Christian-Muslim Relations in Eleventh-Century Spain Author(s): Lynn H. Nelson Source: Military Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Dec.

, 1979), pp. 195-198 Published by: Society for Military History Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1986753 . Accessed: 28/09/2013 05:19
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Christian-Muslim Relations in Eleventh-Century Spain

by Lynn H. Nelson The University of Kansas

HE opening of the eleventh century saw a remarkable riseinthe fortunes ofwestern Europe. Itseastern frontiers werestabilized, themenaceoftheMagyars andSlavs diminished, anda mutually beneficial commerce between central and easternEurope began to flourish. The Vikings were Christianized and pacified, and traderoutes to theBalticwere in agricultural opened.Innovations technology gainedgreater ofimproving theinfluence climatic andunder conacceptance, and livingstandards ditions, production, population, beganto and urA newtempo commerce oftravel, improve markedly. intellectual and banization, endeavor,artisticachievement, hadentered wasestablished. a new political development Europe towhich eachregion era ofopportunity andgrowth. Thedegree to these and responded on thesenewopportunities capitalized in large measure,theirlaterdenew conditions determined, inEuropean velopment. Theeleventh century was a watershed history, inwhich thebasic characteristics ofthegreatstatesof medievalEuropewereestablished. In Spainit was a century characterized union ofChristian andMuslim bya peculiar states in a system oftribute and production known as theparias.' A proper appreciation ofthenature ofthissystem and itsimpact uponSpanish society is crucialin understanding thosecharacteristics which laterdistinguished theChristian Spanishfrom their Europeanneighbors.2 Theperiod opened dramatically with a drastic alteration inthe balanceofpolitical andmilitary ofthePeninsula. Onthe power at least,theopening hadbeensimsurface, yearsofthecentury a continuation ofthe dominance ofthe ply and wealthy, populous, unified MuslimCaliphateof Cordobaover the impoverished, weakanddisunited Christian states ofthe North ofthe Peninsula. All signspointed to this.The devastating Muslim raids ofthe tenth destruction into Christcentury continued, carrying every ian statecapableofthreatening thefrontiers oftheCaliphate or ofaffording theopportunity Theslave marts for ofthe plunder. Muslim South werecrowded with Christian captives;thebellsof the ofCordoba. Thelandwasrich Santiago graced greatmosque theChristians, andenjoyed internal peace. Among bycontrast, wasshattered; the atbest, economy, rudimentary public affairs, and both secularand ecclesiastical, werevirtually paralyzed;3 theChristian more leaderscoulddo little than bracethemselves forthenextonslaught. Inreality, itwasnot theCaliphate however, that dominated the norweretheMoslems, their wealth situation, despite apparent andsecurity, masters ofSpanish affairs. TheCaliphate hadlong been troubled strife. Palace conspiracies, by factional tribal rivalries,theological controversies, regionalintransigence, dynastic andeconomic ambitions, all had contributed envy toa tumultuous and bloody history ofcivilstrife and distrust. This situation was endedbyabout980bytheMuslim military commander whotookthename of al-Mansur4and established his a basic reform power through ofthearmy. The armyof the Caliphate had been a heterogenous force, oftwomajorgroups. The first, thefieldarmy, consisting was leviedon a seasonalbasis and consisted ofnatives.When the occasion volunteers weresought from all oftheprodemanded, vincesofMuslim weremadeup byconSpain,andanydeficits from thelistsofthoseindividuals liableformilitary scription
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service. Due at least partiallyto theintermittent natureofsuch abilities of these troopswere mediocre at service, the fighting was nota conspicuous best,5and the morale oftheirformations quality.A morereliable forcewas providedbythechunud, tribal unitscomposedofthedescendantsofSyrianimmigrants whohad inexchangeforassuming been grantedperpetualproperty rights hereditarymilitaryobligations.Although theirfighting ability was superior to the standard levies, the chunud constituted a dangertothecentralgovernment. Fighting underleaders oftheir own choosing,the internalloyalties of these groups was often greater than their allegiance to the central government. As a consequence oftheunreliability ofthenativeforces,theleaders of Muslim Spain quickly followed the precedent of other authoritarian rulers in establishinga standingarmy composed of foreign mercenarieswithno loyaltiesotherthanto theirmaster. Underal-Hakam (796-822), some 5,000 troopsofFrankish,Gallegan, and even Slavic derivationhad been assembled witha permanentstationat Cordoba. As time passed, thisstandingarmy became themain supportoftheCaliphate,and its privilegesand perquisitesincreased in the same measure as the government's dependance upon its loyaltygrew. Whenal-Mansur assumed thereins ofgovernment duringthe minority ofHisham 11(976), he was faced withnumerouspotentialenemies. The aristocracyheldhiminsome contempt because ofhishumbleorigins, thepalatine mercenarieshopedtoimprove theirpositionstillfurther by manipulating theyoungCaliph,and the chunudwere ready to improveupon troubledtimes by extendingtheir privileges and diminishing their obligations.AlMansur met the situationby extendinggreatly the system by which potential conscripts could purchase exemptions from militaryservice and using the moneythus obtained to import large numbersofBerbers,a groupwhichhad hitherto been virtually excluded from militaryservice in al-Andalus.6Withthis force behind him, he broke up the tribal organizationof the chunud and forced the troops into units with littlefamilial or In thisfashionthefieldarmywas made loyal regionalsolidarity. to al-Mansurpersonally.It soon ceased to be simplya seasonal forceas its commanderbegan thecustomofconducting regular winteras well as summer campaigns. It was now possible for al-Mansurto increase war taxes and to expand thefieldforceto the pointwhere it overshadowedand isolated the old standing armystationedat Cordoba. The basic roles ofthebranchesofthe armyhad been reversed; itwas nowthefieldarmy,a permanent professional mercenary organization, which formed the backbone of the Muslim militaryforce in Spain. Paying these troops with Muslim taxes and enrichingthem al-Mansurcreated a forcepersonallyloyal withChristian booty, tohimwithwhichhe gatheredall power- military, political,and police - into his own hands. His raids against the Christians probablycost more thantheygained in booty,buttheyjustified in thepublic's estimaestablishment his extraordinary military In the tionand obscured his sternrepressionofany opposition.7 openingyears of the eleventhcenturythe Christianswere not dominatedby the Muslims; bothwere dominatedby a military dictatorrestinghis power upon a mercenaryarmy whose only allegiance was to theirleader. of This power was a fragilething,however. The dictatorship
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a retainer as both side,theparias cametobe regarded hadbeencapableof Christian andlaterofhissonAbd-al-Malik al-Mansur of the on entail part did not, however, tribute This the of destroying tribute. the price as at butonly and civil strife supressing domination. or Muslimany sense of political Christian of the Caliphate. eminence either and traditional politicalprestige to regulate wouldworkor even fight theChristians bybasingthepowerofthestateupona mercenary Although Moreover, in from refrained interfering a states, they taif a senseofcivicresponsi- affairs between anybasisfor haddestroyed army they were as longas regularcash payments affairs Facpopulation. theMuslim among theirinternal purpose bility andcommon still existed, butthefactions made." mayhavebeencurbed, tional strife kingweakMuslim ofmilitary a largenumber Thissituation, their mayoncehaveactedtolimit considerations andwhatever Christian ofpowerful toa group massivesubsidies ofthesituation domspaying Theinstability beenremoved.8 excesseshadnow tothe benefit as anunalloyed beenregarded died,and hasgenerally Abd-al-Malik in 1008 when revealed states, was dramatically butthe theMuslims, for disaster handsofhis theincompetent andan unmitigated passedinto ofthearmy command Christians atfirst would than andmore equitable complex by this wasmore Sanjul. Encouraged Abd al-Rahman brother, system younger disenjoyed theMuslims in which to atforces Castilebeganto gather theCountof development appear.It was a partnership and theCaliphate both Under ofhis and flourished. tothedangers Oblivious advantages offensive. tothe topassover tinct tempt Spainhad purtheleadersofMuslim dictatorship themilitary Abd al-Rahmanproclaimedhimselfheir to the situation, ranconwhich andcentralism ofauthoritarianism anda palacecoup begantosurface, itself. Oldrivalries sueda policy Caliphate The ofthelandanditspeople. andvariety was taken, trary tothediversity faction. Corboda byan anti-Berber was engineered Nowthe and discontent. factionalism byits only had beenconstant heldtogether result Thearmy, established. anda newCaliph had beenallowedfreeplay,and ifthe booty, forces ofparticularism pay,plentiful regular supremacy, ofpolitical traditions a homogeneity enjoyed and Abdal-Rahman taifastatesweresmalland weak,they beganto disintegrate, and easy victories, arArt, citizens. their denied hitherto now Berber contingents and senseofcommunity was killed byhisownmen.Thatarmy's asheach initsownf flourished, and letters science, a foreign chitecture, among without finances, themselves leaderless, found ofthetaifa and thepatronage courts, rebelled, ion,at thevariouspetty They government. bya hostile andmenaced population, thatofRenaissance notunlike milieu createda cultural rulers civil anda full-fledged as Caliph, owncandidate advanced their war was underway. Italy.2 bytheregular only ofcourse, was maintained, Thissituation buteventhishad its advanoflargesumsofmoney, payment T is unnecessary to review the complex series of hadbeenunevenly oftheCaliphate wealth theoppos- tages.Theincreasing that tonote It is sufficient which followed.9 vevents class had a wealthy of powerful the growth and distributed, in issue was the that matched enough were evenly forces ing andhadadded ofBelievers anysenseofa Brotherhood weakened to realizedthisand possessedtheresorces TheBerbers doubt. Mustroubling already antagonisms tothemany envy to achievea decisive economic assistancenecessary securetheoutside had ofal-Mansur establishment Thegreatmilitary limsociety. hadlong which fortifications overtheMuslim Byturning result. of the but acquisition taxes, to war Muslims the thetemporary accustomed bought ofCastile,they thefrontiers dominated rich the between gap the to lessen little done had booty Christian In November of 1009 count andhisarmy. oftheCastilian services of economies In themorerestricted citizenry. and sackedthecityofCor- and thecommon armyentered theBerber-Castilian fell of parias the for payment taxes however, states, a the taif playatthis Twocould opponents. Berbers' the doba,andexpelled uponall, and muchofthecash paid to theChristians thedefeated heavily had retired, OncetheCastilians game,however. oftheMuslim thestatus trade.Thisenhanced through returned of countries with thearmiesoftheChristian returned faction wellas stimuas leveller, an economic acted as and class middle victors The new outtheBerbers. andUrgelanddrove Barcelona itcannot Although export. andagricultural latedlocalartisanry thisaid by and had purchased to offer had had no fortresses drain a netcurrency constituted theparia system that totheChristian regular be denied leaders, sizablesumsofmoney offering currency, of that circulation accelerated the states, the a on With taif for all. to unlimited and the booty their right troops, payto markets, bynewChristian provided thestimulus with withfar-reaching together of parias was established, this,thesystem have might which disadvantages the economic of many cancelled and Muslim Spain. forbothChristian effects that haveescapedtheMuslims itcouldnot Nevertheless, arisen. was ofmilitary dictatorship In thefirst place,theoldsystem Andyet, powers. military foreign werein factsubsidizing The economic advantageof part-time they wrecked. permanently and themercenary theCaliphate, under force taxeshad beenrising overa full-time independent troops Christian mercenary oflocal needs had beenno moreattentive typewouldnever armiesofal-Mansur was so greatthatany armyof al-Mansur's theChrissince In fact, Christians. the were than and aspirations to the old a return again arise in MuslimSpain. Moreover, or subdue to not dominate, and to profit, was simply aim tians' of The was with its system even impossible. defects, Caliphate, for was,at thelocallevelat least,a change thesituation factionalism. ofMuslim Caution, dictate, theforces parias hadliberated a statesdiversity allowedthetaif The paria system werenolonger necessary thebetter. andclaimsoflegitimacy compromise, from and protection domination, orderwithout strife, Christian without topurchase A sumofmoney sufficient toseizepower. price.13 reasonable for a all and enemies, their and atleastlocalcontrol, a faction could secure services military in winners thegreat were theChristians atleast, Onthesurface revenues as adequate for as long control could be maintained that Musweresafefrom frontiers Their arrangement. Politicalfragmentation thispeculiar wereavailableto retainthesetroops. oftaifa cash made possible and massiveinfusions thattherewereeventually lim threat, to such an extent was encouraged advances. Theirrulersbecame ecclesiastical extraordinary inwhat had ortaifakingdoms, states, half a hundred petty about and monasteries ofCluny, coffers filled the gold Spanish thesubsidiza- patrons; Thisfragmentation, oncebeena united Caliphate. tradition Romanesque the Spanish great proliferated, cathedrals the and military power, tionof and relianceuponChristian a new andtheHolySee took patronage, widespread taxes rather aroseunder civicsolidarity through ofmaintaining necessity in their peculand the of Spanish welfare in the spiritual interest influence. a stabilizing all exerted Bythe initiative than personal weremadeinthe improvements Great traditions.'4 iarliturgical middle ofthecentury abouta dozenmoreor less stabletaifa andnewthrongs de Compostella, toSantiago routes geog- pilgrimage to a traditional each corresponding stateshad emerged, saintofthe patron the honor to came Pyrenees the beyond from regular paying regionand each or economic raphic,ethnic, with and citiesalongthewayswelled Reconquista. The towns in statesforassistance oftheChristian parias tooneoranother Europe,anda new,morecosmopoliwestern from newsettlers Onthe order.'0 and internal political independence maintaining
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tan air came over Spain. The sons and daughters of Spanish rulers were now regarded as eminently marriageable, and alliances soon unitedtheSpanish withnoblefamiliesfrombeyond thePeninsula. All appearances indicatedthatSpain's longisolationwas endingand thatshe was beingonce again drawnintofull in the development ofthe westernEuropean comparticipation munity. can be deceptive, however. Massive infusions of liquid capital without an adequate economic infrastructure inevitablysubject a society to severe strains. In eleventhcenturyChristianSpain these strains were creatingbasic and relatively social and politicaldispermanent tortions. DuringthisperiodtheSpanishwere able todependupon a regular moneyincome and, due to the weakness of the taifa kingdoms, readyaccess to moreland. The otherstatesofwestern Europe did notenjoysuch advantages and were improving their conditionthrough betterutilizationof theirinternalresources. New techniques and institutions were developing to perform thesefunctions. Intensification ofagricultural techniquesand the clearing and drainingofland were increasingproduction, towns and guildswerefacilitating a greaterrationalization ofartisanry and manufacture, and a new and vigorousmerchantclass was expandingtradeand commerce.A process ofpoliticalconsolidation was underway. Smaller states were being absorbed by to heel by a new were being brought larger, and lesser nobility diocesan type of monarch backed up by a tightly-organized church and an expandingprofessionalbureaucracy. didpenetrateSpain, butin attenuatedform. These innovations further behind the rest of Europe in Spain lagged continually since therewas no impetusto social and economicdevelopment, thesenewinstitutions and approaches intothefabricof integrate Spanish society.At the beginningof the century,it briefly appeared that the Christianstates were developingsome sort of underthehegemony ofNavarre,butthissoonbrokedown.'5 unity While the otherstates of westernEurope were consolidating, Spain experiencedcontinuedfragmentation. The Christiansin Spain had no need to seek protection in unity, and thepossibility ofobtaining parias encouragedChristian leaders to pursueindependentpolicies. Whilethe taifastates enjoyedpeace and prostheChristians perity, contendedamong themselvesfortheright to collect tributefrom the Muslims. Political developmentof Christianswas arrested, and their economic developmentseverely distorted. Fightingmen were at a premium,and the Christianleaders couldnotafford toalienate theirnoblesortheywouldlose themto a more permissivelord.,' No strongcentral monarchyarose in Spain; indeed, much of the Muslim gold was distributed by the monarchsto thenobility to retaintheirallegiance. The noblesin turn,withrelativelylittleto purchase, investedin land. Small

APPEARANCES

land owners were bought out, and great noble estates were The small land owners, formed. intheir used themoneythus turn, acquired to establish themselvesbeyondfeudal restrictions in Withextensive lands and lifree settlementson the frontier.'7 mited labor both great and small land owners devoted themselves primarilyto sheep and cattle-raising.While the rest of to intensified Europe was turning agriculture, Spain became increasinglypastoral.,8Manufacturewas not ignored,but it was - French,Jewsor Moorsleftlargelyinthehands offoreigners whilethe Spanish amassed flocks,pastures, and pursued more Muslimgold.19 Despite theadvantages enjoyedbytheSpanish,or ratherbecause of these very advantages, theyfailed to particiofthosebasic institutions pate in thedevelopment whichwereto shape later medieval society.Superficially thesystemofparias favoredChristian Spain, butfundamentally thecosts were high: arrested political and economic development,political fragmentation, internecine rivalry,theparalysis ofthereconquista, from the rest of Christian and an increasing differentiation Europe. The relationshipbetween the taifa kingdomsand Christian Both states ofeleventhcentury Spain was a curiouspartnership. sides obtained what theywanted: the taifas independenceand wealth.Andyettheywere destroying each peace, theChristians and on other'sabilities to obtainthese ends by theirown efforts basis. Once theparia systemcollapsed, thetaifas anypermanent found thattheyhad lostthecapacity todefendtheirownindependence and passed under the overlordshipof a series of North Africandynasties.The Spanish, fortheirpart, had failed to develop the attitudesand institutions to produce wealth through their own efforts.They continuedto seek unearned treasure, whetherit be Muslim or New World,onlyto see it slip through their The curiousand fragileparia systemoftheeleventh fingers. centurywas a transitory arrangement, but its effects helped to shape Spanish historyforcenturies. Lynn H. Nelson has been Professor of Medieval History at the University of Kansas since 174.A graduateof the Univerof Chicago, he receivedhis sity doctorate from theUniversity of Texas in1963.He is theauthor of The NormansIn South Wales, 1070-1171 (Austin, 1966).His recent work has concentrated upon medievalSpain, and his article"The Foundation ofJaca (1076): Urban Growthin Early Aragon"appearedinSpeculum. This article was accepted for in June1978. publication

oftheparia ofthedevelopment 1. For an overalldiscussion de la economicos see JoseMaria Lacarra, "Aspectos system, Homenaje a Jaime de taif de los reinos as, 1010-1102," sumisi6n de Barcelona,1965), Vicens Vives. I (Barcelona:Universidad have been ofparia payments agreements Twowritten 255-277. de paz y alianza entre byLarcarrain "Dos tratados published de Zaragoza, 1069y 1073," Sancho6l de Penaleny Moctadir Estudiosde historiade Navarra (Pamplona:Diariode Navarra, 83-102. 1971), periodsin of this and otherformative 2. The importance bythehistoriographical hasbeenobscured development Spanish in character to explainSpanishnational of seeking tradition Sanchez Claudio orlessmonocausational systems. ofmore terms bestrife continuous sees thevirtually forinstance, Albornoz, ofSpanish as the touchstone history, andMuslim Christian tween nottruly and regardsthe periodof parias as an aberration, inother laterinfluence. Any andoflittle in character, Spanish inhispolemic hisposition weaken ofcourse, would, terpretation
DECEMBER 1979

REFERENCES

withAmerigo Castro.See Albornoz, Espafla. Un enigma hist6rico,2 vols. (Buenos Aires; Editorial Sudamericana, 1956),II,

13ff. 3. Thisdisruption is bestdemonstrated bytherarity ofchartersfrom theperiodsof theattacks,a sure indication of the paralysis ofpublic affairs. InNavarre, for a single instance, only charter has survived from theyears997-1010, and thepersons appearing after thehiatusare ofa newgeneration. Therewas little continuity in thepersonnel oftheruling classes. 4. Ibn Abi cAmir, hachib oftheCaliphate, tookthenamealMansur bi-llah, "Victorious through God,"intheyear981, andit was bythisnamethathe was mentioned in theprayers ofthe faithful ofAl-Andalus. It was bythisassumedtitle thathe was known among theChristians, who transliterated itas Almanzor. 5. See Evariste Levi-Provencal, Espaita muslman. Instituci6nes y vida social e intelectual, ed. EmilioGarciaG6mez, vol.5ofHistoriade Espafla,ed.Ram6n Menendez Pidal (Madrid, n.31for 1965), 41, the of the leviesofMuslim poor reputation Spain
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whenthekingof Aragon by the Cid in thebattleof Morella, torestrain the oftheMuslim attempted unsuccessfully expansion kingdom ofZaragoza.Among thecaptives wereCount Nuflo of Portugal, Anaya SuarezofGalicia,Nuflo SuarezofLeon,Garcia Diaz ofCastile, FlaynPetrezofPamplona, andFortuno Garcez ofAragon. All ofthemajorChristian statesofSpain,with the possibleexception of Cataluria, had been represented in the Aragonese ranks.See RamonMenendez Pidal, La Espafla del Cid, 2 vols.,5thed. (Madrid;Espasa-Calpe,1956), II, 930and 740-744. 17. Traditional Muslim frontier policy dictated theestablishment ofunpopulated buffer zones(thugr) between neighboring frontiers constituted a constates.Suchempty landsalongtheir to theChristians. stantattraction de llanura.La "El castellano, hombre J. Bishko, 18. Charles de La Manchay Exen el area fronteriza explotacion ganadera tremadura durante la edad media,"Homenaje a Jaime Vicens Vives. I, 208.Bishkonotesthe increasing preference by the in thelate eleventh butemSpanishforpastoralism century, testamento de Almanzor," Miscelanea Jost Maria Lacarra. EsIt should toitsdevelopment. phasizes other factors contributing tudios de historiamedieval (Zaragoza, 1968),25-32. a somewhat different be notedthatCatalufla 9. Oneofthe pursued pathof bestsingle accounts ofthis period maybefound in and thebeginnings ofinE. L6vi-Provencal, Espana musulmana hasta la caida del development. Intensified agriculture which with themovements dustrial processing linked theregion Califato de Cordoba (711-1031de J.C.), translatedby Emilio GarItaliansociety. werereshaping southern Frenchand northern cia G6mezas Vol. 6 of Historia de Espana (Madrid: EspasaThedifference andthe Christian states of between Cataluna other Calpe,1957), 369ff. 10. The study thepeninsula theperiod. ofthesestateshas notbeen muchpursued. wereonlyaccentuated during A 19. A certain inthe notable amount ofeconomic occurred urbanization recent exception is themassivework ofManuelTerron North ofSpain,butit was primarily a Frenchaffair; see Jose Albarran,El solar de los Aftdsidas. Aportaci6n temdtica al esMariaLacarra,"La repoblacion tudiodel reinomorode Badajoz (Badajoz: CSIC, 1971).Also see del camino del camino de SanAmbrosioHuici Miranda, Historia musulmana de Valencia y su tiago," La reconquista espanola y la repoblaci6n del pais 223-232, among other works. Byandlarge,the region,3 vols.(Valencia:Ayuntamiento de Valencia, 1965-1970). (Zaragoza,1951), monarchs ofLeon-Castile appeartohavebeenlittle 11. Thissituation interested in didnot, ofcourse, endure, breaking upinthe encouraging thesecommunities 1080s as a result as commercial and manufacoftheexpansionist policiesofAlfonso VI. See turing note13below. communal revoltsin the twelfth centers;widespread 12. Although It is interesting themajorattention weretheresult. to notethatthemost century of cultural has historians ofurbangovernance was progressive and enlightened system been fixed thegolden andupon the later upon age oftheCaliphate statewithout theonlymajor Christian by Aragon, ofGranada, is ampleevidence Kingdom there oftheintellectual developed ofJaca "The Foundation H. Nelson, ofthetaifastates.A listofthemajorintellectual vitality figures access toparias; see Lynn inEarlyAragon", (1077):UrbanGrowth Speculum (Oct. 1978), oftheperiod suffice: thepoets IbnZaydun might Ibn (1003-1070), Hazm (994-1064), al-Mutadid and al-Mutamin (1012-1069) (1031- 688-708. thelexicographer 1083), Ibn Sida (1006-1066); and thescholars AbuBakr at-Turtushi Ibn Hazm,Ibn Abdal-Barr (1059-1130), (978-1071), and Ibn Bajja are worthy al-Humaydi of (1025-1095) inthehistory anysimilar ofAl-Andalus. period Thelistcouldbe extended, butitshould be enough tostatethatAl-Andalus was, theperiod ofthetaifastates, during oneofthemost and dynamic activeintellectual ofIslam. communities 13. It should be noted itwas infacttheChristians that andnot theMuslims whoabandoned theparia system. The conquest of ToledobyAlfonso VI in 1085 and his attackuponZaragozathe following yearmade it clear to all thatthepayment ofparias offered no permanent In facttheArableadersconprotection. cludedthatit had becomeAlfonso's policy to use theparias to drain their strength and,byforcing them toraisetaxestomeet these payments, toundermine their local authority. It was only then that thetaif a rulers renounced thesystem andcalledinthe aid oftheNorth African Anexcellent Almoravids. account ofthe entire from period theviewpoint ofone oftheArableadersis "Les Memoires de Abd provided by EvarisleLevi-Provencal, dernier roiziride de Grenade," 3 (1935), 232Allah, Al-Andalus, 6 (1941),1-63. 244;4 (1936), 29-145; 14. Thisinterest ofan embarbecamesomething eventually VII and his successors rassment to theSpanish whenGregory toapply toSpain.Contherising idealoftheCrusade attempted n MA/AH PUBLISHING to theSpanish, butalso wereattractive questand conversion _ _ EisenhowerHall threatened themodusvivendiwhich afforded them considerable leaders were Christian often forced toplaya advantages. Spanish n-n ~Kansas State University delicate toretain gamein their &|iS 04 attempt Manhattan,Kansas 66506, USA Papal and French suptheirallies' zeal and portwhileat thesame timerestraining greed. 15. Thedetails ofthis havebeena matter of particular process considerable are Justo dispute.Key worksin thisdiscussion MA/AHPublishing is interested in unpublished manuPerez de Urbel,Sancho el Mayor and Antonio UbietoArteta, and otherworks scripts-memoirs, diaries, monographs, Estudios en torno d la divisi6n del reino por Sancho el Mayor de Please send includingthe proceedingsof symposia. Navarra (Pamplona:InstituciOn Principe de Viana,1960). 16. El Cid,theCastilian freebooter, is a symbolic figure ofthe detailsas to pages,size, etc.,including a Xerox relevant opportunities opento thefighting man of theperiod.A more sample. representative example is provided bya listofthecaptives taken

evenamongMuslim authors. 6. Recruitment ofBerbers beganlateinthe reign ofal-Hakam. Thereasons for theprevious failure touse this source ofmilitary manpower are complex andimperfectly investigated. The continuedturbulence of thoseBerbercolonieswhichhad been planted inSpaininthe early daysoftheconquest, the of prejudice the Arab aristocracyagainst their unsophiscatedfellowbelievers, intermittent hostilities withthe Berberleaders of North Africa, andtheexclusiveness ofthepalatine mercenaries are all factors to be considered in thisregard. 7. Thispoint is madebyJoseph F. O'Callahan,A Historyof Medieval Spain (Ithaca and London:Cornell University Press, 128. 1975), 8. Al-Mansur realized that all hehadreally accomplished was to createone morefaction simply in an alreadybadly-divided Muslim Spain.His parting words tohissuccessors weretowarn them that only byremaining united could they hope toresist those who would seektodestroy them. See Fernando de la Granja,"El

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