GM 08 030 02 PDF

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02
This is a Controlled Document that complies with Wesfarmers Chemicals, Energy & Fertilisers formatting and Quality Control standards. Please check that this is the latest available version before use. Title: Number: Version Number: Date Revised: Owner: Authoriser: Reasons for Creating or Amending Document
HAZOP PROCESS GM-08-030-02

15.0 08 May 2013 Harish Chopra Manoj Thakur New Owner New Authoriser Full Review of Document
Actual Change Details:
Document reviewed and revised. Owner and authoriser changed. Sections 5.1 to 5.5 changes made from SiteSafe to Cintellate plus changes on how to action HAZOP's in Cintellate
Version No. 15.0 Document last modified: 08 May 2013. PDF created: 08 May 2013.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
FIGURE 1 - HAZOP PROCESS FLOW CHART............................................................................................. 3
1. 2. 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3. 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4. 5. 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6. 6.1 6.2 7. 8.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 4 HAZOP PREPARATION ........................................................................................................ 4 HAZOP LEADER ................................................................................................................. 4 SELECTION OF HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBERS ...................................................... 5 OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES .............................................................................................. 7 INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR HAZOP STUDY ......................................................... 7 HAZOP TERMINOLOGY ...................................................................................................... 8 SYSTEM ............................................................................................................................... 8 DESIGN INTENT ................................................................................................................. 8 HAZOP GUIDE WORDS ..................................................................................................... 8 HAZOP STUDY RECORD .................................................................................................. 8 RISK ASSESSMENT ........................................................................................................... 9 HAZOP MEETING PROCEDURE ...................................................................................... 10 HAZOP FOLLOW UP ACTIONS ........................................................................................ 11 ACTION PROGRESS MANAGEMENT ........................................................................... 11 FOLLOW UP ...................................................................................................................... 12 ACTION COMPLETION ................................................................................................... 13 CINTELLATE REPORTING ............................................................................................. 13 ALTERNATIVE HAZOP ACTION TRACKING PROCEDURE ..................................... 13 HAZOP CLOSURE ................................................................................................................ 15 CLOSE-OUT ....................................................................................................................... 15 CLOSE OUT MEETING .................................................................................................... 15 DOCUMENTATION .............................................................................................................. 15 RECORD KEEPING TABLE................................................................................................ 16
APPENDIX 1 - RISK ASSESSMENT TABLES ............................................................................. 17 APPENDIX 2 - HAZARD STUDY CARDS ..................................................................................... 18
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Select line
Select guideword eg High Flow Review planned safeguards and carry out Risk Assessment. For events with extreme consequences, a further action may be recorded to consider a SIL, LOPA or other process safety risk study outside the HAZOP meeting
Can High Flow occur?
Yes
Are consequences potentially very serious?
Yes
No
No
Reviews planned safeguards and informally assess risk
Yes
Are safeguards adequate?
No
Agree and record No suggested changes to plant design or operation which will reduce risk to acceptable level
Yes
Is cost of changes justified?
No Agree any further actions on this item Agree further actions after HAZOP to reduce risk to acceptable level
Go to next Guide Word card
Figure 1 - HAZOP Process Flow Chart
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1.
INTRODUCTION
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent a risk to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation. A HAZOP is a qualitative technique based on "guide words" and is carried out by a multi-disciplinary team (the HAZOP Team) during one or more meetings. This Guide Manual defines the principles for conducting a HAZOP study, the tools that will be used and the documentation that will be produced. It provides guidance on the information that is required to prepare for and run a HAZOP study. This Guide Manual does not define when a HAZOP study should be carried out. In the case of modifications, this is defined in Engineering Modification (GM-05-050-01). A HAZOP study is a mandatory requirement for any new plant and for modifications to "critical" plant items as defined in the Modification Procedure. A HAZOP is a design verification process. It should not be used as a design development process. The HAZOP should be performed at the stage in the design process when all preliminary engineering is complete and the basic design has been fixed. This includes complete process design, process flow diagrams, P&IDs, plant and equipment layout, operating philosophy, control and instrumentation philosophy, utilities requirements, specification and selection of major equipment items, protection systems, start up and shutdown systems. A HAZOP may be conducted on an existing facility to identify modifications that should be implemented to reduce risk and operability problems. The HAZOP process is most suited to analysis of piping systems and can extend to solid materials handling systems. For solid material handling projects that do not involve any piping systems, a design review as detailed in Engineering Project Design Review (EP-08-030-19) should be carried out instead of a HAZOP.
2.
HAZOP PREPARATION
It is the responsibility of the Responsible Officer to initiate the HAZOP study where the project or modification meets the criteria defined in Engineering Modification (GM-05-050-01).
2.1
HAZOP LEADER
The Responsible Officer will first appoint an independent HAZOP Leader to act as the Chairperson for the HAZOP meetings. The HAZOP Leader must be trained in HAZOP methodology and have successfully completed a suitably recognised HAZOP Leader Course, or equivalent experience, as approved by the Manager - Project Engineering. The HAZOP Leader should be independent, i.e. with no responsibility for the process or operations in the area where the process being reviewed is located. Current approved CSBP HAZOP Leaders are as follows: 1. 2. 3. Version No. 15.0 Document last modified: 08 May 2013. PDF created: 08 May 2013. Ambrose Hargan Barry Wagg Colin McKenzie Page 4 of 62
4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Note:
Daniel Massie Eli Knudsen Kim Eng Peter Hein Phillip Brown Sakar Scott Olsen Yvonne Darlow Deepak Gupta Justin Manganaro Jamal Fozdar Vinod Verma If there is no CSBP HAZOP Leader available from within CSBP, an external Chairperson who is a qualified HAZOP Leader with experience in chemical industries may be engaged.
2.2
SELECTION OF HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBERS
HAZOP studies will be conducted using a team approach, with a minimum of four members. The Responsible Officer together with the HAZOP Leader will select the HAZOP team members to achieve the spread of knowledge and skills required for the particular project, and may include: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Representative of the customer A person with Process knowledge A person with Safety knowledge A person with Environmental knowledge A person with operating and/or maintenance experience in comparable environment A person with Engineering/Design knowledge Secretary
How this knowledge and experience is represented in the team depends on the size and nature of the change being reviewed by the HAZOP. As a guide in team member selection for projects of different sizes, refer to the table below. However, the final selection will be at the discretion of the HAZOP Leader and/or the responsible officer having regard for potential risk. It is expected (but not essential) that the people selected as members of the HAZOP team will already have completed a suitably recognised HAZOP Team Member training course, or equivalent experience, and have a good understanding of the HAZOP process. Note: The HAZOP shall be led by a person considered to be independent to the day to day responsibilities of the process plant, who nonetheless has sound process knowledge of the plant being HAZOPed. For example: (i) A process engineer responsible for a different but similar plant on site; or (ii) A process engineer/ technical officer/ superintendent/ manager who previously had process engineering/ process chemistry/ technical operational responsibilities for the plant concerned but works elsewhere in the business, are considered suitable independent persons to lead a HAZOP. Version No. 15.0 Document last modified: 08 May 2013. PDF created: 08 May 2013. Page 5 of 62
At least one process knowledge representative in the HAZOP team must be of sufficient experience having sound knowledge and understanding of the process fundamentals as well as possess high abstract reasoning capabilities. This HAZOP team member is usually the most experienced resident process engineer responsible for the plant. When requested by the HAZOP leader, the HAZOP leader can be supported by the process knowledge representative in the team.
TEAM MEMBERSHIP
SMALL PROJECT for example Minor Alteration Independent Chairperson MEDIUM PROJECT for example Replacing Sections of Plant Independent Chairperson LARGE PROJECT for example New Plant or Replacing more than 50% of a Plant External Chairperson Process Designers Design Engineer Project Engineer/Plant Engineer (i.e., Responsible Officer) Plant Process Engineer or Manufacture Team Leader Manufacture Team representative Project Engineer/Plant Engineer (i.e. Responsible Officer) Plant Process Engineer or Manufacture Team Leader Manufacture Team representative/Maintenance Team representative OSH Advisor and Environmental Advisor Others as required: Electrical/Instrument representative OSH Advisor and Environmental Advisor Improvement Facilitator Maintenance Team representative Other specialist knowledge. Others as required: Electrical/Instrument representative Improvement Facilitator Responsible Officer/Senior Project Engineer Plant Process Engineer Manufacture Team representative/Maintenance Team representative OSH Advisor and Environmental Advisor Others as required: Electrical/Instrument representative Improvement Facilitator Equipment vendor representative Other specialist knowledge
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2.3
OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES
The Responsible Officer is responsible for the following HAZOP study arrangements: a. b. c. d. Organising meeting dates, venue and notices to the attendees Layout of venue and supply of stationery and other resources for the meeting Provision of information required for the HAZOP study (refer to Section 2.4) Close out meeting date, venue and notice to the attendees.
2.4
INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR HAZOP STUDY
The following information should be assembled by the Responsible Officer and the HAZOP Leader before the HAZOP study team commences work. a. ESSENTIAL ITEMS 1. 2. b. Functionally complete P & ID for the process System design philosophy and process description
DESIRABLE ITEMS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Plot plans or layouts Process flow diagrams Piping class specifications Equipment data sheets and purchase specifications Vessel inventories Relief valve specifications Start up and emergency shut-down procedures Emergency depressurising system functions Electrical area classification Standards used Procedures - operating and maintenance as applicable
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3.
3.1
HAZOP TERMINOLOGY
SYSTEM
A System is a specific location or logical part of the process or operation in which possible deviations from the design intent are to be evaluated. Examples might be a heat exchanger, vessel, pump, compressor and interconnecting pipeline or group of lines. Systems should be progressively identified on the P&ID as the HAZOP study proceeds.
3.2
DESIGN INTENT
The design intent is a description of how the process is expected to behave at the system being studied. This is qualitatively described as an activity eg feed, reaction, transfer, heating, and quantitatively in process parameters such as pressure, temperature, flow rate.
3.3
HAZOP GUIDE WORDS
All HAZOP studies will be conducted using the HAZOP Study Cards included in Appendix 2. These HAZOP Study Cards provide guide words and prompts for a range of deviations from acceptable conditions, and each of these must be individually considered by the HAZOP team for each System. This review is done "line by line" by selecting a line or System off the P&ID and reviewing each of the guide words on the HAZOP Study Cards for that System. When all guide words have been reviewed for a particular line or System, the process is repeated for the next line or System selected off the P&ID.
3.4
HAZOP STUDY RECORD
HAZOP Study Record form SF1309 is used to create a historic record of the HAZOP Study. Details of discussions, decisions taken, risk assessments made and further actions recommended during evaluation of each of the HAZOP Study Cards will be progressively recorded by the HAZOP Secretary on the HAZOP Study Record form. Discussions on each of the following items should be recorded for each guide word. 3.4.1 Deviation
A deviation is a way in which the process conditions may depart from the design intent as suggested by each guide word, eg high pressure. 3.4.2 Cause
As each guide word is considered, if it is determined that a deviation, eg high pressure, could occur, then the possible cause or circumstances that would allow the deviation to occur should be identified. There may be several causes identified for one deviation. When reviewing the various causes of a deviation, it is best to start with the causes that may result in the worst possible consequences. 3.4.3 Consequence
Having identified a possible cause for the deviation, the HAZOP Team should then assess the possible consequences if the deviation occurred. Consequences may comprise both process Version No. 15.0 Document last modified: 08 May 2013. PDF created: 08 May 2013. Page 8 of 62
hazards and operability problems. Several consequences may follow from one cause. One consequence can have several causes. Each cause and consequence scenario identified should be recorded in the HAZOP Study Record form and must be comprehensive, realistic and sequential. eg "Closed valve in pump discharge causes high pressure which leads to pipe rupture which results in a loss of 20 kg of ammonia to atmosphere before a shut off valve closes". 3.4.4 Safeguards
Safeguards are facilities, processes or procedures that help to reduce the likelihood or frequency of the deviation, or to mitigate its consequences. Examples of safeguards include the following. a. b. c. d. e. f. g. procedures to define what actions to take in the event of a deviation increased frequency of inspection, servicing or calibration of critical items facilities that draw attention to the deviation (eg indicators and alarms to inform operators so that they can make the process safe) facilities that automatically compensate for the deviation (eg an automatic control system, usually an integrated part of the process control) facilities that prevent the deviation from occurring (eg excess flow valve) facilities that prevent further escalation of the deviation (eg by total trip of the activity or process by a safety interlock, control system, or emergency shutdown (ESD) system) facilities that relieve the process from a hazardous deviation (eg pressure safety valve (PSV) and vent systems)
As each cause and consequence scenario is identified, planned safeguards should be reviewed to determine if they are adequate to either prevent the deviation or to protect the System if the deviation occurs. Any decision on the adequacy of the safeguards should take into consideration the magnitude of the potential consequences and the likelihood of the event occurring with all the planned safeguards in place. This is reflected in the risk assessment as below. Each scenario will usually have more than a single layer of protection. For high risk deviations, it is useful to review each of the layers of protection before determining the adequacy of the safeguards. 3.4.5 Recommendations
If the HAZOP Team recommends that additional safeguards or changes to the design should be made to ensure the safety of the system, these recommendations must be recorded on the HAZOP Record for further action after the HAZOP study. The name of the person who will be responsible for the further actions should be recorded on the form next to the assigned action.
3.5
RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk assessments should be carried out to quantify the risks associated with deviations and their potential consequences, and to assist in determining the adequacy of planned safeguards and the possible need for further action. Version No. 15.0 Document last modified: 08 May 2013. PDF created: 08 May 2013. Page 9 of 62
An initial informal risk assessment should be carried out on each cause - consequence scenario based on the inherent risk in the unprotected state. The Risk Matrix included in Appendix 1 should be used as a guide. The risk should then be re-assessed taking into consideration the planned safeguards and risk reduction measures. For less important risks, the need for further action can be based on the experience and judgement of the HAZOP Study Team. For high risk scenarios, several layers of protection will usually be necessary to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. If the HAZOP team agrees that, so long as the planned safeguards are in place, the risk of an unwanted event occurring is reduced to an acceptable level, then no further action is required. For extreme risk scenarios, the adequacy of safeguards and the need for further action should be quantitatively assessed using higher level risk assessment techniques such as Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), or Safety Integrity Level (SIL) analysis. The risk assessment process and outcome should be recorded on the HAZOP Study Record form against each item.
4.
HAZOP MEETING PROCEDURE
At the HAZOP meeting, the HAZOP Leader will act as Chairperson to lead the team through each of the following steps. a. Introduce the project 1. 2. 3. 4. Ensure all team members are familiar with the HAZOP process Define the project for the team Review the proposed process or modification using the Process and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) and describe its operation On the P&ID, divide the process to be studied into logical Systems.
Note: Modifications that are prone to the potential of expected two phase flow or condensation effects (eg. modifications to steam or chemical vapour systems) will be highlighted during the introduction.
b.
Carry out HAZOP Study 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Select a particular System for detailed review and describe the design intent for that System. Work through the guide words on the HAZOP Study Cards, following the HAZOP Process Flow Chart as per Figure 1 For each guide word, establish if the deviation from normal conditions suggested by the guide word could occur. If the deviation could occur, identify the possible causes of the deviation Determine the possible consequences or problems if the deviation occurred. Carry out an initial assessment of the risk associated with the identified consequneces Review any proposed safeguards to prevent or mitigate the consequences Page 10 of 62
8.
9. 10.
Evaluate if the proposed safeguards adequately reduce the risk to an acceptable level and if not, suggest further actions having regard to the consequences and the safeguards already proposed Repeat procedure from step (a) above for the next System. Progressively complete HAZOP Study Record form SF1309 including recording of further actions.
Note: Modifications must be asessed for impact during a variety of plant conditions (ie. start up, running, plant upset, and plant shutdown). This aspect will be formally documented where appropriate throughout the HAZOP, and must also feature as a specific element considered within the agreement and sign-off of the final records of the HAZOP.
5.
HAZOP FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
The Responsible Officer shall ensure that all actions arising from the HAZOP are properly managed and are completed prior to commencing the modification or commissioning the modified plant as determined during the HAZOP. The items recorded on the HAZOP Study Record form SF1309 as requiring action shall be numbered and a required date of completion established. This information shall be entered into the Recommendations column on the HAZOP Study Record. If the HAZOP generates a large number of HAZOP Actions, the RO may seek approval from the Manager of the Area or the Project Engineering Manager to use the Alternative HAZOP Action Tracking process described in 5.5 below.
5.1
ACTION PROGRESS MANAGEMENT
The basic HAZOP information needs to be entered into Cintellate, then Save. The HAZOP results form will then be available to be populated, the actions can then be raised and assigned from this form. The Responsible Officer shall arrange for the HAZOP to be entered in Cintellate as follows: a. b. c. Open Cintellate and select Workspace then "Inspection". Select "New" and a new Inspection form will be opened. An Inspection Reference Number will be automatically allocated by the Cintellate system. Enter the HAZOP details as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Version No. 15.0 Document last modified: 08 May 2013. PDF created: 08 May 2013. "Inspection type" - select "HAZOP" Inspection Title enter the same as the title shown on the HAZOP record sheets. "Area inspected" - select the plant area in which the modification will be done. "Inspector" - select the Responsible Officer "Reviewer" - leave blank Page 11 of 62
6.
7. 8. Note:
"Department Manager" - select the Manager of the Responsible Officer. This person will be notified by email when the page is saved and will close out the Inspection entry page by ticking the box at the bottom of the page. Select Start Date, Frequency and Number of Occurrences Hit "Save" to close the form after noting the Inspection Reference number. Be sure to note the Cintellate Inspection reference number on the original HAZOP Study Report to enable the matching Cintellate record to be found. This is essential for reporting from Cintellate where the Reference Number is the only way to select an item for a report.
d.
Create an Action in Cintellate for each HAZOP Action on the HAZOP Study Record as follows. 1. 2. 3. Open basic HAZOP Inspection (double click the Inspection Number) Move to bottom of form and click on Add new Inspection Results Inspection Date and Inspector must be populated within the form. No other fields on this form are mandatory, however may be populated if wanted. Move to bottom of form and click on Add New Actions Fill in the mandatory fields (those with an orange asterisk against the field name) and any non mandatory fields that you have information to suit. Date Raised select todays date Due Date Enter the date the Action is required to be complete "Assigned To" - Assign the action to the appropriate person "Assigned By" - Select the Responsible Officer's name Depatment Select the Department of the Assigned to Action Title Type in a brief but explanatory description Action Description Enter the description of the action exactly as it was recorded in the HAZOP. Start each action description with the Cintellate Inspection Reference Number and the Item Number on the HAZOP Study Record (e.g. HAZOP 4782 Action 27) Hit "Save" button to close the form and return to the Inspection form. An email will be immediately sent to the person to whom the "Action" has been assigned Create additional Actions to correspond to each of the Actions identified at the HAZOP. Select a reasonable and achievable due date for each action. Actions in Inspections in Cintellate are the same as any other Preventative Actions generated from other areas of Cintellate and will appear in any Cintellate report showing Outstanding Preventative Actions.
4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
13.
14.
Note: Note:
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5.2
FOLLOW UP
HAZOP actions will be managed in the Cintellate system. It will automatically generate reminders when actions are not complete by the due date. When complete, actions shall be closed in Cintellate by the person to whom the action was assigned. Note: Any Action not completed by the due date will appear in the overdue action list and will be subject to the usual Cintellate escalating notification.
5.3
ACTION COMPLETION
After completion of the action, the person to whom the "Action" was assigned must close the action in Cintellate by completing the "Action Completion" form. This is done by 1. 2. 3. Note: Selecting "Workspace then Action Management then Actions and double clicking on the required action. Move to the "Action Completion" box at the bottom of the form. Complete mandatory fields, Closure Evidence and Completion Date add new file storage. If needed then Save. To allow for traceability at a later time, it is important to make reference to associated documents such as drawing numbers, operating procedures, emails or memos, etc when describing the action taken. The use of the words "Done" or "Competed" in the close out comments is not sufficient. Full details of documents created or modified are required. Examples include: P&ID aaa was updated to Rev. bbb; Refer operating procedure OP-xxx, Rev ccc; Refer to memo, email, etc dated dd/mm/yyyy
5.4
CINTELLATE REPORTING
Reports are available in Cintellate by selecting "Reports and Graphs" from the entry screen and then selecting from the lists. A comprehensive inspection report is available by selecting "Reports and Graphs" then Self Assessment Reports and then Comprehensive Inspection Report". This report requires the user to enter the inspection (HAZOP) number previously generated, and lists all actions whether completed or not.
5.5
ALTERNATIVE HAZOP ACTION TRACKING PROCEDURE
The alternative HAZOP Action Tracking procedure detailed below may be used when: a. b. a large number of Actions (as a guide, more than 20) have been created during the HAZOP and entry of the Actions into Cintellate becomes an administrative burden; or a software based HAZOP system, which automatically generates reports and paper based HAZOP Action sheets, has been used to document the HAZOP.
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Use of this Alternative HAZOP Action Tracking procedure must be approved in writing by the Project Director or Project Manager for major projects, Business Unit Manager or Project Engineering Manager for plant projects. 5.5.2 a. b. Procedure The HAZOP shall be completed and Actions identified and assigned as detailed in this Guide Manual. After the HAZOP, an Action Summary sheet shall be produced by either 1. 2. c. manually entering all Actions into an Excel spreadsheet; or using a software based HAZOP recording system to create the documented record.
The Action Summary sheet shall provide a direct cross reference to the original HAZOP record and will show for each Action: 1. 2. 3. 4. a brief description of the action required the person or organisation to whom the Action has been assigned the required completion date completion status
d.
A single Cintellate entry making direct reference to both the original HAZOP and the Action Summary sheet shall be made by the RO. The Cintellate entry shall have one Action on the RO to close out all HAZOP Actions before commissioning the new plant which was the subject of the HAZOP. The RO will then send out individual Action requests to each person or organisation to which an Action has been assigned. This request will be accompanied by a copy (paper or electronic) of the HAZOP Action sheet for that Action. When the Action is complete, the person or organisation to whom an Action has been assigned will complete and sign a paper copy of the HAZOP Action sheet and return the signed original to the RO. On receipt of each signed HAZOP Action sheet, the RO will review the sheet and if satisfied that the Action is truly complete, will 1. 2. 3. Note: countersign the form (subject to note below) insert the signed-off HAZOP Action sheet in the Project file change the status for that Action on the Action Summary sheet to complete. Each completed HAZOP Action sheet shall have two signatories in order to verify that the appropriate action has been implemented. The person verifying the action need not have been present at the HAZOP. It is not acceptable for one person to sign for both the completion of the action and as the Responsible Officer.
e.
f.
g.
h.
When all the Actions on the Action Summary sheet have been completed and all the signed-off and countersigned HAZOP Action sheets have been received by the RO, a paper copy of the Action Summary sheet shall be created, signed off by the RO, and inserted in the project file along with the signed-off Action Completion sheets. Page 14 of 62
i. j.
The Cintellate Action item covering all the items on the Action Summary sheet will then be signed off. All HAZOP Actions must be complete and the Cintellate entry signed off prior to commissioning. If any HAZOP actions that require data obtained during or post commissioning cannot be completed (eg maintenance PMs, some plant alarm settings, etc.), these can be considered complete when the relevant actions are captured in draft procedures. If an Action item cannot be completed until after plant commissioning eg where operating plant data or experience is required, and is not covered by item j. above, then a new entry and associated outstanding action shall be created in Cintellate for each Action item. The original Cintellate action covering all the HAZOP Actions can then be closed with a cross-reference to the new Cintellate outstanding action item.
k.
6.
6.1
HAZOP CLOSURE
CLOSE-OUT
When all follow-up actions are complete, the Responsible Officer shall note on the HAZOP Study Record of Discussions (SF 1909) that all items have been completed and make reference to the Inspection Reference Number in Cintellate.To assist in later verification, a copy of the complete Cintellate record should be printed out after all actions have been completed and attached to the HAZOP Study Record in the Project file. Note: The impact of the modification(s) during all plant conditions (ie. start up, running, plant upset, and plant shutdown) must have its related HAZOP conditions revisited during the Closeout process.
6.2
CLOSE OUT MEETING
The Responsible Officer will arrange a close out meeting to record completion of outstanding issues. Once all parties are satisfied that all issues arising from the study have been adequately addressed and are reflected in the project design documentation, form HAZOP Study Record of Discussions form shall be completed and signed off by the Responsible Officer and the Customer Representative. No commissioning activities associated with the modification or the new plant covered by the HAZOP shall commence until form HAZOP Study Record of Discussions (SF1909) has been signed off.
7.
DOCUMENTATION
The following HAZOP study information and documents are required for the files: a. HAZOP Study Record (SF 1309) which includes: 1. 2. 3. Version No. 15.0 Document last modified: 08 May 2013. PDF created: 08 May 2013. Project title Project number (that is, work order number for the parent project) Project scope Page 15 of 62
4. 5. Note:
Study date Participant names, job titles, organisation, brief profile Any generic issues or matters requiring further study but not considered to be part of the HAZOP should still be recorded on the HAZOP Study Record and a person nominated to follow up
b. c. d. e. f.
Signed off HAZOP Study Record of Discussions (SF 1909) The original copy of all P&IDs used in the study (with lines clearly identified) Variations in guide words used. Signed off Action Summary sheet (if generated in accordance with 5.5.1) Signed off HAZOP Action sheets (if generated in accordance with 5.5.1)
The study Responsible Officer is responsible for the preparation and collation of the output documentation from the HAZOP study, and for forwarding it to all attendees, including the Chairperson who should sign off the HAZOP Study Record before filing by the Responsible Officer. The Responsible Officer ensures an electronic copy the documentation listed above is filed in the Domino.Doc System in accordance with Management of Risk Assessment Records (GM-04041-14). A hard copy of all this documentation will also be filed in the Project File by the Project Officer.
8.
RECORD KEEPING TABLE

RECORD IDENTIFICATION Form No. Document Title Paper Electronic Paper Electronic Paper Electronic Cintellate Action Summary sheet (if created) HAZOP Action sheets (if created) Paper Electronic Paper Electronic Project File Domino Doc Project File Domino Doc Project File Domino Doc Cintellate Project File Domino Doc Project File Domino Doc Project Number Project Number Indefinite Project Number Project Number Project Number Indefinite Storage Media Storage Location Indexing Method Retention Period Authorised Disposer Disposal Method
SF1309 HAZOP Study Record SF1909 HAZOP Study Record of Discussions Record of Actions arising from the HAZOP
Indefinite
Indefinite
Indefinite
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APPENDIX 1 - RISK ASSESSMENT TABLES
DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCE Injury / Illness Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic Minor Injury / Illness Medical Treatment Injury / Illness Restricted Duties Injury / Illness Lost Time Injury / Illness Fatality or Permanent Disability Injury / Illness DESCRIPTION Only by exception Could occur at some stage Might occur at some time Will probably occur Is expected to occur Environment Little or no environmental impact Small and/or localised impact Substantial environmental impact Serious environmental impact Widespread environmental impact RISK RANK L M H E Property Damage / Process Loss Low financial loss (<$5,000) Medium financial loss ($5,000 - $20,000 High financial loss ($20,000 - $50,000) Major financial loss ($50,000 - $500,000) Huge financial loss (>$500,000) IMPACT Low risk Medium risk High risk Extreme risk
LIKELIHOOD Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Almost certain
Table 1 HAZOP Risk Assessment: Consequence, Likelihood and Risk Ranking Definitions
Once the reasonable consequence and likelihood of each potential unwanted event is determined, the risk can be ranked using the Risk Assessment Matrix below and recorded on the HAZOP Study Record sheet.
CONSEQUENCE LIKELIHOOD Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Almost certain Insignificant L L L M H Minor L L M H H Moderate M M H H E Major H H E E E Catastrophic H E E E E
Table 2 HAZOP Risk Assessment Matrix: Likelihood versus Consequence
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APPENDIX 2 - HAZARD STUDY CARDS
NEW DRAWING
1. 2. DESCRIPTION OF PURPOSE OF PLANT SHOWN BROAD OUTLINE OF OPERATION
NEW LINE OR SYSTEM

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. PURPOSE OF LINE AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT NORMAL OPERATING CONDITION NORMAL METHOD OF OPERATION DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT, VALVES, INSTRUMENTS GENERAL BROAD DISCUSSION
Version No. 15.0 Document last modified: 08 May 2013. Date printed: 08 May 2013.
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HIGH FLOW HIGH LEVEL

PUMP RACING, DELIVERY VESSEL PRESSURE LOST, SUCTION PRESSURISED, SCALE DISLODGED, LEAK IN HEAT E CHANGER, LOSS OF AUTO CONTROL, OPERATOR ERROR, FAILURE OF PIPE, TRAP, ETC. FOR SOLIDS HANDLING PROCESSES! BLOCKED OR ARCHED CHUTES, LUMPS FALLING ONTO BELT, CLEAN OUT SAFETY, BELT RUN"ON, SEQUENCING, OBSTRUCTION, CONVEYOR BELT BROKEN, DRIVE BELT BROKEN, BELT RUN" BACK, BUCKET RUN" BACK.
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LOW FLOW LOW LEVEL

PUMP FAILURE, SCALING OF DELIVERY, FOREIGN BODY OR SEDIMENT, POOR SUCTION CONDITION, CAVITATION, LEAK IN HEAT E CHANGER, DRAIN LEAKING, VALVE #AMMED, LOSS OF AUTO CONTROL, OPERATOR ERROR, FAILURE OR #OINT, PIPE, TRAP ETC. FOR SOLIDS HANDLING PROCESSES! BLOCKED OR ARCHED CHUTES, LUMPS FALLING ONTO BELT, CLEAN OUT SAFETY, BELT RUN" ON, SEQUENCING, OBSTRUCTION, CONVEYOR BELT BROKEN, DRIVE BELT BROKEN, BELT RUN" BACK, BUCKET RUN"BACK.
Page 20 of 62
ZERO FLOW EMPTY

PUMP FAILURE, DELIVERY VESSEL$MAIN PRESSURISED, GAS LOCKING, BLOCKAGE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN BODY, SCALE ETC. SUCTION VESSEL EMPTY, LOSS OF AUTO CONTROL, OPERATOR ERROR, FAILURE OF #OINT, PIPE ETC. FOR SOLIDS HANDLING PROCESSES! BLOCKED OR ARCHED CHUTES, LUMPS FALLING ONTO BELT, CLEAN OUT SAFETY, BELT RUN" ON, SEQUENCING, OBSTRUCTION, CONVEYOR BELT BROKEN, DRIVE BELT BROKEN, BELT RUN" BACK, BUCKET RUN"BACK.
Page 21 of 62
REVERSE FLOW
PUMP FAILURE, PUMP REVERSED, DELIVERY VESSEL$MAIN OVER PRESSURE, POOR ISOLATION, GAS LOCKING, SURGING, BACK SIPHONING, LOSS OF AUTOMATIC CONTROL, OPERATOR ERROR, PIPE FAILURE, ETC. FOR SOLIDS HANDLING PROCESSES! STOP BEFORE START, WARNING FOR TAIL DISCHARGE ELEVATOR ROLL"BACK.
Page 22 of 62
HIGH PRESSURE
- VENTING - RELIEF RATE
BOILING, CAVITATION, FREE%ING, CHEMICAL BREAKDOWN, FLASHING, CONDENSATION, SEDIMENTATION, SCALING, FOAMING, GAS RELEASE, PRIMING, E PLODING, IMPLODING, CHANGES IN VISCOSITY, DENSITY, E TERNAL FIRE, WEATHER CONDITIONS.
Page 23 of 62
LOW PRESSURE
- VENTING - RELIEF RATE
Page 24 of 62
HIGH TEMPERATURE
Page 25 of 62
LOW TEMPERATURE
Page 26 of 62
IMPURITIES
- GASEOUS - LIQUID - SOLID
INGRESS OF AIR, WATER, STEAM, FUEL, LUBRICANTS, CORROSION PRODUCTS, OTHER PROCESS MATERIALS FROM HIGH PRESSURE SYSTEM, LEAKAGE FROM HEAT E CHANGER SYSTEM. FOR SOLIDS HANDLING PROCESSES! CONTAMINANTS, MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS DEVIATION, TRAMP METAL.
Page 27 of 62
CHANGE IN COMPOSITION CHANGE IN CONCENTRATION 2 PHASE FLOW REACTION

FOR SOLIDS HANDLING PROCESSES! ACIDIC FUMES, BUILD" UP, OVER GRANULATION, SCREEN BLINDING, SETS TOO FAST, STICKS TO BELT$IDLERS, HARD TO CLEAN.
Page 28 of 62
TESTING
- EQUIPMENT (INCL. TRIPS & ALARMS) - PRODUCT
HOW DO WE KNOW THEY ARE OK& VACUUM ' PRESSURE TESTING WITH HARMLESS MATERIAL.
Page 29 of 62
PLANT ITEMS
- OPERABLE - MAINTAINABLE
ACCESS, ISOLATION, SPARES, PURGING, DRYING, COOLING, WARMING FOR SOLIDS HANDLING PROCESSES! LACK OF ACCESS (IDLERS, SCRAPERS), BUILD" UP CAUSING DIFFICULTY MOVING, LONG CLEANING REACH, CONFINED SPACE.
Page 30 of 62
ELECTRICAL
- AREA CLASSIFICATION - ISOLATION - EARTHING
Page 31 of 62
INSTRUMENTS
" SUFFICIENT FOR CONTROL " TOO MANY " CORRECT LOCATION " INFORMATION FOR OPERATORS
THIS LINE IS NOW COMPLETE. NOW DO NEXT LINE.
Page 32 of 62
OVERVIEW
" TO BE DONE WHEN ALL LINES ARE COMPLETE. " CONSIDER CUMULATIVE AND POTENTIAL OFFSITE IMPACT OF THE REVIEWED PROCESS (SUCH AS IMPACT ON UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM OF THE PROCESS DUE TO MODIFICATIONS$CHANGES).
Page 33 of 62
SERVICES REQUIRED
" AIR " NITROGEN " WATER " ETC.
Page 34 of 62
MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION
" VESSELS " PIPELINES " PUMPS " OTHERS
Page 35 of 62
COMMISSION
" BROADLY HOW WILL IT BE DONE " WHAT DIFFICULTIES ' HA%ARDS CAN BE FORESEEN
Page 36 of 62
STARTUP
" FIRST STARTUP METHODS, DIFFICULTIES, " HA%ARDS ROUTINE STARTUP METHODS, DIFFICULTIES, " HA%ARDS TOO MANY INTERLOCKS&
Page 37 of 62
SHUTDOWN
- ISOLATION - PURGING
DIFFICULTIES, HA%ARDS
Page 38 of 62
BREA DOWN
- POWER FAILURE - AIR - STEAM - WATER - VACUUM - FUEL - VENTS - COMPUTER - OTHER
MA#OR CAUSES OF BREAKDOWN EMERGENCY PROCEDURES ' COMMUNICATIONS WHICH WAY SHOULD VALVES MOVE
Page 39 of 62
EFFLUENT
- GASEOUS - LIQUID - SOLID
CONTAINMENT REACTIONS IN DRAINS TREATMENT METHODS
Page 40 of 62
NOISE
SOURCES PROBLEMS& CONTROL MEASURES
Page 41 of 62
FIRE EXPLOSION
BROAD OVERVIEW " PROTECTION, PREVENTION, CONTROL LOCATION OF SAFETY SHOWERS, DELUGES, SHUT"OFF VALVES ' CONTROLS.
Page 42 of 62
SAFETY EQUIPMENT
" PERSONAL " FIRE DETECTION " FIRE FIGHTING " MEANS OF ESCAPE
Page 43 of 62
QUALITY & CONSISTENCY

WHAT WILL MOST CAUSE QUALITY TO FAIL OR VARY " HOW PREVENT
OUTPUT- RELIABILITY & BOTTLE NEC S

LEAST RELIABLE COMPONENTS, MOST LIMITING COMPONENTS
EFFICIENCY - LOSSES
WHERE WILL WE LOSE MATERIAL, CONVERSION ETC
SIMPLICITY
CAN WE OMIT PLANT OR SIMPLIFY CONTROL
Page 44 of 62
PERSONAL HAZARD
SOLIDS HANDLING! FUMES, LUMPS OFF CONVEYORS, E POSURE TO MAGNETIC FIELD, DUST, LOCATION OF NORMAL ACCESS TO EQUIPMENT, POTENTIAL FOR LOOSE OB#ECTS TO FALL (EG ACCESS DOORS ' WEDGES.
Page 45 of 62
GUIDE WORDS AND DEVIATION FOR COMPUTERISED AND DISTRIBUTION CONTROL SYSTEMS.
ITEMS LISTED ON THE FOLLOWING CARDS CAN BE ADDRESSED BY AS ING THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
Page 46 of 62
DOES IT MATTER!
RISK ASSESSMENT LIKELIHOOD CONSEQUENCE
Page 47 of 62
WILL THE OPERATOR NOW!
Page 48 of 62
ANY ACTIONS REQUIRED BY THE OPERATOR OR OTHER SYSTEMS!
Page 49 of 62
ANY CHANGES NEEDED!
Page 50 of 62
PURPOSE
METHOD OF OPERATION, CONTROL PHILOSOPHY, SAFETY RELATED FUNCTIONS
Page 51 of 62
MORE OF
SIGNAL ACTION, BLOCK OF DATA, TRANSFER FREQUENCY.
Page 52 of 62
LESS OF
SIGNAL ACTION, INCOMPLETE TRANSFER, SYSTEM CRASHES DURING TRANSFER.
Page 53 of 62
NONE OF
SIGNAL ACTION, NO TRANSFER, ACTUATOR STUCK.
Page 54 of 62
OTHER THAN
MISMATCH DUE TO SOFTWARE CHANGE OR REFORMAT, INCORRECT ACTION OR SIGNAL.
Page 55 of 62
SOONER " LATER THAN

PROCESSING OF MEASUREMENTS, TIME OUT, OUT OF SEQUENCE, AVERAGING ASSUMPTIONS.
Page 56 of 62
CORRUPTION
NOISE, MAGNETIC FIELDS, RADIO INTERFERENCE, WELDING, LIGHTNING, HIGH VOLTAGE
Page 57 of 62
REVERSE
LOOK AT ABOVE POINTS WITH DATA TRANSFER IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION
Page 58 of 62
INTERACTION
WITH OTHER SYSTEMS, START"UP, SHUT"DOWN, NORMAL OPERATION, E PECTED OR REQUIRED OPERATOR ACTIONS, SYNCHRONISATION AND TIMING ISSUES AND ALARMS, PLANT UPSETS
Page 59 of 62
TUNING PARAMETERS
ARE THEY CORRECT, ANY CHANGES REQUIRED
Page 60 of 62
SECURITY
SECURITY ACCESS LEVEL, PROTECTION AGAINST UNAUTHORISED MODIFICATION
Page 61 of 62
OTHER
TRAINING TESTING
Page 62 of 62

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HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP PROCESS GM-08-030-02

Actual Change Details:

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

Can High Flow occur?

Are consequences potentially very serious?

Reviews planned safeguards and informally assess risk

Are safeguards adequate?

Is cost of changes justified?

Go to next Guide Word card

Figure 1 - HAZOP Process Flow Chart

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Note:

SELECTION OF HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBERS

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR HAZOP STUDY

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP GUIDE WORDS

HAZOP STUDY RECORD

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP MEETING PROCEDURE

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP FOLLOW UP ACTIONS

ACTION PROGRESS MANAGEMENT

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

ALTERNATIVE HAZOP ACTION TRACKING PROCEDURE

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

CLOSE OUT MEETING

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

RECORD KEEPING TABLE

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

APPENDIX 1 - RISK ASSESSMENT TABLES

LIKELIHOOD Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Almost certain

Table 2 HAZOP Risk Assessment Matrix: Likelihood versus Consequence

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

APPENDIX 2 - HAZARD STUDY CARDS

NEW LINE OR SYSTEM

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HIGH FLOW HIGH LEVEL

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

LOW FLOW LOW LEVEL

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

ZERO FLOW EMPTY

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

CHANGE IN COMPOSITION CHANGE IN CONCENTRATION 2 PHASE FLOW REACTION

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

HAZOP Process GM-08-030-02

THIS LINE IS NOW COMPLETE. NOW DO NEXT LINE.