Armed Conflict and International Law: Contemporary Challenges Clashes between great powers, regional conflicts, traditional interstate

wars and armed liberation/resistance movements remain relevant in international politics, but their number has declined significantly. The contemporary era is witnessing the rise of conflicts that are markedly different from those prevalent during the last century. The fact that most wars are fought within rather than between states is only the most obvious transformation. Additionally, modern warfare is distinguishable from the past by virtue of the following characteristics: 1 1. Goals : olitical goals related to foreign policy interests of states have been pushed aside by the consolidation of new forms of power based on ethnic/religious homogeneity. !ven though ethnicity and religious affiliation are rarely sources of armed conflict, they often are the basis of social mobili"ation and an e#pression of the deeper causes of war. $. Values : %ith few e#ceptions, notably the &'lobal %ar on Terrorism( )'%*T+, armed conflicts are no longer about universal principles, such as those advanced by fascism, socialism or democracy, but about identities at the tribal and communal levels. Third party intervention, in contrast, is most often guided by universal principles, including democracy, human rights and humanitarianism. ,. Mobilization : -ather than mobili"ing constituencies by creating a sense of national patriotism, leaders use fear, corruption, religion, ethnicity and the media to advance the interests of narrowly defined identity groups. .n many instances, boys, girls, men and women are forcibly recruited to serve as soldiers, cooks, and se# slaves or to perform other duties.

/. E ternal !upport : .n the absence of super0power patrons, e#ternal support comes from 1iaspora communities, foreign mercenaries, criminal networks and bad neighbors. 2upport is not limited to financial contributions, but encompasses active participation in the fighting. 3or instance, 4ud5ahedeen of the -ussian0Afghan war have fought in 6osnia and 7osovo, and are now supporting the rebels in .ra8. .n Africa, mercenaries are playing an important role in many conflicts.

9. "arfare : .n most of today(s armed conflicts fighting is dispersed and fragmented and front lines disappear. .nstead of heavy artillery and tanks, armed non0state actors use light weapons, rocket0propelled grenades and improvised e#plosive devices. 3orced recruitment and child soldiers are common. .n traditional warfare, conflicting parties deploy organi"ed armies, relying on the strength and 8uantity of e8uipment and troops. :on0state armed actors do not have the military capacity of states and the resulting mismatch in capabilities and methods of engagement results in asymmetric warfare : The disadvantaged side must use special tactics to overcome the military deficit. These tactics include hit0and0run attacks, the use of difficult terrain and urban areas, various forms of violence, including terrorism. ;. #argets : The laws of war are increasingly disregarded and the civilian population has become the deliberate target of atrocities, rape and siege. 'enocide, systematic rape and other violence against civilians, including terrorism, are characteristic of asymmetric warfare. <. $inancing : 3inally, armed conflicts today are financed by war economies that are often sustained through outside emergency assistance and parallel grey and black markets, including illicit trade in commodities, drug trafficking, and weapons trade. 4ost countries engaged in conflicts today are poor and cannot finance their military campaigns through ta#es alone, and armed non0state actors, even though they often levy forced ta#es within the territory they control, rely heavily on other forms of income. Terrorism, if not a new phenomenon, follows in its most recent global manifestation the changes outlined above. .n this sense, terrorist groups differ only in degree from other armed non0state actors. Armed Conflicts and International Law .nternational law governing armed conflicts is divided into two branches: Ius ad bellum .us ad bellum refers to when it is proper to resort to armed conflict. The main source of this =5ustification to resort to war= is the >nited :ations Charter. Article $)/+ of the >: Charter

prohibits the use of force and the threat thereof in international relations. This overall prohibition of the use of inter0state force is sub5ect to two e#ceptions: 1. Article %& recogni"es the use of force as self0defense in response to an armed attack by another state. $. Articles '()*& allow military action authori"ed or taken by the 2ecurity Council, if it is determined that there is a threat to international peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggression. The >: Charter only regulates the use of force between states. There are no provisions in the Charter, or anywhere else in international law, that regulate when it is proper to resort to force in intra0state affairs. Ius in bello .us in bello refers to international humanitarian law ).?@+. .?@ is known by many other names such as =humanitarian law,= =law of conflict,= and =laws of war.= All these terms refer to the rules regarding the treatment of civilians and non0combatants in areas of armed conflict and the rules of engagement for soldiers and combatants. .?@ is only applicable in times of war and consists of two branches: 1. #he +ague Law , based on the 1ABB and 1BC< ?ague Conventions, relates to the proper use of weapons and military tactics. .t states that choice of methods and means of warfare is not unlimited. .n order to spare the civilian population, armed forces shall at all times distinguish between civilians and civilian ob5ects on the one hand and military ob5ectives on the other. The ?ague @aw sets forth the principles of military necessity and proportionality. $. Gene,a Law , which relates, among other things, to the proper treatment of prisoners of war, civilians and other noncombatants. .t states that persons who are not, or are no longer, taking part in hostilities, including captured combatants, shall be respected, protected and treated humanely. They shall be given appropriate care, without any discrimination. The main sources of ius in bello are the four 1B/B 'eneva Conventions and the two Additional rotocols of 1B<<. .n contrast to ius ad bellum, the 1B<< Additional rotocol .. to the 'eneva Conventions contains provisions that apply to non0international conflicts.

The two bodies of law, ius ad bellum and ius in bello, are based on the premises that there are clear distinctions between: $

.nternational and non0international conflicts Crimes and acts of war 'eographic boundaries eace and war time .ndividuals

#he Impact of Globalization The changes in the nature of contemporary conflict outlined at the beginning of this unit have to be viewed in the conte#t of globali"ation. .ncreased transnational activities, growing interdependence and integration, as well as the emergence of non0state entities in international relations have had a profound impact on the international system and local communities. As a result, the distinctions on which the laws of armed conflict were based slowly eroded. The advent of the new generation of wars and global terrorism have e#acerbated and accelerated this erosion. International ,ersus -on)international Conflicts .n $CC1, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was involved in a long standing civil war with the :orthern Alliance while at the same time fighting an inter0state war with the American0led coalition as a result of the regime(s connection to al Daeda and the 2eptember 11 attacks. The internal conflicts in 6osnia and 7osovo have resulted in an international response. The >.2. invasion of .ra8 in $CC, to remove 2addam ?ussein because of his threat to international peace has triggered an internal armed struggle among the 2hia, the 2unni and, to a lesser degree, the 7urds. The problem is not only that the boundaries between international and non0international conflicts have become blurred for analytical reasons. 3ar more important is the fact that as a result, it has become difficult to determine and even disputed which body of law is applicable in a specific case.

Crime ,ersus Armed Conflict The 'eneva Conventions, its Additional rotocols and the >nited :ations Charter all assume that not every act of violence constitutes an act of armed conflict. Additional rotocol .. states that the rotocol:

= . . . shall not apply in situations of internal disturbance, and tensions such as riots,

isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.= , .n 1B</, the >nited :ations 'eneral Assembly defined aggression as:

=. . . the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or

political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the >nited :ations . . . =/ This statement raises three important 8uestions with regard to the distinction between crimes and armed conflict: 1. $. ,. %hat is the threshold level of violenceE %ho uses violenceE %hat is the purpose of the violenceE

The threshold level of violence and armed conflict has been debated among researchers for a long time. A wide range of definitions of armed conflicts reflects this. At the political level and in practice, the intensity and type of violence that amounts to armed conflict is e8ually debated. The ambiguity of international law in distinguishing between acts of crime and armed conflict results in distinctions based on policy rather than the law. 9 >nder the >: Charter, only states can take aggressive actions that result in international armed conflict. According to Article 1 of the Additional rotocol .., non0state armed groups in non0international conflicts must: 1. $. ,. /. 6e under responsible command. !#ercise control of part of the state(s territory. 6e capable of carrying out sustained and concerted military action. 6e capable of implementing the rotocol.

The purpose of the violence, as alluded to in the definition of aggression, must be to threaten the sovereignty or integrity of the state. .n many of today(s armed conflicts, forms of violence are used that don(t threaten the integrity or sovereignty of the state:

-ape, torture, the burning of houses and fields, theft and other forms of violence are Criminal activities, such as drug and weapons trafficking, are necessary to sustain !#tra5udicial killings, political assassinations and kidnappings are used to protect the

crimes often committed in times of war.

conflict.

flow of resources generated by those criminal undertakings. .n Colombia, the initial ideological struggle between the government and the rebel groups, :ational @iberation Army )!@:+ and -evolutionary Armed 3orces of Columbia )3A-C+, has been replaced by a turf war about the lucrative drug market. The 'lobal %ar on Terrorism )'%*T+ illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing between crimes and armed conflict. 4any commentators argue that the terrorist attacks of 2eptember 11, $CC1 did not constitute an act of war but were simply a crime. ; Their argument is based on the following assertions:

Al Daeda is not a state, and as a result there can be no international conflict. Al Daeda(s attacks were isolated and sporadic and therefore the laws of war do not Al Daeda holds no defined territory and controls no population, certainly not in the

apply.

>.2. *ne cannot speak of a non0international conflict. Al Daeda is best described, so it is argued, as a criminal network similar to weapons and drug traffickers. Criminal law, then, is the best way to deal with the terrorist organi"ation. *pponents of this view, including the >nited 2tates government, argue that the violence used by al Daeda is of a magnitude amounting to an act of war. .n addition, the al Daeda leadership stated that it is in a state of war with the >.2. and that the organi"ation intends to conduct more attacks against >.2. interests. 3inally, terrorist attacks are far from sporadic and isolated and point to a pattern of hostile action against >.2. interests that began with the 1BB, bombing of the %orld Trade Center and continue until today. <

The options available in responding to crimes and armed conflicts differ drastically. >nder the criminal law perspective, there is no immunity for acts that are normally allowed during war times and humanitarian law does not apply. 4ilitary responses, self0defense and preemptive measures at home or abroad are not allowed. .nstead, the government must engage in a process of national and international legal investigation and is dependant on cooperation, warrants and the demonstration of probable cause. The >.2. approach has been to treat the 2eptember 11 terrorist attacks as an act of war warranting a military response. .n contrast, 6ritain has always regarded the terrorist activities in :orthern .reland as a criminal matter outside the scope of the law of armed conflict. A This difference has had a significant impact on the manner in which each country has responded to the terrorist threat. .lurring Geographic .oundaries The traditional paradigm of armed conflict assumes that there are clear spatial boundaries between "ones of war and "ones of peace. .n other words, one can clearly distinguish between those places where the laws of war apply, and those places where regular domestic laws and international agreements govern. As mentioned at the beginning of this unit, asymmetric warfare has resulted in fragmented and dispersed pockets of fighting, ambushes, and hit0and0run attacks. *ften the war "one only encompasses parts of a country, as in 2udan, where the fighting occurs in the 1arfur region. 2ometimes, attacks are staged from areas across international borders, as is the case in the 1emocratic -epublic of Congo and -wanda. %ith the advent of international terrorism, the distinction has become even more blurred. .t is not clear where the ne#t attack is going to occur, nor is it clear where the highly mobile terrorist cells operate. The implications of the >.2. approach are that any terrorist, regardless of his whereabouts, can be the target of a military strike sanctioned by international law and the principle of self0defense. 3ollowing the same line of reasoning, 6ritain could order the targeted killing of an .-A terrorist on vacation in .taly, and this right would e#tend to all other states. %hether this interpretation should and will prevail is the sub5ect of a heated debate among legal scholars, diplomats and international affairs specialists. At a minimum, it challenges the principle of territorial sovereignty.

/istinguishing #imes of 0eace from #imes of "ar 2imilar to the spatial delimitations between "ones of peace and "ones of war, the international law of armed conflict rests on the temporal distinction between times of peace and times of war. 'lobal terrorism makes this distinction less salient. %hile the '%*T )'lobal %ar on Terrorism+ is a political reality, a significant number of legal e#perts and specialist in international relations 8uestion whether the >nited 2tates is in a state of war, because:

Al Daeda is not a state. .nternational conflicts may only occur between states. The attacks of 2eptember 11, as well as the fatwas issued by *sama bin @aden, do not Al Daeda does not control territory in the >.2.F therefore this does not constitute a

constitute acts of war or declarations of war. B

situation of internal conflict. .t is also unclear what would mark the end of the 'lobal %ar on Terrorism )'%*T+. The fact that there is no clear end to the hostilities has important ramifications for detaining risoners of %ar ) *%s+. *%s are to be returned as soon as possible after the cessation of armed conflict. .n a war with no end, *%s could legally be detained indefinitely. 1uring times of war, many states give the government e#tended war powers that may conflict with domestic laws, particularly in the area of civil liberties. Those powers are normally e#tended for a finite period of time. .n reaction to 2eptember 11, the >nited 2tates Congress has granted the president a wide array of powers with the adoption of the atriot Act. 4any of the provisions e#pired at the end of $CC9. !ven though Congress renewed the provisions for si# months, lawmakers are not prepared to curtail civil liberties at the e#pense of e#ecutive power indefinitely. .lurred /istinctions in the !tatus of Indi,iduals Ci,ilians and combatants The distinction between civilians and combatants is one of the most important distinctions in international humanitarian law. Civilians are:

= ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces

who have laid down their arms and those placed (hors de combat( G=out of the fight=H by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause . . .= 1C

Article /, of the Additional rotocol . defines a combatant as a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict. As important as this distinction is, there is an ongoing debate about the definition of =civilian= and the meaning of =taking no active part in hostilities.= The distinction is based upon the assumption that wars are fought between uniformed armies along clearly identifiable front lines. .t is increasingly difficult to distinguish between civilians and combatants because:

Combatants deliberately seek to blend into the civilian population. Civilians often take part in violence against each other, as 6osnia, 2omalia, -wanda Advances in technology and communications render problematic the distinction rivate security services and armed contractors operate in conflict "ones.

and 7osovo have shown.

between the operations of military systems and civilian support systems.

Terrorists, like many guerilla fighters, wear no uniforms and blend in with the local population. 4any actively engage in acts of violence, and can be tried for war crimes, under the law of armed conflict paradigm, or for murder, under the criminal procedure paradigm. ?owever, 8uestions remain about the status of the many hundreds of supporters that never actually detonate a bomb. Are members of a charitable organi"ation that funnels money to al Daeda combatants or civiliansE 1nlawful combatants and lawful combatants The terms =lawful combatant= and =unlawful combatant= are not mentioned in the 'eneva Conventions and the Additional rotocols. The distinction is made because combatants who act within the parameters set forth by the laws of armed conflict are immuni"ed for their actions, and are thus lawful. .f they are captured, they must be treated as prisoners of war and returned after the cessation of hostilities. Combatants who violate the laws of armed conflict either by committing a war crime or by failing to comply with the formal definition of combatant, are not protected by the 'eneva Conventions and the Additional rotocols, they are therefore unlawful combatants and can be tried and punished by a military tribunal or a regular court. 11

There are two criteria that must be satisfied for the status of lawful combatant: 1. Comply with the following conditions:1$ a+ being under the command of a person responsible for his subordinatesF b+ wearing a distinctive sign recogni"able at a distanceF c+ carrying arms openly. $. Conduct military operations according to the laws and customs of war. The >.2. government has applied these criteria in its decision to deny al Daeda operatives prisoner of war status. 2ince they do not wear uniforms, do carry concealed weapons, and deliberately target civilians, they are violating the laws of war and are, therefore, unlawful combatants. The same standard has been applied to the Taliban fighters. ?uman rights groups, military lawyers and diplomats have challenged this interpretation of the law because of its blanket application to all terrorists and Taliban members. They argue that some of the detainees, specifically the members of the Taliban captured in Afghanistan, could have worn recogni"able uniforms or signs, or could have carried arms openly. .n addition, Article 9 of the 'eneva Convention on risoners of %ar states that:

=. . . should any doubt arise as to whether a person, having committed a belligerent act

and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, Gis a lawful combatantH, such persons shall en5oy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.= The >.2. has not held any hearings pursuant to Article 9 to determine the status of 'uantanamo 6ay detainees. The reality of today(s conflicts, in which impoverished regimes and militias may lack the resources to get uniforms, which identify them as soldiers, makes the determination between lawful and unlawful combatants problematic to some I Aggregater /ata on Armed Conflicts Armed Conflicts: &((2)322% 1,

As a general trend, the number of armed conflicts in the aggregate has declined since the end of the Cold %ar and was at the level of the 1B9Cs at the end of $CC/. .nterstate wars have become increasingly uncommon and since 1BBC there have been only a few international armed conflicts: the invasion of 7uwait by .ra8 )1BBC+, the 'ulf %ar )1BB1+, the border war between !ritrea and !thiopia, the >.2.0led intervention in Afghanistan )$CC1+ and .ra8 )$CC,+, and the military clashes between .ndia and akistan )$CC$+. .n addition to these more clear0cut armed interstate conflicts, the following cases also fall within this category: >.2. led intervention in 6osnia )1BB9+, against .ra8 )1BBA: enforcing protection "ones over 7urd and 2hi(a Arab regions+, and in Jugoslavia )1BBB: ending the repression of 7osovar Albanians+. The >nited 2tates and others argue that the al0Daeda attacks on >.2. soil on 2eptember 11, $CC1, amounted to an act of international war as defined by the >: Charter. arallel to the decline in international wars there has been a steady rise in intrastate armed conflicts in the years before the end of the Cold %ar and shortly thereafter. 2ince the year $CCC, most intrastate conflicts have occurred in Africa and Central Asia, and a trend has emerged indicating increased armed conflicts in the 4iddle !ast and the predominantly 4uslim countries in Africa and Central Asia. This trend may be related to >.2. activities in connection with the '%*T. .ntra0state armed conflicts often have regional and/or international dimensions, thus challenging the traditional distinction between the two. At the same time, Afghanistan and .ra8 have shown that international intervention may significantly raise the possibility of civil war.

.n early $CC9, twenty ma5or armed conflicts were being fought of which eight were of

medium or high intensity: Colombia, -ussia )Chechnya+, .ndia, 4yanmar, :epal, .ra8, 2udan and the 1emocratic -epublic of Congo.

@ow intensity conflicts include Afghanistan, :ortheast .ndia, .ndonesia, and the 99 of 1;1 countries were affected by intrastate armed conflict since 1BBC and of those .n the year $CC9, only eight of these protracted conflicts were highly active and

hilippines, as well as Algeria, .srael, 6urundi, .vory Coast, :igeria, 2omalia, and >ganda.

nearly two0thirds ),9+ witnessed conflict lasting seven or more years.

resistant to settlement and international pressure: Algeria, 6urundi, Colombia, 1emocratic -epublic of Congo, .ndia, 4yanmar, :epal, and -ussia.

Conflicts in .ndia, the

hilippines and 2omalia continue at low levels with

negotiations for peace ongoing. Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict !ince 3222 4&*5 Angola The year $CC$ marked a turning point in the civil war between the :ational >nion for the Total .ndependence of Angola and the 'overnment of Angola. After the death of >:.TA(s leader Konas 2avimbi in 3ebruary $CC$ fighting stopped in 4arch and a peace agreement based on the 1BB/ @usaka protocol was signed in August. !ven though >:.TA has been transformed into the opposition party holding about 1/, of the seats in parliament, integration and demobili"ation efforts for >:.TA fighters have been slow. overty, the absence of rule0of0law and the integration of a large number of returning refugees continue to pose problems for the government. Liberia .n the year $CCC, a two0pronged insurgency led by the @iberians >nited for -econciliation and 1emocracy )@>-1+ and the 4ovement for 1emocracy in @iberia )4*1!@+ against the regime of Charles Taylor mobili"ed international pressure and culminated in the approach of >.2. warships. As a result, Taylor resigned in $CC, and left the country. A peace agreement between the insurgents and the remnants of Charles Taylor(s :ational atriotic arty was signed shortly thereafter, followed by the deployment of a >nited :ations peacekeeping mission )>:4.@+ to provide security. .n :ovember $CC/, the three factions agreed to disband their militias and >:4.@ has confirmed the completion of their disarmament. !lections were held in *ctober $CC9. 6wanda .n 4ay $CC1, the ?utu0led Army for the @iberation of -wanda, since 1BB/ based in the 1emocratic -epublic of Congo, launched incursions into -wanda. The Tutsi0dominated -wandan atriotic Army )- A+ repelled the attacks and forced the ?utus to retreat. The Army for the @iberation of -wanda maintains a strong presence in the 7ivu region of the 1-C, threatening the -wandan government, which periodically crosses into the 1-C in pursuit of ?utu militants.

!ierra Leone .n 4ay $CC1, the government and the -evolutionary >nited 3ront signed a peace agreement under the auspices of the >nited :ations and initially enforced by 6ritish troops. A >nited :ations peacekeeping mission )>:A42.@+ was established and its mandate subse8uently e#tended through Kuly $CC9. 3ree and fair elections were held in $CC$ endorsing the 2ierra @eone eople(s arty )2@ + and installing its leader, Ahmad Te5an 7abbah, as resident. 1isarmament was completed at the beginning of $CC/, and the >nited :ations ?igh Commissioner for -efugees announced in Kuly of $CC9 the completion of its operation to repatriate $<C,CCC refugees. Tensions remain, however, as poverty is still wide0spread and the central government is weak. *f particular importance are tensions over the control of the diamond0producing region. !ri Lan7a At the end of $CC1 a new coalition led by the >nited :ational arty )>: + took control of the government after violent elections. The coalition started talks with the @iberation Tigers of Tamil !elam )@TT!+ in an effort to negotiate and implement a conciliatory agenda with the rebels. A cease0fire agreement was struck under international auspices in 3ebruary $CC$. :orway0lead negotiations between the parties continued and at the end of $CC$ they committed to ending the war and instituting a federal system in 2ri @anka. 1eep divisions still e#ist within the @TT!, the >: and the former ruling coalition, the eople(s Alliance. 3urther peace talks were suspended in $CC, and have not yet resumed because the government views the @TT!(s demand for an .nterim 2elf0'overning Authority ).2'A+ in the Tamil region as a move toward independence. .n addition, factional fighting continues within the @TT! and a mutiny led by Colonel 7aruna was put down by force in $CC/. The lack of cooperation between the government and the @TT! in the aftermath of the $CC/ Tsunami was indicative of the fro"en nature of the peace talks. ?owever, at the beginning of $CC;, the parties agreed to meet in 2wit"erland under the aegis of :orway to revive the process. 1nited !tates *n 2eptember 11, $CC1, a concerted terrorist attack on the %orld Trade Center in :ew Jork and the entagon in %ashington 1C caused the collapse of the skyscrapers, badly

damaged the

entagon and killed and in5ured thousands of people when two hi5acked

commercial airplanes were crashed into the sites. Jet another target was spared when civilian passengers of a third flight resisted the terrorist attackers causing the plane to crash into a ennsylvania field. The attack by Al Daeda is widely regarded as an act of war and has led to >.2. military action in Afghanistan and .ra8. %hile Al Daeda continues to attack >.2. targets abroad, mainly in 4uslim countries, there have been no further incidents on >.2. territory since the B/11 attacks. Countries with on)going ma8or armed conflict through 322% Afghanistan As a result of the B/11 attacks, a >.2. led coalition ousted the ashtun0dominated Taliban regime in late $CC1. .n $CC$, a @oya Kirga established the Transitional Authority and elected ?amid 7ar"ai as interim president. A new constitution was approved in $CC/. residential elections marked by violence were held in *ctober $CC/ giving victory to ?amad 7ar"ai. The provinces of Afghanistan remain largely outside the control of the central government and violence persists. -ecent attempts to prohibit opium production have further aggravated the relationship between 7abul and the warlords in the provinces. Algeria The Armed .slamic 'roup )'.A+ and a splinter faction, the 2alafist 'roup for reaching and Combat )'2 C+, continue their violence to undermine the secular government of resident 6outeflika. They re5ected the president(s offer of negotiations toward a peace agreement as well as his offer of amnesty for all .slamic guerillas who would lay down their weapons. At the beginning of $CC9, the government announced that it broke the resistance of '.A and that the '2C was severely weakened due to the loss of much of its leadership and internal dissension. .urundi The arty for the @iberation of the ?utu eople03orces for :ational @iberation ) alipehutu03:@+ remained the only rebel group in armed opposition to the government in early $CC9. The principal ?utu rebel group, the :ational Council for the 1efence of 1emocracy 0

3orces for the 1efence of 1emocracy )C:110311+, agreed to a comprehensive peace agreement with the government in $CC,, after a power transfer within the transitional government from :ovember $CC9. Colombia eace talks initiated by resident astrana collapsed at the beginning of $CC$ after four years of negotiations that failed to end the ,C0year civil war. The government recaptured the demilitari"ed "one that had been granted to the -evolutionary Armed 3orces of Colombia )3A-C+. .n response to the government offensive the 3A-C attempted to disrupt the $CC$ elections and mounted a counter0attack. :ewly0elected resident >ribe declared a state of emergency, backed by the >.2., and abandoned all prospect for negotiations in favor of counter0 insurgency measures. The >.2. provided L, billion in military aid under & lan Colombia( to support the government in Colombia. 6y attacking 3A-C strongholds and destroying coca fields the government plans to weaken 3A-C forces and undermine the rebel(s financial base. The :ational @iberation Army )!@:+, the smaller rebel faction, has kept a low profile since $CC$. Talks between the government of Colombia and the !@: were agreed upon at the end of $CC9, signaling a breakthrough in negotiations. The ma5or right wing paramilitary group, the >nited 2elf01efense 3orces )A>C+, signed the 2anta 3e de -alito Agreement to demobili"e in $CC, after serious human rights violations put pressure on its leadership. ?owever, the group is slow in implementing the terms of the agreement. /emocratic 6epublic of Congo The 1emocratic -epublic of Congo )formerly Maire+ has been fractured into four distinct regions since armed rebellion first flared in 2eptember 1BB;, forcing the fall of the long0 standing and corrupt 4obutu regime in 4ay 1BB<. The coalition of rebel forces that brought @aurent 7abila to power in 1BB< 8uickly disintegrated and violence resumed. 7abila himself was assassinated in Kanuary $CC1 and was replaced by his son Koseph 7abila. The presence of large numbers of fighters and refugees from armed conflicts in neighboring states and the active resident 6uyoya, a Tutsi to ?utu resident :dayi"eye. An interim constitution was approved in $CC/. The transitional government is scheduled to end in

involvement of troops from several regional states has further complicated the situation. 2trong international pressure on the warring parties has led to a string of ceasefire and peace agreements including the @usaka peace accord in August 1BBB, negotiated withdrawals of foreign troops, and the 1ecember $CC$ power0sharing agreement signed in retoria. :egotiations between the government and the two main rebel groups begun in 3ebruary $CC$ ended in early $CC,, resulting in a draft constitution calling for an all0party transitional government and the signing of a peace agreement. Koseph 7abila was sworn in as president of the transitional government in April $CC,. .n $CC/, 7abila(s transitional government faced failed coup attempts in 4arch and Kune, a military rebellion in Kune, and increasing tension with -wanda in 1ecember. The transition to a permanent government was scheduled for Kune $CC9. ?owever, the parliament e#tended the process to 1ecember $CC9. 2imilarly, national elections were also postponed from Kune $CC9 to 4arch $CC;. Niolence continued in the more remote regions, especially in the provinces of .turi and 7atanga. .n $CC/, The >nited 2tates has sponsored a tripartite Commission bringing together officials from -wanda, Congo and >ganda in an effort to foster regional cooperation and build confidence. 6urundi 5oined the commission in $CC9. India .ndia(s strategy of creating peace and stability in the disputed 7ashmir territory from within )i.e., attempting to legitimi"e its administration over the territory by holding democratic elections and engaging in dialogue with the local authorities over self0rule and governance issues+ continued to be undermined by 4uslim militant groups that seek to either establish an independent 7ashmiri state or bring it under rule by akistan. Attacks by .slamist militants on the 7ashmiri legislative assembly in late 2eptember $CC1 and on .ndia(s parliament building in 1ecember $CC1 drastically raised tensions between .ndia and akistan. ersistent infiltration from akistan and attacks by 7ashmiri separatists brought the two countries to the brink of interstate war in 4ay0Kune $CC$. %hile the .ndian and akistani armies instituted a comprehensive ceasefire agreement for the @ine of Control in :ovember $CC, and began bilateral talks in early $CC/, separatist violence continues to flare in 7ashmir.

Indonesia 3ollowing the failed implementation of a Kanuary $CC1 regional autonomy agreement, 3ree Aceh 4ovement )'A4+ militants and .ndonesian armed forces engaged in renewed violence. Although resident 4egawati 2ukarnoputri had pledged, as recently as August $CC$, to crush the 'A4 rebellion, the .ndonesian government responded to intense international pressure and signed a new regional peace and autonomy measure with the 'A4 leadership in 'eneva in 1ecember $CC$. .n 4ay $CC,, the government imposed martial law in Aceh following the breakdown of the ceasefire and the failure of peace talks in Kapan. .n :ovember $CC/, newly0elected resident Judhoyono e#tended the state of civil emergency for si# months. Coastal and lowland areas of Aceh were devastated by the 1ecember $CC/ tsunamiF the provincial capital, 6anda Aceh, was destroyed. 1espite offers of a ceasefire by 'A4 rebels during relief operations in the province, .ndonesian forces claimed to have killed 1$C rebels during offensive operations in Kanuary $CC9. eace talks resumed in late Kanuary although the main hurdle continues to be 'A4(s insistence on, and the government(s re5ection of, an independence referendum. Ira9 The >nited 2tates, with the support of the >7, invaded .ra8 on 4arch $C, $CC,, with the stated goal of deposing the 6a(athist regime of 2addam ?ussein, as it was allegedly developing %41 capability in contravention of >: -esolutions and was refusing to allow mandated weapons inspections. The 6a(athist regime was 8uickly deposed and a rovisional Authority was established on April $, and an .ra8i 'overning Council was established in Kuly $CC,. 1espite concerted efforts to locate them, no weapons of mass destruction or evidence of their development were found. @ocal armed resistance to the >.2.0led occupation increased through the year, particularly among 2unni0Arab communities and former0supporters of the 6a(athist regime. !8ually disruptive has been an influ# of 4uslim =5ihadists= from across the 4iddle !ast. 4a5or armed resistance by a 2hi(a militia based in :a5af erupted in April $CC/ and again in August $CC/ before it was effectively repressed. .nsurgency in the so0called =2unni triangle= north and west of 6aghdad continued to grow through $CC/ and early $CC9, despite ma5or offensives against the rebel stronghold of 3allu5ah in April $CC/ and, again, in :ovember

$CC/. An interim .ra8i government was installed in Kune $CC/ and general elections were held, as planned, on Kanuary ,C, $CC9F the elections were boycotted by most 2unni0Arabs. As e#pected, the ma5ority 2hi(a community captured the largest number of seats in the new :ational Assembly, with the >.2.0favored secularists gaining only a small percentage of the vote. At this writing, efforts were ongoing to forge a ruling coalition between the two largest factions: the religious 2hi(a and ethnic07urds. The conflict inside .ra8 shows no sign of abating. Israel Niolent confrontations between alestinians and .sraelis have continued with only short spells of relative calm since the latest outbreak of the alestinian =.ntifada= )uprising+ in alestinians using suicide0 2eptember $CCC. 6oth sides have escalated their tactics, with

bombings of mainly civilian targets and .sraelis enforcing containment, mounting military invasions of alestinian enclaves )with massive military invasions carried out in the 'a"a 2trip+, and launching preemptive attacks on alestinian militants. articularly controversial has been .srael(s construction of a security wall outside its internationally recogni"ed border. The conflict continues despite a =road map= peace plan devised by the >.2. and announced in April $CC,, and Ariel 2haron(s proposed plan for .sraeli disengagement from the 'a"a 2trip approved by the 7nesset in *ctober $CC/. ?opes for a breakthrough in the stalemated situation have risen following the death of the long0time leader of the alestinian @iberation *rgani"ation, Jasser Arafat, in :ovember $CC/ and the Kanuary $CC9 election of moderate reformer 4ahmoud Abbas as the new alestinian leader. ?owever, ?amas( victory at the polls in Kanuary $CC; may slow the peace process down considerably. The >.2. has already cancelled funds to the alestinian Authority ) A+ because ?amas is considered a terrorist organi"ation. The !uropean >nion, for now, is still providing much needed funding, but will decide later whether the funds will continue to flow once ?amas has formed a new government. %hether and to what e#tent .srael is willing to negotiate with the new ?amas led A will further depend on the results of the parliamentary elections in 4arch $CC;. I,ory Coast The situation in .vory Coast first began to unravel in 1ecember 1BBB with a military coup that ousted resident 6edie,widely accused of corruption. %hen coup leader 'eneral 'uei

attempted to thwart the *ctober $CCC presidential elections by first dis8ualifying the most popular candidates and then nullifying the results, massive demonstrations ensued and a little known politician, @aurent 'bagbo, was sworn in as the elected president. A second, violent confrontation occurred in 1ecember $CCC when legislative elections were marred by political maneuvering. After a failed coup attempt in Kanuary $CC1, all parties pledged to work toward reconciliation. The reconciliation ended with an apparent coup attempt in 2eptember $CC$, which was 8uickly followed by the killing of 'eneral 'uei. These events triggered an eruption of open warfare. A rebel group, calling itself the atriotic 4ovement of .vory Coast )4 C.+, sei"ed control of several areas in the north. .n :ovember $CC$, two new groups emerged and took control of territory in the west: 4ovement for eace and Kustice )4 K+ and the opular .vorian 4ovement for the 'reat %est )4 .'*+. The @inas04arcoussis peace accords, providing for a power0sharing government, were signed in Kanuary $CC, and a ceasefire between the northern0based rebels and the southern government was brokered in 4ay $CC,. 3rench forces were deployed to enforce the accords. All sides in the conflict have decried lack of commitment to the peace process and have continued to threaten violence, leading to stalled implementation of the accords. .n 3ebruary $CC/, the >: sent a peacekeeping mission )>:*.C+ to the country. .n 4arch $CC/, the government violently suppressed an opposition demonstration. -ebel forces failed to disarm by the *ctober $CC/ deadline and the government launched air strikes on rebel positions in the north, killing a number of 3rench peacekeepers in the process. 3rance retaliated by destroying the .vorian air force, sparking anti03rench and anti0 foreigner attacks throughout the country. The human rights situation in the country continues to deteriorate and authority is fragmented among government0 and rebel0controlled enclaves.

Myanmar 4.urma5 The ruling military 5unta, the 2tate eace and 1evelopment Council )2 1C, formerly the 2tate @aw and *rder -estoration Council+, maintains its repressive hold on power, however, the 2 1C has moved haltingly toward political pluralism by opening up dialogue with the main opposition movement, the :ational @eague for 1emocracy ):@1+ under pressure from international donors. 2poradic clashes with ethnic militias continue, particularly with the 2han,

7aren, and 7arenni groups, which have established de facto autonomy over traditional lands. The rime 4inister announced in August $CC, that the government would convene a :ational Convention to draft a new constitution, the first phase of its seven0step =road map= to democracyF ethnic groups meeting in 3ebruary $CC/ at the Third !thnic :ationalities 2eminar re5ected the =road map= and instead called for a =tripartite dialogue= between the 2 1C, the :@1 and other political parties, and the ethnic minorities. The 7aren :ational >nion held peace talks with the military government in Kanuary $CC/F a second round of talks was held in 3ebruary. .t was reported in August $CC/ that the 2 1C had launched a military offensive against rebels of the 7arenni :ational rogressive arty )7: Army )22A+. 3resh assaults against rebel bases of the 7: Kanuary $CC9. -igeria 2ince the movement to impose 2hari(a law in the northern 4uslim states gained momentum in 1BBB, tens of thousands have died in communal clashes in the central plains region of :igeria. The clashes, mainly involving ethnic0?ausa )4uslim+ and ethnic0Jorubas )Christian+ but also 3ulani )4uslim+ and Tarok )Christian+, generally diminished in $CC$ but broke out once again in 7aduna in :ovember $CC$ and 8uickly spread. 2erious communal violence between Christians and 4uslims continued unabated through mid0$CC/ but had decreased considerably in the latter monthsF resident *basan5o lifted the state of emergency in :ovember $CC/. 2ince the movement to impose 2hari(a law in the northern 4uslim states gained momentum in 1BBB, tens of thousands have died in communal clashes in the central plains region of :igeria. +, the 7:>, and the 2han 2tate and the 7:> were carried out in

Throughout the conflict in :igeria, the distribution of oil revenues from the :iger delta has been a central element of disagreement between conflict parties. At the beginning of $CC;, rebel groups have kidnapped oil workers, stolen tankers and attacked oil fields claiming to support impoverished communities in the delta and beyond with the proceeds of their activities.

Corruption among oil workers and government officials tied to the oil business is high and adds fuel to the conflict. .n addition, foreign oil companies are blamed for e#porting the profits without investing in local communities. 0hilippines The transition of power from resident !strada to his vice0president 'loria 4acapagal Arroyo prompted a significant change in the government(s policy toward the 4oro .slamic @iberation 3ront )4.@3+, which broke from the main 4oro :ational @iberation 3ront )4:@3+ following the latter group(s signing of a peace agreement and continued to seek an independent 4uslim state in 4indanao. .n $CCC !strada had adopted a hard0line policy against the 4.@3 and launched a military offensive against them. Arroyo, however, initiated a more conciliatory path. eace talks between the government and 4.@3 began in 4ay $CC1 and a cease0fire was signed in August $CC1. The peace process stalled, however, in early $CC$ as a splinter, e#tremist group, Abu 2ayyaf, staged high profile attacks on civilian targets and the >nited 2tates e#tended its global war on terrorism to the hilippines. 4alaysia acted as broker for talks between the government and the 4.@3 leadership and, in 2eptember $CC/, sent a monitoring team to monitor a ceasefire between the two sides. The government and the 4.@3 had in Kuly $CC/ agreed to cooperate against kidnapping gangs and the .slamic terrorist group Kemaah .slamiah )K.+. 3ighting continues with the e#tremist Abu 2ayyaf faction. resident Arroyo(s position within the government remains unstable in $CC;. .n 2eptember $CC9, she escaped impeachment on the grounds of corruption and fraud after the opposition in parliament was not able to garner the necessary votes. As a result of a thwarted coup d(etat by senior military official, resident Arroyo has for the first time since the demise of the 4arcos -egime, declared an emergency status. 6ussia The armed conflict between the -ussian government and separatist rebels in the republic of Chechnya that had originally begun in 1BB/ and ended with de facto autonomy for the enclave in 1BB; resumed in autumn 1BBB when rebels staged attacks in neighboring 1agestan. The continuing war has defied -ussia(s concerted attempts to crush the resistance and

contain the fighting. 3ailure to contain the rebels has led to increased friction with neighboring 'eorgia, which has been accused of harboring rebel forces, and periodic attacks by militants in neighboring regions, the most serious incident being an attack on a school in 6eslan, :orth *ssetia on 2eptember 1, $CC/, that resulted in over ,,C deaths )official countF actual numbers may be much higher+. Chechen militants have mounted several deadly terrorist attacks as far away as 4oscow over the course of the conflict, including the sei"ure of ACC hostages in a 4oscow theater in *ctober $CC$ )that ended with -ussian troops storming the theater and resulted in over 19C dead, including all the militants+, a metro train bombing that killed /C in 3ebruary $CC/, and simultaneous commercial airliner bombings in August $CC/ that killed AB persons. Chechen rebels launched attacks into the -ussian republic of .ngushetia in Kune $CC/, raiding arms depots and briefly occupying the .ngush .nterior 4inistry, killing the acting .ngush .nterior 4inister and nearly 1CC others )mostly police and security forces+. .n 3ebruary $CC9, Aslan 4askhadov, the Chechen rebel leader, was killed during a -ussian special military operation, shortly after calling for peace talks with -ussia, a move not supported by the entire Chechen leadership. The new leader, Abdul07halim 2aydullayev, signaled the end of peace talks with -ussia. .n an attempt to widen the conflict, 2aydullayev formed the Caucasus 3ront. Chechen rebels continue to attack -ussian military installations and government buildings in Chechnya. -egional elections were held under tight security in :ovember $CC9. The -ussian0backed >nited 3ront won more than 9CO of the seats, a result that was decried by the separatist forces. !omalia 2poradic armed clashes continued to plague 2omalia in $CC/F many of the more serious factional clashes continue to occur in the capital city, 4ogadishu, which has been carved up among rival warlords since the ouster of the 6arre regime in 1BB1. Narious regions of 2omalia have emerged with fairly stable regional administrations, including 2omaliland )1BB1+, untland )1BBA+, and 2outhwestern 2omalia )$CC$+. A Transitional :ational 'overnment )T:'+ was formed in 2eptember $CCC but it failed to establish any effective authority inside 2omalia. .n the most recent attempt to reestablish a central authority, a peace agreement including all the main warlords and feuding factions, was signed in :airobi, 7enya on Kanuary $B, $CC/, providing for

a $<90member transitional legislature and a referendum on a new constitution. 3ighting broke out along the border between 2omaliland and untland in 2eptember $CC/ and in the southern port of 7ismayo. .n *ctober $CC/, the resident of untland, Col. Jusuf, was elected resident of the new transitional government. rime 4inister Ali 4ohammed 'hedi survived two assassination attempts in $CC9. The various regional administrations and warlords were slow to concede authority to the new government and it remains unclear whether it will be able to establish authority inside the country. @awlessness in 2omalia continued through $CC;. .n addition to violence on land, militias have targeted freighters and passenger ships off the coast of 2omalia. The transitional parliament has, for the first time since it was formed in 7enya in $CC/, met inside 2omalia in 3ebruary $CC;. !udan : /arfur 1arfur, one of 2udan(s most isolated regions, has e#perienced communal violence in the past but no organi"ed armed group operated in the area until the emergence of the 1arfur @iberation 3ront )1@3+ )subse8uently renamed the 2udan @iberation 4ovement/ArmyP 2@4/A+ and the Kustice and !8uality 4ovement )K!4+ in 3ebruary $CC,. The harsh response of the 2udanese government and its support of Arab =5an5aweed= militias, accused of massive human rights violations, brought international condemnation of the ethnic cleansing being carried out in the region. !scalating violence in 1arfur has claimed tens of thousands of lives and resulted in massive refugee flows. The humanitarian situation in 1arfur continued to decline despite a ceasefire called in early $CC/. >nder threat of international sanctions, the government had agreed to disarm the militias and allow human rights monitors in the area, but little progress had been made throughout $CC9. 6ags of wheat provided by >2A.1 are loaded on a truck for transport to 1arfur.

!udan : !outh 3ighting has ceased between the government of 2udan and the main rebel group, the 2udan eople(s @iberation Army )2 @A+, since a comprehensive ceasefire was signed in *ctober $CC$. The war had continued through the summer of $CC$, despite peace talks and the signing of the 4achakos rotocol in Kuly $CC$ declaring agreement on a self0determination

referendum for southern 2udan after a si#0year interim period. :umerous rounds of peace talks held throughout $CC, and $CC/ finally resulted in a comprehensive peace agreement signed on Kanuary B, $CC9, establishing a permanent ceasefire between the rebels and the 2udanese government. .t was hoped the agreement, characteri"ed as =one of the most comple# peace deals in history,= would bring an end to the twenty0year civil war. 1ganda The conflict in north >ganda defies conventional analysis as the main rebel group, the @ord(s -esistance Army )@-A+, has established a fairly secure base of operations in the troubled area across the border in the 2udan. The @-A has been preying mainly on the very large refugee and internally displaced populations in the region. A 1ecember 1BBB agreement between 2udan and >ganda to cooperate in lessening the strength of armed rebel factions in the border regions led to a 4arch $CC$ agreement allowing >ganda armed forces to attack @-A bases in south 2udan. *ne immediate result of the >gandan offensive in 2udan was an increase in @-A attacks in north >ganda. The 4arch $CC$ agreement was e#tended in 1ecember $CC$ to allow >gandan forces access to 2udan territory until the end of Kanuary $CC,. 1espite a /;0day ceasefire and high0level peace talks in late $CC/, the government and the @-A failed to reach agreement on a long0term ceasefire and e#tended peace negotiations. @-A rebels ambushed an army unit in northern >ganda in Kanuary $CC9, prompting resident 4useveni to order the resumption of full0scale operations against the rebels. !ummary The international system is in the midst of substantial change. This may be partially due to the end of the Cold %ar and the conse8uent break up of the eastern and western blocs as well as the severing of relationships with states on the periphery that were once deemed strategically significant by the superpowers. The last $C years have seen a rise in internal conflicts and the proliferation of non0state actors. The nature of contemporary conflicts has changed in many respects. This lesson has identified seven changes: 1. olitical goals related to foreign policy have been replaced by the consolidation of new forms of powerF

$. ,. nationalismF /. 9. ;. <.

The underlying values are based on identities at the communal level and no longer 4obili"ation is achieved through fear and coercion rather than a sense of The sources of e#ternal support have shifted from superpowers to 1iasporas, Asymmetrical warfareF Civilians have increasingly become the target of violenceF andF Armed conflicts are often financed through illegal activities rather than ta#es.

on universal principlesF

mercenaries and bad neighborsF

The second part of the lesson introduced the laws governing international and non0 international conflicts, i.e. ius ad bellum and ius in bello. .t pointed out that the mechanisms of globali"ation and changes in the nature of armed conflict have challenged five key distinction that form the basis for the international law of armed conflict: 1. $. ,. /. 9. .nternational vs. non0international conflicts Crime vs. conflictF Mones of war and "ones of peaceF Times of war and times of peaceF and Civilians and )un0+lawful combatants.

The lesson then highlighted the sources of these challenges and the latest developments, particularly with reference to the 'lobal %ar on Terrorism. The final sections of this lesson presented some aggregate data and provided a brief summary of the on0going armed conflicts through the year $CC9. The data shows that since 1BBC, roughly 1/, of all states have e#perienced internal conflicts, and that ,9 of those conflicts have lasted over seven years. 4ost conflicts take place on the African continent.