VILLASEOR VS. HON.

ABAO, ET ALSANCHEZ, September 29, 196

NATURE
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
FACTS
-Petitioner, a mere government employee, earningbut a monthly salary, of P210.00,
and the solebreadwinner of a family of five, was charged with themurder of a Boac
police sergeant. He was admittedto a P60k bail which was reduced to P40k.
Thepetitioner on May 29 posted a property bond and wasset at provisional liberty.However, respondent Provincial Fiscal amended theinformation, now accusing the
petitioner with DirectAssault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority withMurder"
before the arraignment on the murdercharge. So on August 7, respondent judge
cancelledthe petitioners bond and ordered his immediatearrest.-On September 9
upon petitioners motion toreconsider, the respondent judge resolved to
admitpetitioner to bail provided he puts up a cash bond of P60k.-On September 15,
on petitioners motion thatoriginal bond previously
given
be reinstated,respondent judge resolved to fix "the bond anew inreal property in the
amount of P60,000, but to beposted only by residents of the province of Marinduque
actually staying, therein" with propertieswhich "must be in the possession and
ownership of said residents for five years."-On October 1, petitioner filed a prayer
for preliminjunction to SC, seeking to set aside respondent judge orders of August 7,
September 9 and 15, andto reinstate the bail bond approved on May 29(original
bond), charging the respondent judge of having acted w/o and/or in excess of his
jurisdictionand w/grave abuse of discretion, and w/ violation of the Consti and the
ROC in issuing the disputed orders-Oct 3: the Court issued a writ of
preliminaryinjunction upon a P1k bond.-Nov 5: SC allowed continuation of the
proceedings of the criminal case to avoid delay in its prosecution.
ISSUES
1. WON the orders of August 7 and 9 should be setaside2. WON THE P60K bond
fixed by respondent judgetransgress the constitutional injunction that"(e)xcessive
bail shall not be required?3. WON the condition that the property bond beposted
only by "residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying therein" is within
thepower of the respondent judge4. WON the requirement that properties to be
offeredas bond must be "in the possession and ownership of the sureties for at least
five years is within thepower of the respondent judge
HELD1. NO NEED

Ratio
A rule of ancient respectability is that it is notthe function of a court of justice to
furnish answers topurposeless questions that no longer exist.
Reasoning
The said orders were replaced by thelast order of September 15, 1964, by virtue of
whichthe cash bond required was reverted back toproperty bond. The two orders of
August 7 andSeptember 9, 1964 thus became functus offcio.
2. NO
Ratio
the principal factor considered, to thedetermination of which most other factors
aredirected, is the probability of the appearance of theaccused, or of his flight to
avoid punishment.
Reasoning
Guidelines in fixing bail: (1) ability of theaccused to give bail; (2)) nature of the
offense; (3)penalty for the offense charged; (4) character andreputation of the
accused; (5) health of the accused;(6) character and strength of the evidence;
(7)probability of the accused appearing at trial; (8)forfeiture of other bonds; (9)
whether the accusedwas a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the
accused is under bond for appearance at trial inother cases.Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court (definitionof bail):
"the security required and given for therelease of a person who is in the custody of
the law,that he will appear before any court in which hisappearance may be
required as stipulated in the bailbond or recognizance."-Circular 47 of the
Department of Justice, reiteratedin Circular 48, directed prosecuting attorneys
torecommend bail at the rate of P2,000.00 per year of imprisonment, corresponding
to the medium periodof the penalty prescribed for the offense charged,unless
circumstances warrant a higher penalty. Here,petitioner is charged with a capital
offense, directassault upon an agent of a person in authority withmurder. A complex
crime, it may call for theimposition of capital punishment.
3. YES
Ratio
Bondsmen in criminal cases, residing outsideof the Philippines, are not within the
reach of theprocesses of its courts.- Bail is given to secure appearance of the
accused. If bondsmen reside in far away places, even if withinthe Philippines, the
purpose of bail may befrustrated.

Reasoning
Weighing as heavily against petitioner'scase is the fact that a reading of his petition
fails of an averment that the requisite exacted thatbondsmen be residents of and
actually staying inMarinduque would cause him prejudice. The burdenof his
arguments solely is that such a condition runscounter to the rules of court (
Section 9, Rule 114,Rules of Court
1
)
.-reason why respondent judge issued such condition:it is hard to send notices to
people outside of theprovince through registered mail accompanied byreturn cards
which in many instances have not beenreceived in court when trial comes and when
theparties fail to appear, there is no way of knowingwhether the notices have been
duly received;therefore, he cannot order the confiscation of thebond and the arrest
of the accused because he is notsure whether the bondsmen have been duly
notified;that sending telegrams to people outside theprovince is costly, and the
court cannot afford toincur much expenses.
4. YES
Reasoning
Circular 2 of the Secretary of Justice,addressed, amongst others, to Judges of
FirstInstance recites that it had been brought to theattention of the Department of
Justice that in certainprovinces, unscrupulous persons who are spuriousland owners
have been accepted as sureties. TheSecretary then suggested that "(1)t may be a
goodpolicy not to accept as bail bonds real properties notcovered by certificates of
title unless they have beendeclared for taxation purposes in favor of the
personoffering them as bond for at least five (5) years."-rationale of Circular 2: p

revent the commission of frauds in connection with the posting of personal

bailbonds and to protect the interests of theGovernment.- the order of September
15, 1964 is to beunderstood as excluding properties covered by Torrens titles from
the requirement that properties tobe offered as bond must be "in the possession
andownership of the sureties for at least five years.
Disposition
With the observations heretoforeadverted to, we vote to dismiss the petition
forcertiorari, and to dissolve the writ of preliminaryinjunction issued herein. Costs
against petitioner. Soordered.

HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO.

82544; 28 JUN 1988]
Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: This

is

a petition for Habeas

Corpus.

Petitioners

are

the

following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72.

Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna
respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders
to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended
petitioners at their residences. The Operation Report read that Andrew
Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was
found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the
after Mission Report read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been
under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now.
Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photonegatives and
photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as
boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the
child

prostitutes

were

also

found.

Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were

apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the
CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for selfdeportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for
pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face
deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were
instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised
Administrative

Code.

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation

of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative
Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same

date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by
the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20
April

1988.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain
petitioners

pending

determination

of

existence

of

probable

cause.

(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID
agents.
(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to
petitioners.

Held:

While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it

violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical,
moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners
was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3
months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of
articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a
lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126,
Section12

of

Rules

on

Criminal

Procedure).

The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a validwarrant of

arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this
rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle.
3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search
done

was

incidental

to

the

arrest.

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any

irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its
validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently
conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a
fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement
is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the
beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner ofImmigration are
in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the PhilippineImmigration Act of 1940 in
relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides
that

aliens

shall

be

arrested

and

deported

upon

warrant

of

the Commissioner ofImmigration and Deportation after a determination by

the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation
against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and
never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it
need

not

be

conducted

strictly

in

accordance

with

ordinary

Court

proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge

against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must
also

be

conducted

with

assistance

of

counsel

if

desired.

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the
authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure against the
undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.

Sayson v. People
J. Cortez (1988)

An information for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of aCommercial

Document was filed against the herein petitioner,Ramon SAYSON before the CFI of
Manila

Prosecutions Version:
A blank US dollar check of Bank of America came into the possession of SAYSON.
With intent todefraud one Ernesto Rufino and/or the Bank of America,SAYSON
allegedly filled out said blank check and made it appear as though said check was
issued to one Atty. NorbertoPerez (as payee) in the amount of US$ 2,250 by the
Bank. Bymeans of similar deceits, SAYSON allegedly induced Rufino tochange the
check at the prevailing exchange rate, the total sumamounting to P14, 850.
7

SAYSON was duly arraigned were he pleaded not guilty. Then,trial ensued. Despite
several postponements, the prosecutionrested its case

Time for the defense to present its evidence

on thescheduled day of the hearing, only SAYSON appeared in court.He said that his
counsel had another case in a different court.Contrary to such statement, in the

morning of the said day, hiscounsel has sent a telegram to the court
requestingcancellation of the hearing because he was sick

TC denied the motion for postponement and the case wasconsidered submitted for
decision without petitioner'sevidence

TC ultimately found accused SAYSON guilty of the crimecharged and sentenced him
to an indeterminate penalty of
prison correccional
and to pay a fine of P2,000.00, withsubsidiary imprisonment

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed but modified the penalty byimposing six months of
arresto mayor
and eliminating the fine

Unsatisfied, SAYSON comes now with this petition for reviewon certiorari raising the
following:
ISSUE:
WON SAYSON was denied due process when he wasunable to present his evidence
and convicted thereupon [NO]
HELD:
The instant petition is DENIED and the decision of the CAis AFFIRMED
in toto
RATIO:

The right to be heard by himself and counsel is one of theconstitutional rights of the
accused. But while the accused hassuch a right, the same is not exempt from the
rule on WAIVERas long as the waiver is not controverted to law, public order,public
policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a thirdperson with a right
recognized by law

There is nothing in the Constitution nor in any lawprohibiting such waiver.

Accordingly, denial of dueprocess cannot be successfully invoked where a
validwaiver of rights has been made

SAYSON, however, avers that he was not inclined to waive hisright to present
evidence and his actuations during trial onlysuggests that he was vehemently
asserting such a right by way
7
I have omitted some exciting facts on how he got his hands onthe blank checks a
nd how he was caught. But in case youreinterested, heres a gist of what
happened: SAYSON was friends
with the private secretary of Rufino (owner of theatres in neededdollars). His friend,
however, knew him not as SAYSON but asFiscal/Atty. Norberto Per
ez. When he learned that his friends
boss (Rufino) needed dollars, he offered his perjured check forexchange. Rufino
issued him checks in peso. When SAYSON went
to the bank to encash Rufinos check in his name (posing as Atty.
Perez), the bank teller, being a diligent employee as she is,inquired and verified all
the documents he has presented to herfor encashing purposes. She called the
phone number heprovided, sent a messenger to the home address
SAYSONprovided, etc. When she found out all of them were lies, she

called and notified Rufino and the police. Thats how he got
caught.

As to how he got the blank check, it appears that hestole them while the blank
checks were being shipped from SanFrancisco to the Manila branch of the Bank of
America.of his verbal motion of postponement due to absence of counsel
de parte

Unfortunately for SAYSON, it is too well established a rule that the grant or refusal
of an application for continuance orpostponement of the trial lies within the sound
discretion of the court. And the ruling of the court will not be disturbed onappeal in
the absence of a clear abuse of discretion

When the discretion of the court is exercised with a reasonabledegree of judicial

acumen and fairness, it is one which thehigher court is loath to review or disturb.
The trial judge must be to a certain extent free to secure speedy and
expeditioustrials when such speed and expedition are not inconsistent with fairness

As such, the TC is afforded the favorable presumption of regularity in ruling on

continuances or postponements.
Trial judges are in the best position to form the correct opinionupon the cases
before them due to their peculiar (personal)knowledge of all relevant circumstances
presented.
It wouldtake an extreme case of abuse of discretion to make theaction of the trial
court a denial of due process

IN THE CASE AT BAR, the information was filed on March 1972but the arraignment
was held December the following year na!The prosecution started presenting its
evidence March 1973and after 1 year, 10 months and 1 day, only then did it rest
itscase. During this whole time, SAYSON had already secured 7postponements!

This is a notoriously postponed case!Hence, the judge was right to declare that "the
defense hadabused the rules." No grave abuse of discretion in denying
thepetitioner's motion for postponement can be imputed to thetrial court

In any case, the denial of SAYSONs motion to postpone is

not without other basis.
For starters, it was filed out of time;there was no 3-day notice as required by the
rules (Rule 15,Sec 4, ROC); motion was also not accompanied by an affidavit nor a
medical certificate to support the alleged illness of counsel as required under Rule
22, Sec 5; lastly, there was a
conflict between SAYSONs excuse for his counsels absenceand his counsels own
sorry excuse with the court he sent via
telegram

his motion for postponement was properly denied!

[now comes the relevant issue for our purposes]

The last issue dwells on the effect of the alleged variance between theprosecution's
allegation and proof

SAYSON firmly asserts that his conviction was in grossviolation of his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him because the charge
in theinformation is so much different from the acts proved in court

this is UNTENABLE

SAYSON maintains that he cannot be justifiably convicted

under the information charging him of attempting to defraud
Ernesto Rufino, Sr.
and/or Bank of America because the
totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution showvery clearly that the he
allegedly attempted to defraud MeverFilms, Inc., a corporate entity entirely
separate and distinct from Ernesto Rufino, Sr.

The rule in this jurisdiction is: "variance between theallegations of the information
and the evidence offered bythe prosecution in support thereof does not of itself
entitlethe accused to an acquittal

Also, it has been repeatedly held that when an offense shallhave been described in
the complaint with sufficient certaintyas to identify the act, an erroneous allegation
as to the personinjured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a mereformal
defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantialright of the defendant

The above ruling finds support in the Rules of CriminalProcedure where despite the
requirement that thecomplaint/information should state the name and surname of
the person against whom or against whose property theoffense was committed or
any appellation or nickname bywhich such person has been or is known and if there
is nobetter way of identifying him, he must be described under afictitious name
(Rule 110, Sec 12, ROC), the designation of thename of the offended party is not
absolutely indispensable for

10
CrimPro (Parts 9-10)
AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Martin | Vien

as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint orinformation can be properly
identified

IN THE INSTANT CASE FOR

Estafa
which is a crime against property under the Revised Penal Code, since the check,
whichwas the subject-matter of the offense, was described with suchparticularity as
to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of
convicting the accused,that it was established during the trial that the offended
partywas actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as
alleged in the information

People v. Elesterio; Fe Cruz v. Ex-Judge Enrique Agana (Digest)

Facts: After a brief pursuit operation, policemen found a .32 caliber revolver and
two rounds of live ammunition in the person of Ricardo Elesterio. They also
recovered the holster Elesterio dropped while attempting to escape. The Assistant
City Fiscal filed an information against him in the Court of First Instance of Pasay
City for violating General Order No. 6 in relation to Presidential Decree No. 9.
Elesterio pleaded not guilty during arraignment. During the trial on 14 August 1981,
Patrolman Nepomuceno narrated the arrest and search while Elesterio testified that
the gun was passed to him by one Ray Arong minutes before the patrol car passed
by. Judge Agana asked if the defense had any more witness. The defense counsel
said other witness would corroborate the testimony that Elesterio had earlier gone
to several discotheques but the judge said such would only be cumulative evidence.
The defense rested their case. Judge Agana then dictated his decision in open court
finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to life imprisonment. Elesterio
appealed.
Elesterio, after being committed in Bilibid prison, was able to escape on October
1981. He was recaptured on March 1983. Fe Cruz, his aunt, filed a petition for
habeas corpus. The SC dismissed the habeas corpus case.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred when it 1) dispensed with other testimonies, 2)
concluding the case in one sitting, 3) dictated the decision in open court
immediately after trial?
Held:

1) No. Judge Agana had the right to control the proceedings and to bar unnecessary
testimony that are merely intended to delay the case.

2) No. If all the evidence needed by both parties could be presented in one single
session, there is no reason why any resetting could be made.

3) Yes. Judge Agana was exceptionally careless, if not deliberately high-handed. It

seemed that he had prejudged the case and had a prepared decision even before

the submission of the case. What is worse is that the decision is wrong. Elesterio
cannot be convicted of violating General Order No. 6 in rel. to PD No. 9 because the
second element (motive for carrying firearm is in furtherance of rebellion,
subversion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder) is
not alleged at all. All that is alleged is that Elesterio possessed an unlicensed
firearm with two live bullets outside his residence. It is a wonder that Judge Agana
did not see this very obvious omission. Perhaps he chose not to see it.

However, Elesterio is not entirely guiltless. He can be convicted for illegal

possession of firearms under the provision of Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Under this provision, mere possession of an unlicensed firearm
is malum prohibitum and is punishable regardless of lack of criminal intent or proof
of the ownership of the firearm by another person.

People vs Jardin
Petition for certiorari on decision of CFI Quezondismissing the criminal cases against
accusedDemetrio Jardin because his constitutional right tospeedy trial was allegedly
violated.
FACTS
- The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter-complaint of the Provincial
Auditor of Quezonrequesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessarycriminal
action under Article 217 of the Revised PenalCode against Demetrio Jardin for
malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents onsix counts.
(1967)
- {This case is full of delaying tactics}PI 1
: accused moved to postpone 4 times, andfailed to appear everytime.- PI was
nevertheless conducted. And the six criminalinformations were filed in CFI.AR 1
: accused moved to postpone 4 time, neverappeared; counsel asked for
reinvestigation on theground that the accused was not given theopportunity to
present his defense during thepreliminary investigation. Court granted motion.PI 2
: accused moved to postpone many times, failed still to appear. When he finally
appeared withhis counsel, they asked for 15 days to filememorandum. The
memorandum was never filed, sothe investigating fiscal filed a manifestation
beforethe court that the records of these cases be returnedand the trial on the
merits of the same be set.- The court transferred the case to new branch of
CFIQuezon without acting on manifestation.Arraignment date was set.AR 2
: more postponements at instance of accused; moved for reinvestigation again.
Court granted.PI 3
: reset because no show. Counsel then askedfor 5 days to file written sworn
statement of accusedas defense. No statement was submitted so therecords of the
case were returned to court. A datewas set for arraignment.-

AR 3
: accused asked for postponement. Arraignment finally happened on Sept 8,1970
. Accused pleaded NOT GUILTY and asked fortrial to be postponed. On postponed
date, accusedasked for another postponement.- Oct 1970, accused and counsel
were at trial; but noone appeared for prosecution, except for a statewitness.
Counsel moved (orally) for dismissal,invoking accused right to a speedy trial.
Courtgranted motion and dismissed the cases.
ISSUES
1. WON accused can invoke right to speedy trial2. WON this appeal places the
accused in double jeopardy
HELD
1. NO- The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the cases and in basing thedismissal on the constitutional right of the accused
tospeedy trial.- The right to a speedy trial means that the accusedis free from
vexatious, capricious, and oppressivedelays, its salutary objective being to assure
that aninnocent person may be free from anxiety andexpense of a court litigation
or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortestpossible time
compatible with the presentation andconsideration of whatever legitimate defense
he mayinterpose.- The delays in the prosecution of the offenses wereall caused by
the accused so he cannot invokeconstitutional right to speedy trial. By his
owndeliberate acts, he is deemed to have waived orabandoned his right to a speedy
trial2. NO- The dismissal of the criminal cases against theaccused by the
respondent court on the ground thathis right to speedy trial had been violated was
devoidof factual and legal basis.- In order that the protection against double
jeopardymay inure to the benefit of an accused, the followingrequisites must be
present in the first prosecution:(a) a valid complaint or information;(b) a competent
court;(c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and(d) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted, or thecase against him was dismissed or
otherwiseterminated without his express consent.- The last requisite is not present
because the orderof the CFI judge was null and void.
Dispositive
Petition granted. The criminal cases arereinstated and the proper regional trial court
isordered to proceed with all deliberate speed in thesecases.

Sec. 12, par. 1 RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL--NO DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS WHERE APPELLANT'S RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WAS NOT
VIOLATED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
CARLITO LINSANGAN
[G.R. No. 88589. April 16, 1991.]FACTS:This is an appeal from the decision dated
April 26, 1988, of the Regional Trial Court , finding theaccused guilty of the crime of
Violation of Section 4 of Article II in relation to Section 21, Art. IV of Republic Act
6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Law), as amended, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of
reclusion perpetua
with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of P20,000 plus costs.It
was established during the trial that in early November, 1987, police operatives of
the DrugEnforcement Unit, Police Station No. 3 of the Western Police District were
informed that there wasrampant drug using and pushing on Dinalupihan Street,
Tondo, Manila. The pusher was described to themas a boy of about 20 years, 5'5" in
height, and of ordinary build. He allegedly sold marijuana to anybody,regardless of
age.In light of these reports, Police Lieutenant Manuel Caeg and the other members
of the unitorganized a "buy-bust" operation , to effect the arrest of the notorious
drug pusher. On November 13,1987 at 10 o'clock in the morning, before the group
left the office for the area of operation, two (2) ten-peso bills were given to Pat.
Corpuz who had marked them with his initials "T.C." He gave one of themarked bills
to the informer. The said marked bills was then found tucked in the waist of the
accusedafter he was frisked and arrested by the police for handing over to the
informer and police poseur-buyerten (10) cigarette sticks of hand rolled
marijuana.Linsangan denied the charge. He alleged that at around 10:30 in the
morning of November 13,1987, he was in the vendor's stand of his neighbor
Emeterio Balboa, alias Rey Galunggong, on DinalupihanStreet to buy his breakfast,
for he had just awakened. He lived with his widowed mother, Erlinda, on theground
floor of a two-storey house on the alley at 1284 Dinalupihan Street, Tondo, Manila.
The upperfloor was occupied by his mother's brother, Geosito Diaz, who is engaged
in the second-hand tirebusiness. Although once in a while, his uncle helped them
financially, he earned his living by driving atricycle on a 5 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. shift.
He admitted that he had witnessed some men in Dinalupihanengaged in drinking
sprees and smoking marijuana.ISSUE:Whether or not the lower court erred in not

holding that when the policemen required him to initial theP10-bills, they violated
his constitutional right to counsel, to remain silent, and not to incriminate himself
while under custodial investigation.HELD:The appeal has no merit. The appellant
was not denied due process during the custodial investigation.Although he was not
assisted by counsel when he initialled the P10-bills that the police found tucked
inhis waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated for his possession of
the marked bills did notconstitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his
act of selling marijuana cigarettes. Hisconviction was not based on the presence of
his initials on the P10 bills, but on the fact that the trial courtbelieved the testimony
of the policemen that they arrested him while he was actually engaged in
sellingmarijuana cigarettes to a member of the arresting party. The trial court gave
more credence to theircategorical declarations than to the appellant's denials. That
is as it should be for as law enforcers, theyare presumed to have performed their
official duties in a regular manner. Their task of apprehendingpersons engaged in
the deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and procedural technicalities
tomake it doubly so.

People vs. Linsangan

People vs. Linsangan

Post under Imprisonment for Debt , Political Law Case Digests

No person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax.

Facts:
Linsangan was prosecuted for non-payment of the cedula or poll tax under section 1439,
inconnection with section 2718, of the Revised AdministrativeCode. After due trial, he was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five days, and to pay the costs. From this judgment he
appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in not declaring said sections 1439 and 2718 of
the Revised Administrative Code unconstitutional and void.
Held:
This case was tried and decided in the court below before the Constitution of the Philippines
took effect. But while this appeal was pending, the said Constitution became effective,
and, section 1, clause 12, of Article III thereof provides that "no person shall be imprisoned
for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax." This introduces a new element into the case, for while
our previous organic law provided that no person should be imprisoned for debt, it
contained

no

expressprovision against

imprisonment

for

non-payment

of

poll

or cedula tax.
Turning again to the particular question raised in this case, section 2 of Article XV of the
Constitution, provides:
All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by
the National Assembly, and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the
Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this Constitution.
It

seems

too

clear

to

require

demonstration

that

section

2718

of

the

RevisedAdministrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the
Constitution, in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for nonpayment of the poll

or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of the Government
of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the RevisedAdministrative Code became
inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be based thereon. (People vs. Ambrosio
Linsangan, G.R. No. L-43290, December 21, 1935)

Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan [GR L-72335-39, 21 March 1988]

En Banc, Yap (J): 14 concur
Facts: Sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los Reyes, former Head Executive
Assistant of the then
Department of Public Information (DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the
Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a
formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging
Francisco S. Tatad, who
was then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged
violations of Republic
Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently,
no action was taken on
said report. Then, in October 1979, or 5 years later, it became publicly known that
Tatad had submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, and 2 months
after, or on 12 December 1979, Antonio de los
Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP Case 8005-16-07) against Tatad,
accusing him of graft and
corrupt practices in the conduct of his office as then Secretary of Public Information.
The complaint repeated
the charges embodied in the previous report filed by complaint before the Legal
Panel, Presidential Security
Command (PSC). On 26 January 1980, the resignation of Tatad was accepted by
President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. On 1 April 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los
Reyes to the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. On 16 June 1980, Roberto
P. Dizon, CIS
Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation
Report, with the following
conclusion, "evidence gathered indicates that former Minister Tatad had violated
Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA

3019, respectively. On the other hand, Mr. Antonio L. Cantero is also liable under
Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and
recommended appropriate legal action on the matter. Tatad moved to dismiss the
complaint against him,
claiming immunity from prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was
denied on 26 July 1982 and
his motion for reconsideration was also denied on 5 October 1982. On 25 October
1982, all affidavits and
counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. On 5 July 1985,
the Tanodbayan approved a
resolution, dated 1 April 1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor Marina Buzon,
recommending that the
informations be filed against Tatad before the Sandiganbayan, for (1) violation of
Section 3, paragraph (e) of
RA 3019 for giving D'Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law,
unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions through manifest
partiality and evident bad
faith; (2) violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of R.A. 3019 for receiving a check of
P125,000.00 from
Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as
consideration for the release of a
check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention
Referendum in 1973; and (3) violation of Section 7 of R.A. 3019 on three (3) counts
for his failure to file his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978."
Accordingly, on 12 June
1985, informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Tatad (Criminal cases
10499 to 10503). On 22
July 1985, Tatad filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the
information on the ground

that, among others, "the prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of

law and of the right to a
speedy disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction of
file the informations."
On 26 July 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated
motion to quash. On August
9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its resolution denying Tatad's motion to
quash. On 10 August 1985, the
Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case 10500, changing the
date of the commission of
the offense to 30 September 1974. On 30 August 1985, Tatad filed a consolidated
motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the Sandiganbayan on 17 September 1985. On 16 October
1985, Tatad filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the long delay in teh termination of the preliminary investigation by
the Tanodbayan violated
tatads rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases.
Held: A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that
political motivations played a
vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly,
the complaint came to life,
as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos.
Secondly, departing from
established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which
require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Presidential Security
Command for fact-finding investigation and report. The Court cannot emphasize too
strongly that prosecutors
should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is
being used or prostituted,

wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive
of, the basic and
fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear
or favor to any and all
litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by
strict adherence to the
established procedure may the public's perception of the impartiality of the
prosecutor be enhanced. Coming
into the main point, the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan is
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of
the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the timelimitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the
case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due
process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the
broad umbrella of the due
process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of
cases as embodied in Section
16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution), the inordinate
delay is violative of Tatad's
constitutional rights. A delay of close to 3 years can not be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the present case. The Court is not impressed by the
attempt of the Sandiganbayan
to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay
may be due to a
painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government
official." In the first
place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected.

Secondly, three out of the five charges against Tatad were for his alleged failure to
file his sworn statement of
assets and liabilities required by RA 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual
issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a
delay of almost three years in
terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged
bribery and alleged giving
of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and
factual issues, certainly do
not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to
resolve the case. After a
careful review of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court was constrained
to hold that the inordinate
delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the
instant case is violative of
the constitutionally guaranteed right of Tatad to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against
him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502
and 10503 should be
dismissed.

Lozano vs. Martinez

GR L-63419, 18 December 1986
En Banc, Yap (J): 9 concur
FACTS: Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April 1979. The petitions
arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs. RTC Judge
Antonio M. Martinez [Manila, Branch XX] in GR L-63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive
Judge Glicerio L. Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio and Susan Datuin vs.
RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 71654, Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge
Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25, Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A.
Gerochi Jr. [Makati, Branch 139] in GR 75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding Judge of
Branch 154 of Pasig in GR 75812-13, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro,
Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and People vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila, Branch 52] and Thelma
Sarmiento in GR 75789]. Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and Sarmiento moved
seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense,
the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the trial courts, except in one case, which
is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs. Nitafan), wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional
and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief.
ISSUE: Whether BP 22 is a valid legislative act.
HELD: Yes. It is within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of the police
power. It is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and
inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not
be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it
inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. BP 22 is
aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end
up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes, nor is it intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
Further, a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its
constitutionality. Where it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the limits of its authority under the
constitution, the Court should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily on the offending statute

PEOPLE v RELOVA
148 SCRA 292
CANIZA v PEOPLE (AGLORO)
159 SCRA 16FELICIANO; March 18, 1988
NATURE
Petition for Prohibition and certiorari directed at 1)the CFI Order of Nov. 27, 1979
issued by Branch 23of CFI of Manila in Criminal Case 46768 and 2) saidcourts Order
of March 20, 1980 in the same casedenying Canizas Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS
- March 20, 1974: Assistant City Fiscal of Manila filedan Information for falsification
of public documentsallegedly committed on Nov. 5, 1968 by Caniza.- May 24, 1974:
Caniza filed Motion to Quash sayingthat allegations in the information did not
constitutean offense, and that the information containedaverments which, if true,
would constitute a legalexcuse or justification- trial court granted Motion to Quash,
dismissed caseagainst Caniza- Fiscals Motion for Reconsideration of this Orderwas
denied- June 13, 1979: a second Information (docketed asCriminal Case 46768) was
filed charging Caniza withsubstantially the same offense as that charged underthe
previous information- Caniza moved to quash this second information onthe
grounds that 1) the offense charged had alreadyprescribed, 2)quashal of the first
Information hadbeen on the merits, 3)the allegations of the secondInformation did
not constitute and offense- Respondent judge issued an order denying themotion to
quash- He also denied Canizas motion for reconsideration
ISSUES
1. WON the offense charged had already prescribed2. WON the filing of the second
Information hasplaced the accused in jeopardy of punishment for thesame offense a
second time
HELD
1. NO
Reasoning5 years, 4 months, and 16 days had elapsedbetween November 5, 1968 (the date of
commissionof the alleged offense) and March 20 1974 (date of filing the first
information); 4 years, 2 months and 12days had elapsed between April 3, 1975
(date of denial by the trial court of the Fiscals motion forreconsideration) and June

13, 1979 (date of filing of the second information). A total of 9 years, 6 monthsand
28 days had been consumed by the time thesecond Information was filed in court.Under Article 90, in relation with Article 172 of theRevised Penal Code, the crime of
falsification of public document committed by a private individual -the offense with
which petitioner Caiza is presentlycharged - prescribes in ten (10) years. In this
respect,Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code states further:
- Computation of prescription of offenses
. Theperiod of prescription shall commence to run fromthe day on which the crime
is discovered by theoffended party, the authorities, or their agents, andshall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint orinformation, and
shall commence to run again whensuch proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted,
or are justifiablystopped for any reason not imputable to him.2. NO
Reasoning
ection 9 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
6
liststhe following requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may be
successfully invoked by anaccused person:a.
a valid Complaint or Information or other formal

charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain aconviction;

b. a Court of competent jurisdiction;c. that the accused had pleaded to the
chargeagainst him;d. that the accused had been convicted, or acquitted,or
the case against him dismissed or otherwiseterminated without his express consent
; and

e. that the second offense charged is the same asthe first, or an attempt to commit
the same or apetition thereof, or that the second offensenecessarily includes or is
necessarily included in thefirst offense charged.- Criminal Case No. 16879 was
ordered dismissed bythe trial court with the express consent of theaccused i.e.,
upon Motion to Quash filed bypetitioner Caiza. Generally, a dismissal under
suchcircumstance win not bar another prosecution for thesame offense; the
defendant, in having the caseagainst him dismissed, thereby waives

hisconstitutional right against double jeopardy for thereason that he effectively

prevents the trial courtfrom proceeding to trial on the merits and renderinga
judgment of conviction against him- Application of the aforestated
doctrine of waiver
,however, is subject to two (2)
sine qua non
conditions: first, dismissal must have been sought orinduced by the defendant,
either personally orthrough counsel; and second,
such dismissal must not have been on the merits and must not necessarily amount
to an acquittal
. In this respect,the record shows that petitioner Caiza moved toquash the
first Information
(Criminal Case No. 16879)on grounds that the allegations made therein did
notconstitute an offense and/or that the first Informationcontained allegations
which, if true, constituted alegal excuse or justification. These grounds, uponwhich
the trial court anchored its 27 November 1974Order of dismissal, are clearly
directed at thesufficiency of said information to sustain theconviction of petitioner
Caniza and, hence, indicatethe absence of the first requisite in doublejeopardy.Furthermore, and more importantly, dismissal of acriminal action on this
basis is not properlyconsidered as amounting to an
acquittal on themerits
; from a legal standpoint, the defendant isdeemed as not having been charged with
thecommission of any offense whatsoever under thedeficient information.
Consequently, petitionerCaizas plea of second jeopardy cannot besustained: he
effectively waived his right to assertthat plea when he moved to quash the
firstInformation filed against him.
Dispositive
Petition for Prohibition and certiorari isDISMISSED. The 8 December 1980 Resolution
of thisCourt giving due course to the Petition is withdrawnand the disputed Orders
dated 27 November 1979and 20 March 1980 issued by respondent judge inCriminal
Case No. 46768 are hereby AFFIRMED. Thiscase is remanded to the court
a quo
for trial on themerits

Case Digest on People v. Relova

November 10, 2010
Facts:
1 Feb 1, 1975 Police searched the ice plant owned by Opulencia; they discovered electric wiring, devices and
contraptions had been installed without necessary authority from city govt
2 Nov 24, 1975 Asst. City Fixcal filed info against Opulencia for violation of a city ordinance which prohibits
unauthorized wiring installations.
3 Opulencia pleaded not guilty and filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the crime had alrdy prescribed (offense
charged was a light felony w/c prescribes 2 mos from discovery thereof.)
4 Lower court dismissed the case
5 Acting City Fiscal filed another info for theft of electric power
6 Opulencia filed Motion to Quash upon the ground of double jeopardy
7 Judge Relova granted motion and dismissed the case.
8 Motion for Recon denied, hence this appeal
Issue: WON there was double jeopardy
Ratio Decidendi: A person who was charged for violating a city ordinance for having installed a metering device to
lower his electric bills which was dismissed for prescription of the offense may not be charged again for theft of
electric power under the RPC
Reasons:
1 The second sentence of Art. IV Sec. 22 embodies an exception to the gen. Proposition: the consti protection,
against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the
offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the RPC, provided that both offenses spring from
the same act or set of acts
2 Where an offense is punished by different sections of a statute or different statutes, the inquiry, for purposes of
double jeopardy is on the identity of offenses charged BUT where an offense is penalized by an ordinance and a
statute, the inquiry is on the identity of acts.
Since the dismissal of the case against Opulencia for violation of an ordinance alrdy amounted to an acquittal, he can
no longer charged with an offense punishable under a statute which arise from the same act

Rufino Nuez vs Sandiganbayan & the

People of the Philippines
on November 15, 2010

Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan

Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD
1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public
officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of
the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims
that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because
appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal
likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and
trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC,
instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal
as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the
CA and thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as
appeals would be concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a
special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged
with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a
special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which
cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may
thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973,
when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused
therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily
offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification
therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it
must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of

the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous
decision from 3 justices - a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully
reached than other trial courts.

Read full text

Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)

Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the
government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to
two appellate courts first, to the CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of
private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers,
who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to the
SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial
court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination.
Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that
meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the
intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two
appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to
the people.
Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan
can only be reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the
SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor
findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as
serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA,
and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when
the trial courts judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise
the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as
they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.
Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of

innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond
reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution)

Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board

on November 12, 2011

Political Law The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill

Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD 1994 which amended the National
Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be collected on each
processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of
five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be
subject to sales tax. The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of
videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms
has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that
such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30%
tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax
imposition provision is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PD embraces only one subject.
HELD: The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is
not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to
accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are
germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general object. The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to
the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. In the case at
bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video

industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with,
nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. The express purpose of the
PD to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the
uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5 of the said PD
which explain the motives of the lawmakers in presenting the measure. The title of the PD,
which is the creation of the VRB, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to
express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the PD.

Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc.

vs Presidential Commission on Good
Government
on November 19, 2012

150 SCRA 181 Business Organization Corporation Law A Corporation Cannot Invoke the
Right Against Self-Incrimination
When President Corazon Aquino took power, the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) was formed in order to recover ill gotten wealth allegedly acquired by
former President Marcos and his cronies. Aquino then issued two executive orders in 1986
and pursuant thereto, a sequestration and a takeover order were issued against Bataan
Shipyard & engineering Co., Inc. (BASECO). BASECO was alleged to be in actuality owned
and controlled by the Marcoses through the Romualdez family, and in turn, through dummy
stockholders.
The sequestration order issued in 1986 required, among others, that BASECO produce
corporate records from 1973 to 1986 under pain of contempt of the PCGG if it fails to do so.
BASECO assails this order as it avers, among others, that it is against BASECOs right against
self incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures.
ISSUE: Whether or not BASECO is correct.
HELD: No. First of all, PCGG has the right to require the production of such documents
pursuant to the power granted to it. Second, and more importantly, right against selfincrimination has no application to juridical persons. There is a reserve right in the
legislature to investigate the contracts of a corporation and find out whether it has exceeded
its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a
corporation like BASECO to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of
sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been
abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose.
Neither is the right against unreasonable searches and seizures applicable here. There were
no searches made and no seizure pursuant to any search was ever made. BASECO was
merely ordered to produce the corporate records.