 56 1 2 3 6
250. The Panel believes that a decision on the enlargement of the Council,
Europe 47 3 2 1 6
satisfying these criteria, is now a necessity. The presentation of two
clearly defined alternatives, of the kind described below as models A Americas 35 1 2 3 6
and B, should help to clarify - and perhaps bring to resolution - a debate Totals
which has made little progress in the last 12 years. model B 191 5 8 11 24
80 81

254. In both models, having regard to Article 23 of the Charter of the United tors have rights under Article 44 of the Charter to be fully consulted concern-
Nations, a method of encouraging Member States to contribute more to ing the deployment of troops to Council-mandated operations. We recom-
international peace and security would be for the General Assembly, tak- mend that processes to improve transparency and accountability be
ing into account established practices of regional consultation, to elect incorporated and formalized in the Council’s rules of procedure.
Security Council members by giving preference for permanent or longer- 259. Many delegations on the Security Council lack access to professional military
term seats to those States that are among the top three financial contrib- advice. Yet they are frequently called upon to take decisions with far-ranging
utors in their relevant regional area to the regular budget, or the top military implications. We recommend therefore that the Secretary General’s
three voluntary contributors from their regional area, or the top three Military Adviser and the members of his staff be available on demand by the
troop contributors from their regional area to United Nations peace- Security Council to offer technical and professional advice on military options.
keeping missions.
260. We welcome greater civil society engagement in the work of the Security
255. The Panel was strongly of the view that no change to the composition of the Council.
Security Council should itself be regarded as permanent or unchallengeable in
the future. Therefore, there should be a review of the composition of the
Security Council in 2020, including, in this context, a review of the XV. A Peacebuilding Commission
contribution (as defined in para. 249 above) of permanent and non- 261. Our analysis has identified a key institutional gap: there is no place in the
permanent members from the point of view of the Council’s effective- United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide
ness in taking collective action to prevent and remove new and old to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace. That this was
threats to international peace and security. not included in the Charter of the United Nations is no surprise since the work
256. Neither model involves any expansion of the veto or any Charter modification of of the United Nations in largely internal conflicts is fairly recent. But today, in
the Security Council’s existing powers. We recognize that the veto had an impor- an era when dozens of States are under stress or recovering from conflict, there
tant function in reassuring the United Nations most powerful members that is a clear international obligation to assist States in developing their capacity to
their interests would be safeguarded. We see no practical way of changing the perform their sovereign functions effectively and responsibly.
existing members’ veto powers. Yet, as a whole the institution of the veto has an 262. The United Nations unique role in this area arises from its international legit-
anachronistic character that is unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly imacy; the impartiality of its personnel; its ability to draw on personnel with
democratic age and we would urge that its use be limited to matters where vital broad cultural understanding and experience of a wide range of administrative
interests are genuinely at stake. We also ask the permanent members, in their systems, including in the developing world; and its recent experience in organ-
individual capacities, to pledge themselves to refrain from the use of the veto in izing transitional administration and transitional authority operations.
cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses. We recommend that
IR-210: UN Report
under any reform proposal, there should be no expansion of the veto. 263. Strengthening the United Nations capacity for peacebuilding in the widest
sense must be a priority for the organization. The United Nations needs to be
257. We propose the introduction of a system of “indicative voting”, whereby able to act in a coherent and effective way throughout a whole continuum that
members of the Security Council could call for a public indication of runs from early warning through preventive action to post-conflict peacebuild-
positions on a proposed action. Under this indicative vote, “no” votes would ing. We recommend that the Security Council, acting under Article 29 of
not have a veto effect, nor would the final tally of the vote have any legal force. the Charter of the United Nations and after consultation with the
The second formal vote on any resolution would take place under the current Economic and Social Council, establish a Peacebuilding Commission.
procedures of the Council. This would, we believe, increase the accountability
of the veto function. 264. The core functions of the Peacebuilding Commission should be to iden-
tify countries which are under stress and risk sliding towards State col-
258. In recent years, many informal improvements have been made to the trans- lapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proac-
parency and accountability of the Security Council’s deliberative and decision- tive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to
making procedures. We also remind the Security Council that troop contribu- assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict
82 83

Page 158
Page 159
peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the transitional political arrangements or building new State institutions. It should
international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever submit twice-yearly early warning analyses to the Peacebuilding Commission
period may be necessary. to help it in organizing its work.
265. While the precise composition, procedures, and reporting lines of the 268. The Peacebuilding Support Office should also maintain rosters of national and
Peacebuilding Commission will need to be established, they should take international experts, particularly those with experience in post-conflict cases.
account of the following guidelines: 269. The Office should have an inter-agency advisory board, headed by the Chair of
(a) The Peacebuilding Commission should be reasonably small; the United Nations Development Group, that would ensure that the Office
(b) It should meet in different configurations, to consider both general worked in effective cooperation with other elements of the system that provide
policy issues and country-by-country strategies; related support.
(c) It should be chaired for at least one year and perhaps longer by a
member approved by the Security Council; XVI. Regional organizations
(d) In addition to representation from the Security Council, it should
include representation from the Economic and Social Council; 270. The ability of the Security Council to become more proactive in preventing and
(e) National representatives of the country under consideration should be responding to threats will be strengthened by making fuller and more produc-
invited to attend; tive use of the Chapter VIII provisions of the Charter of the United Nations
(f) The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, the than has hitherto been the case.
President of the World Bank and, when appropriate, heads of 271. Since the establishment of the United Nations, a considerable number of
regional development banks should be represented at its meetings regional and subregional groupings have been established. Some of these group-
by appropriate senior officials; ings have made important contributions to the stability and prosperity of their
(g) Representatives of the principal donor countries and, when appro- members, and some of them have begun to address directly threats to peace and
priate, the principal troop contributors should be invited to partici- security. We believe the United Nations should encourage the establishment of
pate in its deliberations; such groupings, particularly in highly vulnerable parts of the world where no
(h) Representatives of regional and subregional organizations should be effective security organizations currently exist.
invited to participate in its deliberations when such organizations are 272. Recent experience has demonstrated that regional organizations can be a vital part
actively involved in the country in question. of the multilateral system. Their efforts need not contradict United Nations efforts,
nor do they absolve the United Nations of its primary responsibilities for peace and
Peacebuilding Support Office security. The key is to organize regional action within the framework of the Charter
IR-210: UN Report
and the purposes of the United Nations, and to ensure that the United Nations and
266. A Peacebuilding Support Office should be established in the Secretariat
any regional organization with which it works do so in a more integrated fashion
to give the Peacebuilding Commission appropriate Secretariat support
than has up to now occurred. This will require that:
and to ensure that the Secretary-General is able to integrate system-wide
peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide (a) Authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought
cohesive support for field operations. for regional peace operations, recognizing that in some urgent situations
that authorization may be sought after such operations have commenced;
267. The Office should comprise about 20 or more staff of different backgrounds in
the United Nations system and with significant experience in peacebuilding (b) Consultation and cooperation between the United Nations and
strategy and operations. In addition to supporting the Secretary-General and regional organizations should be expanded and could be formalized
the Peacebuilding Commission, the Office could also, on request, provide assis- in an agreement, covering such issues as meetings of the heads of the
tance and advice to the heads of peace operations, United Nations resident coor- organizations, more frequent exchange of information and early
dinators or national Governments - for example in developing strategies for warning, co-training of civilian and military personnel, and exchange
of personnel within peace operations;
84 85

(c) In the case of African regional and subregional capacities, donor level. Second, the United Nations has an unrivalled convening power, on the basis
countries should commit to a 10-year process of sustained capacity- of which the General Assembly and the major conferences and summits it has con-
building support, within the African Union strategic framework; vened in the last three decades have generated consensus around internationally
(d) Regional organizations that have a capacity for conflict prevention or accepted goals, especially in the social field. Third, the United Nations shows that
peacekeeping should place such capacities in the framework of the it has strong grass-roots support for its goals and can thus mobilize public opin-
United Nations Standby Arrangements System; ion in their favour. Three strategies can help the Economic and Social
Council enhance its relevance and contribution to collective security,
(e) Member States should agree to allow the United Nations to provide
building on United Nations comparative advantages, as described below.
equipment support from United Nations-owned sources to regional
operations, as needed; 276. First, the Economic and Social Council can provide normative and ana-
lytical leadership in a time of much debate about the causes of, and intercon-
(f) The rules for the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be
nections between, the many threats we face. To that end:
amended to give the United Nations the option on a case-by-case
basis to finance regional operations authorized by the Security (a) We recommend that the Economic and Social Council establish a
Council with assessed contributions. Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of Security Threats, and
that it use its powers to commission research and develop better understanding
273. In recent years, such alliance organizations as NATO (which have not usually
about the economic and social threats to peace, and about the economic and
been considered regional organizations within the meaning of Chapter VIII of
social aspects of other threats, such as terrorism and organized crime;
the Charter but have some similar characteristics) have undertaken peacekeep-
ing operations beyond their mandated areas. We welcome this so long as these (b) We welcome the recent improvement in the exchange of information
operations are authorized by and accountable to the Security Council. In the case between the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council, for
of NATO, there may also be a constructive role for it to play in assisting in the example through regular meetings of their Presidents, and encourage both
training and equipping of less well resourced regional organizations and States. bodies to regularize these exchanges.
277. Second, it can provide an arena in which States measure their commit-
ments to achieving key development objectives in an open and transpar-
XVII. The Economic and Social Council ent manner.
274. The framers of the Charter of the United Nations understood that peace and 278. Third, it can provide a regular venue for engaging the development com-
security were inseparable from economic development. The institutional prob- munity at the highest level, in effect transforming itself into a “develop-
lem we face is twofold: first, decision-making on international economic mat- ment cooperation forum”. To that end:
ters, particularly in the areas of finance and trade, has long left the United
(a) A new approach should be adopted within the Economic and Social
IR-210: UN Report
Nations and no amount of institutional reform will bring it back; and second,
Council agenda, replacing its current focus on administrative issues
the Charter allowed for the creation of specialized agencies independent of the
and programme coordination with a more focused agenda built
principal United Nations organs, reducing the role of the Economic and Social
around the major themes contained in the Millennium Declaration;
Council to one of coordination. The fragmentation of the United Nations funds,
programmes and agencies makes this a difficult proposition in the best of times. (b) A small executive committee, comprising members from each
It would not, however, be realistic to aim for the Economic and Social Council regional group, should be created in order to provide orientation and
to become the centre of the world’s decision-making on matters of trade and direction to its work and its interaction with principal organs, agen-
finance, or to direct the programmes of the specialized agencies or the interna- cies and programmes;
tional financial institutions. (c) The annual meetings between the Economic and Social Council and
275. And yet the United Nations does have potential assets in the areas of economic the Bretton Woods institutions should be used to encourage collec-
and social development. First, the United Nations is the only place where the tive action in support of the Millennium Development Goals and the
issues of peace, security and development can be addressed together at the global Monterrey Consensus;
86 87

Page 160
Page 161
(d) The Economic and Social Council, with inputs from its secretariat Rights is entrusted with promoting respect for human rights globally, fostering
and the United Nations Development Group, should aim to provide international cooperation in human rights, responding to violations in specific
guidance on development cooperation to the governing boards of countries and assisting countries in building their human rights capacity.
the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies; 283. In recent years, the Commission’s capacity to perform these tasks has been
(e) The Economic and Social Council should provide strong support for undermined by eroding credibility and professionalism. Standard-setting to
the efforts of the Secretary-General and the United Nations reinforce human rights cannot be performed by States that lack a demonstrat-
Development Group to strengthen the coherence of United Nations ed commitment to their promotion and protection. We are concerned that in
action at the field level and its coordination with the Bretton Woods recent years States have sought membership of the Commission not to
institutions and bilateral donors. strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to crit-
279. We believe the time has arrived to reconsider the manner of and quantity of icize others. The Commission cannot be credible if it is seen to be maintaining
funding for the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. New initia- double standards in addressing human rights concerns.
tives in this regard have been explored recently and deserve the special atten- 284. Reform of this body is therefore necessary to make the human rights system per-
tion of the international community. form effectively and ensure that it better fulfils its mandate and functions. We
support the recent efforts of the Secretary-General and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights to ensure that human rights are integrated
Achieving policy coherence throughout the work of the United Nations, and to support the development of
280. While the strategies above are important for a better functioning Economic and strong domestic human rights institutions, especially in countries emerging from
Social Council, we appreciate that historical developments in the governance of conflict and in the fight against terrorism. Member States should provide full sup-
the multilateral system have limited the capacity of that body to influence port to the Secretary General and the High Commissioner in these efforts.
international policies in trade, finance and investment. There still remains a 285. In many ways, the most difficult and sensitive issue relating to the
need for a body that brings together the key developed and developing coun- Commission on Human Rights is that of membership. In recent years, the
tries to address the critical interlinkages between trade, finance, the environ- issue of which States are elected to the Commission has become a source of
ment, the handling of pandemic diseases and economic and social development. heated international tension, with no positive impact on human rights and a
To be effective, such a body must operate at the level of national leaders. negative impact on the work of the Commission. Proposals for membership cri-
281. While the annual meetings of the G8 group at head of State or Government level teria have little chance of changing these dynamics and indeed risk further
fulfil some of the characteristics required to give greater coherence and impetus to politicizing the issue. Rather, we recommend that the membership of the
the necessary policies, it would be helpful to have a larger forum bringing together Commission on Human Rights be expanded to universal membership.
the heads of the major developed and developing countries. One way of moving for- This would underscore that all members are committed by the Charter to the
IR-210: UN Report
ward may be to transform into a leader’s group the G20 group of finance ministers, promotion of human rights, and might help to focus attention back on to sub-
which currently brings together States collectively encompassing 80 per cent of the stantive issues rather than who is debating and voting on them.
world’s population and 90 per cent of its economic activity, with regular attendance 286. In the first half of its history, the Commission was composed of heads of delega-
by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, WTO and the European Union. tion who were key players in the human rights arena and who had the profes-
In such meetings, we recommend the inclusion in the group of the Secretary- sional qualifications and experience necessary for human rights work. Since then
General of the United Nations and the President of the Economic and Social this practice has lapsed. We believe it should be restored, and we propose that all
Council to ensure strong support for United Nations programmes and initiatives. members of the Commission on Human Rights designate prominent and
experienced human rights figures as the heads of their delegations.
XVIII. The Commission on Human Rights 287. In addition, we propose that the Commission on Human Rights be supported
in its work by an advisory council or panel. This council or panel would
282. One of the central missions of the United Nations is to protect human rights, a
consist of some 15 individuals, independent experts (say, three per region),
mission reaffirmed by the Millennium Declaration. The Commission on Human
88 89

appointed for their skills for a period of three years, renewable once. They would A. Strengthening support for the Secretary-General
be appointed by the Commission on the joint proposal of the Secretary-General
and the High Commissioner. In addition to advising on country-specific issues, 293. The creation of the post of Deputy Secretary-General in 1996 helped bring
the council or panel could give advice on the rationalization of some of the the- far greater coherence to the work of the United Nations in the economic,
matic mandates and could itself carry out some of the current mandates dealing social and development fields and on issues of management reform. Given
with research, standard-setting and definitions. the enormous increase in the workload of the Secretary-General in the area
of peace and security in the 1990s, creating a second Deputy Secretary-
288. We recommend that the High Commissioner be called upon to prepare General post for peace and security would ensure that the Secretary-General’s
an annual report on the situation of human rights worldwide. This could efforts in this area are equally well supported. To assist the Secretary-
then serve as a basis for a comprehensive discussion with the Commission. The General, an additional Deputy Secretary-General position should be
report should focus on the implementation of all human rights in all countries, created, responsible for peace and security.
based on information stemming from the work of treaty bodies, special mecha-
nisms and any other sources deemed appropriate by the High Commissioner. 294. With one Deputy Secretary-General focusing on the economic and social devel-
opment work of the United Nations, the additional Deputy Secretary-General
289. The Security Council should also more actively involve the High Commissioner and his/her office would assist the Secretary-General in systematically oversee-
in its deliberations, including on peace operations mandates. We also welcome ing the work of the United Nations system in the area of peace and security,
the fact that the Security Council has, with increasing frequency, invited the with the aim of formulating integrated strategies and ensuring concerted
High Commissioner to brief it on country-specific situations. We believe that action. Such an office should not be operational and would not duplicate, but
this should become a general rule and that the Security Council and the instead rationalize and make more effective, existing bureaucratic functions. It
Peacebuilding Commission should request the High Commissioner to would integrate inputs from the various departments and agencies and prepare
report to them regularly about the implementation of all human rights- early-warning reports and strategy options for decision by the Secretary-
related provisions of Security Council resolutions, thus enabling focused, General. It should comprise approximately 15 Professionals able to perform
effective monitoring of these provisions. strategic analysis, planning and coordination tasks. It should also provide the
290. More also needs to be done with respect to the funding situation of the Office of Secretary-General with new expertise to deal with new threats - for example, the
the High Commissioner. We see a clear contradiction between a regular budget scientific advice necessary to address questions of environmental and biological
allocation of 2 per cent for this Office and the obligation under the Charter of the security.
United Nations to make the promotion and protection of human rights one of the
principal objectives of the Organization. There is also a need to redress the limited
funding available for human rights capacity-building. Member States should seri- B. A competent and professional Secretariat
ously review the inadequate funding of this Office and its activities. 295. The burden of implementing the decisions of Member States and providing
IR-210: UN Report
291. In the longer term, Member States should consider upgrading the Commission them with timely analysis and advice rests not only on the Secretary-General but
to become a “Human Rights Council” that is no longer subsidiary to the on the Secretariat as a whole. If the United Nations is to be effective, it needs a
Economic and Social Council but a Charter body standing alongside it and the professional and well-trained Secretariat whose skills and experiences have been
Security Council, and reflecting in the process the weight given to human adapted to match the tasks at hand. The last 15 years have witnessed a large
rights, alongside security and economic issues, in the Preamble of the Charter. expansion in work related to conflict prevention and peacekeeping, the negotia-
tion and implementation of peace agreements, and peacebuilding. And yet,
despite the increase in demand since the end of the cold war total Secretariat staff
XIX. The Secretariat has declined since 1990, while only 6 per cent of the staff of the Secretariat are
responsible for the entire range of issues that include mediation, the organization
292. A strong Secretary-General at the head of a more professional and better organ-
and management of peacekeeping operations, support for the Security Council,
ized Secretariat is an essential component of any effective system for collective
disarmament, elections support and sanctions. Many of those based at
security in the twenty-first century.
Headquarters have no field experience or training and the existing rules militate
90 91

Page 162
Page 163
against their gaining it. In addition, there is little or no expertise for tackling decolonization. The United Nations should turn its back on any attempt to
many of the new or emerging threats addressed in the present report. return to the mentalities and forms of colonialism.
296. The Secretary-General should be provided with the resources he 300. Article 47 (The Military Staff Committee) should be deleted, as should all
requires to do his job properly and the authority to manage his staff and references to the body in Articles 26, 45 and 46. It is no longer appropriate
other resources as he deems best. To meet the needs identified in the for the joint chiefs of staff of the five permanent members to play the role imag-
present report, we recommend that: ined for them in 1945. We have in paragraph 258 above addressed the need for
the Security Council to have better military advice.
(a) Member States recommit themselves to Articles 100 and 101 of the
Charter of the United Nations; 301. We believe, however, that the Charter as a whole continues to provide a sound
(b) Member States review the relationship between the General legal and policy basis for the organization of collective security, enabling the
Assembly and the Secretariat with the aim of substantially increasing Security Council to respond to threats to international peace and security, both
the flexibility provided to the Secretary-General in the management old and new in a timely and effective manner. The Charter was also farsighted
of his staff, subject always to his accountability to the Assembly; in its recognition of the dependence of international peace and security on eco-
(c) The Secretary-General’s reform proposals of 1997 and 2002 related to nomic and social development.
human resources should now, without further delay, be fully imple- 302. All Member States should rededicate themselves to the purposes and
mented; principles of the Charter and to applying them in a purposeful way,
(d) There should be a one-time review and replacement of personnel, matching political will with the necessary resources. Only dedicated
including through early retirement, to ensure that the Secretariat is leadership within and between States will generate effective collective
staffed with the right people to undertake the tasks at hand, includ- security for the twenty-first century and forge a future that is both sus-
ing for mediation and peacebuilding support, and for the office of the tainable and secure.
Deputy Secretary-General for peace and security. Member States
should provide funding for this replacement as a cost-effective long-
term investment;
(e) The Secretary-General should immediately be provided with 60 posts -
less than 1 per cent of the total Secretariat - for the purpose of estab-
lishing all the increased Secretariat capacity proposed in the present
report.
IR-210: UN Report
XX. The Charter of the United Nations

297. Our recommendations on Security Council reform will require the amendment
of Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations. In addition, we suggest the
following modest changes to the Charter:
298. Articles 53 and 107 (references to enemy States) are outdated and should
be revised – revisions should be appropriately drafted to avoid retroactively
undermining the legal provisions of these articles. The Charter should reflect
the hopes and aspirations of today, not the fears of 1945.
299. Chapter 13 (The Trusteeship Council) should be deleted. The Trusteeship
Council of the United Nations performed an important task in helping the
world emerge from the era of colonialism and steering many cases of successful
92 93

IR-210: UN Report
Page 164
Annexes

Page 165
Annex I
Summary of recommendations
Note: The number in parentheses that appears after each summarized recommendation refers to the
paragraph in the main report that contains the complete text of the recommendation.
Contents
Recommendations Page
Part 2
Collective security and the challenge of prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Poverty, infectious disease and
environmental degradation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11 . . . . . 99
Conflict between and within States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-20 . . . . 100
Nuclear, radiological, chemical and
biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-37 . . . . 101
Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38-44 . . . . 103
Transnational organized crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45-49 . . . . 104
The role of sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50-52 . . . . 105
Part 3
Collective security and the use of force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Using force: rules and guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53-57 . . . . 106
Peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability . . . . . . . . . . 58-62 . . . . 107
Post-conflict peacebuilding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63-65 . . . . 107
Protecting civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66-69 . . . . 108
IR-210: UN Report
Part 4
A more effective United Nations for the
twenty-first century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
The General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-72 . . . . 109
The Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73-81 . . . . 109
A Peacebuilding Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82-85 . . . . 111
Regional organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 . . . . 112
The Economic and Social Council. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87-89 . . . . 112
The Commission on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90-94 . . . . 113
The Secretariat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95-96 . . . . 114
The Charter of the United Nations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97-101 . . . . 114
97

Part 2
Collective security and the challenge of prevention
Poverty, infectious disease and environmental

degradation
1. All States must recommit themselves to the goals of eradicating poverty, achiev-
ing sustained economic growth and promoting sustainable development. (59)
2. The many donor countries which currently fall short of the United Nations
0.7 per cent gross national product target for official development assistance
should establish a timetable for reaching it. (60)
3. World Trade Organization members should strive to conclude the Doha devel-
opment round of multilateral trade negotiations at the latest in 2006. (62)
4. Lender Governments and the international financial institutions should provide
highly indebted poor countries with greater debt relief, longer rescheduling and
improved access to global markets. (63)
5. Although international resources devoted to meeting the challenge of
HIV/AIDS have increased from about $250 million in 1996 to about $2.8 bil-
lion in 2002, more than $10 billion annually is needed to stem the pandemic.
(64)
6. Leaders of countries affected by HIV/AIDS need to mobilize resources, commit
funds and engage civil society and the private sector in disease-control efforts. (65)
7. The Security Council, working closely with UNAIDS, should host a second spe-
cial session on HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security, to
explore the future effects of HIV/AIDS on States and societies, generate research
IR-210: UN Report
on the problem and identify critical steps towards a long-term strategy for
diminishing the threat. (67)
8. International donors, in partnership with national authorities and local civil
society organizations, should undertake a major new global initiative to rebuild
local and national public health systems throughout the developing world. (68)
9. Members of the World Health Assembly should provide greater resources to the
World Health Organization Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network to
increase its capacity to cope with potential disease outbreaks. (69)
10. States should provide incentives for the further development of renewable
energy sources and begin to phase out environmentally harmful subsidies,
especially for fossil fuel use and development. (71)
99

Page 166
Page 167
A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Summary of recommendations
11. We urge Member States to reflect on the gap between the promise of the Kyoto (c) Greater interaction with national mediators, regional organizations and
Protocol and its performance, re-engage on the problem of global warming and non-governmental organizations involved in conflict resolution;
begin new negotiations to produce a new long-term strategy for reducing global (d) Greater consultation with and involvement in peace processes of impor-
warming beyond the period covered by the Protocol (2012). (72) tant voices from civil society, especially those of women, who are often
neglected during negotiations. (103)
Conflict between and within States 20. National leaders and parties to conflict should make constructive use of the
option of preventive deployment of peacekeepers. (104)
12. The Security Council should stand ready to use the authority it has under the
Rome Statute to refer cases of suspected war crimes and crimes against human-
ity to the International Criminal Court. (90) Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological
13. The United Nations should work with national authorities, international finan-
weapons
cial institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector to develop 21. The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament:
norms governing the management of natural resources for countries emerging (a) They must honour their commitments under Article VI of the Treaty on the
from or at risk of conflict. (92) Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and
14. The United Nations should build on the experience of regional organizations be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfilment of those commitments;
in developing frameworks for minority rights and the protection of democrat- (b) They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear
ically elected Governments from unconstitutional overthrow. (94) weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. (120)
15. Member States should expedite and conclude negotiations on legally binding 22. The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear-weapon
agreements on the marking and tracing, as well as the brokering and transfer, States and States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
of small arms and light weapons. (96) Nuclear Weapons should commit to practical measures to reduce the risk
16. All Member States should report completely and accurately on all elements of of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive
the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the Secretary-General schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons. (121)
should be asked to report annually to the General Assembly and Security 23. The Security Council should explicitly pledge to take collective action in
Council on any inadequacies in the reporting. (97) response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear
17. A training and briefing facility should be established for new or potential special weapon State. (122)
representatives of the Secretary-General and other United Nations mediators. (101) 24. Negotiations to resolve regional conflicts should include confidence-building
18. The Department of Political Affairs should be given additional resources and measures and steps towards disarmament. (123)
IR-210: UN Report
should be restructured to provide more consistent and professional mediation 25. States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
support. (102) should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, demon-
19. While the details of such a restructuring should be left to the Secretary-General, strating their commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
it should take into account the need for the United Nations to have: Treaty and supporting negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of
which are open to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We
(a) A field-oriented, dedicated mediation support capacity, comprised of a small
recommend that peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear
team of professionals with relevant direct experience and expertise, available
disarmament talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free
to all United Nations mediators;
zones in those regions similar to those established for Latin America and the
(b) Competence on thematic issues that recur in peace negotiations, such as the
Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific and South-East Asia. (124)
sequencing of implementation steps, the design of monitoring arrange-
ments, the sequencing of transitional arrangements and the design of 26. All chemical-weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all
national reconciliation mechanisms; existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012. (125)
100 101

27. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical
delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the Weapons Convention. (140)
active participation of the biotechnology industry. (126) 37. The Security Council should consult with the Director-General of the World
28. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Health Organization to establish the necessary procedures for working together in
should recognize the Model Additional Protocol as today’s standard for IAEA safe- the event of a suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease. (144)
guards, and the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious con-
cern over non-compliance with non-proliferation and safeguards standards. (129)
Terrorism
29. Negotiations should be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early
conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing provisions of Articles III 38. The United Nations, with the Secretary-General taking a leading role, should
and IX of the IAEA statute, which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor for promote a comprehensive strategy against terrorism, including:
the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users. (130) (a) Dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, includ-
30. While that arrangement is being negotiated, States should, without surrendering through promoting social and political rights, the rule of law and dem-
ing the right under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to ocratic reform; working to end occupations and address major political
construct uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, voluntarily institute grievances; combating organized crime; reducing poverty and unemploy-
a time-limited moratorium on the construction of any further such facilities, ment; and stopping State collapse;
with a commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply (b) Efforts to counter extremism and intolerance, including through education
of fissile materials by the current suppliers at market rates. (131) and fostering public debate;
(c) Development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism cooperation,
31. All States should be encouraged to join the voluntary Proliferation Security
all within a legal framework that is respectful of civil liberties and human
Initiative. (132)
rights, including in the areas of law enforcement; intelligence-sharing, where
32. A State’s notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of possible; denial and interdiction, when required; and financial controls;
Nuclear Weapons should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with (d) Building State capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations;
the Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of (e) Control of dangerous materials and public health defence. (148)
Governors should resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided
39. Member States that have not yet done so should actively consider signing and
by IAEA should be withdrawn. (134)
ratifying all 12 international conventions against terrorism, and should adopt
33. The proposed timeline for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to convert the eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing issued by the
highly enriched uranium reactors and reduce HEU stockpiles should be halved Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-supported
from 10 to five years. (135) Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering and the measures recom-
IR-210: UN Report
34. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should negoti- mended in its various best practices papers. (150)
ate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and estab- 40. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee should institute a process for
lish binding international standards for the export of such agents. (137) reviewing the cases of individuals and institutions claiming to have been
35. The Conference on Disarmament should move without further delay to nego- wrongly placed or retained on its watch lists. (152)
tiate a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that, on a designated schedule, 41. The Security Council, after consultation with affected States, should extend the
ends the production of highly enriched uranium for non-weapon as well as authority of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to act as a clearing
weapons purposes. (138) house for State-to-State provision of military, police and border control assis-
36. The Directors-General of IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of tance for the development of domestic counter-terrorism capacities. (154)
Chemical Weapons should be invited by the Security Council to report to it 42. To help Member States comply with their counter-terrorism obligations, the
twice-yearly on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on United Nations should establish a capacity-building trust fund under the
any serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate. (155)
102 103

Page 168
Page 169
43. The Security Council should devise a schedule of predetermined sanctions for 49. The United Nations should establish a robust capacity-building mechanism for
State non-compliance with the Council’s counter-terrorism resolutions. (156) rule-of-law assistance. (177)
44. The General Assembly should rapidly complete negotiations on a comprehen-
sive convention on terrorism, incorporating a definition of terrorism with the The role of sanctions
following elements:
50. The Security Council must ensure that sanctions are effectively implemented
(a) recognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against civilians is regulated
and enforced:
by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, if of sufficient scale,
constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity; (a) When the Security Council imposes a sanctions regime - including arms
(b) restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti-terrorism conventions are embargoes - it should routinely establish monitoring mechanisms and
terrorism, and a declaration that they are a crime under international law; provide them with the necessary authority and capacity to carry out high-
and restatement that terrorism in time of armed conflict is prohibited by quality, in-depth investigations. Adequate budgetary provisions must be
the Geneva Conventions and Protocols; made to implement those mechanisms;
(c) reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention (b) Security Council sanctions committees should be mandated to develop
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security Council res- improved guidelines and reporting procedures to assist States in sanctions
olution 1566 (2004); implementation, and to improve procedures for maintaining accurate lists
(d) description of terrorism as “any action, in addition to actions already speci- of individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions;
fied by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva (c) The Secretary-General should appoint a senior official with sufficient sup-
Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended porting resources to enable the Secretary-General to supply the Security
to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when Council with analysis of the best way to target sanctions and to assist in
the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a popula- coordinating their implementation. This official would also assist compli-
tion, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or ance efforts; identify technical assistance needs and coordinate such assis-
to abstain from doing any act”. (163-4) tance; and make recommendations on any adjustments necessary to enhance
the effectiveness of sanctions;
(d) Donors should devote more resources to strengthening the legal, adminis-
Transnational organized crime trative, and policing and border-control capacity of Member States to
implement sanctions. Capacity-building measures should include efforts to
45. Member States that have not signed, ratified or resourced the 2000 United
improve air-traffic interdiction in zones of conflict;
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three
(e) The Security Council should, in instances of verified, chronic violations,
Protocols, and the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption should
IR-210: UN Report
impose secondary sanctions against those involved in sanctions-busting;

do so, and all Member States should support the United Nations Office on
(f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, should
Drugs and Crime in its work in this area. (172)
ensure that an appropriate auditing mechanism is in place to oversee sanc-
46. Member States should establish a central authority to facilitate the exchange of tions administration. (180)
evidence among national judicial authorities, mutual legal assistance among
51. Sanctions committees should improve procedures for providing humanitarian
prosecutorial authorities and the implementation of extradition requests. (173)
exemptions and routinely conduct assessments of the humanitarian impact of
47. A comprehensive international convention on money-laundering that addresses sanctions. The Security Council should continue to strive to mitigate the
the issues of bank secrecy and the development of financial havens needs to be humanitarian consequences of sanctions. (181)
negotiated, and endorsed by the General Assembly. (174)
52. Where sanctions involve lists of individuals or entities, sanctions committees
48. Member States should sign and ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and should establish procedures to review the cases of those claiming to have been
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and parties to incorrectly placed or retained on such lists. (182)
the Protocol should take all necessary steps to effectively implement it. (175)
104 105

Part 3 57. The above guidelines for authorizing the use of force should be embodied in
declaratory resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly. (208)
Peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability
Using force: rules and guidelines 58. The developed States should do more to transform their existing force capaci-
53. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations should be neither rewritten nor ties into suitable contingents for peace operations. (216)
reinterpreted, either to extend its long-established scope (so as to allow preven- 59. Member States should strongly support the efforts of the Department of
tive measures to non-imminent threats) or to restrict it (so as to allow its appli- Peacekeeping Operations, building on the important work of the Panel on
cation only to actual attacks). (192) United Nations Peace Operations of the United Nations Secretariat, to improve
54. The Security Council is fully empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter its use of strategic deployment stockpiles, standby arrangements, trust funds
of the United Nations to address the full range of security threats with which and other mechanisms in order to meet the tighter deadlines necessary for effec-
States are concerned. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security tive deployment. (218)
Council as a source of authority but to make the Council work better than it 60. States with advanced military capacities should establish standby high readi-
has. (198) ness, self-sufficient battalions at up to brigade level that can reinforce United
55. The Panel endorses the emerging norm that there is a collective international Nations missions, and should place them at the disposal of the United Nations.
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing mili- (219)
tary intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale 61. The Secretary-General should recommend and the Security Council should
killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which sover- authorize troop strengths for peacekeeping missions that are sufficient to deter
eign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. (203) and repel hostile factions. (222)
56. In considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the 62. The United Nations should have a small corps of senior police officers and man-
Security Council should always address - whatever other considerations it may agers (50-100 personnel) who could undertake mission assessments and organ-
take into account - at least the following five basic criteria of legitimacy: ize the start-up of police components of peace operations, and the General
(a) Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a Assembly should authorize this capacity. (223)
kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of mil-
itary force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other
large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international
Post-conflict peacebuilding
IR-210: UN Report
humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended? 63. Special representatives of the Secretary-General should have the authority and
(b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military guidance to work with relevant parties to establish robust donor-coordinating
action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other purposes or mechanisms, as well as the resources to perform coordination functions effec-
motives may be involved? tively, including ensuring that the sequencing of United Nations assessments
(c) Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question and activities is consistent with Government priorities. (226)
been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other measures 64. The Security Council should mandate and the General Assembly should author-
will not succeed? ize funding for disarmament and demobilization programmes from assessed
(d) Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed budgets for United Nations peacekeeping operations. (227)
military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
65. A standing fund for peacebuilding should be established at the level of at least
(e) Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the military action
$250 million that can be used to finance the recurrent expenditures of a nascent
being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of
Government, as well as critical agency programmes in the areas of rehabilita-
action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction? (207)
tion and reintegration. (228)
106 107

Page 170
Page 171
Protecting civilians Part 4

66. All combatants must abide by the Geneva Conventions. All Member States A more effective United Nations
should sign, ratify and act on all treaties relating to the protection of civilians, for the twenty-first century
such as the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court and all refugee conventions. (233)
67. The Security Council should fully implement resolution 1265 (1999) on the
The General Assembly
protection of civilians in armed conflict. (237) 70. Members of the General Assembly should use the opportunity provided by the
68. The Security Council, United Nations agencies and Member States should fully Millennium Review Summit in 2005 to forge a new consensus on broader and
implement resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. (238) more effective collective security. (240)
69. Member States should support and fully fund the proposed Directorate of 71. Member States should renew efforts to enable the General Assembly to perform
Security and accord high priority to assisting the Secretary-General in imple- its function as the main deliberative organ of the United Nations. This requires
menting a new staff security system in 2005. (239) a better conceptualization and shortening of the agenda, which should reflect
the contemporary challenges facing the international community. Smaller, more
tightly focused committees could help to sharpen and improve resolutions that
are brought to the whole Assembly. (242)
72. Following the recommendation of the report of the Panel on Eminent Persons
on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, the General Assembly should estab-
lish a better mechanism to enable systematic engagement with civil society
organizations. (243)
The Security Council

73. Reforms of the Security Council should meet the following principles:
(a) They should, in honouring Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations,
increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to
the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically - specifically in
terms of contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in
IR-210: UN Report
mandated peace operations, contributions to the voluntary activities of the

United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activ-
ities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates. Among developed
countries, achieving or making substantial progress towards the interna-
tionally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of gross national product for official devel-
opment assistance should be considered an important criterion of contribution;
(b) They should bring into the decision-making process countries more repre-
sentative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world;
(c) They should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council;
(d) They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body.
(249)
108 109

74. A decision on the enlargement of the Council, satisfying these criteria, is now a A Peacebuilding Commission
necessity. The presentation of two clearly defined alternatives, of the kind
described below as models A and B, should help to clarify - and perhaps bring 82. The Security Council, acting under Article 29 of the Charter of the United
to resolution - a debate which has made little progress in the last 12 years. (250) Nations and after consultation with the Economic and Social Council, should
75. Models A and B both involve a distribution of seats as between four major establish a Peacebuilding Commission. (263)
regional areas, which we identify, respectively, as “Africa”, “Asia and Pacific”, 83. The core functions of the Peacebuilding Commission should be to identify
“Europe” and “Americas”. We see these descriptions as helpful in making and countries that are under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse; to organ-
implementing judgements about the composition of the Security Council, but ize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in pre-
make no recommendation about changing the composition of the current region- venting that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for tran-
al groups for general electoral and other United Nations purposes. Some mem- sitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to
bers of the Panel, in particular our Latin American colleagues, expressed a prefer- marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict
ence for basing any distribution of seats on the current regional groups. (251) peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary. (264)
76. Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and 84. While the precise composition, procedures and reporting lines of the
three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major Peacebuilding Commission will need to be established, they should take
regional areas. Model B provides for no new permanent seats, but creates a new account of the following guidelines:
category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non- (a) The Peacebuilding Commission should be reasonably small;
permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas. (b) It should meet in different configurations, to consider both general policy
(252-253) issues and country-by-country strategies;
77. In both models, having regard to Article 23 of the Charter, a method of encour- (c) It should be chaired for at least one year and perhaps longer by a member
aging Member States to contribute more to international peace and security approved by the Security Council;
would be for the General Assembly, taking into account established practices of (d) In addition to representation from the Security Council, it should include
regional consultation, to elect Security Council members by giving preference representation from the Economic and Social Council;
for permanent or longer-term seats to those States that are among the top three (e) National representatives of the country under consideration should be invited
financial contributors in their relevant regional area to the regular budget, or to attend;
the top three voluntary contributors from their regional area, or the top three (f) The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, the President
troop contributors from their regional area to United Nations peacekeeping of the World Bank and, when appropriate, heads of regional development
missions. (254) banks should be represented at its meetings by appropriate senior officials;
78. There should be a review of the composition of the Security Council in 2020, (g) Representatives of the principal donor countries and, when appropriate, the
IR-210: UN Report
including, in this context, a review of the contribution (as defined in paragraph principal troop contributors should be invited to participate in its deliber-
249 of the main report) of permanent and non-permanent members from the ations;
point of view of the Council’s effectiveness in taking collective action to prevent (h) Representatives of regional and subregional organizations should be invited
and remove new and old threats to international peace and security. (255) to participate in its deliberations when such organizations are actively
involved in the country in question. (265)
79. The Panel recommends that under any reform proposal, there should be no
expansion of the veto. (256) 85. A Peacebuilding Support Office should be established in the Secretariat to give
the Peacebuilding Commission appropriate Secretariat support and to ensure
80. A system of “indicative voting” should be introduced, whereby members of the that the Secretary-General is able to integrate system-wide peacebuilding poli-
Security Council could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed cies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field
action. (257) operations. (266)
81. Processes to improve transparency and accountability in the Security Council
should be incorporated and formalized in its rules of procedure. (258)
110 111

Page 172
Page 173
Regional organizations (a) A new approach should be adopted within the Economic and Social Council
agenda, replacing its current focus on administrative issues and programme
86. In relation to regional organizations: coordination with a more focused agenda built around the major themes
(a) Authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought for contained in the Millennium Declaration;
regional peace operations; (b) A small executive committee, comprising members from each regional
(b) Consultation and cooperation between the United Nations and regional group, should be created in order to provide orientation and direction to the
organizations should be expanded and could be formalized in an agree- work of the Economic and Social Council and its interaction with principal
ment, covering such issues as meetings of the heads of the organizations, organs, agencies and programmes;
more frequent exchange of information and early warning, co-training of (c) The annual meetings between the Economic and Social Council and the
civilian and military personnel, and exchange of personnel within peace Bretton Woods institutions should be used to encourage collective action in
operations; support of the Millennium Development Goals and the Monterrey Consensus;
(c) In the case of African regional and subregional capacities, donor countries (d) The Economic and Social Council, with inputs from its secretariat and the
should commit to a 10-year process of sustained capacity-building support, United Nations Development Group, should aim to provide guidance on
within the African Union strategic framework; development cooperation to the governing boards of the United Nations
(d) Regional organizations that have a capacity for conflict prevention or peace- funds, programmes and agencies;
keeping should place such capacities in the framework of the United (e) The Economic and Social Council should provide strong support to the
Nations Standby Arrangements System; efforts of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Development
(e) Member States should agree to allow the United Nations to provide equip- Group to strengthen the coherence of United Nations action at the field
ment support from United Nations-owned sources to regional operations, level and its coordination with the Bretton Woods institutions and bilat-
as needed; eral donors. (278)
(f) The rules for the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended
to give the United Nations the option on a case-by-case basis to finance The Commission on Human Rights
regional operations authorized by the Security Council with assessed contri-
butions. (272) 90. Membership of the Commission on Human Rights should be made universal.
(285)
91. All members of the Commission on Human Rights should designate promi-
The Economic and Social Council nent and experienced human rights figures as the heads of their delegations.
87. The Economic and Social Council should provide normative and analytical lead- (286)
IR-210: UN Report
ership in a time of much debate about the causes of, and interconnections 92. The Commission on Human Rights should be supported in its work by an advi-
between, the many threats we face. To that end, the Economic and Social sory council or panel. (287)
Council should establish a Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of
93. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights should be called
Security Threats. (276)
upon to prepare an annual report on the situation of human rights worldwide.
88. The Economic and Social Council should provide an arena in which States meas- (288)
ure their commitments to achieving key development objectives in an open and
94. The Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission should request the
transparent manner. (277)
High Commissioner for Human Rights to report to them regularly on the
89. The Economic and Social Council should provide a regular venue for engaging implementation of all human rights-related provisions of Security Council
the development community at the highest level, in effect transforming itself resolutions, thus enabling focused, effective monitoring of those provisions.
into a “development cooperation forum”. To that end: (289)
112 113

The Secretariat with the necessary resources. Only dedicated leadership within and between
States will generate effective collective security for the twenty-first century and
95. To assist the Secretary-General, an additional Deputy Secretary-General posi- forge a future that is both sustainable and secure. (302)
tion should be created, responsible for peace and security. (293)
96. The Secretary-General should be provided with the resources he requires to do
his job properly and the authority to manage his staff and other resources as he
deems best. To meet the needs identified in the present report, the Panel rec-
ommends that:
(a) Member States recommit themselves to Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter
of the United Nations;
(b) Member States review the relationship between the General Assembly and
the Secretariat with the aim of substantially increasing the flexibility pro-
vided to the Secretary-General in the management of his staff, subject
always to his accountability to the Assembly;
(c) The Secretary-General’s reform proposals of 1997 and 2002 related to
human resources should now, without further delay, be fully implemented;
(d) There should be a one-time review and replacement of personnel, including
through early retirement, to ensure that the Secretariat is staffed with the
right people to undertake the tasks at hand, including for mediation and
peacebuilding support, and for the office of the Deputy Secretary-General
for peace and security. Member States should provide funding for this
replacement as a cost-effective long-term investment;
(e) The Secretary-General should immediately be provided with 60 posts – less
than 1 per cent of the total Secretariat capacity – for the purpose of establish-
ing all the increased Secretariat capacity proposed in the present report. (296)
IR-210: UN Report
The Charter of the United Nations

97. In addition to any amendment of Article 23 of the Charter of the United
Nations required by proposed reform of the Security Council, the Panel sug-
gests the following modest changes to the Charter:
98. Articles 53 and 107 (references to enemy States) are outdated and should be
revised. (298)
99. Chapter XIII (The Trusteeship Council) should be deleted. (299)
100. Article 47 (The Military Staff Committee) should be deleted, as should all ref-
erences to the Committee in Articles 26, 45 and 46. (300)
101. All Member States should rededicate themselves to the purposes and principles
of the Charter and to applying them in a purposeful way, matching political will
114 115

Page 174
Page 175
Annex II
Panel members and terms of reference
Members
Anand Panyarachun, Chair (Thailand) Former Prime Minister of
Thailand
Robert Badinter (France) Member of the French Senate
and former Minister of
Justice of France
João Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil) Former General Secretary of
the Ministry of External
Relations of Brazil and
Secretary-General
of the Organization of
American States
Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway) Former Prime Minister of
Norway and Director-
General of the World Health
Organization
Mary Chinery-Hesse (Ghana) Vice-Chairman of the
National Development
Planning Commission of
Ghana and former Deputy
Director-General of the
International Labour
Organization
IR-210: UN Report
Gareth Evans (Australia) President of the International

Crisis Group and former
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Australia
David Hannay (United Kingdom) Former Permanent
Representative of the United
Kingdom to the United
Nations and United
Kingdom Special Envoy to
Cyprus
117

A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Panel members and terms of reference
Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay) President of the Inter- Terms of reference

American Development
Bank and former Minister for 1. The past year has shaken the foundations of collective security and undermined
Foreign Relations of confidence in the possibility of collective responses to our common problems
Uruguay and challenges. It has also brought to the fore deep divergences of opinion on
the range and nature of the challenges we face and are likely to face in the future.
Amre Moussa (Egypt) Secretary-General of the
League of Arab States and 2. The aim of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change is to rec-
former Minister for Foreign ommend clear and practical measures for ensuring effective collective action,
Affairs of Egypt based upon a rigorous analysis of future threats to peace and security, an
Satish Nambiar (India) Former Lt. General in the appraisal of the contribution collective action can make and a thorough assess-
Indian Army and Force ment of existing approaches, instruments and mechanisms, including the
Commander of UNPROFOR principal organs of the United Nations.
Sadako Ogata (Japan) President of the Japan 3. The Panel is not being asked to formulate policies on specific issues, nor on the
International Cooperation role of the United Nations in specific places. Rather, it is being asked to pro-
Agency and former United vide a new assessment of the challenges ahead and to recommend the changes
Nations High Commissioner which will be required if these challenges are to be met effectively through col-
for Refugees lective action.
Yevgeny Primakov (Russian Federation) Former Prime Minister of the 4. Specifically, the Panel will:
Russian Federation (a) Examine today’s global threats and provide an analysis of future challenges
Qian Qichen (China) Former Vice Premier and to international peace and security. While there may continue to exist a
Minister for Foreign Affairs diversity of perception on the relative importance of the various threats fac-
of China ing particular Member States on an individual basis, it is important to find
Nafis Sadik (Pakistan) Special Envoy of the United an apropriate balance at the global level. It is also important to understand
Nations Secretary-General the connections between different threats;
for HIV/AIDS in Asia and (b) Identify clearly the contribution that collective action can make in address-
former Executive Director of ing these challenges;
the United Nations (c) Recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collective action,
Population Fund including but not limited to a review of the principal organs of the United
IR-210: UN Report
Salim Ahmed Salim (United Republic of Tanzania) Former Prime Minister of the Nations.
United Republic of Tanzania 5. The Panel’s work is confined to the field of peace and security, broadly inter-
and Secretary-General of the preted. That is, it should extend its analysis and recommendations to other
Organization of African issues and institutions, including economic and social ones, to the extent that
Unity they have a direct bearing on future threats to peace and security.
Brent Scowcroft (United States) Former Lt. General, United
States Air Force and United
States National Security
Adviser
118 119

Page 176
Page 177
Annex III
Panel secretariat
Stephen Stedman (Research Director)
Loraine Rickard-Martin (Secretary to the Panel)
Bruce Jones (Deputy Research Director)
Muhammad Zeeshan Amin
Tarun Chhabra
Sebastian Graf von Einsiedel
Angela Irving
Graham Maitland
Angelica Malic
Thant Myint-U
Maria Zaroui
IR-210: UN Report
121

Annex IV
Panel meetings, regional consultations

and issue workshops
Panel meetings
Date and place
5-7 December 2003 16-18 July 2004
Princeton, United States of America Baden, Austria
13-15 February 2004 24-26 September 2004
Mont Pelerin, Switzerland Tarrytown, United States of America
30 April-2 May 2004 3-5 November 2004
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia New York City, United States of America
Regional consultations and issue workshops

Date (2004) and place Meeting/theme Organizer
13-14 January “The Secretary-General’s High- Stanley
Harriman, level Panel: maximizing Foundation
United States of America prospects for success”
29 January Briefing to NGOs on United Department of

IR-210: UN Report
New York City, Nations reform initiatives and Public

United States of America the High-level Panel Information of the
United Nations
Secretariat
16 February Meeting of the High-level Parliamentary

Paris, Panel with the Parliamentary Assembly of the
France Assembly of the Council of Council of Europe
Europe
123

Page 178
Page 179
A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Panel meetings and consultations
Date (2004) and place Meeting/theme Organizer Date (2004) and place Meeting/theme Organizer
23-25 February “Addressing contemporary Wilton Park 7 and 8 March Regional consultations Viva Rio and
West Sussex, security threats: what role for Rio de Janeiro, New York
United Kingdom the United Nations?” Brazil University Center
on International
27 February “Security Council reform” Yale Center for Cooperation
New Haven, the Study of
United States of America Globalization 12-14 March Retreat for permanent Governments of
26-27 March representatives and Panel Australia, Mexico,
Manhasset, members to discuss the work the Netherlands,
United States of America of the High-level Panel Singapore and
1 March “Nuclear proliferation” Stanford South Africa, and
Stanford, University Center International
United States of America for International Peace Academy
Security and
Cooperation 18-20 March Regional consultations Norwegian
Oslo, Institute for
1 and 2 March “Use of force” Stanley Norway International
Harriman Foundation and Affairs and New
United Nations York University
Foundation Center on
International
Cooperation
2 and 3 March “Intervention in humanitarian Stanley
Harriman crises” Foundation and 28-30 March Workshop on Article 51 of the Government of
United Nations Geneva, Charter of the United Nations Switzerland
Foundation Switzerland and future threats to interna-
tional security
4 March “Terrorism and non-State Stanley 29 and 30 March “Small arms and light Stanley
New York City actors” Foundation, Harriman weapons” Foundation and
United Nations United Nations
Foundation and
IR-210: UN Report
Foundation
Ralph Bunche
Institute of
International 2-4 April Asia High-level Symposium on Government of
Studies Hangzhou, Threats, Challenges and China
China Change
5 March “The future of the weapons of Government of
New York City mass destruction regimes” New Zealand and
International 5 April “Nuclear arms control and pro- Harvard
Peace Academy Cambridge, liferation” University Belfer
United States of America Center for Science
and International
Affairs, Nuclear
Threat Initiative
and United
Nations
Foundation
124 125

8 April Outreach to humanitarian and Friedrich Ebert 30 April High-level meeting with the High-level Panel
New York City human rights NGOs Stiftung and Addis Ababa Commission of the African secretariat and
United Nations Union Bureau of the
Foundation Chairperson of
the African Union
16 and 17 April “Governance and sovereignty” Stanford Institute
Stanford for International 2 May Meeting with African civil High-level Panel
Studies Addis Ababa society organizations secretariat
19 April “Bio-security” United States 6 May Outreach to civil society, eco- Friedrich Ebert
Washington D.C., National New York City nomic and social development Stiftung and
United States of America Academies of NGOs United Nations
Sciences, Nuclear Foundation
Threat Initiative
and United 10 and 11 May “Development, poverty and Stanley
Nations Warrenton, security” Foundation and
Foundation United States of America United Nations
Foundation
21-24 April “Dialogue on security in Asia: Singapore
Singapore concepts, threats and assurances Institute for 13 and 14 May Conference on Security Council Johns Hopkins
after 9/11” International Washington D.C. change University
Affairs and New Institute for
York University Transatlantic
Center on Relations
International
Cooperation 17-19 May “Governance, democracy and Instituto
Mexico City, free markets” Tecnológico
25-27 April Meeting on the work of the Economic and Mexico Autónomo de
Shanghai, High-level Panel at the sixtieth Social México, Friedrich
China session of Economic and Social Commission for Ebert Stiftung
IR-210: UN Report
Commission for Asia and the Asia and the and United
Pacific (ESCAP) Pacific Nations
Foundation
27-29 April Regional consultations Inter-Africa
21-23 May “The United Nations, regional Center for
Addis Ababa, Group and New
Cape Town, organizations and future Conflict
Ethiopia York University
South Africa security threats in Africa” Resolution,
Center on
Friedrich Ebert
International
Stiftung and
Cooperation
United Nations
Foundation
126 127

Page 180
Page 181
24 and 25 May “New threats, new responses” Government of 28 and 29 June “Security for the billion at the Oxford University
Warsaw, Poland Oxford, bottom” and Stanford
Poland United Kingdom Institute for
International
27-29 May “The United Nations and new Istituto Affari Studies
Rome, threats: rethinking security” Internazionali,
Italy Aspen Institute
1-3 July “United Nations and the new Institute of Peace
Italia, Istituto
New Delhi, threats: rethinking security” and Conflict
Italiano per
India Studies and
l’Africa e
United Nations
l’Oriente, United
Foundation
Nations
Foundation and
United Nations 6 and 7 July “Threats, challenges and Government of
Interregional Kyoto, change: internal violence” Japan
Crime and Justice Japan
Research Institute
11 and 12 September “Threats, challenges and Egyptian Council
Cairo, reform: building security in the for Foreign
2 June “Environment and security” Woodrow Wilson Egypt Mediterranean and Gulf Affairs, Al-Ahram
Washington D.C. International region” Center for
Center for Political and
Scholars and Strategic Studies,
United Nations United Nations
Foundation Foundation,
Friedrich Ebert
8 and 9 June “Strengthening United Nations Government of Stiftung, Istituto
Copenhagen, capacity for crisis management” Denmark Affari
Denmark Internazionali
11-16 June Thirty-ninth Conference on the Stanley

IR-210: UN Report
Prouts Neck, United Nations for the Next Foundation

United States of America Decade
17 and 18 June “Poverty and security: an inte- London School of

London, grated approach” Economics and
United Kingdom Political Science,
United Kingdom
Department of
International
Development and
United Nations
Foundation
128 129

IR-210: UN Report
Page 182

IR-210: UN Report Analysis
Page 183
IR 210 Professor Lamy

Discussion Handout # 2 1
Levels of Analysis: Explaining the Behavior of International
Actors-the Search for the Independent Variable
In the analysis of decision-making the starting point is rationality. We assume
that most decision-makers will act to maximize benefits and minimize costs.
This is called instrumental thinking. Other variables that might influence
behavior are assumed to be less important. This rational choice model,
although popular in economics and now in political science, discounts other
factors or variables. If parsimony is your goal, the rational choice is the way
to go. Considering other variables, however, may give the researcher a more
comprehensive picture of the policy-making process.
A traditional framework of variables suggests four
levels: Level One: Individual Level of Analysis

Bounded Rationality/cybernetics
Biological explanations
Motivational/personality
Perception/Images Belief
system/operational code
Level Two: National Attributes and Domestic Factors
a. More permanent elements-
Size and resource base
Geographic factors Political
structure Economic system
Political Culture
b. Changing elements
• Power capabilities
• Domestic politics: finding coalitions for policy and support for
retaining power
• Decision-making style and structures: bureaucratic politics and
organizational behavior
Level Three: Systemic Attributes: Nature and Structure of
International System
• Level of Anarchy-Order
• Distribution of Power
• Obligations, treaties, alliances
• Regimes or governing arrangements
Level Four: Global Factor*: Transboundary/Man-made and natural
factors
Global Social Movements
Environmental conditions and challenges
Media and popular cultural forces
Decisions by TNEs and other economic actors
Ideas, values, and norms that transcend culture and time

Page 184
Nathan Wood, Maintainer

Mari Dumlao, Reformer
Keith Parker, Transformer
TA Dan Tauss
Prof. Steven Lamy
UN Report Analysis:
Three Lenses

Page 185
Nathan Wood
IR210 Lamy
TA: Dan Tauss
Chicago and Milan Firm
The position of Machiavelli, Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Mearsheimer is one of
realism. The basis of all these voices believe in is the struggle for power. Foundational
realisms like Machiavelli believe that everyone is out to get us, which can closely be
paralleled with Mearsheimer’s “Offensive Realism”. What they believe is that we stop
thinking of wishful behavior of what we should do and take care of what needs to be
done now to retain political power. They will also forgo any ethics, religion, or charity in
order to gain political power. This thought is explained by sacrificing morals for what is
more important. What is more important than morals and ethics is to enhance the power
and security of the state. Morganthau, the father or realism, echos the duality of morality.
His voice is therefore less crude and would choose to act in the lesser evils, but will also
forgo ethics to gain political power and security. Morganthau is a voice that doesn’t
believe in taking offensive stances. He would rather let the world come to the individual
state rather than go out and solve problems. Mearsheimer also believes in state-interests
as their policy for action, but takes a more aggressive stance on his offensive realist view.
They all carry a very barbaric and selfish policy to realism excluding Morganthau who
believes in keeping morals as long as it doesn’t stand in the way of high-policy issues.
In applying the UN reforms to each of the major voices we hear a collective
realist view. Machiavelli would be more likely to push his policy on the UN reforms to
strengthen his exclusive state interests. The recent reforms cover an all-inclusive world,
which Machiavelli could not even begin to take interest in. He would rather that his state
internally became powerful and then start cutting off competitors to power. Which

Page 186
follows his notion of climbing up the ladder and pulling it up behind him. Morganthau of
the three realists, would accept the most of all the aspects of each present UN reform.
Morganthau being the most acceptant of ethical and moral actions to a further point than
Machiavelli and Mearsheimer, would function within an ethical and moral manner inside
the state’s interest. Mearsheimer finds none of the reforms beneficial at all besides the
fact that the UN could be used as an aggressive vehicle to make his state the hegemone.
The most useful recommendations are the ones involving better representation of the
states the provide the resources and arms in the UN. Reforms that were unacceptable are
the powers to give the Security Council more authority to hand over conflicts to the ICC
to help prevent conflict. The ICC believes in surpassing state sovereignty which then is
opposite of what maintainer voices like Morganthau and Machiavelli believe. What’s
missing if that the UN could give more incentives to being involved to rewarding those
who participate the most in the UN and give most of their resources and arms to have the
most voice and representation in the workings of the UN.

Page 187
Mari Bumlao
TA Dan Tauss
Prof. Lamy
I am writing this brief as a junior partner in the law firm Grotius, Mitrany, Pearson and
Brandt (Amsterdam and Toronto). I met with Grotius, Mitrany and Brandt and the following
ideas are based both on my views and their suggestions on the UN’s major recommendation in
their 2004 report. My position is based on a system reformer worldview and it is reflected in our
recommendations of what we agreed with and what we did not agree with about the report. In
our current system, there are a lot of issues that need to be addressed in order to reform the
system. To do this, states must not only pledge their help and cooperation, they must truly
commit themselves in order to ensure that positive changes are made. Multilaterism and
cooperation from the P-5 and from other member states is key to the successful execution of
reforms. This is difficult when we live in a maintainer society, so another issue is illustrating
that it is in everyone’s national interest to reform and counter the threats and problems that are
plaguing our world. Many of the problems that the world face are interrelated or perpetuate
other and bigger issues.
To create cooperation there needs to be a creation of International Law and international
regimes. Grotius believed in International Law in which he explained in Laws of War and Peace.
Grotius believed that to expand peace, their needed to be some system of rule that could govern
all states P 54. His ideas were some of the foundational ideas of International Law and
cooperation. Natural Law is part of the Grotian perspective in that human nature upholds certain
standards and morals that reason is needed in order to apply rules and laws p 693. International
Law has evolved from the age of Grotius to involve the idea of reciprocity or how International
law was the result from cooperation of states; states are obliged by this law to uphold the rules.

Page 188
International law and a rule based system will create system or reciprocity. Through reciprocity,
states will uphold the rules because of the mutual benefits, and hope of mutual gain and needs.
In Grotian time, people were obliged to uphold rules because God deemed it so, but now it is
based on states consent and every state has sovereignty to make their own decisions. p. 355.
The system is anarchic so it is important to organize society through international Law and these
laws will be enforced by people in the International society (notes). Man is both good and evil
and the system is anarchic; International Law is important in creating cooperation and counter
the anarchy of the system and a platform in which reform can be enacted. (Wight handout). It is
meant to both manage the system but also work to solve the problems in the system. Grotius
also advocated the idea of “just war” or jus ad bellum described in Laws of War and Peace. This
is the laws that dictate when it is legal to wage war and under what circumstances.p350.
P 193
David Mitrany was an integration theorist. Integration theorists believe in integration or the
process in which there is a growing cooperation and union between states in a regional or
international context (200). The cooperation includes problem solving of technical problems or
ramification as Mitrany described it. Mitrany believed that in order for states to problem solve
or to modernize their needed to be transnational cooperation to deal with common problems. His
process of “ramification” meant that if their was cooperation in one sector or area, it would lead
to governments spreading that cooperation into other sectors. The increased integration of states
in cooperation efforts would mean that there would be higher costs if they decided to withdraw
their support. This idea was also called “functionalism” or how states could cooperate to create
regimes in certain areas that would have a “spillover” affect ion onto other areas. (notes and bs).

Page 189
Brandt and Brandt Report
The discrepancy between the North and South and the concerns that came along with how
underdeveloped the global south remains well the global north experiences economic growth is
of much concern. This report examined elements and challenges of interdependence and
development and how to create modernization and growth in the global south. P 331. Issues of
poverty and disease need to be addressed along with the economic issues of how countries can
work together to help the less fortunate. Other issues include environmental degradation which
can perpetuate other problems.
http://www.stwr.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=7#OVERVIEW
There are many important issues discussed in the report but there are only 3 I will discuss
that I believe will get support of the maintainers.

Page 190
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
TA Dan Tauss
Prof. Lamy
Detailed position statement, from the collective worldviews of Kant, Penn, J. Adams, and
Falk, on the recommendations set forth by “A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility.” (United Nations Report)
The proposed ideas and UN reforms set forth in “A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility” closely mirror the opinions of those in our law firm in many
respects. First, the UN report suggests that the cornerstone to the development of world
security and peace lies in the development of those countries that are considered
undeveloped. The UN suggests that the nations that are already developed contribute
more to the development of these undeveloped nations; the report calls for donor
countries to reach a 0.7 percent gross national product target for Overseas Development
Assistance.1 The Kantian perspective acknowledges the importance of such suggestions.
Our firm believes that states should be more economically interdependent and establish
stronger linkages.2 We understand that the suggestions set forth by the UN would help
advance this goal by helping to enable less developed states to participate further in the
world economy. Concurrently, our firm promotes the idea that all states should
contribute to the advancement of rights for under-developed states. In this UN report, the
responsibility of individual states to provide for the welfare of its own people is
recognized but the importance of the advancement of collective security is emphasized.
The establishment of a Peacekeeping Commission that would address the collapse of
1
Anand Panyararachun. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004 p. 28;
sec. 60
2
Lamy, Steven. "IR-210 Lecture." University of Southern California. 11.30.05
Keith Parker, Page 1 of 4

Page 191
states and the rebuilding of post-war states is also recommended in the report.3
Furthermore, our firms’ stance on war, which mirrors Falk’s recommendations, is well
represented in the UN report. Richard Falk emphasized that war must be tamed in order
for humane governance to be achieved.4 The UN report provides a close parallel to this
stance in its report. Conversely, though, our firm recommends the elimination of
standing armies, while the UN report does not provide a significant stance on the
advancement of this doctrine. Furthermore, the UN report calls for a greater enthusiasm
for disarmament, namely the reduction of the world’s supply of nuclear weapons.
Nonetheless, the report allows for the execution of war on states based on five criteria:
seriousness of the threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of
consequences.5 Our firm takes an opposing stance on war. We believe that, in order for
peace to ensue, accountability and collective security must be emphasized rather than war
and violence.
The most useful recommendations of the UN report, unacceptable recommendations of

the report, and missing elements
Our firm considers most of the UN report to contain very useful recommendations
to states, namely developed nations. Nonetheless, many of the recommendations
provided in the report are unsatisfactory. Our firm supports the emphasis placed on
collective security. It is the responsibility of the world’s developed nations to assist in
the economic and social development of undeveloped states. We take this stance because
the individual governmental powers of undeveloped states are not always strong enough
to provide for the necessary human rights and economic advancement accommodations
3
sec. 261-269
4
5
sec. 207

Page 192
to materialize. Furthermore, if developed states were to implement this recommendation,
the increased interdependence resulting from states’ development would advance the
spread of ethical ideas and cooperation. On the other hand, we disagree with the report’s
apparent acceptance of war. While the UN insists that war only be a last resort, we
propose that war be abolished altogether. Moreover, standing armies should be
eliminated. Standing armies do not advance world security; much to the contrary
standing armies fuel the world arms race, drain resources, and have a negative impact on
politics in the home country.6
Our firm is further supportive of the UN redefining of the security threats that
face our world today. While the UN was created mostly to prevent the atrocities of the
World Wars from being repeated, more unique threats face the world today. In
connection with the UN’s acknowledgement that many states cannot take on problems
alone, the UN has taken on more responsibility by including on their agenda threats such
as: economic and social threats, inter-state conflicts, terrorism, international organized
crime, and nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons.7
In regards to the reform of the UN Security Council, our firm takes an opposing
stance. In dealing with an anarchic system of states, a federation of states is
recommended. The proposed UN Security Council reforms would give more power to
states that contribute the most to the UN financially, militarily and diplomatically. In
doing this, the UN is recommending a move to a more ‘world government’ based system
rather than a federation of equal states.
6
7
Devon Curtis, Paul Taylor. The Globalization of World Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005 p. 415

Page 193
While the UN report recommends the advancement of greater collective security,
it fails to address the issue of education. In recommending greater collective security the
UN report focuses mainly on the prevention of state collapse, the advancement of human
rights and basic human needs, and economic development. Education among LDCs leads
to the advancement of economic interdependence and ethical ideas.8 Furthermore, a
more educated world advances the Kantian idea of a world community.9
8
9

Page 194
Final Consensus
Our three law firms discussed the UN reforms and have come to a consensus on
some UN reforms but have also disagreed on certain aspects of others. The first reform
we discussed was nuclear proliferation and the terrorism threat. We have decided that
non-proliferation of WMDs is a positive reform and worth devoting special attention. The
law firm Machiavelli, Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Mearshimer (MNMM) believe that
security is as important as political power; therefore, they support all actions of non-
proliferation. All three firms want to ensure that WMDs do not fall into the hands of
terrorists. However, maintainers will maintain their current defense systems until they
have guaranteed that all other countries are following protocol. The law firm of Grotius,
Mitrany, Pearson, and Brandt (GMPB) agrees with non-proliferation, but for different
reasons. They believe it is everyone’s best interest that states cooperate because if the
UN does not have the commitment of states, this reform will not be as effective or
credible. The law firm of Kant, Penn, J. Addams, and Falk (KPJF) as transformers are
very much in agreement of this reform however war and standing armies should be
eliminated all together.
Another reform on which the firms found consensus is the collective security
reform. Each firm supports the idea of cooperatively suppressing global threats. From
the maintainer law firm, collective security would be supported as long as it beneficial to
their national interest. The reformer law firm believes that collective security is
definitely an important reform because through multilateralism and cooperation, they can
work to overcome global threats. KPJF supports collective security to fight global
threats, but they also go a step further by supporting the development of the global south.

Page 195
The last reform the firms discussed was conflict prevention. MNMM supports
certain aspects of conflict preventions long as they can maintain a position as a rule-
maker. For example, they are not against the strengthening of the ICC, however they are
not in support of the policies that weaken their sovereignty. Maintainers do not promote
governing management of natural resources to countries in conflict, unless it is their
interest. The reformer law firm believes that this reform is extremely important. In terms
of internal conflict, GMPB believes that this reform will save resources by making sure
the problem does not escalate into a more complex and difficult issue.

Page 196
Nathan Wood
IR210 Lamy
TA: Dan Tauss
Chicago and Milan Firm
The position of Machiavelli, Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Mearsheimer is one of
realism. The basis of all these voices believe in is the struggle for power. Foundational
realisms like Machiavelli believe that everyone is out to get us, which can closely be
paralleled with Mearsheimer’s “Offensive Realism”. What they believe is that we stop
thinking of wishful behavior of what we should do and take care of what needs to be
done now to retain political power. They will also forgo any ethics, religion, or charity in
order to gain political power. This thought is explained by sacrificing morals for what is
more important. What is more important than morals and ethics is to enhance the power
and security of the state. Morganthau, the father or realism, echos the duality of morality.
His voice is therefore less crude and would choose to act in the lesser evils, but will also
forgo ethics to gain political power and security. Morganthau is a voice that doesn’t
believe in taking offensive stances. He would rather let the world come to the individual
state rather than go out and solve problems. Mearsheimer also believes in state-interests
as their policy for action, but takes a more aggressive stance on his offensive realist view.
They all carry a very barbaric and selfish policy to realism excluding Morganthau who
believes in keeping morals as long as it doesn’t stand in the way of high-policy issues.
In applying the UN reforms to each of the major voices we hear a collective
realist view. Machiavelli would be more likely to push his policy on the UN reforms to
strengthen his exclusive state interests. The recent reforms cover an all-inclusive world,
which Machiavelli could not even begin to take interest in. He would rather that his state
internally became powerful and then start cutting off competitors to power. Which

Page 197
follows his notion of climbing up the ladder and pulling it up behind him. Morganthau of
the three realists, would accept the most of all the aspects of each present UN reform.
Morganthau being the most acceptant of ethical and moral actions to a further point than
Machiavelli and Mearsheimer, would function within an ethical and moral manner inside
the state’s interest. Mearsheimer finds none of the reforms beneficial at all besides the
fact that the UN could be used as an aggressive vehicle to make his state the hegemone.
The most useful recommendations are the ones involving better representation of the
states the provide the resources and arms in the UN. Reforms that were unacceptable are
the powers to give the Security Council more authority to hand over conflicts to the ICC
to help prevent conflict. The ICC believes in surpassing state sovereignty which then is
opposite of what maintainer voices like Morganthau and Machiavelli believe. What’s
missing if that the UN could give more incentives to being involved to rewarding those
who participate the most in the UN and give most of their resources and arms to have the
most voice and representation in the workings of the UN.

Page 198
Summary of
‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’
By Anna Baxter
One World Trust
December 2004
On the 2nd December a High-Level Panel of the United Nations (UN) released the
Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, called A more
secure world: our shared responsibility. The report contained recommendations on
changes that could be made within the UN system so that it might better address today’s
security challenges. It was commissioned by the Secretary General to attempt to address
the deep divisions among Member States on the nature of the security threats faced today,
and the appropriateness of the use of force to address those threats. (For more
information on the composition of the Panel see Note A)
When the United Nations was created in 1945 its main concern was to ensure that the
horrors of the World Wars would never be repeated. Accordingly, its attention was
primarily devoted to the threat of aggressive wars between states. The past sixty years,
however, have witnessed massive changes in political geography. Whilst progress on life
expectancy and per capita income has been made in some areas of the developing world,
large areas of the world continue to experience life threatening poverty as a daily reality.
In recognition of the impact that these changes have had on security, the report calls for a
broader, more all-encompassing conception of the threats and challenges that we face.
The report has a number of sections addressing key security concerns, the most important
of which are summarized below.
Collective security:
One of the aspirations of the UN, as expressed in the Charter, is to provide collective
security for all. The report highlights the continuing relevance of the idea of collective
security today, emphasizing the mutual vulnerability of weak and strong that results from
increasing global economic integration. Whilst the duty of the State to protect and
provide for the welfare of its own people is recognized, historical evidence demonstrating
that the state can also be unable or unwilling to perform this role is taken into account.
The report insists that the principles of collective security require the international
community to step in to assist in the provision, or development of the capacity to provide,
necessary protection where needed. Past failures of collective action are recognized, with
the report noting that ‘early warning is only effective when it leads to early action for
prevention.’
A broader conception of security:
In stark contrast to more traditional conceptions of security the report identifies six
clusters of threats with which the world must now be concerned as elements that can feed

Page 199
into each other to produce deadly cycles of civil violence. (For more information see
Note B)
Sustainable development and security:
Emphasis is placed on the importance of promoting development as the ‘indispensable

foundation for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously.’ The report
calls on all States to recommit to the goals of eradicating poverty, achieving sustained
economic growth and promoting sustainable development. More specifically it calls for
donor countries to establish a timetable for reaching the 0.7 per cent gross national
product target for Overseas Development Assistance, for greater debt relief and improved
access to global markets for poorer countries, for more resources to be channeled to
stemming the AIDS pandemic, and for new initiatives to assist in the development of
public health systems and to help tackle global warming.
Conflict prevention:
The Panel emphasizes the need for conflict prevention efforts by UN to be improved.
One of their most significant recommendations is for the Security Council to be more
ready to use the authority invested in it by the Rome Statute to refer cases to International
Criminal Court. They also recommend that more resources be channeled through the
Department of Political Affairs for diplomacy and mediation, and that sanctions be used
to better effect. National leaders and parties to conflict are encouraged to make
constructive use of the option of preventative deployment.
The use of force:
On the question of the use of force in cases where there is a perceived threat, but that
threat is not immediately imminent, the Panel make it clear that they consider Article 51
of the UN Charter to provide adequate guidance. They recommend that in such cases the
evidence should be presented to the Security Council, which can then decide whether or
not to authorize action. If they decide not to authorize action, other options should be
explored further, before potentially revisiting the military option. The Panel are clear that
they do not endorse unilateral preventative action.
Collectively endorsed military action, on the other hand, when all other preventative
efforts have failed, is seen by the panel as a cornerstone of effective collective security.
The report defines five criteria of legitimacy to govern the use of force (for more
information see Note C). The Panel recognizes the need to develop the capacity of the
Security Council to respond when a decision has been taken to use force, and makes
recommendations to those Member States that have significant military capacity to place
it at the disposal of the UN. Recommendation

Page 200
Peacekeeping:
Recognizing the central importance of peacekeeping efforts to long-term, lasting peace,

the report highlights the need for more effective coordination between the various bodies
engaged in peacekeeping. The Panel recommends that national authorities be at the heart
of coordination efforts, and that robust donor coordination efforts be made.
Making the UN more effective:
The report recommends changes to the structure of the Security Council (for more
information see Note D here)It also recommends the establishment of a Peacebuilding
Commission. This commission would address the lack of any place in the UN system
specifically designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war, or to assist countries in
their transition from war to peace. It should, they propose, work in partnership with
national governments to provide proactive assistance in such cases.
Terrorism:
The Panel suggest a definition of terrorism that emphasizes that acts of terrorism
constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity (for more information see Note E). The
report emphasizes the need to address the causes of terrorism and extremism as well as
strengthening prevention efforts.
Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons:
The Panel recommends that new enthusiasm be directed towards disarmament, and that
efforts be made to reduce the supply of nuclear weapons. They also recommend
improvements to the enforcement capacity of the Security Council and better public
health defenses to combat the threat of biological weapons.
Footnotes
Note A) Composition of the High Level Panel:
Anand Panyarachum, former Prime Minister of Thailand CHAIR, Robert Badinter

(France), João Baena Soares (Brazil), Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Mary Chinery
Hesse (Ghana), Gareth Evans (Australia), David Hannay (United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland), Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay), Amre Moussa (Egypt), Satish
Nambiar (India), Sadako Ogata (Japan), Yevgeny Primakov (Russian Federation), Qian
Qiqian (China), Salim Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Nafis Sadik (Pakistan) and
Brent Scowcroft (United States of America).
Note B) A Broader Conception of Security (Synopsis to Part two)

The six clusters of threats, identified in the report, as elements that can feed into each
other to produce deadly cycles of civil violence are;

Page 201
• Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases and

environmental degradation
• Inter-state conflict
• Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide, and other large-scale atrocities
• Terrorism
• Transnational Organised Crime
Note C) Criteria to define the use of force (207)
• seriousness of threat
• proper purpose
• last resort
• proportional means
• balance of consequences
Note D) Reform of the Security Council (251-254)
The Panel offer two suggestions, Models A and B, of how the Security Council might be
reformed. Their suggestions are guided by a desire to increase the involvement in
decisionmaking of those who contribute most to the UN financially, militarily and
diplomatically (in line with Article 23 of the Charter) and make the decision-making
process more democratic, accountable and representative of the broader membership.
• Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created and three
new two-year non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas.
• Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight
fouryear
renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat,
divided among the major regional areas.
Note E) Description of Terrorism (164 (d))
‘Any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on

aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566
(2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-
combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain
from doing any act.’

Page 202
Mari Bumlao
TA Dan Tauss
Prof. Lamy
I am writing this brief as a junior partner in the law firm Grotius, Mitrany, Pearson and
Brandt (Amsterdam and Toronto). I met with Grotius, Mitrany and Brandt and the following
ideas are based both on my views and their suggestions on the UN’s major recommendation in
their 2004 report. My position is based on a system reformer worldview and it is reflected in our
recommendations of what we agreed with and what we did not agree with about the report. In
our current system, there are a lot of issues that need to be addressed in order to reform the
system. To do this, states must not only pledge their help and cooperation, they must truly
commit themselves in order to ensure that positive changes are made. Multilaterism and
cooperation from the P-5 and from other member states is key to the successful execution of
reforms. This is difficult when we live in a maintainer society, so another issue is illustrating
that it is in everyone’s national interest to reform and counter the threats and problems that are
plaguing our world. Many of the problems that the world face are interrelated or perpetuate
other and bigger issues.
To create cooperation there needs to be a creation of International Law and international
regimes. Grotius believed in International Law in which he explained in Laws of War and Peace.
Grotius believed that to expand peace, their needed to be some system of rule that could govern
all states P 54. His ideas were some of the foundational ideas of International Law and
cooperation. Natural Law is part of the Grotian perspective in that human nature upholds certain
standards and morals that reason is needed in order to apply rules and laws p 693. International
Law has evolved from the age of Grotius to involve the idea of reciprocity or how International
law was the result from cooperation of states; states are obliged by this law to uphold the rules.

Page 203
International law and a rule based system will create system or reciprocity. Through reciprocity,
states will uphold the rules because of the mutual benefits, and hope of mutual gain and needs.
In Grotian time, people were obliged to uphold rules because God deemed it so, but now it is
based on states consent and every state has sovereignty to make their own decisions. p. 355.
The system is anarchic so it is important to organize society through international Law and these
laws will be enforced by people in the International society (notes). Man is both good and evil
and the system is anarchic; International Law is important in creating cooperation and counter
the anarchy of the system and a platform in which reform can be enacted. (Wight handout). It is
meant to both manage the system but also work to solve the problems in the system. Grotius
also advocated the idea of “just war” or jus ad bellum described in Laws of War and Peace. This
is the laws that dictate when it is legal to wage war and under what circumstances.p350.
P 193
David Mitrany was an integration theorist. Integration theorists believe in integration or the
process in which there is a growing cooperation and union between states in a regional or
international context (200). The cooperation includes problem solving of technical problems or
ramification as Mitrany described it. Mitrany believed that in order for states to problem solve
or to modernize their needed to be transnational cooperation to deal with common problems. His
process of “ramification” meant that if their was cooperation in one sector or area, it would lead
to governments spreading that cooperation into other sectors. The increased integration of states
in cooperation efforts would mean that there would be higher costs if they decided to withdraw
their support. This idea was also called “functionalism” or how states could cooperate to create
regimes in certain areas that would have a “spillover” affect ion onto other areas. (notes and bs).

Page 204
Brandt and Brandt Report
The discrepancy between the North and South and the concerns that came along with how
underdeveloped the global south remains well the global north experiences economic growth is
of much concern. This report examined elements and challenges of interdependence and
development and how to create modernization and growth in the global south. P 331. Issues of
poverty and disease need to be addressed along with the economic issues of how countries can
work together to help the less fortunate. Other issues include environmental degradation which
can perpetuate other problems.
http://www.stwr.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=7#OVERVIEW
There are many important issues discussed in the report but there are only 3 I will discuss
that I believe will get support of the maintainers.

Page 205
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
Prof. Lamy
Detailed position statement, from the collective worldviews of Kant, Penn, J. Adams, and
Falk, on the recommendations set forth by “A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility.” (United Nations Report)
The proposed ideas and UN reforms set forth in “A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility” closely mirror the opinions of those in our law firm in many
respects. First, the UN report suggests that the cornerstone to the development of world
security and peace lies in the development of those countries that are considered
undeveloped. The UN suggests that the nations that are already developed contribute
more to the development of these undeveloped nations; the report calls for donor
countries to reach a 0.7 percent gross national product target for Overseas Development
Assistance.1 The Kantian perspective acknowledges the importance of such suggestions.
Our firm believes that states should be more economically interdependent and establish
stronger linkages.2 We understand that the suggestions set forth by the UN would help
advance this goal by helping to enable less developed states to participate further in the
world economy. Concurrently, our firm promotes the idea that all states should
contribute to the advancement of rights for under-developed states. In this UN report, the
responsibility of individual states to provide for the welfare of its own people is
recognized but the importance of the advancement of collective security is emphasized.
The establishment of a Peacekeeping Commission that would address the collapse of
states and the rebuilding of post-war states is also recommended in the report.3
1
sec. 60
2
3
sec. 261-269

Page 206
Furthermore, our firms’ stance on war, which mirrors Falk’s recommendations, is well
represented in the UN report. Richard Falk emphasized that war must be tamed in order
for humane governance to be achieved.4 The UN report provides a close parallel to this
stance in its report. Conversely, though, our firm recommends the elimination of
standing armies, while the UN report does not provide a significant stance on the
advancement of this doctrine. Furthermore, the UN report calls for a greater enthusiasm
for disarmament, namely the reduction of the world’s supply of nuclear weapons.
Nonetheless, the report allows for the execution of war on states based on five criteria:
seriousness of the threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of
consequences.5 Our firm takes an opposing stance on war. We believe that, in order for
peace to ensue, accountability and collective security must be emphasized rather than war
and violence.
The most useful recommendations of the UN report, unacceptable recommendations of

the report, and missing elements
Our firm considers most of the UN report to contain very useful recommendations
to states, namely developed nations. Nonetheless, many of the recommendations
provided in the report are unsatisfactory. Our firm supports the emphasis placed on
collective security. It is the responsibility of the world’s developed nations to assist in
the economic and social development of undeveloped states. We take this stance because
the individual governmental powers of undeveloped states are not always strong enough
to provide for the necessary human rights and economic advancement accommodations
to materialize. Furthermore, if developed states were to implement this recommendation,
4
5
sec. 207

Page 207
the increased interdependence resulting from states’ development would advance the
spread of ethical ideas and cooperation. On the other hand, we disagree with the report’s
apparent acceptance of war. While the UN insists that war only be a last resort, we
propose that war be abolished altogether. Moreover, standing armies should be
eliminated. Standing armies do not advance world security; much to the contrary
standing armies fuel the world arms race, drain resources, and have a negative impact on
politics in the home country.6
Our firm is further supportive of the UN redefining of the security threats that
face our world today. While the UN was created mostly to prevent the atrocities of the
World Wars from being repeated, more unique threats face the world today. In
connection with the UN’s acknowledgement that many states cannot take on problems
alone, the UN has taken on more responsibility by including on their agenda threats such
as: economic and social threats, inter-state conflicts, terrorism, international organized
crime, and nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons.7
In regards to the reform of the UN Security Council, our firm takes an opposing
stance. In dealing with an anarchic system of states, a federation of states is
recommended. The proposed UN Security Council reforms would give more power to
states that contribute the most to the UN financially, militarily and diplomatically. In
doing this, the UN is recommending a move to a more ‘world government’ based system
rather than a federation of equal states.
While the UN report recommends the advancement of greater collective security,
it fails to address the issue of education. In recommending greater collective security the
6
7
Devon Curtis, Paul Taylor. The Globalization of World Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005 p. 415

Page 208
UN report focuses mainly on the prevention of state collapse, the advancement of human
rights and basic human needs, and economic development. Education among LDCs leads
to the advancement of economic interdependence and ethical ideas.8 Furthermore, a
more educated world advances the Kantian idea of a world community.9
8
9

Page 209
Final Consensus
Our three law firms discussed the UN reforms and have come to a consensus on
some UN reforms but have also disagreed on certain aspects of others. The first reform
we discussed was nuclear proliferation and the terrorism threat. We have decided that
non-proliferation of WMDs is a positive reform and worth devoting special attention. The
law firm Machiavelli, Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Mearshimer (MNMM) believe that
security is as important as political power; therefore, they support all actions of non-
proliferation. All three firms want to ensure that WMDs do not fall into the hands of
terrorists. However, maintainers will maintain their current defense systems until they
have guaranteed that all other countries are following protocol. The law firm of Grotius,
Mitrany, Pearson, and Brandt (GMPB) agrees with non-proliferation, but for different
reasons. They believe it is everyone’s best interest that states cooperate because if the
UN does not have the commitment of states, this reform will not be as effective or
credible. The law firm of Kant, Penn, J. Addams, and Falk (KPJF) as transformers are
very much in agreement of this reform however war and standing armies should be
eliminated all together.
Another reform on which the firms found consensus is the collective security
reform. Each firm supports the idea of cooperatively suppressing global threats. From
the maintainer law firm, collective security would be supported as long as it beneficial to
their national interest. The reformer law firm believes that collective security is
definitely an important reform because through multilateralism and cooperation, they can
work to overcome global threats. KPJF supports collective security to fight global
threats, but they also go a step further by supporting the development of the global south.

Page 210
The last reform the firms discussed was conflict prevention. MNMM supports
certain aspects of conflict preventions long as they can maintain a position as a rule-
maker. For example, they are not against the strengthening of the ICC, however they are
not in support of the policies that weaken their sovereignty. Maintainers do not promote
governing management of natural resources to countries in conflict, unless it is their
interest. The reformer law firm believes that this reform is extremely important. In terms
of internal conflict, GMPB believes that this reform will save resources by making sure
the problem does not escalate into a more complex and difficult issue.

IR-324: Class Notes
IR-324
Page 211
10/12/05 12:00 PM
Midterm: themes or questions?
Read Chapter 7 for next lecture
Chapter 5: multilateral
Chapter 6: Businesses policing themselves
Handout: News article from Wall Street Journal: Syria Moves to Attract
Investors
Trust in the Syrian government: may go down when/if found guilty of

Lebanon PM assassination
Syria's chances may not be good: not a very stable government,

competition from surrounding countries
When you have countries with oligarchies in power, the government

competes somewhat, and FDI is actually not as attractive
Does the US presence affect Syria pulling out of Lebanon? Possibly a big
factor
What banks are going to go there? Nobody trusts banks there
How can less developing countries attract FDI?
FDI and globalization

• When Nike hires out work to another country, it isn’t FDI
WTO: possible body to enforce labor standards
Could play the role of the Benevolent dictator
Cheating or free riding

• WTO could step in

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 212
WTO: problem: the power depends on the consent of the members.
League of nations surviving body: ILO
NAFTA: adhere to the ILO standards. Right to assemble, no mandatory

overtime, et cetera. If you feel this is happening, you can report this. How
well does this work in reality?
What is the role of the ILO? A group in the UN devoted to labor issues.
Provide many data. Wages, labor costs. Employment, unemployment.
Need a third party that is assumed to be objectual
What can we do? Target trade, but who do you target if there’s a violation
• Could be the firm, could be all the products in the country
High skilled industries would be hurt, low skilled would increase. This would
not improve the conditions of labor.
Actors will always act on their best interests
Issue of sovereignty. There’s no way many countries would go for this
Adding a tax decrease taxes for relocation and training of workers by MNCs.
Progression from low skill to high skill
How to define labor standards? Culture, purchasing power, income, et

cetera
What about fines? Well, how do you enforce the fines?
Group of countries: collective action problems, some free-riders, things

break down
Labor standards and unfair advantages for exporters.

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 213
• Race to the bottom

• Is this race to the bottom really in this firms advantage
• Is suppressing labor a good thing? Yes and no. Yes for very
unskilled jobs, in an isolated place. For the most part, it is not
beneficial to suppress labor.
Kohls’ Jeans: Jeans retail at 21.99, unit labor cost per jean .66. This is 3%.
How would cutting labor costs benefit the company significantly?
For the firm itself, it’s not too big of a deal to cut labor costs
Low labour standards to not seem to significantly enhance the

competitiveness of exports. Do they offer an unfair advantage to FDI?
US firms tend to invest in countries with high labour standards, with

conditions similar to the US
In countries with low labor standards, less investment than would be

expected (Rederick study)

IR-324: Class Notes
IR 324 Page 214
10/14/05 12:05 PM
Passed out review for midterm
Basic tenants of realism

• actors govern themselves with self-interest and self-help
• IR are a zero sum according to realists
• According to Marxists, more of a negative sum
• Liberals: positive sum
Know one school of thought from each of the topics on the review
Why are mercantilists realists?

• Increase state power
• Fundamentally fits in the realist framework
• Decrease imports
Keynesian thought
Key difference between dependency theory and Marxist

• Dependency theory: negative
• Marxist: positive and necessary: workers of the world will unite
stronger
The basics about MNCs and FDI

• OLI is geared towards: why firms go abroad
o Advantages, such as internalization, competitive advantage in
organization, et cetera
Bargaining models
• Know Botswana and Brazil cases
o Botswana: successful venture between government and firms
o Brazil: auto industry
Why would firms not want to work with the government

• Gives a bad image of running everything, even politically
o Seems exploitative at times

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 215
Know a few reasons why Resnick thinks autocracies strengthen FDI

incentives
Labor being a large input cost
As discussed yesterday, how much does a slightly smaller wage effect the
firm?
• In terms of overall cost of a product, labor costs may be a very
small proportion
Rules on international investment – Number 5 on review sheet

• Just know the basics for these
6 and 7 are the most important

• Know ISI policy
• Know the idea of how FDI may increase development
o Within firms
o backward linkages, et cetera
• Understand Akin and Harrison argument
o May be competing effects
• FDI and protection
o FDI will increase domestic protection if it is import
complementing
 Import complementing: when ‘they’ go to a foreign
country they import whatever imports they need into
the production process
• Backward linkages vs. industry spillover effects
o Backward linkages
 Increase the amount they are buying from local firms,
gives them more of a competitive advantage
 Inputs going into production must come from within the
country (Backward linkages)
 If it has to be a joint venture
 They bring inferior technology
 Doesn't enhance the development process

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 216
Best way for them to develop is:

• Develop tight linkage to firm and subsidiary
• Parent firm has a large stake in the subsidiary
• Need tight production process
• Create the best backward linkages possible
Botswana would be an exception to this
Overall, the best way to use FDI for development, control the whole
subsidiary process
When putting 'technology sharing requirements,” “Backward linkages,” et

cetera, it doesn’t work out best for either the state of the firm
Does FDI seek lowest wage labor
On Chapter #7
FDI was commonly thought to increase amount of…
Roamer says: I developed a huge economic theory based on the

observations of (Insert some little country here)
• Its much more than just saving that FDI brings
• They bring hard-to-replicate technology, business techniques, the
list goes on
• More than just the common-knowledge financial capital brought to
developing state
What can host countries do to maximize benefits and minimize costs?

• Should they insure that investors are tightly integrated with foreign
firms
Horizontal and Vertical FDI

• Horizontal: market seeking
• Vertical: EPZs: cheap labor, export from that market

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 217
Auto Industry
Many states wanted to insure that FDI would contribute more to

development
With too much of these, countries end up having many small plants that
never achieve an economy of scale
Many of these regulations end up preventing foreign firms from bringing

their best technology to he state: run the risk of expropriation
Electronics industry: same effects, even worse. Lack of backward linkages,

brought older technology
Data from 183 projects show that the majority of the operations increase
income
• Data also revealed that a large minority of the operations, the host
nations income decreased
o In whole, the overall income decreased
o This was a result of high levels of protection
Key here: development prospects for host country (less developed country):
domestic protection requirements don’t help production and development
• Want to encourage the parent country in the country to have as
much control as possible
o These close connections can create the backward linkages
between parent and subsidiaries
o May lead to reliable networks of suppliers
o Many examples of this in the auto industry
Discussion on expertise moving overseas (from student)

• Is there less opportunity in the US now? More competitive?
• More education: we are a service-based economy
o broad skill
o

IR-324: Class Notes
IR-324 Page 218
10/17/05 12:05 PM
In chapter one: failure of multi-lateral agreement on investment

• Why this agreement failed
• Forces opposed to globalization
• Contributed to this agreement failing
• Agreement will kill poor countries
o This is ironic
• Anti-globalization debate
• Different cities where the debate got going
• City council of Seattle decided that they wouldn’t honour its
agreements
For Wednesday: Skim chapter 1, skim 2 and 3, in random book that is

supposedly on the syllabus
IMF and World Bank were created at a conference in New Hampshire
France or Germany weren't there in 1944
Main thinker representing the UK: Kaines
Five parts of the World Bank

• IBRD: International bank for Reconstruction and development
• International development association
• IMF
• International labor organization
• More...
OECD: Organization for economic cooperation and development

• Development
• Exception: Poland, Hungary, South Korea, Czech Republic
• Mainly an organization of rich, developed countries
Types of regional development organizations

• Economic, political union
Free trade area: Like NAFTA

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 219
Customs union
• Differs from a free-trade area because: NAFTA would need the
same tariffs for outside countries
• Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay are part of something that
sounds like “America-guay”
Common market
• Includes: all members have the same internal and external tariffs,
add free mobility of factors of production
• Such as EU: labor can move freely through the EU
Economic union
• Add: same currency, same fiscal and monetary policy
• Means that they share a central bank
• Inflation needs to be homogenous within the members, this is the
solution
• Like the US or Mexico
Political Union
• Control over defense policy and foreign policies
• The EU is fairly far off from this
• France and Dutch said no to the constitution
Federalist system
• Levels of government
o Federal, state, local
 Power is shared amongst those levels
Union: power is horizontal, as opposed to more ‘vertical’ for federal
Big idea: income disparities in the US

• How much of this can we attribute to globalization
o Disparity between skilled workers and unskilled workers is
very large in the United States

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 220
Long discussion about the value that college adds to your life – somewhat
pointless conversation

IR-324: Class Notes
IR-324
Page 221
10/19/05 12:08 PM
Books for the class
Friday: read chapter 4 from book online (important)
Read chapter 6 for Monday
Describe the “internal” and “external” hypotheses regarding the failure of

the MAI
• The failure of this agreement
• External say: external factors (the NGOs) pressured them so it
failed
• Example: US and Mexico; “tuna fishing” environmental issue;
American NGOs wanted Mexican fishers to be more ecologically
friendly
o At this point NGOs became very involved in the environmental
issue
o Evolved into concern about NAFTA, that it would turn
everything into a race to the bottom
o Positive effect? Economies of scale, more efficient
o NGOs sold this agreement to make it look like it applied to the
less developed countries as well, but it didn’t
• Internal Factors: next few questions cover this
o This is an agreement between developed countries
o Primarily developed countries, though some aren’t all that
developed
Describe the possible political reason why the MAI failed. Hint: It has to do
with the governing elite versus the governing bureaucracy
• Bureaucracy was pushing this forward
• Unless one gets the big image from the elite, without elite support,
it was doomed (Internal)
• Divisions within the countries
• Jessie Helms: Helms Burton act. Senator from the south, highly
conservative
o Geared towards: Cubans, designed towards Cuba
 Cubans in Miami don’t like the Cuban government

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 222
o Allows people to expropriate Cuban capital in Miami, et cetera

o Cubans in Miami loved the Helms Burton act.
o Clinton signed it
 Florida was a very important state
o Introduction of this act made the MAI even further failed
Describe the five obligations that host countries would have been required to
adhere to under the MAI. Note: MFN, national treatment, transparency,
performance requirements (see p. 62), investment incentives
• MFN: Most Favored Nation
o Foreign investment
o Everybody in the group must get the same treatment
o Can't tell somebody from Poland “we’ll sweeten your deal a
little” et cetera
o Best deal applies to everybody
• National Treatment: same regulations and standards and treatment
to everybody who you’ve made this agreement with
• Transparency: All signatory countries must make publicly available
all laws and regulations for foreign investors
• Performance requirement: Have to use input of everyone in the
agreement
o Can’t require that places have to transfer technology, move
headquarters, establish joint venture
o All os this would not be possible under the MAI agreements
o Those who aren't part of the agreement don't have to apply
to these thing, this is what the NGOs didn’t tell the public
• Investment incentives: can’t do them under MAI.
o Investment incentives are wasteful
Describe the two dispute settlement procedures that the MAI had in the draft
• State to State
• State to investor
Important parts of this that we should know

• It failed
o Why did it fail

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 223
o Both internal and external reasons

• Make the process more transparent, so the NGO couldn’t skew
things and make it fail
• Must include the elite
• Trying to create frameworks to regulate investment will be difficult
o Investment adds a whole new dimension, rather than just
trade
 Trade is more short term
 Control of the factors of production
• Huge opposition
o This is the heart of globalization, and many people see this as
exploitative

IR-324: Class Notes
IR 324 Page 224
10/21/05 12:08 PM
Subcontractors are being outsourced to
NGOs say workers are being exploited immensely
Argument that foreign firms are profiting off of the hard labor of workers
overseas?
• This is not true
• There aren't incentives for firm to do this
• Will the gap increase: everyone gains but the rich gain more
• How do you define the race to the bottom
• A position taken by some US anti-globalists: the wages paid are
lower than the worker is outputting, that’s how the rich gain more
• The value of what they produce exceeds what they are paid
• Isn't good data on this
• The incentive in this is for the firm to hire more workers until the
marginal productivity is even. So, economically, these US anti-
globalists don’t have an economically sound argument
• Assume the market is competitive; if it’s not, the US anti-globalists
may be right
• Two different time frames, we are talking about the short-run
What is the benefit of analyzing this in the short-run? (Question asked by

student)
• Data isn’t really very available for the long-run
Globalization may be good, but are we making too big of a deal out of it?
There are many other important factors that contribute to success of states
Key argument: is globalization good or bad?
When you want to keep jobs at home, are you really helping those overseas
by not outsourcing (as many NGOs may say) or are you hurting them?
If MNCs come home, they will be operating more inefficiently, will probably
go out of business, et cetera. One of the big reasons they went overseas is

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 225
to survive. So bringing them home won’t necessarily decrease

unemployment very much
If MNCs come home, who loses?

• Consumers lose
o Prices go up, then interest rates increase, economy would
slow
Caines came in at a time when there wasn’t much employment

• It was the governments responsibility to answer this question
Offering a different perspective to the anti-globalization debate
Should there be a world minimum wage: who wins and who loses?
• Can’t really think of anyone who wins
Y = C + I + G + NX (Not on midterm)
• NX = Exports minus imports

IR-324: Class Notes
IR-324 Page 226
10/28/05 12:00 PM
Handed in Midterms
Exports + imports
Trade =
GDP
Cuba, Iran score 2-3 higher then the US

• Trade dependence
Balance of payments classified in to two difference accounts

• Current account
• Capital and financial account
• New capitol account include foreign aid, debt relief
• Financial account includes capital flows
Capital is tough to define
Major part of current account is the trade balance
Trade deficit is not necessarily bad
Know the three major accounts

• Current
• Financial
• Capital
Current account imbalance is the difference between savings and investment
Increasing economic interconnections make the likelihood of conflict go down
China is export led growth
Big issue for China and the US: Human rights issues in Taiwan
Chile was led by a Marxists for a while in the 60s

• This was a problem for the US
o Cold War

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 227
Chile’s strategy to ‘Open Up’

• Tried to join NAFTA
• Only joined Merrick Osur (sp?)
• Don’t want to be burdened by high external tariffs
• Agreements with México, Canada, Bolivia
Chile History
• Spanish came in 1546, set up a forced labor system
• Resistance by the locals
• 1810, a group of nationalists declared independence, Spain tried to
re-establish control
• Independence began with an Irish dictator
• Declared a parliamentary democracy in 1891
• Chile is now a presidential democracy
• These last 50 years, Chile has been successful, with the exception
of a few dark periods, namely in the 70s
• In 1964, Frei won the presidency under the banner of revolution
and freedom
• Ambitious program for reform, housing programs
• Foreign mining interests
• Economic program: imposed price control, nationalized private
firms
• These policies led to high inflation and high public sector deficits
• Middle class turned against him and Pinochet, army commander,
assumed control
University of Chicago Economists – Re-structuring Chile under Pinochet

• Structured the economy in Chile
o Stabilization policies
o Dismantle controls on exchange rate
o Removed controls on international capital flow
• Trade liberalization
• Privatization
• Further tax reforms
• Social policies

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 228
• New economic team who promotes FDI
Opponents of NAFTA in Chile said: we are the low man on the totem pole
• We will be exporting low-income things
• Have no say compared to the US

IR-324: Class Notes
IR-324
Page 229
10/31/05 12:17 PM
What drives current account?

• Trade deficit in the US
• Really strong demand in the US, lots of consumption
BOP (Balance of Payment) deficit, governments can do two things to deal

with this
• Adjust or finance
o Adjust: Monetary (access to money), fiscal (tax), commercial
(subsidies, tariffs, etc.)
o Finance: borrow from external sources (politically costly,
especially dealing with the IMF)
US deficit only started in the 70s

• Gold backing the greenback
How is the international monetary system structured

• Major movement in this system is FDI
o Going in and taking control
• Fixed system
• Does FDI affect trade imbalance
• Was 35 dollars for an ounce of gold
• Gold standard set up a fixed exchange rate, rates were set up in
relation to gold
o Opened things up internationally
o Liberals were in favor of this system
o Promotes market integration
From WWI and WWII, what was the system like?

• It was competitive
• Protection through tariffs
• Currency competition
The problems with the floating exchange rate

• Volatility in the short run
• Misalignment in the long run (A rate which is not optimal for you)

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 230
Period between WWI and WWII

• Monetary relations were competitive, disruptive
• Now it is more free
• At the end of WWII, Breton Woods
o Encouraged a more open international system
o To prevent many political problems, and thus wars
o Trade prevents political problems
 States depend on other states and have interest in
them
o We don’t have the fixed exchange rates anymore
o Based on post-war, interventionist, liberal compromise
o Monetary stability
o Ensured flexibility to ensure domestic interests
o Fixed, but adjustable exchange rate
o Major result: creation of the IMF
o IMF role: lender of last resort
o Support for capitol controls over speculative, short-term FDI
o Chile did do this
o Chile discouraged speculation by increasing taxes for certain
things
 If one took money out within a year, had to pay higher
taxes, et cetera
Success of the IMF is a big debate

• Choose to join the IMF, pay a quota based on GDP
• Countries can barrow beyond their quota
• When borrowing from the IMF, the big deal is conditionality
o The IMF then controls fiscal and monetary policy in the
borrowing country, to a point dependent on the amount
borrowed compared to GDP

IR-324: Class Notes
IR-324
Page 231
11/2/05 12:02 PM
Reading for today: Cohn chapter 7
Debt and debt crisis

• What happened in Latin America in the late 80s domestically?
• One option: borrow from the IMF
• Strong political effect from high debt
• Debt as a percentage of exports
• Exports: earn foreign exchange and ability to pay off debt
Debt relief
• Originally made up of church groups
• Jubilee: an NGO
o Started the movement to wipe away debt
Paper could be about the movement of debt relief

• Much of which could be focused on what is happening now
A country have deficit when payments abroad are greater than what they
receive
Debt crisis is when country cannot pay principle and/or interest payments
with export income
Major periods of debt crisis

• One in the 30s, 70s, 80s, 90s
Difference between the 30s and the 70s

• Losses in the 30s were fragmented among individual bondholders
• In the 70s, the banks were doing the lending
A spike in oil prices in the 70s

• Income by oil companies went to banks in the US, who in turn
made incredible amounts of loans
• There was large amount of money available
In 1994

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 232
• Presidential candidate was assassinated in Mexico

• Assassination signaled political instability
• People sold stock in Mexico, huge increase in the supply of Pesos,
inflation and crisis
• The US bailed Mexico out with a huge loan
• If one expects currency to lose value, one sells stocks, et cetera
• Other factors influencing this: Overvalued exchange rate (Import
substitution) and new president in ’94 began devaluation process of
the Peso
• IMF lending may be too slow, and bias on IMF lending: Mexico may
get funding and Kenya may not
Exports is an indicator of ability to bring in reserves
Liberalizing capitol account: that’s what this is all about

• Allowing people to buy stocks and bonds in one’s country
• Countries open up FDI first
• For countries having trouble managing this
Debt relief
• Is it good or bad?
• How is it beneficial to wipe out debt of another country?
Alternatives to debt relief

• Trade agreements
The higher the debt-to-export ratio, the bigger the effect on FDI going into
that country
If borrowed money goes into things that may increase FDI, there would be a
positive effect on democracy
If this doesn’t work, one would have to borrow from IMF, which may have a
negative effect on democracy

IR-324: Class Notes
IR-324
Page 233
11/7/05 12:03 PM
Handed back midterms: got a 14 out of 15
Capitol controls don’t really work

• Looks primarily at Chile
• Main problems with capitol controls: people find a way around them
o Besieged by loopholes
o Leads to corruption
• Two types of capitol controls
o Formal: government is monitoring
o Indirect: taxes, currency, exchange rates
• Capitol coming in would appreciate its exchange rate
• In Chile, it was more of a development tool
• In the 90s, it was designed to respond to crisis
• Political corruption
o Corruption more prevalent on the outflows
• Controls on Short-term capitol
o Total amount of capitol controls did not go down
o Long-term capitol went up, while short term went down
o Small producers hurt by this
 Only have access to local markets
• Short-term controls could become long-term, and could then be
inefficient
• Why not recommend this policy for Ethiopia?
o It assumes that foreign investors are going there
o Short-term capitol controls would create even more
uncertainty
Other good points in this article

• Countries were trying to maintain a fixed exchange rate, but this
didn’t help. Had to keep a floating exchange rate
• Chile focused on the short term, while focusing on keeping the
long-term things open
• Malaysia: responded negatively to IMF, who promoted one-size-fits-
all perspective
• Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 234
• Malaysia cut government spending, but didn’t have IMF to use as a

scapegoat
• Three groups: Malays, Indians, and Chinese
• How does this play into the capitol controls
o Socialist-like policy of creating equality
o Social equality
• How does this matter for Malaysia’s response to the crisis?
o The IMF has a cookie-cutter prescription for changing policy
o Malaysia came up with a special prescription catered to
Malaysia
• Has Malaysia been successful? Yes, in the short-term
• Need confidence in the exchange rate
• IMF prescribed tied fiscal and monetary policies, bank closures,
improvement in banking regulations and oversight, structural
reforms (liberalization of trade, ownership of monopolies
[increasing market competition])

IR-324: Class Notes
IR-324
Page 235
11/14/05 12:08 PM
Creating societies with overlapping identities

• When groups begin to struggle, it will be less likely that it will result
in violence
• How does globalization fit in?
o Foreign firms typically have more sophisticated management
ideas
 Bringing this into foreign states can help overlap
identities
Problem systems for minorities

• Multicultural policies can be good, but what if those cultural policies
violate our idea of human rights, et cetera
• Allowing for multiculturalism is more complex than may seem,
because of contradictions between cultures
Theories promoting the idea that growth is resultant of a society’s culture

are problematic
Myth: having a lot of diversity ends in clashes in culture

• Usually is merely a struggle over inequality and resources
• Economically oriented
• Example: France: it is mostly a result of unemployment; but most
of the unemployed are of a certain culture
Corruption causes huge inefficiencies
Three myths
• Some cultures are more likely to make development progress than
others
ROMA: the gypsies

• Widely discriminated against
• Associated with laziness, unproductiveness
• Largely uneducated

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 236
In Brazil, only two of the cabinet members are Afro-Brazilian, though almost
half of the population is Afro-Brazilian
Going from a majoritarian system to a proportional system

• Trying to be more inclusive of minorities
• Government spending goes up
• Example: New Zealand; A parliamentary system

IR-324: Class Notes
IR-324
Page 237
11/16/05 12:00 PM
Chapter 3 of reading
Majority rule can persecute minorities
How to build a democracy in the midst of a very diverse state
Africa: many different languages
Fundamental to democracy
• Education
• Voting
Federalism and a proportional electoral system
Indigenous people can be hurt by governments working with multinationals
Nigeria is much more diverse then Botswana

• Leaders come from the same groups, and identify with the people
• If a state is more diverse, redistribution may be less ‘fair’
Should legal system be common law, or traditional

• Traditional law is often underdeveloped and arbitrary
• For a multinational, traditional law is problematic
Wall Street Journal Article

• China’s anti-monopoly laws
• Could be used in a bad way
• Mush world political oversight
• China is not ready to enforce this law: lack of training and
infrastructure
• The Chinese have let foreign firms in very easily before this, and
even beforehand
States in the US compete for FDI

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 238
May be easier for FDI to manipulate a federalist system than other, such as
centralized
If Wal-Mart were to move overseas, is it an extension of US nationalism, i.e.

the US government

IR-324: Class Notes
IR-324
Page 239
11/21/05 12:03 PM
Teach for America presentation
Review for Final December 5th noon – 1 pm

• Bring exam 1 and 2 from this semester
“Globalization, Gender, and Poverty: Bangladesh, Woman Workers, in Export

and Local Markets”
• Journal of International Development 2004 (16) p. 93-109
• Kabeer, Naila and Mahmud, Simeen
Roderick and Dresnic
Trying to Debunk the myth that MNCs contribute to the ‘race to the bottom’
Roderick
• Sense and non-sense in the globalization debate
• After the great depression
o Social agreement between people and government
o FDIC created, Social Security, Government would provide
jobs
o Government has to spend more money to do all of this
• Globalization tears at these arrangements
• Opens up new markets for employers, but not employees
• Who does it hit the worst in the US?
o Low skilled workers
o Workers who are most replaceable
o These people are hurt by globalization, which is problematic
• Globalization makes the bargaining power of labor less effective
• ISI: substitute imports with domestic production
• Low wages are directly related to low productivity
• Trade deficits: the result of savings and investment
o US has a very low savings rate, high investment rate
o This results in an imbalance
• Misconception: life hasn’t improved for Southeast Asian workers
o Life has improved overall
• If we ship jobs to China: scarcity of aggregate demand

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 240
o Would argue differently; any economist would point out:

productivity from the Chinese worker would be less
• Multinationals engage in: regulatory arbitrage
• In many countries, there are no standards
• The race to the bottom hypothesis appears logical, but it is not
• FDI is flowing to the regions and countries with the highest
standards, for the aforementioned reasons and more
Analytical literature review for essay: 5-7 pages

• Make the end a research question
• Look at 3-5 academic articles

IR-324: Class Notes
IR-324
Page 241
11/28/05 12:02 PM
Regression Results handout
Globalization, Gender and Equality
Women working under EPZs are unequivocally better off
EPZs are specifically set up by the host government for the foreign firms
Bangladesh
• Overpopulated, unskilled, small geographically
• High population density
• Patriarchal society
Labor market in Bangladesh

• People are migrating to urban cities
• Agriculture is not a viable future for Bangladesh
• Enormous surplus of labor
In the 80s, Bangladesh turned to globalization

• That’s the point of this article
• Bangladesh hit its stride in the 90s
• Bangladesh pioneered micro-credit accounts
The rise of an export centered garment industry has changed the face of the
female work sector
• Has been largely female employment (garment industry)
• Female employment in the garment industry has increased
exponentially
Why the preference for woman?

• They are cheaper
Lower returns than men with equivalent skills
Woman workers offers employers a low-cost workforce that is more docile

then the male workforce

IR-324: Class Notes
Page 242
Tables presented in article
Most important uses of earnings per category of workers
In the case of Bangladesh, globalization has had a positive impact on women

in a number of ways
When looking at the women surveyed, it is clear that the women in the EPZs
are better off
Another issue: the transformation that this has had on the relation between
men and woman and how each are viewed in their society
39% of EPZ garment workers are self-reliant

• Really important in patriarchal societies
It is important to choose carefully the two or more groups being compared,

as it has an enormous effect on what the results portray

IR-324: Class Notes
IR-324
Page 243
11/30/05 12:01 PM
Creating the final exam
Regulating FDI
Final is from 11-1 on the 9th
Mmmmm… Pizza
Main topics: FDI, labor, government, pros and cons of globalization,

regulation
Final questions
• *1) Should LDC view MNCs as a positive force in development?
• *2) How has FDI affected labor in LDCs?; What effect does FDI
have on unskilled workers? What is the reality of the race to the
bottom? Roderick, Dresner, Muran
• *3) How has globalization been a positive or negative force on
culture? Explain which you believe.
• *4) How does globalization help women in a patriarchal society?
Cite an example.
• **5) What is the most important thing you have learned in this
class, and how does it relate to world politics? Explain.
• *Pick two, but must know answer to all; **Must do
• A page to a page an a half each

IR-324: Assignments
Page 244
IR 324: Homework 1
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
1. The class IR 324 is designed to teach students to understand the way in which the
world is globalizing, including how it will continue to do so; more specifically the
way in which Multinational Enterprises influence and are influenced by the
changes that globalization has brought about. The class avoids the traditional IR
topics of nation-states as actors in the global picture and instead concentrates on
MNEs and their role as actors in the world economy and politics.
2. The US firm would benefit greatly from its purchase of the call center in India
which it had outsourced to previously, given the right conditions. First and
foremost, it would eliminate another link in its chain of production (or service in
this case, as it is a call center) and would thus eliminate a drain of potential profit.
Concurrently, the firm could “Transfer prices” and avoid taxes by depressing
profits in the state with a higher tax rate and inflate profits in the state with a
lower rate.
3. Net foreign factor income is, in essence, the difference between Gross Domestic
Product and Gross National Product. NFFI would indicate the extent to which a
country is invested in foreign states in relation to the extent that foreign states are
invested in the said country. This is important to IR students mainly because it
illustrates the degree to which a state has globalized, and where it stands in
comparison to other states (i.e. Is it a third-world state or developed super-
power?)

IR-324: Assignments
Page 245
4. Of the three approaches to IR, the liberalists consider transnational actors to be
most important, in relation to the other theories’ followers. Liberalists envelope
more of a bottom-up approach than, say, realists; most importantly the theory
2
explicitly promotes the idea that other states are very important actors in the
global economy, and must be understood and dealt with in some way. Realists
take the opposite approach in that they hardly consider the importance of foreign
states, and are more concerned with defending the security of their own state.
5. BOP, or Balance of Payments, is an indicator of the extent to which a state is
receiving funds from foreign states minus the amount that it is paying out to
foreign states. For example, the United States has been running a BOP deficit for
some time now, because it imports a large quantity of products (thus pays out
large sums to foreign states) and doesn’t export as much (thus doesn’t receive as
many funds from foreign states).
2 Keith Parker

IR-324: Assignments
Page 246
IR 324: Homework 2
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
1. In the UN World Investment Report, the chapter entitled “The Shift Towards
Services” can be summer up by three major points. First, outsourcing various
services has increased in recent years, and the services are becoming more
diverse. Large corporations have moved many services, which would have not
been seen as outsourcing candidates years ago, overseas. Some of these services
include R & D in all fields, business processing, and many other services.
Secondly, as technology and education in developing countries increases, the
outsourcing of these services has become more widespread. While companies
originally may have been skeptical about trusting a firm in India with their firm’s
accounting, evidence has shown that it is well worth it to do so. The reasons for
this include financial incentives, but it is also being noticed that the quality of
work is quite impressive in most cases. Lastly, outsourcing is not only done in
developing countries, it is often carried out in developed countries: Ireland has a
very large amount of call centers servicing foreign firms. Furthermore,
outsourcing is not a “zero-sum” operation. If a company outsources to another
state, both states gain from the transaction. Most importantly, jobs aren’t lost in
the home country, in the long term at least.
2. If your firm is merely outsourcing to another state, it is not an MNC. To be an
MNC, the corporation must have a physical presence within the border of another
state. Foreign direct investment would qualify a corporation as being an MNC.

IR-324: Assignments
Page 247
3. The government of Ethiopia is trying to play an important role in promoting FDI
in the state mostly by making it easy to be done. The government has made
quicker and simpler many processes that are required to invest in the state through
various means. One point in which the government of Ethiopia may improve
their income of FDI is though promoting the benefits of investment, rather than
just the ease of entry. Further, a more stable government and more deal making
with MNCs may improve the position of Ethiopia.
4. The top countries of the Inward FDI Performance Index tend to be either small
city-states, such as Singapore, or underdeveloped countries only recently moving
into the world economy, such as Congo. At first glance the country list wouldn’t
seem to be accurate, but this may be a result of the method they use to make the
list. The list is weighted by the size of the country, so what the list is actually
telling the reader is the amount of FDI inflow a state is receiving in comparison
the states entire economy, in relation to other states. The measure could be good
for some purposes, such as identifying which countries’ governments are
particularly skilled at promoting FDI or how dependent a state is on foreign firms.
For other purposes, such as identifying which states have the most overall FDI or
which states the world economy is most willing to enter, the measure is not very
reliable.
5. In this class, the most important thing I have learned so far would be the way in
which governments work so closely with outside firms who may or may not be
willing to invest in their country. Also, the way in which governments incite
firms to invest and the type of government to look for when a firm is searching for
Parker, 2 of 3
IR-324: Assignments
Page 248
potential states in which to invest. This is most important largely because it
applies directly to my Business major, though the other elements of the class may
arguably be more important depending on the career path I choose.
Parker, 3 of 3
IR-324: Assignments
Page 249
Keith Parker
IR 324
Homework #3
AT Kearney’s study on trends in FDI raises a variety of facts that would
potentially help many executives in decisions of FDI. First, Executives are less wary in
entering foreign markets. This is exemplified by the fact that fewer CEOs prefer mergers
and acquisitions as their preferred mode of entry into a foreign market this year. While
45% preferred mergers and acquisitions last year, only 39% do this year. As firms
become more daring in entering foreign markets, they begin to prefer more direct forms
of FDI rather than the safer path of merging with or acquiring foreign firms that are
already established. This is important to know because if provides executives with the
knowledge of what other executives are doing; further, the trends that are advancing must
have some sort of extra value and are most likely worth looking into.
Secondly, the US and Europe seem to be coming closer in relations, at least in
terms of FDI. This year, as compared to last, the US ranked European countries higher in
desirability for FDI. The Europeans, in turn, also ranked the US higher than they had
previously. Despite the growing FDI desirability of many other low-cost FDI options
overseas, firms are leaning more and more towards states that are already developed in
terms of infrastructure, economy, and other issues. This is seen by firms in the US to rate
higher FDI prospects in Europe, and vies versa. This is important to know, as the fact
demonstrates which qualities other firms are viewing as most valuable in potential
candidates for FDI.
Furthermore, more countries this year are deciding to offshore, despite image
concerns. Previously, firms had often been unwilling to offshore operations, as it often

IR-324: Assignments
Page 250
deteriorates the firm’s image in the global community. As more firms become less
worried about image deterioration, it becomes apparent that consumers are becoming less
concerned about a firm’s decision to offshore. This analysis reflects on the social trend
of consumers. This is important for an executive as it opens the door wider for
offshoring.
Further emphasizing a previous point, the study has found that developed
countries tend to be more desirable for FDI. Firms prefer countries that are developed,
even if they cost significantly more than undeveloped countries. This is for a variety of
reasons including stability, education, intellectual property protection, and others. This is
important to know, as most common knowledge suggests otherwise: that firms are
looking for the cheapest country possible. This information displays the idea that not
every industry prefers under-developed countries for FDI, and further illustrates the
difference between labor and wages.
Despite increased interest from the US to Europe for FDI, the 10 new EU
members have a few visible problems that must be overcome in order to be more
attractive to investors. Of these, the most prominent are poor infrastructure, corruption,
and deteriorating low-cost advantage. This is important to know, as this analysis breaks
down the broad fact that the US is viewing Europe as more desirable for FDI. It is shown
that, while many European countries have strong attractiveness, namely the UK, Ireland,
Germany, and France, others are not as attractive. Further, these facts inform a firm as to
what needs to be developed in, say, one of these 10 new EU members after entering the
country (i.e. corruption or education).

IR-324: Midterm
Page 251
IR 324 Midterm
Answer all three questions and be specific
1. Describe how FDI flows and which countries have the largest stocks of FDI
flows. Is this data important to know? Why?
2. In your opinion is FDI beneficial for workers in LDCs? Explain your answer in
detail.
3. Is it necessarily in the best interest of MNCs to exploit labor? Can you give an
example to support your answer?

IR-324: Midterm
Page 252
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
Midterm
1. Describe how FDI flows and which countries have the largest stocks of FDI
flows. Is this data important to know? Why?
FDI, foreign direct investment, flows from countries that are economically, and usually
politically, prosperous. These countries are typically in the ‘North.’ The major players in
FDI are the United States, Japan, The EU, and increasingly China. After the Second
World War, the United States accounted for three-quarters of new FDI. FDI has risen in
importance over the last few decades, and now accounts for more than twenty percent of
global GDP. After flowing from the aforementioned affluent nations, FDI flows to
underdeveloped nations. These nations are typically in the ‘South’ and are considered
LDCs. Key players on the receiving end of FDI include China, India, and many other
states around the world. Because most of the world isn’t ‘developed’ (in the American
sense of the word), most of the world is potentially at the receiving end of FDI. It is
important to know where FDI flows to and from, largely because FDI has a strong
influence on control and the economy. The controlling aspect of FDI is somewhat
complex. Before the initial investment in a foreign state, the investor typically has the
most control. After the investment, though, it is the state receiving the investment that
has the control. Nonetheless, this idea is merely a theory, and is not concrete in its
validity. Information on the flow of FDI is also important in analyzing the economies of
both the receiving and investing states. Information on the amount of FDI coming from a
state, as well as FDI coming into a state, combined with other factors such as the
improvement of a state’s economy, can help other states to understand what might be the
best state policy to adopt in regards to FDI.
Keith Parker; Page 1 of 4

IR-324: Midterm
Page 253
2. In your opinion is FDI beneficial for workers in LDCs? Explain your answer in
detail.
FDI can be beneficial to workers in LDCs and has been beneficial in a variety of ways.
First, it is nearly impossible to argue that people being employed as a direct result of FDI
are making less money than they would have absent the FDI. FDI benefits workers more
than just monetarily, though. The firms associated with FDI in a foreign state are usually
more technologically advanced than the local firms in the foreign state. Further, these
firms tend to be more advanced in organization and management, among other aspects of
operation. Consequently, workers gain valuable knowledge that they keep with them
even after leaving the company from which they gained it. In relation to the value added
to workers after leaving a company, an externality is created for the state itself if those
workers go on to start their own company or work for a local firm. Although it is seen
that workers benefit in many ways from FDI, it should be understood that most
controversy related to workers’ benefits is derived from the working conditions that one
is faced with. Though conditions are often extremely subpar to what society in the West
is accustomed to, the state receiving the FDI has a few options to change these
conditions. Of these, the most prominent option is to increase the education of workers.
By doing this, labor resulting from FDI moves from the unskilled sector to the skilled
sector. Ergo, companies will treat their workers better so as not to lose them, because
they will be harder to replace. Yet another benefit to workers comes from lower prices
for goods that the workers may purchase for living expenses, and increased wages for
workers in firms associated with inter-industry trade with the aforementioned company.
Through backward linkages, firms within a state benefit from the foreign firms purchase
of goods in bulk. The increase in production by those in the backward linkages lowers

IR-324: Midterm
Page 254
prices, and often results in knowledge gained by these firms. Though this principally
benefits other firms, the effects are felt by workers as well, especially the workers of the
firms in the backward linkages. This is only true for inter-industry trade, though. Intra-
industry trade may see some companies going out of business, which could hurt workers.
It is thus evident that many factors play into the extent to which workers benefit from
FDI. Nonetheless, in my opinion the effects of FDI on workers is much more positive
than it is negative.
3. Is it necessarily in the best interest of MNCs to exploit labor? Can you give an
example to support your answer?
While society often views MNCs in LDCs to be exploitive by nature, this is usually not
the case. MNCs tend not to exploit labor largely because it is not beneficial to them.
Consider the case of the Philippines’ first EPZ, or Export Processing Zone. This EPZ
was geographically isolated and the labor force was largely unskilled. The EPZ failed for
these reasons. Following this failure, the next three EPZs established by the Philippine
government were successful. They were successful because they were located near larger
urban centers whose workforce was more skilled. Unskilled workers are easily
exploitable, because they can be replaced easily. Skilled workers, on the other hand, are
harder to replace and are exploited less for that reason. In summary, MNCs had the
choice of exploiting unskilled workers in the Philippines and didn’t take advantage of it.
When MNCs later had the chance to hire more skilled workers, they jumped at the
opportunity. The reason for this decision made by MNCs can be found in simple
economics. Consider the following scenario. An MNC needs workers for building
computer motherboards. The MNC could hire 40 unskilled workers for $0.25 an hour to
get the job done (thereby exploiting these workers), or hire 20 more skilled workers for

IR-324: Midterm
Page 255
$0.40 an hour. If the MNC were to exploit unskilled workers, it would cost $10 an hour
to build their product. If the MNC were to use more skilled workers, it would only cost
them $8. Therefore, it is in MNCs’ best interest not to exploit workers. Often, MNCs
even help to educate their employees and effectively make them more skilled and less
exploitable, as is the case with Intel’s operations in Costa Rica today.

IR-324: Final Essay
Page 256
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
Prof. John Doces
Article Analysis:
Effects of Globalization on Central Africa

IR-324: Final Essay
Page 257
In analyzing the effect of globalization on underdeveloped countries in Africa,
namely central Africa, articles presented by Shang-Jin Wei, Yi Wu, Georgi M.
Deruguian, Jeffrey Sachs, R. Sudharshan Canagarajah and C. Mark Blackden provide
helpful insights into the way in which globalization has altered the economies and
societies of this region. Beginning with a broad perspective, the article “Life and Death
Implications of Globalization” by Shang-Jin Wei1 and Yi Wu2 provides a unique analysis
of globalizations effects on society. While most research in this area analyzes the direct
impact of globalization on the economic growth of a state or region, this article compares
globalizations rise to the rise or fall of life expectancy and infant mortality rates. In
making this comparison, a more insightful knowledge of globalization’s effect on a
society at a community level is brought to light. In the article, the importance of life
expectancy and infant mortality as important dimensions of a society’s well being are
emphasized. Furthermore, the connection between a society’s health status and
globalization provides a better picture of globalization’s effects, as the connection
between economic growth and a society’s well being are not very strong.3 Moreover,
studies connecting globalization with income inequality are often inaccurate because
poverty and income distribution are measured differently across countries. For these
reasons, the use of life expectancy and infant mortality rates provides for a much clearer
and accurate analysis.
One of the most apparent ways in which globalization effects life
expectancy and infant mortality comes from globalization’s effects on a country’s income
1
Shang-Jin Wei works for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Brookings Institution, and NBER
2
Yi Wu is a professor at Georgetown University
3
This viewpoint is presented in a review, by Rodriguez and Rodrik, of literature connecting society’s well being with
economic growth. 2001

IR-324: Final Essay
Page 258
or growth rate. A change in income would affect the ability of a people in a country to
afford medicine, health care, proper nutrition, et cetera. Naturally, though, this analysis
is dependant on the effect of globalization on a country’s income and growth rate, which
is highly controversial. A more stable analysis looks directly at globalization’s effect on
the distribution of income, holding a country’s average income as a constant. This article
has assumed that a nation’s health status is largely a reflection of the health status of its
low-income members.4 Therefore, according to the article’s authors, anything that
improves or worsens the income distribution of a country (holding the average income
constant) tends to improve or worsen that country’s health status.5 Furthermore, if the
globalization increases the income inequality of a country, as many studies suggest that is
does, that country’s public health status may decline.
In a counter-argument to this, one might suggest that the health status of a country
may rise as a result of globalization even is income inequality worsens. First, if high-
income members of a society benefit from globalization by earning higher wages, a
spillover effect may actually improve the health conditions of the society’s low-income
workers. For example, if high-earners are able to afford more medical treatment, then
hospitals will accumulate more advanced medical technology and hire more experienced
staff. When low-earners go to these same hospitals, they will benefit from this as well.
Second, the above argument holds constant the average income of a country.
Globalization has been shown to increase the average income of a country. Therefore, if
4
Wagstaff (2000) calculates child mortality rates by quintile of equivalent consumption for 9 developing countries
(Three of which are in central Africa, and another being South Africa). He finds that in many countries there is a large
gap between the bottom quintile and the rest of the population.
5
Many authors have shown that countries with a more equal distribution of income are healthier. See Rodgers, 1979;
Flegg, 1982; Walsdmann, 1992; and Wilkinson; 1992. It is often argued that income inequality will play a more
important role once the average income passes a threshold of income level (Wilkinson, 1996). Deaton (2001) surveys
the literature and argues that the empirical link between income inequality and ill health is not robust.

IR-324: Final Essay
Page 259
average income is increasing, the income of the lower-income members of a society can
still increase even if income distribution is increasing as well.
Further contradicting the argument made by the article’s authors is evidenced by
the current state of health in central Africa. As FDI has continued to fall in Central
Africa, so also have health rates. If this were a causal relationship and not just a
correlation, it would be clear that the reverse would also be true: an increase in
globalization would result in the increase of health. Nonetheless, this argument may not
hold much water. A causal relationship must be proven; there are many other factors
contributing to a society’s health than merely globalization, such as governmental
provisions of health care and outside factors like AIDS.6
One of the largest problems in present-day Africa is violence, particularly
between different groups. Georgi M. Derluguian7 addressed this issue in the article,
“Does Globalization Breed Ethnic Violence?” Georgi raises the questions: Does
globalization breed violent anti-enlightenment reactions? Can democracy take root in
non-Western societies? His stance is that violent ethnic politics of recent years did not
arise in a direct reaction to globalization, though they may have arisen as an indirect
result. Rather, he suggests, this violence was the result of desperate attempts to dismantle
the wave of developmental regimes that in some cases resulted in the collapse of states.
The states under developmental regimes became impossible to sustain because they could
no longer deliver on the promise of progress and national development. Therefore,
violence was the result of unsuccessful globalization, namely in the central African
region. The reasons for globalization’s lack of success in central Africa are numerous.
6
AIDS has increased as FDI has decreased, which may be the reason for declining health rates
7
Georgi M. Derluguian is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at Northwestern University

IR-324: Final Essay
Page 260
Many of these issues went unsolved by these developmental regimes, such as dealing
with those who may bear the costs of globalization, who will regulate the profit of those
who gain from it, and who will support the new system of capitalist property rights.
Another problem, as presented in the article “International Economies: Unlocking the
mysteries of Globalization,” by Jeffrey Sachs,8 is the geographic isolation of much of
Central Africa. According to Sachs, “The gains from trade depend on the transportation
costs between a national economy and the rest of the world being low enough to permit
an extensive interaction between the economy and world markets.” Central Africa, due
to its size, is home to a very large amount of landlocked area that suffers from this
situation. Moreover, tropical areas, such as much of Central Africa, impose additional
burdens such as infectious disease and poor agricultural conditions that involve soil water
and pests. Sachs further asserts what has already been mentioned in this analysis:
globalization may promote growing inequality and further quandaries as to whether the
problem is limited to low-skilled workers in advanced economies or is this inequality is a
deeper result of intensifying market forces all over the world. Going back to ethnic
conflict, Georgi states that ethnic conflict is the result of globalization-gone-wrong, but
there could be other reasons as well. One might assume that when income inequality
increases in a society, violence does as well. Furthermore, Globalization has been shown
to increase income inequality and thus may be the reason for some of the increase in
violence occurring in many of these areas.
8
Jeffrey David Sachs is an American economist known for his work as an economic advisor to governments in Latin
America, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Asia, and Africa. He proposed shock therapy (though he himself
hates the term) as a solution to the economic crises of Bolivia, Poland, and Russia. He is also known for his work with
international agencies on problems of poverty reduction, debt cancellation, and disease control—especially HIV/AIDS,
for the developing world.

IR-324: Final Essay
Page 261
Changing perspectives, the question might be asked: Is globalization in central
Africa necessary for the survival of Central Africans? It is estimated that Africa would
need to grow by five percent every year just to keep the number of poor from rising.
Further complicating Africa’s situation, the African economy, in terms of its share of
exports and imports, has been declining. From 1970 to the end of the 1990s, Africa’s
share of world exports has fallen from 3.5% to 1.5%.9 Keep in mind, though, that this
represents their share of the world economy, not an actual increase or decrease in exports
or imports.
From this analysis, it is clear that globalization in Central Africa has had some
negative effects on its society, such as the indirect (or direct) increase in violence.
Further, many argue that globalization in underdeveloped countries merely results in
increased income inequality and potentially even lower health. Nonetheless, studies have
indisputably shown that globalization is, overall, healthy for an economy. With all of the
current crises looming over Africa, is globalization necessary in order to pull Africa out
of a slump, or will it cause more harm then help?
9
From “Gender and Growth in Africa: Evidence and Issues,” by C. Mark Blackden and
R. Sudharshan Canagarajah, World Bank, 2003

IR-324: Final Essay
Page 262
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
Prof. John Doces
Final Exam

IR-324: Final Essay
Page 263
How has FDI affected labor in LDCs? What effect does FDI have on unskilled
workers? What is the reality of the race to the bottom?
FDI often has a negative connotation. Nonetheless, FDI has had an enormous
impact on the lives and standard of living for citizens of foreign countries, namely LDCs.
This impact has been largely positive. Furthermore, FDI not only benefits the host
country but also the home country. When considering FDI, the citizens of the home
country often believe that jobs are merely being ‘shipped overseas’ and unemployment
will rise. For those in the host country, FDI seems to be monopolizing the local market,
keeping locals from ‘making it big,’ while all of the ‘good’ jobs and benefits stay home.
First, in considering the home country, FDI makes it possible to accomplish things
overseas for a much lower price and makes possible the existence of many firms that
could not compete without this option (thus providing more jobs). Second, FDI into a
host country is extremely beneficial to the local economy. FDI provides an inflow of
capitol into countries in dire need of it. Furthermore, FDI provides thousands of jobs to
people in LDCs that offer a much higher pay than what is already offered in the local
market, as proven by numerous studies. While the jobs provided to those in the host
country are often not as skilled or ‘professional’ as those offered by the same firms at
home, the labor usually provides a variety of benefits to the employee. Primarily, as
previously mentioned, the people employed through FDI gains financially. The
employee also gains skills that can be used in the local market. For example, an
employee working for a foreign firm will gain valuable knowledge and experience in
doing the work. Foreign firms are usually more technologically advanced than local
firms, as well as more organized and efficient. After gaining this knowledge from the

IR-324: Final Essay
Page 264
foreign firm, the employee might leave and start his own company, thus adding to the
local economy.
In addition to providing individual employees with benefits, FDI also benefits
already existing local firms. Through backward linkages, firms provide jobs to those in
other firms that supply the foreign firm with the production materials that are needed for
operation. For example, a firm making computers in a LDC will need silicon for the
chips inside the computer. The foreign firm will buy silicon from local firms, and may
even incite the formation of more local firms to meet the foreign firms’ silicon demands.
In doing this, even more jobs are created for the local population. Furthermore, just as
mentioned earlier for individual employees, the foreign firm may provide useful
information and techniques to the aforementioned local firm as to how they might make
silicon more efficiently of how to better organize their company. In doing this, the
foreign firm might lower their silicon costs, while also creating a stronger local economy.
The race to the bottom is more of a myth than a truism. Research has shown that
foreign firms prefer more stable democracies to invest in. Many of the nations at the
‘bottom’ can’t provide foreign firms with the security of many of the rights needed to
competitively run a firm; entering into these countries runs the risk of being nationalized,
which is not a risk that many firms are willing to take. Therefore, firms do not prefer the
countries at the bottom, but instead prefer countries that can offer the stability needed for
operation. Furthermore, foreign firms prefer states that can provide a knowledgeable
workforce. With a more educated workforce a firms labor costs will be lower, even if the
wages they pay are higher per employee; an educated worker provides more output than
an uneducated worker.

IR-324: Final Essay
Page 265
How has globalization been a positive or negative force on culture? Explain which
you believe.
Globalization has been both a negative and positive force on culture. As
mentioned previously, globalization provides many advancement opportunities to a
country. In educating both the workforce and local supplying firms, FDI adds to the
diversity of a culture. Furthermore, globalization provides a culture with a more hopeful
future. Nonetheless, some of the effects globalization has on a society’s culture are
negative. For example, namely in LDCs, societies begin to lose much of their national
identity and heritage because of globalization. Many call this effect the McDonaldization
of the world. Additionally, when a firm enters into a foreign market the jobs offered to
the local people are often completely different from what their society has traditionally
done. For example, many LDCs were, and still largely are, farming and agriculture
based. If shoe-making firms were to enter into this market, many former farmers would
begin to work in the shoe-making factory making, say, shoe soles. After time, these
workers and much of the local society would lose their traditional work identity.
Nonetheless, in my opinion the benefits provided by globalization, both financial and
cultural, outweigh what is lost in heritage and tradition.
What is the most important thing you have learned in this class, and how does it
relate to world politics? Explain.
This class has provided me insight into the many ways in which MNCs and FDI
have affected the world, both in LDCs and our own country as well. For our home
country, foreign investment has given us the possibility of expanding beyond what could
traditionally be done domestically. Most importantly, though, the knowledge of FDI’s
influence in LDCs has provided me the ability to understand the actual benefits of

IR-324: Final Essay
Page 266
globalization on the world as a whole. Further, with knowledge of both arguments that
are pro-globalization and anti-globalization, I am able weigh both costs and benefits.
From this, I am able to choose more effectively the states that are more desirable for FDI,
and those that are not suitable for investment. For example, a state that offers an MNC
very low wages, but has a very uneducated and unskilled workforce is much less
desirable than a state whose workforce requires slightly higher wages but offers a more
educated and skilled workforce. Furthermore, it is helpful to understand the benefits that
LDCs derive from FDI. The benefits derived from backward linkages and the spread of
knowledge across an entire employee base helps to explain the reasons behind the bids
for foreign investment by local governments. Overall, the class has cleared many of the
questions that I had about investment in foreign markets, namely LDCs, by explaining
the reasons and motivation behind the large-scale decisions made by MNCs everyday.

IR-383:
University Syllabus
of Southern California
Page 267
School of International Relations
International Relations 383-Fall 2005
Wednesday 6:30-9:30 pm; SOS B44
“Negotiating the End Conflicts

in the Third World”
Professor Gerald J. Bender
VKC 314 – 740-2127
bender@usc.edu
Office Hours:
M,W 3:30-5:30 &
by appointment
Course Description:
The aim of this course if to introduce students to the interesting

subject of the origins and nature of conflict in the Third World with
an emphasis on international efforts to mediate an end to the con-
flicts. Special attention is accorded the mediation efforts of the
United Nations, Regional Organizations, and Great Powers. Several
cases outside the Third World are added to illustrate the universality
of the problems that need to be solved to obtain peace.
Negotiations are usually highly complex and not merely a matter
of agreeing to a cease-fire and separating military forces. It involves
identifying the sources of conflict, developing a system of early warn-
ing about deteriorating conditions that might lead to conflict, and mo-
tivating the right people to act on the warnings. It also involves,
once peace is achieved, the establishment and nurturing of key ele-
ments of reconciliation and reconstruction – political, social, cultural,
legal, and economic – that can allow peace to take root and flourish.
Usually the mediators are under funded and understaffed and must
rely on their own instincts and judgments as well as their dedication.
Each student will select one crisis area to focus on. The list of
cases is found at the end of this syllabus. The course also includes a
number of case studies based on crises in different parts of the
world. Each student is expected to come to class prepared to partici-
pate in each of the cases.

IR-383: Syllabus
IR 383 // Fall 2005 “Negotiating to End Conflicts in the III World” Page 2
Page 268
Requirements and Grading:
There are three main components to your grade in this course, with a
possibility of a bonus if you participate in the Teaching International Relations
Project (TIRP) or the Joint Educational Project (JEP).
Thirty Percent (30%) of your total grade is based on a closed-book, mid-term

examination that will cover the readings, lectures, and class discussions. The
mid-term examination will be given on Wednesday October 19th.
Ten Percent (10%) of your total grade is based on your classroom participa-
tion of the case studies.
Twenty-five Percent (25%) of the total grade in IR 383 is based on your in-
dividual case study paper (including your oral presentation to the class). This
paper is due on the last day of class, November 30th.
Thirty-five Percent (35%) of the total grade in IR 383 is based on a one-

hour final exam to be held on Wednesday, December 8 from 7:00-9:00 pm.
Three Percent (3%) Bonus for (satisfactory) participation in the Joint

Educational Project (JEP) or Teaching International Relations Program (TIRP). If
you earn an A or solid B (or C or D) this will not affect your grade, but if you
earn a high B+ (or C+ or D+) in all combined components of the course, this
bonus could push you over the threshold to an A- (or B-, C-). The JEP & TIRP
programs will be explained during the second day of class.
Required Texts
Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson, & Pamela Aall (eds.) Herding Cats: Mul-
tiparty Mediation in a Complex World. Washington: Endowment of the
United States Institute of Peace, 1999. This can be purchased from the USC
Bookstore.
Gerald J. Bender (ed.), Case Studies on: Third World Negotiations. This
can be purchased from The Magic Machine in the Village.

IR-383: Syllabus
Page 269
Weekly Assignments:
Week One (August 24): Introduction
 Introduction and Organization of the course.
Week Two (August 31):
 Lecture on growing importance of ethnic and religious factors behind

conflicts in the world today.
(From Herding Cats)
 Introduction
Chester A. Crocker, Fen Oster Hampson, and Pamela Aall; pp. 3-18.
 Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle

Chester A. Crocker, Fen Oster Hampson, and Pamela Aal; pp. 19-46.
 The Practitioner's Perspective

Chester A. Crocker, Fen Oster Hampson, and Pamela Aall; pp. 47-62.
Week Three (Sept 7):
Nicaragua Case Studies (All Readings in Case Study Reader)
 Douglas Chalmers, "The United States and Anastasio Somoza: Dealing with
Friendly Dictators Who Are Losing Their Authority” pp. 26-45.
 Bruce Bagely & Juan Tokatlian, "Contradora: The Limitations of Negotia-

tions" pp.46-117.
 Rhoda Howard & Jack Donnelly, "Confronting Revolution in Nicaragua:

U.S. and Canadian Responses” pp. 118-132..
Week Four (Sept 14):
Rhodesia Case Studies (All Readings in Case Study Reader)

IR-383: Syllabus
Page 270
• Herbert M. Howe, "Dancing on Cobwebs: The 1976 American Diplomatic Par-

ticipation in the Rhodesian Peace Process" pp. 133-152.
• Stephen J. Stedman, "The Lancaster House Constitutional Conference” pp. 153-

194.
Week Five (Sept 21):
South Africa Case Study

 Gregory Treverton and Pamela Varley, "The US and South Africa: The Sanc-
tions Debate of 1985” CASE STUDY READER, pp. 1-25.
Week Six (Sept 28):
(From Herding Cats)
 The Road to Madrid

James A. Baker III; pp. 183-206.
 The Road to Sarajevo

Richard Holbrooke; pp. 325-344.
Week Seven (Oct 5:
(From Herding Cats)
 Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Namibia-Angola Settlement of 1988

Chester A. Crocker; pp. 207-244.
 Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of

Sant'Egidio
Andrea Bartoli; pp. 245-274.
 Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement

Aldo Ajello; pp. 615-644.
Week Eight (Oct 12):
Lebanon Case Studies (All Readings in Case Study Reader)
 Richard Haass & David Kennedy, "The Reagan Administration and Leba-
non" pp. 195-213.

IR-383: Syllabus
Page 271
 Barry Rubin & Laura Blum, "The May 1983 Agreement Over Lebanon.” Pp.
214-230.
Week Nine (Oct 19): Mid-Term Examination
Week Ten (Oct 26):
Vietnam Case Studies (All Readings in Case Study Reader)
• David Painter, "The Geneva Conference of 1954: Indochina (Part A)” pp. 231-
249.
• Gary Geipel, "The Nixon Administration and Vietnam: A Case Study in Negotia-
tion and War Termination” pp. 250-285
Week Eleven (Nov 2):
Haiti (Reading in Case Study Reader)
• Curtis H. Martin, “President Clinton’s Haiti Dilemma:

Trail by Failure.” pp. 286-293.
Week Twelve (Nov 9): Student Presentations
(From Herding Cats)
 Bringing Peace to Cambodia

Richard H. Solomon; pp. 275-324.
 Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador

Alvaro de Soto; pp. 345-386.
Week Thirteen (Nov 16): Student Presentations
(From Herding Cats)
 The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland

John de Chastelain; pp.431-468.

IR-383: Syllabus
Page 272
 Multiparty Mediation in Northern Ireland
Paul Arthur; pp. 469-502.
Week Fourteen (Nov 23): Student Presentations
(From Herding Cats)
 Canada and the Crisis in Eastern Zaire

Gordon Smith and John Hay; pp. 85-106
 Burundi:A Case of Parallel Diplomacy

Fabienne Hara; pp. 135-158.
Week Fifteen (Dec 1): Student Presentations
(From Herding Cats)
 Rising to the Challenge of Multiparty Mediation

Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall; pp. 665-699.
Final Examination: Wednesday, December 7th (7-9:00 pm)

IR-383: Syllabus
Page 273
Individual Case Studies
Each student in the class is to select an individual case, which will be pre-
sented orally to the class and in a written form (6-10 pages, double spaced).
Please turn in on the second day of class a sheet of paper that has your name
and e-mail clearly written and a list of your top five choices for case studies
(in order of preference). The list to choose from is found below. If you
would like to do a case on an area not on the list please contact me by e-mail
(bender@usc.edu). If the case is covered in our classroom discussions you
will be expected to deal with different dimensions not covered in class.
 Your paper should be a retrospective on the case, which enriches our understand-
ing. If the case happened some time ago then how does it look retrospectively? If
it occurred only a short time ago then what new information is available to en-
hance our understanding?
 Your papers should be thoroughly documented (i.e. footnotes) with secondary

and, definitely, some primary sources. The major problem of the past is that stu-
dents do not include footnotes so make sure that you include footnotes!
 I will meet with each student for a half hour to discuss your progress prior to the
mid-term. A sign up sheet will be passed out in class.
1. South Africa 19. Haiti

2. Angola 20. Vietnam
3. Namibia 21. Cambodia
4. Zimbabwe 22. Bosnia
5. Mozambique 23. Kosovo
6. Dem. Rep of Congo 24. Macedonia
7. Liberia 25. Sri Lanka
8. Sierra Leone 26. Nagorno-Karabakh
9. Horn of Africa 27. Georgia
10. Somalia (1993-95) 28. Tajikistan
11. Ethiopia/Eritrea 29. Chechnya
12. Burundi 30. East Timor
13. Rwanda 31. Cyprus
14. Sudan 32. Iraq
15. Western Sahara 33. Israel & PLO
16. Kashmir 34. Lebanon
17. Nicaragua
18. El Salvador

IR-383:
University Syllabus
of Southern California
Page 274
School of International Relations
International Relations 383-Fall 2001
Wednesday 6:30-9:20 pm
“Negotiating to End Conflicts

in the Third World”
Professor Gerald J. Bender

VKC 314 – 740-2127
Bender@usc.edu
Office Hours:
M,W 3:45-5:30 &
by appointment

IR-383: Class Notes
Lebanon
Page 275
10/12/05 6:37 PM
Handed out questions for exam, 2 of the 8 questions given will be on the
test
New York times article about Mozambique: on Blackboard. Rivalries solved,

national anthem, flag, et cetera
Signup sheets for next week, meeting with professor
Main groups in Lebanon

• Christians/Armanarites, Muslims (Sunnis, Shiites, Drews [not arab,
sometimes play obstructionist rule, sometimes helpful]), Militia
1941; great compact signed. Mostly between Shiites and Moslems.

Demographics were changing, fewer Christians and more Moslems.
Christians had control, and didn’t want to lose it
Moslems and Christians never really got along very well. They used to be a
colony of France
Lebanon was very successful before this 1975
Syrians came in to help the Christians, though they were mostly Moslem.
This was to help stability in the region
Syria basically brought an end to this civil war, but there were still different
militia in different regions
At that time, Syria’s entrance was very respected
The PLO was also a bit of a major player, they helped the Shiites
In 1982, PLO made many journeys around the middle east. Now, they’ve
settled around Gaza
Maronites and Israelites cooperated immensely

IR-383: Class Notes
Page 276
The PLO is getting out of control, causing serious problems
President is assassinated. First president was a natural leader, while his

brother, who took over after him, wasn’t very stable
US and others create MNF to help the PLO safely leave Lebanon
First one made deals willingly, entered alliances more willingly
The Israelites decided to move into a 25 mile buffer zone to eliminate PLOs
that were remaining
They just went all the way in and took Beirut
Israel surrounded the camps, and allowed Christian militias to come in and
kill over 700 Palestinians in retribution for the president’s assassination
Israel swings back and forth between giving up territory for peace or gaining
territory to use as a buffer
The Israelites were getting nowhere and spending lots of money
Modern: pulling out of Gaza might pit the Palestinian PLO against those who
don’t recognize Israel at all as a nation
More about Israel and the west bank
Back to the Massacre, instability in Lebanon
First group from US came back, but again left two weeks later
• Get all foreign forces out of Lebanon
• Provide stability to Lebanese government
Stimulate a peace movement in the middle east
Syria and Israel war: get it out of Lebanon

IR-383: Class Notes
Page 277
Build the Lebanese army into a force that could keep the peace in Lebanon
Unify the country, build up the parliament
Every time the US gets involved in the middle east, the US is “beginning to
spread peace to the middle east.”
Sent in the Marines
A dispute in the administration as to what would be happening
Shultz and Rumsfeld from the US state department in Lebanon: read a

article
“You are where you sit” this doesn’t apply in this case, it is quite the
opposite
700 American troops at an airport hotel were supposed to get all of this done
CIA bombing in Lebanon was a very devastating blow to the US
Kidnapping was before the bombing
241 were killed in the CIA bombing in the embassy
The US response: send in a battleship, fired into the mountains where the
Drews were, who the US blamed for much of the instability
Other groups were in these mountains as well, some Israeli, some of our
allies as well
We were killing our allies just as much as we were killing the enemy
The case doesn't tell you: Reagan starts getting worries that the policy is
becoming self-defeating. Decides to pull the remaining 400 or so troops out

IR-383: Class Notes
Page 278
of Lebanon in the middle of the night. That was the end of US troops in
Lebanon. Strangely, this being about a year before the 1984 elections, this
never comes up in the elections. Reagan wasn’t scolded for it at all.
Used to have a third case dealing with the war powers act
• Before troops are killed, issue comes up
o Does Reagan have to declare that we were at war
o Reagan maintained that there was no war in Lebanon, thus
congress had no power because “there was no war going on”
o Ted Stevens advised against this
• When a couple troops are killed, it is explained as random fighting
The US wanted a ban on foreign forces in Lebanon
Demilitarized regions of Israel
The Christian militias weren’t protected, everybody knew that they had
worked with Israel
Where do the US and Israel differ

• US didn’t want King Hussein to play a role, Israel wanted him
Syria and the United States

• Syria didn’t want to get out of Lebanon
• Shared goals: a stable government in Lebanon
o Syrians had the means to provide this, while the US only
brought over 700 troops to get this done, which wasn’t
enough
US and Lebanon
• Lebanon didn’t have much choice in accepting US support, US
promised economic aid among other things
It seems that every time there is a crunch in the middle east, everybody
turns to the US. Largely because the US is seen to be the only state that
has leverage against many of these countries

IR-383: Class Notes
Page 279
Soviets increase aid to Syria when US increases aid to Israel
Very few members of the US government will go against anything Israel
The parliament in Lebanon has never really had any power. Lebanon has
had and has democratic institutions, but has never really been a democracy
More points of view are represented in Parliament
Israel; nothing can happen on the Sabbath, millions spent on schools

specifically on orthodox Jews, et cetera
Are there cold war dimensions in this situation?

• An east-west dimension, Lebanese dimension, Isreal-Syria
dimension, PLO dimension
• For Washington, the Cold War dimension was probably a fairly large
factor
The US thought Israel couldn’t improve on US technology. They did, and the
US even bought back some of the enhanced technology
Israel air force: average age is 19. Most are recruited from an area where
people grow up to the idea of ‘collective good’
US was slow to negotiate until the last moment. This was resultant from:
• Great concern about a Israeli Syrian war
• War of superpower-backed states
• Made this more urgent, it seems
Gave Israel a 25-mile buffer zone
Israel has never really trusted the UN
When Israeli PM stayed through UN talks, it was amazing (news article last
weekend)

IR-383: Class Notes
Page 280
This was largely because of Gaza pullout (Again, recent news)
Israel doesn’t belong to any regional organization
The idea that the ability for Lebanon to support a stable government, true?
• Wasn’t a question of timing, a question of ability
Could the US succeed in Lebanon?

• Waited too long, maybe
• Another question of timing
• More pressure possibly
Reagan wasn’t very active in any decisions

• Never really kept up with foreign policy
Reagan did good with domestic economy, but lacked in foreign affairs
Bush traveled only twice before presidency: Mexico and Gambia
Bush is retarded
To succeed, we needed more military power than we put in
US needed to put much more pressure on Israel to withdraw, which would

have led to a possible Syrian withdraw
• Unfortunately this didn’t happen
The US has never been able to force Israel out, why could they have done it
in the early 80s?
This wasn't even on their own turf, was there any hope for US success?
When US troops first came to Lebanon, they were seen as liberators. Once
they left, they were seen as occupiers. Tangent to Iraq?

IR-383: Class Notes
Page 281
Tangent to Germany (brought up by classmate)
November 1984: Casper Weinberger laid down six conditions for the US to
meet before it could stay in Lebanon
• A determination of the existence of US vital national interests
• A commitment of force of adequate size (700 was far from
adequate) (Tangent: Iraq: can’t be Lean and Mean and still hold
control of everything in a state. Some say the only hope in Iraq is
for the US to double troops. Rumsfeld would never do this)
• The presence of clear (realistic) objectives
• A constant willingness to reassess and adjust policy
• A reasonable assurance of congressional and public support
• The elimination of other options so that force is the last resort
As is evident, these six requirements were not followed
Weinberger: we paid a price for not following these requirements, but should
learn and follow them in the future
Passed out 8 possible exam question: 2 will be chosen for the hour-long
midterm next Wednesday

IR-383: Class Notes
Vietnam Page 282
10/26/05 6:42 PM
Professor Bender is sick today, will be lectured for a bit, then a documentary
Things that threatened the West

• Social revolutions
• Rise of socialist regimes
Rise of nationalist regimes were also a bit threatening
The British accepted the logic of withdrawing from India
Situation in Vietnam was similar to the Dutch in the East Indies
Indochina posed the greatest problems for France
Forces led by the communist leader: …
Hanoi: communists forced out, 6,000 people die
Washington supplies military aid for the French, then took over issue with
Vietnam itself
Geneva conference: Cambodia, France, UK, Laos, Vietnam (North and

South), US, Soviets
• July 1954
• Ceasefire along the 17th parallel, divided Vietnam into two halves
• Conference called for the unification of Vietnam in two years with
free elections
• Two years later, when it was found that elections would result in a
guy winning, a guy the US didn’t like
• Fighting continued
• South Vietnamese received aid from the US for war
• Continued Cold War policies
• Opposed sending in troops
• Continued sending military advisors and a lot of money
Killed in '63

IR-383: Class Notes
Page 283
• Before if was clear what he was going to do in Vietnam
Linden Johnson
• Following JFK’s previous path in regards to Vietnam
• Something changed with Vietnam
Two American destroyers attacked in international waters by a torpedo boat

from North Vietnam
Decision to escalate the war
North Vietnamese attack was provoked
Energy and attention shifted to North Vietnam, instead of withdrawing from

the war, decided to escalate the war
• Operation rolling thunder
o Continuous air war on North Vietnam
o Many planes bombed civilians, temples, villages
o Majority of people killed by the strikes were the weak
• First troops landed in Dat Nang in March ‘69
• Soon, number of troops surpassed 500,000
Tet offensive
• Vietcong occupied Sigon including US embassy
Anti-war sentiment in the US

• Prominent artists, musicians began to critisize the war
• Men burning their draft cards
• Demonstrations provoked violent reaction: Kent University
o National guard shot at the crowd, killing four students
1969: Nixon elected president

• Ran on peace plan platform
o Had a secret solution to winning the war
o Once elected, never put his ‘secret solution’ into effect
o Continued the war

IR-383: Class Notes
Page 284
Many documents publicized now show that there was no way we could win
the war through all of these administrations
War expanded to Cambodia and Loas

• Nixon began to take peace talks seriously
• War was evenually 'lost' by the US
Video with interviews including Kissinger and Nixon, et cetera

IR-383: Midterm Questions and Answers
Page 285
NGO
Example 1: “Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant’Egidio”
*Community of Sant’Egidio
-the community entered negotiations when level of violence was high
-during that time, the situation was “ripe” because Renamo and Frelimo were both
exhausted from war, and ready for peace
-approach was more social-psychological as the NGO:
-focused on processes of communication
-involved principle civil leaders
-assisted dialogue  tried to find different ways for groups to communicate
-the NGO’s negotiation process was simultaneous, as it encouraged/got the involvement of many
different state and non-state actors  political latitude
-Mozambique civil society
-Catholic Church
-NGO worked with Vatican and local Catholic leadership to settle disputes with
the Mozambican government
-United States
-Italian government
-played into political interests of the Italian Community Party
-the party wanted to establish closer ties with Catholic organizations as it
had extensive political and economic ties with Frelimo
-United Nations
-random: Kenya, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Britain, Portugal, Russia
-also established friendly relations with the Mozambican government by promoting
Mozambican culture and knowledge within Italy
-also sought relationship with Renamo, when its military victory stopped being a
possibility
 created synergies, which were based on direct relationships between representatives of
different interests and organizations  there was no single powerful actor that had compelling
interest in Mozambique to force itself into negotiations
-its goals were focused on:

-pluralism and inclusiveness
-political control of military forces
-encourage of direct personal contact
-adherence to human rights standard
-acceptance of national sovereignty and borders
-though did not bring much leverage to the table, brought many different actors together that
brought something
-United States agreed to indirectly support the efforts
-provided expertise in military, legal, economic and institutional fields
-UN: symbolic role

Page 286
-Italy provided financial support and provided political atmosphere

-Mozambique civil society involved caused the process to feel inclusive
 also helped that the Mozambicans wanted peace, not retributive justice
-therefore had impact on negotiations, because focus on development of relations among

different actors, lack of self-interested goals (though motivated to help the Catholic community),
“weakness”
-the NGO’s lack of international power and prestige allowed it to be free of traditional
formalities
-Community of Sant’Egidio is a fellowship of small communities sharing a
spiritual life in a secular setting while serving the poor in friendship
-members are unpaid, therefore mediators seen as altruistic and
unmotivated
-lack of political prestige prevented it from being an coordinator, but was able to see the
coherence in the actions of the actors involved in the process – cooperation vs.
coherence
-negative aspects of roles

-not much leverage power
-many limitations in regards to money, expertise and prestige
-positive aspects of roles
-free from traditional formalities
-more wiling and able to work with different actors – realize its own limitation
-able to get others to agreed to work with it as no stigma, obligations
-willing to share information
-willing to keep confidentiality as well – need for Frelimo, which had hardliners that
were against compromise with Renamo
-b/c didn’t have own agenda, could make parties fully responsible for the peace process,
and to draw in the international community as significant but nonintrusive actors
 resulted in the General Peace Agreement  brought end to 16 years of civil war
Example 2: “Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement”
*United Nations: Aldo Ajello
-peace keeping mission = United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)

-4 components: political, military, humanitarian and electoral
-later on added a civil police component
-political component:
-key commission: Supervision and Monitoring Commission (CSC): empowered to
replace the gov’t in all matters related to the implementation of the agreement
-CSC: members of the 2 parties and various international partners meet and agree on
a decision  consensus
-consisted of subsidiary bodies: the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF)

Page 287
-the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers (CORE)

-the Commission for the Police (ComPol)
-the Commission for Intelligence (ComInfo)
-Commission for the Formation of the New Army (CCFADM)
-the Commission for the Territorial Administration
-National Election Commission
 ONUMOZ can only chair CSC, CCF, and CORE, rest by Mozambicans
 but Felimo and Renamo asked them to chair CCFADM
-military component:
-consisted of 350 UN observers and 5 infantry battalions w/ necessary logistical,
transportation, and communication support structure
-job: supervise the assembly and demobilization of both gov’t and Renamo soldiers
-monitor cease-fire; investigate any alleged violations of the peace agreement
-allow effective delivery of humanitarian aid and orderly return of refuges and displaced
people
-humanitarian component:
-coordinated by the UN Office of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator (UNOHAC)
-job: coordinate humanitarian assistance of UN organizations, and NGOs
-major target groups: Mozambicans returning to their villages
-electoral component:
-relatively small
-job: monitor and observe
-civil police:
-confidence building measure requested by Renamo
-impact was marginal
-in the General Peace Agreement, it was established that the UN would be the locomotive
moving the entire process forward  this gave the UN influence over the course of the events
-the UN has to make sure process moves forward or else will be scapegoat
-it is watched by the media and other countries
-the United Nations’ credibility was tested by the GPA, as its timetable was unrealistic
-When Renamo boycotted the work of the commissions and recalled its delegation to the bush,
Ajello did not pressure him to return because he knew that Renamo needed to train a team of
new officials
-Ajello had to understand the different needs of the two parties
-When Dhalakama launched an attack and captured the towns of Angoche, Maganja da Costa,
Memba and Lugela  UN was confronted with a serious crists
-Ajello had to draw on the socio-psychological method, in which he recognized that
Dhalakama wanted to be acknowledged by the international community
-Ajello illustrated the importance of for Renamo to change its image in order to ensure a
political future
-Ajello had to make sure that he was seen as a representative of the international community in
order to keep the peace process on track

Page 288
-Also, Ajello made sure that the international community was follow involved in the decision
making role by securing agreement from members of the CSC
-UN assembled, disarmed, demobilized troops  formed a special Technical Unit of civilians to
take the lead in demobilization
-UN needs to realize how to offer assurance:

-has to take initiatives that may not be that popular with the rest of the world, but thinks is
necessary – setting up a fund for Dhalakama
Dhlakama said wouldn’t participate in elections the day before b/c he thought it was all a fraud
due to:
-several days before the elections, a doc was mysteriously faxed to UN and Renamo  listed
ways that Frelimo could win through fraud
-Ajello said would declare elections a fraud if any of the things happened, but Dhlakama
thought he was just covering for the gov’t
-activities of the National Election Commission came under suspicion
-frontline states said Renamo had to accept election results no matter what or military
intervention
 Ajello got as many heads of state and gov’t to say that they didn’t understand Dhlakama’s
decision and that he was losing credibility  Dhlakama said would participate if CSC and Ajello
agreed to investigate elections
criticisms:
-military component too big and inefficient
-Trust Fund to help Renamo go from military org to political
-effectiveness of humanitarian component:
-excess of bureaucratic rules
-approach of weapons
-UN has many organizations within, which allows it to specialize in certain areas
-is able to draw from different sources of information, expertise and policy planning
which allows it to be more effective
-Ajello used symbolic leverage, instead of military threats

-recognition, support from community
-negative aspects of roles

-because big member of the international community, the United Nations is constantly
being watched and criticized for its mistakes
-it is expected to make/fulfill certain guarantees, as a result it does not have much
leniency
-it must get support from its members – because so many members, hard to please
everyone
-some nations may not trust UN because has leanings towards certain policies
-positive aspects of roles

Page 289
-wide recognition and respect

-has the ability to draw from its different members, as well as other NGOs that are
willing to work with it
-some nations are more inclined to trust it
-huge symbolic leverage
STATE METHODS
Example 1: “The Road to Madrid”
Focus more on the structuralist method
-US involved in the Middle East peace process because it has a strategy relationship with Israel,
and the political power of the American Jewish community makes it a fixture in domestic
politics
-types of leverage
-US used its political and military leverage:
-took advantage of the fact that it defeated Iraq in the Gulf War
-US also used its credibility in the region because it had left Iraq promptly after liberating
Kuwait
-has leverage with each party: blaming others for scuttling the process
-economic leverages
-“creative ambiguity”: US willing to be vague in certain areas so to give other states room to
interpret events on their own terms
-the US has power to pressure each side for certain concessions; also, it is able to make
concessions
Example 2: “The Lanchester House of Constitutional Conference”
-Carrington also implemented the structuralist track in the peace process
-Britain’s types of leverages:

-economic sanctions on Rhodesia
-offered parties an alternative to war: took responsibility to bring Zimbabwe
independence
-used socio-psychological leverage on Murzorewa
-Britain said it would give him formal recognition if the conference failed
-able to bring together/get support from Frontline states
-Frontline states pressure Patriotic Front to participate in conference
-threats to leave out the party that refused to participate
-Carrington was firm in his plans, refusal to change outline of conference

-he had enough power/leverage so that he did not need to cater to the different parties

Page 290
-leverage: threat to leave out the party that did not participate
 non-state actors are more flexible, where as state actors are more set/rigid in its policies
and plans

Page 291
How has ethnicity and religion affected, complicated, and in some cases eased negotiations?
What steps were taken to lessen the impact of ethnic/religious tensions? How would you
recommend dealing with such delicate issues?
From the time of the toppling over of the Tower of Babbel, religion and ethnicity have
been the primary causes for conflicts—big and small. Although different, both ethnicity and
religion share a similar influence on someone’s will to compromise to absolve such conflict.
Because both ethnicity and religion carry with them connotations of a person’s character, biasing
one over the other, it is hard to resolve conflicts of this nature as trust is hard to gain. While
some conflicts that were started hundreds of years ago continue today, a certain hope exists in
the immediate and outside parties to gain such trust and, hence, achieve peace. The following
cite specific examples to illustrate weaknesses and strengths in negotiating ethnic and religious
conflict.
I. Ethnicity and Religion mostly complicate, but sometimes ease negotiations

A. Further weakens trust of participants in potential negotiations
i. Arab-Israeli peace process of 1991
a. Simply creating a dialogue (again) between the Israelis
and the Palestinians would prove fruitless as a result of
mistrust between the two groups—based on the history
between the two religious groups.
ii. Many black South Africans—even after the end of Apartheid—have
issues trusting Afrikaaners as many were tortured and killed, not to
mention thousands more who were hindered from any social mobility
based on the color of their skin.
B. History of these conflicts tend to be longer and more emotionally-charging
i. Often times colonial states or superpowers drew political lines
irrespective of ethnic and religious groups.
ii. Land is a hot issue in the Middle East—deciding who deserves the
West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, etc. As both groups believe
that they inherited various areas from God, it is hard to resolve such a
conflict. They either compromise their beliefs or their safety.
iii. In Rwanda, a genocide occurred largely in result of divisions that
colonial powers made, dividing up the country into two new ethnic
groups—the Hutu and the Tutsi—which supposedly determined
whether or not they could have any sort of power.
C. Lose momentum for negotiating with these particular conflicts
i. Arab-Israeli conflict has been going on for years and years and is more
complicated now than ever. Any possible momentum of the 1991
peace talks was lost as the ethno-religious aspects of the conflict
overshadowed any possible strides for peace.
II. Steps taken to lessen impact of ethnic and religious tensions
A. Find and bring in a neutral negotiator
i. Nicaragua peace process

Page 292
1. Canada was considered more neutral than the US under

Reagan’s administration, particularly when it came to human
rights violations.
ii. Arab-Israeli peace process of 1991
1. UN did not have credibility with Israel because of the
Zionism= Racism policy of the UN
2. The US was the only country known for its potential leverage
with Israel; thus, Baker was sent.
iii. Mozambique peace process—1990 to 1992
1. Major powers (US, Italy, etc.) were not as appealing to
facilitate negotiations, although involved
2. Saint Egidio provided a “mental path to peace for the
participants,” according to Andrea Bartoli.
B. Bilateral concessions—furthering credibility of negotiators
i. Arab-Israeli peace process
1. Baker asked for simultaneous concessions from Israel, PLO,
Syria, Jordan, Lebanon & Saudi Arabia
a. “Parallel reciprocity”: parallel confidence-building
steps to demonstrate simultaneous will towards peace.
2. Substance over symbols
a. Baker refused to come to Jerusalem to discuss two
years of automatic vetoes in the Security Council on
any proposal which Israel opposed.
b. Baker confronted Palestinian demand for US official
support of an independent Palestinian state.
i. “…the question of East Jerusalem would be on
the agenda at some point. If that’s not good
enough, I said, then I must tell you that your
position is that symbols are more important than
substance---and, unfortunately, that position has
helped to create and sustain the Palestinian
tragedy. For God’s sake, don’t let Israel hide
behind symbols.”1
ii. Bosnia
1. Holbrooke and Wes Clark were able to get the Serbian leaders
to “cease all offensive operations” and remove large weaponry
from the area in and around Sarajevo within a week.C.iii.2
2. Holbrooke also promised that he would “recommend” that
NATO discontinue bombing—only resuming after 72 hours if
the Serbs did not fulfill their promise.2
C. Put players on the defensive
i. Arab-Israeli peace process of 1991
1. Jordan, for example, was willing to meet US terms because of
their economic aid needed by US.
1
Baker, James A. III. “The Road to Madrid.” Crocker, Chester, et al. Herding Cats. p. 202.
2
Holbrooke, Richard. “The Road to Sarajevo.” Crocker, Chester, et al. Herding Cats. p. 343, 342.

Page 293
2. Especially since Israelis wanted out of the war anyway, Baker

convinced Assad to put Israel on the defensive by breaking the
taboo of sitting down to peace talks with Israel.
ii. Lebanon peace process
1. Sharon put on defensive as discontent grows among the Israeli
populace after their involvement in the massacres of over 700
Palestinian civilians.
iii. Bosnia
1. The UN put sanctions on Yugoslavia for supplying weapons to
and support of the Serbs—the ones who massacred thousands
of Muslims in Sarajevo. not very fruitful
2. According to Holbrooke, only force or its “credible threat”
would elicit cooperation from the Serbian leaders (“bullies”).
a. leave without any (nearly) guarantees of concessions,
especially from NATO, if Mladic (and Karadzic)
insisted not to give up any of their “sacred … soil!”2
D. Maximize window of opportunity created by major historical events
i. Fall of the Soviet Union—loss of Soviet patronage for many states
1. Syria was newly open to US initiatives in the 1991 Arab-Israeli
peace talks with the fall of the USSR.
ii. End of the Gulf War
iii. Changing political climates within a country
1. Mozambique—willingness to promote peace
2. Israel—diminishing support for the state of war
III. Recommended steps to take when dealing with these fragile tensions
A. Examine weaknesses in unresolved ethno-religious conflicts
i. Little trust, little leverage
ii. Poor use of timing, momentum lost
iii. Many lives displaced and many lost
B. Examine strengths in resolved conflicts
i. Ability of negotiators to elicit steady, phased negotiations
ii. Credible, strong but flexible leaders and negotiators
iii. Ability to compromise and put welfare of the people as first priority
iv. Not allowing issues that have been unresolved for years (such as claim
to Jerusalem) to get in the way from resolving any other issues.

Page 294
QUESTION #2:
The non-state actors involved in Third World Negotiations can be playing the part of (1) a
mediator or (2) a direct negotiating party, such as a group that can be considered to be a
"winner" or "loser" in the conflict. The methods they use when involved in negotiations,
therefore, are determined by the role that they are playing. As I see it, each of the cases that
we reviewed in class, except for South Africa, includes contributions from non-state actors.
In terms of non-state mediators, only the case of the negotiated settlement of Mozambique
did an independent non-state actor or group (the community of Sant'Egidio) facilitate the
negotiations, and for this reason I have spent a great deal of space dissecting this case. In
terms of negotiating parties, any conflict negotiation that involved guerrilla or militarily
active opposition groups- Nicaragua, Rhodesia, Namibia-Angola, and Mozambique thereby
included non-state actors (even though some of these groups were more involved in the
actual negotiations than others.) Guerrillas were not the only non-state actors to be direct
participants, though. In "The Road to Madrid," the Palestinians (and ostensibly behind
them, the PLO) were not guerillas, nor state actors, yet still active participants with a real
stake in the outcome of negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis. Somewhat similarly,
in “The Road to Sarajevo,” the questionable titles or leadership of the so-called Bosnian-
Serb President Radovan Karadzic and his right-hand man General Mladic seem to put them
more in the position of non-state actor than state-actor. Below I have outlined two different
cases which concern non-state actors, one in each of the two roles. My answer includes the
actors’ methods, influence on outcomes of the negotiations to which they were a part, and
the positive or negative aspects of their roles. The problem with outlining the non-state
negotiating party involvement in many of the other cases is that, while these actors were
present and active, their actions were not always very well covered in the readings.
Mozambique:
Mozambique is unique concerning the pertinence of non-state actors to the resolution of its
conflict because not only one of its disputing parties (Renamo) but also its team of
mediators were non-state actors. I will concentrate on the team of mediators.
Background:
Sant’Egidio, an international Roman Catholic association, is “a fellowship of small
communities sharing a spiritual life in a secular setting while serving the poor in
friendship.” It was not a professional conflict resolution agency, but rather involved itself
in Mozambique through the group’s personal relationship with a young Mozambican priest
named Goncalves. In the mid-1970’s, it first established contacts with the extremely
influential Italian Communist Party, which had extensive political and economic ties with
the Mozambican government (Frelimo) and was interested in strengthening its ties to the
Catholic Church. Aiming to play on PCI’s interests, Sant’ Egidio then established very
positive ties to Frelimo by promoting Mozambican culture within Italy. In the late 1980s,
when it became obvious that a military victory was not feasible and Frelimo’s leader
Chissano decided to explore the option of a dialogue with Renamo (its armed opposition),

Page 295
Goncalves and Sant’Egidio were well-positioned to bring the Renamo leadership in to

begin discussions. In 1990, after direct meetings with Renamo’s leader, Alfonso
Dhlakama, Sant’Egidio took on the status as observer to the talks that both sides were
trying to organize. A few months into the process, the four member team was asked to
become a full-fledged mediation team.
Method:
The mediation team’s method was neither clear-cut nor pre-planned, but it stayed, at
minimum, focused on the peace process and committed to its wider strategy of maintaining
the open dialogue it created between the two movements.
Concretely, Sant’Egidio provided the organizational space (in its headquarters in
Rome) for the two sides to complete whatever activities were necessary to the process as
well as a team of volunteers to carry out whatever support (logistics, translation) was
needed during the two year negotiating period.
Sant’Egidio did not act alone, but rather with financial and political aid from the
government of Italy, the strong, rather symbolic, backing of the United Nations, the
technical (military, legal, economic, and institutional) support of the United States, and the
cooperation of various other countries in the region and internationally- all of which
enlarged the political space in which the dialogue took place as well as the credibility of
Sant’Egidio. The mediation team gathered and fused together the leverage of other
disparate actors to create political latitude that would not have existed either with it on its
own or with only a major power mediator. It had a realistic evaluation of its own strength
and created direct personal relationships between representatives and organizations (such
as with the Italian ambassador to Amputo, Manfredo Incisa di Camerana and various
members of the US government) that could be used to create a complex dynamic favorable
to conflict resolution. Delegation members also created these kinds of close personal
relationships with delegations from the government and Renamo, directly nourishing them
with ideas, suggestions, and critical observations. More than right answers to specific
crisis, however, the mediators created a framework within which all crisis could be
assessed and addressed. The interpersonal bonds became significant assets by enabling
members to better cope with these crisis encountered in later stages of the process.
To compensate for its lack of experience and expertise, the team used a strategy of
incremental success in which the first step, the joint communique signed in 1990, opened
the door to further meetings and negotiations. It also worked to ensure that the channels of
communication between the delegations in Rome and the political or military leaders back
home were open in such a way as to ensure that all agreements made in Rome were binding
to the two sides. The careful management of information concerning the peace process was
also necessary in order to minimize a possibly disruptive and inflammatory diffusion of
information about sensitive discussions or agreements taking place in Rome.
The influence of the mediation team:

Sant’Egidio was chosen because of its moral and political authority, not the amount
of leverage that it could exert over the situation. The weakness of the negotiation team

Page 296
reduced the possibility of imposing outside solutions through coercive diplomacy or

military threat, thereby forcing the parties to negotiate for themselves. Andrea opines that
the success of Sant’Egidio as a “conduit of negotiation” was due to this weakness because
it ensured that it avoided being cast into and constricted by the formalities of more
traditional mediation initiatives. Their method was to get the adversaries to talk with one
another and others in a setting that was conducive to dialogue, and this method delivered
results.
Positive or Negative?
The role of Sant’Egidio was obviously positive in terms of the resolution of the
conflict between Renamo and Frelimo seeing as their work created the environment that led
to the signing of a peace agreement in 1992. In fact, the example of Sant’Egidio’s work in
Mozambique shows that NGOs can contribute positively to the resolution of deadly
conflict and that, under certain circumstances, they may be better placed than more
traditional diplomatic actors to play the lead role in such circumstances, thereby providing
new options for the negotiation of peace.
The Road to Madrid (Peace Conference):

While the peace talks in Madrid could not directly include the PLO because of the adamant
objections of Israeli Prime Minister Shamir, the groups of Palestinians leaders with whom
Secretary of State Baker met during the time leading up to Madrid certainly were a
significant party to the negotiations, seeing as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was the most
divisive issue at hand. Baker's main goal was to get a Palestinian delegation that would
agree to attend the talks and that would be accepted by Shamir.
Method:
In terms of method, these Palestinians argued mainly about three things, (1) that the issue
of Jerusalem must be addressed before peace talks could begin, and later, that (2) they did
not want a joint delegation, and (3) they wanted some PLO and East- Jerusalemite
representation in whatever delegation was conceived. Baker told the leaders with whom he
spoke that they were putting symbols over substance, meaning that if they would let go of
the representation issue, they would actually be able to get to the negotiating table with
Israel as opposed to allowing the Israelis to continually settle more of their land. In the end,
the Palestinians were the last to agree to go to the Madrid Peace Talks. Not only did they
decide to (in vain) call for the United States to change long-standing policy opposing an
independent Palestinian state, but continuously brought up the issue of Jerusalem and
representation until the very last day of Baker's shuttle diplomacy. In the end, Baker had to
explode and walk out on their talks before the Palestinians would agree to a joint-
Palestinian delegation with Jordan that included 14 (non-PLO) Palestinians that were
acceptable to Israeli PM Shamir.
Influence:

Page 297
As to how they influence the negotiations, I would say that they didn't have much of an
impact, seeing as, in the end, they were forced to accept the conditions that were acceptable
to Shamir. Their biggest impact was on Baker; he certainly got a workout trying to get
them on-board.
Positive or Negative?:
With that said, I am not sure if I would say that the Palestinian role in the “road to Madrid”
was positive or negative. Despite the fact that their resistance hindered the success of
Baker’s shuttle diplomacy, their final acquiescence was critical to the success of Baker’s
strive to break the “greatest taboo in the Arab-Israeli dispute”- the unwillingness of the
different parties to even meet with each other.

Page 298
Do you believe that the US foreign policies are related to its domestic
politics? Explain, supporting your argument with several cases we read.
The US foreign policies are related to its domestic politics. Even today’s case of
President Bush can be applied to this. For example, the fact that he sent out troops to Iraq
to fight the “War on Terrorism” is disliked by many Americans, who are against Bush’s
foreign policies. As a result, he barely passed with a couple of votes as the US’s next
president. “Right now, then, is the time for a maximum effort to exert political influence
by all of us who believe that the U.S. should change its internal security, military, and
above all foreign policies.” This is nothing but clear evidence that voters in this country
are turning against current U.S. policies associated with the so-called war on terrorism,
which will bring about changes that many of Americans think are necessary.
One case study that supports this is the Angola case study of 1975. The US was
supporting two parties, and in the middle of negotiations, the US passed an amendment
which prohibited that the US supports Angola. Another case study was the Rwanda case
where Tutsi and Hutu tribes were fighting for six days between each other. This was as a
result of the Germans, who owned the colony, said that the Tutsi can have power in
Rwanda because they are better educated and wealthier. Both tribes were very similar
and for Germans very hard to distinguish, but the tribes began fighting with each other as
a result of that proclamation. For example, Bosnians, Serbians and Muslims (the story
about the interview and the bread that Professor Bender mentioned in class).
For those who think the exercise is doomed because votes in the U.S. are rarely
influenced by foreign policies, we should emphasize that the stringent and even
unconstitutional internal security policies that now affect us all are directly related to and

Page 299
caused by the foreign policies we are talking about. All the lobbies powerful in U.S.
politics--lobbies for Israel, arms manufacturers, energy conglomerates, or any others you
want to name--cannot prevent us forever from influencing the policies of this benighted
administration.

Page 300
Question #3:
How can economic sanctions influence the process of mediation and negotiations?
Assess their effectiveness in the cases covered.
Suggestions: Make up whatever thesis you want to say whether sanctions are ultimately
effective
E.g.
Could argue that sanctions would be effective if there was worldwide cooperation in
imposing them. However, U.S. often does not participate in UN resolutions to impose
sanctions, and since U.S. can have much economic influence, other attempts at
sanctioning fail.
Could also use South Africa example (listed below) as a model to explain arguments
against and for sanctions….
Overview of Economic Sanctions in South Africa (SA):

Summary:
• At first (during Reagan’s first term) only Democrats pushed bills for Sanctions on
SA.
• In 1984, violent confrontations between SA security forces and black
demonstrators increased.
• National TV showed SA riots, putting SA policy into spotlight.
• So bill to impose sanctions sailed through House with bipartisan support.
• Both house and senate seemed prepared to override a presidential veto.
• Instead, president forestalled passage of sanctions legislation by issuing executive
order.
• 1986—congress did override pres veto for more sanctions
History:
• Series of events (massacres, detention of any leaders of black sonsciousness
movements), led to 1977 UN Secuirty Council imposed a mandatory arms
embargo on SA.
o First embargo imposed by UN on one of its members.
• Other countries in South Africa, black-ruled nations, were sympathetic, but could
not do much cuz economically dependant on SA.
o e.g. SA sole buyer of electricity from a plant in Mozambique.
1963—US arms embargo.
1977—Carter joined UN arms embargo
1978—US government barred US exports to SA military, po,ice, or apartheid-enforcing
agencies of the gov.
1960’s-70’s: US private sector had lucrative financial dealings with SA
US was SA’s primary trading partner
Crocker’s Constructive Engagement.

• Recognized leverage the US had in dealing with SA was relatively small
• Plan was that continuing engagement with SA, could encourage SA to move away
from apartheid system.

Page 301
• Proper US role would be to encourage reform efforts.

o Establish friendly relations.
o Shold respect arms embargo.
o But not economic warfare
According to Crocker:
• Regarding sanctions, compare to bullets in gun: once u fire them, they’re gone
and what to do then. Sanctions aren’t a policy, but a gesture. When they’re done
theyre’d done and your leverage is reduced.
Still media attention on SA in US….Tutu criticized policy of Constructive Engagement,

said they should apply pressure on SA.
Debate over imposing sanctions on SA:

Areas of Disagreement
• Role of SA Economy
o Healthy SA economy would serve as engine of race reform, or whether
further entrench the ruling white minority.
o Liberal critics especially disputed this: Successful capitalism and apartheid
can, and have been, co-existing…so clearly change wont come from
healthy economy.
• Role of American Investment in SA
o Did it help move apartheid forward or was it a force for race reform,
providing better working conditions for blacks than would otherwise be
available?
o Liberal argument that the companies did more for government than it ever
helped blacks.
• Would Sanctions Hurt Blacks?
o Thought SA sanctions might hurt other black south African countries.
o Liberals argued that prominent black south African leaders advocated US
economic pressure.
• Would Sanctions Work at all?
o e.g. Arms embargo encouraged SA to develop strong arms-production
industry.
o But many pointed out contradiction in administrations policies to sanction
communist countries but not SA.
o Sanctions advocates argued that it would make a difference
Pro sanctions argued that there was a moral responsibility to act.

Make it plain what we stand for…
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985

Proposed banning new bank loans to SA gov, prohibit sales to gov of computer
equipment, barred US citizens from purchasing Krugerrands, prohibited new investment
in SA by any US firms.
Part could be postpaid if SA took series of significant steps including:
Release political prisoners

Page 302
Full citizenship to blacks

Remove race-based restrictions on where black people could live and work
Negotiate with black leaders to establish representative political systems
End SA control of Namibia
This bill was modified and forms of it passed around the house and senate.
Then US blocked UN sanctions resolution
By 1985 clear that constructive engagement wasn’t working
Reagan wanted to reject sanctions bill, but speech by Botha where he was supposed to
announce reforms and didn’t, made it impossible to stop sanctions bill
So instead issued executive order
Eventually, apartheid system ended and black majority rule came into play. But hard to
argue to what effect sanctions influenced this outcome.
Rhodesian Case:
Once Ian Smith becomes leader and Rhodesia declares itself independent (1966),
UN immediately applies sanctions
• However, sanctions don’t work at all if frontline state does not accept them (e.g.
unlikely that SA would abide by sanctions)
1971 Byrd Amendment: Permitted U.S. to purchase chrome and other minerals from
Rhodesia if the only other supplier was the Soviet Union.
1976—U.S. lacked leverage because Rodesian government has survived over ten years
without significant American diplomatic or economic assistance.
World sanctions had created among many white Rhodesians a strong nationalism and
hostility to world public opinion
• Note: Could argue that Sanctions just make countries more hostile and
unresponsive to world pressure, and are thus ineffective.
During negotiations, Smith tries to persuade Kissinger that Rhodesia deserved aid, not
sanctions, in its fight against communist encroachment.
Kissinger refused, instead gave Smith a list of points including one that stated “Rhodesia
agrees to black majority rule within two years”
Smith agrees, but adds his own concessions.
Could argue that economic sanctions had some influence in ultimate success of transition
to majority rule

Page 303
Madrid Conference Case

Economic sanctions were not an option because U.S. could not afford to cut off oil
supply from Arab countries

Page 304
Question # 6:
What role does military force or the threat of force play in the negotiations process?
Having the backing of military force or the threat of using military force provides
leverage in negotiations. It also gives the ability to make demands, without a backing of
military force it is hard to push a view on an opposing side during negotiations.
Should force be used to bring parties to the table?
This is an opinion section of the question…but I would say No. In the readings
Bagely and Tokatlian (Contadora: The Limitations of Negotiations) point out the fact that
legitimate and moral authority can give a party sufficient leverage in negotiating (pg. 108
of the orange book). To get the backing of a majority is more important than using
military force to bring parties to the table. This allows a peaceful negotiation where
parties are not intimidated into negotiations but influence into making needed changes.
If so when should it be used and how effective is it?
However, in many cases getting a majority backing is very difficult and the threat of
force becomes necessary to get parties to participate in negotiations. A good example to
use here is the marines in the airports in the Lebanon case. As Bender always says: There
will be no negotiations if one side wants to continue to fight. This is where military can
influence parties into negotiations. It makes it extremely difficult to continue to want to
fight if you know you will not win.

Page 305
IR 383 Midterm
Question #7
There are many examples of how the previous policies of the Great Powers have
caused the modern day problems in the decolonized countries. The colonial powers
would cause divisions based on arbitrary factors. In Rwanda it had to do with the
slimness of the nose versus the actual percentage of the African population that have the
majority. In other places, they would use natural factors such as rivers to divide people.
Obviously, this was not the right way to divide up the people, so when the colonists left,
it caused problems. In Rwanda, there was the slaughtering of Tutsis by the Hutus
because of the unfair advantages the former had due to colonization. In Zimbabwe,
formerly, Rhodesia, once the power was restored to the Africans, corruption ensured
because the new leaders all wanted the chance to have power and shape the new, free
country. In South Africa, Blacks to this day, do not lead equal lives to their whites
counterparts even thought they are now allowed to participate in the political process.
Whites, who have remained in South Africa, are still more advantaged than the Blacks
due to the racist policies of Apartheid. The Israel and Palestine conflict is still brewing.
Even thought the UN declared in 1947 that there should be two separate states, only one
was created. Israelites and Palestinians constantly fight over territory and rights to even
small things like electricity and power. In Lebanon, the conflict among the different
groups dates back to an archaic law that used to give the Christians more power and
standing in the government. Even though there was an increase in the Muslim
population, the Christians were not willing to give up their power—or let alone, distribute
the power more evenly.

Page 306
Namibia- Angola Settlement of 1988

Problems:
1. In 1975 there is a coup in Portugal because the military leaders were tired of
fighting colonial wars. They give independence to Mozambique and Angola in
one of the most irresponsible de-colonization moves.
2. The UN declared that Namibia is independent and South Africa’s military
presence illegal
3. Cuban troops are in Angola supposedly to help fight against UNITA, the primary
Angolan opposition.
Three Conflicts:
1. South African Defense Force (SADF) fight in Namibia against the Namibian
liberation movement SWAPO on the northern Namibia border. SWAPO is 90%
Obvano, which is the same group that is on the southern Angolan Border. (Look
at Map)
2. SADF vs. Cuban MPLA in Angola when the SADF fights alongside UNITA or
enters Angola to strike SWAPO camps
3. UNITA vs. MPLA
Resolving the first two would make it easier to deal with the civil war.
1981 the Regan Administration has 3 options:

1. have a Namibia-only approach that would be ineffective but buy time with
allies and avoid trouble
2. downgrade relationship with South Africa and pressure them
3. Incorporate the Angola factor. Until then the Cuban troops in Angola had been
largely ignored.
Crocker choose the third. He proposed a settlement whereby South African troops
would withdraw out of Namibia if Cuban troops left Angola.
South Africa was uncooperative throughout the negotiations because they had nothing to
gain by leaving Namibia. The conflict wasn’t ripe. They kept fighting alongside UNITA
in Angola causing the Cuban troops to increase five fold.

Page 307
In the US they were trying to repeal the Clark Amendment so that the US would have the
option of offering aid to UNITA. This would distance UNITA from South Africa and put
pressure on the MPLA. When the amendment was repealed the US did give aid to
UNITA.
The key to the agreement was that the Cubans, Angolans and South Africa all had to save
face in the agreement:
South Africa launched a major attack in Angola that became a quagmire, making the
conflict VERY unpopular home and increasing the pressure for it to end. Because the
Angolans had helped turn the attack into quagmire they felt good about themselves and
were willing to negotiate. The Cubans were willing to negotiate when they launched a
major attack against a dam in Namibia. They could say they were victorious.
They signed the agreement in 1988 when South Africa had no support from home, and
they saw that George Bush won the election and the negotiations would continue.
Namibia reached its independence in 1990.
This is a Cold War case, which might limit its usefulness. Also it is a specifically Africa
Case which limits the regions where it could be applied. It is a useful illustrator of
“borrowing leverage.”

Page 308
Tamiel Holloway
#7
The policies of the Great Powers in the 19th century /early century contributed too
many of the contemporary conflicts such as that of Rhodesia, and South Africa. South
Africa was colonized by the Belgium and later by the British. Rhodesia was colonized by
the British. When the countries left they pulled out and left a small white minority in
control of the country. In turn this left the majority of the country disenfranchised and
without rights. There existed a horrible racially motivated apartheid system in South
Africa, and similar programs in place in Rhodesia. Wayne Fredericks argued the US had
to come out against white domination and condemn apartheid in South Africa, Rhodesia,
and the Portuguese colonies. The US was reluctant to turn their support from the former
colonial powers and the left over white ruling majorities because the US had high stakes
in the imports it brought in from those areas; the US didn’t want to loose allies and trade.
In the case of South Africa the US did not want to loose one of its few democratic
allies in the midst of lots of newly formed African countries with socialist Marxists
regimens. This system perpetuated by the Afrikaner (white) population perpetuated the
negative race relations present in that country at the time that exasperated the US
relationship with South Africa. The United States had an ongoing policy of supporting
the colonial powers. The US was afraid that if white Majority rule were to leave South
Africa the country might abandon democracy. The US former Presidents such as Nixon,
and Ford were very friendly to these all white regimens, Carter on the other hand
condemned them and declared the US should fight the white minority rule, which was not

Page 309
very democratic. Under Carter the UN voted to increase sanctions against all these
regimens. The stance developed by the Reagan administration of “constructive
engagement” exasperated the deplorable race relations already present in the country and
ongoing racial discontent amongst black Americans. The US thought therefore that it
may be best to verbally condemn but not cut off relations or trade. They wondered how
their country could be friends with a nation that mistreats its black citizens so terribly
with a notion once acceptable in the US of “separate but equal”. Under the apartheid
system white South Africans controlled 2/3 of the disposable income, and the land. This
thus perpetuated a system in which certain areas of the country were deemed white, black
citizens had to carry passes late at night, and to visit certain areas. The black majority
was rounded up and deposited onto 10 homelands with no job opportunities which
perpetuated a system of migrant labor. A civil rights movement highly similar to that
which took place a few decades earlier in the US with opposition groups called the
(ANC) African National Congress, and the (PAC) the Pan African Congress. This
movement began perpetuating major violent conflicts such as the “Sharpeville massacre”,
followed by rioting from the “black consciousness movement”. The UN Security
Council reprimanded one of its members for the first time when it imposed a mandatory
arms embargo on South Africa. Do to outside pressure South Africa entered negotiations
with Ronald Reagan who was more sympathetic to their system than some of the past
presidents they encountered. The problems in South Africa were more exasperated by
their constant attacks on their self ruled neighbor Angola. These attacks ultimately
forced the US to take action. In 1980 they launched a major attack on Angola and
continued an ongoing presence there that leads to more Cubans traveling to the region.

Page 310
Assistant negotiator of African policy Chester Crocker felt that the only way to get the
Cubans out of the area was to invite them to negotiations. The reason the Cubans were in
the area was to aid the Angolans in preventing the UNITA from rule. The US was
reluctant to sanction South Africa under P. W. Botha because they felt that was an
“action”. Crocker felt the US had very little leverage in South Africa when in actuality
they had the power to sanction, cut off supplies and goods. The US wanted more stability
in the region for business, the abolishment of apartheid however slow, and South Africa
to leave Namibia as well as the Cubans to go home. Crocker had a very ambitious plan
to get the South African rebels to stop running to their neighbors for protection and for
South Africa to stop destabilizing borders. Things exploded when South Africa created a
new constitution that showed some deference for non whites and non blacks but no
representation for the black majority. Eventually with the help of Senator Richard Lugar
the Senate started changing its stance on the issue it come closer and closer to passing
sanctions until it was inevitable. The Gray bill was one push that the South African
Government needed to backs off. Shortly after sanctions were put in place and Reagan’s
veto was overrode.
Similar to South Africa’s case was the Rhodesian conflict. White left over from
the British settlers gave them an exaggerated sense of importance and stated that the
country was not ready for majority rule. Their emphasis on racism and ethnocentrism
perpetuated a regimen that acted mainly in the interest of its ruling white minority.
Henry Kissinger went into these negotiations with bias and a lack of information about
the region. He felt a kinship with the Rhodesian Hero Ian Smith and rather than

Page 311
encourage majority representation he acted in the favor of whites. In his National
Security Study Memorandum 39 the 5 options he heavily weighed were to ignore blacks,
furnish whites with weapons to maintain control, or cut whites off and give weapons to
blacks. It was in the US interest to maintain the status quo they also felt it might be the
best option against communism. The settlement of whites in Rhodesia was fairly recent
in 1888 under Cecil Roads. Steadily the white population grew but never came close to a
majority. The English eventually began considering it a referendum. The White
minority in control claimed they were not racists because rather than racial restrictions
they only had economic restrictions. The economic restrictions were created to keep the
disenfranchisement of blacks in place though. Great Britain as in the case of the US in
South Africa greatly ignored the leverage it had against Rhodesia; they maintained veto
power in the area but severely hesitated on exercising it. They were suppose to exercise
their power to veto to protect Africans but ignored it all together. The “portioning act”
was another racist’s act aimed at maintaining the disenfranchisement of blacks it did not
allow communal land ownership. This land grab would certainly push the blacks into a
black proletariat working class. Africans could only own plots o 6-8 acres. 97% of
whites lived in cities, 3% on the land. This land grab led to serious health and
educational problems for the Africans. This move by the white ruling elite exasperated
the state of affairs there an led to the need for foreign mediation because it pushed the
majority to rebel with more and more denial of rights with acts like the preventive
detention bill, the vacancy act, and the unlawful organization act.. Prime ministers Todd
and Whitehead shared a belief in a multiracial state but in actuality this system would
take years for blacks to “earn” their way to a majority. They lack of support from Great

Page 312
Britain was egregious. When Rhodesia declared itself independent the UN applied
sanctions. In 68 the “Fearless talks” reached two agreements which allow for freedom
with option of majority rule. Smith and Britain attempted to work out a plan that would
allow blacks more representation but were ultimately unsuccessful; ultimately the Pierce
Commission’s findings made it quite clear that Rhodesians were not satisfied with the
state of their representation. Ultimately Kissinger got far too involved with Ian Smith to
be effective at working out negotiations. He terribly misused the influence he had with
the frontline states with deceit further alienating them and exasperating their trust of
super powers. During the Lancaster talks Lord Carrington was able to effectively unite
the actors and really help bring about a settled peace by showing respect to the Frontline
states and using his leverage to push Ian smith very hard. Another major problem that
arose from colonialism exasperated by these issues was the lack of black unifications
against the colonizing forces and the left over white minorities. Especially in Rhodesia it
was hard for the blacks to gain power while they had major conflicts amongst each other
exasperated by the way colonial lines were drawn around these nations. In Rhodesia
(ZANU) Zimbabwe African National Union and (ZAPU) the Zimbabwe African National
Union could not really agree on anything but the elimination of white rule.
Colonization and decolonization in these two African nations lead to the political
problems that surfaced in the twentieth century. The people were so disenfranchised that
the only way they would ever be able to improve their circumstances without pushing for
it themselves. When they formed organizations that were banned and later expelled from
the countries they responded with violence which leads to retaliatory violence from the

Page 313
white regimens. These nations forced cultures traumatized by colonialism and racists
practices to make peace and find and identity under white ruling elite, abandoned by their
original colonizers that had the leverage they desperately needed to bring about majority
rule these nations. The negotiators that should have been more active should have been
that of their host countries. It seems that US policies were largely influenced by an initial
attempt to maintain the status quo in these areas but do to the heavy race relation
problems and lack of majority representation for the black majority caused them to look
toward establishing majority rule.

Page 314
Question 1 – Has mediation and the role of the mediator changed over the past
century? What different types of mediation can exist during negotiations? Discuss and
support your answer by citing examples from specific cases.
Mediation has become more common and complex, but same basic task – make
independent parties w/o desire/obligation to compromise work together. “herding cats”
- the mediator is primarily a "process person," helping the parties define the
agenda, identify and reframe the issues, communicate more effectively, find
areas of common ground, negotiate fairly, reach an agreement, implement
settlement.
Types of negotiation:
- prevent conflict from erupting, intervene in active conflict to bring about
settlement, facilitate implementation of negotiated agreement
Phases of 20th century: collapse of Ottoman & Austro-Hungarian empires, collapse of

colonial empires, collapse of Soviet empire.
Factors that have changed mediation: (see introduction to Herding Cats, 1st
lecture notes)
Many conflicts caused by post-imperial drawing of borders
- boundaries don’t coincide with population divisions (Iraq, Afg, throughout ME,
Africa)
- unequal distribution of resources
- some groups favored at expense of others  resentment, anger. (Rwanda)
intrastate conflicts last longer than interstate conflicts
guerilla/terrorist tactics, and cross-border support
outsiders stay away when conflict appears intractable (Iraq – coalition has shrunk)
identity tied up in conflict (Kurds)
disaffected groups hesitant to form coalition with others
migration – groups will sometimes leave, train military/regroup, and return
UN sovereignty issue in charter
Not easy to tell good guys from bad guys
Advent of democracy gives groups a voice to express grievances
COLD WAR
- disappearance of constraints imposed by rival superpowers
- disappearance of bipolarity states vulnerable to reassertion of old antagonisms
among national, religious, ethnic groups
o conflicts multiple and escalated
o demagogic leaders use ethnicity, religion to gain/solidify power
o proxy battles  civil/intercommunal conflicts
 Soviet/Cuban/US rivalry complicated Mozambique, Angola, South
Africa mediations during Cold War
 conflict in former Yugoslavia – ethnic, religious divisions

Page 315
• intervention: EC/European Union, UN, Jimmy Carter, NATO

bombing
GLOBALIZATION
- instantaneous, global media coverage
o domestic publics more aware of leaders’ decisions (Vietnam, Lebanon…)
- increased interest in human rights, democracy, rule of law.
o South Africa - apartheid
- proliferation of number/types of 3rd-party intervenors
o regional orgs, NGOs, UN, states, coalitions of small/mid-sized powers
 Sant Egidio – Mozambique
 Contact Group – Namibia
 Contadora -- Nicaragua
o peacekeeping forces, development agencies, lone operators
 management issues, level of commitment, responsibility
Roles of mediator:
- facilitate communication, either directly or through shuttle diplomacy (common in
Middle East, where it’s particularly hard to agree on meeting face-to-face)
- set up logistics/create framework for talks – who to talk to, when
o Carrington – Lancaster House vs. Kissinger
- Prod parties into compromise
o Leverage: economic/military/humanitarian aid, sanctions,
prestige/reputation
 NATO bombing in Bosnia
- Enforce cease-fires
o Peacekeeping
 Rwanda, Lebanon
- Create “hurting stalemate” and/or ripeness
o Assist weaker side to equalize conflict

Page 316
How has ethnicity and religion affected, complicated, and in some cases eased
negotiations? What steps were taken to lessen the impact of ethnic/religious
tensions? How would you recommend dealing with such issues?
Rhodesian crisis
1890 – British settlers entered, conquered, and ruled Rhodesia.
1923 – Britain granted Rhodesia internal self-government
1960’s – ZAPU and ZANU had been established; they opposed white domination, but
they disagreed over ethnic, personal, ideological issues
ZAPU – 19% Ndebele ethnic group; Nkomo ideology was pro-west

ZANU – 80% Shona-speaking ethnic group; Mugabe ideology was Marxist
Ethnic differences made it difficult for the US to intervene because they had to deal with
divisions within the nationalist movement. ZANU leaders and The African National
Conference leaders were both split within each group. The Smith government was able to
exploit the divisions among the black forces so that they can buy time until the West
would eventually be on their side. Also the fact that the Rhodesian government was
headed by white officials stirred tensions amongst the majority black population.
With the support of South Africa and the frontline states, the US was able to begin the
process of negotiating a peace agreement. The US knew that the frontline states were
important because they supplied the guerilla groups. They also knew that South Africa
was important because they were the outlet for the Rhodesian government’s trade
operations.
Great Britain along with the US adopted a proposal that they could negotiate with all
representatives if Rhodesian gov would accept 4 conditions: 1) majority rule 2) no
independence before majority rule 3) elections within next 2 years 4) no prolonged
negotiations
With ZANU growing rapidly into Rhodesia, South Africa pulled out half of the troops in
Rhodesia, nearly crippling the air strike and also threatened to limit rail traffic into
Rhodesia unless Smith agreed to negotiate. It was the first time Vorster, Rhodesia’s
military supplier, publicly declared support for majority rule.
Kissinger had a meeting with Smith and stated that the US would never aid his
government and that intelligence research was concluding that Rhodesia was doomed to
collapse. After long talks and Smith believing that there were more possibilities to the
Rhodesians if he accepted Kissinger’s proposal, he agreed to majority rule in 2 years.
Even though these negotiations failed due to 1) Smith disliking the last minute
modifications of the proposals and 2) Smith offering no alternatives at the Geneva
conference, Kissinger still gained a major breakthrough by having Smith agree to
majority rule, kept hopes alive for a peaceful settlement, and lessening violent conflicts.

Page 317
I would start off dealing with this issue in the same way that Kissinger approached it
because it was clever of him to use each countries supply lines as leverage to get both
countries to the negotiating table. By cutting off their main source of military supplies, it
makes each country very vulnerable. An aspect that I would have done differently is to
remain focused throughout the whole negotiation process. Kissinger was too excited at
the fact that Smith had agreed to majority rule so he made any concessions to get the
agreement signed.
Arab-Israeli Conflict
There was strong racial tension. No country in the middle east was willing to make the
first initiative in gaining peace, no country wanted to accept any sort of blame for the
hindering of the peace process. Also no Arab country wanted to deal with the Israelis.
Both sides have been stating for years that they wanted to hold a conference to discuss
peace.
US decided to begin a process of leading a Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and also an

Israeli-Arab conference sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union where all parties
would be represented. The main idea that the US had to get across to all parties was
parallel reciprocity (confidence building measure to demonstrate to both sides that each
side is willing to negotiate for peace).
US suggested that the Saudis could drop the economic boycott of Israel, reject the 1975
UN resolution equating Zionism with racism, end the formal state of belligerency with
Israel, meet with Israeli officials at a low level, or exchange intelligence info on terrorist
activities. In turn, Israel would halt the deportation and detention of Palestinians and
withdrawal of troops in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
US knew that the peace process would fail without the participation of Syria for the
Arabs and Jordan for Israel. The US had leverage with Jordan. Jordan needed economic
help and King Hussein needed to rebuild ties with Washington and Riyadh.
The US got one leader at a time to join the conference by having them compromise to
each others requests. And having large impacting countries such as Syria to attend the
conference provided the US with leverage in influencing others to follow.
The US sent letters to all of the countries urging them to be more flexible so that a peace
conference can be held, but Shamir rejected the proposal and would not budge
concerning the full UN involvement. The only option was to get Assad to compromise.
Eventually after the US’s constant effort to meet with Middle Eastern leaders to reach a
compromise to attend the conference, the US got Shamir to finally attend as well as
Assad.
There were 4 factors that allowed US diplomacy to succeed: 1) the defeat of Iraq and
collapse of communism which created a dynamic for peace 2) US leadership in the defeat

Page 318
of Iraq, combined with credibility of compromising with both side 3) two-track approach
and parallel reciprocal confidence building 4) take or leave it mentality
I would recommend that the US handled the Arab-Israeli conflicts very well to the parties
that they were dealing with. All the racial tension between Arabs and Israelis certainly
made it very difficult for the US because each country was not willing to compromise. It
forced the US to constantly setup meetings with leaders and eventually use the leaving a
dead cat on the doorstep tactic to get all the countries to attend the conference.

Page 319
#6
What role does military force or the threat of force play in the negotiations process?
Should force be used to bring parties to the table? If so when should it be used and how
effective is it? Illustrate your answer with reference to cases discussed in class.
Relevant Cases:
• “The Reagan Administration and Lebanon”
• “The Road to Sarajevo”
• One condition for military force is that it needs to be used for mediation purposes,
military force with an inherent interest in the conflict usually is more hurtful than
helpful because it is trying to defend it’s own interests rather than aid in
everyone’s interest with negotiations.
• Also when military force is coordinated with diplomatic efforts it works well, not
to solve the problem distinctly, but in aiding the negotiations to gain ground with
obstructionists or those who will not accept negotiations at all.
• The most obvious example of where there wasn’t sufficient coordination and it
hurt the negotiators was in the case of “The Reagan Administration and
Lebanon”.
o Because Department of Defense and the State Department weren’t on the
same page their compromises on how to use military power resulted in
inefficiency. The DOD agreed to send in military force, but wouldn’t
allow them to do anything. Their main role was intimidation that would
be used by the mediators to get fighting to stop and Israel and Lebanon to
the table.
o But because the Diplomats involved in negotiating, namely Habib and
Shultz, wanted more and expected more in the way of military action, they
made promises beforehand to try and elicit concessions from Lebanon, but
what they had promised them in return was military support from the US
and that never materialized making them seem untrustworthy and harder
to negotiate with.
o As the situation became slightly more stable, the Multi National Forces
(including US Marines) were pulled out and proved to everyone their
importance of being there when the president of Lebanon (Gameyal) was
assassinated.
o When the time was ripe to use military power to gain ground on the peace
process it wasn’t used. When Israeli forces had humiliated Syria and there
was a strong anti-war sentiment domestically in Israel due to the
massacres Sharon was held responsible for and the expense of the war,
military force could not be wrenched out of the Pentagon’s closed fist to
close the deal.
 The military was sent back in, but with the same policy- no
fighting (except in self-defense). As a result Syria was allowed to
revamp it’s military mission with the help of the Soviets and Israel
was given time to take care of its domestic politics, both giving
new fire to the conflict.

Page 320
It wasn’t until military forces of all sides had penetrated the country and distinction was
nearly impossible, that the US forces stepped up their policy and began firing upon
insurgents and enemy forces. But by then it was too late, Syria was too strong and Israel
was determined to stay in the country, at this time the US military force only added to the
complexity of the conflict.
One case that exemplifies the effectiveness military force can have on negotiations is
“The Road to Sarajevo”.
• In the Balkans conflict, Serbian President, Milosevic was unwilling to engage in
serious negotiations, the whole thing was a kind of game to him, a means to more
power and authority over the region.
• He continued to give the negotiation team, led by Richard Holbrooke, the run
around, never admitting he had ties or influence on the Bosnian Serb forces that
were causing the most damage.
• The negotiating team was able to narrow the differences, politically, between the
warring sides, but peace continued to be elusive, no party was willing to stop
fighting and could not be diplomatically coerced to do so.
• It wasn’t until NATO began launching air strikes that Milosevic was ready to be
serious about negotiating. Almost immediately after the air strikes the negotiating
team was able to get what it needed from him because he definitely wanted the
conflict ended rather than an escalation of NATO involvement.
• The US team met with Milosevic and his delegation of Bosnian Serb military
leaders and drafted a ceasefire/peace agreement including a lifting of the siege of
Sarajevo. NATO air strikes continued to be the enforcement for this agreement,
if fighting didn’t stop they knew the NATO air strikes would begin again.
• In this case military force was essential to the negotiation process if it were to be
successful. Milosevic could have handled all the diplomatic efforts the mediators
threw at him, that is not what he is intimidated by. The only thing that resounded
with him was force. It is what he uses against his enemies when he is serious and
needs to get a point across and as a result it is the only thing that will work with
him to convey seriousness and urgency.
Military force should definitely be used to bring parties to the table, but with much
discretion. Who ever is making the decision should know how the party will respond to
such force, the situation and level of conflict must be taken into consideration. It is only
one weapon in an array that can be effective in negotiating peace and is often not the
most effective. Milosevic was a key candidate for military force because of his history in
dealing with external pressure. In 1992, UN imposed sanctions on Serbia for supplying
Bosnian Serbs with military equipment, in response to this, Milosevic immediately closed
borders with Bosnia and cut off his ties with insurgents to induce the lifting of sanctions.
In the case of Lebanon, history of the actors must also be taken into consideration along
with the situation and level of conflict. Israel has been known to be stubborn and averse
to backing down to the United States, Syria has been known to be the same way as
exemplified in some of the cases we have read in this class. With the added support of the
Soviets, the negotiating diplomats must realize this and use force at the appropriate times
(when they were weak and had other factors going against them), if at all. In the

Page 321
Lebanon case there was simply too much disunity across departments and agencies and
not enough teamwork or leadership to effectively deal with the situation. Military force
should not be seen as a last resort it should be used as a strategic tool only where it is
going to draw out the results needed.
*I hope this helps you- April.

Page 322
Question 7: How have policies of the Great Powers in the 19th/early 20th century
contributed to many of the contemporary conflicts that we have covered?
Throughout history, external powers played a critical role in shaping modern states. Colonial powers’ policies of de-
colonization, haphazard creation of states, and racial policies greatly contributed to many contemporary conflicts. The Great
Powers of the 19th and early 20th century often relied on the manipulation of conflict between ethnic and racial identities in
order to keep populations from uniting against the occupying power. However, with the advent of de-colonization, these
strategies left a legacy of partition and racism.
The African continent is one of tremendous diversity-linguistic, tribal, and religious. With colonization, these very
diverse groups were forced into haphazard colonial boundaries determined by the Europeans. However, once African nations
finally gained their independence, they were left with these same unstable and irrational borders. After becoming independent,
Africans had to try to adjust to this new political structure and live with fellow citizens not of their own choosing. Many wars
erupted due to the fact that many tribes of Africans were divided between states. Also, in nations where two tribes were forced
together, violence often emerged over which tribe should have political control. In short, the haphazard drawing of nation
borders by uneducated Europeans caused much of the conflict still occurring today.
For example, the Congo River, although it appears to be a natural geographic boundary, had groups that otherwise
shared a language, culture or other similarities and resided on both sides. However, division of the land between Belgium and
France along the river isolated these groups from each other. In adddition, those who lived in Saharan or Sub-Saharan Africa
who had traded across the continent for centuries, often found themselves crossing "borders" that often existed only on
European maps.
Another large contributing factor to the current conflict in African due to colonization is the racial policies that were
instilled by the Great Powers of the 19th and early 20th century. European powers often created ethnic divides where they did
not previously exist, in order to serve their needs.
Rhodesia, which is now Zimbabwe, was governed by Britain until 1980. Prior to 1888, there were no whites in
Rhodeisia. However, when settler Cecil Rhodes brought settlers as part of his vision of imperialism, this all changed. In order
to achieve his goal of “painting the African map red (symbolizing British control)“ he dreamt of developing a Cape-Cairo
railway route. By 1922, there were 35,000 whites in Rhodesia. While there were no racial restrictions on voting, there were
educational and property ones, whose requirements were so high that it made it almost impossible for blacks to votes. In 1930,
the Land Apportionment Act, which no longer acknowledged the ownership of communal land, furthered the divide between
Africans and white settlers. In response to this divide, two nationalist groups emerged. ZAPU, headed by Joshua Nkomo,
and ZANU, headed by Robert Mugabe, began to rise up against the government. Despite multiple negotiations and peace
talks, Zimbabwe still remains in shambles. Mugabe became arrogant and corrupt, and has acted in response to years of
oppression by the whites. He now has a self-destructive policy of seizing white land. This year, a few million Zimbabweans
now face starvation and the ZIN dollar has fallen greatly. This current conflict can all be traced back to oppressive racial
policies by the colonizing power.
De-colonization, although it seems like a good thing upon first glance, also has its problems. For example, many new
leaders and independent people faced the enormous task of creating a stable and independent economic base in the aftermath of
de-colonization. Usually, they lacked the necessary capital, industrial infrastructure such as factories, transportation and
communication systems. In addition, there is often a power vacuum after colonization. Most governments, if even instilled,
faltered due to civil wars, armed take over by military on the right, or radical left based revolutionary leadership.
After Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975, it was left in chaos. Upon losing control of
Mozambique, some Portuguese settlers try a coup d'etat against Frelimo. The coup failed when put down by united forces from
Frelimo and Portugal, however, on their retreat many settlers destroyed as much as they possibly could-houses, livestock, cars,
infrastructure and machinery-to prevent others from using it. In many ways the Portuguese settlers left a large gap which could
not easily be filled without education, governance and experience. In the following years, civil war broke out between Frelimo,
and anti-Communist South African supported government, Renamo. Conflict surrounding this civil war has encompassed
Mozambique for over twenty years since the end of colonization. Although there is now peace in Mozambique, it is still
extremely fragile. This explicitly shows the detrimental effects that de-colonization can have on a nation.
In conclusion, while the abolishment of colonial rule has in part eliminated some of exploitation and suffering that took
place under imperialism, the problems of political instability, civil violence, poverty, and racism still remain. The policies of the
Great Powers in the 19th and early 20th century Colonialism had a destabilizing effect on many ethnic groups, the repercussion
of which are still being felt in African politics. The negative effects of imperialism are extremely apparent in all aspects of
African nations, and the policies of European colonization greatly contributed to many contemporary conflicts.

Page 323

Page 324
Rosella Cappella
8. Do you believe that the US foreign policies are related to its domestic politics?
a. US foreign policies are related to its domestic politics. US foreign
policies relation to its domestic politics can be illustrated into the context
of the role of the mediator as the mediator deals not only with the parties
to the conflict, but also with his own domestic constituencies. The
mediator’s challenge in maintaining unity grows more severe when the
policy debates become more politicized.
i. The congressional disputes about US policy and broader public
arguments about US policy toward southern Africa in the 1980s
could have served to undercut the authority of the mediators by
seeming to offer different venues—as well as different priorities
and different leanings—to the parties in conflict.
1. Namibia-Angola. US mediators had critics on both flanks
during the 1980s—in congress, within the administration
itself, and from media and public sources. As a result of
US domestic politics in the Namibia-Angola case,
Washington did not possess the means to enforce its will.
Critics on the right felt that the US negotiators were not
sufficiently tough with the Marxist parties and they did not
want Cubans involved in negotiators nor condemn South
Africa who was anti-Marxist. Critics on the left claimed to
perceive US collusion in permitting Pretoria to get away
with its failure to implement Resolution 435. Thus, the
mediators could not apply pressure on the parties.
2. Namibia-Angola/South Africa. By 1985 the US domestic
political scene had shifted in favor of the mediator. During
the summer of 1985, US diplomats sought to convert the
mounting domestic American sentiment against both the
apartheid regime and Soviet-aligned Angolans into
leverage on them to more forward in the talks. Thus, they
used the growing antiapartheid fervor at home as the basis
for imposing limited sanctions on South Africa. These
developments in 1985 demonstrate the extreme complexity
facing US mediators: ground was shifting under our feet at
home which were changing the calculations of both parties.
Thus, reflecting that US foreign policies are related to its
domestic politics.
3. Rhodesia. When Americans were entering the Rhodesia
conflict domestic politics looked to limits US foreign
policy regarding its ability to deliver. While most
Americans cared little about specific African situations, any
perceived strong American commitment to either
combatant could raise problems to Pres. Ford during the
presidential year of 1976. By spring of 1976 Ford was
expecting a strong convention challenge from conservative

Page 325
Regan. Conservatives had supported Rhodesia would

oppose any American “tilt” toward the Patriotic Front.
Conversely, given the predicted closeness of the upcoming
November election and the importance of the black votes,
Ford could ill-afford to support the white Rhodesian
government.

IR-383: Final Questions and Answers
Page 326
IR-383 Study Question
8) Discuss how colonial policies are, at least in part, the cause of many of the conflicts
covered in the class. What lessons should be taken from this when dealing with conflicts
with colonial roots? Use evidence from cases.
Colonial policies are, at least in part, the cause of many of the conflicts covered in class
• Colony owners drew borders between states regardless of any previously existing
relations in the area
o Tribes were often split apart, as was the case in Rhodesia and surrounding
states. Telling a tribe/group that they are now two different entities, and
then forcing half of the tribe together with another enemy tribe does not
end well.
o Because many places weren’t used to having specific borders, the idea of
not being able to go somewhere had an effect on groups’ outlooks
• Colony owners imposed white rule over areas
o For obvious reasons, the leaders of many tribes/groups were angry
o This is applicable all over, such as Apartheid rule in South Africa, Rule in
Rhodesia, and almost everywhere else that there was a colony
• When leaving colonies and accepting colonies’ declarations of independence,
many colony owners didn’t set up a good system after leaving. This is especially
true for any of Portugal’s colonies.
o This is also related to the drawing of borders. Colonies were set up
splitting tribes/groups, and forcing them together with other tribes/groups.
Then, they left. With the European hierarchal government and land
ownership idea in mind, tribes/groups fought for power.

Page 327
o Kashmir is a good example of this. Britain did a fairly good job of
leaving, but didn’t follow through. Kashmir was left to be fought over by
India and Pakistan. The conflict is now considered one of the most
dangerous in the world, as both countries have nuclear capabilities.
The lessons that should be taken from this when dealing with conflicts with colonial roots
• Understand the uniqueness of the situation. Conflict without colonial roots are
often over security or the pursuit of land/oil et cetera. With colonial roots,
though, each party may believe that they have a right to control over something
(land or otherwise) because of historical tradition.
• As conflicts with colonial roots are relatively new problems in the world, they
cannot be dealt with in traditional ways (i.e. giving each party half of the land
they want, et cetera). Unique solutions must be presented. In Kashmir, for
example, the Livingstone Report presents a solution that would unite Kashmir as
an independent state for domestic issues, but their current controlling state would
deal with foreign issues. This report was seriously considered by India.

Page 328
1) Has mediation and the role of the mediator changed over the past century? What
different types of mediation can exist during negotiations? Discuss and support your
answer by citing examples from specific cases.
Early in the 20th century, mediation consisted of very few different elements, in
comparison with today’s complex hierarchy of mediation techniques and theories. The
field of mediation focuses mainly on settling disputes between two or more states. This
applies to both the early years and late years of the 20th century. The difference is seen
when analyzing the parties involved in settling the dispute between the states. In the
early years of the 20th century, mediation, in the true sense of the word, hadn’t much of
an impact on the international community. Third-party mediators would often make
legitimate attempts to solve conflicts between two parties in a non-violent way, but their
influence was usually limited. First, states would tend to stay out of international
conflicts that were unrelated to their own; this tendency came mostly from individual
states inherent nature to work towards their own self interested goals. While this may
still be true today, a couple of major events have outweighed this ‘inherent nature’ and
begun a period of deep involvement in mediation throughout the international
community, even when the dispute doesn’t directly effect the mediating state.
WWII brought a realization of the importance of mediation abroad. For mostly
blatantly obvious reasons, the US found that the result of neglecting boiling disputes
overseas was that the effects would eventually come back home. Thus a new era of
mediation began, one with many distinct types of mediating.
First, mediation can be carried out by thinking of a reasonable compromise in the
dispute and speaking with the leaders of each state (or with the leaders of the disputing

Page 329
parties within a state), effectively ‘talking them into peace.’ One of the most prominent
examples of this type of mediation comes from the dispute in Southern Africa between
South Africa and Rhodesia. Kissinger, a US diplomat, was the most active mediator in
this case. Kissinger developed a compromise between Smith’s white-led government in
Rhodesia and the demands of the majority black community. Though it was the British
who were eventually successful in the negotiations of Rhodesia, Kissinger made much of
the headway needed by speaking with the leaders, most notably Smith, and telling them
directly what needed to be done before peace could occur.
Force, especially in the realist-dominant United States, is a common method of
mediation between two parties when every other option is exhausted. This was the case
of Bosnia, shortly after its declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. When demands
made by the international community for the Serbs in Bosnia to end the massacre of
Moslems weren’t met, the UN proceeded to bomb many of the Serb camps. This
methodology proved to be successful.
Many variations of force and negotiations have proven to be both successful and
failures. Nonetheless, over the course of the past century the international community
has developed a better understanding of the types of mediation that must take place in
order for a more peaceful world to be realized.

-removal of Cold War rigidities has opened up a range of conflicts to entry and political participation by previously
excluded or marginal actorsIR-383: Final Questions and Answers
-greater global consensus Page 330
-support for political means for managing conflicts and for experimenting with expanded UN roles
-opened up opportunities for other actors to play mediating roles (e.g. Canada)
-the possibility that conflict will spread has provided the rationale for a number of international interventions
-current climate of mediation: confusion of objectives, approaches, instruments employed by the international
community in the response of conflict may cause more harm than good
-the role a mediator plays in the peace process depends in good part on his relationship to the parties and the objective
of mediation
-mediator uses what ever tools are available: threats of sanctions, promises of trade relations, international law,
pressure from neighboring states… get to talk rather than fight
-the multiplication of mediators is less a matter of choice than a fact of life in today’s world
*multi-party mediation can mean different things in different contexts: simultaneous, sequential, composite
mediated interventions
-multiparty and sequenced mediation can promote peacemaking in concrete ways
-have unique pathologies
-but if not working together, they can make matters worse
-UN has taken on greater roles, as well as Japan, Germany, European Community, South Africa, Nigeria
-community Sant’Egidio
*regional organizations:
-strengths:
-closer to the problems
-have better understanding
-weakness:
-too close, cannot intervene effectively
-weaker in general resources
*NGOS:
-weakness:
-depend on their relationships with the governmental and intergovernmental players
-borrow political leverage where they can
-strengths:
-offer space to parties: (space is an important component of the process that allows parties to conceive and
accept alternatives to their hardened positions)
 manipulated in Zaire (pg 85 in Herding)
-the ability to use force lends credibility to the mediation and allows the mediator to level the playing field in situations
of uneven power distribution
 problems of coordination: (e.g. b/w UN, military and NGOs)

-lack of unity in an effort to prevent conflict, to bring parties to the table, or to impel them to act on what they have
agreed weakens the peace negotiations
-needed to move between stages of peace process
-undercut one another
--
*benefits of multiparty mediation:
-it is not always possible for one institution or country to fulfill these requirements  need more than one 3rd party to
prepare/establish a way to peace
-2 paradigmsKeith Parker,
of multiparty University
mediation: structuralist of Southern
and social-psychological models California
-diff individuals and institutions have diff strengths
IR-383:
-e.g. low end of conflict Final actors
curve – nonofficial Questions and Answers
-set up331
Page parallel tracks for informal dialogue  reduce tensions and encourage the development of trust and working
relationships
-opening new avenues for dialogue
-creating leverage, isolating spoilers, and sharing costs and risks
-catalyzing systemic change
-building supportive constituencies within society
-informal discussions helped build trust in the gov’t and opposition as well with other int’l organizations
-mediation efforts that are tired to wider exit strategies can lead coherence to multi-party mediation efforts provided
that the various parties to the joint effort share similar strategic goals
-multiparty mediation can also be related to a wider strategy of political engagement by external actors in a country or a
region
*liabilities:
-keeping on target
-forum shopping and mixed messages
-negotiations conducted on separate tracks and with different constituencies
-efforts undermined if parties can go “forum shopping”
-perceive that mediators are working at cross-purposes
-dropping the ball
-hand-off problems when different mediators try to engage parties in negotiations over a prolonged period of time
-misunderstanding about implementation are common
-buck passing and blame avoidance
-duck tough issues and try to pass the responsibility/blame when things go wrong
-lack of resources
--
Burundi: A Case of Parallel Diplomacy
-external actors initiated a large number of explicitly conflict-oriented activities, in addition to the more standard
humanitarian and development programs
-although NGOs proved to have competitive advantages in dealing with the conflict and had accomplishments to their
credit, they also augmented the fragmentation of the international response
-competing definitions of the problems and the resulting mismatch of responses led to a general misdiagnosis of the
conflict’s most critical forces
-efforts by private actors cannot substitute for strategic commitment by states to deal with the issue of violence
-Community of Sant’Egidio helped play a role in the secret negotiations to the signing of an agreement on inter-
Burundian negotiations b/w Pres. Pierre Buyuya and Hutu rebel leader Leonard Nyangoma
-the Great Lake region have had a lot of official and private diplomatic agents involved
-the expansion and decentralization of the diplomatic field to include private entities has fostered the emergence of
a “parallel” diplomacy
-the agendas of different agents interconnect like dominoes laid out on a table, creating an odd assortment of coalitions
-e.g. in 1996, the gov’t of Rwanda formed an alliance with Kinyarwanda-speaking members of the Tutsi elite 
financed by American Canadian and South African mining companies; also, backed military by troops from Angola,
Burundi, Eritrea Uganda
-orphaned by the Manichaean system of policies and references of the Cold War, the superpowers find it difficult to
perceive the link b/w these conflicts and their own national interest, to identify their intervention responsibilities
-b4, private humanitarian organizations assumed the responsibility of launching international response  but costly,
fighters manipulate humanitarian aid programs
-more mediators involved:
-countriesKeith Parker,
become more interested University of Southern California
-universities study the field
-NGOs offer new skillsIR-383: Final
and creative projects Questions and Answers
Page 332
-many members of the international community saw Burundi as a laboratory test new conflict resolutions and
prevention approaches
-NGOs had found themselves playing almost gov’t roles in Burundi – sit as partners at the negotiation table, promote
dialogue and enjoy access to wealth of resources
-in 1993, 1st democratically elected Hutu pres was assassinated by Tutsi officers from the Burundi army
-after several months of negotiating and fighting: decided to have Hutu pres and Tutsi PM
-however, a Hutu fraction didn’t want to share power so made own army which caused civil war and thousands to
be killed
-Major Pierre Buyoya claimed power through coup  caused sanctions by other states in the region
-various dialogues have taken place:
-the Arusha process: pres of Tanzania
-Sant’Egidio process
-internal dialogue b/w Pierre Buyoya’s gov’t and FRODEBU  1998 international partnership for peace
-UN
-AU: sent military observers
-EU, US, Canada, South Africa and Kenya appointed special enjoys in 1996
-although coordination efforts are officially part of each official mediator’s agenda, the sheer number of special envoys
reflects the diversity of their agendas and motivations  tends to jeopardize the official claim that the international
community wants peace, or at least the same peace, for the region
-private orgs and churches: launch own reconciliation and dialogue initiatives to make up for the states’ cynicism
-give priority to the interests of the own population
-special enjoys: represent the interests of the institutions and gov’ts giving them authority
-the struggle for influence b/w France and US
-geopolitical and economic interests of the countries in the region
 all official mediators suspected of partiality
-their work not backed by intermediaries who work to build trust among warring fractions
 faith in the international community eroded as implement drastic solutions that have no political logic or real
concrete results (only symbolic ones)
-NGOS try to solve the problems on two levels: 1) by conflict resolution programs and by “assisting” in official
mediation
-NGOs have tried to reintroduce the elements of time and psychology into the mediation process by expanding the field
of parallel diplomacy to include a wide variety of activities specifically geared toward conflict resolution
-a key element of the NGO contribution has been to introduce Burundians by way of trips and training seminars to
political figures experienced in conflict resolution in South Africa and other countries in transition
-have Hutus and Tutsis work together on common projects and by building “common ground”
-Search for Common Ground (an American NGO) to provide public with independent source of info
-Hutu and Tutsi journalists
-in rural areas/capitals: agents of parallel diplomacy enjoyed tremendous autonomy and direct/indirect influence on
the management of the Great Lakes region’s many conflicts
-the number, commitment and competence allow them to have a “cognitive” role in the definition of gov’t agendas
-watchdogs (e.g. International Crisis Group established presence in Burundi)
 such actions clearly helped the different private and public actors face up to their responsibilities, forcing gov’ts to
be accountable to an informed constituency, as well as same NGOs to one another
-parallel diplomacy in the Great Lakes region has worked alongside official mediations and complemented state
diplomacy
-e.g. high level representatives from multinational orgs (e.g. UN) capitalize on NGO creativity, flexibility and skill
 synergies b/w gov’t and private sector
-e.g. UN special envoy for Burundi made sure his activities complemented NGOs’
Keith
-encouraged Parker,
external activities to University offunds
offer certain individuals Southern California
to cover the costs of travel and other things
 gave him leverage, establish informal penalty-and-reward system for those who helped/hindered in the
IR-383:
peace process  developed aFinal Questions
practical method and
of cooperation Answersb/w public and private
and subcontracting
Page 333sectors
-in 1993, NGOs took over some official mediation processes in Burundi
-mediation activities have been pluralists in nature, and focal point has changed several times
-certain private actors have successfully jump-started parallel political negotiations on a head-of-state level
-decentralization and the splitting of negotiation levels have depoliticized outside contributors, giving them a
comparative edge in terms of access to the parties in conflict
-e.g. Pres Carter and former pres of Mali, and Archbishop of Desmond Tutu rbought together leaders of warring
countries and neighboring nations to address the Burundi situation
-politicians are driven by the logic of the political world

-private entities usually drive by variety of different motivations
-Community of Sant’Egidio: international commit on religious research to unite humankind
-Synergies Africa: bridge gap b/w internt’l community and local actors in the conflict
HOWEVER:
-private agents have been eager to compensate for official diplomatic mistakes, but their initiative no only have failed
to solve the problems of communication gridlock but have also contributed to the incompatible mix of messages
e.g. by 1996, various interpretations and definition of the country’s prob produced fragmented and inconsistent
international response
-in order to promote their own solutions, private agents took part in every debate, pushing for cause after the next 
identifying many aspects of Burundi’s situation without ever being able to grasp the full picture
-humanitarian and human rights problems led to short term goals
-mediation initiatives and conflict resolution projects were sponsored but tended to only address one issue
 ppl thought that the sum of all these efforts could reduce the level of violence
-burundians were able to profit from the confusion, with agents manipulating the different negotiations in order to gain
maximum legitimacy
-it appears that every political tendency has found a temporary ally among the international organizations  become
part of the problem
-Burundians have intensified division among various international agents by underlining and exploiting their different
agendas
-parallel diplomacy can help to initiate a negotiation or facilitate a political process  but cannot substitute for state
diplomacy when it comes to obtaining concessions from warring factions
-having private agents become de facto representatives of the international response presents the grave danger of
eroding the responsibility of states to intervene
Multiparty Mediation in Northern Ireland

-the Northern Ireland conflict has had a life cycle of thirty years
-the world of IGs and NGOs must be emphasized

-role of American diplomacy was paramount in securing the Good Friday Agreement
-EU and Eminent Peron’s Group (EPG)
-one of the first decisions made was the creation of a new Police Commission to begin work on a fundamental review
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary
-headed by former governor of Hong Kong
-composed of a 7 member commission draw from Canada, Ireland, UK and US
-Commonwealth = agent of preventative diplomacy and soft power
-offers experience
-special relationship with Queen Elizabeth w/o having to be worried about being party of a uniquely British-
dominated entity IR-383: Final Questions and Answers
Page 334
-as sovereign boundaries diminish in the context of increasing globalization, there is a greater incentive for intervention
-the increase in the number of states at the negotiation stage can impose a lack of coherence as well as additional points
of leverage
-context:
-community felt as if they were victimized: memory
-unionist refused to trust their British overloads and instead relied on local arrangements
-Catholic community thought that it was a persecuted minority: believe that unity would be achieved through
physical force or demographic change
-unionist and protestant community too close: couldn’t work together  violence began
-minorities moved to other communities to become the majority  expulsed ethnic opponents
-no resolution b/c violence had not reached intolerable levels
-Northern Ireland society shunned visionary leadership and emanated “bottom up”
-suspicious of state
-Protestants suspicious of intention of the center, particularly the British government
-no one church can represent all
-ethnic conflict can be irreconcilable and thus most harmful to nation-building when each of the chief contestants is
politically underdeveloped
-fraught with internal dissent and suspicion, each community is incapable of presenting leaders who can negotiation
and institutions that can accurately represent the community’s views
-e.g. unionism presented by 5 diff parties
-nationalism divisions were fewer but more profound: divided into constitutional and physical force
traditions
-miscommunication b/w the people and leaders: leaders thought voters more extreme than they were, so they took on
extreme positions  the people thought the situation was worse that it really was
-egoism of victimization: there is no other memory than the memory of wounds
-1990s: hurting stalemate
-where there is intense and protracted communal conflict, moderates will often attempt to build relationships with
moderates on the other side of the divide, to bridge the gap, and develop a “centering” dynamic
-negotiating middle is required for peace processes to take hold
-N. Ireland lacked strong center until the 1990s:
-problem strength of the center was compromised by the weakness of its members  elements outside the 2 groups
could use violence as form of veto  they had to be brought into negotiations
-key players in the Irish American diaspora also played their part in bringing the IRA into the fold  Clinton
administration granted Gerry Adams to attend a conference in New York
-reinforced the call to Sinn Fein to engage in the process of political dialogue
-intense pressure from Irish Americans succeeded in lobbying Congress over Irish immigration issues
-loyalist paramilitaries persuaded to follow the lead of IRA’s declaration of cessation of violence in 1994  one IRA
stopped, they did not need to fight against it
-track-two diplomacy: unofficial, informal interaction b/w representatives of adversary groups or nations which aims to
develop strategies and create and environment which could contribute to the resolution of their conflict
-not substituting track one (gov’t to gov’t, leader to leader contact)
-helping to assist official leaders by compensating for the constraints imposed upon them by the need to be seen as
strong in the face of the enemy
 workshops: bill of rights, human rights culture
-Harvard
-N Ireland participants learned from the first hand experience of those who were involve din the South Arican
negotiation process IR-383: Final Questions and Answers
Page 335

Page 336
Why was the Vietnam Peace agreement acceptable in 1973 but not in 1969 even though the agreement on the
table was practically the same? What can this teach us about the negotiating process?
In 1969, the US tried to decouple the military and political aspects of the war – which ignored the North’s
entire motivation for fighting (which was to determine the South’s political future.)
- US wouldn’t consider anything that included overthrow of Thieu
- Henry Cabot Lodge tried to start w/ mutual withdrawal from south, and neutral Cam/Laos
o North had no intention of leaving the South.
o South couldn’t move toward a political settlement without endangering its existence. Thieu had
very little support.
 There were no neutral figures who could play a role in a future settlement.
o US couldn’t take a softer stance because of domestic pressures/international reputation.
(Kissinger argued we should have offered a generous proposal and then stood on it without
further concessions until there was reciprocity.)
o “We could have neither peace nor our prisoners until we achieved what Hanoi apparently no
longer trusted itself to accomplish: the overthrow of our ally.”
- North argued that South had to be settled according to program of the NLF – which didn’t include Thieu
staying in power.
In March of 1972, North invaded. Kissinger saw this as Hanoi’s last throw of the dice. There would now be
serious negotiations, but substance would depend on who won on the battlefield.
- ARVN shouldered burden, but w/ heavy US aid, returned military situation to a relative stalemate by
mid-June.
- MUCH at stake for US policymakers – in Vietnam and in international realm (allies…)
o began to work Moscow/Beijing connections. They were restrained – offered Hanoi no
support.
 Used meeting w/ Brezhnev to test out stance, so he could pass it on to Hanoi and urge
its acceptance.
o Used (and were hurt by) pressure of upcoming US election.
 North – make agreement before or hold firm, hoping to wear down US resolve?
 US – suspend talks until they had a fresh mandate, or compromise further to reach an
accord?
• Nixon didn’t want to seem weak, anxious, desperate
- Pushed South harder – told them there would be an inevitable and immediate termination of US eco
and mil assistance.
In 1969, North still thought they could accomplish their goals through force. Time was on their side – could
wear down the South, especially considering Vietnamization.
This teaches us that negotiations will not be successful if one side still wants to fight.
- You have to create a stalemate that will force both sides to compromise
o North to accept compromise on political future
o South (Thieu) to realize that they were too weak to be stubborn.
One could argue the same happened in Bosnia.
- NATO used air power to get the Serbs to try to capitulate, but it was not decisive enough to get them to
assign the agreement until demonstrative use of power.
o Serbs felt their advantage was significant enough to continue pushing for more territory before
signing a cease-fire.
o Croats/Muslims at times also hindered the process, thinking their piece of the pie was too small
- Military force has to be substantial enough to show you’re serious, and committed to the cause to
commit resources.

Page 337
Question # 6
• The Kosovo Conflict was based on ethnicity and religion.

• Discuss:
a) The war in Kosovo can be largely considered a religious conflict between the
Serbs who mainly belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the ethnic
Albanians who are mainly Muslims, and part Roman Catholics.
• In this case the ethnicity and religion complicated the issue and
negotiations were difficult because the two parties would not even be in
the same room together at the same time. The two sides were even more
split due to the attitudes of the radicals of each party.
• Steps were taken to get the leaders of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Party)
and the Yugoslavian gov’t to agree to meet or NATO would keep
bombing Serbs and they threatened to abandon the KLA and leave them
on their own to fend for themselves against the much larger Yugoslavian
government. Both sides eventually agreed to negotiations
• However, today relations are still bad between the two parties and NATO
troops are still forced to keep the peace and look out for Serbs still living
in Kosovo.
To resolve issues that deal with ethnic and religious conflicts the negotiator must first
figure out how to bring the two parties to the table while having them willing to deal with
each other and give into compromises. This part requires motivation for both sides. IN
the case of Kosovo the motivation was brought in by military intervention and the threat
of leaving ethnic Albanians on their own to deal with the Serbs. Even with this type of
motivation tensions will still be high and negotiations will be difficult. A negotiator must
not give in to biases that he or she has and must accept the ideology of both sides and
understand that the way they think is not the way that the other side thinks.

Page 338
Question #7. The Cold War affected some, but not all, of the cases we studied this
semester. Citing specific cases show how the cold war complicated the achievement of a
successful outcome of negotiations. Now that the cold war is over, do you believe that it is
easier to successfully conclude negotiations of conflicts in the Third World?
Example 1: Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Namibia-Angola Settlement of 1988

(Herding Cats, p. 207)
Setting:
• -In 1968 Namibia became independent state. Presence of South Africa there declared
illegal.
• -1974 Portugal’ withdrawal from African colonial empire was followed by Soviet-backed
Cuban intervention in Angola.
• -South Africa maintained presence in Namibia—launched attacks into Angola from
position there
Ways in which Cold War complicated situation:

South Africa upset that West had not responded to 1975 Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola
• Meant that it did not trust the West
• Did not listen to West’s demand for its withdrawal from Namibia
West’s justification for not putting enough effort to Cubans in Angola problem:
• Undercut Angola’s cooperation in Namibian diplomacy
• Accusations that the West was more concerned about communist presence in Angola than
about colonialism and racism in South Africa-ruled Namibia
• Any Western nation that publicly raised issue of Cubans in Angola would be criticized by
non-aligned and communist groups in UN
Situation:
• South Africa would not withdrawa from Namibia because claimed that Cubans in Angola
posed a threat
• Angolan government would not let Cubans leave because they said their presence was
needed against attacks across the border from South Africa in Namibia
Linkage Policy:
Eventually U.S. adopted linkage policy
• Withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola + South African forces from Namibia
• So neither side could justify presence by danger posed by other side
Results:
Linkage policy worked
Clearly solution took a while and was complicated by Cold War
Example #2: Nicaragua (In Case Study Reader)

Background:
• Unrest in Nicaragua

Page 339
• Somoza regime overthrown by Sadinistas backed by Cuba

• Somozas were very unpopular
• 1979 Sadinistas formed new governments
East-West perspective:
• Dominated U.S. view towards Nicaragua
• This perspective believes that unrest in Latin America is caused by Marxist-Leninist
revolutionary movements acting at instigation of Soviet Union
• Poverty and inequality seen as problems that could be dealt with by non- revolutionary
political means if it were not for Soviet interference
• (contrast to North-South perspective)
Overriding Interests of U.S.:
• Preserve U.S. regional hegemony and deny the Soviet Union another base of operations
in the hemisphere
• Prevent another Cuba
U.S. Actions in Nicaragua Based on Cold War Thinking:

• Earlier had decided to back Somoza regime even though they were unpopular and
committed human rights violations
• Once Sandinistas were in power, U.S. backed the Contras, who fought against the
Sadinistas from bordering countries
o U.S. did not like that Sandinistas had maintained a Marxist-Leninist ideology and
ties to communist countries
• Efforts were ultimately unsuccessful

Page 340
Question 7
the cold war polarized many conflicts (which could have been solved easily if
handled simply and directly) into conflicts of supranational ideology,
bringing in 3rd parties and which often resulted in stalemates, thus delaying
the resolution of the actual conflict issue.
i think the cases most affected by the cold war are Angola, Mozambique, South
Africa
Angola
SWAPO, though not truly marxist or socialist, exploited the Communist movement
for Soviet weapons and Cuban soldiers.
South Africa as the main anti-communist force in the region supported UNITA, and
supplemented the fight along the Angola-Namibia border with its own SADF
America as anti-communist allies of South Africa, could not threaten or coerce
South Africa to withdraw from Namibia
this was counterproductive because the Cubans were willing to leave if only South
Africa would back down and retreat from Angolan-Namibian borders.
The Cold war legitimized American presence, but at the same time gave Angola
reason to doubt the sincerity of their [american] intentions as any more than
cold war tactics.
Mozambique
newly independent Mozambique is run by Marxist government FRELIMO
RENAMO is created to oppose Frelimo, thus garnering support from anti-
communist South Africa, conflict escalates.
At end of Cold War South Africa pull out support for Renamo.
In this case the end of the cold war helped the situation by cutting Renamo's
support and making it aware that it couldnt win the conflict on its own.
Mention of South Africa
USA verbally condemned Rhodesia and South Africa for their human rights
violations but never stopped trade with the white regimes. It was President
Reagan that hailed the South Africans as Anti-Communist Friends

Page 341
#8 Discuss how colonial policies are at least in part, the cause of many of the conflicts covered in the class. What
lessons should be taken from this when dealing with conflicts with colonial roots? Use evidence from cases.
Thesis: Throughout history, colonial powers’ policies of de-colonization, haphazard creation of states, and racial policies
th th
greatly contributed to many contemporary conflicts. The Great Powers of the 19 and early 20 century often relied on the
manipulation of conflict between ethnic and racial identities in order to keep populations from uniting against the occupying
power which left a legacy of partition and racism with de-colonization. When dealing with conflicts with colonial roots,
Problems with colonization:

1 Imperial powers’ racial policies
A. European powers often created ethnic divides where they did not previously exist, in order to serve
their needs
EX: Rhodesia
-No whites prior to 1988
-When settler Cecil Rhodes came with vision of
imperialism he dreamt of developing a Cape-Cairo railway route. By 1922,
there were 35,000 whites in Rhodesia
-Racial restrictions
-there were no racial restrictions on voting, there
were educational and property ones, whose
requirements were so high that it made it almost
impossible for blacks to votes.
-In 1930, the Land Apportionment Act, which no
longer acknowledged the ownership of communal
land, furthered the divide between Africans and
white settlers.
-In response: ZAPU, headed by Joshua Nkomo, and ZANU,
headed by Robert Mugabe, began to rise up against
the government.
-Now: Mugabe became arrogant and corrupt, and has acted
in response to years of oppression by the whites. He now
has a self-destructive policy of seizing white land. This
year, a few million Zimbabweans now face starvation and
the ZIN dollar has fallen greatly◊ALL DUE TO
IMPERIAL RACIAL POLICIES
2. Haphazard drawing of state lines
-With colonization, these very diverse groups were forced into haphazard
colonial boundaries determined by the Europeans.
-once African nations finally gained their independence, they were left
with these same unstable and irrational borders
-Forced to live with people not of their own choice
-in nations where two tribes were forced together, violence often
emerged over which tribe should have political control
-Many wars erupted due to the fact that many tribes of Africans were
divided between states
-Ex: Kurds in Iraq
3. Imperial powers’ racial policies didn’t just go away when the country was de-
colonized.
-EX: Rwanda:
-Since the Belgians had favored the Tutsis, after de-colonization
the Hutus sought out revenge through killing and repressing
over 80,000 Tutsis.
-Power vacuum
4.New leaders faced the enormous task of creating a stable and independent economic base in the aftermath of de-
colonization. Usually, they lacked the necessary capital, industrial infrastructure such as factories, transportation and
communication systems.
EX: Mozambique
-. Upon losing control of Mozambique, some Portuguese settlers
try a coup d'etat against Frelimo

Page 342
-on their retreat many settlers destroyed as much as they possibly

could-houses, livestock, cars, infrastructure and machinery-
to prevent others from using it.
-Portuguese settlers left a huge gap that could not be filled without
education and experience
-civil war broke out between Frelimo, and anti-Communist South
African supported government, Renamo.
-Now peace in region, but very fragile
Lessons to be Learned:
1. In order for peace to be negotiated in conflicts dealing with colonial roots, the major controlling powers must have
the desire to disengage from the country in way that will not leave it in chaos.
EXAMPLE: Cambodia case
-One of the main reasons that the situation in Cambodia was able
to be negotiated peacefully was due to the desire of major
powers to normalize their bilateral relations and disengage
from Indochina.
-These “ripe” circumstances were reinforced by the efforts of
several regional states - such as Indonesia, Thailand, Australia,
and Japan - to eliminate foreign intervention from Indochina and
stabilize Southeast Asia in an era of accelerating economic growth
-Through the negotiated settlement, Indochina gained stability
through the withdrawal of major power intervention, affirmation of
the integrity of its three separate states (Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia), and integration of the three states into ASEAN.
2. NGOs can be quite helpful in resolving conflicts that have colonial roots.
BURUNDI
Background: Burundi, which was colonized by Germany in the late 19th century and under German and
then Belgian administration until its independence in 1962, developed conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis after gaining
independence.
Benefits of NGOs: In order to effectively negotiate the conflict, NGOs that were specialized in
mediation and conflict resolution were especially effective in the prengoitiation phase by helping to spur dialogue between the
protagonists. They can also alert public opinion to official policies and impose norms of action.
Drawbacks of NGOs:
-Their sheer number
-Divergin institutional agendas
-Various definitions of the problem
***All these problems risk fragmenting and therefore
hindering the international response

Page 343
Question # 8:
As a good example might be Sri Lanka Case Study. Sri Lanka was known as
Ceylon before it gained independence in 1948. The name was changed from Ceylon to
Sri Lanka in 1972. Occupied by the Portuguese in the 16th century and by the Dutch in
the 17th century, the island was ceded to the British in 1796 and became a crown colony
in 1802
• Was ruled by western nations, there were two distinct kingdoms on the
island
a) the Tamil Kingdom in the north
b) the Sinhala kingdom in the South
The British gave Ceylon independence in 1948, handing over control of the entire island
to a Sinhalese government, based in Colombo, which renamed the island Sri Lanka
• The Sinhalese were proclaimed as the majority group and as a result received the
entire island, while the other one was called Tamil, a minority group.
• The conflict between those two groups was called an “ethnic conflict” and the
civil war erupted in mid-1983 between separatist Tamil guerrillas(LTTE
Liberation of Tamil Tigers Elam) and the Sri Lanka armed forces.
• Sri Lanka has been a poor country with a high unemployment rate and, after
gaining independence, it possessed an agricultural and fishing economy
• Most of the population survived by farming
• Sri Lanka is multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-lingual
The conflict between these divided societies began as a result of these differences among
them and due to the British colonialism
• In fact, in 1505, when Sri Lanka became a colony of Portugal, the Sinhalese and
Tamils lived separately to a certain extent without fighting any wars among each
other
• The British created an English-speaking elite out of the Tamils, who benefited
from a comfortable position in the organization: “[The British] favoritism
engendered an opposition that took racial and religious overtones.” Buddhists and
Sinhalese speakers did not belong to the elite, and as a form of retaliation they
began to advance the racist belief that Sinhalese are superior: “The Sinhalese
believe that Sri Lanka is largely a Sinhalese-Buddhist country and all other
religious or language groups are alien. Sri Lanka, they argue, is the only country
of and for the Sinhalese people.”. Despite the racist beliefs of the Sinhalese, “the
Tamils thought of themselves as equal in status to the Sinhalese during the
colonial era
• Once the Sri Lankan independence was gained, the Sinhalese group, which had
control over the state of Sri Lanka, began to discriminate against the Tamils. The
Tamils were excluded from higher education, jobs and land, which resulted in
Sinhala becoming the official language.
• The educational structures were altered to restrict Tamil admissions to higher
education: “[The Tamils’] decreased levels of participation in higher education
and public employments since the end of the colonial era are probably the most
important cause of Tamil separatism

Page 344
• In July 1983 the worst riots in Sri Lanka’s history—full-scale, anti-Tamil

attacks—took place in the capital, Colombo The violence was so eruptive and so
contagious that Colombo was closed down for almost two weeks and it moved to
surrounding cities and towns
• Even during the war, the exhaustion of the fighters was visible because there were
30,000 desertions from the Sri Lankan army of 150,000. The high level of
desertions was explained by the fact that Sri Lanka has been in civil war since
1983
• The number of deaths recurrently destabilized and damaged the society: “More
than 60,000 Sri Lankans were killed in the war between 1983 and December
2000.

Page 345
Elizabeth Barreras
Question #8: 3rd World Final
Question Breakdown:
1. How are colonial policies (at least in part) the cause of many of the conflicts covered in
the class?
2. What lessons should be taken from this when dealing with conflicts with colonial
roots?
3. Use specific examples from cases.
A. Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)

1. Cecil Rhodes and his imperialistic policies encouraged the 35,000 whites
(British) to “paint the African map red” and wanted to develop a Cape-Cairo
railway route.
2. No racial restrictions on voting, but there were educational and property
restrictions which were directly correlated with voting. You had to have so much
property and the restrictions were so high that most blacks never had the
opportunity to vote.
3. Land Apportionment Act, which no longer acknowledged the ownership of
communal land, furthered the divide between Africans and white settlers.
a. This triggered the conflict against the government and ZAPU and
ZANU (headed by Mugabe) emerged, lack of black unification though as
a result.
b. Mugabe became corrupt and arrogant, and began his self-destructive
policy of seizing white land without actually achieving anything for
blacks.
c. This year, millions of Zimbabweans face starvation and the ZIN has
fallen greatly – a great destabilizing effect
4. Lessons in dealing with conflict with colonial roots:
a. When decolonizing, the necessary capital and industrial infrastructure
needs to be established. Also, the colonizing country needs to disperse the
power accordingly between groups in power with political leverage,
otherwise radical revolutionary groups will emerge and upset the
decolonized country.
B. South Africa (Afrikaners)

1. Racially motivated apartheid system. White South Africans owned 2/3 of
disposable income and land, even though whites were a very small portion of the
population.
a. Perpetuated a system where certain parts of the country were deemed
white, and black citizens had to carry passes late at night and passes to
visit certain areas – blacks were put into 10 different homelands and a
system of migrant labor developed.

Page 346
2. When a new constitution was developed, there was some deference for non-
whites and non-blacks, but no representation for the black minority still
3. Sanctions were imposed
a. Blacks were penalized to some extent as outside countries were trying
to be reserved to protect their own agendas (ex. US was trying to keep
good relations with S. Africa because they had good business with them.)
4. Fighting between rebel groups and government, ex. SADF and UNITA v.
MPLA as a result, international mediators were counting on the fact that S. Africa
would be very cooperative, which turned out to be very wrong.
5. Lessons:
a. Negotiators should’ve been more involved in the situation and the US
needed to exercise its leverage in the situation instead of shying away
because of big business interests. Lack of representation before and after
colonization once again proved detrimental. Sanctions can’t replace a
tried and true solution.
C. Mozambique (Sant’ Egidio Case)

1. Colonized by Portugal, ended in 1974. Power turned over to nationalist
movement Frelimo which was formed in 1963 from 3 nationalist groups
a. Frelimo was suppose to unify the country and build national identity,
but they ended up using a socialist structure of power and it provoked
resentment and opposition. Renamo emerged as a result.
2. Renamo became the biggest military resistance to the government
a. A bloody civil war ensued for 15 years
b. Conflict fed by global tensions from Cold War and the fact that
Rhodesia and S. Africa supported Renamo.
3. Lessons:
a. A solid political structure must be established before the ruling/colonial
power parts from the country. When a strong-voiced nationalist group
emerges, chances are they aren’t free and fair toward everyone as their
cause is to oust the government in rule. The problems with the Frelimo
government were glaring and were apparent in the fact that they had such
a large military resistance against them. National elections and free and
fair politics are necessary to get a country on their feet, as was mediated
by NGO’s and major world actors.

Page 347
IR-383 Study Question
8) Discuss how colonial policies are, at least in part, the cause of many of the conflicts
covered in the class. What lessons should be taken from this when dealing with conflicts
with colonial roots? Use evidence from cases.
Colonial policies are, at least in part, the cause of many of the conflicts covered in class
• Colony owners drew borders between states regardless of any previously existing
relations in the area
o Tribes were often split apart, as was the case in Rhodesia and surrounding
states. Telling a tribe/group that they are now two different entities, and
then forcing half of the tribe together with another enemy tribe does not
end well.
o Because many places weren’t used to having specific borders, the idea of
not being able to go somewhere had an effect on groups’ outlooks
• Colony owners imposed white rule over areas
o For obvious reasons, the leaders of many tribes/groups were angry
o This is applicable all over, such as Apartheid rule in South Africa, Rule in
Rhodesia, and almost everywhere else that there was a colony
• When leaving colonies and accepting colonies’ declarations of independence,
many colony owners didn’t set up a good system after leaving. This is especially
true for any of Portugal’s colonies.
o This is also related to the drawing of borders. Colonies were set up
splitting tribes/groups, and forcing them together with other tribes/groups.
Then, they left. With the European hierarchal government and land
ownership idea in mind, tribes/groups fought for power.

Page 348
o Kashmir is a good example of this. Britain did a fairly good job of
leaving, but didn’t follow through. Kashmir was left to be fought over by
India and Pakistan. The conflict is now considered one of the most
dangerous in the world, as both countries have nuclear capabilities.
The lessons that should be taken from this when dealing with conflicts with colonial roots
• Understand the uniqueness of the situation. Conflict without colonial roots are
often over security or the pursuit of land/oil et cetera. With colonial roots,
though, each party may believe that they have a right to control over something
(land or otherwise) because of historical tradition.
• As conflicts with colonial roots are relatively new problems in the world, they
cannot be dealt with in traditional ways (i.e. giving each party half of the land
they want, et cetera). Unique solutions must be presented. In Kashmir, for
example, the Livingstone Report presents a solution that would unite Kashmir as
an independent state for domestic issues, but their current controlling state would
deal with foreign issues. This report was seriously considered by India.

Page 349
How has ethnicity and religion affected, complicated, and in some cases eased
negotiations? What steps were taken to lessen the impact of ethnic/religious
tensions? How would you recommend dealing with such issues?
Rhodesian crisis
1890 – British settlers entered, conquered, and ruled Rhodesia.
1923 – Britain granted Rhodesia internal self-government
1960’s – ZAPU and ZANU had been established; they opposed white domination, but
they disagreed over ethnic, personal, ideological issues
ZAPU – 19% Ndebele ethnic group; Nkomo ideology was pro-west

ZANU – 80% Shona-speaking ethnic group; Mugabe ideology was Marxist
Ethnic differences made it difficult for the US to intervene because they had to deal with
divisions within the nationalist movement. ZANU leaders and The African National
Conference leaders were both split within each group. The Smith government was able to
exploit the divisions among the black forces so that they can buy time until the West
would eventually be on their side. Also the fact that the Rhodesian government was
headed by white officials stirred tensions amongst the majority black population.
With the support of South Africa and the frontline states, the US was able to begin the
process of negotiating a peace agreement. The US knew that the frontline states were
important because they supplied the guerilla groups. They also knew that South Africa
was important because they were the outlet for the Rhodesian government’s trade
operations.
Great Britain along with the US adopted a proposal that they could negotiate with all
representatives if Rhodesian gov would accept 4 conditions: 1) majority rule 2) no
independence before majority rule 3) elections within next 2 years 4) no prolonged
negotiations
With ZANU growing rapidly into Rhodesia, South Africa pulled out half of the troops in
Rhodesia, nearly crippling the air strike and also threatened to limit rail traffic into
Rhodesia unless Smith agreed to negotiate. It was the first time Vorster, Rhodesia’s
military supplier, publicly declared support for majority rule.
Kissinger had a meeting with Smith and stated that the US would never aid his
government and that intelligence research was concluding that Rhodesia was doomed to
collapse. After long talks and Smith believing that there were more possibilities to the
Rhodesians if he accepted Kissinger’s proposal, he agreed to majority rule in 2 years.
Even though these negotiations failed due to 1) Smith disliking the last minute
modifications of the proposals and 2) Smith offering no alternatives at the Geneva
conference, Kissinger still gained a major breakthrough by having Smith agree to
majority rule, kept hopes alive for a peaceful settlement, and lessening violent conflicts.

Page 350
I would start off dealing with this issue in the same way that Kissinger approached it
because it was clever of him to use each countries supply lines as leverage to get both
countries to the negotiating table. By cutting off their main source of military supplies, it
makes each country very vulnerable. An aspect that I would have done differently is to
remain focused throughout the whole negotiation process. Kissinger was too excited at
the fact that Smith had agreed to majority rule so he made any concessions to get the
agreement signed.
Arab-Israeli Conflict
There was strong racial tension. No country in the middle east was willing to make the
first initiative in gaining peace, no country wanted to accept any sort of blame for the
hindering of the peace process. Also no Arab country wanted to deal with the Israelis.
Both sides have been stating for years that they wanted to hold a conference to discuss
peace.
US decided to begin a process of leading a Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and also an

Israeli-Arab conference sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union where all parties
would be represented. The main idea that the US had to get across to all parties was
parallel reciprocity (confidence building measure to demonstrate to both sides that each
side is willing to negotiate for peace).
US suggested that the Saudis could drop the economic boycott of Israel, reject the 1975
UN resolution equating Zionism with racism, end the formal state of belligerency with
Israel, meet with Israeli officials at a low level, or exchange intelligence info on terrorist
activities. In turn, Israel would halt the deportation and detention of Palestinians and
withdrawal of troops in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
US knew that the peace process would fail without the participation of Syria for the
Arabs and Jordan for Israel. The US had leverage with Jordan. Jordan needed economic
help and King Hussein needed to rebuild ties with Washington and Riyadh.
The US got one leader at a time to join the conference by having them compromise to
each others requests. And having large impacting countries such as Syria to attend the
conference provided the US with leverage in influencing others to follow.
The US sent letters to all of the countries urging them to be more flexible so that a peace
conference can be held, but Shamir rejected the proposal and would not budge
concerning the full UN involvement. The only option was to get Assad to compromise.
Eventually after the US’s constant effort to meet with Middle Eastern leaders to reach a
compromise to attend the conference, the US got Shamir to finally attend as well as
Assad.
There were 4 factors that allowed US diplomacy to succeed: 1) the defeat of Iraq and
collapse of communism which created a dynamic for peace 2) US leadership in the defeat

Page 351
of Iraq, combined with credibility of compromising with both side 3) two-track approach
and parallel reciprocal confidence building 4) take or leave it mentality
I would recommend that the US handled the Arab-Israeli conflicts very well to the parties
that they were dealing with. All the racial tension between Arabs and Israelis certainly
made it very difficult for the US because each country was not willing to compromise. It
forced the US to constantly setup meetings with leaders and eventually use the leaving a
dead cat on the doorstep tactic to get all the countries to attend the conference.

IR-383: Final Paper
Page 352
Points to Make
Most of the conflict from 1987 and on is centered on the Indian-controlled side of
Kashmir
Further, Kashmiriyat identity was already being formed in the mid 80s
There was a rise in Muslim education around this time as well, mostly because of a lack
of Indian-provided alternatives
Kashmiris began to feel neglected by India
Many of the new Kashmiris were more open to new ideas about how Kashmir should be
run
An Action Committee was formed after the theft of a Muslim relic from Hazratbal in
Kashmir
Farooq Abdullah, the Indian-supported candidate in the 1987 elections, was thought to be
below in the runnings
India rigged the elections, and Abdullah won
After this, Kashmiris began to understand that they could not get their way though the
political system, and began to result to violence
Violence escalated, tourism dropped, and the Indian forces could not stop the violence
New Delhi dismissed the Abdullah government and placed Jammu and Kashmir under
Central Indian Rule
In the five years following this, violence increased. Most of the activity came from the
JKLF (Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front) led by Amnullah Kahn who demanded a
sovereign Kashmir
By 1996 many other groups began militant operations, including Afghans, Uzbeks, and
Arabs
Most of these groups relied on covert Pakistani training and entering Indian-controlled
Kashmir over the Line of Control
Pakistan’s experience in the training of insurgents for the Afghan insurrection against the
Soviets proved helped in providing an infrastructure for the training of Kashmiri militants
The Inter-services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), an arm of the Pakistani military without
oversight, was responsible for most of this

IR-383: Final Paper
Page 353
Nonetheless, most of the conflict was local, from within Kashmir
Since 1989 more than 350,000 Hindus were displaced by violence in Kashmir
Zia-al-Haq’s Pakistani military regime is largely responsible for spreading the idea that
India-controlled Kashmir was largely a religious issue for Muslims
Islamic extremist groups were emerging in part because of this, including the Lashkar-e-
Tayaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad groups of militants
These organizations began to become more organized and assertive. The United Jihad
Council was one of these organizations. It was an umbrella organization with many
groups under it
From 1988 to 1999, Zia’s military successors all supported the Kashmir Jihad. The
elected officials during this period were more or less acquiescent
India’s response to violence after 1989 was force. By 1994, there were over 500,000
Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir
Indian troops were involved in massive human rights violations, which only deepened
anti-Indian sentiments. Between 1987 and 1995, over 76,000 people had been arrested
with only 2 percent being convicted of a crime
While sticking to its coercion strategy, India began to hold elections from 1995-1996.
During this, militant groups only multiplied. The groups had begun fighting each other
as well as Indian security forces
In 1994, APHC (All Parties Hurriyat Conference) was formed as a political front to
advance Kashmiri objectives. The APHC consisted of some 38 parties with a three-
option referendum: independence, accession to Pakistan or accession to India.
The APHC was very brittle. Coherence was hard to achieve with both extremist and
moderate parties on both sides of the spectrum
The 1996 election returned the ousted Farooq Abdullah to power amid widespread
violence by both Indian Security groups and Militants. The APHC boycotted the election
Abdullah, in coherence with India’s BJP Hindu nationalist party, merely continued the
administration of Kashmir based on Article 370
Nonetheless, even amid violence, the economy in the Valley gradually improved from
1990 to 1998, largely as the result of central government encouragement

IR-383: Final Paper
Page 354
Even though the economy was doing better, the future looked grim. In 1998 a report by
the Indian government pointed out that 758 educational institutes had been destroyed. In
reality, many of these institutions had been converted into army barracks.
In 2001, the Indian government pointed out that nearly all sports and recreational
facilities were closed or damaged
In 1998, Nuclear tests were carried out by both countries
In 1999, India found that Pakistani-based insurgents, along with Pakistani troops, had
intruded into Kargil in Indian-controlled Kashmir
When India threatened war with Pakistan, Pakistan’s prim minister Nawaz Sharif sought
US mediation. Clinton was successful in convincing the militants to leave Kargil
Sharif pinned the blame on the failure on Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf. In
October 1999, Musharraf ousted Sharif and imposed military rule
In September 2000, over 200,000 Kashmiri Hindus were living as refugees.
In 2001, terrorist attacks were carried out on the Indian Parliament. India blamed the
Jaish and Laskhar Pakistani-based militant groups for the attack and amassed troops
along the LOC. Pakistan moved troops to their side of the LOC, and war seemed
immanent. India then pulled its troops from the border, but war tensions were still high
In 2002, state elections produced fresh bursts of violence. Hundreds were killed,
including several candidates. One of the candidates killed was the much-respected Law
Minister Lone. The turnout was higher than expected, at about 44%.
Because participating in the elections meant an acceptance of Indian control of Kashmir

under their terms, the APHC again boycotted the elections
The National Conference, who previously controlled Kashmiri politics, had lost its
domestic standing within Kashmir
The National Conference had strong ties to the Indian central government, and thus
contributed to the alienation of Kashmiris from politics
The Peoples Democratic Party’s (PDP) leader Mufti Muhammed Sayeed, a Sunni
Muslim, won the election. The PDP favored talks with the militants.
Sayeed made contact with the APHC and released some of the militants detained in
Kashmir under state provisional laws
Sayeed also promoted full autonomy within the state of Kashmir

IR-383: Final Paper
Page 355
New Delhi has made it hard to talk with the APHC, as they view the APHC as Pakistani
puppets
Since the Kargil crisis in 1999, India was relatively successful in isolating Pakistan. The
crisis led to a US formal recognition of the sanctity of the LOC and informal Pakistani
recognition
After September 11, Pakistan became more important to the US in the ‘War on Terror’
that again put Pakistan in the international spotlight
In order to gain US backing, though, president Musharraf was forced to clamp down on
Muslim extremists
Musharraf banned many prominent Muslim groups, including the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and
Jaish-e-Mohammad.
Much of this was merely cosmetic though. Many of the groups re-opened under different
names.
The US also put pressure on Pakistan to restructure the ISI, but the organization still
plays a proactive role in interventionist policies in Kashmir.
US support for Pakistan relies heavily on its prevention of Taliban insurgents from using
Pakistan’s soil for strikes against US and Afghan forces in Afghanistan
Further, the Pakistani military is hesitant to end its support for insurgency in Kashmir,
which could possibly trigger Indian military response
Possible Solutions
The basic possible solutions:
Finalize the LOC and end militancy
India would like to formalize this status quo and make it the accepted international
boundary. But Pakistan and Kashmiri activists reject this plan because they both want
greater control over the region.
They see all the militancy as a result of Pakistani intervention.
India views the Kashmir issue as an internal affair and does not want to include Pakistan
in talks.
India’s position has increased the factionalism within the APHC. Some group members
insist that Pakistan be included in talks, while others disagree. Further dividing the
APHC is the disagreement on whether violence should be continued.

IR-383: Final Paper
Page 356
One solution to the crisis is presented in the Livingstone Report
The Livingston Report came from the Kashmir Study Group in 1998
The solution presented would result in the solidifying of the LOC, in some respects
Further, Pakistan-controlled and Indian-controlled Kashmir would be a sovereign state in

regards to domestic issues. For foreign policy and defense, each entity would rely on its
current host country
One of the problems with this solution is the interpretation of the solution. For example,
“independence” would mean complete sovereignty to the Kashmiris, but would not mean
the same thing to India
India publicly dismissed the report but actually gave it serious consideration
Kashmir joins Pakistan
Pakistan pushes for Kashmir to join Pakistan
Because of Kashmir’s majority Muslim population, Pakistan believes that they would
vote to become a part or Pakistan
However, this plan would compromise the minority Hindu population in Kashmir
It has become clearer to the political leaders of Pakistan, though, that continued support
of Kashmir insurgency would not support its cause
Pakistan has been leaning towards a more peaceful alternative
The political elite in Pakistan, though, are not included in policy-making decisions. It
would be up to the military leadership to end insurgency support
With Pakistan ready to find a peaceful alternative, the peace process would go much
more smoothly if India would officially recognize that Pakistan has legitimate interests in
Kashmir that should be taken into consideration
Kashmir joins India
This solution would be unlikely to yield any piece in the region
There are few supporters of this solution
Independent Kashmir

IR-383: Final Paper
Page 357
Kashmiris push for an independent Kashmir
Kashmiris have developed a very unique identity, after having a very unique status in the
international community for over 50 years during the Kashmir dispute
The difficulty in this proposal is that it requires both India and Pakistan to give up
territory, which they are not willing to do
A solution must include Kashmiri demands in order to end violence
India has been committed to a democratic Kashmir, but fears losing too much control and
national unity
An independent Kashmir may not be a feasible solution, but India and Pakistan must
include Kashmiri demands in peace talks in a way that is radically different from all past
attempts in order to gain momentum in the peace process
A small independent Kashmir from the Kashmir Valley, and the acceptance of the
LOC outside of that
A smaller completely independent and sovereign Kashmir could be created from the
Kashmir Valley and possibly include Azad Jammu and Azad Kashmir
This solution would give both Pakistan and India most of the land that they want, and
also give an independent Kashmir to those militants who have been fighting against
central rule since 1989
Critics of this proposal say that the smaller independent Kashmir would not be
economically sustainable
Further, it is unlikely that India or Pakistan would be willing to consider this option in
talks
International role in negotiations
As the Kashmir dispute has been so long lasting, it will be hard for either Pakistan or
India to make concessions on their own. The two countries have fought three wars since
1947
Now that both countries have nuclear capabilities, it will be even harder for the countries
to make concessions to each other
Since 1990, the US has intervened numerous times to pull the two countries away from
war

IR-383: Final Paper
Page 358
The countries seem to have set into a ritual of negotiation and threats that have
accomplished nothing
India has traditionally rejected appeals for international help, saying the issue is domestic
and should be dealt with as so
Pakistan, on the other hand, has generally favored international support
More recently, though, India has been more accepting of international support
The international community has a lot to offer
Including the exchange of views between the two countries and reassurance of each
country’s cooperation and the concessions that each country is willing to make
Further, UN could provide personnel to oversee the any negotiated settlement that might
arise
Current situation
The Bus service, which began on April 7 this year, has been seen as a big step towards
peace in the region. The service carries passengers back and forth between Pakistan-
administered Kashmir and the Indian-administered side
Many argue that the bus service has not moved peace forward at all, as both India and
Pakistan haven’t changed their views on how to deal with Kashmir
The Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers signed a security deal on October 3 of this
year, which included a promise of advance warnings of ballistic missile tests and a
hotline between the two nation’s coastguards.
India’s view has not changed much. Indian premier Manmohan Singh told Bush recently
that they believe Pakistan still controls the flow of terror across the line of control
Domestic support for a settlement in the region has risen, putting pressure on both
governments
It is clear that any settlement will result in a less-than-ideal outcome for at least one of
the parties involved. The parties need to be prepared to accept this for any peace
settlement to gain momentum

IR-383: Final Paper
Page 359
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
IR-383; Prof. Bender
Kashmir Since 1989:

History and Proposed Solutions

IR-383: Final Paper
Page 360
This essay will detail the events that took place in Kashmir, as well as happenings
in India and Pakistan related to Kashmir, from 1989 and on. Further, viewpoints of the
parties involved will be discussed. A quick overview of the situation in Kashmir that led
to violent rebellions starting in 1989 will also be covered. References to events before
1989 will also be included. For the most part, most of the conflict in the Kashmir area
since 1989 has occurred in the geographical section of Kashmir referred to as ‘Indian-
controlled’ Kashmir and Jammu; the discussion here will focus primarily on this area.
By the mid-1980s, a Kashmiriyat identity had already been developing. As
conflict had surrounded the people of Kashmir for almost 40 years, a new generation of
Kashmiris who had been surrounded by conflict their entire life were beginning to change
the culture in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Around this time, there was a sharp rise in
Muslim education in the region. The reason for this rise was mostly the result of India’s
negligence in providing other education to the Kashmiris. Furthermore, Kashmiris were
beginning to feel neglected by the Indian central government. This new generation of
Kashmiris were much more open to new ideas and methods of achieving these ideas than
their predecessors.
Farooq Abdullah was the candidate most supported by the Indian central
government in the 1987 Kashmir elections. Fearful that Abdullah would lose the election
in Kashmir to anti-Indian sentiments, India decided to rig the election. Following
Abdullah’s victory in the election, the people of Kashmir felt more isolated from India
than ever before. Feeling unable to achieve their agenda through the political system,
Kashmiris began to resort to violence as a reasonable alternative. In 1989, consistent
anti-Indian violence in Indian-controlled Kashmir began and hasn’t completely ceased

IR-383: Final Paper
Page 361
since. India made a strong attempt to end the violence with force, by sending in more
Indian security troops. The failure of these troops to achieve their goal ended in the
Indian government’s ousting of Abdullah from his position as leader of Kashmir.
Kashmir and Jammu were placed under Central Indian rule.
In the five years following 1989, violence continued to increase. Most of the
violent activity within Kashmir was under the name of the JKLF.1 Amnullah Kahn, who
demanded a completely independent and sovereign Kashmir, led the JKLF; the Indian
central government would not consider this agenda as an option, and has continued this
stance ever since. By 1996, many other outside militant groups had begun to cross the
LOC2 into Indian-controlled Kashmir including Afghans, Uzbeks and Arabs.3 Most of
these groups relied on covert Pakistani training and assistance from Pakistan for entering
Indian-controlled Kashmir. The ISI4 has been responsible for most of the support
provided to these insurgents. The ISI is an arm of the Pakistani military that was created
partly for providing training for insurgents into Afghanistan to fight against Soviets, an
agenda that was strongly supported by the US at the time. The ISI also has very little
oversight from the Pakistani government, and reports directly to the military. It should be
noted, though, that the far majority of the conflict in Indian-controlled Kashmir was local,
coming from within Kashmir itself.
Zia-al-Haq’s5 Pakistani military regime, which existed prior to 1989, is held
largely responsible for spreading and promoting the concept that India’s control of
Kashmir is a religious issue, pitting the Muslim majority in India-controlled Kashmir
1
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
2
Line Of Control
3
See ICG, “Kashmir: Learning From The Past,” Brussels, 2003, p. 13
4
Inter-services Intelligence Directorate
5
Zia-al-Haq died in a suspicious airplane crash in 1987
Parker, 2 of 10
IR-383: Final Paper
Page 362
against the Hindu-controlled Indian central government. As an indirect result of this
ideology, more than 350,000 Hindus from Indian-controlled Kashmir have been
displaced by violence since 1989.6 Many of the groups responsible for the violence since
1989 were Muslim extremist groups following this ideology. The United Jihad Council,
an umbrella organization under which many militant groups operated, was the most
prominent of the Muslim extremist organizations. From 1988 to 1999, all of Zia’s
military successors have supported the Kashmir Jihad through the ISI. The politically
elected officials of Pakistan during this time were mostly acquiescent to the military
regime.
India’s response to the aforementioned militant groups following 1989 was the
direct use of force, as mentioned earlier. By 1994, there were over 500,000 Indian
security troops in Jammu and Kashmir.7 These troops operated under a strong, upper-
handed policy that worked only to alienate further the Kashmir people from India. Indian
troops were involved in massive human rights violations in the region. Between 1987
and 1995, over 76,000 people had been arrested, with only two percent being convicted
of a crime.8 Further, India also attempted to counteract the negative attention that they
were receiving from Kashmiris by holding elections that would remove the India central
government from direct rule over Kashmir.9 During the first of these, from 1995-1996,
militant groups multiplied and even began fighting each other as well as the Indian
security forces. Before this, in 1993, the APHC10 was formed as a political front
designed to advance the agenda of many of the groups, militant and otherwise, operating
6
See Jag Mohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir (New Delhi, 1992) A number of Kashmiri Hindus (Pandits) also
became refugees after the communal riots that accompanied India and Pakistan’s partition in 1947
7
8
See Human Rights Commission of India, “Report on Kashmir,” New Delhi, 2001, p. 21
9
The Indian Central Government had direct control over Kashmir since the ousting of Farooq Abdullah in 1989
10
All Parties Hurriyat Conference
Parker, 3 of 10
IR-383: Final Paper
Page 363
in the region. The APHC consisted of 38 parties with a three-option referendum:
independence, accession to Pakistan, or accession to India.11 The organization was very
brittle, as it included groups from many extremes; coherence in the APHC was very
difficult to achieve. The APHC boycotted the 1996 election, as participating in it would
include agreeing to prolonged Indian control over the region. Amid widespread violence,
the 1996 election returned the ousted Farooq Abdullah to power. Abdullah’s
administration achieved very little change, and mostly continued the provisions set forth
by Article 370.12
Even amid persistent violence from 1990 to 1998, the economy in the Kashmir
Valley gradually improved; this improvement was largely the result of government
encouragement. Though the current economy was looking better, the future looked
worse. An Indian report in 1998 pointed out that 758 educational institutes had been
destroyed.13 In reality, many of these institutions had been converted into army barracks
for the Indian security forces.14 Further, in 2001, the Indian government reported that
nearly all sports and recreational facilities were closed or damaged.15
In 1998, India proved its nuclear capabilities by testing warheads near the LOC.
Pakistan returned by testing six, one more than India, nuclear warheads near the LOC.16
Without warning, in 1999 India discovered that Pakistani-based insurgents, along with
Pakistani troops, had made their way over the LOC into Kargil in Indian-controlled
11
See ICG, “Kashmir: Learning From The Past,” Brussels, 2003, p. 16. Many APHC parties had their own militant
wings operative in the field against Indian security forces and against each other
12
Article 370 of the Indian constitution grants special status to Jammu and Kashmir. Article 370 made Jammu and
Kashmir a country within a country, with its own flag, emblem, constitution and Sadr-i-Riyasat (Prime Minister)
13
See National Commission on Human Rights, “Special report on Kashmir, 1997-98,” New Delhi, 1999
14
The report released by the Indian government did not include this reality
15
See Interim Report, ministry of sports and welfare, New Delhi, 2001
16
See BBC News Online, “India Pakistan | Timeline,” Nuclear Rivalry chapter, 2005. The United States ordered
sanctions against both countries, freezing more than $20bn of aid, loans and trade. Japan ordered a block on about
$1bn of aid loans
Parker, 4 of 10
IR-383: Final Paper
Page 364
Kashmir. After India threatened war with Pakistan and launched an air strike against the
insurgents in Kargil, Pakistan’s PM Nawaz Sharif sought US mediation. Clinton was
successful in convincing Pakistan to withdraw from Kargil and India to end air strikes.17
Sharif tried to blame the ordeal on the Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf. In
retaliation, Musharraf ousted Sharif from power in October 1999 and imposed military
rule over Pakistan.
In September 2000, over 200,000 Kashmiri Hindus were still living as refugees.18
The next year, terrorist attacks were carried out on the Indian parliament. India blamed
the Jaish and Laskhar Pakistani-based militant groups for the attack and amassed troops
along the LOC. Pakistan did the same on their side of the LOC, and war seemed
imminent. Though the troop build-up along the LOC slowly eased after promises by
Pakistan to end its support of insurgents, war tensions remained high.
In 2002, a fresh burst of violence came with state elections in Kashmir. Hundreds
were killed, including several of the political candidates. The APHC again boycotted
elections, but the voter turnout was higher than expected at about 44 percent.19 The
National Conference, who had controlled Kashmir before elections, had lost considerable
standing in Kashmir due primarily to its strong connection to the Indian government and
lack of proactive action. The People’s Democratic Party (PDP), founded by its leader
Mufti Muhammad Sayeed, a prominent Sunni Muslim, won the election. Much of the
PDP’s support came from its favor of talks with militants. Sayeed promoted full
autonomy within the state of Kashmir, began talks with the APHC, and released some of
17
See text of Vajpayee-Clinton Joint Vision Statement, The Times of India, 21 March 2002. During the last days of the
Clinton administration, India was relatively successful in isolating Pakistan
18
See Chindu Streedharan, “The Lost Generation: The Story of Children in Kashmir,” National Foundation of India,
New Delhi, 2002. After becoming refugees, these Kashmiris were fearful of returning to Srinagar ever since
19
See ICG, “Kashmir: Learning From The Past,” Brussels, 2003, p. 16. The turnout was lower than for elections held
before the 1989 uprising
Parker, 5 of 10
IR-383: Final Paper
Page 365
the militants detained without conviction. New Delhi slowed much of Sayeed’s progress
in talks with the APHC, as India views the APHC as a group of Pakistani puppets.
Following the 11 September attacks on the US, Pakistan became important to the
US ‘War on Terror.’ In order to gain US backing, Pakistan’s Musharraf was forced to
clamp down on its support of Muslim extremists. Musharraf banned many prominent
Muslim groups, including Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Though these
efforts satisfied the US, they resulted in very little change. Many of the groups re-opened
under different names, which were later banned by Musharraf, then re-opened again
under new different names.20 Regardless, the majority of Muslim extremists in the region
continued operations. The US also put pressure on Pakistan to restructure the ISI,
however the organization still plays a major role in interventionist policies in Kashmir.
Even under US pressure, the Pakistan military is hesitant to end support for insurgency
into Indian-controlled Kashmir; the perpetuation of this interventionist policy could
potentially trigger an Indian military response.
Both the parties involved and outside groups have presented a variety of possible
solutions. The most straightforward of these solutions have been in circulation for years,
but have yet to materialize due mostly to the unwillingness of the parties involved to
accept anything other than what would be ideal for them.
First, the LOC, set forth as a temporary border between Indian-controlled and
Pakistan-controlled Kashmir could be formalized and made to be the accepted
international boundary.21 Pakistan-controlled Kashmir would become a part of Pakistan,
20
See Staff Reporter, “Three more outfits put under ban: Offices’ Sealing Ordered,” Dawn, 21 November 2003
21
See BBC News Online, “Kashmir Flashpoint | The Future of Kashmir?” Scenario one: The status quo, 2005. Under
United Nations' supervision, India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire along a line which left one-third of the state,
comprising what Pakistan calls Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and the Northern Areas administered by Pakistan and two-
thirds, Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir Valley, administered by India
Parker, 6 of 10
IR-383: Final Paper
Page 366
and the Indian-controlled portion would become a part of India. This is India’s preferred
solution. India views the militancy and violence in Kashmir to be mostly the result of
Pakistani intervention; a formalization of the LOC would further allow for India to deal
more effectively with any internal uprising in Kashmir. Both Pakistan and Kashmiri
activists are quick to reject this proposal, as they would prefer greater control over the
region. Further complicating this proposal and all others is India’s reluctance to include
Pakistan in talks over the region. India’s position has also further increased factionalism
in the APHC, causing even more unrest from within Kashmir. Some APHC members
insist that Pakistan be included in talk, while others disagree. More factionalism results
from groups’ disagreements on the use of violence in Kashmir to promote their agendas.
Another solution is presented in the Livingstone report, published by the Kashmir
Study Group in 1998.22 If this plan were implemented, the LOC would be formalized,
but only to an extent. A new Kashmir, which would include both the Indian-controlled
and Pakistani-controlled regions, would be a sovereign independent state responsible for
all of its own domestic issues. For foreign policy and defense, though, Kashmir would be
considered two separate entities divided by the current LOC. The foreign Policy and
defense of each region would be the responsibility of its current host country, India on the
Indian side and Pakistan on the Pakistan side.23 India has publicly dismissed this
possibility, but had actually given it serious consideration. The most prominent problem
with this solution is its interpretability. For example, “independence” for Kashmir would
22
See “Kashmir: The Way Forward, 1998” at www.kashmirstudygroup.net. Farooq Kathwari, an American of
Kashmiri descent, heads the Kashmir Study Group.
23
Full text of the report at www.kashmirstudygroup.net/awayforward/proposal.html. Kashmir Study Group members
have political, diplomatic, business and academic backgrounds and search for innovative solutions to the conflict in
Kashmir
Parker, 7 of 10
IR-383: Final Paper
Page 367
most likely be interpreted by Kashmiris differently than by the Indian central
government.24 The technicalities of this solution may prove to be overwhelming.
The solution most preferred by Pakistan is for all of Kashmir and Jammu to join
Pakistan.25 With Kashmir’s majority Muslim population, Pakistan believes that if given
the choice Kashmiris would vote to become a part of Pakistan. However, this proposal
would compromise the minority Hindu population in Kashmir. Further, the solution
obviously disregards the demands of both Kashmiri activists and India. As Pakistan has
more recently been leaning towards a more peaceful solution, this option has become less
desirable. Because of this, it has become clearer to Pakistani politicians that continued
support of Kashmir insurgency would not support its cause. However, the military
leadership in control of insurgency policy seems to have not come to the same
conclusion.
Possibly the least likely solution is for the entirety of Kashmir to join India. This
solution would be unlikely to yield any peace in the region, with Kashmir’s majority
Muslim population. None of the parties involved have strong support for this solution.
Kashmiri activists push for a completely independent and sovereign Kashmir.
Kashmiris, after being the center of the dispute for over 50 years, have developed a very
strong national identity separate from both India and Pakistan. The difficulty in this
proposal is that it requires both India and Pakistan to give up territory, which they are not
willing to do. 26 India has been committed to a democratic Kashmir, but fears losing all
control over the region. A completely independent and sovereign Kashmir may not be
the most probable solution, as it completely disregards both India and Pakistan’s
24
25
See BBC News Online, “Kashmir Flashpoint | The Future of Kashmir?” Scenario two: Kashmir joins Pakistan
26
See BBC News Online, “Kashmir Flashpoint | The Future of Kashmir?” Scenario four: Independent Kashmir.
Parker, 8 of 10
IR-383: Final Paper
Page 368
demands. Even so, it is important to include Kashmiri demands in any talks in order for
peace to develop in the region.
Another solution proposes the creation of a small independent Kashmir from the
Kashmir Valley, and a formalization and international recognition of the LOC outside of
the Valley.27 This proposal would give Pakistan much of the land that they want, and
give an independent Kashmir to those militants who have been fighting against central
rule since 1989. Critics of this proposal argue that a small, landlocked independent
Kashmir would not be economically sustainable. Further, it is unlikely that either India
or Pakistan would consider this option.
It is important to understand that, given the duration of the Kashmir dispute, it
would be difficult for a solution to be implemented without international intervention.
Every solution presented so far requires some concession from at least one of the parties
involved. Further, now that both countries have nuclear capabilities, the possibility of
making concessions without international intervention is very unlikely.28 India has
traditionally rejected appeals for international intervention, stating that the Kashmir issue
is a domestic dispute; Pakistan has been much more accepting of international support.
The international community, namely the US, the UN, and the EU, can offer a more fluid
exchange of views between the two countries and reassurance to all parties involved that
all parties involved will be making concessions in order to provide for a solution.
Further, the community, particularly the UN, can provide personnel to oversee the
implementation of any settlement.
27
See BBC News Online, “Kashmir Flashpoint | The Future of Kashmir?” Scenario five: A smaller independent
Kashmir
28
See Tariq Rauf, “Learning to Live With The Bomb in Southeast Asia: Accommodation Not Confrontation,” CNS
Reports, 1998, p. 1
Parker, 9 of 10
IR-383: Final Paper
Page 369
The most recent peace movements in the Kashmir dispute have been sluggish, but
many analysts argue that steps towards peace in Kashmir are being made. The Kashmir
bus service, which began on 7 April this year, has been seen as a big step towards peace.
The service, which runs one bus every two weeks, carries passengers between Pakistan-
controlled Kashmir and Indian-controlled Kashmir. 29 Though the bus service might be a
step towards peace, it is worth pointing out that Kashmiri activists, India, and Pakistan
have not changed their demands. In addition, on 3 October, the Indian and Pakistani
foreign ministers signed a peace deal that will promise the advance warning of ballistic
missile tests and a hotline between the two nation’s coastguards.30 Further, domestic
support for a Kashmir settlement in both India and Pakistan has risen, putting more
pressure on the respective governments to make concessions.
It is clear that any settlement will result in a less-than-ideal outcome for at least
one of the parties involved. The parties must be prepared to accept this concept and be
willing to make any necessary concessions needed for any peace settlement to gain
momentum.
29
See BBC News Online, Sanjoy Majumder, “Bus aids Kashmir's road to peace,” 2005
30
See BBC News Online, “S Asia Rivals Sign Security Deals,” 2005
Parker, 10 of 10
WRIT-340: Short Assignments
Page 370
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
Prof. David R. Samuelson
Writing 340
MWF 1-2 PM
Section #91035
Problem – Dan and Vic
Dan will be found guilty of Burglary, regardless of other charges that may apply
to this crime. Dan hadn’t known that he’d commit a crime once breaking into Vic’s
home. Nonetheless, Dan had the intent to commit a crime sometime that night, vis-à-vis
his decision to carry a firearm with him when searching for Vic and the statement he
made before leaving his home. The jury will find that Dan was in violation of every
element of the law and is thus guilty.
By smashing in the window of a home that was not his and entering the home,
Dan was already guilty of breaching the law of Breaking and Entering. Dan did not
know that he was entering his target’s house at this point in the progression of events.
Dan had the intent to enter Vic’s home and commit a crime with the aforementioned
firearm he had brought with him, as further displayed by his exclamation, “I’ll nail that
guy for cheating me out of $500.” Problem, at 1. The case includes the facts that “Dan
took a loaded pistol with him. Not knowing where Vic lived…” Id. at 1. By taking a
loaded pistol with him, Dan showed intent to commit a crime. Additionally, by
acknowledging that he hadn’t known where Vic lived, and further by searching for Vic’s
home, Dan showed intent to commit the crime in Vic’s home.
The jury will find Dan guilty of Burglary, as the elements of the crime of
Burglary are fully met in this case. Dan, as shown formerly, had the intent to commit a
crime in the home of Vic. The crime of Burglary is clear, as seen through the progression

Page 371
of events that night: During the night, Dan broke into the Vic’s home by smashing the
window, bringing with him the intent to commit a crime inside the aforementioned home
with the firearm he carried. The law of burglary is defined as, “The breaking and
entering of the dwelling of another, in the nighttime, with the intent to commit a crime
therein.” Id. at 1.

Page 372
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
Writing 340
MWF 1-2 PM
Section #91035
Problem – Dan Golfing
1) Dan did not commit assault, as Tom never saw the ball coming at him.
a) Had Tom seen the ball coming towards him, which was originally intended to hit
Tom, Dan could be convicted of assault.
b) Tom and Paul did commit assault towards Dan, with the threat of ‘Smacking’
Dan. Dan could easily perceive this as an imminent threat.
2) Through transferred intent, Dan would be guilty of battery, though this was an act of
self-defense.
a) Dan intended to injure Tom.
b) Paul was injured as a result of Dan’s intent to injure Tom. This falls under the
‘transferred intent’ law.
3) Dan could be found guilty of ‘Trespass to Chattel’
a) For the same reason as being guilty of battery, he is guilty through ‘transferred
intent’
b) This does not fall under self-defense, as it was against an object, not a person
displaying an imminent threat towards Dan
4) The attack could be considered self-defense
a) Paul told Dan he would smack him if he didn’t hurry up, thus potentially giving
Dan a reasonable fear of imminent battery. This is considered Assault.

Page 373
b) Dan used a reasonable force, the hitting of a ball towards the plaintiff, which he
was entitled to because of Tom and Dan’s assault. The assault was a threat of
imminent battery.
5) False imprisonment does not apply
a) Paul and Tom confined Paul to the space in front of them with assault, though
Dan had the option of leaving the area and merely filing a complaint.

Page 374
Keith Parker
Tragni Case Summary
October 16th 2005
Seven private garbage truck workers were indicted for crimes of burglary in the
third degree (first count) and attempted burglary in the third degree (second count) for an
event that occurred on January 26th, 1981. Four of the defendants, all helpers on the
garbage trucks, were ultimately acquitted.
On January 16th, 1981 at about 4:30 AM two members of the group began to drill
two holes into the wall of the China Jade Company jewelry store on Canal Street in
Manhattan. The two holes were on an exterior wall of the building. It appears that the
two holes were purposefully drilled on each side of a 3,000-pound safe that was located
directly within the premises and adjacent to the exterior wall. These two men do not
currently stand trial, and were not included in the seven men previously mentioned.
While these two men were drilling, defendants Tragni and Barrios made an attempt to
mask the sounds of the drilling operation. The two men were long-time garbage truck
drivers. They positioned their respective garbage trucks in front of the jewelry store and
revved their engines to both shield the driller’s operations and mask the sound of the
drilling. A third defendant, Mazzocchi, acted as a lookout. The four men who were
eventually acquitted stood idly on the nearby sidewalk.
After the two men working on the drilling operation had completed drilling one
hole and had partially drilled the second hole, they aborted their tasks. It appears that the
reason for this was an alert through radio that the police were on their way. Indeed, the
Fifth Precinct station house of the New York City Police Department around he corner

Page 375
had been monitoring the defendants, though its anticrime unit. Once the drilling had
stopped, the anticrime unit apprehended all of the defendants.
The People speculated that the objective of the defendants was to pull the safe
through the exterior wall through which they were drilling the holes. Once the holes
were drilled the defendants would have inserted something through the openings and
slipped it around the safe so that it could be pulled through the wall and removed. None
of the defendants invaded the airspace of the jewelry store with a physical limb of their
body. Nonetheless, at the moment that the first of the two holes was completed, the drill
bit on the drill entered into the airspace of the jewelry store. This decision will be one of
first impression, as no New York court has been confronted with a similar instrumentality
problem under the revised Penal Law.

Page 376
Keith Parker
Tuesday, October 25, 2005
Winterbottom v. Wright Facts Summary
The defendant contracted a mail-coach to the Postmaster General. The
defendant’s obligation was to keep the mail-coach in good operating condition. The
mail-coach was contracted to the Postmaster General for the purpose of conveying
mailbags from Hartford to Holyhead. With this contract fulfilled, the Postmaster General
made a contract with a Nathaniel Atkinson. Mr. Atkinson’s duty was to supply the
horses and the coachman for the mail-coach. Mr. Atkinson fulfilled part of his duty by
contracting the plaintiff as the coachman for this particular mail-coach. While under the
impression that all other contracts were fulfilled, the plaintiff accepted this contract. The
plaintiff’s concern for the extent to which other related contracts were fulfilled arises
from the fact that the mail-coach’s maintenance was contracted to the defendant. Ergo,
his occupational safety was in the hands of the defendant.
All parties made the assumption that all contracts related to this particular mail-
coach had been fulfilled. The defendant was erroneous in his assumption. The
defendant, under contract to keep the mail-coach in a safe condition, had not maintained
the mail-coach properly. In fact, the mail-coach was in a “frail, weak, infirm, and
dangerous state.” On the 8th of August 1840, the plaintiff was driving the aforementioned
mail-coach from Hartford to Holyhead when the mail-coach gave way and broke down.
The plaintiff was then thrown from his seat and, from the injuries that he received as a
direct result of the crash, became lamed for life. There were no extenuating
circumstances that would have caused the mail-coach to be under unnatural stress.

Page 377
The plaintiff intends to sue the defendant. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant,
having assumed responsibility for the maintenance of the mail-coach, is responsible for
the failure of the mail-coach in the 8th of August 1840. Further, the defendant is
responsible for the injuries sustained from the mail-coach’s failure. The plaintiff further
asserts that he would not have driven the mail-coach if he had knowledge that the other
contracts related to the mail-coach had not been fulfilled, namely the contract related to
maintenance. The defendant did not fulfill his part in the contract, which as a direct
result lamed the plaintiff for life. The plaintiff’s case relies on these points.
The defendant, the supposed maintainer of the mail-coach, argues that the
plaintiff has no right to sue. He argues that, because there was no direct contract between
the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot sue. Indeed, the defendant never
signed a contract with the plaintiff. The defendant also asserts that, if the plaintiff is
allowed to sue, there will be no limit to the domino effect that will be created by this
case. He states that, if the plaintiff wins this case, then everybody could sue indefinitely.
Potentially, the plaintiff could also sue the steel maker who made the axle for the mail-
coach. The defendant’s case relies heavily on the negative precedent that could be set
forth by this case.

WRIT-340: Assignment #1
Page 378
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
Writing 340
MWF 1-2 PM
Section #91035
Assignment #1
Memorandum on Speluncean Explorers

Page 379
Memorandum
To: Senior Partner
Fr.: Associate Keith Parker
Re: Speluncean Defendants
September 25, 2005
Facts
Five amateur speluncean explorers are charged with the unlawful homicide of
Roger Whetmore. These five explorers, Roger Whetmore among them, planed to explore
a limestone cave for the weekend. They left a note at the Speluncean Society, which they
were all members of, detailing the itinerary for their trip. Their plan was to enter a
limestone cavern for a short period of time; they packed few supplies, including a
wireless communication device, and entered the cave in July of 2005. While they were
deep in the cave, a landslide occurred which blocked the only known entrance to the
cavern. The families of these five men became concerned when they did not arrive when
expected, and notified the Speluncean Society. The society promptly dispatched a rescue
party to the site. Additional funds needed to complete the rescue were being raised
through a legislative grant and popular subscription. During the next twenty days,
several further landslides occurred, killing ten of the workmen at the site.
The five men trapped in the cavern began to worry about their chances of
survival. On the twentieth day of the rescue attempt, the rescuers learned that the men
had with them the wireless communication device. Oral communication was henceforth
established. The head engineer on site quoted the men at least ten days, barring further
landslides, before completion of the rescue. The chairman of the committee of
physicians informed the group that they had little chance of surviving a further ten days,
given their current condition. During an eight hour break in communications, initiated by
the trapped men, Mr. Whetmore proposed that the men eat one of their number to
perpetuate the existence of the others. He suggested that they use a method of casting

Page 380
lots to identify the one to be eaten. The other men were reluctant initially. Whetmore
then re-established communication with the head physician, and inquired as to whether
eating one of their number would allow the other four men the ten more days needed to
survive. While the physician answered in the affirmative, the physician would not advise
the men to proceed in doing so. When the trapped men asked for another physician,
minister, or priest to assist them in their choice, none of those found would promote the
measure. No further communication was made, and the rescuers assumed the batteries
were dead in the men’s wireless device.
After much deliberation, the five men decided to proceed with the measure. They
proceeded to work out a mathematically fair method of casting lots. Following this, the
groups’ finalization of a proper method of casting lots, Whetmore had a change of mind
and recommended they wait a further 48 hours. The others scolded him, and continued to
cast the dice they carried with them. This was their 23rd day in the cavern. One of the
men cast the dice for Whetmore, who they report had no objections to another member
casting the die in place of him. Whetmore lost the throw and was killed then eaten by the
other four spelunceans. On the 32nd day of the rescue effort, success was achieved. The
four men were treated for malnutrition and shock. It was found that the batteries were
operational in the wireless device until the 32nd day. The men were subsequently charged
for the homicide of Roger Whetmore.
Analysis
In order to overcome the prosecution of a homicide charge, the defendants must
demonstrate that the killing of Roger Whetmore took place under a provable condition on
necessity. They must also demonstrate that all five speluncean explorers were treated as
though they were on equal footing, and that no one explorer was treated with a bias.
Keith Parker, 2
Page 381
Further, they must prove that each member of the group was given a fair chance to
survive. The case United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360 (1842), mirrors the case of
the spelunceans in the conditions which prove the necessity of murder. This precedent is
known as the “Law of Necessity.” In the case of the speluncean explorers, the facts
presented by the remaining four members will demonstrate to the jury that the killing of
Mr. Whetmore took place under a provable condition of necessity. The facts indicate that
the five men were in a position that required them to result to cannibalism in order for
survival. Furthermore, the men were on equal footing and weren’t operating under any
bias. The men also gathered as much information as was possible to them under the
circumstances, and made their decision using this information, as well as the opinions set
forth by each member in discussion. Further, the choice of the killing was made to be
fair to all five men.
Provable Condition of Necessity
The element of prevailing importance in defining the law of necessity is that of
the requirement of killing in order to preserve life. Provable condition of Necessity exists
when there is no method that would preserve the lives of the members of a group, except
for the sacrifice of one of the members. The members must further be presented with
information that proves without reasonable doubt that the entire group would perish
without the sacrifice of one’s life. A provable condition of necessity exists in the case of
Holmes insofar as the crew on board the vessel had reason to believe that, based on past
experience and basic knowledge of the ocean, the entire group on board would not
survive if none of the passengers were sacrificed Id. at 2.
The case of the explorers had a similar disposition. When contact was made with
the rescue crew on the 20th day of confinement, the five explorers were informed that they
Keith Parker, 3
Page 382
would not continue to exist if they did not consume any substance within the next ten
days. Further, the engineers informed the explorers that the rescue would take ten or
more days to complete. After an enquiry by the explorers, the head physician on site
informed the men that the consumption of human flesh would perpetuate their existence.
As human flesh was the only available nutrient known to the men to be inside the cavern,
it is clear that their only option was to consume this available nutrient. According to the
information that was available to them at the time, death by starvation would have
followed if they did not consume human flesh.
The prosecution would argue that the killing was not necessary on the grounds
that the men had not enquired about their ability to survive for a further 48 hours without
consuming human flesh. Roger Whetmore proposed the 48-hour wait time. Though
informed about a further ten-day wait until rescue, the men weren’t required to result to
cannibalism so quickly. Given the knowledge that the men could survive another 48
hours, they may have been able to find another nutrient in the cavern that would have
spared the life of Roger Whetmore. However, this argument is likely to be unpersuasive
because the men, after agreeing that one of them would be killed, couldn’t be sure of Mr.
Whetmore’s intentions. Mr. Whetmore may have had the intention of bypassing the
drawing of lots and taking the life of another member in the next 48 hours in an effort to
potentially save his own. As the decision that one member must die was made, it was
necessary for the killing to take place immediately thereafter to prevent any scandal.
Equal Footing
The five spelunceans explorers were decidedly on equal footing. To be on equal
footing all members must have considered themselves equal in importance in regards to
their survival. As all five members were of a similar skill level, there was no dependency
Keith Parker, 4
Page 383
on a specific member for survival. Vis-à-vis, no member of the group would be excluded
from the drawing of lots for reasons of dependency. The members went so far as to
“discuss the mathematical problems involved” S.E., at 2, of casting lots in attempt to
ensure unequivocal fairness in the choice of the man to be sacrificed Id at 1-3.
The case of United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360 (1842), a close precedent
to the case of the speluncean explorers, the situation of equal footing differs. In the case
of Holmes, the lives of the passengers depended on the skill and knowledge provided by
the crew. Therefore, the crew would be the last to be sacrificed. This disposition made
the choice of sacrifices simpler, as those who were needed least would be chosen. For
the spelunceans, where equal footing was established, the most viable method of choice
would be by casting lots in a mathematically fair way. This being the method chosen by
the five men, the assumption that all five men were on equal footing is made valid and
conclusive.
Consultation
Consultation with the rescue crew was of utmost importance to the five men
trapped inside the cave, as was consultation with each other. Unrestricted
communication with all available parties and discussion of available information is
necessary to making a well informed decision, especially when the choice involves
cannibalism. Once communication was established on the 20th day of their
imprisonment, the five men gathered information from both the head engineer and head
physician. They also attempted unsuccessfully to gather the opinion of either a judge,
official of the government, minister, or priest. By communicating to this extent, the five
men proved that they had extensively discussed the method to which they would cast lots
S.E. at 3.
Keith Parker, 5
Page 384
Fairness
The five spelunceans made use of every resource available to them in order to
ensure the fairness of the casting of lots. It was necessary that the choice of whom to
sacrifice be fair in every respect, so as not to promote one’s life as being more important
than another’s. As all members were on equal footing, the members decided through
consultation that they should each have an equal chance of surviving long enough to be
rescued. They deliberately took extensive steps in order to ensure the fairness of the
casting of lots.
The prosecution will argue that the casting of lots was not fair because of the
disagreement that Roger Whetmore had with the proposed plan. Mr. Whetmore originally
agreed to, as well as proposed, their plan for survival through casting lots and
cannibalism. Nonetheless, before the lots were cast, he would not cast the dice himself
and proposed waiting another 48 hours before casting lots. The other four men, charging
Mr. Whetmore with a breach of faith, continued with the plan. One of the four cast the
dice in place of Mr. Whetmore. The roll went against him. Though the four reported that
Mr. Whetmore declared no objections to another member rolling the dice in place of him,
it is hard to verify this statement. Only the testimony of the remaining four men is
available Id. at 3-4.
Nonetheless, this argument is likely to be unpersuasive because of the lack of
alternative options available to the four men who charged Mr. Whetmore with a breach of
faith. Having already decided on cannibalism as the only path to survival, the men found
it necessary to continue with the casting of lots immediately. The decision to continue
immediately may be partly because of suspicion as to the intention of Mr. Whetmore in
his proposal of a 48-hour wait time, as mentioned earlier. Further, there wasn’t any
Keith Parker, 6
Page 385
viable reason to wait another 48 hours, as the engineer had informed the men that they
would surely not escape within the next ten days. The men weren’t rescued for another
twelve days after communication was established, thus concluding the validity of the
head engineer’s statement Id. at 3-4.
Conclusion
The four defendants will not be found guilty of the unlawful homicide of Roger
Whetmore. The prosecution will not be able to present a persuasive argument based on
the lack of information supporting an unlawful homicide charge. All of the elements
leading up to a provable condition of necessity will be sufficiently met, given the
information made available by the four defendants and the rescue crew operating outside
of the cavern. It will be shown that the five men were on equal footing, consulted
sufficiently and operated in complete fairness to every member. In their decision to kill
and consume Roger Whetmore, the four defendants will convince the jury that they
operated under the “Law of Necessity.”
Keith Parker, 7
Page 386
Memorandum
To: Senior Partner
September 25, 2005
a limestone cave for the weekend in July of 2005. They left a note at the Speluncean
Society, which they were all members of, detailing the itinerary for their trip. The
Speluncean Society is an organization of amateurs interested in the exploration of caves.
Their plan was to enter a limestone cavern for a short period. They packed few supplies,
including a wireless communication device. While they were deep in the cave, a
landslide occurred which blocked the cave’s only known entrance. Further, the explorers
were unaware of any food in the cave for the duration of their entrapment. The families
of these five men became concerned when they did not arrive when expected, and
notified the Speluncean Society. The society promptly dispatched a rescue party to the
site. During the next twenty days, several further landslides occurred, killing ten of the
workers at the site.
The five men trapped in the cavern began to fear death by starvation. On the
twentieth day of the rescue attempt, the rescuers learned that the men had with them the
wireless communication device. Oral communication was established. The head
engineer on site quoted the men that it would be at least ten days, barring further
physicians informed the group that they had little chance of surviving a further ten days
without food, given their current condition.

Page 387
During an eight-hour break in communications, initiated by the trapped men, Mr.
Whetmore proposed that the men eat one of their number so that the others may survive.
He suggested that they use a method of casting lots to identify the one to be eaten. The
other men were reluctant initially. Whetmore, who had been serving as the group’s
spokesman, then re-established communication with the head physician and inquired as
to whether eating one of their number would allow the other four men the ten more days
needed to survive. The physician answered in the affirmative. Whetmore further asked if
it would be advisable to cast lots. The physician would not advise the men to proceed in
doing so. When the trapped men asked for another physician, minister, or priest to assist
them in their choice, none of those found would promote the measure. No further
communication was made, and the rescuers assumed the batteries were dead in the men’s
wireless device.
proceeded to work out a mathematically fair method of casting lots. Next, Whetmore had
a change of mind and recommended they wait a further 48 hours. The others accused
charged Whetmore with a breach of faith, and continued to cast the dice that Whetmore
carried with him. This was their 23rd day in the cavern. One of the men cast the dice for
Whetmore, who had no objection to the fairness of the throw. Whetmore lost the throw
and was killed then eaten by the other four spelunceans. On the 32nd day of the rescue
effort, success was achieved. The four men were treated for malnutrition and shock. It
was found that the batteries were operational in the wireless device until the 32nd day.
The men were subsequently charged for the homicide of Roger Whetmore.
The issue here is whether the four remaining speluncean explorers should be held
responsible for the killing of Roger Whetmore. The case United States v. Holmes, 26
Keith Parker, 2
Page 388
Fed. Cas. 360 (1842), is a precedent for the case of the spelunceans in the conditions
which prove the necessity of murder. In order to overcome the prosecution of a homicide
charge, the defendants must demonstrate that the killing of Roger Whetmore took place
under a provable condition on necessity. They must also demonstrate that all five
speluncean explorers were treated as though they were on equal footing, and that no one
explorer was treated with a bias. Further, they must prove that each member of the group
was given a fair chance to survive. This precedent is known as the “Law of Necessity.” In
the case of the speluncean explorers, the facts presented by the remaining four members
will demonstrate to the jury that the killing of Mr. Whetmore took place under a provable
condition of necessity. The facts indicate that the five men were in a position that
required them to choose cannibalism in order to survive. Furthermore, the men were on
equal footing and were not operating under any bias. The men gathered as much
information as was possible to them under the circumstances. They made their decision
using this information, as well as the opinions set forth by each member in discussion.
Moreover, the choice of the killing was made to be fair to all five men.
In the case of Roger Whetmore, there is a provable condition of necessity.
Provable condition of Necessity exists when there is no method that would preserve the
lives of the members of a group, except for the sacrifice of one of the members. The
element of prevailing importance in defining the law of necessity is that of the
requirement of killing in order to preserve life. The members must further agree that the
entire group would perish without the sacrifice of one’s life. A provable condition of
necessity exists in the case of Holmes. In Holmes, the crew on board the vessel had
reason to believe that, based on past experience and basic knowledge of the ocean, the
entire group on board would not survive if none of the passengers were sacrificed Id. at 2.
Keith Parker, 3
Page 389
A provable condition of necessity existed in this instant case as well. After
contact with the rescue crew on the 20th day of confinement, the five explorers were
informed that they would face certain future peril if they did not consume any substance
within the next ten days. Further, the engineers informed the explorers that the rescue
would take ten or more days to complete. After an enquiry by the explorers, the head
physician on site informed the men that the consumption of human flesh would
perpetuate their existence. As human flesh was the only available nutrient known to the
men to be inside the cavern, it is clear that their only option was to consume this available
nutrient. According to the information that was available to them at the time, death by
starvation would have followed if they did not consume human flesh.
spared the life of Roger Whetmore. Furthermore, it would be argued that the men should
have at least kept in contact with the rescuers for the possibility of new, helpful
information. However, this argument is likely to be unpersuasive because the men, after
agreeing that one of them would be killed, could not be sure of Mr. Whetmore’s
intentions. As the decision that one member must die was made, it was necessary for the
killing to take place immediately thereafter to prevent any scandal. Further, the necessity
of the killing was made clear by the dire condition of the remaining explorers when they
were rescued twelve days after communication ended.
Keith Parker, 4
Page 390
The five spelunceans explorers were on equal footing. To be on equal footing all
members must have considered themselves equal in importance in regards to their
survival. As all five members were of a similar skill level, there was no dependency on a
specific member for survival. Vis-à-vis, no member of the group would be excluded
In Holmes, the situation of equal footing differs. The lives of the passengers
depended on the skill and knowledge provided by the crew. Therefore, only the needed
passengers would be the last to be sacrificed. This disposition made the choice of
sacrifices simpler, as those who were needed least would be chosen. For the spelunceans,
where equal footing was established, the most viable method of choice would be by
casting lots in a mathematically fair way. This being the method chosen by the five men,
the assumption that all five men were on equal footing is made valid and conclusive.
S.E. at 3.
Keith Parker, 5
Page 391
casting of lots.
Keith Parker, 6
Page 392
Whetmore. In their decision to kill and consume Roger Whetmore, the four defendants
will convince the jury that they operated under the “Law of Necessity.”
Keith Parker, 7
Page 393
Facts Summary
Five amateur speluncean explorers, a Roger Whetmore among them, left a note at
the Speluncean Society, which they were all members of, including the itinerary for their
trip. Their plan was to enter a limestone cavern for a short period of time; they packed
few supplies, including a wireless communication device, and entered the cave in July of
2005. While deep in the cavern, a landslide occurred which blocked the only known
entrance to the cavern. The families of these five men became concerned when they did
not arrive when expected, and notified the Speluncean Society. The society found the
note that the five spelunceans had deposited at the headquarters, and promptly dispatched
a rescue party to the site. The society was running out of funds quickly, while additional
funds were being raised through a legislative grant and popular subscription. During the
next twenty days, several further landslides occurred, killing ten of the workmen at the
site.
The five men trapped in the cavern, emaciated by their lack of substance, began to
worry about their chances of survival. On the twentieth day of the rescue attempt, the
rescuers learned that the men had with them the wireless communication device. Once a
similar device was installed outside of the cave entrance, oral communication was
established. The head engineer on site quoted the men at least ten days, barring further
landslides, before completion of the rescue. Conversely, the chairman of the committee
of physicians informed the group that they had little chance of surviving a further ten
days, given their current condition. During an eight hour break in communications,
initiated by the trapped men, Mr. Whetmore proposed that the men eat one of their
number to perpetuate the existence of the others. He suggested that they use a method of
casting lots to identify the one to be eaten. The other men were reluctant. Whetmore
Keith Parker, 1
Page 394
then re-established communication with the head physician, and inquired as to whether
eating one of their number would allow the other four men the ten more days of survival.
While the physician answered in the affirmative, he or she would not advise the men to
proceed in doing so. When the trapped men asked for another physician, minister, or
priest to assist them in their choice, none of those found would promote the measure. No
further communication was made, and the rescuers assumed the batteries were dead in the
men’s wireless device.
After much deliberation, the five men decided to proceed with the measure.
Following the groups’ finalization of a proper method of casting lots, Whetmore had a
change of mind and recommended they wait a further 48 hours. The others scolded him,
and proceeded to cast the dice they carried with them. One of the men cast the dice for
Whetmore, who they report had no objections to this. Whetmore lost the throw and was
killed then eaten by the other four spelunceans. On the 32nd day of the rescue effort,
success was achieved. The four men were treated for malnutrition and shock. It was
found that the batteries were operational in the wireless device until the 32nd day. The
men were subsequently charged for the homicide of Roger Whetmore.
Keith Parker, 2
Page 395
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
Writing 340
MWF 1-2 PM
Section #91035
Assignment #3
Cash v. Klopps

Page 396
Les D’Mented is CEO and owner of D’Mented and Son Builders. Mr. D’Mented
told Miss Inga Noar, the CFO of the building company, to place an order for new
scaffolding. Noar went to Cy Klopps, owner of K.C. Building Supplies, for the new
order of scaffolding. Miss Noar was in charge of a cost-cutting operation at D’Mented
and Son Builders. Cy Klopps suggested to Noar that using common chain link fasteners
on the scaffolding instead of using reinforced steel fasteners could reduce the price of the
scaffolding. Mr. Klopps also insisted that the scaffolding would last for years, and he
could not foresee any problems with its use. Miss Noar was an accountant, and knew
very little about the technicalities of scaffolding building. Noar assumed that Mr. Klopps
was correct in his statements, and ordered the scaffolding to be made with common chain
link fasteners. Both Mr. Klopps and Miss Noar informed D’Mented that the chain link
fasteners were a workable alternative. Using chain link for fasteners, Mr. Klopps and a
number of his workers built the scaffolding for D’Mented and Son Builders. After
completing the project, Klopps tested the scaffolding using 500 pounds of dead weight.
The scaffolding held steady under this weight. Klopps then delivered the scaffolding to
D’Mented and Son Builders. The next day, D’Mented and Son was working on a sand
blasting operation that required a worker to be hoisted to the top floor of a building on
scaffolding. Using the new scaffolding built by Mr. Klopps for the first time,
D’Mented’s team began hoisting Ivan Cash, an employee of D’Mented, up on the
scaffolding with an air compressor also on the scaffolding. The combined weight of Mr.
Cash and the compressor was about 450 pounds. After being risen to a height of about 10
feet, one of the chain link fasteners gave way, causing both Mr. Cash and the compressor
to fall off of the scaffolding. Mr. Cash fell on top of the air compressor, breaking both

Page 397
his leg and shoulder. Vis-à-vis the incident, Mr. Cash was expected to be out of
commission for about five months. (Cash v. Klopps Deposition Summaries)
There are three contracts that are of reasonable relevance to this case. First, Mr.
Klopps was in contract with D’Mented and Sons Builders to build scaffolding to the
specifications set forth by the purchaser for D’Mented and Sons, Miss Inga Noar.
Further, Miss Inga Noar was in contract with Les D’Mented to provide him accurate
information on the products that she had ordered to be made. Finally, Les D’Mented was
involved in a contract with Ivan Cash to provide equipment to be used on the
construction site by his workers, and to ensure that the equipment provided is safe
enough to be used without incident during regular working conditions. Conversely, there
is a public duty for the maker of a product to ensure that the product will not place the
user at a level of threat that is above and beyond the standard risk involved, regardless of
contract linkages. This public duty was argued in the case of Thomas v. Winchester (6
N.Y.) 2 Seld., 397, in which the defendant labeled a bottle of poison as medicine, which
resulted in the injury of the plaintiff with which there was no contractual relation.
In order for the prosecution to be successful, the plaintiff must convince the jury
that Mr. Klopps owed a public duty to Mr. Cash to build a set of scaffolding that could be
safely used. In this sense, Mr. Klopps was in a breach of his public duty by building
scaffolding that was instable and not on par with safety standards. Further, the plaintiff
must assert that, by Mr. Klopps recommending unsafe scaffolding and assuring the
purchaser of its safety, Mr. Klopps was in a direct breach of a public duty to D’Mented
and Sons Builders and its employees. Public duty exists regardless of contractual ties and
could be argued to be applicable to this case. This case is similar to other cases in which
Parker, Page 2 of 5
Page 398
public duty is referred, insofar as that the plaintiff with no contractual ties to the
defendant was injured by the defendant’s manufacturing of a product that would almost
certainly cause injury to the user.
The outcome of the case of Cash v. Klopps revolves around the existence of a
public duty link between the defendant and the plaintiff. This link can be made in a
variety of ways, which will be mentioned in the latter pages of this memorandum. It is
certain, though, that there was no legal contract ever made between the defendant and the
plaintiff. Certainly, there was a breach of contract between the defendant and D’Mented
and Son Builders, in that Mr. Klopp’s product was not equivalent to the product that he
had promised. Further, the contract between Les D’Mented and Ivan Cash was broken,
insofar as Mr. D’Mented did not provide Mr. Cash a safe working environment.
According to law, though, multiple breaches of interconnected contracts cannot be linked
together in order for a party on one end of the spectrum to bring action against a party on
the opposite end.
The defendant and plaintiff may be linked through a tie of public duty, which
need not be signed or legally verified by either party. In the aforementioned case of
Thomas v. Winchester (6 N.Y.) 2 Seld., 397, the argument was made by the defendant
that there was no contractual relationship between himself and the plaintiff, thus there
were no grounds for a lawsuit. The plaintiff, conversely, argued that a public duty
existed between the defendant and plaintiff. The argument was made that, under normal
circumstances, there would be no grounds for the plaintiff to bring legal action against a
party with which the plaintiff has no legal contract. Nonetheless, the case involved the
mislabeling of a bottle of poison as a bottle of medicine. This mislabeling would almost
Parker, Page 3 of 5
Page 399
certainly bring harm upon the consumer of the product. As the bottle was labeled as
medicine, the plaintiff had no way of knowing that the product was dangerous. The same
principle would go for any purchaser of the mislabeled bottle. The mislabeling of the
bottle thus presents a hidden danger to the lives of any member of the public who might
have decided to purchase the medicine. Had the product been a gun or hunting knife, the
public would be aware of the danger it presents to one’s life, and thus would handle it
accordingly. In the case of a bottle of medicine in which the public assumes the bottle’s
contents to be harmless to one’s life, the manufacturer has public duty to whoever might
purchase the bottle to ensure that the contents are not life-threatening, regardless of the
lack of a contract between the manufacturer and consumer.
In the case of Cash v. Klopps, the same aforementioned duty exists. An unused
set of scaffolding is not an item considered by the public to be dangerous, outside of the
possibility of injury resultant from some type of user misuse. A set of scaffolding used
correctly should not injure the user, just as a bottle of medicine used correctly should not
harm the consumer. In selling and building the scaffolding, Klopps made the scaffolding
appear to be safe and useable while also describing it as such. Klopps’ negligence in
building the scaffolding in a way that makes it harmful to the user under normal
conditions was a breach of the public duty that he owed to any user of the scaffolding,
regardless of contract affiliations. In breaching this public duty, Klopps is liable for the
damages done to the public. The public entity injured was Mr. Cash, thus Mr. Klopps is
liable for whatever damages that were caused by his breach of duty.
Conversely, the defendant may argue that no public duty existed. They would
argue that the product delivered to D’Mented and Son’s Building was exactly as ordered
Parker, Page 4 of 5
Page 400
by the purchaser at D’Mented and Sons. Further, the information provided by Mr.
Klopps to Miss Inga Noar was correct to the extent of Mr. Klopp’s knowledge.
Therefore, there was no wrongdoing on the part of Mr. Klopps. The defense may further
argue that Mr. Klopps was not responsible for injury caused by an item that was known
by some people to be dangerous in nature. Mr. I. N. Spector, the Chief Engineer of
SoCal Metallurgy, has the opinion that scaffolding made with common chain link
fasteners is unsafe for use. Therefore the scaffolding was unsafe in nature, and the user is
responsible for injury to oneself when using a dangerous product.
The plaintiff will counter this argument by arguing the validity of the defendant’s
claim. The defendant claims that the scaffolding was dangerous by nature. Scaffolding,
though, has a very specific place in its use for construction. Scaffolding to be used for
construction, and ordered specifically for that use, is assumed by the public to be safe for
use in construction. Use in construction would include the withstanding of the weight of
a worker and the equipment the worker may need.
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff Ivan Cash will be successful in bringing
legal action against the defendant Cy Klopps. The jury will find that Mr. Klopps, in the
manufacturing of a product known by the public to be safe when used under normal
circumstances, owed a public duty to build the product to be so.
Parker, Page 5 of 5
Page 401
Keith Parker
ID# 6390.4899.77
Prof. Samuelson
December 2nd, 2005
Johnson v. Bush

Page 402
The litigation of the case of Johnson v. Bush legally began on September 21,
2000. On September 14, 2005, the litigation effort ended when the U.S. Supreme court
refused to consider a challenge1 to Florida’s ban on voting rights for ex-felons as
described in Article VI §4 of Florida’s Constitution.2 Under Florida’s State constitution,
disenfranchisement is permanent after a person has been convicted of a felony, unless a
pardon is granted by the governor with the approval of three members of the cabinet.
This is a class-action lawsuit, where the plaintiffs are civil-rights groups who argue on
behalf of 600,000 ex-felons without voting rights. Under Jeb Bush, governor of Florida,
the process of regaining one’s voting rights after a felony conviction have loosened. As
an indirect effect of this case, Florida felons have their voting rights automatically
restored after five years without committing another crime, unless they were convicted of
several specific violent crimes. Further, a felon can regain voting rights if an appeals
process is completed.3 The appeals process is seen by many to be too complex and
unachievable. In addition to losing voting rights, ex-felons who have not regained their
voting rights cannot hold public office, serve on a jury, own a firearm, or hold
professional licenses. When the suit was filed in 2000, fourteen states permanently
barred ex-felons from voting, unless they underwent an appeals process. Now, only
Florida, Kentucky, and Iowa impose automatic lifetime bans on felons.4
1
The decision was reached by the justices without hearing the merits of the case
2
See also Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 97.041(2), 98.093, 98.0975 and 944.292. Fla. R. Exec. Clemency 5(I)(E), 5(II), 9(A)(2)
and 9(A)(3) (permanently denies persons convicted of a felony unless granted clemency by the governor).
3
The appeals process requires ex-felons to provide copies of their birth certificate, driver’s license, and Social Security
card; any education certificate attained; a complete and detailed twenty-year residential history; a complete
employment history of the past twenty years, including the names of all supervisors; copies of all bank, mortgage and
credit detailing the previous three-years’ worth of income-tax returns; copies of all court documents pertaining to the
applicable copies of all traffic tickets ever received, along with proof of payment; and character-reference letters. (Jim
Green, Abramsky, supra note 9, at 3)
4
See “State’s Ban On Felons Voting Rights Stands,” Lesley Clarck and Gary Finout, Miami Herald, 2005

Page 403
The Supreme Court case of Hunter v. Underwood provides an important
precedent to this case. In Hunter v. Underwood, the Supreme Court decided that, under
the fourteenth amendment, the Alabama disenfranchisement law was invalid. The court
reasoned that the law was invalid because it was enacted with racial motivation.
Furthermore, in Ramirez v. Brown, the California Supreme Court ruled that the
disenfranchisement of felons’ voting rights was unconstitutional and was an unnecessary
safeguard against voter fraud.5 Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
decision of Ramirez v. Brown in Richardson v. Brown. The court decided that the state of
California had a right to disenfranchise felons’ voting rights under the second section of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The second section states, “…except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime…” The court found that ‘other crime’ could apply to felons.6
This decision was a major blow to any challenges to the felon disenfranchisement based
on the Fourteenth amendment.
Following a thorough evaluation of the case, it has become clear that the U.S.
Supreme Court has made the incorrect decision. During the last five years, the number of
states permanently disenfranchising felons fell from fourteen to three. This drop clearly
displays that the majority opinion on voter disenfranchisement is negative. Further, there
has surfaced decisive evidence that the original voter disenfranchisement laws, which
were enacted primarily in the south after the U.S. Civil War, were inspired by racism.
States in the former confederacy enacted laws that disenfranchised felons for crimes such
as intent to steal, using insulting gestures or language, or preaching the gospel without a
5
See Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1348-1349
6
See Richardson v. Brown, 418 U.S. at 27
Parker, 2 of 4
Page 404
license.7 These laws were primarily applied to blacks. Furthermore, the laws continue to
affect blacks much more than members of other races. There are an estimated 1,600,000
voting-age African Americans in Florida, of which 256,392 are disenfranchised.
Therefore, while over 16 percent of voting-age African Americans cannot vote, only 4.4
percent of non-African Americans cannot vote.8 Though it may not be true that
lawmakers intentionally were racist in creating disenfranchisement laws, the law clearly
affects African Americans in a much higher proportion than it does whites. Put a
different way, a fewer percentage of blacks in Florida can vote than non-blacks. This
inequality is in violation of the fourteenth amendment, which guarantees equal rights to
vote regardless of race.
Nonetheless, in Richardson v. Brown, the U.S. Supreme court upheld that
disenfranchisement was legal under the fourteenth amendment. Further, many would
argue that the laws are fair, regardless of which race they apply most to. Florida, the state
with the highest number of disenfranchised voters of the three states with these laws, has
made it possible to regain voting rights after one’s sentence is served. In the words of
Governor Jeb Bush’s spokesperson, “The decision not to hear the case simply reaffirms
that the clemency process which is laid out in our Constitution is a fair one which allows
felons to regain their rights through a thoughtful process.”9 Further, many pro-
disenfranchisement arguments are based on the moral correctness of disenfranchisement
laws. This moral correctness must be covered, as the laws are primarily based on the
moral idea that a felon should not be allowed to participate in the political process.
7
See Sasha Abramsky, The Other Election scandal, Rolling Stone, Aug. 30, 2000 at 50
8
See Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraception? Political Consequences of Florida
Disenfranchisement in The United States, 67 Am. Sec. Rev. 777, Appendix Table A (2002)
9
See “State’s Ban On Felons Voting Rights Stands,” Lesley Clarck and Gary Finout, Miami Herald, 2005
Parker, 3 of 4
Page 405
Further, there exists the notion that disenfranchisement is merely another punishment,
such as prison or community service. The majority of those who hold these pro-
disenfranchisement views are republican, the reasons for which vary. Certainly,
republicans tend to advocate stricter penalties for those who break the law then
democrats. Furthermore, the 2000 presidential elections would have resulted in a
democratic presidential outcome, displacing Bush from victory, had the
disenfranchisement laws not been in place.10
Regardless of morality, the Florida disenfranchisement laws were clearly created
to be racist, as they were enacted directly after the Civil War and applied to crimes most
committed by African Americans. Furthermore, the disenfranchisement laws are a direct
assault on the rights given to citizens under the fourteenth amendment; thus,
disenfranchisement should not be used as a punishment in addition to prison time or other
penalties. Disenfranchisement laws are unconstitutional, affect one race much more than
others, and have altered the political world by placing Bush in office in 2000. Therefore,
the Supreme Courts decision should be reversed.
10
See Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraception? Political Consequences of Florida
Disenfranchisement in The United States
Parker, 4 of 4
WRIT-340: Final Portfolio
Page 406
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
Writing 340
MWF 1-2 PM
Section #91035
Assignment #3
Cash v. Klopps

Page 407
Memorandum
To: Senior Partner
Re: Cash v. Klopps
November 12, 2005
Les D’Mented is CEO and owner of D’Men ted and Son Builders. Mr. D’Mented
told Miss Inga Noar, the CFO of the building company, to place an order for new
scaffolding. Noar went to Cy Klopps, owner of K.C. Building Supplies, for the new
order of scaffolding. Miss Noar was in charge of a cost-cutting operation at D’Mented
and Son Builders. Cy Klopps suggested to Noar that using common chain link fasteners,
used for connecting the plank to the lift, on the scaffolding instead of using reinforced
steel fasteners could reduce the price of the scaffolding. Mr. Klopps also insisted that the
scaffolding would last for years, and he could not foresee any problems with its use.
Miss Noar was an accountant, and knew very little about the technicalities of scaffolding
building. Noar assumed that Mr. Klopps was correct in his statements, and ordered the
scaffolding to be made with common chain link fasteners. Both Mr. Klopps and Miss
Noar informed D’Mented that the chain link fasteners were a workable alternative. Using
chain link for fasteners, Mr. Klopps and a number of his workers built the scaffolding for
D’Mented and Son Builders. After completing the project, Klopps tested the scaffolding
using 500 pounds of dead weight. The scaffolding held steady under this weight. Klopps
then delivered the scaffolding to D’Mented and Son Builders.
The next day, August 2nd, D’Mented and Son was working on a sand blasting
operation that required a worker to be hoisted to the top floor of a building on
scaffolding. Using the new scaffolding built by Mr. Klopps for the first time,
D’Mented’s team began hoisting Ivan Cash, an employee of D’Mented, up on the
scaffolding with an air compressor also on the scaffolding. Ivan Cash had extensive

Page 408
previous experience with scaffolding. Cash did not test or inspect the scaffolding prior to
its first use. The combined weight of Mr. Cash and the compressor was about 450
pounds. After being risen to a height of about 10 feet, one of the chain link fasteners
gave way, causing both Mr. Cash and the compressor to fall off of the scaffolding. Mr.
Cash fell on top of the air compressor, breaking both his leg and shoulder. Vis-à-vis the
incident, Mr. Cash was expected to be out of commission for about five months. (Cash v.
Klopps Deposition Summaries)
There are three contracts that are of reasonable relevance to this case. First, Mr.
Klopps was in contract with D’Mented and Sons Builders to build scaffolding to the
specifications set forth by the purchaser for D’Mented and Sons, Miss Inga Noar.
Further, Miss Inga Noar was in contract with Les D’Mented to provide him accurate
information on the products that she had ordered to be made. Finally, Les D’Mented was
involved in a contract with Ivan Cash to provide equipment to be used on the
construction site by his workers, and to ensure that the equipment provided is safe
enough to be used without incident during regular working conditions. Conversely, there
is a public duty for the maker of a product to ensure that the product will not place the
user at a level of threat that is above and beyond the standard risk involved, regardless of
contract linkages. This public duty was argued in the case of Thomas v. Winchester (6
N.Y.) 2 Seld., 397, in which the defendant labeled a bottle of poison as medicine, which
resulted in the injury of the plaintiff with which there was no contractual relation.
The plaintiff must convince the jury that Mr. Klopps owed a public duty to Mr.
Cash to build a set of scaffolding that could be safely used. In this sense, Mr. Klopps was
in a breach of his public duty by building scaffolding that was instable and not on par
with safety standards. By not doing so, Mr. Klopps placed the user of the scaffolding in
Parker, Page 2 of 5
Page 409
imminent danger. Further, the plaintiff must assert that, by Mr. Klopps recommending
unsafe scaffolding and assuring the purchaser of its safety, Mr. Klopps was in a direct
breach of a public duty to D’Mented and Sons Builders and its employees. Public duty
exists regardless of contractual ties and could be argued to be applicable to this case.
This case is similar to other cases in which public duty is referred, insofar as that the
plaintiff with no contractual ties to the defendant was injured by the defendant’s
manufacturing of a product that would almost certainly cause injury to the user.
The outcome of the case of Cash v. Klopps revolves around the existence of a
public duty link between the defendant and the plaintiff. This link can be made in a
variety of ways, which will be mentioned in the latter pages of this memorandum. It is
certain, though, that there was no legal contract ever made between the defendant and the
plaintiff. Certainly, there was a breach of contract between the defendant and D’Mented
and Son Builders, in that Mr. Klopp’s product was not equivalent to the product that he
had promised. Further, the contract between Les D’Mented and Ivan Cash was broken,
insofar as Mr. D’Mented did not provide Mr. Cash a safe working environment.
According to law, though, multiple breaches of interconnected contracts cannot be linked
together in order for a party on one end of the spectrum to bring action against a party on
the opposite end.
The defendant and plaintiff may be linked through a tie of public duty, which
need not be signed or legally verified by either party. In the aforementioned case of
Thomas v. Winchester (6 N.Y.) 2 Seld., 397, the argument was made by the defendant
that there was no contractual relationship between himself and the plaintiff, thus there
were no grounds for a lawsuit. The plaintiff, conversely, argued that a public duty
existed between the defendant and plaintiff. The argument was made that, under normal
Parker, Page 3 of 5
Page 410
circumstances, there would be no grounds for the plaintiff to bring legal action against a
party with which the plaintiff has no legal contract. Nonetheless, the case involved the
mislabeling of a bottle of poison as a bottle of medicine. This mislabeling would almost
certainly bring harm upon the consumer of the product. As the bottle was labeled as
medicine, the plaintiff had no way of knowing that the product was dangerous. The same
principle would go for any purchaser of the mislabeled bottle. The mislabeling of the
bottle thus presents a hidden danger to the lives of any member of the public who might
have decided to purchase the medicine. Had the product been a gun or hunting knife, the
public would be aware of the danger it presents to one’s life, and thus would handle it
accordingly. In the case of a bottle of medicine in which the public assumes the bottle’s
contents to be harmless to one’s life, the manufacturer has public duty to whoever might
purchase the bottle to ensure that the contents are not life-threatening, regardless of the
lack of a contract between the manufacturer and consumer.
In the case of Cash v. Klopps, the same aforementioned duty exists. An unused
set of scaffolding is not an item considered by the public to be dangerous, outside of the
possibility of injury resultant from some type of user misuse. A set of scaffolding used
correctly should not injure the user, just as a bottle of medicine used correctly should not
harm the consumer. In selling and building the scaffolding, Klopps made the scaffolding
appear to be safe and useable while also describing it as such. Klopps’ negligence in
building the scaffolding in a way that makes it harmful to the user under normal
conditions was a breach of the public duty that he owed to any user of the scaffolding,
regardless of contract affiliations. In breaching this public duty, Klopps is liable for the
damages done to the public. The public entity injured was Mr. Cash, thus Mr. Klopps is
liable for whatever damages that were caused by his breach of duty.
Parker, Page 4 of 5
Page 411
Conversely, the defendant may argue that no public duty existed. They would
argue that the product delivered to D’Mented and Son’s Building was exactly as ordered
by the purchaser at D’Mented and Sons. Further, the information provided by Mr.
Klopps to Miss Inga Noar was correct to the extent of Mr. Klopp’s knowledge.
Therefore, there was no wrongdoing on the part of Mr. Klopps. The defense may further
argue that Mr. Klopps was not responsible for injury caused by an item that was known
to be dangerous in nature, such as a gun. Mr. I. N. Spector, the Chief Engineer of SoCal
Metallurgy, has the opinion that scaffolding made with common chain link fasteners is
unsafe for use. Therefore the scaffolding was unsafe in nature, and the user is
responsible for injury to oneself when using a dangerous product.
The plaintiff will counter this argument by arguing the validity of the defendant’s
claim. The defendant claims that the scaffolding was dangerous by nature. Scaffolding,
though, has a very specific place in its use for construction. Scaffolding to be used for
construction, and ordered specifically for that use, is assumed by the public to be safe for
use in construction. Use in construction would include the withstanding of the weight of
a worker and the equipment the worker may need. In relation to this case, the provision
of scaffolding that does not meet these requirements by Mr. Klopps provided an
imminent danger to Mr. Cash.
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff Ivan Cash will be successful in bringing
legal action against the defendant Cy Klopps.
Parker, Page 5 of 5
Page 412
Keith Parker
ID#6390.4899.77
Writing 340
MWF 1-2 PM
Section #91035
Assignment #1
Memorandum on Speluncean Explorers

Page 413
Memorandum
To: Senior Partner
September 25, 2005
a limestone cave for the weekend in July of 2005. They left a note at the Speluncean
Society, which they were all members of, detailing the itinerary for their trip. The
Speluncean Society is an organization of amateurs interested in the exploration of caves.
Their plan was to enter a limestone cavern for a short period. They packed few supplies,
including a wireless communication device. While they were deep in the cave, a
landslide occurred which blocked the cave’s only known entrance. Further, the explorers
were unaware of any food in the cave for the duration of their entrapment. The families
of these five men became concerned when they did not arrive when expected, and
notified the Speluncean Society. The society promptly dispatched a rescue party to the
site. During the next twenty days, several further landslides occurred, killing ten of the
workers at the site.
The five men trapped in the cavern began to fear death by starvation. On the
twentieth day of the rescue attempt, the rescuers learned that the men had with them the
wireless communication device. Oral communication was established. The head
engineer on site quoted the men that it would be at least ten days, barring further
physicians informed the group that they had little chance of surviving a further ten days
without food, given their current condition.

Page 414
During an eight-hour break in communications, initiated by the trapped men, Mr.
Whetmore proposed that the men eat one of their number so that the others may survive.
He suggested that they use a method of casting lots to identify the one to be eaten. The
other men were reluctant initially. Whetmore, who had been serving as the group’s
spokesman, then re-established communication with the head physician and inquired as
to whether eating one of their number would allow the other four men the ten more days
needed to survive. The physician answered in the affirmative. Whetmore further asked if
it would be advisable to cast lots. The physician would not advise the men to proceed in
doing so. When the trapped men asked for another physician, minister, or priest to assist
them in their choice, none of those found would promote the measure. No further
communication was made, and the rescuers assumed the batteries were dead in the men’s
wireless device.
proceeded to work out a mathematically fair method of casting lots. Next, Whetmore had
a change of mind and recommended they wait a further 48 hours. The others accused
charged Whetmore with a breach of faith, and continued to cast the dice that Whetmore
carried with him. This was their 23rd day in the cavern. One of the men cast the dice for
Whetmore, who had no objection to the fairness of the throw. Whetmore lost the throw
and was killed then eaten by the other four spelunceans. On the 32nd day of the rescue
effort, success was achieved. The four men were treated for malnutrition and shock. It
was found that the batteries were operational in the wireless device until the 32nd day.
The men were subsequently charged for the homicide of Roger Whetmore.
The issue here is whether the four remaining speluncean explorers should be held
responsible for the killing of Roger Whetmore. The case United States v. Holmes, 26
Keith Parker, 2
Page 415
Fed. Cas. 360 (1842), is a precedent for the case of the spelunceans in the conditions
which prove the necessity of murder. In order to overcome the prosecution of a homicide
charge, the defendants must demonstrate that the killing of Roger Whetmore took place
under a provable condition on necessity. They must also demonstrate that all five
speluncean explorers were treated as though they were on equal footing, and that no one
explorer was treated with a bias. Further, they must prove that each member of the group
was given a fair chance to survive. This precedent is known as the “Law of Necessity.” In
the case of the speluncean explorers, the facts presented by the remaining four members
will demonstrate to the jury that the killing of Mr. Whetmore took place under a provable
condition of necessity. The facts indicate that the five men were in a position that
required them to choose cannibalism in order to survive. Furthermore, the men were on
equal footing and were not operating under any bias. The men gathered as much
information as was possible to them under the circumstances. They made their decision
using this information, as well as the opinions set forth by each member in discussion.
Moreover, the choice of the killing was made to be fair to all five men.
In the case of Roger Whetmore, there is a provable condition of necessity.
Provable condition of Necessity exists when there is no method that would preserve the
lives of the members of a group, except for the sacrifice of one of the members. The
element of prevailing importance in defining the law of necessity is that of the
requirement of killing in order to preserve life. The members must further agree that the
entire group would perish without the sacrifice of one’s life. A provable condition of
necessity exists in the case of Holmes. In Holmes, the crew on board the vessel had
reason to believe that, based on past experience and basic knowledge of the ocean, the
entire group on board would not survive if none of the passengers were sacrificed Id. at 2.
Keith Parker, 3
Page 416
A provable condition of necessity existed in this instant case as well. After
contact with the rescue crew on the 20th day of confinement, the five explorers were
informed that they would face certain future peril if they did not consume any substance
within the next ten days. Further, the engineers informed the explorers that the rescue
would take ten or more days to complete. After an enquiry by the explorers, the head
physician on site informed the men that the consumption of human flesh would
perpetuate their existence. As human flesh was the only available nutrient known to the
men to be inside the cavern, it is clear that their only option was to consume this available
nutrient. According to the information that was available to them at the time, death by
starvation would have followed if they did not consume human flesh.
spared the life of Roger Whetmore. Furthermore, it would be argued that the men should
have at least kept in contact with the rescuers for the possibility of new, helpful
information. However, this argument is likely to be unpersuasive because the men, after
agreeing that one of them would be killed, could not be sure of Mr. Whetmore’s
intentions. As the decision that one member must die was made, it was necessary for the
killing to take place immediately thereafter to prevent any scandal. Further, the necessity
of the killing was made clear by the dire condition of the remaining explorers when they
were rescued twelve days after communication ended.
Keith Parker, 4
Page 417
The five spelunceans explorers were on equal footing. To be on equal footing all
members must have considered themselves equal in importance in regards to their
survival. As all five members were of a similar skill level, there was no dependency on a
specific member for survival. Vis-à-vis, no member of the group would be excluded
In Holmes, the situation of equal footing differs. The lives of the passengers
depended on the skill and knowledge provided by the crew. Therefore, only the needed
passengers would be the last to be sacrificed. This disposition made the choice of
sacrifices simpler, as those who were needed least would be chosen. For the spelunceans,
where equal footing was established, the most viable method of choice would be by
casting lots in a mathematically fair way. This being the method chosen by the five men,
the assumption that all five men were on equal footing is made valid and conclusive.
S.E. at 3.
Keith Parker, 5
Page 418
casting of lots.
Keith Parker, 6
Page 419
Whetmore. In their decision to kill and consume Roger Whetmore, the four defendants
will convince the jury that they operated under the “Law of Necessity.”
Keith Parker, 7
Sailing Class Review
Sailing Review Page 420
11/28/05 2:08 PM
Nautical Science 301A
Final will be all multiple choice questions
Seamanship
• Rights of Way
o Sail
o Power
 3 types of vessel encounters
 Meeting
• Recommend that they pass port-to-port
 Overtaking
• Vessel in Front has the right of way
 Crossing
• Works with the light system
o Determining a collision course
 Constant bearing and Decreasing range
Characteristics of planning hulls and displacement hulls
Theoretical hull speed
How to measure the length of vessels

• Overall length
• On-Deck length
• Waterline length
Draft: amount of water required to keep a vessel afloat
Lubber-line: The keel line or a line parallel to the keel line

• Significant because compass has to be set lined up with the lubber
line
Rigging

Page 421
• Shrouds
• Sheets
• Halyards
• Stays
Types of sailing vessels

• Sloop
• Cutter
• Schooner
• Ketch
• Yawl
"In-Irons" know what this is
Sailing positions
Sailing maneuvers: a changing of something (i.e. “coming about”)
Parts of sails
The rest is in
notebook Luff
Feet
Venturri and Bernini effect
Third law of motion

• Action and reaction
Navigation
• Figure course heading and distances
Lighthouses
• Identify lights in three ways
o Color
 Red, Green, White, Amber

Page 422
o Phase Character (Kind of signal)

 Flashing, Occulting signal, et cetera
o Period (Has to do with time of the signal)
Feet in a nautical mile: 6,076 Feet (about 800 feet more than a standard
land mile)
• 1 Nautical mile is equal to 1 minute of arc of latitude
o Very important to use minutes of latitude, as it is consistent
everywhere on the map of the earth
Tossing a banana peel off the bow

• Speed = (.6 * length of travel) / seconds
Range of lights
• Geographic, has to do with the curvature of the earth
• Nominal
o Luminosity (Brightness of light)
o Metrological visibility (If there is fog, et cetera)
Magnetic compass error

• Deviation
o Error in the magnetic compass due to the effect of the vessel
of her cargo on the compass
• Variation
o An error in the compass due to the difference between the
magnetic north pole and the geographical north pole
Change from white to blue on a chart indicates a change to shallow water
The three R’s

• Red (keep red markers to the right)
• Right
• Returning
• Also, even numbers are kept to the right
Average high tide: benchmark for heights above water

Page 423
Average low tide: benchmark for depths (10 ft = 10 ft below average low
tide)
Different kinds of tide

• Spring tide (has nothing to do with the season)
o Dramatic high and dramatic low tides
• Neap tides
o The opposite
Review the 3-bearing fix
Large-scale charts cover small areas
Small-scale charts cover large areas
1 nautical fathom is 6 feet
Charts may be lain out in different units
Four sounding devices that will be found on buoys and lighthouses

• Bell (Gives single tone)
• Horn
• Whistle
• Gong (Gives multiple tones)

University Notes - Junior Year, 1st Semester

Transféré par

Informations du document

Description originale:

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

University Notes - Junior Year, 1st Semester

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Table of Contents

Keith Parker’s Notes from USC

Junior Year, First Semester

420 Sailing Class Review

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

International Relations as a theoretical study during the cold war was

Return to waves of IR theory

Cold war thinking

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

-Study of IR heavily influenced by Cold War: Area and language studies

The structure of the system is analyzed by neo-realism

Rationalists: economists, et cetera

US IR: Neo-realism or structural realism – Can focus on one variable – good;

Outside US: English school, neo-marxist as a structural treaty,

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Reformist ideas: NIEO and NWIO

Wave VII: Globalization, governance and human security

Real debate in both policy and theory

Policy debates: economic world = neoliberal vs. neomercantalism

Political/military = realism and democratic peace liberalism

Social world: Feminists, ecotopians, utopians, anarchists and other

Kant 1783 essay contest:

Need to consider how each approach contributes to scholarship

Handout #21, in folder

II. How we study IR: Explaining and understanding

How can we be certain a fact is a fact

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Explaining = social scientists – middle range theories – objectivity –

Causes of war, poverty, et cetera

Explanations for Nixon policies – look at it from his worldview he is a

If a leader has a realist point of view, they will take advantage of

We know what we have to explain – in search of the independent variable:

Explaining second handout

Second handout is an assignment, don’t know when it is due

Not due until after the midterm

Study this handout, though

Keith Parker, University of Southern California

Back to levels of analysis and how we study IR

E in our Depp skills

Goal = good middle range theory

How do we know the above quote to be true?

What is his hypothesis? If X then Y

Y is the condition or behavior you are trying to explain

X is the possible case