Requisites for validity of marriage settlements - Prior to marriage: modifications

G.R. No. 164201

December 10, 2012

EFREN PANA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE JUANITE, JR., Respondents. DECISION ABAD, J.: FACTS: The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder. RTC rendered a consolidated decision2 acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ,5 resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.6 Petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.9 Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, given that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.14 The heirs of the deceased victims insist that it was the system of absolute community of property that applied to Efren and Melecia. The reasoning goes: Admittedly, the spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. But that fact does not prevent the application of [A]rt. 94, last paragraph, of the Family Code because their property regime is precisely governed by the law on absolute community. This finds support in Art. 256 of the Family Code which states: "This code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." None of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no vested rights have been acquired by each over the properties of the community. Hence, the liabilities imposed on the accused-spouse may properly be charged against the community as heretofore discussed.15 ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case.

HELD: To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable against the properties of the marriage, the Court has first to identify the spouses property relations. While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements. The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage. Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136. Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage. Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation;18 b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime;19 c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family;20 d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains.21 None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia. What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. Thus: Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties. What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still the operative law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code thus provides: Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife. Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case. Its Article 122 provides: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose abovementioned. Melecia has no exclusive property of her own,24 the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.25 Those responsibilities are as follows: Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement; (7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and (9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated . Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered."[26] No prior liquidation of those assets is required.

Donations propter nuptias Definition

G.R. No. L-27939

October 30, 1928

FORTUNATA SOLIS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAXIMA BARROSO, ET AL., defendants-appellants. AVANCEA, C. J.: FACTS: The spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima A. Barroso begot three children named Alejo, Eugenia and Marciana Lambino. Spouses Barroso made a donation of propter nuptias of some parcels of land favor of their son Alejo Lambino and plaintiff Fortunata Solis in a private document (Exhibit A) in consideration of the marriage which the latter were about to enter into. One of the conditions of this donation is that in case of the death of one of the donees, onehalf of these lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half. Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis were married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the possession of the donated lands to them. Donee Alejo Lambino died. In the same year donor Juan Lambino also died. After the latter's death, his wife, Maxima Barroso, recovered possession of the donated lands. The surviving donee Fortunata Solis filed the action, defendants, heirs of the deceased donor Juan Lambino, demanding of the defendants the execution of the proper deed of donation according to law, transferring one-half of the donated property, and moreover, to proceed to the partition of the donated property and its fruits. The court rendered judgment based upon article 1279 of the Civil Code granting plaintiff's prayer and ordering the defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of the plaintiff, adequate in form and substance to transfer to the latter the legal title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the original donation. HELD: We are of the opinion that article 1279 of the Civil Code, relating to contracts, is not applicable to the present case. We are concerned with a donation propter nuptias, which, according to article 1328 of the Civil Code, must be governed by the rules established in Title II, Book III of this Code, on donations (articles 618 to 656).

Article 633 provides that in order that a donation of real property may be valid, it must be made in a public instrument. This is the article applicable to donation propter nuptias in so far as its formal validity is concerned. The only exceptions to this rule are onerous and remuneratory donations, in so far as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules on contracts (art. 622), and those which are to take effect upon the donor's death, which are governed by the rules established for testamentary successions (art. 620). We have, therefore, a donation propter nuptias which is not valid and did not create any right, since it was not made in a public instrument, and hence, article 1279 of the Civil Code which the lower court applied is not applicable thereto. Article 1279 provides that, should the law require the execution of an instrument or any other special form in order to make the obligations of a contract effective, the contracting parties may compel each other to comply with such formality from the moment that consent has been given, and the other requirements for the validity of the contract exist. Suffice it to state that this article refers to contracts and is inapplicable to the donation in question which must be governed by the rules on donations. It may further be noted, at first sight, that this article presupposes the existence of a valid contract and cannot possibly refer to the form required in order to make it valid, which it already has, but rather to that required simply to make it effective, and for this reason, it would, at all events, be inapplicable to the donation in question, wherein the form is required precisely to make it valid. But the lower court states in its judgment that the present donation is onerous, and pursuant to article 622 of the Civil Code must be governed by the rules on contracts. This opinion is not well founded. Donations for valuable consideration, as may be inferred from article 619 of the Civil Code, are such as compensate services which constitute debts recoverable from the donor, or which impose a charge equal to the amount of the donation upon the donee, neither of which is true of the present donation, which was made only in consideration of marriage. In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation. This is, so because the marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation.

G.R. No. 126996

February 15, 2000

HEIRS OF CESARIO VELASQUEZ, namely: ANASTACIA VELASQUEZ, SOFIA VELASQUEZ, ELISEO VELASQUEZ, JOSE VELASQUEZ, CORAZON VELASQUEZ, LEONORA VELASQUEZ, and NIEVES VELASQUEZ, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF ANATALIA DE GUZMAN, namely: SANTIAGO MENESES, ANDRES MENESES, FELICIDAD MENESES, and APOLONIO MENESES, respondents. GONZAGA-REYES, J.: FACTS: Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in 1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of Petitioners) and Tranquilina de Guzman (grandmother of Respondents). Respondents filed a complaint for annulment, partition and damages against petitioners for the latters refusal to partition the conjugal properties of the Spouses Aquino. They pray for the order of partition of the properties between petitioners and respondents in equal shares and to order the petitioners to render an accounting of the produce of the land in question from the time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected. WHY? Respondents alleged that before Leoncia de Guzman died, she called for a conference, which had been attended byCesario Velasquez, Anatalia De Guzman and petitioners Santiago Meneses and Tranquilina de Guzman , wherein Leoncia told Anatalia, Tranquilina and Cesario that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario because Anatalia who is one of her sisters had several children to support. Cesario then promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half (1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to of each of all the properties in question being the children of Anatalia. BUT petitioners forcibly took possession of all the properties and despite respondents repeated demands for partition, P refused Petitioners counter-claimed that during the lifetime of spouses Aquino, they had already disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners predecessors-in-interest, Cesario and Camila de Guzman and petitioners Anastacia and Jose Velasquez; that there was no conference happened; and that the instant case is already barred by res judicata since there had been

three previous cases involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of action which were all dismissed Trial Court ruled in favour of Respondents. The Court found Santiago Meneses and his testimony were credible. He is 80 yearsold testified spontaneously in a clear, straight forward and convincing manner. Santiago said there was indeed a conference and that he came across an affidavit of Cesario Velasquez notarized by Atty. Elpidio Barrozo stating that he is an adopted son of Spouses Aquino which, is however, not supported by evidence (a court order). Spouses Aquino who were childless, therefore, had Anatalia and Tranquilina as their legal heirs notwithstanding the claims of donation propter nuptias and conveyance to Cesario, Camila, Anastacia and Jose. Petitioners contend that private respondent Santiago Meneses failed to prove the nullity of the Deeds of Conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses in favor of petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez and their predecessors-in-interest. Petitioners claim that they were able to show by documentary evidence that the Aquino spouses during their lifetime disposed of the four parcels of land subject of the complaint , to wit: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias dated February 15, 1919 in favor of then future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman (petitioners' parents) conveying to them a portion of the second parcel and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels in the complaint; (b) Deed of donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first parcel in favor of petitioners Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez; (c) Deed of Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman conveying to them the remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa abovementioned. Petitioners claim that the record is bereft of any evidence showing the infirmities in these formidable array of documentary evidence but the courts below declared their nullity on the basis of the "telltale" story of Santiago Meneses. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPERTIES MENTIONED IN THE COMPLAINT FORM PART OF THE ESTATE OF THE SPOUSES CORNELIO AQUINO AND LEONCIA DE GUZMAN. HELD: Petitioner's submission is impressed with merit. After examination of the records, we find that there is no preponderance of evidence adduced during the trial to support the findings and conclusions of the courts below , which error justifies a review of said evidence. We are unable to sustain the findings of the respondent Court that it has been adequately shown that the alleged transfers of properties to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest made by the Aquino spouses were repudiated before Leoncia's death; thus private respondents are still entitled to share in the subject properties.

There is no preponderance of evidence to support the findings and conclusions of both courts. It would appear that the trial court relied solely on the basis of Santiago Meneses' testimony. On the other hand, petitioners were able to adduce the uncontroverted and ancient documentary evidence showing that during the lifetime of the Aquino spouses they had already disposed of four of the six parcels of land subject of the complaint starting in the year 1919. A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee25 and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.26 The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919 The deed of donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in article 86 of the Family Code.29 The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e., that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since Anatalia (Leoncia's sister) had several children to support is not one of the grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.

Form of Donations

G.R. No. 122134

October 3, 2003

ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioners, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF PANGASINAN, respondents. x----------------------------x CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioner, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: FACTS: Sps. Locquiao (6 children) executed a deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao bride, respondent Tomasa Mara. Respondents were gifted with 4 parcels of land, as well as a malecow and1/3 portion of the conjugal house of the Sps. Locquiao. Later, the respondents got married. The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383. The Sps. Locquiao died. With the permission of the respondents spouses, petitioner Romana took possession and cultivated the subject land. When petitioners husband got sick, her daughter petitioner Constancia took over and has been in possession of the land. Meanwhile, respondent spouses registered the deed with the Office of the Register of Deeds. A new TCT was issued under the respondent spouses names. Subsequently, the heirs of the Spouses Loquiao including respondent Benito and petitioner Valencia, executed Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights, wherein they distributed among only 3 of them, the 12 parcels of land left by parents, excluding the land in question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses earlier. The Deed contained a statement that respondent Benito and Marciano Locquiao, along with the heirs of Lucio Locquiao, have already received our shares in the estates of their parents, and because of that the heirs of Lucio Locquaio were not made parties to the deed.

All the living children of the Locquaio spouses at the time, including petitioner Valencia, confirmed the previous dispositions and waived their rights to whomsoever the properties covered by the deed of partition were adjudicated. Later, petitioner Romana disagreed as to the distribution of the 2 lots covered by the deed of partition. So they again executed Deed of Compromise Agreement which redistributed the land. Respondent Benito also signed the compromise agreement, all of them confirmed the stipulations etc in the compromise agreement. Petitioner Constancia filed an action for annulment of title against the respondent spouses. They alleged that the issuance of the transfer certificate of title was fraudulent ; that the notary public who notarized the document had no authority to do so, and; that the donation did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptanceon the document itself or in a separate public instrument. ISSUES: (1) whether acceptance of the donation by the donees is required; (3) if so, in what form should the acceptance appear HELD: Concerning the issue of form, petitioners insist that based on a provision43 of the Civil Code of Spain (Old Civil Code), the acceptance by the donees should be made in a public instrument. The petitioners, the appellate court and the trial court all erred in applying the requirements on ordinary donations to the present case instead of the rules on donation propter nuptias. Underlying the blunder is their failure to take into account the fundamental dichotomy between the two kinds of donations. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those "made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses."44 The distinction is crucial because the two classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites. Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described.45 However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that "acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts". In other words, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code. Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds . Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance "is not necessary for the validity of these donations." Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.

The pivotal question, therefore, is which formal requirements should be applied with respect to the donation propter nuptias at hand. Those under the Old Civil Code or the New Civil Code? It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.46 Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950.47 As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case. Even the petitioners agree that the Old Civil Code should be applied. However, they invoked the wrong provisions50 thereof. Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of the petitioners would collapse just the same. As earlier shown, even implied acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices under the New Civil Code.51

G.R. No. 169454

December 27, 2007

THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, NAMELY: REGINA AND FLORA, BOTH SURNAMED DORONIO, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO, NAMELY: TRINIDAD ROSALINA DORONIOBALMES, MODING DORONIO, FLORENTINA DORONIO, AND ANICETA ALCANTARA-MANALO, Respondents. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: FACTS: Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered owners of a parcel of land located in Pangasinan The spouses had children but the records fail to disclose their number. It is clear, however, that Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased, were among them and that the parties in this case are their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio. A private deed of donation propter nuptias5 was executed by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of Marcelino Doronio and the latters wife, Veronica Pico. One of the properties subject of said deed of donation is the land in question. It appears that the property described in the deed of donation is the one covered by OCT No. 352. However, there is a significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of adjacent property at the eastern side. Based on OCT No. 352, the adjacent owners are the Najordas, whereas based on the deed of donation, the owner of the adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio. Furthermore, said deed of donation remained a private document as it was never notarized.7 According to petitioners, they are now the owners of the entire property in view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that only half of the property was actually incorporated in the said deed of donation because it stated that Fortunato Doronio, instead of Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern side. ISSUE: WHETHER or NOT THE DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS IS INNOFICIOUS, IS PREMATURE, AND THUS IT IS ILLEGAL AND UNPROCEDURAL.29

Donation Propter Nuptias of Real Property Made in a Private Instrument Before the New Civil Code Took Effect on August 30, 1950 is Void It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable to it and not the later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.70 Accordingly, the Old Civil Code applies in this case as the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1919, while the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described.71 Article 1328 of the Old Civil Code provides that gifts propter nuptias are governed by the rules established in Title 2 of Book 3 of the same Code. Article 633 of that title provides that the gift of real property, in order to be valid, must appear in a public document.72 It is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void unless made by public instrument.73 In the instant case, the donation propter nuptias did not become valid. Neither did it create any right because it was not made in a public instrument.74 Hence, it conveyed no title to the land in question to petitioners predecessors.

What may be donated by a spouse as donor Future Property

G.R. No. L-26270

October 30, 1969

BONIFACIA MATEO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. GERVASIO LAGUA, ET AL., respondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.: FACTS: Cipriano Lagua was the original registered owner of 3 parcels of land situated in Asingan, Pangasinan. Sometime in 1917, Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public instrument, donated Lots 998 and 6541 to their son Alejandro Lagua, in consideration of the latter's marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on 15 May 1917, and thereafter, the couple took possession of the properties, but the Certificates of Title remained in the donor's name. In 1923, the son, Alejandro, died. His widow, Bonifacia Mateo, and her infant daughter lived with her father-in-law, Cipriano Lagua, who then undertook the farming of the donated lots. It seems that at the start, Cipriano Lagua was giving to Bonifacia the owner's share of the harvest from the land. In 1926, however, Cipriano refused to deliver the said share, thus prompting Bonifacia to resort to the Justice of the Peace from where she obtained a judgment awarding to her possession of the two lots plus damages. Cipriano Lagua, executed a deed of sale of the same two parcels of land in favor of his younger son, Gervasio. This sale notwithstanding, Bonifacia Mateo was continuously given the owner's share of the harvest until 1956, when it was altogether stopped. It was only then that Bonifacia Mateo learned of the sale of the lots to her brother-in-law, who had the sale in his favor registered only on 22 September 1955. Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter, Anatalia, seek annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Gervasio Lagua and for recovery of possession of the properties. The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered cancelled nd for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime, The donation was

thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted correctly in ordering the reduction of the donation for being inofficious and in ordering herein petitioners to reconvey to respondent Gervasio Lagua an unidentified 494.75 square-meter portion of the donated lots. HELD: We are in accord with the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 442 is not one exclusively for annulment or revocation of the entire donation, but of merely that portion thereof allegedly trenching on the legitime of respondent Gervasio Lagua and that a donation proper nuptias property may be reduced for being inofficious. Contrary to the views of appellants (petitioners), donations proper nuptias (by reason of marriage) are without onerous consideration, the marriage being merely the occasion or motive for the donation, not its causa. Being liberalities, they remain subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor's death, if they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.2

Void donations by the spouses - Donations during the marriage

G.R. No. 165879

November 10, 2006

MARIA B. CHING, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH C. GOYANKO, JR., EVELYN GOYANKO, JERRY GOYANKO, IMELDA GOYANKO, JULIUS GOYANKO, MARY ELLEN GOYANKO AND JESS GOYANKO, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: FACTS: The respondents are the seven children out of the legal union of Joseph Goyanko, Sr. and Epifania dela Cruz. Respondents claim that in 1961, their parents acquired a real property incCebu which was first registered in the name of their aunt as their parents was still Chinese citizens this time. In May, 1993, their aunt executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property in favor of their father. In turn, on October 1993, respondents father executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the petitioner, Maria Ching, his common-law wife. After Goyanko Sr.s death, the respondents discovered that the property hadbeen transferred to the name of the petitioner. Thus, the respondents filed a Complaint for the recovery of the property and damages against petitioner and they prayed for the nullification of the deed of sale and the issuance of a new one in favor of their father However, Ching claimed that she is the actual owner of the property as it was she who provided its purchase price. The RTC dismissed the complaint against Ching, declaring that there is no valid and sufficient ground to declare the sale as null and void, fictitious and simulated. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared null and void the questioned deed of sale and TCT No. 138405. ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of sale and TCT No. 138405, in favor of the Maria Ching, was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy HELD: The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which apply to the present case read:

ART. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. ART. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: (1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy; These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived. ARTICLE 1490. The husband and wife cannot sell property to each other, except: (1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or (2) When there has been a judicial separation of property under Article 191. (Underscoring supplied) The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships. So this Court ruled in Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, etc., et al.:11 The contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. The sale was subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union." Those provisions are dictated by public interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the will of the parties. . . .12 As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his common- law-wifeherein petitioner, it was null and void. Petitioners argument that a trust relationship was created between Goyanko as trustee and her as beneficiary as provided in Articles 1448 and 1450 of the Civil Code which read:

ARTICLE 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child. ARTICLE 1450. If the price of a sale of property is loaned or paid by one person for the benefit of another and the conveyance is made to the lender or payor to secure the payment of the debt, a trust arises by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the money is loaned or for whom it is paid. The latter may redeem the property and compel a conveyance thereof to him. does not persuade. For petitioners testimony that it was she who provided the purchase price is uncorroborated. That she may have been considered the breadwinner of the family and that there was proof that she earned a living do not conclusively clinch her claim.

Void donations by the spouses - Donations in common law marriages

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES L-2877 (38 SCRA 284) March 31, 1971 FACTS: In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable. ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. HELD: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half. Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

G.R. No. L-21642

July 30, 1966

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner-appellee, vs. CANDELARIA D. DAVAC, ET AL., respondents; LOURDES Tuplano, respondent-appellant. BARRERA, J.: FACTS: The late Petronilo Davac, a former employee of Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. became a member of the Social Security System (SSS for short) on September 1, 1957. In SSS (Member's Record) which he accomplished and filed with the SSS, he designated respondent Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and indicated his relationship to her as that of "wife". He died. Each of the respondents (Candelaria Davac and Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for death benefit with the SSS. It appears from their respective claims and the documents submitted in support thereof, that the deceased contracted two marriages, the first, with claimant Lourdes Tuplano and the second, with Candelaria Davac. On February 25, 1963, the Social Security Commission issued the resolution referred to above, But appellant contends that the designation herein made in the person of the second and, therefore, bigamous wife is null and void, because (1) it contravenes the provisions of the Civil Code, and (2) it deprives the lawful wife of her share in the conjugal property as well as of her own and her child's legitime in the inheritance. ISSUE: Whether or not the Social Security Commission acted correctly in declaring respondent Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive the death benefits in question. Under Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161, the beneficiary "as recorded" by the employee's employer is the one entitled to the death benefits. Article 2012 of the New Civil Code provides: ART. 2012. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the person who cannot make any donation to him according to said article. And Article 739 of the same Code prescribes: ART. 739. The following donations shall be void:

(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; xxx xxx xxx

Without deciding whether the naming of a beneficiary of the benefits accruing from membership in the Social Security System is a donation, or that it creates a situation analogous to the relation of an insured and the beneficiary under a life insurance policy, it is enough, for the purpose of the instant case, to state that the disqualification mentioned in Article 739 is not applicable to herein appellee Candelaria Davac because she was not guilty of concubinage, there being no proof that she had knowledge of the previous marriage of her husband Petronilo.1 Regarding the second point raised by appellant, the benefits accruing from membership in the Social Security System do not form part of the properties of the conjugal partnership of the covered member.

G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994 NENITA BIENVENIDO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO, respondents. MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio Camacho contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito). The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958. In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband. Aurelio courted her and apparently won her heart because from June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her. Aurelio bought the house and the lot on in which they were staying from the owners. In the deed of sale and Transfer Certificate of Title issued in his name, Aurelio was described as single. Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration by virtue of which the title was issued in petitioner's name on January 11, 1985. On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner took care of the funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the United States with respondent Chito. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito came home. Luisita paid for the funeral services. Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout Delgado Street in which Nenita had been living . The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but efforts to settle their dispute failed.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE BETWEEN AURELIO AND NENITA [PETITIONER
HEREIN] IS VALID

The Court of Appeals held that the sale of the property to Nenita is void on the principle embodied in Art. 739(1) of the Civil Code which declares donations made between persons who are guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation to be void.
HELD:

In the first place, an action for declaration of the nullity of such donations can only be brought by the innocent spouse, perhaps in this case by the first wife, but certainly not by Luisita whose marriage to Aurelio is itself void . The last paragraph of Art. 739 clearly provides:
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullify may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

In the second place, until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner's ownership is evidenced by a deed of absolute sale 7 executed with all the solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name. 8 Petitioner is in possession of the property. It was error for the Court of Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the instance of one whose marriage to the seller is void.

G.R. No. 106060 June 21, 1999 EMILIE T. SUMBAD and BEATRICE B. TAIT, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARD OKOREN, OLIVIA T. AKOKING, EVELYN W. SACLANGEN, assisted by her husband Julio Saclangen, MARY ATIWAG assisted by her husband Arthur Atiwag, JAIME T. FRONDA, BARBARA TALLONGEN, JULIA PIYES, assisted by her husband Edward Pives, GLEN PAQUITO and FELICITAS ALINAO, respondents. MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agatas husband, George Tait, Sr., lived in a common-law marriage with Maria Tait. In 1974, he donated a certain parcel of unregistered land to Maria Tait. George died in 1977. From 1982 to 1983, Maria Tait sold lots included within the Sum-at property in favor of the private respondents who purchased the lots on thestrength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at property showing the seller, Maria, to be the owner of the property in question. In 1989, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with damages against private respondents, alleging that they are the children and compulsory heirs of George and Agata.
Petitioners contend that the deed of donation, dated April 2, 1974, is void for the following reasons ; (1) it is a forgery; (2) it was made in violation of Art. 133 of the Civil Code, now Art. 87 of the Family Code; and (3) it was notarized by a person who had no authority to act as a notary public. They further contend that Maria F. Tait had no authority to sell the Sum-at property and, therefore, the sales in favor of private respondents are null and void; Petitioners argue that the deed of donation contravenes Art. 133 in view of our ruling in Matabuena v. 32 Cervantes that the prohibition in Art. 133 extends to common-law relations. Indeed, it is now provided in Art. 87 of the Family Code: ISSUE: Whether or not the subject deed if donation is void. HELD: The petition has no merit. Art. 133 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 133. Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (Emphasis added). This point is being raised for the first time in this Court. The records show that in the trial court, petitioners' attack on the validity of the deed of donation centered solely on the allegation that George K. Tait, Sr.'s signature but petitioners never invoked Art. 133 of the Civil Code as a ground to invalidate the deed of donation. Time and again, this Court has ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice. Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners were unable to present evidence in support of such a claim. The evidence on record does not show whether George K. Tait, Sr. was married to Maria F. Tait and, if so, when the marriage took place. If, as petitioner claim, Maria F. Tait was not married to their father , evidence should have been presented to show that at the time the deed of donation was executed, their father and Maria F. Tait were still maintaining common-law relations. Beatrice Tait's testimony is only to the effect that in 1941 Maria F. Tait became their stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George K. Tait, Sr. and Maria F. Tait continuosly maintained common-law relations until April 2, 1974 when the donation was made.

G.R. No. 146683

November 22, 2001

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents. MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A loacated Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of of the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Franciscos house as well as the store inside. According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the masters bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her . She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging. Franciscos health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that Franciscos only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets. A few months before Francisco died, he executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas favor was valid. HELD: In Bitangcor v. Tan,28 we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute

Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses.

There were documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." The fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law.3

It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse. Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

[G.R. No. 168733. March 27, 2006] IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF PETE ROXAS DE JESUS, a.k.a. PETER ROXAS DE JESUS OR PEDRO DE JESUS, MARIA TERESA LAZATIN DE JESUS v. SALVE BARICAN DE JESUS, FRANCIS GILBERT DE JESUS, MARIA JOVELYN DE JESUS AND JENIFER DE JESUS FACTS: Pete Roxas de Jesus (Pete) married respondent Salve Barican on 4 September 1960.[4] Their union produced three children, all co-respondents in this case.
cralaw

Sometime in May 1977, Pete emigrated to the United States of America.[5] In December of 1977, he obtained a divorce decree against Salve[6] and married petitioner, Maria Teresa Lazatin de Jesus, in the state of Nevada.[7] Notably, however, he only became a citizen of the United States in 1988.[8] He died in Daly City, California, on 4 December 1994.[9]
cralaw cralaw cralaw cralaw cralaw

Petitioner instituted a petition for the probate of the holographic will of the decedent. In his will, the decedent instituted petitioner as his sole heir and disinherited the respondents. After trial, the probate court rendered a Decision holding that even as the will is extrinsically valid, i.e., duly executed in accordance with the requisites and solemnities prescribed by law, it is intrinsically void for containing illegal dispositions and institution of an heir.[10]
cralaw

Petitioner's argues that since the lower courts upheld the intrinsic validity of the will, the testamentary provision therein in her favor should be given effect even if only to the extent that it does not affect the legitime of the respondents. She argues that the pronouncement of her marriage with the decedent as bigamous does not detract from the fact that the testator had intended to leave something for her, entitling her to at least the free portion of the decedent's estate. HELD: The argument is untenable. Under Article 739 of the Civil Code, donations made between persons in a state of adultery or concubinage are void. Article 1028 of the same code mandates that the same prohibition be similarly applied to testamentary provisions.
cla

Since the courts below have made the factual finding that the marriage between petitioner and the decedent was bigamous, necessarily, petitioner and decedent are considered as having been in a state of concubinage in the context of Article 739. Significantly, a conviction for adultery or concubinage need not be had before the disabilities mentioned in paragraph (1) of Article 739 may effectuate.[14] Thus, in a case for the probate of a will where the testator bequeathed to his bigamous wife the free portion of his estate, this Court ruled, inter alia, that the disposition is void under Article 739 in relation to Article 1028 of the Civil Code.[15]
cralaw cralaw

G.R. No. 161357 November 30, 2005

ELENA P. DYCAICO, Petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, Respondents. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: FACTS: Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his selfemployed data record (SSS Form RS-1), he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pensio n from the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away on June 19, 1997. A few months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997. Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivors pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of or the Social Security Law2 she could not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. The petitioner points out that the term "primary beneficiaries" as used in Section 12-B(d) does not have any qualification. She thus theorizes that regardless of whether the primary beneficiary designated by the member as such is legitimate or not, he or she is entitled to the survivors pension. HELD: The Court holds that the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, which qualifies the term "primary beneficiaries," is unconstitutional for it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.7 The proviso infringes the equal protection clause As illustrated by the petitioners case, the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12 B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 which qualifies the term "primary beneficiaries" results in the classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries into two groups: (1) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted prior to the latters retirement; and

(2) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement. Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their respective marriages are valid. In other words, both groups are legitimate or legal spouses. The distinction between them lies solely on the date the marriage was contracted. The petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses. However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivors pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., "provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden."14 The nexus of the classification to the policy objective is vague and flimsy. Put differently, such classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the aforesaid policy objective. Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages to the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latters retirement for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension does not rest on real and substantial distinctions. The proviso infringes the due process clause The proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard. Conclusion Even as the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) is nullified, the enumeration of primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension is not substantially affected since the following persons are considered as such under Section 8(k) of Rep. Act No. 8282: (1) The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and (2) The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children. In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse and dependent children as follows: (1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;

(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twentyone (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 15, 2003 and Resolution dated December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69632 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is declared VOID for being contrary to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The Social Security System cannot deny the claim of petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivors pension on the basis of this invalid proviso.