Advaita Vedanta PDF

Advaita Vedanta and typologies of multiplicity and
unity: An interpretation of nondual knowledge

Joseph Mllne
THE SOTERIOLOGICAL BASIS OF ADVAITA VEDANTA
This study is an attempt to clarify the meanings of duality and nonduality as
they are found in Advaita V edii.nta.
1
The need for such clarification may not be
immediately obvious since, of all the systems of Hinduism, none has been more
studied and commented upon than the nondual teachings of Sailkara. It is my
view, however, that the real meaning of nonduality has frequently been misun-
derstood, especially by Western scholars. Its essential sense has often been only
partially grasped, or oversimplified, and sometimes even quite distorted. These
misunderstandings are reflected in the use of such terms as 'impersonal abso-
lute,' 'non-theistic,' and 'monism' when referring to Sailkara's nondualist teach-
ings. We may trace these misunderstandings to two main causes. First,
nonduality is taken to be a 'doctrine' or a 'belief' of Sailkara's, and, second, it is
usually discussed as a 'philosophical' or 'metaphysical' theory of reality. In
either case it is lifted out of its original religious context where it has a soterio-
logical function. These ways of discussing nonduality have arisen in the main
from the methodologies of Western scholars of comparative religion, where the
emphasis has been upon classifying and comparing the 'belief systems' of the
world religions, which tends to be reductive. I wish to show in this study that
nonduality is, for Saftkara and for later nondualists such as

neither a 'belief to be taken on faith nor a 'philosophical system' to be demon-
strated, proven, or justified through rational argument.
3
Merely to define the sense of the term advaita will not suffice. To understand
what lies in the term, in the context to which it belongs, requires an understand-
ing of the problem it addresses. To suppose that Sailkara is answering questions
International Journal of Hindu Studies 1, 1 (Apri11997): 165--88.
1997 by the World Heritage Press Inc.
166 I Joseph Milne
he is not posing will necessarily lead to a misreading of his teachings. Sankara
is not a philosopher in the usual Western sense proposing a metaphysical
system through which reality is to be interpreted or explained to the satisfaction
of reason. Even less is he proposing a scientific theory of the nature of reality.
Non duality is not an objective description of phenomenal existence. Nor is it a
refutation of any such objective description. The nondual nature of reality, as he
discusses it, is not demonstrable in the rational sense, and if taken this way it
amounts only to one possible theory of reality. Sailkara is explicit in saying
nondual knowledge transcends the grasp of reason. This is not to deny, of
course, that Sailkara employs rational or philosophical arguments to support
nonduality, but where such arguments are advanced they are usually negative
arguments aimed at exposing the defects of false or illusory views or experiences
of reality. His ultimate support for nonduality is not reason but the authority of
the scriptures or sruti, especially of course the or Vedanta. Here he
makes no greater claim than that of an exegete. In his commentaries on the
Bhagavad Gita, the Brahma Sutra, and the he is centrally concerned
to elucidate what he takes to be the true meaning of these texts and to refute any
possible defective interpretations. His aim is to show that these scriptures
declare that the highest knowledge is knowledge of the Self and that with
knowledge of the Self comes the realization that the Self, brahman, and the
universe are one. This nondual knowledge alone, he contends, is absolute
knowledge (brahma-jniina), and that all other knowledge is, by comparison,
only relative knowledge or simply ignorance. This brahma-jniina or absolute
knowledge is not 'knowledge of' or 'knowledge about,' as all rational knowl-
edge is, but knowledge as such, knowledge in which the knower is the known
without any division between subject and object The Self is this knowledge.
What problem, then, is this nondual knowledge the answer to? Essentially it
is a response to the problem of false or deceptive experience of reality. The root
of all such false experience of reality lies, according to Sailkara, in the mind
attributing the notion of reality to what is not real. These projections of the
mind take two primary forms. On the one hand, what is held to be the personal
self with its limiting adjuncts (upiidhi) is identified with, while on the other
hand, what is held to be 'other' than oneself is thought to be, a completely
separate and independent reality. From this arises the sense that there are two
fundamentally discontinuous realities-self and not-self or subject and object.
Neither of these separate realities are secure. What is held to be the personal self
is constantly changing and uncertain. Although it is taken to be ontologically
independent of all that is other than itself, it is continually affected and over-
whelmed by what is regarded as other than and external to itself. Thus, although
the personal self is held to exist by itself, it finds itself continuously subject to
Advaita Vedanta and typologies of multiplicity and unity I 167
experience of what it holds to exist separately from itself. It is dependent upon
what is not itself. The separate reality of the world, on the other hand, is simi-
larly perpetually changing and unpredictable. With every good it offers, it caries
a seed of sorrow. No stable relationship can be established between the personal
self and the other. The two realities are experienced as perpetually in conflict. In
addition to these two realities is a third reality, Brahma or the Creator. But
Brahma also is conceived of or experienced as yet another wholly separate reality,
a reality which further relativizes the personal self and the world.
Thus the personal self cannot hold steady in any certain knowledge of itself,
but changes with different states and experiences. It cannot settle on any fixed
relation with the world, but is agitated by the ever-changing impressions of the
senses and the never-ending stream of desires and aversions that arise from this.
Nor can it attain rest in the knowledge of brahman because brahman remains
ever beyond its grasp. The personal self may embrace any theory or belief about
the true nature of reality, but the experience of reality remains divided and
continuously in flux.
It is therefore important that we understand that the problem Sailkara is
addressing is primarily an experiential problem. It is in the subjective experience
of separateness, incompleteness, and relativity of being that the problem of
duality arises and comes into view. The notion of duality is not a philosophical
or metaphysical notion but is an experiential fact. Of course, it talces a consider-
able degree of reflection and discrimination to analyze the problem and articulate
it in terms of duality. Sa.Iikara is addressing his teachings to those who have
already arrived at such an analysis. He fully acknowledges that the undiscrimi-
nating mind or that ruled by the passions never arrives at this analysis. They
live in the hope that satisfaction of their various desires will eventually bring
fulfillment. There is no moral judgment in this. But for those who have reflect-
ed sufficiently on their experience, the insight into the fundamental problem of
the dual appearance of reality leads them to search for a resolution to that
duality. The desire to know the underlying unity of everything awakens. This
desire to know the underlying unity of everything is a religious desire. That is
to say, it is not a desire that can be satisfied through intellectual speculation,
but only in direct experience of unity. It is at this point that the inquiry into the
true nature of the Self begins, and this leads to the inquiry into the true nature
of the world and of brahman. Experience itself, however, has a metaphysical
ground and Sailkara necessarily explores this.
These three lines of inquiry-into the nature of the Self, the world, and
brahman-are connected because they address the question of the ultimate nature
of the real. The real appears, in the state of ignorance, as threefold or as three
separate realities: the Self, the world, and brahman, as Ramar,a ~ i points
168 I Joseph Milne
out:
All religions postulate the three fundamentals, the world, the soul and God.
The one Reality alone manifests Itself as these three. One can say 'the three
are indeed three' only while the ego lasts. Therefore to inhere in one's own
Being, where the 'I,' the ego, is dead, is the perfect state (1969: 72).
Saiikara and RamaJ;la Mahal1ii teach that this multiple perception of reality is the
product of the ego (ahaitkiira), the false sense of Self. The pure or unqualified
sense of 'I' (aham) has become associated with the mind, senses, and body
(upiidhi) and has attributed to them the sense of reality that belongs to the
atman alone. Through this false identification, which is the creation or projec-
tion of the ego, the mind experiences the world and brahman as 'other,' as
separate realities. To put this another way, by limiting itself by identification
with mind, senses, and body, the one Reality appears as multiple realities.
Consciousness is constrained to see separate entities.
The essential teaching of Satikara is that Reality is one. This is the basis of
the term advaita. Yet it is a negative term, intended to deny that there are multi-
ple realities. Brought to its sharpest, it denies an absolute ontological distinc-
tion or difference between the subject and object, or between perceiver and
perceived, or between Creator and created. It is misleading, however, to call this
teaching 'monism' or 'monistic,' as Robert Zaehner does, for example, in his
Mysticism, sacred and profane (1961). Although this term is employed in an
attempt to translate the negative term advaita into a positive Western philo-
sophical equivalent, though the term 'monism' really has no precise meaning in
Western philosophy, it results in a distortion of the concept. It confuses the
negation of difference with the conflation into one. To grasp this important
distinction clearly, we will now look at the whole question of duality in some
detail.
THE NATURE OF DUALITY
~ r are various kinds of dualities, or dualisms, and these need to be distin-
guished from each other. The terms 'duality' and 'dualism' are frequently
employed as loosely as 'monism' and 'monistic.' There are dualities that are
ultimately resolvable or which only appear as dualities. These are the dualities
with which Advaita Vedanta is concerned. There are dualities comprised of
complementary pairs. There are mutually exclusive dualities. There are coexten-
Advaita Vediinta and typologies of multiplicity and unity I 169
sive dualities. There are co-dependent dualities. As far as I am aware, no detailed
study has been made of these various types of dualities.
4
This is unfortunate,
since much confusion has arisen in the application of terminologies that unite or
resolve certain of these dualities. The term coincidentia oppositorum as we find
it in Nicholas of Cusa, for example, or the term coniunctio oppositorum as used
by the alchemists. These terms belong to very precise systems and contexts and
should never be arbitrarily exchanged or regarded as equivalent to one another.
It will be helpful, then, to take a brief look at the various types of dualities
and try to broadly classify them. We may begin with two general classifications
under which different kinds of pairs or dualities may be placed: (i) vertical duali-
ties, in which opposites stand on different planes, and (ir) parallel dualities, in
which opposites stand alongside one another.
The most obvious vertical duality we find in religious thought is that of
transcendent Creator and temporal creation. From this fundamental vertical
duality arise a whole series, such as immortal/mortal, transcendent/immanent,
cause/effect, spirit/matter, mover/moved, potential/actual, unmanifest/manifest,
above/below, and at a lower level mind/body, king/subject, master/pupil, and so
on. Vertical dualities are essentially hierarchical and are found in the various
religious or metaphysical cosmologies and cosmogonies. In some cosmologies
they remain absolutely separate and irreconcilable, as, for example, in the Judeo-
Christian ex nihilo doctrine of creation in which an absolute difference or onto-
logical discontinuity is maintained between Creator and creature. In others, such
as in the emanationist cosmogony of Neoplatonism or in the theophanic cos-
mogony of Eriugena-which are perhaps the most akin to V edantic cosmogony
-reconciliation is sought between the ineffable One and the many.s
Parallel dualities are quite different to these. As the term suggests, they stand
side by side in the form of equal pairs. Examples of parallel dualities are male/
female, left/right, within/without, good/evil, rest/motion, subject/object, hot/
cold, light/dark, and so on. In Vedanta these are generally spoken of as the
'pairs of opposites' and are regarded as belonging to the way the mind represents
perception to itself. Not all parallel dualities are of the same kind, however.
They may be subdivided into (i) complementary pairs and (ii) mutually exclu-
sive pairs. Complementary pairs, such as male/female or left/right, exist only by
virtue of each other. They are reciprocal opposites. Mutually exclusive oppo-
sites, on the other hand, exist only by the negation of each other, as, for
example, with monism/pluralism, hot/cold, light/dark. They are antithetical. In
Advaita Vedanta the good/evil opposites are regarded as complementary or
reciprocal opposites, while in Platonism and in Christianity they are understood
as mutually exclusive opposites, like being/nonbeing. Not all mutually exclu-
sive opposites are, however, of the same kind. Some are antithetical, while
170 I Joseph Milne
others are only relative opposites in which only one pole is pritnary. Presence/
absence would be an example of this type of opposite. In the Christian tradition
'good' is understood as a primary presence and 'evil' as the absence or privation
of good and not a reality in its own right. From this understanding of the nature
of good and evil there developed the Christian doctrine of privatio boni, which
escapes the Manichean dualism in which good and evil are regarded as two
opposing realities or powers.
6
Strictly speaking, this Christian understanding of
good and evil belongs to the vertical class of opposites, while in Vedanta it
belongs to the parallel class. In Christianity good and evil are ontological oppo-
sites, while in Vedanta they are moral opposites. This is an important distinc-
tion because it shows that the understanding of the notions of good and evil are
not necessarily the same in different religious or philosophical traditions.
There is a further class of more ambiguous pairs that express a kind of
'identity in difference,' such as universal/particular, being/becoming, absolute/
relative, macrocosm/microcosm, and so on. These appear to share in some
respects the attributes of reciprocal opposites as well as mutually exclusive
opposites, hence their ambiguity. These are the types of opposites to which the
notion of coincidentia oppositorum has been applied.
It is obvious from this brief survey that not all dualities can be resolved in the
same manner, and that there are some-the mutually negating opposites-that
cannot be resolved at all. Great care needs to be taken when considering how
dualities or opposites occur and the particular types of philosophical or meta-
physical problems each type raises. To suppose that there is some general model
of resolution that can be applied to all dualities would be quite misguided.
Some types of opposites simply belong to the pluralistic nature of creation itself
(sagUJ:Ul brahman) and rather than being resolved they can only be 'transcended'
through the knowledge of the undifferentiated substratum of creation (nirguiJO
brahman).
Three main types of resolution may be discerned: (i) unity of identity, (ii)
unity of reciprocity, and (iii) unity of mergence. Unity of identity is where all
trace of distinction or separateness is entirely removed. It is where 'lost' or
'forgotten' identity is restored. Unity of reciprocity is where there is identity in
distinction, or differentiated unity, as, for example, in the Christian doctrine of
the three persons of the divine Trinity. This is what might be termed a 'complex'
unity, since it is where, to use the term of Teilhard de Chardin (1965), 'unity
differentiates.' At the mystical level it is where the individual soul knows and
becomes most distinctly itself in union with God. It is this type of union that
Bonaventure speaks of when he says 'I will see myself better in God than in my
very self (1972, 5: 12, n.9). Here God is understood to be the ground of the
subjectivity or self-presence of every being. And unity of mergence is unity
through transformation and absorption. In mystical terms this is where the soul
is said to be transformed or transfigured into God. It is union through an onto-
logical change.
All three of these types of unity are spoken of in mystical literature describing
the ultimate union of the soul with God, although allowance must be made for
metaphorical language in many of these descriptions. Advaita Vedanta clearly
and emphatically speaks of the first, unity of identity. This is why it has often
been called monism, although this is a misleading term as I have mentioned
already. Nevertheless, it is in the differences between these three concepts of
mystical union that distinctions are made between Advaita V edlinta and other
religious traditions. On the other hand, there are passages in the and
in the Bhagavad Gftii that appear to describe each of these three types of unity,
and it is from these differences that various schools of interpretation have arisen.
The Vedanta or qualified nondualism of Ramanuja,1 for instance,
is based upon the second type of unity, unity of reciprocity. Arvind Sharma
(1986) explores some of these differences of interpretation in his comparative
study of the Gftii and suggests that on occasions Sailkara' s nondualist interpre-
tation (1977b) is forced, although he discusses in his conclusion ways in which
these diverse interpretations may be reconciled.
If there are different kinds of resolution to dualities, then obviously the appro-
priate kind of resolution must be applied to each type of duality, where a resolu-
tion is actually possible or necessary. Here is where we may take issue with the
term 'monism' as applied to Sankara's nondualism. Monism is, I suggest, a
false resolution of the dualism that Advaita Vedanta is concerned with. To see
this as clearly as possible we may discuss the dualities Sailkara is concerned
with in terms of three primary dualities. I have called them three primary
dualities because they arise out of a threefold division of Reality into brahman,
jagat, and iitman-God, universe, and Self. They are: (i) Universe/God (It!Thou
duality); (il) God/Self (Thou/1 duality); and (iil) Self/Universe (lilt duality).
These dualities do not fall easily into any of the categories discussed above.
This is partly because each pair is experienced differently and partly because as a
class they may be thought of in quite different ways. In general, however, three
different ways of conceiving these pairs may be distinguished: (i) as entirely
separate and autonomous realities in themselves, (ir) as cause and effect, and (iiz)
as co-relative. It will be useful to examine each of these in turn.
(l) The first of these we may term 'monadism.' Although no such scheme of
entirely separate existences has been elaborated, as far as I am aware, the
assumption of absolute independence of being is not uncommon. Attempts to
define beings or entities 'in themselves,' without accounting for their relations
with other beings or entities, or the notion of individualism found in certain
172 I Joseph Milne
kinds of existentialism in which essence is held to be self-created, are examples.
But notions of the radical transcendence of God, which deny any ontological
relation between God and creation, or between God and the soul-God as
'wholly other' -also fall into this class of dualism. Also, the doctrine of
iirambha-viida, which holds that the universe is a new creation not contained in
its cause, is dualistic in this sense and is refuted by Sailkara in his Brahma
Sii.tra BhiifYa (2.1.15-20), where he argues that the effect is non-different from
the cause.
The assumption underlying such a conception shows itself to be extremely
radical once it is considered closely. It attributes absolute autonomy or self-
determination to every entity or being, regarding it as originating and termi-
nating in and for itself. This implies an absolute non-relation between all
entities or beings. Such an absolute non-relation would even exclude, logically
speaking, any ontological or epistemological relations between all things. Even
to speak of each possessing 'being' or 'existence' would not strictly be possible
since some nominalist explanation of the apparent common properties of being
or existence would be required to justify absolute non-relation. Although such
monadism seems wholly implausible, it represents, at least conceptually, the
most radical form of dualism in the sense that Advaita Vedanta conceives
dualism-a duality of separately originating and wholly independent realities.
(ii) It is perhaps the weaknesses of this ftrst type of dualism that lead to the
second, the causal explanation of separate being. If it is implausible to conceive
every being or entity as self-originating and self-determining, then a theory of
commonly derived being may be posited. There are two such theories of causal-
ity, the materialist and the theistic. Materialism posits primal matter as the
common substance and cause of all things, while theistic causation posits that
the world and the self are created by God. According to Advaita Vedanta, the
notion of cause and effect belongs strictly to the empirical world or miiyii, even
though brahman is held to be both the material and efficient cause of creation. It
is a model of the relations between created things, where everything affects
everything else. In the empirical world, however, what is a cause in one relation
is an effect in another. No object or entity can be found that is solely a cause,
nor can any object or entity be found that is solely an effect Thus, causality is a
relativistic notion. It turns out either to be circular or else an infinite regress.
9
In
Vedanta causality is the characterizing feature of smrasiira, or else it belongs to
nature or prakrti. Also, it posits the existence of brahman only by inference,
while, according to Sailk:ara (1977a Brahma Sutra Bhiifya 2.1.14-20), brahman
cannot be inferred from creation. To posit God as first cause, so as to break the
inflnite regress of causality, may solve the problem in one sense, but it reduces
every being to the status of an effect. Consequently, an insurmountable onto-
logical discontinuity is placed between the being of God and the being of the
universe and the being of the self. If it is said that the world and the self 'have'
being, or in some sense 'participate' in being, then being itself becomes dual.
What type of entity 'has' being if the entity itself is not being? Or what type of
entity 'participates' in being if it is itself not being? It is clear that to attribute
Primal Being to God as first cause and some kind of derived being to the world
and to the self reduces Being itself to an attribute of some kind, even though an
uncreated attribute of God and a created attribute among created things.
(iii) A way out of this impasse might seem to be offered by the third type of
duality, the duality of co-relativism.
10
As with our first type of dualism, we are
dealing here with a concept that has not been given detailed philosophical
exposition but which nevertheless lies hidden or is implicit in various notions
of reality. At the opposite pole to monadism, co-relativism conceives that all
entities and beings exist only by mutual relation to one another. Nothing exists
in or by itself as such, but only over against and by virtue of everything else.
For example, 'I' can be posited only in relation to 'Thou.' 'This' can only be
posited in relation to 'That.' But neither 'I,' 'Thou,' 'This,' nor 'That' exist as
such because, from another perspective, they are interchangeable. The 'I' is a
'Thou' to another, 'This' is a 'That' to another. Therefore everything is what it
is only by virtue of the perspective from which it is known or the context or
relation in which it appears. All things exist only by virtue of these ever mobile
perspectives and contexts. To put this in other terms, everything is simply the
expression of conditions and is devoid of any real existence in itself. There are
no entities or beings, only relations. This conception of reality finds implicit
expression in various forms of relativism and deconstruction theory.
According to Advaita Vedanta the possibility of interpreting reality in these
diverse ways arises out of the fundamentally paradoxical nature of miiyii itself:
This (miiyii) is without the characteristics of Reality or unreality, without
beginning and dependent on the Reality that is the Supreme Self. She (miiyii),
who is of the form of the three u ~ s (qualities or energies of Nature) brings
forth the Universe with movable and immovable (objects) (Sailkara 1987
Prabodhasudhakara 99).
Since it is neither real nor unreal it cannot be comprehended:
All people admit in their experience existence of miiyii. From the logical point
of view miiyii is inexplicable. Sruti too declares it to be neither existence nor
non-existence. Since the effects of miiyii are undeniably manifest, its existence
cannot be denied. Being stultified by knowledge, it cannot really be said to
174 I Joseph Milne
exist. From the point of view of (absolute) knowledge (of the Iitman) it is
always inoperative and hence negligible V i d y ~ y a 1967 Paiicadai 6.128-
29).11
It is to be appreciated, however, that although Advaita declares that the percep-
tion of duality is ultimately false or illusory, it does not deny the rational intel-
ligibility of the world through dualistic or pluralistic models. Miiyii is by nature
manifold. The above types of duality render the world intelligible to high
degrees and may be taken as hypotheses that make phenomenal reality explicable
and calculable. For example, many of the findings of modern Western science
have been made possible upon the implicit assumption of monadism. The
foundational notion of 'pure objectivity,' although now called into question,
assumes that the world is composed of discrete objects observable and identi-
fiable 'in themselves' independently of the subject who observes them. So
likewise has the notion of causality rendered whole areas of phenomena intelli-
gible. And a form of the notion of co-relativism has found recent expression in
such theories as holism, chaos, and ecology, in which reality is conceived as a
total interconnected process with no individual self-determining entities or
beings. There can be no doubt that each of these views of reality produce
genuine knowledge about the phenomenal world.
12
Their value is not disputable
at the empirical level, and Advaita V ediinta does not dispute them there. It is
only when they make a claim to absolute knowledge that they may be called
into question, for they yield only relative knowledge and can be in dispute with
the claims of one another. The multiplicity of scientific theories of reality and
the consequent disputes over scientific methodologies itself displays, from the
nondual perspective, the elusive and multiple nature of the phenomenal world or
miiyii. Advaita Vedanta does not propose to replace this field of knowledge with
a better or truer version that will render the world more intelligible. It proposes,
instead, that another order of knowledge exists which transcends the paradoxical
nature of all such knowledge by transcending its dualistic basis which lies in the
very structure of cognizance and reason itself, upon which it is founded.
13
Thus, although Advaita V ediinta declares that miiyii is inexplicable, since it is
neither real nor unreal, it does not deny workable empirical knowledge of the
phenomenal world. Of itself, however, such knowledge does not lead to libera-
tion because it is knowledge of a secondary and relative order. It is conceptual
knowledge, not knowledge as such, which is knowledge of the Self alone. Yet
the relative nature of all such knowledge points towards absolute knowledge in
so far as the desire for knowledge originates in the Self. It is because nondual
knowledge is ultimately sought, and because the mind can intuitively discrimi-
nate between relative and absolute, that all such knowledge is known to be
relative. On the other hand, according to Advaita Vedanta, it is only when the
nondual nature of reality is known that the ephemeral nature of mayii itself is
also truly known.
The teaching that the empirical world is unreal does not mean that it is not
there, only that it is like a drama in which the actors are real actors but they are
not the characters whom they play, in which all sorts of events take place but
which do not really happen. For the actors to play their parts convincingly they
need great knowledge of the art of drama, yet for this knowledge to work effec-
tively the actors must always know that they only play roles. Thus a drama, by
analogy with mayii, is both real and unreal at once. Yet this knowledge of its
illusory nature neither impedes the play nor makes its performance pointless.
But it preserves both the actors and the audience from projecting the notion of
absolute reality upon whatever appears or befalls.
THE RESOLUTION OF DUALITIES
Given the types of dualism that we have outlined as ways of conceiving the
three primary dualities, how are these to be resolved-if resolution is really the
right word? Here is where we need to tread rather cautiously. There are many
descriptions of nonduality we might cite from the Vedantic literature (as the
analogy of the 'wave' and the 'ocean,' for instance) but, as with the notion of
duality, these are easily, and commonly are, misunderstood. We cannot leap, as
it were, immediately from duality to nonduality. Any ill-considered leap from
duality to nonduality is likely to misconceive nonduality in a number of ways
and produce what may be called 'naive unities' or monisms. That is to say,
either unities conceived merely as at the opposite pole to duality, or else confla-
tions of dualities. The first of these leaps makes a pair of duality and non-
duality, and so still belongs to the thought structure of duality. It is because the
term 'nonduality' is a negative term that it cannot easily be polarized with an
opposite, as the positive term 'monism' can be. The second leap, in which one
pole of a duality is conflated into the other, conceives plurality merely as the
'dispersion' of unity and so attempts to arrive at nonduality by means of an
ingathering of the multiple to the one. This leap is a reduction or conflation
based upon the mutually negating conception of duality, .yet it represents a
common misunderstanding of the teaching of Advaita V edinta.
I propose, therefore, to examine a series of false nondualities before coming
to a final discussion of what nonduality means in Advaita Vedanta. Here it will
be helpful to bear in mind the distinction I have alluded to several times
176 I Joseph Milne
between nonduality and monism. Recalling our three primary dualities, we
discover that in attempting to resolve their polarities we are liable, through a
false move of reduction, to conflate each of them into six possible naive
monisms. These are each worth considering since, in their most radical forms,
they produce six views or paradigms of reality, some of which are articulated in
received philosophical systems. Those suggested here, such as materialism,
essentialism, and so forth, present themselves in extreme or radical forms and
obviously each of them imply quite different conceptions of God, the universe,
and the Self. More seriously, for our purposes, they also produce several
monisms with which Advaita Vedanta has often been incorrectly identified. The
six false reductions or monisms that emerge from the three primary dualities
may be summarized as follows:
1. Reduction of Universe into God (Theistic idealism)
2. Reduction of God into Universe (Pantheism)
3. Reduction of God into Self (Radical existentialism)
4. Reduction of Self into God (Radical essentialism)
5. Reduction of Self into Universe (Materialism)
6. Reduction of Universe into Self (Solipsism)
By 'reduction' I mean here a conflation or subsumation of one pole of a duality
into the other, and thereby an elimination of the pole that has been conflated
into the other, which now alone stands for the 'real.' Each such conflation
produces what may accurately be called a 'monism.' It may be called a monism
because the status of reality belongs to it alone. It may be called a naive monism
because the problem of duality has been overcome through a false unification, a
unification in which the identity of one pole of a duality has been relativized
and surrendered into the identity of the other, which is taken as an absolute or
true identity. Dualism has not been authentically overcome but simply short-
circuited, discounted, or leapt over.
Yet it is not difficult to understand how these naive monisms can arise,
although reflection upon their implications immediately brings them into ques-
tion. If it is assumed that reality is in some fundamental sense one or unified, as
Advaita Vedanta says it is, then there is an obvious temptation to locate within
it some unifying element or principle, some universal factor, to which every-
thing may be reduced. Materialism is perhaps the most obvious instance of such
a reduction. If every entity, every process, or every disposition of things always
involves a material quantity, conjunction, or action, then matter itself may be
taken as the primal reality and the key with which all things may be made
explicable. So runs the thought underlying much scientific theorizing. Such a
predisposition of thought is tempted to discount or bracket out whatever does
not fit this view, or else to say that it will eventually be incorporated through
the advance of science.
The various names I have given to some of these monisms, such as Theistic
idealism, Materialism, Radical essentialism, and so forth, may strike us as
curious at ftrst glance. They are offered only as approximations, but deliberately
given in extreme forms. Yet a little consideration of each one throws an interest-
ing light upon them, and it is particularly illuminating to consider each position
as a monism. Pantheism, for example, is obviously an identification of God
with the universe. As a monism it suggests a particular type of pantheism, of
course. But it is significant here because Advaita Vedanta is occasionally called
a form of pantheism, and this shows one way in which nondualism can be, and
has been, misinterpreted as a type of monism. Again, the reduction of the Self
into God, from an essentialist perspective, produces a certain type of essential-
ism. And likewise with each reduction. Each monism conceives of God, the
universe, or the Self quite differently.
14
What is more significant and interesting,
however, is that these monisms themselves make up a fresh set of dualities
between them, dualities that might be termed 'mutually exclusive' dualities or
pairs of opposites, the principal ones being: (i) Theistic idealism/Pantheism, (ii)
Radical existentialism/Radical essentialism, and (iii) Materialism/Solipsism,
and a secondary set being: (i) Theistic idealism/Solipsism, (ii) Pantheism/
Radical existentialism, and (iii) Radical existentialism/Materialism. Other per-
mutations are possible but the three principal ones are the most significant here
since they represent genuine opposites as well as genuinely irreconcilable schools
of thought. But, again, they are significant because Salikara could be taken to be
a 'radical essentialist' or a 'theistic idealist,' as well as a pantheist as we have
noted already.
It is the danger of misconceiving nondualism in terms of these kinds of
monisms that opens the way to false or inadequate comparisons between Advaita
Vedanta and other philosophical or religious positions, particularly with 'types'
or 'typologies' of mysticism. The fact that one interpreter sees Advaita as 'non-
theistic' while another sees it as 'theistic idealism,' or one as 'pantheistic' and
another as subjective 'essentialism' shows us, at the very least, that all these
terms are inadequate ways of classifying Advaita.
How then may we approach a more adequate way of elucidating, without
reduction or distortion, the genuine purport of Satikara' s nondualism-and with-
out, of course, assuming that Sankara has not himself adequately elucidated it?
The best approach, which is the one we have followed so far in our discussion,
would seem to be to tackle the misunderstandings that are common or most
likely to occur. This implies a negative approach rather than a positive one. But
178 I Joseph Milne
it is those attempts at translating Sailkara's thought into positive language that
have generally led to misunderstandings. This approach, from which arises the
term 'monism,' has tended to leave aside, as we noted at the beginning, the real
problem that Sailkara is addressing, which is that of nescience or ignorance of
the true nature of reality. Tiris in turn tends to pass over the experiential dimen-
sion that lies at the heart of his teaching. From the perspective of the tradition
to which Sailkara belongs, his teachings are those of a fully enlightened man.
Tiris means that, far from being a philosophical system of the speculative kind
to which the West has grown accustomed over the last three hundred years or so,
Satikara is attempting to communicate, with the aid of the scriptures and all the
philosophical tools at his disposal, his own direct experience of ultimate
Reality, disciplined by the authority of the Vedas. Seen from this perspective,
Satikara is trying to expose to our view the obstructions to that direct experience
of ultimate Reality. These obstructions lie, he says repeatedly, not in our
rational powers of apprehending the phenomenal world, but in the conditioned
underlying sense of personal selfhood. The problem lies in the realm of subjec-
tivity rather than in the reasoning powers or in the nature of the phenomenal
world. The way human selfhood is experienced determines the way the world is
experienced, and the way the world is experienced reinforces (in the state of
ignorance) the way the self is experienced. It is a perpetual circle. According to
Sailkara that circle can only be broken by exposing to view the false structure of
the sense of personal selfhood. I propose, then, to conclude with a brief
examination of the nondual approach to the subject/object relation.
ADV AlTA VEDANTA AND WESTERN PHILOSOPIDCAL
IMPLICATIONS
The question of the real nature of the relation between the subject and the object,
the perceiver and the perceived, the knower and the known, is not confined to
Eastern thought. It is perhaps a universal question of all philosophy, returning
in different ways in each age. Until recently the West has confined itself pre-
dominantly to only one side of the question, to the epistemological problem of
true knowledge of the object, or the 'objective world.' In its quest for such
'objective' knowledge, particularly in the sciences, it has taken as axiomatic the
real existence of the phenomenal world, and in doing this it has assumed that
the epistemological difficulties encountered in this quest arise not from the
nature of the world itself, but from the subjectivity of the observer or knower.
Thus the word 'subjectivity' has taken on pejorative connotations. The subject,
it is believed, needs to be removed from perception because it colors objective
perception with its personal idiosyncrasies, predispositions, and conditioning.
Consequently it is held that ideal perception is objective perception-perception
free from any blemish of subjectivity. The fact that philosophers, Immanuel
Kant for instance, have demonstrated that perception of the phenomenal world
(including thought) is by nature a structuring process of impressions, which
therefore precludes absolutely direct knowledge of any object as it is in itself,
has not altered this view in common practice. The ideal of objective perception
is still pursued, as though the only inhibiting factor to it were acquired opinion
or emotional bias.
What is significant in this is the consequent notion that, when it comes to the
question of knowledge of the human subject, the fact of the subject being a sub-
ject is set aside and every effort is made to know it as an object. This is the case
with the various schools of psychology too, which claim, rightly or wrongly, to
proceed by empirical methodology. The assumption behind this view, apart
from the authority vested in the notion of objective knowledge, is that human
subjectivity is already known and understood, as though it were a given knowl-
edge and presented no difficulties.
1
5
From the point of view of Advaita Vedanta the aspiration for such objective
knowledge, whether of the phenomenal world or of the human subject, is
founded upon the false notion that objects exist at all in any real sense. All
attempts are doomed to fail since the very notion that objects exist is itself a
projection of the mind upon sense impressions. The subject/object appearance of
reality arises only in the mind. This is not the same thing as Kant is saying.
Although he says, just as Sailkara does, that there cannot be knowledge of
things in themselves because perception is a structuring process, Salikara goes
further and says that there are no things in themselves to be known and that
perception of discrete objects is in fact rnisperception. It is from this stand-point
that Advaita Vedanta proposes the notion of miiyii within brahman:
Miiya which has this double of projection and concealment is in brahman. It
limits the indivisible nature of brahman and makes It (brahman) appear as the
world and the embodied being (SaJikara 1976 Drgdriyaviveka 35.35).
Or again in his commentary on the Katha p a n ~ a d (1.3.12):
Alas, how unfathomable, inscrutable, and variegated is this miiyii, that every
creature, though in reality identical with the supreme Entity, and is instructed
as such, does not grasp the fact, 'I am the supreme Self,' while even without
being told, he accepts as his Self the non-selves, viz. the aggregate of body
180 I Joseph Milne
and senses, under the idea, 'I am the son of such a one,' though these (latter)
are objects of perception (and are hence not his selves) like pots etc.! (SaJiJcara
1972).
Sailkara does not mean by miiyii that the phenomenal world is not actually
present, but that its presence is an appearance only-though a 'real' appearance.
Appearance is, by definition, real and unreal at once. This, however, is not an
'objective fact' about the phenomenal world in the same sense as a scientific fact
claims to be. When Sailkara states that the phenomenal world is unreal he is
speaking not of the phenomenal world 'in itself but of the act of perceiving it,
which arises from the notion of an independent observer looking upon an inde-
pendent reality.
All the various forms exist in the imagination of the perceiver, the substratum
being the eternal and all-pervading whose nature is Existence and
Intelligence. Names and forms are like bangles and bracelets, and is
like gold (Sailkara 1975 Atmabodha 8).
In other words, he is claiming that the phenomenal world appears by virtue of
the subject/object concept of the mind. Again, unlike Kant, he is not saying that
the phenomenal world cannot be directly accessed as it really is because of the
nature of the mind, but rather that it can be known directly through the realiza-
tion that it is non-different to the Self.
All that is perceived, all that is heard, is brahman, and nothing else. Attain-
ing the Knowledge of Reality, one sees the universe as the nondual brahman,
Existence-Knowledge-Bliss Absolute (Salikara 1975 Atmabodha 64).
Thus Saiikara is really speaking of the subject, or rather of the notion of an 'I'
that conceives itself as a subject. This 'I' (ahankara as distinct from iitman) is
the product of upiidhis or limiting adjuncts imposed upon the pure, limitless,
and self-illuminating consciousness. It is in this process of qualifying pure
consciousness that the duality of subject and object arises. It is therefore quite
wrong to say that in nondual perception the subject unites with the object. This
would be an instance of monism rather than of nonduality. For Sailkara percep-
tion is dual by nature. It requires and consists of a subject and object and is
therefore a product of miiyii. What Sailkara is not saying, as the Buddhists do in
their doctrine of aniitman-viida, is that there is no self. On the contrary, he is
saying that the Self or Iitman always remains the undeluded supreme Witness of
the illusion of subject and object as well as of the removal of that illusion.
This objective universe is absolutely unreal; neither is egoism a reality, for it
is observed to be momentary. How can the perception, 'I know all,' be true of
egoism etc., which are momentary? But the real 'I' is that which witnesses the
ego and the rest. It exists always, even in the state of profound sleep .... The
knower of all changes in things subject to change should necessarily be eternal
and changeless. The unreality of the gross and subtle bodies is again and
again clearly observed in imagination, dream, and profound sleep (Sailkara
1978 Vivekaciif!iimarJi 293-95).
Notice here that Sailkara says it is the objective universe that is absolutely
unreal. It is in the experience of reality as objective that its unreality lies. Real-
ity Itself, which is brahman, cannot be known as an object by a subject. Thus,
the notion of objectivity necessitates a subject. The subject is its logical compli-
ment. Therefore, the ideal of absolutely objective knowledge is self-contra-
dictory from the nondual position. The vantage-point of real knowledge, as the
passage quoted from the VivekacU{lilmafJi shows, is that of the real 'I' which
witnesses the duality of subject and object as unreal. That is to say, the iitman
knows of itself the reality of the Real and the unreality of the unreal, and so the
use of the word 'witness' here does not imply a perceiver seeing anything
separate from itself. The resolution of the duality of subject and object lies,
then, not in a union of subject with object-which would necessitate either a
conflation of the subject into the object or of the object into the subject-but in
a knowledge of the unreality of the separation of perceiver and perceived, knower
and known, and so forth, through seeing the process through which the mind
creates the notion of itself as a perceiver separate from the all-pervading iitman
through qualifying infinite, self-luminous consciousness.
But for delusion there can be no connection of the Self-which is unattached,
beyond activity, and formless-with the objective world, as in the case of
blueness etc. with reference to the sky. The Jlvahood of the iitman, the
Witness, which is beyond qualities and beyond activities, and which is
realized within as Knowledge and Bliss Absolute-has been superimposed by
the delusion of buddhi, and is not real. And because it is by nature an unreal-
ity, it ceases to exist when delusion is gone (Sarikaca 1978 Vivekacii4iima1J.i
195-96).
The negation of the duality of subject and object is, however, only one aspect
of nondual knowledge. The difficulties or misconceptions that arise when trying
to understand nonduality simply in tenns of the removal of dualities, which is
impossible to conceive since conception is itself dualistic, can only be resolved
182 I Joseph Milne
through direct knowledge of the Self that is by nature nondual. There is an inter-
esting passage in the PaflcadaSi (4.38-42) of Vidyiirru:tya that makes this clear.
A question is put to the teacher in the form of an objection:
If the mind causes bondage by giving rise to the phenomenal world, the world
could be made to disappear by controlling the mind. So only yoga needs to
be practiced; what is the necessity of knowledge of brahman?
[VidyiiraiJya:] Though by controlling the mind duality can be made to disap-
pear temporarily the complete and final destruction of the mental creation is
not possible without a direct knowledge of brahman. This is proclaimed by
the Vedanta. The duality of rsvara's creation may continue, but the nondual-
ist, when convinced of its illusoriness, can nonetheless know the secondless
brahman. When all duality disappears at the time of the dissolution of the
universe, the secondless iitman still remains unknown, because then, as in
deep sleep, there is no teacher and no scripture, though there may be absence
of duality. The world of duality created by r!vara is rather a help than an
obstacle to a direct knowledge of the nonduality. Moreover, we cannot destroy
the creation, so let it be. Why are you so opposed to it?
What this passage seems to imply is that the mere suspension or suppression of
the dualistic projection of the mind through control by practice of yoga is not
sufficient for knowledge of Reality. The knowledge of nonduality is not merely
some kind of reversion of the mind to a non-distinguishing or non-cognizant
state, a cessation of the projecting activity of the buddhi, as happens temporarily
in deep sleep for instance, which would be a state of ignorance of duality rather
than a knowledge of nondual Reality, but instead it is full knowledge of the
identity of iitman and brahman. Thus SaJikara (1978) says:
The cessation of that superimposition takes place through perfect knowledge,
and by no other means. Perfect knowledge, according to the !rutis, consists in
the realization of the identity of the individual soul and brahman
(VivekaciU;iiimaJJi 202).
This perfect knowledge involves full discrimination between the characteristics
of existence, cognizability, and attraction as they belong to brahman, there
corresponding to sat, cit, and iinanda, and the way the phenomenal world
appears to be endowed with these characteristics by the further imposition of the
qualities of name and form. Name and form qualify the unqualified characteris-
tics of brahman and make them appear to belong to the phenomenal world in
discrete objects.
16
This of course includes the ego.
It is significant that says that if the Self is not known when all
duality disappears at the moment of dissolution of the universe, then it will
remain unknown, as it is in deep sleep. This implies that true realization of the
Self involves the accomplishment of realization within the creation. This in turn
implies that realization involves knowledge of the true nature of the universe as
brahman, and therefore a direct and continuous discrimination between the real
and the unreal. It is in this sense that the various analogies of illusion, such as
the snake and the rope or the wave and the ocean, are illustrative of nondual
knowledge. The universe as the 'phenomenal' world or as an 'object' of percep-
tion by a subject is known as an appearance only, and so is still apprehended,
but not taken to be Reality itself. If, by abiding in perfect knowledge of the
Self, the universe still appears, but now as appearance only, then whatever befalls
will not affect the Self in any way. Nor will the movements of the mind or the
emotions perturb the Self because there will be no attachment to them through
the attribution of reality to them. This would indicate a change in the mind
itself, even though the mind is part of miiyii. Thus a distinction is made in
Advaita Vedanta between illusion (miiyii) and delusion, which is to mistake
miiyii for Reality. A question is put to touching on this prob-
lem and it is worth considering his reply:
[A visitor:] 'The Supreme Spirit (brahman) is Real. The world (jagat) is illu-
sion,' is the stock phrase of Sri Satikarachirya. Yet others say, 'The world is
reality.' Which is true?
[Ralruu}a Both statements are true. They refer to different stages of
development and are spoken from different points of view. The aspirant
(abhyiisi) starts with the definition, that which is real exists always; then he
eliminates the world as unreal because it is changing. It cannot be real; 'not
this, not this!' The seeker ultimately reaches the Self and there finds unity as
the prevailing note. Then, that which was originally rejected as being unreal is
found to be a part of the unity. Being absorbed in the Reality, the world also
is Real. There is only being in Self-Realization, and nothing but being. Again
Reality is used in a different sense and is applied loosely by some thinkers to
objects. They say that the reflected (adhyiisilca) Reality admits of degrees
which are named:
(i) vyiivaharika-satya (everyday life )-this chair is seen by me and is real.
(ii) priitibhiisika-satya (illusory}-illusion of serpent in a coiled rope. The
appearance is real to the man who thinks so. This phenomenon appears at a
point of time and under certain circumstances.
184 I Joseph Milne
(iii) piiramiirthika-satya (ultimate)-Reality is that which remains the same
always and without change.
If Reality be used in the wider sense the world may be said to have the
everyday life and illusory degrees (vyiivahiirika- and priitibhiisi/ca-satya).
Some, however, deny even the reality of practicallife-vyiivahiirika-satya and
consider it to be only projection of the mind. According to them it is only
priitibhiisika-satya, i.e., an illusion (1989: 41-42).
This implies that in realization of the Self as the same Reality as brahman the
universe is known also as that same Reality, but that with the dissolution of
ignorance in the mind the projection or imposition of the notion that the
universe is a separate reality ceases. What has dissolved in the mind is the
delusion that Reality is multiple, and with this comes the knowledge that mayii
and brahman are ultimately identical (piiramiirthika-satya), although there is a
knowledge of the distinction between brahman and miiyii. This suggests that,
although the Self alone knows nondual Reality, the mind l).}so acts differently
under that knowledge-even though mind, from the ultimate stand-point, is
illusory. Under the direct light of the Self the mind no longer makes mistakes
about reality. What appear to be two contradictory statements by Sailkara, on the
one hand, that the universe is unreal and, on the other hand, that the universe is
brahman, really amount to saying the same thing but on different levels. The
first statement denies the separate reality of the universe, while the second
affirms its true nature. The two statements are addressed to different stages of
knowledge in the subject, and therefore have a soteriological function, and so
cannot be taken simply as 'objective' statements about reality itself in a scien-
tific sense. This implies, finally, that there is no real distinction between
appearance of brahman as the universe (sagu1Ja brahman) and brahman as the
eternal and unchanging Reality (nirgu1J.a brahman), just as there is no real
distinction between the ocean and the wave. All such distinctions, even though
they have a didactic function in Advaita Vedanta, lie solely in the mind of the
perceiving subject.
Notes
1. Although I shall focus primarily on the teachings of Sankara, I take for granted a
consistency in the principal teachers in the Advaita Vedanta tradition up to and including
Ramlll}a Mahafli. I acknowledge that there may be certain variations in this tradition
over time, but I regard these variations as matters of emphasis which do not modify the
core teaching of nondualism, which is here my main concem. I have therefore felt free
to quote from other expounders of nonduality where I feel they throw light on questions
that Saitkara does not himself fully elaborate but which are nevertheless implicit in his
works.
2. Ramal)a (1879-1950) is regarded as one of the greatest teachers of Advaita
of modem India. At the age of seventeen he had a profound experience of the true nature
of the Self without any guidance from a teacher and remained conscious for the rest of
his life of the identity of iitmDII and brahmlln. After some years in seclusion in the holy
mountain of AruJJacala, he began to receive visitors and to teach through dialogue. He
advocated no single system of teaching, or any one religion, but taught from his direct
experience of the Self. Although not a follower of Sankara, he wholly accepts Sankara's
teachings and refers to them on many occasions in the records of his dialogues.
3. This is clearly recognized by Rudolph Otto in his comparative study of Saitkara and
Meister Eckhart:
That that Being is one, without a second, that it is undivided, without apposition or
predicate, without 'How' or fashion, these are not merely metaphysical facts but at
the same time 'saving' actualities. That the soul is eternally one with the Eternal is
not a scientifically interesting statement, but is that fact upon which the salvation of
the soul depends. All affirmations and arguments in proof of the absolute unity, the
complete simplicity, and the perfect identity of the soul with God, all the evidence
and declamation against multiplicity, separateness, division and manifoldness-
however much they may sound like rational ontology-are for both of them only
ultimately significant because they are 'saving' (1987 [1932]: 21).
4. A partial exception is the valuable study of David Loy (1988: Chapter 1) in which
he classifies the various ways in which nonduality is employed in Asian philosophic and
religious thought.
5. For an excellent study of this question, see Gersh 1978; for a fine collection of
papers comparing Neoplatonism with Indian philosophy, see Harris 1982.
6. For a study of the distinctions between Zoroastrian, Platonic, and Gnostic dualism,
see Rudolph 1983: 59ff.
7. Ramanuja (1055-1137), Hindu saint and philosopher and founder of the doctrine of
qualified nondualism Vedanta), which holds that God and the world are
both real, but that the reality of God is independent while that of the world is dependent.
This he expressed in the analogy of brahman as the Self and the world as body.
8. I exclude the 'monadology' of Gottfried Leibniz (1898) because although he
conceives reality as made of independent and autonomous 'souls' that only appear to
affect one another, they are all created by God and all act within a pre-established
harmony which God has established. Nevertheless, Leibniz's monadology is an example
of a philosophy that denied any single unified substance as the basis of reality.
9. See Saillcara's discussion and refutation of God as efficient cause in Brahma Siitra
2.2.37-41.
10. By co-relativism I do not mean the Buddhist conception of conditioned origination
186 I Joseph Milne
(pratrtyasamutpiida) which excludes the existence of brahman, although in other respects
it is structurally similar but applied in a specialized sense.
11. Little is known of VidyiiraJJ.ya. Some scholars hold that he was head of the Srogeri
Matha from 1377 to 1386, one of the four principal matluls founded by SaJikara. His
Paiicadasr is a rich exposition of Advaita Vedanta and has come to be regarded as a
classic in India. It bears interesting comparison with the works of ~ a i k a r a as a non-
polemical manual of instruction.
12. These three modes of conceiving duality have perhaps never been given detailed
philosophical exposition because they are held to be self-evident truths by those who
hold them. They operate in the mental structure in much the same manner as Kant's
notion of time (1929) as a transcendental a priori does.
13. It will be noticed that the dualism attributed to Zoroastrianism and to certain forms
of Gnosticism, which conceive of existence as a perpetual struggle between opposing
principles of good and evil, are not included in our classification. The fact that Advaita
Vedanta does not discuss this form of dualism is because, firstly, it is not strictly an
ontological dualism and, secondly, good and evil belong to a class of pairs of opposites
which belong solely to mii.yii. The problem of duality as Advaita Vedanta conceives it is
the problem of God, the universe, and the Self appearing as separate realities, while in
fact they are one. The Gnostic form of dualism does not propose that the principles of
good and evil have independent origination, but rather that the principle of evil, as iden-
tified in matter, is a secondary and degenerate addition to a good original creation. In
this cosmology, evil is a product of a fall, not of the first creation. It has features more in
common with miiyii, or of avidyii, than of the creation as Vedanta conceives it. Advaita
has a very specific understanding of duality, just as it has of nonduality, which ought not
to be confused with other types or other uses of the term. The duality of Advaita
Vedanta is an essentially illusory duality, a duality that arises through a misperception of
reality, not a cosmic duality. As such it can be overcome through the knowledge o{ the
real nature of God, the world, and the Self.
14. The Radical existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre (1956), for example, altogether
denies the reality of God as well as a given essence of the self, which is to be created by
the individual. Sartre conceives both God the creator and the self as essence as denying
man ultimate freedom, which he locates in the potentiality of existence. Thus for Sartre
God is conceived as determinist and created essence as fatalist. From a monistic view-
point, Sartre would confer upon man those qualities of God, such as self-determination
and freedom to create, which in the West are traditionally attributes of God alone.
Sartre's existentialism is, of course, only one type of existentialism.
15. Recent philosophers such as Edmund Husserl (1982), Martin Heidegger (1992),
Martin Buber (1970), and Paul Ricoeur (1992) have opened up the question of
'subjectivity' in various ways and shown that the 'givenness' or transparency of the
Cartesian self is illusory.
16. For a fuller explanation of this, see the explanatory notes of Svlimi Nilchilananda
to verse 8 of his translation of Saiikara' s Atmabodha (1947).
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Otto, Rudolf. 1987 [1932]. Mysticism East and West. London: Quest.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1992. Oneself as arwrher (trans. Kathleen Blarney). Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Rudolph, Kurt. 1983. Gnosis (trans. Robert McLachlan Wilson). Edinburgh: T. & T.
Clark.
Salikarichruya. 1972. Commentary on Ka!ha Upani1ad (trans. Svarni Gambhirinanda).
Calcutta: Advaita Ashram.
Salikarlichiirya. 1975. Atmabodha (trans. Sviimi Nikhiliinanda). Madras: Sri Ramakr-
ishna Math.
Sankarlichiirya. 1976. Drg-driya-viveka: An inquiry into the nature of the seer and rhe
seen (trans. Svarni Nikhiliinanda). Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Math.
Sankarachiirya. 1977a. Brahma-sutra Bhiifya (trans. Sv!mi Gambhiriinanda). Calcutta:
Advaita Ashrama.
Sailkarichiirya. 1977b. The Bhagavad Gftii, with the commentary of Srf Sankariichiirya
(trans. A. Mahadeva Sastry). Madras: Samata Books.
Sarikarichruya. 1978. (trans. Sviimi Madhaviinanda). Calcutta: Advaita
Ashrama.
SaJ\karichiirya. 1987. Prabodhsudhakara: The nectar-ocean of enlightenment (trans.
Samvid). Madras: Samata Books.
Sartre, J. P. 1956. Being and nothingness: An essay on phenomenological ontology
(trans. Hazel Barnes). New York: Philosophical Library.
188 I Joseph Milne
Sharma, Arvind. 1986. The Hindu Gftii: Ancient and classical interpretations of the
Bhagavadgftii. London: Duckworth.
Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre. 1965. The phenomenon of man (trans. B. Wall). London:
Collins.
VidyiiJ1ll}ya. 1980. Paiicadasf (trans. Sviirni Svahiinanda). Madras: Sri Ramakrishna
Math.
Zaehner, R. C. 1961. Mysticism, sacred and profane: An inquiry into :rome varieties of
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JOSEPH Mll..NE teaches philosophy at the University of Kent at Canterbury.
HARIDAS CHAUDHURI
The Concept o/ Brahman
1n Hindu Philosophy
THE CONCEPT OF Brahman may be said to constitute the
central core of the philosophical outlook of Hinduism. It is the master idea
in rhe Vedas and the which have been the fountain-source of
inspiration in Indian culrure down through the ages. It has impaned to
Hinduism irs remarkable catholicity of outlook, irs power to absorb in a spirit
of creative synthesis the different streams of culrural influence that have
poured into India in the course of the centuries, irs boundless vitality in with-
standing the successive waves of alien attack in the cultural field, and irs
limitless toleration in allowing within irself the peaceful growth of all types
of docrrinal systems and spiritual practices. It is the concept of Brahman
which makes Hinduism a kind of universal and eternal religion. Hinduism
can, indeed, apdy be described as a religion of no-religion. It is a religion
in so far as it emphasizes the necessity of living in harmony with the basic
spiritual rruths of existence; and yet it is not a religion in so far as it does
not set irself in opposition to the other great religions of the world but insistS
upon the human spirit's going beyond all docrrinal religions. Hinduism has
been constant in irs affirmation of the essential unity of all religions as dif-
ferent lines of approach to the same fundamental spiritual reality of the world.
Now, what is the meaning of the word "Brahman"? What are the philo-
sophical implications of the theory of Brahman? The term "Brahman" ety-
mologically means the Great, the Supreme. It sums up the Hindu view of
the narure of ultimate reality. Brahman is the cosmic principle of existence,
the ultimate unifying and integrating principle of the universe. It has two
inseparable aspectS or modes of existence: nirgu1_14 and saguf!A/ impersonal
1
S4p!f Brbmtm is the Supreme Spirit conceived as the universal principle endowed with such
cosmic functions as creation, and dissolution. lVirp1)4 Br11;,.,.,. has been conceived in
variow According to Samkan.-Vedinta, it is devoid of all attributes or qualifying chan.curistia..
(See Swami Nikhilananda, TIN Up1171ish.Js. N..,. York: Harpu and Brothen, 1949, Vol I, pp.
According to Nirgx,. Brobm.m is either the self-luminosity and spiritual pervasiveness of
the Supreme Personality or His freedom from natural attnbutes and sensuous qnalities, even though
He is endowed with such supernal qualities as absolute truth, absolute goodness, absolute beauty, at.-
lute bliss, etc. See R.adhigovinda Nath, Sri Sri c.itan:y Cmtlimrit" Blnl.mw [in Benpli] (Calcutta:
47
48
HA!uD.AS CH!t.UDHURI
and personal, indeterminable and self-determining. Brahman, which is at
once indeterminable and self-determining, is thus the unity of freedom and
creativity, time and eternity, ineffable silence and perpetual self-expression.
BRAHMAN AS INEFFABLE SILENCE
Brahman, in its indeterminable aspect, is the great Silence
2
in so far as it
oursoars all logical concepcion and verbal characterization. No words are
adequate to describe it; no human notion is able to penetrate its inmost
essence; no philosophical system can pronounce the last word about the
fathomless mystery of its being.
"Brahman is that from which our words, togeth"'r with the mind, turn back
frustrated." (Yata vaco nirvartante aprapya manasa saha.)
3
But this is not to be construed as agnosticism. Even though Brahman is
inaccessible to the relational way of thinking, or to our conceptual under-
standing, it is possible for man to attain a direct vision of Brahman by tran-
scending the trammels of the intellect. Brahman can be immediately appre-
hended by what has been called knowledge-by-identity or knowledge-by-
being.4 One can realize Brahman by being one with Brahman. The vision
of Brahman is in the nature of supersensuous and supra-rational immediate
experience born of the complete integration of personality.
The closest rational approach to the essential nature of Brahman is pro-
vided, perhaps, by such terms as pure being, pure consciousness, and pure
joy. So, it may be said that the primordial manifestation of Brahman in the
intelligible sphere is infinite being-consciousness-joy ( sat-cit-ananda).z Brah-
man is pure infinite being, not in the sense of an abstract concept common
ro different forms of existence, but in the sense of the indeterminable creative
Bhaktignnth>pncanbhinda, B.ngibd. IJ55), p. 80. Br4bmn being of the nuure of in1inite conscious
delight (cidin4ndtJTJiptmS), NiTP'."' m>y .!so be uken to man the delight of unnrying self-e:tistence
:u distinguished from the ddight of v.ri.ble self-m.mfesucion, See Sinadis Bibiji, Vdint4 D4ri"""
(c.lc:utta: Chaknv.rty, Chuterjee .nd Co., s.kibdi 1854), p. 10. Finilly, NiTgu'."' Brabmtm m>Y
also be interprtted u the supn-co.smie poise of being of S4P'."' Brabmtm, that i.. to say, Brabmtm in
so fas u it i.. i11dttermi=ble in being a11d inexhaustible io richness of content. See Sri Aurobindo, T h
Uf Diorirw (New York: Sri Aurobindo Libruy, Inc., 1951 ), pp. 287-288. Thi:s would be a synthesis
of the standpoints of Sarilkan and Riminuja.
Nirgu1J4 Br4bmtm i.. Silence in the sense that it i.. beyond ill verbalized expression, See S. Radha-
krisnan, Indi4n Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), Vol. I, p. 178.
T 4ittiriy4 U Ptmisd II.4.
Knowledge of Br4hmtm u immedi.te non-d1111 experience, in which the distinction between knower
nd known i.. transcended. Thw, knowledge-by-being and knowledge-by-identiry m .. n the same thing.
See T4ittiriy4 Uptmifd ILl.
5
in its inmost essence .strictly speaking, entirely ic.apre:ssible.. The utmost th.at can be
s.aid by w.zy of indicating the e:s.se::ntia.l n2ture of BrtJbmtJ1J is tlnt it is i.cJinice being, infinite conscious-
ness, and infinite joy.
BRAHMAN IN HINDU PHILOSOPHY 49
source of all existence. As pure being, ir is, in essence, beyond the dualities
of life and death, or of existence and non-existence. Brahman is pure infinite
consciousness, nor in the theological sense of an all-inclusive knower, bur
in so far as it is that pure unobjective light of consciousness which lights
up all empirical and objective knowledge. As pure consciousness, Brahman
is beyond the polariry of subject and object, knower and knowable. Brahman
is pure infinite joy, nor in the religious sense that it is the bliss-bestowing
ruler or the supreme lover of the world, bur in so far as ir is beyond the
psychic polarities of pain and pleasure, sorrow and joy, and beyond the dualiry
of lover and beloved.
As being-<onsciousness-joy, Brahman is the uniry of fact, thought, and
value. Realism, idealism, and pragmatism build upon these three inseparable
aspects of the same realiry. Realism lays stress upon the moment of fact as
the primary and determining factor. Idealism emphasizes the moment of
thought as the primary and determining factor. Pragmatism fastens upon
the moment of value as the primary and determining factor. According ro
the theory of Brahman, facr, thought, and value-being, consciousness, and
joy-are, in ultimate analysis, interwoven and interrelated aspects of the
same indivisible reaiiry.
Brahman is indeterminable, nor in the sense that it is incapable of self-
determination, bur in the sense rhar though ir is capable of endless self-
determination, it cannot be limited ro, or identified with, any specific deter-
mination, or sum of determinations, or the collectiviry of all determinations.
Unfathomable and inexhaustible in irs essence, Brahman as the ineffable
Supreme transcends the limitations of all self-expression, whether cosmic or
individual. As inexhaustible and illimitable, the Supreme is called
Brahman; bur, as endowed with the power of endless self-determination and
revealed as the universal creative principle, it is called Sagu1Ja Brahman.
Brahman performs the threefold cosmic function of creation, main-
tenance, and dissolution in regard ro the cosmic manifold.
6
It creates the
world, pervades and permeates ir, controls ir as a principle of immanent
finaliry, and periodically dissolves it on the fulfillment of a particular plan
of evolution, so that it can be recreated anew in accordance with a new
scheme of evolutionary self-manifestation. The whole process of self-
manifestation which consrirures the essence of the beginningless and endless
BrtJhman is the same a.s 1iv11r1J (the Lord of the universe), who is the creative source of all
multiplicity. See Swami Nikhilananda, Thr Up4ni<b4ds, VoL I, p. 49. According to Samkara, 54g"!'4
BrtJhmtsn is, from the ultimate standpoint, :n unreal superimposition upon Nirgu7Ja BrahmtJrt. Accord-
ing to Aurobindo, Sagzu;ra Brahman is as real a form of manifestation of the Supreme ;u Nirg:n:r.tJ Brah-
"'"" See Sri Aurobindo, Ish4 Up4ni<h4d (Calcutta: Arp Publishing !-louse, 1924), p. 52.
50 HAluDAS CHAUDHURI
cosmic flow may be said to be prompted by a kind of "purposeless purpose."
7
The "purpose" operative in the world process is no desire or need or want
in Brahman. It is called ttla, the self-expansive urge of delight, the outflow
of creative joy, the spirit of playful self-expression. Law is the mechanism
through which creative joy e.'!:presses itself in infinitely diverse forms. So,
Brahman is, indeed, the supreme artist of the world. The world of
endless variations is a spontaneous outpouring of the fullness of his joy.
5
BRAHMAN AS IDENTITY OF ALL FUNDAMENTAL
POLARITIES
According to the theory of Brahman, reality is, in itS deepest essence, be-
yond all such polarities as one and many, infinite and finite, absolute and
relative, and the like. But, viewed from the human standpoint, reality may
be d<:Scribed as the identity or creative unity of all polar opposites. This is
Sagu'!Za Brahman. He may be described as the One endowed with the power
of manifesting Himself as an endless many;
9
He is the Infinite having the
inherent power of manifesting Himself under the aspect of finirude.
10
Sagu'!Za
Brahman is at once the archetypal male and the archetypal female.
11
That
is why the Vedanta calls it Isvara-maya; the Tantras call it Siva-Sakti;
J.?.avism calls it or Sita.-R.ama, or As the arche-
typal male, Brahman is immutable and eternally perfect, sufficient unto itself,
and is supreme knowledge or absolute thought. As the archetypal female,
Brahman is endless creativity, the perperual becoming of time, the dynamic
flux of empirical existence, the principle of objectivity and love-that is, the
creative principle which brings into existence the objective world as an object
of enjoyment for the pure subject. These two, the masculine and the feminine
and Radha, or Siva and Sakti--are, however, two inseparable
aspects of the same cosmic principle.
purpose. in this coacexc. is not to be a.ke.a in it.s ordinary semc of the ulll.menc of a.ny want
or desire. It is the self-expansive urge of creative delight inherent in S4gU!J4 BrtJbm11n, or HU will to
express the joy of variable self-manifestation. See Brabma-Hltra, II.i.n.
8
T aittiri ya U Ill. 6.
'Taittiriya UpanisaJ III. 6. nBrabman willed, 'I am one, I shall become many, and be manifested."'
J.OThe Lord says in the Git4, .. I am manifested in the world of life 2.S an eternal portion of myself
in individualized form." BhagavaJ-gWi X:V.7.
u Brabma" is Br11hm11n endowed with attributes and dynamic creative power In
Hindu philosophy, the cre2tive energy of the spirit, the principle of becoming, is described metaphori-
cally as the feminine principle, where:u the principle of being (sattti), which is the basis and support
of the creative Jl.ow of becoming, is characterized metaphorically .. the male principle. While Vedanta
12ys 3pecia.l stress upon pure being, Ta.ntr:a lays special stress upon pure becoming or energy. According to
both, however, reality in iu deepre:n essence is conceived as beyond aule-female satic-d ynamic differen-
tiation..
There are some systems of thought in Hinduism which separate the mas-
culine and the feminine components of the cosmic principle and conceive
of them as forming an irreducible dualism. For instance, in the SariJ.khya
philosophy we find that the archetypal male and the archetypal female are
conceived as the ontologically discontinuous principles of puru!a and prakrti.
12
The manifested world is explained as the offspring, as it were, of some kind
of union of puru!a and prakrti. And prakrti, the ultimate principle of objec-
tivity, is conceived as determined in all its functioning by the "desireless will"
of purusa. It is in order to satisfy puru!a that prakrti functions, sometimes
in an extravened way toward creation and evolution, and sometimes in an
inrrovened fashion toward liberation and involution. Prakrti is, indeed, like
a dancing girl who is never tired of dancing and unfolding the charms and
graces of her form so long as purusa is interested in her dancing; but as soon
as puru!a is satiated with the delights of self-externalization and is seized
with a kind of nostalgic longing for self-realization, prakrti shrinks back,
stops dancing, and helps purusa to realize the pure essence of his being.
13
This spirit of close co-operation between puru!a and prakrti, and the tele-
ological subordination of the larrer to the former, make their ontological
dualism more apparent than real. So, in the Bhagavad-gita, the apparent
dualism of puru.fa and prakrti, i.e., the dualism of being and becoming, sub-
ject and object, is described as only a derivative stage in the objective self-
manifestation of the one undivided bipolar spiritual reality of the world.
14
Evolutionary nature (apara prakrti) is described there as the lower form of
manifestation of the regulative higher nature, or the spiritual Supernature
(para prakrti), of the Supreme Spirit ( Purusottama).
Brahman has been described in the as abundance, plenum, in-
finite fullness. Brahman is so completely infinite that even the subtraction
of an infinite world of finite forms cannot destroy its infinity or diminish
its plenitude of being. The logic of the infinite entails that if you take an
infinite from an infinite what remains is the infinite. This implies that
Brahman is capable of existing simultaneously in many forms.
15
The in-
determinable transcendent, the unitary universal, and the multiple indi-
vidual-these are different forms of existence of the same Brahman. The
12
believes in the dualism of and prt:k:rti. is pure being and consciousness,
and is metaphorically described as the male principle. Prt:k:rti is conceived a.s the unconscious principle
of perpetual becoming, and is metaphorially described as the feminine principle. Prakrti has been com-
pared to a dancing girl who dances for the enjoyment of and then ccaJe:S to dance for his libera-
tion. SeeS. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (4th ed., Calcutta:
University of Calcutta, p. 289.
13
S. Sa.stri? trans.9 Simlr.hya .. Kirik.A (M.adru: ]t.fadras University, n.d.), p. S9.
"See Anilbaran Roy, ed., The Mmgt of thr Git (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1946),
pp. 109-111. "See Sri Aurobindo, Ish Upnishd, pp. J6-J7.
52
HAltiDAS CHAUDHURI
inmost essence of individualized existence is called the Atman, the Self.
The Atman is not the same thing as the ego which is the organizing principle
of the conscious mind. Nor is it to be understood as the mere aggregate of
such different members of embodied existence as body, life, mind, and the
unconscious psyche. The Atman is, in truth, the ultimate integrating prin-
ciple of the tOtality of subjective existence. It is Brahman in that mode of
being in which it sustains the development of an individual as a unique
medium of its objective self-expression. So, the Atman, the true Self
16
of
the individual, is not, in essence and being, different from Brahman, the
cosmic principle.
This brings us to a very significant implication of the theory of Brahman,
to wit, the essential identity of the individual self with the universal spirit.
Atman, the unifying principle of subjective existence, is affirmed to be in
essence non-different from Brahman, the unifying principle of objective
existence.
17
Different analogies are often employed to express the relation
of identity between the individual self and the Supreme Spirit, namely, the
analogy of infullte space as related to finite portions of space,
15
the analogy
of the one moon as related to its plurality of refleaions on the surface of a
lake,
19
and the like. But, philosophically speaking, analogies are more mis-
leading than helpful, in so far as they create special difficulties of their own.
Atman and Brahman are not, of course, identical in the sense that they are
synonymous terms. According to some, they are in essence the same reality
viewed from different standpoints, the subjective and the

Accord-
ing to some, they are different poises of being or modes of existence of the
same reality.
21
The individual self is identical with the Supreme Spirit in
10
"Self" in the capiulized form denotes the inmost spiritual essence of the indi .. idual, which is tO be
distinguished from the mind, the intellect, the ego, or the empirical self conceived of as a Jiux or stream
of and :Uso from the soul conceived of 2.S a particular ment2.l substance. The Self or
Almtm is the Absolute viewed from the subjecti .. e standpoint (S2rilbn), or a real mode of existence
of the Absolute (Aurobindo).
17
The differentiation between the subjective and the objective is relative to the discursive undersund-
ing. The discovery of Brahmtm is the discovery of the uniry of existence beyond the subject-object
diJferentiation; but this discovery is made in the Vedas and the by tracing the multipliciry
of the objective world tO its uniury source. The discovery of the Alma,. is the discovery of the inmost
center of human personaliry beyond the mind, the ego, and the intellect, which are responsible for all
divisions and separations, indud.ing the subject-object differentiation. But this discovery is made in the
Upaa4ads through subjective seJf.explontion and seJf.analysis. By both subjective and objective routes,
what is ultimately attained is the nondual and indivisible pure con.sciousness which is manifested as
the d.iJferentiated world characterized by subjective and objective poles. Vedinta affirms this identiry
of A.tma" and Brahman, both on the authoriry of mystic realization and on the strength of rational
analysis. See Chatterjee and Daru, op. cit., pp. 406-11 I.
"Ibid., p. 4I I.
'"Ibid., p. 4IO.
"'Ibid., pp. 403-404.
"'See Sri Aurobindo, Th Li/ Diviv, Book 2, Part I, Chap. ID.
BRAHMAN IN HINDU PHILOSOPHY
53
being and essence; but it is different from the latter in function and form of
manifestation. And, even though the Supreme Spirit is indivisibly present
in the individual self, it cannot be said to be contained or exhausted in the
latter. According to some, again, the individual self is part and parcel of the
Supreme Spirit.
22
It is not, of course, a part in the usual acceptation of the
term, because the Supreme Spirit is assuredly partless and indivisible in char-
acter. Nor can Brahman be said to be present in the individual self only
partially or in a limited degree, because Brahman surely cannot be said to
admit of any quantitative determination. The truth is that individual selves
are in essence different unique centers of creative self-expression of the same
undivided reality, Brahman.
BRAHMAN AND THE WORLD
Viewed from the human perspective, Brahman is the creative source of
the cosmic manifold: Brahman creates the world, and pervades, controls,
and guides the world process. But, at the same time, Brahman transcends the
world in respect of irs unfathomable essence, its inexhaustible possibilities,
and irs absolure freedom. The relation between Brahman and the world, if
we can speak of any relation at all, is an asymmetrical one, because even
though th<: world is pervaded by Brahman, Brahman cannot be said to be
pervaded by the world. The world is a form of appearance of Brahman/
3
but appearances cannot be said to be the sruff of which Brahman is made.
The world process is a creative adventure of Brahman. It is the process of
irs objective self-manifestation in the apparent contraries of irs narure.
24
Brahman is indivisible being-consciousness-joy. Matter, which is infinite
divisibility, dark inconscience, and utter insentience, is the utmost limit of
the self-externalization or self-alienation of Brahman, the Supreme Spirit.
The process of cosmic evolution is the process of the increasing self-
manifestation of Brahman in the conditions provided by matter.
2
z
The world is in essence the infinitely diversified expression of the super-
conscient creative energy (maya or fakti) of Brahman. It may be described
"This is the view of Rimiinuja. SeeS. Radhakrishnan, The (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1948), p. 329.
%3 The world is an appearance in the sense that it does not exist by itself, but is a beginningless and
endless process of cre2tion and d..i.ssolution by the cre:ztive power of BrtJbmtm called trUyi or
iak.ti. Whether this process is re:l or unreal, and, i unreal, in what sen.se it is unreal, are marten of

:'In Mu7Jf:/.aka I.i.8? it is said? HBrahma.n expands by mens of austerity, and from It
matter is produced; from matter pra7Ja (life); from trri1:ta, mind; from mind
9
the elements;
from the elements, the worlds; thence work.s
9
and from works, their immortal fruiu:
"This point Ius been brought out at length by Sri Aurobindo. See The Life Divine, pp. 628-6"31.
54
HARIDAS CHAUDHURI
as the interweaving of endless forms assumed by the primordial creative
energy. The manifestation of the cosmic creativity in inconscient form is
physical energy, which constitutes the essence of matter. The manifestation
of the cosmic creativity in subconscient form is vital energy, which constitutes
the essence of life. The manifestation of the cosmic creativity in subrational
form is sense-bound mental consciousness, which constitutes the essence of
the animal mind. The manifestation of the cosmic creativity in rational form
is rational self-consciousness, which constitutes the essence of humanity.
Finally, the manifestation of cosmic creativity in superconscient form is spir-
itual energy, which constitutes the essence of the divine spirit. The divine
superconscient is charaCterized by unfettered truth-vision and creative delight.
Those who have a glimpse, or more or less enduring experience, of the super-
conscient are persons whom we call mystic seers, spiritual masters, god-
intoxicated saints, ambassadors of God on earth,
26
and the like.
SPIRITUAL FREEDOM
We have seen that, according to the theory of Brahman, individuality and
universality are interrelated forms of manifestation of the same basic reality.
The question may now be raised: What is the highest goal or the summum
bonum of the individual? The answer of Hindu philosophy is embodied in
its concept of mukti, spiritual freedom. Mukti means freedom from ignorance
and, consequently, the attainment of the direcrness of truth-vision (jnana).
It implies transition from all forms of narrowness of outlook and a limitless
expansion of consciousness. It implies emancipation from all kinds of emo-
tional attachment and psychic dependence. Mukti signifies freedom from
such psychic polarities as pain and pleasure, love and hatred, attraction and
repulsion, and the consequent attainment of mental balance and equilibrium
(samata). Finally, mukti means conscious abiding in Brahman (Brahmisthiti),
which is another name for spiritual integration. It involves the reorganiza-
tion of the entire personality in the light of one's knowledge of the supreme
truth.
Mukti, spiritual freedom, is essentially a matter of knowledge.
27
It is not
mediate knowledge via the senses or the discursive understanding, but an
immediate apprehension of reality born of the complete integration of per-
sonality. It is not a passive state of the mind, but a dynamic experience which
"'Those who attain spiritual fu!Jillment are integrated with the supreme truth, and dedicate their
lives, as did the Buddha, the Christ, Samkan, etc., to the interests of the reign of truth in the world.
:r M.uk.ti is not the acuinment of a new and foreign condition. but the reali.zacion of the inmost
essence of one's being. See Chatterjee and Datta, op. cit., p. 414.
is capable of transforming the entire personality into an active center of self-
manifestation of the supreme truth. It is not a condition of blessedness ro
be attained in a hypothetical hereafter, but a state of self-integration which
can be attained here and now in this very world (jivanmukti). So, the charge
of other-worldliness, which is often brought against Hinduism, rests upon
a regrettable misunderstanding. The highest goal of life, according co Hindu-
ism, is not attainment of a hypothetical heaven beyond the grave, or per-
peruity of existence in time, but one's conscious integration with the funda-
mental truth of existence, which is non-temporal in character. Since the
non-temporal pervades every moment of time, such conscious integration
can be achieved at any time in our wordly life as soon as the inner psychic
tensions and emotional conilicrs are completely liquidated. The immediate
experience of Brahman is neither a transcendental mystic fl.ight
28
nor a mys-
terious rapture of trance, but the direct realization of the fundamental one-
ness of all existence and of the rootedness of the All of existence in the
absolute freedom of the spirit.
29
BRAHMAN AND THE VOID
The Brahman of Hindu philosophy and the Sunyata or Void of Buddhism
are ordinarily supposed ro be radically divergent conceptions. Brahman
means fullness of being, plenitude or abundance, whereas Sunyata means
emptiness. Where is the poinr of contact between fullness and emptiness?
On closer examination it will be found thar the difference is more apparent
than real and that it is a distinction in emphasis only. Brahman is the unity
of supra<osmic silence and cosmic creativity ( nir gutJa and s agutJa), the unity
of absolute freedom and universal law (anantam and rtam). In the
there are negative as well as positive descriptions of Brahman; descriptions
in terms of "neti, neti" ("not this, not this") ,'
0
as well as in terms of "iti, iti"
("this is it, this is it") !
1
Negative descriptions intend to bring out the in-
adequacy of logical formulations in regard to the nature of ultimate reality,
whereas positive descriptions seek ro bring out the nature of the supreme
truth as the ultimate unifying and integrating principle of existence. The
"'Because Brhmm is eternally present within us 2nd in the world. "Thzt 2rt thou"; "All this [thzt
you see] is indeed Brbmi.n."
'"To know Brhmm u S.g"l"' is to ralize the unitY of the cosmic mzniiold in His crative power.
To know Brah.,an a.s Nirgu!l is to realize that the entire empirical flux of the one and the nuny is
an appearance, and u such is rooted in that non-dual truth which is 2bsolutely free from all determina-
tions and all limitations of cosmic cxpression.
30
See Taittiriya III. ), .of., 5, 6, where it is successively pointed out th.zt Brahmtm is noc
life, mind, intellect, etc.
UPniwi I. 2: "All this is indeed Brhmtm. This A.tmn is Brhmn."
56 HAluDAS CHAUDHURI
concept of Brahman does not imply faith in the ultimacy of mere non-being
or absolute nothing. It seeks to express the profound spiritual truth that ulti-
mate reality is beyond all conceptual formulation in terms of being and non-
being, one and many, conscious and unconscious. The Void, properly under-
stood, is the same as Nirguna Brahman. It was the spiritual mission of the
Buddha to restore the profound p a ~ a d i c insight into the unfathomable
depth of ultimate reality as against the prevailing intellecrualism and cere-
monialism of his time. But, while Buddhism as a reform movement within
Hindu society had to be mainly negative in its philosophical articulation,
Hindu philosophy at its best has always endeavored to maintain a balance
between the negative and the positive aspects of reality.
BRAHMAN, TAO, AND T'AI CHI
The Brahman of Hindu philosophy bears close resemblance to the Tao
(the Way) of Taoism and the T'ai Chi (the Great Ultimate) of Nee-
Confucianism. They are all proclaimed, in their essence, to be logically in-
definable and conceptually indeterminable,
32
but, nevertheless, the ultimate
source and ground of all determinations. "The Tao which can be named is
not the true Tao," says Lao Tzii..
33
But the nameless Tao is also the ultimate
ground of yang and yin, which are the active and passive principles of cosmic
existence. Similarly, Nee-Confucianism affirms that in the beginning there
was the T' ai Chi, which is the ground of such mutually opposed determinate
principles as yang and yin (the active and passive principles), or li and ch' i
(reason and vital force, or the universal and the particularizing principles).
34
The concept of Tao has been developed mainly, however, as a universal
essence behind the multitudinous forms and processes of Nature, and has
consequently imparted to Taoism the character of naturalistic mysticism. The
concept of T' ai Chi, on the other hand, has been developed mainly as the
principle of unity and harmony underlying the multitudinous transactions
and interrelations of human society, and has consequently imparted to Con-
fucianism the character of ethical realism. In N eo-Confucianism there is a
greater emphasis upon the reality of the transitory determinations of the
infinite background of existence and upon the faets of human relationships.
According to Hinduism, Nature and human society are both modes of mani-
"That is to say, inexpressible in terms of logical notioru and philosophical concepts.
"'Th< Thru R<ligions of Chin4, 2d ed., by Sootbill (1925), p. 56, quoted by R..dhakrishna.n in his
Th< Bhg1111tlgiti, p. 21, foo<note.
"See Wing-tsit Chan, "The Story of Chinese Philosophy," in Charles A. Moore, ed., Philasophy--&ut
md W.st (Princeton: Princeton Univeniry Press, 1946), pp. 56-58.
festation or grades of evolutionary self-fulfillment of Brahman, the Supreme.
3
s
But neither the unbroken unity of Nature nor the ideal harmony of human
relationships exhaustS the signi1icance of the concept of Brahman. Brahman
has also a mode of existence which may be called, to borrow Rudolph Otto's
suggestive phrase, the "Numinous," in so far as it is entirely beyond all cate-
gories of the human mind.
In the Void of Buddhism both being and non-being are denied. Being as
well as non-being may be granted "dependent reality" and "secondary truth,"
but the Void transcends them all.
36
In Taoism the greater emphasis is upon
non-being (wu wei). "Heaven and Earth and all things come from being,"
says the Tao-te Ching, "and being comes from non-being."
37
It has been said
that in Nee-Confucianism both being and non-being are synthesized in
reality, which is conceived as "a continuous process of production and re-
production." According to the philosophy of the Brahman in irs
aspect of supra-cosmic silence (nirgu7Ja) is beyond both being and non-being
in so far as it completely transcends all categories of the human mind. But,
in its mode of existence as cosmic creativity (sagu7Ja), Brahman sustains
the world process as an interplay of being and non-being. The supra-cosmic
and the cosmic, freedom and creativity, are equally real aspectS of Brahman,
38
even though the former may be logically more fundamental than the latter.
It is a complete misunderstanding of the true spirit of Hindu philosophy
to suppose that it encourages a negative attitude to life. The truth is that
Hindu philosophy has always acknowledged negativity as an important factor
in the right type of affirmation of life. In order to understand the world
from the true perspective, in order to appreciate the proper signilicance of
the temporal order in the context of the eternal, in order to participate in
the drama of life in a spirit of detachment, frec::dom, and mental equilibrium,
periodic retirement into the silence of the transcendental has been considered
essential.
BRAHMAN AND THE ABSOLUTE
The word "Brahman" is often rendered in English as the Absolute. But
the Absolute as it is usually understood in the idealistic philosophical systems
of the West can hardly be regarded as synonymous with Brahman. An ade-
"'In the GUo, God reveals Himself :u the World-Spirit that destroys in order to manifest new divine
possibilities in hu,;,an society. See Anilbaran Roy, ed., T hr Mrssagr of thr Gila, XI.
"See Wing-tsit Chan, "Syntheses in Chinese Metaphysics," in Charles A. Moore, ed., Essays in &ut-
West Philosophy (Honolulu: University o Hawaii Press, 1951), p. 164.
"Ibid., p. 165.
"Sri Aurobindo, Essays on tbr Gila (New York: E. P. Dutton, 195)), p. 72.
58 HARIDAS CHAUDHURI
quate grasp of the distinction between Brahman and the Absolute is vital to
a proper understanding of the true spirit of Hindu philosophy. In Western
philosophy, the Absolute has been conceived either as the negation of the
relative, or as the synthetic unity of the world of relations and distinctions.
The Absolute as the total negation of the world of relativity must be entirely
unknown and unknowable, as Herbert Spencer contends. The Absolute con-
ceived as the unifying principle of the relative world is in some respects
dependent upon the world as the world is dependent upon the Absolute, as
Hegel and his followers contend.
39
Even those Hegelian thinkers who are
serious with regard to the element of transcendence in the nature of the Abso-
lute, and who, in consequence, conceive of the Absolute as supra-rational and
super-relational immediate experience, imagine such transcendence as a
function of the world of appearance. For instance, Bradley and Bosanquet
maintain that the Absolute transcends the world of appearance only in respect
to the specific quality of its experience, and that this specific transcendent
quality is the outcome of an all-pervasive ttansmutation of the multitudinous
appearances of the world. In the view of Bradley, appearances are the stuff
of which the world is made. There is nothing in the Absolute which is not
to be found in the appearances, but, as Bradley hastens to add, "with appear-
ances alone to its credit, the Absolute would have been bankrupt."
40
This
qualification does not refer to any transcendent poise of being of the Abso-
lute. Nor does it refer to any element in the narure of the Absolute which
is independent of the world of appearance. It simply intends to remind us
of the faa that the appearances or the phenomenal diversities of the world
undergo varying degrees of modification and transformation in giving rise
to the specific quality of experience which is characteristic of the Absolute,
and which is, by the very narure of the case, inaccessible to any man.
The conception of the Absolute as the total negation of the relative and
the finite is repugnant to the theory of Brahman.u The theory of Brahman
is, as we have seen, emphatic in its affirmation of the essential identity of
Brahman and Atman, of the Divine and the Self, of the universal and the
individual. This implies that Brahman is the immanent truth of the world
of the finite and the relative. And consequently, Brahman is not entirely
30
$ee H. S. Macnn, Htgtl's Doctrint of Form<ll Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912), p. 84
.. F. H. Bradley, Apptortmct tmd IVIity (Oxford: Clarendon Pr...,, 1946), p. 433: "The Absolute
!us no :wets beyond appearances." Again, "Reility without appearance would be nothing, for there
certainly is nothing ouuide appearances." Ibid., p. 432.
u This is evident from such declarations as .... SGrvam k.hllividam Brabmtus" (All this is indeed BrtJh-
mtm). Cbii
11
dogy Up011isti lll.!4. The finite world, in so far u it is :tSSumed to be self-contained
a.nd sclf-cxi:stent i:s declared unreal in the U p a ~ a d s ~ but the finite world in its true essence is a form
of ma.nifcsution of BrabmtJn, and, therefore, is idential therewith.
BRAHMAN IN HINDU PHILOSOPHY
59
unknown and unk:nowable/
2
but is, rather, the basic condition of all differ-
entiated know ledge and capable of intuitive realization. The Absolute, con-
ceived as the synthetic unity of the world of relativity, may be regarded as
an aspeCt or mode of existence of Brahman. Ic is SaguT/,a Brahman, Brahman
in its poise of being as cosmic creativity. It has been seen that Brahman as
conceived in the is not only sagu1Ja but also nirgu1Ja, not only
cosmic creativity but also supra<osmic silence, not only synthetic unity but
also the non-dual supreme (advaitam). Brahman as the non-dual Supreme is
beyond the scope of application of such categories as unity, creativity, and the
like. NirguT/,a Brahman cannot be properly described even as transcendent,
because transcendence implies relationship to ari other which it transcends.
Nirguna Brahman is that to which the relational way of thinking simply
does not apply. The desire to know the relation between Nirgu1Ja and Sagtt1Ja
Brahman would arise from a failure to grasp the non-relational characrer of
Nirguna Brahman. All that can be said is that nirguT/,a and saguna, silence
and creativity, are rwo poises of being or modes of existence of the same
supreme reality called Brahman!
3
Brahman as the identity of such logical
incompatibles is, indeed, the profoundest mystery of existence.
BRAHMAN AND THE UNDIFFERENTIATED
AESTHETIC CONTINUUM
Professor F. S. C. Northrop has interpreted the concept of Brahman as
thar of the "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum." By this is meant that
Brahman is the totality of all that which is immediately given to our sense
experience, considered in its aspeCt of unity, divested of all differentiations.
"Brahman is what we immediately apprehend with all the distinctions and
differentiations within it abstracred away."
44
Northrop has laid much em-
phasis upon the faet that Brahman is a concept by intuition, and has drawn
a line of demarcation between a concept by intuition and a concept by posru-
lation.i5 Now, it is true that Brahman is essentially a concept by intuition.
It has been repeatedly affirmed in the Upanisads that Brahman can be known
not by logical reasoning, nor by mere erudite scholarship, but by spiritual
intuition born of self-discipline and self-integration. But it has been the en-
deavor of the philosophical works of the Vedanta--e.g., the works of Sam-
.u Brahmtm is :u an objective content and inaccessible to the mind and the intellect, but
it is surely attainable in a supn.-intellectual immediacy of experience called tu.riya. or samidbi. See
Swami Nikhilananda, Th< Upanishads, Vol. II, pp. 248-249.
"See Sri Aurobindo, Essoys on the Gila, pp.
'" !'lorthrop, .. The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive ::md Western Philosophy,,.
in Charles A. Moore, ed., Philosopb)--East and West, p. 192. .. Ibid., pp. 186-187.
60
HARIDAS CHAUDHURl
kara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, and others--to show that Brahman, which is
essentially a concept by intuition, can also be vindicated as a concept by postu-
lation. According to the Vedanta philosophy, a thoroughgoing analysis of the
incontrovertible facr.s of our experience leads us to the concept of Brahman
as the postulate or presupposition of all our experience. Sarilkara and his
followers have tried to show, for instance, how an analysis of such different
phases of human experience as waking, dream, dreamless sleep, and mystic
realization (turiya) constrain us to formulate the notion of pure unobjec-
tive consciousness as the one fundamental reality which is called Atman-
Brahman. "
6
Being established on independent logical grounds, the concept
of Brahman is thus as much a concept by postulation as a concept by intui-
tion.47 Reason is not in essence totally opposed to spirirual intuition, but is
an inadequate mode of apprehension which is fulfilled and consummated in
intuition.
It is definitely wrong to identify Brahman with the aesthetic factor in the
nature of existence. The aesthetic and the theoretic factors are in truth in-
separable aspecr.s of the world of manifestation, which is called "jagat," i.e.,
the cosmic B.ux, in Hindu philosophy. Brahman, in its inmost essence, is none
of these-neither the theoretic factor, i.e., thought in its universalized form
(e.g., absolute thought), nor the aesthetic component in its undifferentiated
totality. The concept of Brahman truly represents a radically different dimen-
sion of existence, and that is why the U pa.n.4;ads had to employ the language
of "not this, not this" ("neti, neti") in an attempt to direct our mind toward
its innermost essence. But even though Brahman transcends, in respect of
its deepest essence, both the aesthetic and the theoretic factors in the nature
of empirical existence, still it may also be said to include them in a sense,
in so far as sensuous immediacy and rational mediation are interrelated
factors in the creative self-expression of Brahman. The immediacy charac-
teristic of the experience of Brahman is not to be confounded with that of
sentient experience; rather, it is akin to (though not quite the same as) what
F. H. Bradley in his Appearance and Reality calls "that superior form of
immediacy" where "thought must reach its consummation."
48
What Northrop calls the aesthetic continuum corresponds, strictly speak-
ing, to the concept of prakrti or maya in Hindu philosophy. Prakrti or
.. The same func!amenu.l real.icy is called Brbmtm in so far as it is the creative source o the objective
world, and is alled A.tmtm in so far as it is the inmOSt essence o psyehia.l existence..
See Chatterjee and Datu, op. cit., p. 399 and :Wo p. 406, where it is rightly pointed out that
according to Vedinu the theories o Brhmtm and AJmtm not only rest upon the authority of revealed
texts and spiritual re:iliution, but can also be independently esublished on logical grounds
.. Bradley, Apptntmct ~ m R.etduy, p. 152.
BRAHMAN IN HINDu PHn.osoPHY
61
maya is the totality of empirical existence considered as a creative

It has rwo forms: unmanifest and manifest (avyakta and vyakta). In its
manifest form it is characterized by endless clliferences and d.Uierentiations,
such as sounds, colors, forms, ere.; it is the infinitely diversified world of
our experience. In its unmanifest form it is the sum total of existence in
its unclliferentiated unity and creative potentiality. What Northrop calls the
undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is in truth the unmanifest prakrti of
Hindu philosophy.
It is also a grievous mistake to describe Brahman as a continuum. By con-
tinuum Northrop means ari all-embracing field, a field including the mani-
fold of sensuous intuition. But, as John Wild has rightly pointed out,
50
it
is improper to apply the word "continuum" to Brahman, which is conceived
as "an indivisible unity," and which is "altogether without parts of any kind."
If Brahman is to be represented in any way at all, it is to be represented,
not as a continuum, but as a metaphysical point (bindu). Just as a mathe-
matical point has only position bur no magnitude, similarly Brahman as the
metaphysical point is the undivided and indivisible unity of pure being,
which is, in its deepest essence, beyond all spatia-temporal extension. Brah-
man is, indeed, beyond quantitative measurement.and qualitative determina-
tion, and as such it defies all logical articulation.
Northrop has brought out with admirable precision, however, the practical
implications of the concept of Brahman. He is perfectly right in assuming
that the experience of Brahman entails the following consequences:
51
( 1 ) realiz.,.tion of the uninterrupted unity of all existence; ( 2 ) love of peace
and dynamic compassion for the entire creation; ( 3) readiness to accept
change as the very stuff of our existence; ( 4) perception of the inadequacy
of all determiniue logical and ethical principles as a theoretical equivalent
of the concrete texrure of reality; and ( 5) devotion to the aesthetic and spir-
itual values of life.
BRAHMAN AND THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS
Dr. C. G. Jung, the founder of analytical psychology, has interpreted the
concepts of Brahman and Atman in Hindu philosophy from the psychologi-
.. The concept of pr.Jtrti in Sirilkhy, u well .. the concept of may.> in Vcclinta, is ... entially 2
dynamic principle thu accounts for the entire worlJ proa:ss,. including muter :at one extreme and
thought 2t 2Ilother. Sec Chatterjee 2nd Dtta. op. c-it., pp. 271-27&, 2nd 2lso p. 377.
"'In Chulos A. Moore, eel., Philosophy-EAst nti West, p. 262.
"F. S.C. Northrop, Th< Mettmg of EAst nti Wnt (New York: The M2cmilhn Compony,
Chaps. IX md X. (1) is the implication of Northrop's chuacterization of Brbmn .. an "all-
cmbrcing continuum." For (2), see pp. For (3), see pp. 336-337. For (4), see pp. Hl-386.
For p. 403.
62
HARIDAS OiAUDHURI
cal point of view. The Atman, the Self, is, Jung rightly points our, far more
comprehensive than the ego, for the Self is the center of our roral psychical
existence, including the conscious and the unconscious, whereas the ego is
essentially the focal point of consciousness.
52
Jung interprets the concept of
Brahma-n as the center or essence of the collective unconscious. The great
Vedantic truth concerning the essential identity of the cosmic and the psy-
chical principles is, in his view, indicative of a very deep layer of uniry in
the unconscious, a uniry behind or under the world of personal phantasies
and desires, a unity transcending the chaotic disorder of instinctive forces, a
unity beyond the darkness of the personal unconscious. The identiry of the
Self and the Supreme ( Atma-n and Brahma-n) representS the all-containing
unity of what BuddhistS call the "bodhi-mandala''-the magic circle of en-
lightenment, when the meditator feels his essential identiry with his objecr
of meditation, Brahman or Arnitabha.
53
What Jung says about the conceptS of Atma-n and Brahma-n does, indeed,
contain a good deal of precious truth from the psychological point of view,
but it must be pointed out that a psychological interpretation of philosophical
concepts does not exhaust their total significance; nor is the psychological
point of view decisive in determining the narure of ultimate realiry. Psycho-
logically, Brahman may be regarded as the center of the collective uncon-
scious, but from the philosophical standpoint the concept of Brahma-n sums
up the narure of the universe in irs innermost essence and functions as the ulti-
mate basis, not only of the psychological distinction berween the conscious
and the unconscious, bur also of the more fundamental distinction between
the psychical and the physical or berween the inner and the outer. It is the
failure ro grasp this ontological signficance of the concept of Brahman that
has led Jung to characterize the method of Yoga as an introverted movement
of consciousness. We of India know that yoga is essentially a method of
achieving union with the fimdamental truth of existence and the creative
purpose of life. Those who realize Brahman not only achieve a wonderful
measure of self-integration but also become transformed into immensely
dynamic personalities who dedicate themselves to the good of humaniry and
to the establishment of peace in the world. The Bhagavad-gita teaches that
realization of Brahma-n and abiding in Brahman ( Brahmisthiti) is not in-
compatible with even such an all-absorbing outward activiry as warfare. That
is why the supreme Godhead of the Hindus is at once an archerypal introvert
.. C. G. Jung, Psychological Types (London: Keg:zn Paul and Co., 19H), p. 475
., See C. G. Jung, "The Psychology of Ea.stern Meditation," in K. B. Iyer, ed., Art a11d Th<n<ght
(London: Luzac and Co., 1947), p. 178.
and an archetypal extravert. Siva, for example, is ar once the prince of ascetics
and the king of dancers, whose ecstatic dance constitutes the rhythm of rhe
entire creation. He is ar once the most auspicious and the most terrible, rhe
unity of the daunting and the fascinating. Similarly, is nor only the
God of love and devotion bur also the God of war and destruction, who
mobilizes the forces of righteousness and progress against antisocial and re-
actionary tendencies with a view ro the establishment of the reign of law
in human society.
BRAHMAN AND THE SPIRITUAL RENAISSANCE OF INDIA
The history of the spiritual renaissance of India is the history of rhe reaffir-
mation of the concept of Brahman, nor only as the ultimate principle of
thought, bur also as the central principle of living. Ir is the history of rhe
application of the concept of Brahman ro the reorganization of the national
and cultural life of India. Sri Ramakrishna, the prophet of the harmony of
all religions, points our that the immediate experience of Brahman involves
the vivid realization of the essential unity of the great historical religions
of the world, which are different pathways leading to the same

More-
over, such fundamental philosophical positions as pluralism, monism, and
non-dualism are nor to be statically viewed as mutually exclusive water-right
logical systems, bur should be dynamically conceived as different srages in
man's spiritual unfoldment. The multiple self, the personal God, and the
impersonal Absolute, are different moments in the life of the same Brahman.
So, the most important thing in religion is ro realize rhe Supreme directly
and to bring into life and society something of the creative light of that
realization.
Rabindranath Tagore, the great poet-seer of India, laid special emphasis
upon the aspect of Brahman as joy and beauty and harmony."" Even though
essentially beyond all forms, Brahman as creative joy bursts forth in end-
less forms and in an unending procession of visible patterns. In Tagore's
view, life is a magnificent feast of the Infinite's creative delight, in which
man has been invited to participare.:;
6
Thus, the aim of life is nor ro turn
one's back upon the bonds of human relationship, bur ro realize the divine
in the midst of all relations. The ideal of life is ro er.rer into a creative
"'See Romain Rolland, Prophets of the NI!'W India, E. F. Malcolm-Smith, trans. (New York: Albert
and Charles Boni, 19 3 0), pp. 63-6"1.
"See Tagore, Gitaiili (in Bengali) (Calcutta: ViSvabhirati-Granthi!aya, Bangibda 13 SS), poems
5, 8, 67, 120; also Santinilutn (in Bengali) (Calcutta: Vilvabhirati-Granthilaya, Bangibda 1356),
Vol. I, p. 116, and Vol. II, pp. 132, 229.
"'See Gitanili (in English) (London: Macmillan & Co., poem 16.
64 HAluDAS OiAUDHURl
fellowship with the divine artist and to realize the harmony of Brahman
more and more through a cultural interntingling of the different races and
peoples of the world.
Mahatma Gandhi, the architect of India's political independence, suc-
ceeded in rousing the political consciousness of the teeming millions of
India because his leadership was in keeping with the spirit of Indian culture.
He emphasized the impersonal character of Brahman as the principle of
unity behind all philosophical and religious differences of

Truth
and non-violence were for him the two inseparable aspects of Brahman or
ultimate reality. If truth implies the character of Brahman as the unity of
thought and existence, non-violence or love implies the character of Brahman
as the harmony of human relationship. It was Gandhi's firm conviction that
the Kingdom of God (Ramrajya) can be established in the world only by
a thoroughgoing application of the principles of truth and non-violence to
the social, political, and international problems of our existence. His whole
life was an unceasing effort to carry this conviction into effective reality;
it was, indeed, a series of rigorously conducred experiments with truth in
the sphere of collective living. He guided the freedom movement of India
with spiritual weapons, taking his stand upon the conviction that for the
effective fulfillment of a noble end it is also necessary to employ noble
means, and that the power of evil can be successfully resisted with soul-force,
which is vastly superior to the destructiveness of the machine. In mobilizing
the nationalist forces of India against the armed might of the British Empire
he used rr. say, "We must not have any hatred !n our mind against the
British people,-no hatred in thought, speech and action. We want to resist
evil with love. And love's method of resistance is non-violent non-co-
operation with the forces of injustice."
68
The history of the political in-
dependence of India is a convincing demonstration of the invincible power
of organized non-violence in subduing the forces of evil and injustice.
Another outstanding leader of renascent India was Sri Aurobindo, at
once a mystic poet and a spiritual master, a prophet and a philosopher. The
celebrated French thinker Romain Rolland has acclaimed him as "having
realized the most complete synthesis achieved up to the present between
the genius of the West and of the East."
59
The concept of Brahman occu-
., See the chapters ontitled "The Gospel of Truth" and "Truth is God," i.a. P. K. Pnbbu and U. R.
Rao, eds., The Mi,.J of M4htm o.,.Jhi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946). See also Mahadev
Desai, The Gospel of Sdflm Actiml, The Git Accordmg to G..dbi (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publish-
ing House, 1948), pp. 7-8.
,.The Mmli of Mht"'" Gnlibi, Chaps. X, Xll, XIV.
,. See Prophets of the Nnv lndiJJ, p. 627.
pies a central place in the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo. Brahman, properly
interpreted, contains within itself, so holds Sri Aurobindo, the principle of
reconciliation of the highest values of the civilizations of the East and the
West.
60
Brahman is the name given ro that fundamental truth of existence
which is the unity of time and eternity, freedom and creativity, silence and
acov1ty.
According ro the theory of Brahman as interpreted by Sri Aurobindo, the
uniqueness of individual self-expression, endless cosmic creativity, and supra-
cosmic freedom are equally real and eternal facrors in the nature of reality.
61
It follows from this that the true significance of life lies neither in exclusive
glorification of individuality nor in the liquidation of individuality in a
supra-cosmic silence. The ideal of life is, rather, the realization of the unity
of all individuals in the cosmic creativity and the maximum intensification
of individual self-expression on the solid foundation of spiritual freedom.
The material world is, in the view of Sri Aurobindo, neither independently
real, nor transcendently unreal. It is, rather, the scene of progressive self-
manifestation of the superconscient real in the conditions provided by in-
conscient marter.
62
So, the future of humanity lies in a creative fusion of
the material and the spiritual values of life-in an active reconciliation of
the psychological, aesthetic, and spiritual values with the material, economic,
and political values of life.
63
Sri Aurobindo looks upon the creative flow of time as a play of hide-and-
seek between Nature and Spirit.
64
Marter is Spirit, Spirit hiding itself behind
Nature's mask of inconscience. The process of evolution is Nature constantly
straining forward roward increasing manifestation of the Spirit within
herself. Life, mind, and reason-the vegetable kingdom, the animal king-
dom, and the human race-represent diHerem grades in the objective self-
articulation of the Spirit in marter. The history of human civilization is
the history of the development of Nature toward the next
higher manifestation of the Spirit in material conditions in the form of Super-
manhood. Supermanhood is, in truth, the vision of a unique world order,
an era of peace, progress, and harmony. The effective realization of this
00
See Sri Aurobindo, Essays on tht Gita, Book 2, Chap. XV, where Sri Aurobindo shows that time-
less perfection (ak,sara) :md unceasing ch:mge (k,sara) are equally real aspects of ultimate reality (Pun-
sottam). So, the highest ideal of life is neither mere spiritual liberation nor mere dynamic self.
but active co-operation with the creative imperus of life on the ba.sis of spirirual liberation
(ibid., Book 2, Chap. XVI).
"Sri Aurobindo, Tbt lift Divint, p. 348.
u Ibid., pp. 1 OJ-! 04.
u Ibid., Book !, Chaps. II, III
.. Ibid., pp. 102-104.
'"Ibid., pp. 75 J-754.
66 HAlm>AS CliAUDHURI
ideal depends upon a radical change of the inner narure and consciousness
of mao, and not simply upon a change of the social and political externals
of life. This change of inner consciousness can be effectuated by organized
spiritual endeavor and by bringing into overt operation in our life and
society powers of consciousness higher than the mental and the rational.
Man has evolved out of the matrix of animal consciousness with the emer-
gence of the rational mind as the dominant power of being. Similarly, Sri
Aurobindo maintains, human evolution is destined to blossom forth into
supermanhood with the emergence of the supermiod or the intuitive and
dynamic truth-consciousness as the dominant power of living.
66
The Super-
mind will not have to come from without, because it is the latent divine
possibility of human narure.
It is thus evident that the theory of Brahman, rightly understood, combines
faith in the reality of C:.1e higher spiritual values of life and the spirit of
active fellowship with the creative force of evolution roward the ideal of
a world order of abiding peace, progress, and harmony (Dharmariifya).
61
"Ibid., p. 754. Also Book 2, Chap. XXVI.
57
This is well brought out in the Giti, where KrHla urges Arjuna to co-operate actively with the
world spirit, being con:sciowly united with the supreme Godhead (VIII. 7). ideal behind this
adv:ice is the establishment of truth in the world (IV. 7-8).
Andrew 0. Fort Dreaming in Advaita Vedanta
Indian thinkers, like those in the West, have spent many waking hours wonder-
ing about dreams.
1
One school of Indian thought, Advaita Vedanta, describes
dreams (svapna) primarily in two ways: as mental creations and as recollections
or reproductions of past waking experiences. These descriptions emphasize two
different, but reconcilable, things: that is, dreams are said to spring from wak-
ing experiences, but they are also imaginative reconstructions of them. In this
article, I want to discuss the early advaitin view of dreaming, specifically
Sati.kara's and GaucJapii.da's, and its broader philosophical import in Advaita.
Finally, I want to examine this view in relation to the views of contemporary
Western dream psychology.
It is important to note immediately that Sati.kara and GaucJapii.da are not
interested in dreaming (or waking) for its own sake, or in merely describing the
psychological functions of dreaming. The flux of everyday states of conscious-
ness (like waking, dream, and deep sleep) is said to point to the advaitin's basic
philosophical conviction, that there is a single, eternally self-luminous sub-
stratum of existence (iitmanjbrahman) beyond ever-changing states and the
"everyday" world (vyavahiira, miiyii). Advaitins aim for moksa, liberation from
bondage to appearances, reaching immediate awareness of nondual Brahman.
Thus, descriptions of various states (and their similarities and differences) are
influenced by what most clearly illumines the reality of Brahman in a particular
context.
To Sati.kara, taking any adventitious limitation short of Brahman as real is
ignorance (avidyii), and both waking and dream regularly seduce us into think-
ing that limited appearances are real. Advaitins point out, however, that there
is another state, deep sleep (susupta/i), that nightly indicates the dispensability
of these limits.
2
In deep sleep, consciousness is unified (without limiting con-
cepts) and blissful (without pain or sorrow), thus most like iitmanjbrahman in
its true nature. In fact, as I have explored elsewhere, deep sleep is ultimately
more highly valued than waking or dream because it reveals limitless Brahman
more clearly than do these conditioned states. The problem with the states,
including sleep, is that each is bound in its own realm, and we do not realize
that the source of the state continuity is other than the states.
3
SANKARA ON WAKING
Before elaborating on dreaming, I want to describe briefly Sati.kara's views on
waking Uiigrat). I will not detail his entire analysis of pratyaksa, the process of
perceiving. This is not a severe loss, however, as Sati.kara is not very concerned
with a clearly elaborated epistemology, as is, for example, Dharrnarii.ja.
4
Sati.kara
seems even less concerned with a lengthy exposition of waking; references to it
Andrew 0. Fori is Assislanl Professor of Religion al Texas Chris/ian Universily, For/ Worlh, Texas.
Phi/osopgy East and West 35, no. 4 (October 1985). by the University of Hawaii Press. Allrights reserved.
378 Fort
are generally quite brief, usually leading to some mention of another state (like
dreaming).
This relative disinterest in waking clearly points out the devaluation of wak-
ing from Sailkara's Brahman-oriented point of view. Unlike most in the West,
he does not assume waking is the most real or the measure of other states. While
apparently the most widely shared state, waking is also the most tied to ap-
pearance and limitation.
According to Sailkara, waking objects (artha, vi,raya) are gross, external, and
held in common by all people. A person experiences (anubhii) things mainly by
sight, though other senses (kara!Ja) are also involved (MiiU, 3: GK, 1.2).
5
The
waking perceiving process seems to be as follows: the self (iitman) moves out by
sense channels (niiqf) and sense organs which are directed by and dependent on
the intellect (buddhi, Lights like the sun help the eyes and the
other outgoing senses. Finally, the body/sense collection (kiirya-kiira!Ja-
samghiita) does work (karman) with hands, feet, and so on (BiiU, 11.1.19,
IV.3.10: ChU, VIII.6.3).
Of course, the particular sights which arise from the intellect, eyes, and
forms, are actually superimposed on Brahman due to ignorance (that is, upiidhis
from avidyii), and this everyday seeing is lower than the self's pure uncondi-
tioned "seeing." In fact, one of the problems with waking is that the self now is
both beyond all senses (thus nonperceivable) and utterly mixed up in bodily
activity (kiirya-kiira!Ja-vyavahiira,dehendriya-vyiipiira), so it cannot be shown as
separate from the body/sense limitations (BiiU, IV.3.7,9,15,23).
6
Time and place also seem fixed and lasting in waking. One is bound now to
the illusory duality of cause and effect, perceiver and perceived, and seeing what
is not real (that is, objects separate from you and from each other) (GK, 1.11,14,
11.4-5, 111.34,38, IV.36-37). We shall later return to these characteristics, as
they indicate the purported similarity between waking and dream (from the
highest nondual standpoint).
SANKARA ON DREAMING
Next we turn to Sailkara's description of dreaming. He makes three interrelated
points: first, dreams are mental creations; second, these creations are largely,
but not completely, derived from waking; and, third, to the extent that dreams
are different from waking, they are less real than waking. These points, in
outline, are consistent with the predominant understanding of dreaming in
modern Western psychology.
First, we shall consider dreams as mental creations. Sailkara writes that
dream objects consist of mental images ( viisanii) which are fabricated (nirmii)
from waking deeds (karman).
7
Dreams seem to be formed like this: waking
deeds create mental modifications ( w:tti) in the intellect; the w:ttis really consist
ofmental images which form dream "objects." Of course, this whole process is
379
ultimately illusory appearance (miiyii), illumined by the self (BiiU, IV.3.9-13:
ChU, VIII.l2.3: BS, 111.2.3-6).
Elsewhere, Sankara calls dreams the whirling (spandana) of the mind which
is highly "ornamented" (safnskT:ta) by the stimulation of deeds, desires, and
ignorance (MiiU, 4). These stimulants cause our dream experience of happiness
and sorrow. He repeatedly stresses that perceived "objects" are really only
mental images ( viisanii) illumined by the self. Dream objects are confined within
the intellect, which is actor, action, and thing acted on in dream (Upa, 14.5.8).
Finally, dream creations are quite diverse: it seems as if one sees various things
(pots, elephants, and so forth), has conversations with other people, travels,
feels hunger, gets gold, or builds things (GK, 11.1-2,7-8; IV.35-37; Upa,
11.10,15.24).
As just mentioned, however, this dream "creativity" largely derives from
waking thought and action. The images one has in dreams arise from what one
knows, fears, or imagines in waking. Dreams, Sankara says, are a reflection
(pratibimba) of waking experiences.
8
One sees mental images corresponding to
previously experienced things (purviinubhutavastu) which arise from waking
deeds and desires.
9
Put another way, dreams are mostly the memory of prior
sights which arise from waking works. Sailkara often mentions the similarity of
memory and dream, both bringing forth things already seen in waking action.
10
One other interesting capacity of dreaming is mentioned, but not elaborated,
in BS, 111.2.4 and BiiU, IV.3.9. Dreams are sometimes indicators (sucaka) of
good and evil (dharmiidharma) in the future. In this "otherworldly" state (para-
lokasthiina), one can see future things (like sorrow or bliss) unexperienceable in
this life. Sailkara's lack of emphasis on the precognitive power of dreaming is
somewhat surprising, given precognition's startling possibilities. This seems
further evidence for Sankara's often asserted "commonsensical" attitude to-
ward the empirical world.
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF WAKING AND DREAMING
It is appropriate here to reiterate the similarities of waking and dream from
the highest point of view (paramiirtha), particularly given Gauc;iapada's con-
stant repetition of this point. According to Sati.kara, from paramiirtha both
waking and dream are adventitious (iigantuka); they are ignorance and mere
mental whirling. For example, Upa, ll.4-5 states that as dreams seem true to
the dreamer, perception and embodiment seem true in waking
before the self is known. Although the imaginings (vikalpa) of waking are not
merely within the mind as are dream images, both are ultimately unreal. Waking
and dream unreality is shown by their bondage to cause-effect and perceiver-
perceived dualities. Further, both are transient and relative: the states trans-
form ( vyabhicar) into one another repeatedly, and objects in one state seem
unreal in the other. For example, hunger or satiety in waking do not exist in
380 Fort
dream and vice-versa. Sankara concludes that waking and dream divergences
are only distinctions ( visesa), not fundamental differences (bheda) ( G K, 1.11-15,
11.4-15; Upa, Prose 11.86).
Gauc;lapada also links waking closely to dream in order to show waking's
limitations from the highest view. In GK, 111.29-30, he states that in both
waking and dream, the nondual appears as dual; in both, the mind takes on the
appearance (iibhiisa) of duality by miiyii. He asserts that mental objects are
similarly unreal in both states, for something unreal (dream sights) cannot arise
from something real (waking). Further, what is seen in one state is not always
seen in the other, calling both into question (IV.36-39,64). Gauc;lapada's main
strategy seems to be to devalue waking by linking it with the common assump-
tion that dreams are unreal.
Thus, from the highest point of view, waking and dreaming are profoundly
similar. Both have mental activity (thinking, feeling, "sensing") and are tied to
subject-ivity/duality. Both are also at least somewhat out of our control; that is,
how much do we really direct our thoughts and attention, even in waking, and
do we really "choose" to awaken and to be awake?
Saitkara, more than Gauc;lapada, does see important differences between
waking and dream in the everyday sphere. Sometimes he merely contrasts the
states; in other passages, he emphasizes the inferiority of dreaming. We shall
look at the former first. One obvious difference between these states is the use of
sense organs or body parts. Saitkara states that direct activity (siik:jii.tkriyii.) is
impossible in dream, for there are no external means like hands or feet (Bii.U,
IV.3.10,15; GK, 11.15; Mii.U, 4; BS, 111.2.3). Waking experience is "public" and
linked with objects (arthasmnyoga) by external senses, so ideas have a basis
(ii.lambana) there, whereas dreaming is "private," being made up of memories
or mental images, without objects or a basis for ideas (BS, 11.2.29; GK, 11.15).
Saitkara's GK, commentary repeatedly differentiates subtle, internal, remem-
bered dream "objects" from gross external waking experiences (upalabdhi,
bhoga) (GK, 1.4, 11.1,4,30. IV.37).
The second major difference is dreaming's freedom from waking's time,
space, and causation rules (niyama). Dream has cittakii.la (time according to
mental fancy), while waking has dvayakii.la (time according to the world of
external objects). Thus, dreams are evanescent (atyantacala), while waking is
relatively long-lasting (sthira), at least from the relative standpoint (BS, 11.2.3;
GK, 11.2,14, IV.34,38).
Saitkara often emphasizes that these "relative" differences point to the
greater reality of waking. Whenever dreams and waking are directly contrasted,
dreaming is shown to be inferior to, or sublated (bii.dha) by, waking. For
example, as mentioned above, waking experience is linked with "real" objects,
while dream memory is not. Dream "perceptions" are constantly sublated,
unlike waking. Neither can most of us create the dreams we want to have.
Saitkara also asks that we look to our own experience (anubhii.va), by which he
381
means waking "common sense" (BS, 11.2.29). It is commonsensical to observe
that one is not bound by actions done in dream, nor do their results follow one
upon waking. No one thinks oneself "sinner" (iiga) for dream deeds, nor do
others condemn one for these deeds. One is only as if (iva) active in dreams
(BiiU, IV.3.15).
Sankara's clearest statement on this topic is the BS, Ill.2.3 commentary, on
creation in samdhyii, that is, dream.
11
This creation is only miiyii (a semblance
or illusion), for dream is not a full manifestation (kiirtsnya-abhivyakta) of the
real. Dream objects are not fully real for various reasons:
(I) Space and location limitations. One cannot fit all the places and things
one experiences into the body. Also, one's body, dreamed to be in another
place, is seen still resting by those nearby, nor does one awaken els,ewhere.
Further, the other place is not really as one dreams it to be. In GK, 11.2, Sankara
adds that the people we supposedly meet elsewhere never say we actually met.
Thus, we really do not go where dreams take us.
(2) Time limitations. A person cannot come and go to various places miles
away in one moment, nor do we really experience many years' activities in a
momentary dream.
12
(3) Instrumental limitations. We have no sense-organ activity, nor do we
actually use hands or feet for anything.
(4) Sublation (biidha). Dream sights are consistently sublated in waking and
in dream itself (a chariot becomes a man becomes a tree in a moment).
Sankara goes so far as to say that waking spatial ( viyat) creation is fully real
(piiramiirthika), unlike dream creation-though of course even the former is
not the highest truth (iityantika satya). All manifestation (prapafica) is merely
miiyii, but spatial manifestation seems constant before realizing that iitman is
Brahman, while dream appearance is sublated every day. It is interesting that
Sankara finds the devaluation of dream important enough to use the term
"piiramiirthika" in regard to waking, certainly a rare usage referring to this
dualistic state.
Gau(iapada is willing to term dream false, but he is almost as firm about the
unreality of waking. Unlike Sankara, Gau(iapada finds the differences consis-
tently less significant than the similarities. Still, in GK, 11.1-15, Gau(iapada
attempts to establish that dream objects are false ( vaitathya). They are internal,
unmanifest, and covered (samw:ta). They are transient and illusory like a
mirage. Unlike waking, dream fancies (manoratha) disappear immediately after
being imagined.
However, Gau(iapada also insists here that all objects, in waking as in dream,
are imagined. He points out that internal mental vr:ttis, whether in dream or
waking, are thought to be unreal, while what is seen "outside" in both states is
thought to be real. Gau(iapada concludes by reiterating the unreality of waking
and dream, which the self merely imagines by its own miiyii.
13
Finally, one might note that judgments about the inferiority of dreaming
382 Fort
arise in waking, our present state.
14
Dream, we now say, is "mind-only" with
no "reality-test," assuming that only waking objects are real and that self-
consciousness (knowledge of one's state-bound condition) is desirable. From
the dream standpoint, dream objects are quite real, and from the highest view,
the lack oftimejspace limitations (the ability to go to other places and times, fly,
or talk with those dead or absent) is nearer one's true limitless condition than is
waking.
Further, Sailkara's understanding of deep sleep raises profound ques-
tions about the reality of waking objects and the true meaning of "self-
consciousness." As mentioned earlier, he feels that objectless deep sleep reveals
an aspect of the fundamental reality not apparent in waking and dream.
Sailkara's conception of the self in sleep actually contains two complementary
aspects: one emphasizes the immediately known self's presence as luminous,
serene bliss; the other stresses the absence of objects, or any mind/body/sense
limitation. Sailkara disagrees with Gau<;lapiida's (and a common Western) view
that deep sleep is passive resting and ignorance of reality. Instead of being
unconscious, he feels one is blissfully not conscious of particularity.
DREAMING IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY
In order to illuminate further the advaitin dream analysis, I would like to
discuss briefly modern Western dream research.
15
According to Western psych-
ology, a dream is a regular, involuntary mental activity in sleep (a form of bodily
rest). The primary (but not sole) indicator of dreaming is rapid eye movement
(REM).
16
A dream is a symbolic, pictorial, storylike fantasy which emphasizes
personal, emotional events in the past (recent or far) and our responses to
them.
17
Dreaming acts to harmonize or integrate the personality, a point Jung made
and modern research has buttressed. In dreams, one sorts out and "processes"
unassimilated waking material, especially concerning emotional life. Dreams
release tension or anxiety, and "realize" inner wishes or fantasies; they also
prepare our feelings for tomorrow's activities, explore alternatives, and free us
for effective waking action. Thus, according to modern psychology, dreams
have two roles: to relieve inner tensions and to rehearse possible solutions to
perceived problems; both roles allow us better to handle waking social
conventions.
These roles can be seen by observing our nightly dream series. In our first
dream, the shortest and the most like waking reality, we review the day's
emotions and other concerns. A particular theme is introduced, which later and
longer dreams develop (or restate) symbolically, taking us back to earlier
"deeper" experiences, in which similar emotions were felt. Even later in the
evening, there is generally some exploration of behavioral alternatives or re-
hearsal of solutions (while action is impossible) until there is a resolution (a Ia
383
Freudian wish fulfillment).
18
Thus, even when dreaming, we defend or justify
our self-image, especially against emotional threats in waking.
19
All this, of course, goes far beyond the advaitin understanding. As we have
seen, Sati.kara feels dreams are imaginary constructions, largely re-presenting
waking experiences. This is congruent with modern Western findings. To Sati.-
kara, though, dreams (and their relation to waking) are useful mainly for
indicating the limitations and ignorance in any dualistic state. Dreams do reflect
one's karmic condition; dream viisaniis cause joy and fear depending on one's
good or bad deeds. However, acting in accord with one's dharma is not wish-
fulfillment (see note 9). Further, there is no mention of dream series, emo-
tional tension release, or exploration of behavioral alternatives in Advaita.
Dreams may re-present one's sorrows and joys according to one's duty, but
they do not "relieve tension" or explore alternatives to dharmic action.
Experimental evidence of non-REM sleep also illumines dramatic differences
in advaitin and modern Western views. Non-REM sleep is like a waking day-
dream, more conceptual and realistic than the symbols in dream. In fact, wak-
ing and non-REM sleep representations are more similar than either is to
dreaming/REM. Upon being wakened from the non-REM state, people often
report, "I wasn't really sleeping, I was thinking."
This points to the problem of accurately defining "deep sleep" in a Western
context. In REM/dream, it is harder to arouse a person than in non-REM;
movement is utterly impossible, unlike non-REM; and there is more imagistic
"primary process" rather than conceptual "secondary process." In non-REM,
on the other hand, there is less respiration and brain waves are slower.
This description of non-REM sleep certainly contrasts with the advaitin
conception of deep, dreamless sleep already discussed. Deep sleep is utterly
peaceful, blissful, and nondual. One experiences no-thing in this luminous,
restful unity. Thus, deep sleep in advaita is valued as an indicator of our truest
nondual nature. The modern view, on the other hand, indicates no pure
"dreamless sleep," nor any time that the mind is completely "at rest." The
reason non-REM sleep seems to be "blissful unity" is because external stimuli
cannot enter long-term memory in this state. Sounds or smells are perceived
and evaluated, then are discarded, or one is awakened (as with smoke or a
baby's cry). To this view, no profound metaphysical truth is revealed by deep
sleep.
20
Finally, let us turn briefly to the similarities and differences of waking and
dream according to modern Western psychology. Both states store and process
information (though one deals mostly with external perception and the other
with internal emotional life), and both work to defend or integrate our person-
ality. However, waking seems to make apparent a shared reality and there is
an awareness of being awake, whereas dream brings a private reality without
state-awareness (ignoring here evidence for lucid dreaming). In waking
384 Fort
more than in dreaming, we seem to control our attention and what we think
about.
21
Once again, the advaitin understanding would not directly conflict with this
view of dreaming and waking, but there is little explicit agreement either. The
points about public versus private "reality" and the close similarity of what is
seen in both states are perhaps the clearest likenesses. As stated above, one need
not go far to discover the reasons for differing emphases: in advaita, empirical
evidence about dreaming is in the service of such metaphysical assumptions as
the reality of nondual Brahman, or our ignorant bondage to the limited and
transient. From this point of view, it is important to emphasize the similarities
of waking and dream over against the highest truth (or even deep sleep's unity).
Yet Sailkara (and to some extent Gau<;lapada) does not want to give up the
relative superiority of waking as compared to dream. Western investigators, on
the other hand, seem to be interested in "rehabilitating" dreaming, showing the
important role it plays in our psychological make-up. They do not, however,
exalt non-REM ("deep") sleep. When accenting nonduality, "deep sleep" seems
extremely valuable; when accenting psychological function, non-REM sleep is
less interesting than waking or REM.
To conclude, advaitin and modern Western understandings of dreaming and
sleep reflect the impact of differing kinds of evidence and commitments. Advai-
tins want to illuminate nondual Brahman, while the modern West is committed
to scientific investigation of psychological function.
22
Thus, the advaitin at-
tempt to understand dreaming (even if inaccurate from current Western scien-
tific standards) gives us insight into both our own and classical Indian culture.
We value reason and physical reality; they value lack of limitation and unity. At
the least, this illuminates our attachment to the idea that the waking state
appearance is "reality," and allows us to reflect on our views of "self"-
awareness and "self" -control.
BtiU
BS Brahmasiitra
ChU Chtindogya
ABBREVJA TIONS
GK Gauqaptida's Ktiriktis
MtiU Mti!Jqiikya
Upa UpaddasahasrJ
NOTES
I. In classical Indian thought, dreams were imagined to arise from foods consumed at dinner,
from disease, from clairvoyance, or from waking wishes. For more details on this, and an interest-
ing theory of classical Indian conceptions of dream ("presentative" versus "representative"), see
Jadunath Sinha's Indian Psychology, 2d ed. (Calcutta: Sinha Publishing House, 1958-1961) vol. I,
pp. 307 If.
2. For more on this, see my article "The Concept of in Advaita Vedanta," in the Annals
of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 61 (1980): 221-228.
385
3. William Indich, in his book Consciousness in Advaira (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980),
alludes to this and makes numerous other points about dreaming and other states of consciousness
(pp. 82 ff). In his discussion of dreaming in Advaita (mostly based on Saii.kara, sometimes on
Dharmaraja), Indich elaborates on Sinha's model of dreaming (see note !), and shows some of its
implications for Western philosophy, Sometimes, however, when drawing these parallels, he uses
Western philosophical terms for advaitin ideas without fully explicating the advaitin context. For
example, he says Saii.kara thinks dream experience (vs. dream content) is an "empirically real fact"
(p. 84). Perhaps, but what is an "empirically real fact," especially in light of maya?
Indich also relates advaitin dream speculation to Freudian and Jungian thought in interesting
ways, although he finds, accurately, I think, that the differences are more significant than the
similarities. In fact, the approaches are so different that an extensive discussion seems unnecessary.
One example might suffice: Indich says advaitins, like Jung, "argue that in dreams we are con-
fronted with the greater autonomy, creativity, and potential for fully satisfying renewal which char-
acterize absolute consciousness and the collective unconscious respectively" (p. 92). He himself goes
on to point out some major differences (p. 93), but I would add that Saii.kara nowhere lauds
dream autonomy or renewal, and in fact often says dream "creativity" is derivative and less real
than even waking is.
4. For a clear and concise discussion of advaitin epistemology, see Sengaku Mayeda's "The
Advaitin Theory of Perception," Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Siid-und Ostasiens 22
(1978):221-239.
5. The abbreviations used in this article should be understood throughout to include Saii.kara's
commentaries on the texts.
6. Further, waking exertion brings on sleep. We become exhausted by the many activities of the
karal}as (and the resulting feelings of sorrow and happiness). Our senses must retire within during
sleep to recover from these exertions (ChU, VI.8.1).
7. Vasanas seem to be the "material cause" of dreams, and waking deeds, along with ignorance
and desire, the "efficient cause(s)." See Saii.kara's commentary on Prasna V.4.
8. The re-presenting capacity of dreams is also assumed, but not emphasized, in the GK com-
mentary. Saii.kara there follows Gau<;lapada's emphasis on the illusory construction of both waking
and dream. While dream images derive from waking experiences, both are unreal from a higher
standpoint.
9. While it is tempting to relate the vasanas from desires to Freudian wish-fulfillment (as Indich
does), in the texts Saii.kara emphasizes the impact of past or present deeds (karman) more than
desires (kama). Acting according to one's dharma (or not so acting) affects dreams more than
wishes do (BS, 11.2.4; ChU, VI.8.1). Further research into Saii.kara's usages of karman and kama
here (and in other contexts) would clarify the desire/action/dream relationship.
10. BaU, 11.1.18, IV.3.6,9-10; BS, 11.2.29; GK, IV.34; Upa, 14.1,17,18,26.
II. For a summary of Saii.kara and other thinkers on this passage, seeK. T. Pandurangi's "A
Note on the Analysis of Dream-Experiences in Vedanta Siitra 111.2.1-6," Proceedings of the All-
India Oriental Conference 28 (1976):465-472.
12. Gau<;lapada also mentions the space, time, and location limitations in 11.1-2 and IV.34-6.
13. Elsewhere, Gau<;lapada adds that time and place are not fixed in dream as in waking, equates
dream and maya, and says that upon waking, dreamed conversations, journeys, and wealth are not
accepted (II.31, IV.34-5).
14. For an interesting juxtapostion of the state-specific and the highest points of view, see John
Levy, The Nature of Man According to the Vedanta (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956),
pp. 19 ff.
15. Experimental research on dream and sleep began only in the 1950s. The physiological find-
ings are by now fairly wellknown. I relied primarily on the following three sources. I first read The
New Psychology of Dreaming by Richard Jones (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1970). I then had
some discussions with Dr. Wilse Webb of the University of Florida (author of the Encyclopedia
Britannica entry on dreaming), who led me to Night Life by Rosalind Cartwright (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977), an excellent introduction to most aspects of the Western
psychology of dreaming.
16. For our purposes, REM (emphasizing biological function) and dream (emphasizing psy-
386 Fort
chological function) wiii be used interchangeably. REM State exists in about 25 percent of our
normal sleep period. We go through four or five ninety-minute sleep cycles each night, and our
dreams get longer as the evening continues (from five to forty-five minutes). We also have a "deep
sleep" (or delta sleep) state, which consumes about 20 percent of the sleep period, almost ail in the
first three hours of rest.
Dreaming in sleep is a basic human pattern, similar among ail races and cultures and in both
genders. It is also a basic biological need, like breathing or eating. If dreams are interrupted, there is
a rapid and persistent attempt to reinitiate dreaming, which intensifies as deprivation continues.
This need must eventuaiiy be satisfied, often by a "dream binge." On the other hand, too much
dreaming can tire us out and depress us.
An interesting sidelight for students oflndian thought is evidence of the irrelevance of meditation
to dream needs. Meditation may be relaxing and anxiety-reducing, but it does not replace REM.
Further, most scientists have not found any yogins (or others) who need no sleep. The correlation
between length of sleep and psychological integration is also unclear.
I 7. Freud's importance in the study of dreaming should not go unmentioned. Freud thought
that in dreams, out disguised wishes weii up from the unconscious and are symbolicaiiy expressed or
gratified. These wishes are more concerned with feeling good than with social acceptability (with its
behavioral restraints). His landmark contribution was pointing out that dreaming is a complex
mental activity connected with waking emotional concerns.
18. For a more elaborate discussion of dream series, see Cartwright, pp. 29-31.
19. Rosalind Cartwright argues, quite congently I think, that most Americans do not give
enough attention to inner emotional life in waking, and we must compensate for this inattention in
dreams. We ignore or downgrade dreaming ("oh, that was just a dream"), thus not utilizing a
valuable learning experience. Dreaming "opens doors to self-knowledge" and is "an untapped
resource" which can give us "a wider sense of self, the ability to bring into awareness the inner
responses as they occur and to integrate feeling and action in current behavior" (Nightlife, p. 34;
cited in note I 5). We would then need less therapy and less often act out our frustrations.
20. However, experimental findings show that the "deepest" (or delta) sleep stage is very impor-
tant. This sleep must be recovered first after a sleepless night. As Rosalind Cartwright states in her
book Nightlife, "REM sleep is of second order of importance .... Whatever REM sleep does in terms
of maintenance of health and welfare, it appears to be less vital than delta sleep." She elaborates on
this later, saying "[B]oth the quiet delta and active REM sleep may be necessary for normal
functioning, but they serve different needs-the first type may aid our physical rest and recupera-
tion ... and the second may supply a period during which our emotional responses to our expe-
riences are reviewed and defused, a time to integrate new experience with the old" (p. 48).
21. Some have imaged these differences as based in alternate brain hemispheres: the left or
waking side is linear, logical, and conceptual ("secondary process"); the right or dream side is
holistic, imaginative, and feeling-oriented ("primary process").
22. It is interesting to note that when Western scientists begin to talk in certain ways about
dreaming and other states, they are seen as becoming "mystical" or "turning East." For example,
John Liiiy writes that in altered states like dream (and, for him, the isolation tank), the mind seems
to extend beyond brain and body. Inner dream reality "laws" are more flexible than those of the
external waking world. These self-generated simulations can appear like the external world, or as if
one is in a strange body or in strange surroundings. Eventuaiiy in dream, sleep, or other states, ail
Self/surrounding boundaries can blur or be lost, bringing Self/surrounding unity (iitmanjbrahman?)
or isolation (kaivalya?). See The Metaphors of Consciousness, Ronald S. Vaile and Rolf von
Eckartsberg, eds. (New York: Plenum Press, !981), pp. 171 ff.
Numen, Vol. XXIX, Fasc. 1
THE GURU IN HINDU TRADITION
jOEL D. MLECKO
Introduction
A striking perception for a student of religions is the universal in-
sistence that instruction by an adept teacher is necessary for
development in the spiritual life. This insistence is especially vivid
with regard to the guru in the traditions of Hinduism.
With the variety implicit in Hindu social and religious life and
with the lack of an unified hierarchical organization, the individual
guru as religious teacher plays an important role in the transmis-
sion and development of the Hindu religious tradition, from the
passing on of religious knowledge to being himself a locus for
worship.
It is a general Hindu belief that only through evolution (karma
and reincarnation) and through education within the guru system is
a person perfectible. For Hindus, religion is manifested or em-
bodied in the continuing, successive presence of the guru. It is the
guru who reveals the meaning of life; he is the immediate, incarnate
exemplar in life, and as such, the guru is an inspirational source for
the Hindu. The basic strengths of the guru's role are such that
guruhood is the oldest form of religious education still extant. An
understanding of guruhood, therefore, is of paramount importance
in any consideration of the Hindu traditions.
The pan- Indian, Sanskrit term "guru" has a cluster of meanings
with significance beyond that of the English translation, "teacher."
Gu means "ignorance" and ru, "dispeller." The guru is a dispeller
of ignorance, all kinds of ignorance; thus, there are gurus not only
for specifically spiritual development but also for dancing, music,
wrestling, and other skills.
The term "guru" also means "heavy" or "weighty" and might
well illustrate the belief that accomplished or holy persons are
characterized by an uncommon weight. Jan Gonda states that "it
must primarily have described the man who on account of his
34 Joel D. Mlecko
special knowledge and function was held to be a bearer of power
conspicuous by his prestige, 'weight', and influence."
1
It is also maintained, though not commonly, that "guru" is
derived from the Sanskrit root giri, meaning ''one who calls.'' Kir-
pal Singh writes: "Thus he who always hears this (divine) call
within himself, and is devotedly attached to the call and can make it
manifest in others is described ... as Guru. "
2
If the word "guru" means many things, it is because the guru is
many things. He is an entity which in Western culture has no exact
counterpart. For the guru is a teacher, counselor, father-image,
mature ideal, hero, source of strength, even divinity integrated into
one personality. Primarily, however, the guru is the personal
teacher of spirituality, that is, of the basic, ultimate values per-
ceived within the Hindu tradition. Further, the guru possesses ex-
periential knowledge, not only intellectual knowledge, of these
values. In a word, the guru is indispensable for spiritual develop-
ment. In early Hinduism he was a vital factor in imparting Vedic
knowledge; in later thought the guru became the visible embodi-
ment of truth and in some cases he was worshipped as an incarnate
deity.
The Guru In Vedic and Literature
In his earliest role the guru was a teacher of the Vedas and the
various skills needed for their study, such as grammar, metrics,
etymology, and mnemonics. By means of a question and answer
dialogue, the guru led the or student-seeker-devotee into
philosophical and spiritual inquiry. In this process, the use of books
was rare; knowledge was orally transmitted; the interpersonal
dimension of education was highly regarded. Further, great impor-
tance was attached to the proper accent and pronunciation in the
Vedic recitation; these could be correctly learned only from a pro-
perly qualified teacher. Thus the guru was indispensable since he
was the repository of the people's ultimate knowledge and right
action as recorded in the Vedas.
The guru was generally a Brahman and his students were a very
select group drawn from Brahman, and Vaifya families. In
ancient India these students ideally lived within the gurukula or the
The Guru in Hindu Tradition 35
extended family of the guru since great importance was placed on
association and imitation in the learning process. This close, per-
sonal contact enabled the guru to intimately and radically influence
and mold the fi$ya 's life.
There are scattered references to the religious teacher in the
Vedas. In the IJ_g Veda (IV, 5, 6) the guru is described as the source
and inspirer of the knowledge of the Self, or the essence of reality,
for the seeker. In the Yajur Veda (VII, 27), the guru is described as
the one who blesses and enhances the seeker's spiritual life. He does
this not only through the knowledge he imparts as a teacher but also
through the ritual he performs as a priest. The Aryans conceived
the world as a realm of powers that affected and controlled their
lives. Nature was clearly a main preoccupation as most of the Vedic
gods were forces of nature, such as the sun, the moon, fire, and
storm. The Aryan priest-teachers could thus bring blessings from
this world through their knowledge and performance of the Vedic
prayers and rituals.
It is the Upani$ads, however, that are explicit in insisting on the
necessity of a guru. It is strikingly clear that education was not an
end in itself but a means to the attainment of sacred knowledge or
knowledge of the Ultimate Reality. Even the gods and demons
must be taught by the guru concerning that Ultimate Reality. In
the Chiindogya (VII-XII), Indra from the gods and
Virochana from the demons go to the renowned teacher Prajiipati
in order to learn the essence of reality. Only by knowledge received
direct from the guru does one attain this most beneficent Truth
( Chiindogya Upani$ad IV, 4, 3). So also, in the Ka.tha the
guru is represented as indispensable to the acquisition of
knowledge:
Taught by an inferior man He cannot be truly understood, as He is thought
of in many ways. Unless taught by one who knows Him as himself, there is no
going thither for it is inconceivable, being subtler than the subtle (I, 2, 8).
Further, the repeatedly disapproved of study by
oneself, considering it futile. Even self-study of scriptural works
cannot give the supreme knowledge. In this context the word
"upamjad" itself supplies an important clue for it literally means
"sitting down opposite somebody." Satyakiima, after having been
instructed by fire, bull, swan and bird (that is, by his own observa-
36 Joel D. Mlecko
tions) came at last to his guru. The guru marveled at Satyakama's
knowledge and asked who taught him. Satyakama replied:
Others than men. But I wish, Revered Sir, that you teach me. For I have
heard from persons like you, Revered Sir, that the knowledge which has been
learned from a teacher best helps one to attain his end (Chiindogya IV,
9, 2-3).
Finally, the Svetafvatara (VI, 22) states:
The highest mystery in the Vedanta which has been declared in a former age
should not be given to one whose passions are not subdued, nor again to one
who is not. .. a pupil.
The dialogues with the gurus are clearly didactic (such
as the dialogue between the Nachitekas and the guru Yama in
the Ka_tha UpaniJad). They reveal little about the character of the
gurus. However, the gurus' methods are clear and varied and they
all have a soteriological goal. Varuna, the guardian of cosmic order
and overseer of moral action, merely prods his son and Bhrigu
to perform tapas (austerities) in order to know Brahman. The is
urged to struggle, discover, and experience the Truth which is the
"source, stay, and end of the universe" (Taittirlya III,
1-6). Guru Yajnayavalkya, instructing his wife Maitreyi, used the
neti-neti (not this-not that) method. Brahman cannot be described in
positive terms but when all else is eliminated, Brahman remains
(Brhadara!l.Yaka Upanzjad III, 9, 26). On the other hand, the guru
Uddalaka made use of analogies to enable his students to gain
insight into Truth and then capped it with the famous expression to
his son Svetaketu, "Tat Tv am Asi" or "That thou art" ( Chandogya
VI, 13).
It is also in the that divinity and the guru are subtly
related. Major extant evidence of the most early activity of the
Vedanta school are the Katha, ifa, Svetafvatara, and
Murzrjaka. The first three are significant because of their theistic
theology. They conceived Brahman as a personal God, using words
such as Deva, Bhagaviin, and if a. In his bhakti (devotion) to Brahman
it was not uncommon for the to feel bhakti for the guru who
himself was considered to have reached emancipation (Ka,tha
I, 2, 20-21; I, 2, 7-8) and who therefore was identified
with Brahman. This is referred to as early as the Svetiifvatara
(VI, 23), about the fourth century B.C.E.: "These subjects which
have been declared shine forth to the high-souled one who has the
highest devotion for God and for his spiritual teacher (gurau) as for
God.'' Thus, it is the wise who has the same bhakti for his guru
as for God. The relationship between a guru and his was one of
spiritual reciprocity. The guru provided guidance and knowledge
on the spiritual path and the reciprocated with obedience and
devotion. It thus appears that, much before the medieval bhakti
period, respect for the guru was evolving into a devotional form
similar to that given to God. The guru was to be approached as one
approached God.
The record another subtlety: even teachers had to go as
disciples to adepts when they sought the Truth by paths other than
their own. These teachers no doubt could grasp the other paths in-
tellectually and by themselves; but there was something more im-
portant than factual knowledge that had to be absorbed: the ex-
istential technique to make that knowledge effective in themselves.
The gods related that, "We can give you the knowledge, even
knowledge of the Alman but only the teacher can show the Way"
(Chiindogya IV, 14, 1). Thus, a function of the guru is to in-
tellectually and verbally explain the scripture, its letter and spirit;
but he also teaches by his life, daily acts, casual words, silence,
overseeing the 's health, sleep, diet, the company he keeps, the
places he visits.
3
To be near the guru, to humbly and reverently
serve and obey him, is to find, to know, and to experience the
"Way."
The first step in being near the guru was for the prospective
to proffer firewood and alms to his guru. In this act the
signified a desire to share in the guru's domestic sacrifice and to
accept the duty of helping to maintain it over the several years of
his living with the guru and his family.
The relationship between guru and was officially in-
augurated by a religious ceremony, the Upaniiyana. The ceremony
took three days during which, the Atharva Veda (XI, 5, 3) explains,
the guru brought the student to a new birth. The became dvlj'a
(twice-born), as the Satapatha Briihmarza (XI, 5, 4) states. After the
initiation the stipulated duration of studentship with the guru was
twelve years. However, the completion of this period with intense
38 joel D. Mlecko
Vedic study probably remained an ideal followed most often by a
few select Brahmans.
The formal method of teaching included a dialectical approach
whereby the student asked questions and the teacher discoursed
upon them. There was, however, more to the method than simply
asking and listening. There was the insistence, as the fi;ya advanc-
ed, on contemplating the truth and realizing or activating it in one's
life. The responsibility of spiritual growth, therefore, ultimately
devolved on the fi;ya and not on the guru. R. K. Mookerji relates
the following:
The Brihadiiranyaka Upanishad clearly states that education in the highest
knowledge depends upon three processes following one another ... Srauana is
listening to what is taught by the teacher ... Manana is defined as constant con-
templation of the One Reality in accordance with the ways of reasoning
aiding in its apprehension. Nididhyasana is concentrated contemplation of the
truth so as to realize it.'
All three steps are activities of the fi;ya and all necessitate a great
deal of self-discipline.
Further, the period of studentship was not only a time of learning
and of vigorous discipline but also of humble service to the guru.
The fi;ya had to attend to the guru's sacred fire (Chiindogya Upani;ad
IV, 10, 1) look after his cattle (ibid., IV, 4, 5), collect alms for him
(ibid., IV, 3, 5), and await his every command (Brhadiirarz.yaka
Upani;ad III, 1, 2).
The Guru in The Dharma Siistras
In treating education, the Siistra of Manu (II, 140-141)
distinguished two types of teacher:
1) Upiidhyiiya who taught only a portion of the Veda and who taught for his
livelihood;
2) the iiciirya who invested the student with the sacred thread, taught the Veda
with its Kalpasutras (concerning sacrifices) and the Upanishads, and who
taught free.
(It is well to note the equation of iiciirya and guru at this point.
According to J ogendranath Bhattacharya the ''word Guru and
Acarya originally meant a teacher of the Vedas. ")
5
The fi;ya who
completed his education with the iiciirya or guru could give "gifts"
but not a "payment" to his teacher: a field, gold, cows, horses,
umbrella, shoes, grain, vegetables, clothes (II, 246). But, according
to Manu (III, 156), the "paid" teacher and "paying" student were
unqualified to participate in Srauta rites.
6
The qualities of sacrifice,
devotion and disinterested approach to material wealth seem to
have been essential elements of guru behavior.
Manu also states:
The pupil must know that that man also who benefits him by instruction in
the Veda, be it little or much, is called in these writings his Guru, in conse-
quence of that benefit conferred by instruction in the Veda (II, 149).
That "benefit conferred by instruction in the Veda" was delineated
in Manu as follows:
Of him who gives natural birth and him who gives the knowledge of the Veda,
the giver of the Veda is the more venerable father; for the birth for the sake of
the Veda ensures eternal rewards both in this life and after death (II, 146).
The iiciirya then is ten times more venerable than the upiidhyiiya
(Manu II, 145). He is chief among all gurus (Gautama Siistra II, 50)
and in a significant passage in the Vishnu Dharma Siistra, he is called
an atiguru (an especially venerable teacher):
A man has three Atigurus;
His father, his mother, and his spiritual teacher.
To them he must always pay obedience.
What they say, that he must do ...
By honouring his mother, he gains the world,
by honouring his father, the world of gods;
and by paying strict obedience to his spiritual
teacher, the world of Brahman (XXXI, 1-4, 10).
No doubt the guru was linked with the parents partly because of his
intimacy and his approach to the f i ~ y a , that is, the guru was
expected to expound the texts of scripture and live them in an
attractive, lucid, patient and kind manner (Manu II, 159-161). In
effect, the relation between the guru and his f i ~ y a was to be of a
parental character (Manu II, 171 ).
In Vishnu (XXXII, 1-2) and Manu (II, 227-37) the iiciirya, the
father, and the mother are described as the three highest gurus and
as such deserve the utmost reverence. But the Apastamba treatise
went further; namely, the pupil was to look upon the teacher as
God: "Alms are declared to be sacrificial food. In regard to them
the teacher holds the position which a deity holds in regard to food
offered at a sacrifice" (1, 1, 3, 42). The Apastamba also states: "He
(the f i ~ y a shall approach his teacher with the same reverence as a
40 Joel D. Mlecko
deity, without telling idle stories, attentive and listening eagerly to
his words" (I, 2, 6, 13).
Reverence, it was assumed, naturally gave way to service. Serv-
ing the guru was one of the requisites for attaining "supreme
bliss":
Studying the Veda, practicing austerities, the acquisition of true knowledge,
the subjugation of the organs, abstention from doing injury and serving the
Guru are the best means for attaining supreme bliss (Manu XII, 83).
Prime services which the f i ~ y a performed for his guru were fetching
water, collecting fuel, sweeping the area around the sacred fire and
begging for food (Apastamba I, 1, 1- 7).
Manu (II, 69ff.) spells out elaborate rules for the f i ~ y a s proper
behavior toward the guru whom he serves. The f i ~ y a must not pro-
nounce his guru's name without an honorific title (Manu II, 199).
"And whenever people justly censure or falsely defame his teacher,
then he must cover his ears or depart thence to another place"
(Manu II, 200). Immediately following this verse, it is stated that
the f i ~ y a who even justly censures or defames his guru will be born
in a lower plane of existence in his next birth. The f i ~ y a must be
cognizant not only of speech but also of his actions in the presence
of the guru:
In the presence of his teacher he shall not void excrements, discharge wind,
speak aloud, laugh, spitL clean his teeth, blow his nose, frown, clap his hands,
nor snap his fingers" (Apastamba II, 2, 5, 9-10).
Manu (IV, 162) states: "Let him never offend the teacher who
initiated him, nor him who explained the Veda ... " Possibly the
greatest offense (mahiipiiptaka) against the guru is to "violate the
guru's bed" (Manu IX, 235). The relationship with the guru
and his family was considered so intimate that to have inter-
course with the guru's wife was equivalent to incest.
7
Thus, the
Dharma Siistras elaborated and legislated on the principal virtues
to be directed toward the guru: obedience and propriety.
The Guru In The Epic Literature
It is a presupposition in the Epics that both human and divine
beings need the guru. The celestial beings have Brhihaspati as
their guru; he is their chief offerer of prayers and sacrifices and
their counselor (Riimiiyana II, 1, 24; II, 4, 22; IV, 54, 4). Even
Lord Rama and Lord Krishna, the very incarnations of
had to bow down before their gurus. Visvamitra was a mentor
of Rama. In his early years, however, Visvamitra was a warrior
and conqueror; but through vigorous austerities, he transformed
himself into a saint and guru. Dasaratha, the father of Rama,
magnanimously greeted that guru-saint with these words:
I heartily welcome you. Blest, indeed, with fruit is my life today. I have not
lived in vain. Your visit has washed all my sins away and has made this a holy
place ... 0 honoured sage, doubt me not: I shall be happy to do whatever by
your will, for you are verily a god to me.
8
In the Riimiiyana, the stature of the guru is further attested to
when, in the search for S!Ui, Hanuman is exhorted to leap as the
"hero-son of Desarin and Vayu, by grace of the seers and gurus
and consent of the elder apes" (Riimayana IV, 67, 34 ). Searching for
Slta, Rama encountered a female ascetic of the jungle tribes who
was greatly devoted to him. In his patient generosity Rama describ-
ed nine kinds of bhakti to her. The third kind was humble service to
the guru. This is significant for Rama does not elaborate simply
Vedic sacrifice or Upani$adic philosophy but bhakti. Rama concluded
his explanation with these
Whoever has one kind of devotion out of all these, whether man or woman, a
movable or immovable being, know him or her. .. to be dearly loved by me
(Aranyakanda XXXV, 4).
A similar list and a full description of bhakti is found in the third
book of the Ramiiyana, where Rama is questioned concerning the
difference between God and soul. Troy Organ has analyzed that
conversation:
Rama begins by confirming that knowledge according to the Vedas is the
means to salvation, but he says there is a more excellent way, the way of
bhakti. Bhakti is independent of knowledge. It involves using the senses for the
enrichment of attitudes toward the deity.
9
Rama again listed the nine elements of bhakti which include devo-
tion to the guru. Significant here is the shift of attitude in religious
education and religious experience. It is away from the Brahmanical
preserve of Vedic memorization and study to a more popular
religiosity which enhanced the importance of the teacher to the
lessening of the immediate importance of the priest, scripture, and
even the gods.
42 Joel D. Mlecko
The Mahiibharata contains stories of who distinguished
themselves by exemplary devotion to their gurus, for example,
Upanmanyu and Aruni, pupils of Dhaumya. In the Mahiibhiirata 's
Santi-Parva (containing Great Discourse), the greatest of
all virtues is delineated as respect for father, mother, and guru.
Chapter IV of the Sanatsugatiya section of the Mahiibhiirata states:
But the birth obtained from the preceptor (guru), that verily is true, and
likewise immortal. He perfects (one), giving (one) immortality. Recognizing
what he has done (for one), one should not injure him. The disciple should
always make obeisance to the preceptor; and, free from heedlessness, should
always desire sacred instruction.
The god Gai)esa, averter of obstacles and giver of boons, grants
Gaya the power to know the Vedas without study, simply as Gaya
begs, through "austerity, chastity, observances, vows, and the
grace of the Gurus" (Mahiibhiirata, VII, 55, 2ff.).
The Bhagavad G!tii, asserts that bhakti is the worship and devotion
shown to bhagaviin. Lord Krishna entered the world for very specific
reasons as he himself stated in the G!tii (IV, 8): "For the salvation
of those who are good, for the destruction of evil in men, for the
fulfillment of the kingdom of righteousness, I come to this world in
the ages that pass." Krishna introduced the important concept of
God's entry into the world as a beneficent savior. It is bhakti
directed toward this savior that is the prime means of salvation, as
Lord Krishna himself stated:
Even if the greatest sinner worships me with all his soul, he must be con-
sidered righteous, because of his righteous will.
Give me thy mind and give me thy heart, give me thy offerings and thy adora-
tion; and thus with thy soul in harmony, and making me thy goal supreme,
thou shalt in truth come to me (IX, 30, 34).
Bhakti, however, can also be the attitude which a disciple-devotee
shows to his guru as the personal and immediate manifestation of
the deity. In the G!tii, Krishna is both Lord and guru (XVIII, 75);
and even as divine guru he points to human teachers: "Those who
themselves have seen the Truth can be thy teachers of wisdom. Ask
from them, bow unto them, be unto them a servant" (IV, 34).
It is well to note here that in the Epic literature the human per-
sonality holds the center of interest and the purely divine element is
subsidiary. The Vedic Sa7J7.hitas praise and propitiate the gods; major
portions of the extol and delineate the all-pervading,
formless Brahman. On the other hand, the Epics are homocentric.
They speak of men and their greatness and of gods who have taken
human form (avattira) and who, in fact, are often servants of men.
Though incarnations of the Lord, Rama and Krishna are portrayed
as more human than divine. This humanizing tendency was con-
tinued in the Purti'(las, and had important repercussions for the
understanding of the guru.
The Guru In The Purti'(las
A distinctive element of the Purti'(lic age was the rigorous iden-
tification of Ultimate Reality not as an amorphous being but as
possessing the attributes of recognizable personality. In the Puriirzic
age, it was theistic and humanistic personality which permeated
Hindu consciousness, finding expression in art, architecture,
sculpture, poetry, and the everyday religious life of the people.
Associated with the Vai,r'(lavite Purtirzas (e.g., Vi,r'(lu, Padma, Bhtigavata)
is the doctrine of the avattira, divine incarnations in animal forms
or human beings, such as Krishna and Rama. A facet of this doc-
trine's import was that religion was directed not to a nature god or
amorphous being but to a human-like personality.
The Vi,r'(lu Pura'(la presents the divine-human personality,
Krishna, in several different human relationships: son to father
with Nanda, child to mother with Yasoda, friend to friend with the
cowherds, beloved to lovers with the gopzs. These various personal
relationships, with their respective human emotions (reverence,
affection, kindness, passionate love), eventually were understood
as modes of devotion to God. In effect, human emotions were being
transformed into means of religious devotion thereby making salva-
tion more readily accessible. Salvation could not be confined to per-
sons of high birth alone if devotion was the prime qualification.
Human relationships and human emotions were recognized as in-
herent, worthwhile goods. This attitude enhanced that obedience,
propriety, and devotion already directed to the guru. The guru thus
grew in stature in the Purti'(las. According to R. C. Hazra,
The Brharzrziiradlya-puriirza says that there is no truth (tattya) higher than the
preceptor [the guru]. This high idea about the preceptor is perhaps one of the
reasons why he is found to play an important part in the Puriirzic religious
rites.
10
44 Joel D. Mlecko
Chapter nine of the Vi,rrzu Pura'(l.a, which takes the form of a
dialogue between the guru Parasara and his f(sya Maitreya, con-
tains instructions for the student of a guru which are similar to
those prescribed by Manu (e.g. II, 175ff.):
When the youth has been invested with the thread of his caste, let him
diligently prosecute the study of the Vedas, in the house of his preceptor. .. He
is to wait upon his Guru ... He must stand when his master is standing; move
when he is walking; and sit beneath him when he is seated ...
In the Padma Purii'(l.a, stories are related about proper attitudes
toward parents and gurus to show how one can attain pleasures in
this life and the next by serving them. Those, however, who defile
those relationships are punished; the Miirka'(l.(ieya Purii'(l.a (XIV,
43-45) states:
Those who have blasphemed the Veda, the gods, the twice-born and their
Guru; for so many years these very terrible birds with adamant beaks tear out
the very tongues of those men as they are continually renewed.
In the comparatively late portions of the Purii'(l.as, the devotional
attitude toward the personal deity is shared by the guru. Even
more, the guru is often identified with the highest deity of the sect.
In the Variiha Purii'(l.a (IC) a devotee willing to have (initiation)
is to identify his guru with and honor the spiritual preceptor
accordingly. Similarly, the Bhagavata Purii'(l.a teaches that the guru is
to be regarded as the deity (XI, 3) and worshipped (X, 86), for
mok,ra (liberation) is attained only under the guidance of a guru.
This guru, the Bhiigavata Purii'(l.a counsels, must know the Vedas well,
worship Krishna (XI, 3, 21), and be in control of all passions (XI,
10, 5).
The Guru In The Tantras
Many of the Tantric practices (yogic, mantric, yantric [ritual
diagrammatization]) are secret, complex, and esoteric, thus
necessitating the guidance of the guru. Dasgupta has observed:
Because of their stringent nature these practices have repeatedly been
declared in all the Tantras as the secret of all secrets (guhyiid guhyam), and
therefore, there is no other way of being initiated into this method of yoga
save the practical help of the guru.
11
The Tantric guru taught any who sincerely desired the path,
regardless of caste. The Tantric guru himself was not bound by
heredity or caste. If he has mastered the path, if he as jlvanmukta
(living, liberated person) had ascended to the experience of union
with Ultimate Reality, he could then teach. Religious authority was
significantly shifting from orthodox Brahmans who knew the Vedas to
the guru whose devotion and knowledge of Tantra led him to libera-
tion. Intellectual knowledge or hereditary status alone were not of
prime importance.
In the Kularr.ava Tantra, as expounded by M.P. Pandit,
12
there is
a six-fold classification of the Tantric guru: preraka, who stimulates
interest in sadhana, the method of spiritual practice, by drawing at-
tention to its beneficent results; siicaka, who opens the eye of the
seeker to the siidhana and its objective; vacaka, who explains the
method and the goal; darfaka, who shows them in convincing detail;
sikfaka, who teaches step by step the discipline and details of the
ritual; and finally the bodhaka, who endows the aspirant with the
necessary understanding of mind and illuminates his being with his
own spiritual light. The Tantras thus lay great emphasis on the
developed and mastered abilities of the guru. The Saradiitilaka
Tantra delineates further qualifications of the Tantric guru:
The guru must know the essence of all iigamas and the principles and meaning
of all Siistras, he must be one whose words come out true, who has a quiet
mind, who has profoundly studied the Veda and its meaning, who follows the
path of Yoga and whose bearing is beneficent as that of a deity (II, 142-144).
The Tantric sadhana may entail dhyana, piija, or mantrajapa, but it is
the guru who initiates, conducts, and leads to fruition. His per-
sonality permeates the sadhana as the Kularrzava Tantra (X, 13)
states:
The form of the guru is the root of dhyiina, the lotus feet of the guru is the root
of piijii, the word of the guru is the root of mantra, and the grace of the guru is
the root of siddhi [supernatural power).
The Tantric guru is not just a learned man who can teach; he has
attained and is the Highest Reality. According to Dasgupta, "In
almost all the Tantras the Guru is always praised in superlative
terms and is declared to be the highest reality itself."
13
In the
Tantras the guru is the epitome of the most important persons in
one's life: "Guru is the father, Guru is the mother, Guru is
God ... himself" (Kularttava Tantra XII, 49). An interesting com-
mentary on this verse elaborates:
46 joel D. Mlecko
The Guru is the mother who carries the seeker in the womb of his con-
sciousness before he gives him birth into the life of the Spirit. The Guru is the
father who tends to the growth and welfare of the initiate in the difficult Path.
The Guru embodies the Lord for it is through the person of the Guru that He
manifests Himself to the discipline and reaches to him His saving Grace.'
John Woodroffe has written:
The Tantra Siistras are full of the greatness of the Guru. He is not to be, thought
of as a mere man ... Guru, it is said, can save one from the wrath of Siva, but
in no way can one be saved from the wrath of the Guru.
15
The Tantric guru, then, has extraordinary power. He is not just the
human personality that bears the title of guru. The Rudra Yiimala
states:
There is only one auspicious guru and he is certainly Myself. He is to be con-
templated, at times, in the thousand-petalled lotus, at times, in the heart-
lotus, and at other times, as present before the eye (in human form).
16
The Guru In The Bhakti Tradition
A concise and systematic account of the direction of bhakti
theology can be found in the Niirada Bhakti Siltras where bhakti is
primarily delineated as affection and submission. These qualities
mark the intimate association which is to be developed with
Bhagaviin and also with those men who are totally devoted to
Bhagaviin, for "between God and His men there is no difference."
In these siitras it is stated:
The association of the great souls (mahiitman) is hard to acquire, hard to be had
completely, but is always fruitful. For gaining even that association, onere-
quires God's blessings; for between God and His men there is no difference."
The cult of devotion was bringing in a new kind of teacher in
place of the older Vedic teacher. The guru was being revered not
because of academic knowledge or birth but because of his in-
dividual, inspirational qualities, rooted in his own personal devo-
tion to and realization of the Lord. It is well to note that the ascen-
dancy of both bhakti and the guru occurred during the Hindu
revival of the seventh century C.E., after the period of Buddhist
prominence. This is significant, for according to Pratima Kale:
The Buddhist and Jain doctrines, which emphasized the messianic powers of
persons ... helped create a cult of personality around this spiritual, mystical
Guru whom the devotee enshrined as a personal prophet and mentor.
18
The eventual foreign domination of India by Islam further shat-
tered the power of the upper castes and subsequently gave impetus
to the development of this newer form of guru.
The Guru In The Bhakti Philosophers
It was reaction to the radical idealism of Sal).kara (788-820 C .E.)
which gave definitive momentum to the bhakti movement. S a i ~ k a r a
did place emphasis on the importance of the guru.
19
However, the
context of jiiana and Advaita Vedanta in which he situated the guru
was highly intellectual and did not evoke a response in the popular
mind. In reaction to the intellectual thrust of Sal).kara, other
philosophers of the medieval age stressed bhakti. An early, promi-
nent exponent of a philosophical basis for the bhakti movement was
the Vai!rzavite teacher Riimiinuja who lived in the early years of the
twelfth century. Educated first in Sal).kara's Advaitic tradition,
Riimiinuja soon fell out with his teacher Yadavaprakasa, a militant
Advaitin. In his reaction against Advaita, Riimiinuja taught that
liberation was attained mainly through bhakti. He maintained that
intense devotion would purify the mind of unbelief, open the
individual to divine grace and thereby relieve the individual of
sorrow. The individual could thereby reunite with Brahman but
within that totality retain his own differentiation. Further,
Ramiinuja democratized this position when he taught that even the
Siidra and the outcaste could attain salvation by complete surrender
to the will of the guru.
20
As a metaphysician, Riimiinuja achieved a
synthesis of the bhakti tradition with Vedanta and also provided a ra-
tional basis for Hindu devotionalism. Ultimately, this development
had a great effect on guruhood since the guru often became the
focus for that intense and saving devotion which Riimiinuja
prescribed.
Nimbiirka (eleventh century) was also a philosophical leader of
the bhakti movement. Nimbiirka determined that there are five basic
sadhanas or paths to salvation: karma, jiiana, upasana or meditation,
prapatti or self-surrender to God, and guriipasatti or devotion to the
guru. In guriipasatti the guru leads the devotee to God; and whatever
is necessary for salvation is done for the devotee by the guru. A
follower of Nimbiirka, Sundarabhatta, describes guriipasatti as the
48 joel D. Mlecko
best siidhana, uniting karma, Jiiiina, and bhakti: obeying the guru's
precepts is karma yoga; knowing that the essence of one's self is the
guru is Jiiiina yoga; being devoted to the guru is bhakti yoga.
21
In the seventeenth century, Ramadasa wrote in the Dasabodha on
the absolute necessity of a guru:
Without a Guru we can never attain to real knowledge ... Even though one
may study the sciences and attain to all kind of powers, both physical and
mental, without the grace of the Guru one cannot realise the Self. Contempla
tion and concentration, devotion and worship, would be all useless without
the grace of the Guru ... Rama and Krishna, and all the Saints and Sages of
by-gone times, devoted themselves wholly to the service of their Master
(Dasabodha V, 1, 19-43).
In the same treatise, Ramadasa described the true guru:
He alone can be called a Guru who has no desires left in him, and whose
determination is as steady as a mountain ... He must have extreme dispassion,
and his actions should be beyond censure. With him, spiritual discussion
must be a constant pastime. He uplifts the world and becomes an exemplar
for the various kinds of Bhakti ... Knowledge, dispassionateness, devotion,
rightful conduct, Siidhana, spiritual discussion, meditation, morality, justice,
and the observation of the mean constitute the chief characteristics of a Guru
(V, 2, 44-53).
Ramadasa's admiration for the guru was so great that he con-
sidered the true guru greater than God:
He who regards God as superior to the Guru is a fool... Before the greatness
of the Guru, the greatness of God is as nothing ... God is made God by men by
the power of Mantras; but the Guru cannot be made even by God. The power
of God is the power of illusion; the power of the Guru carries everything
before it (V, 3, 40-46).
Thus, these bhakti philosophers attempted to provide a rational
basis for their devotionalism vis-a-vis the challenge of Sal).kara. In
so doing, they gave a pivotal role to the guru in spiritual develop-
ment. It was, however, the bhakti poets or minstrels who would
instill a popular fervor for bhakti and for the guru.
The Guru In the Bhakti Poets
The Muslim Kablr was born near the Hindu holy city of Benares
about 1440. He was influenced by both Islam and Hinduism,
claimed by both, and was a powerful influence in the formation of
Sikhism. Kablr described the obstacle-laden river of life across
which only a spiritual teacher, the guru, can safely carry man; in
fact to see such a true spiritual teacher is to see God.
22
He maintain-
ed that it is the guru's favor which frees from heaven and hell; those
who do not honor the guru will simply fall into constant rebirths.
23
Kahir expressed himself in a non-philosophical way through devo-
tional poems and hymns. He was only one in a long line of poets,
minstrels, and saints to do so. Though of various times and places,
they all stressed the centrality of the guru.
A vigorous tradition of bhakti was established in the Maratha
region by the Vai,ftzava poets. The thirteenth century poet
Jiiii.ndvara experienced and elaborated on the tri-dimensional
oneness of himself, his guru, and God. He rhetorically asked,
"God, His devotee, and the Guru are united together, as three
rivers merge into a confluence; when everything becomes God, how
is one to worship Him?"H In the Jiiiinefvari, a commentary on the
Bhagavad Gitii, Jiianesvara extolled the guru as the complete focus of
the devotee's attention:
When the sun of illumination has arisen, he [the devotee J fills the basket of his
intellect with the innumerable flowers of emotion, and worships the Guru
with them ... he burns the incense of his egoism and waves lights of illumina-
tion before his Guru ... In short, he makes himself the worshipper, and his
Guru the object of worship (XIII, 385-90).
The result of this guru-worship is complete fulfillment:
As when a tree is watered at the bottom, it goes out to the branches and the
foliage; as when a man has taken a bath in the sea, he may be said to have
bathed in all the holy waters of the world; as when nectar has once been en-
joyed, all the flavours are forthwith enjoyed; similarly, when the Guru has
been worshipped, all the desires become fulfilled (1, 25-27).
The author's love for his own guru was profound. He devoted
the second chapter of another work, the Amritanubhava, to a descrip-
tion ofhis guru Nivritti's grace. The grace ofNivritti is like the sun
for in its presence the darkness of ignorance vanishes and the day of
self-realization begins. His grace is like water which so purifies the
devotee that even Siva should not touch the fi,fya (II, 14).
The Guru In The Bhakti Cults
Great reverence through elaborate imperatives was paid to the
guru in the Brahmanism of antiquity. The fi,fya owed him perfect
obedience during the iiframa of the Brahmaciirin and pious remem-
brance always; but he owed the guru nothing further. However, the
50 joel D. Mlecko
continuing historical development of the relationship saw
an exaltation of the guru to such a degree that he was worshipped
by the
Guru deification and worship received great impetus from at
least the seventh century C.E. within the major bhakti sects,
and Saivite. In the path of devotional faith in a personaliz-
ed deity, increasing emphasis was placed on the role of the guru-
founder of the various cults within these two major sects. He was
assuming, at the very least, the phenomenal role of the personal
deity, replacing the great avatiiras as the vital center of the cults, and
being hailed as a deity fit for worship.
25
According to Jan Gonda,
The followers of Caitanya eventually exalted their master to such a degree
that he almost eclipses ,Krishna, and the Sivaite Lingayats feel higher respect
for their guru than for Siva himself because the former leads the soul to God.
26
first appeared as a religious reform, like J ainism and
Buddhism, but based on theistic principles. A distinguishing
characteristic of the fifteenth century sect of Vallabha
was the exalted position ofthe guru: Guru Vallabha and his descen-
dants who headed the movement were themselves considered incar-
nations of Krishna. The cult was especially partial to the adolescent
Krishna whose amorous companionship with the gop!s and Radha is
the theme of the tenth chapter of the Bhiigavata Puriirza. A high
spiritual effort was to join in the l!lii of Krishna and Radhii through
intercourse with the guru.
About the same time, Caitanya (1485-1533) promulgated the
worship of the adult Krishna. In this particular cult,
Krishna as supreme being reveals himself through three modes:
direct inspiration, the scriptures, and the guru. The guru,
therefore, is invested with the highest honor because he is the or-
dinary means of grace. But he is even more than this. The guru is
the very self of Krishna, showing kindness to his devotee in the form
of the spiritual teacher. A commentator in the late 1800s writing
about the of Bengal and in particular the Caitanya cult
observed the following:
Of all obligations, however, the guru padasraya, or servile veneration of the
spiritual teacher, is the most important and compulsory. The members of this
sect was not only required to deliver up themselves and everything valuable to
the disposal of the guru, they are not only to entertain full belief in the usual
Vaishnava tenet, which identifies the votary, the teacher, and the god, but
they are to look upon the guru as one and the present deity, as possessed of
more authority even than the deity, and as one whose favour is more to be
courted and whose anger is more to be deprecated than even that of Krishna
himself.
27
By the middle of the twelfth century, the reformer Vasava was
breathing new life into Saivism, particularly by freeing it from the
caste system. This regenerated, revolutionary Saivism was called
Virasaivism (heroic or stalwart Saivism). Within Virasaivism,
astravarana signifies the eight shields which put the devotee in tune
with the Infinite and thus protect and lead him to beatitude. The
eight shields are the guru, lirzga (phallic symbol given by the guru at
birth), jangama (itinerant jfvanmukta), piidodaka (water sanctified by
contact with the guru), prasiida (food so sanctified), bhasma (sacred
ashes), rudraksa (rosary), and mantra. The guru is given first place
among the astravarana; for the guru is the realized one who initiates
the novice in the Virasaiva faith and guides him in the use of the
astravarana. The guru has gained experiential knowledge of God and
His world and the Virasaivite finds satisfaction in serving and im-
itating the guru and thereby acquiring knowledge from him. A
twentieth century Virasaivite scholar has stated that the guru "is
considered to be worthy of more reverence than is due to Siva, the
Supreme, because it is he who leads the soul to unity with Siva. "
28
Jan Gonda has written:
All religious schools are agreed that the one who has the authority to initiate
others is the qualified guru ... whom Saivas as well as Vaisnavas often regard
as representing God himself.2
9
It was the bhakti cults, then, which gave a decisive impetus to the
divinity concept and consequent worship of the guru. Spencer
observes:
Being himself one with God, the guru was worshipped as God, and such wor-
ship was regarded as a means of union. Images of the chief gurus were erected
in the great temples. Devotion to the guru was placed on an q u a l footing with
devotion to God.
30
This devotion to and worship of the guru was and is similar to
that of a deity worshipped in a temple. Disciples burn incense
before the guru, prostrate before him, present him offerings, drink
water in which his feet have been washed, and take betel chewed by
the guru as prasiidam. A devotional book published at the turn of this
52 joel D. Mlecko
century, entitled The Daily Practices of the Hindus, epitomizes this
reverence: "In the morning let him [the disciple] remember his
guru, utter his name, and think of him ... There is no higher object
of veneration and homage for man than his gurudeva. ''
31
The Guru and Contemporary Trends
In modern times, it was the advent of Ramakrishna (1836-1886)
o.nd his followers which brought much positive attention to the guru
not only in India but also in the West. Ramakrishna was the
outstanding Hindu saint of the nineteenth century and considered
by some to be an avatiira. Born Gadadhar Chatterji, a Bengali
Brahman, he showed an ecumenically sensitive religious spirit
throughout his life. Having developed a high level of spirituality,
Ramakrishna was a guru for the many people who came to consult
him. Some Indian commentators feel his relation with his f i ~ y s was
umque:
He did not rule them like the traditional gurus with the rod of iron, nor did he
believe in thrusting doctrines or dogmas into their young minds. He was all
love and compassion ... He led each one of them by the hand along the path
best suited to his taste, temperament, and capacity.
Ramakrishna's manner was full of a joyful vivaciousness:
The melancholy air of the stoic was not to touch their [his disciples] tender
minds. He would rather strive to keep up the lustre and buoyancy of these
young souls by humouring them occasionally with endearing words, in-
teresting parables, and witty remarks, and sometimes by making them roar
with laughter by his marvellous mimicry of worldly men and women in a
variety of funny poses.
His method of instruction was to insist on experiencing, not merely
accumulating knowledge:
Instead of burdening their minds with dogmas or fettering their feet with a fix-
e,d code of rituals, he urged them simply to verify the truths mentioned in the
Saslras by their own experiment and observation ... Instead of allowing them
to indulge in vain controversies about metaphysical and theological themes,
he would stir up in their hearts, by his very presence as well as by his pointed
and emphatic words, an intense yearning for realizing God.
32
Concerning the role of the guru, Ramakrishna himself stated:
"He [the guru] brings man and God together, even as a match-
maker brings together the lover and the beloved. "
33
In another
place he related the following:
At the time of meditation the guru appears before the disciple in vision; he
points to the disciple's Chosen Ideal and says, "Look, there is your Chosen
Ideal." Then he himself merges into the form of the Chosen IdeaJ.3
4
During the last six years of his life an organized group of disciples
framed around Ramakrishna. It was led by a young law student,
Vivekananda (1863-1902) who became Ramakrishna's successor.
A brilliant speaker and organizer, Vivekananda founded the
Ramakrishna Movement and spread it worldwide. Vivekananda
urged:
The guru must be worshipped as God. He is God, he is nothing less than that.
As you look at him, gradually the guru melts away, and what is left? The guru
picture gives place to God Himself. The guru is the bright mask which God
wears in order to come to us. As we look steadily on, gradually the mask falls
off and God is revealed. 35
A dramatic development in Hinduism and guruhood came about
particularly through the endeavors of Vivekananda. In order to ap-
preciate this development, the complexity of traditional Hinduism
must be understood: it was a fusion between an organization of
social life on a horizontal plane and paths to liberation or beatitude
on the vertical. In the last century, those paths were to some degree
extricated from the social organization of life; that is, seekers from
outside the Hindu community more readily received spiritual
guidance from its gurus without the necessity of integrating
themselves into the Hindu social community. Vivekananda was
most instrumental in aiding this development with the Vedanta
Societies he founded in the West. He came to Chicago in 1893 to
attend the worldwide Parliament of Religions and he stayed and
lectured in the United States until 1896. He organized Vedanta
Societies in New York, San Francisco, and London. This accep-
tance of foreign disciples without their integration into the Hindu
social fabric is a continuing and developing practice with Hindu
gurus.
Another important contemporary guru was Swami Sivananda
(1887-1962). A passion for service drew him into a medical career.
At the height of that career he renounced his wealth, home, and
position to become a wandering mendicant and finally a sannyiisi.
He spent several years in the solitude of the Himalayan jungles.
Then in 1936 he founded the Divine Life Society to disseminate
spiritual knowledge in India and throughout the world. True to the
54 joel D. Mlecko
Hindu tradition, Sivananda recognized the importance of the guru:
"No doubt, the Guru's blessing can do everything. "
36
With his
background in medicine, Sivananda wrote allegorically on the
necessity of the guru:
There is however the illusion which covers the eye of the Self, on account of
which it directs itself to externality. Here a guru is required, who applies the
collyrium ofjniina to the aspirant, and his internal eye is opened. Without the
guru you cannot do this.
37
The guru, however, is not simply a man of knowledge or a
miracle-worker but a man of profound and subtle experience and
depth. Sivananda explained:
Mere study of books cannot make one a Guru. One who has studied the
Vedas, and who has direct knowledge of the Alman through Anuhhava (ex-
perience), can alone be enrolled as a Guru.
38
For Sivananda, the true guru is more than a mere man: "The
Guru is God Himself manifesting in a personal form to guide the
aspirant. "
39
One of the several outstanding of Sivananda and a guru
himself is Swami Satchidananda. Born in 1914, the son of a wealthy
landowner, Satchidananda pursued a successful business career.
He renounced that life after the death of his wife, made pilgrim-
mage throughout the East for many years, and in 1949 was initiated
as a sannyiisi by Sivananda. Since then, Satchidananda has been a
guru for many in the East and the West. Concerning the guru's
role, he frankly affirms:
In the East, the major forms by which you worship the Lord are divided into
six sections. The highest of all is the worship of the guru ... It is very difficult
to worship the guru. There is ample opportunity to lose faith in him, while
there is nothing to make you lose faith in a picture, a form, a statue of a god.
When you adore a living person, he is not the same always.
40
Another significant, contemporary guru is Muktananda ( 1908-),
particularly well known and venerated in India. In a book entitled
Guru, Muktananda has written:
On the one hand, he [the guru] is adept in spiritual matters, and, on the
other, he is exceedingly shrewd in his worldly dealings. Those aspirants who
live under the protection of such a Master pass through acute crises with ease
and meet the most unfavorable circumstances fearlessly.
Speaking literally, his devotees claim Muktananda is Brahma in
that he creates for them a new and wondrous world; he is
because he sustains and protects them in their divine life; he is Siva
because he annihilates their world of limited individualityY
Gurus can be completely selfless, desiring nothing for themselves
or they can be avaricious, seeking only an easy livelihood off the
naive or guilt-ridden-they use the fi!yas. On the other hand, the
fi!ya can also use the guru for reasons other than spiritual develop-
ment. Because of impinging external forces, the tribes ofindia, out-
side the traditional Hindu caste system, are undergoing significant
change. Many tribes are now shifting toward jiiti characteristics.
So, for example, the headman of a tribal village (the Konds) in
Orissa has taken as a spiritual advisor a Hindu guru with the hope
of learning how to behave like a Hindu and thereby to deal more ef-
fectively with government officials. The headman is aware that if he
can take on certain non-tribal,jiiti (Hindu class) manners, he and
his people will have a more ready access to political benefits. He
listens to and pays for the guru's counsel not only for religious
reasons but primarily because he sees the guru as a means to
modern forms of political powerY This particular use of gurus is
not new, observes Mandelbaum:
For centuries ambitious tribal chieftains have taken Hindu mentors in order
to gain more durable power by learning to be proper Kshatriyas. This older
tutelage was mainly intended to enhance the rule of the tribal chieftain over
his own people; now, however, even a village headman seeks guidance from a
Hindu preceptor, not only to solidify his own power but also to exploit the
power newly available through political democracy."
Although the Bhumij, a tribe of Bengal, has taken on
gurus, the tribe maintains most of its own rituals such as festivals in
honor of local village gods and goddesses. However, association
with the gurus and acceptance of some of their ritual traits conveys
a certain element of respectability in their dealingswith non-tribal,
Hindu society. "The Bhumij look upon a ritual association with the
Vaisnavas as a means of attaining prestige in the eyes of the Bengali
upper castes in the area," writes Milton SingerY Such examples of
the tribal use of Hindu gurus for social acceptance, mobility, and
power are being rapidly recorded by contemporary sociologists.
Just as the guru is a means for some Indian tribes to enter the
sphere of jiiti, the guru can also be a means for exiting from jiiti
influence. This is particularly true for those Indians who have come
56 Joel D. Mlecko
under the influence of Western education and culture and who
consider caste with its attendant ritual and pollution concerns as
embarrassing and socially backward. A guru for this type of Hindu,
maintains Mandelbaum, is often a sannyasi who is
... expected to cut off his secular attachments, to abandon all considerations of
kinship,jati, and village. Hence ... he is likely to pass lightly over such matters
or to brush them aside entirely as inconsequential and positively harmful to
the spirit.
46
By entering the world of the spirit with the guru some Hindus
seek a sense of individual wholeness free from external societal
restraints. Richard Lannoy has written:
Under the conditions of a caste society, hierarchical interdependence and
ritualistic interpersonal relations introduce into every relationship an element
of formal and emotional constraint. The only authentic meeting that can still
occur between two human beings stripped of their masks, is within the
initiatory magic circle of the guru-sishya relationship.<'
Thus, the guru and his disciples often form an alternative social
hierarchy outside caste and class, outside inherited social limits,
which provides not an entry into but an exit from traditional Hindu
society.
Further, religion for the Hindu has traditionally been an in-
dividual and familial affair rather than congregational, except for
the occasional mela (religious festival). On the contemporary scene,
however, Hindus in increasing numbers are going to cult centers
for religious instruction and corporate worship with fellow devotees
of a guru.
48
Thus, guruhood continues to influence, grow, and
adjust.
Recapitulation and Concluding Remarks
It should be emphasized that the guru is involved in a relation-
ship, a vital communication between two personalities. In the
absence of this relationship, a wandering sadhu, a sannyasi of great
renunciation, or a contemplating in his forest retreat, cannot be
considered a guru. It is in the Vedic literature that the rela-
tionship was first recorded. Here, the guru was usually a Brahman, a
priest-teacher of the Vedas. He was revered for his knowledge of the
Vedas and for his exemplary life. At the very least, he was god-like.
He embodied the Vedas and was given the same respect as the Vedas
perhaps, thereby, laying the foundations for the later, intense devo-
tion directed toward the guru.
The Dharma Sastras reinforced the initial Vedic- insights
by elaborating and legislating the appropriate attitudes toward the
guru: propriety and obedience.
The Epics stressed the necessity of the guru and presented human
and divine paragons of guruhood. They also highlighted another
response to the guru beside propriety and obedience; namely, devo-
tion, the paramount dimension of bhakti. The Epics record the at-
tempt to move away from the Brahmanic tradition in two areas:
away from ritualistic (Vedic) and philosophical ( forms of
worship to the more accessible devotional forms; away from nature
gods to divine-human gods, the avataras, with emphasis on their
human dimension. In the Purarzas there is a continuing trend to
personalize the deity and to emphasize the identification of the guru
with that deity.
Because of the difficulty of Tantric sadhana, the indispensability of
the guru reaches its zenith within Tantrism. Also, the personaliza-
tion of the deity definitively moves to another level: from avatara,
god "descending," to the Tantric guru asfivanmukta, man "ascen-
ding," into divinity. The guru as fivanmukta has attained freedom
from karma and its limitations while still living physically. He thus
indicates that the salvation experience is an immediate and lasting
experience taking place in life, not only in death.
Within the bhakti tradition, Hinduism's Vedic roots, though not
extracted, have been violently pruned. The charismatic, self-
realized teacher triumphed over the hereditary priest-teacher just as
devotion and piiJa (rites of offering) triumphed over Vedic homa
(sacrifice in fire) and speculation, meditation, and tapas
(austerities). Emphasis switched from the ritualism, intellectualism,
and legalism of Brahmanism to the devotionalism, theism, and per-
sonalism of ''Hinduism.'' Bhakti became a path of liberation open
to seekers regardless of intellectual sophistication or social rank. To
some degree this development undermined caste position and gave
a decisive impetus to the development of the contemporary position
of the guru. The guru is now revered not because he was born a
priest or because of academic knowledge but because of existential
and inspirational qualities rooted in his personal realization. Salva-
58 joel D. Mlecko
tion centers not on textual authority or logical argument but on
experiences of founders and teachers who are exemplars of what
others can achieve. In this context, the guru often assumes the role
of deity.
The guru has been and is many things to different eras and dif-
ferent people, even to those outside of the Hindu social system: a
manifestation of the Absolute, a god or God, a vehicle of God's
grace, or an essential guide on the spiritual path. In the contem-
porary Hindu ambience, often the guru is a means into or out of the
jat! system; he is a means for exercising free choice or establishing
corporate relationships; he may deal in matters spiritual, political
or even occupational. Whatever the area of his sway, the guru is
expected to facilitate external harmony and internal serenity to his
f i ~ y a
The traditional scriptural description of gurus has often been a
listing of ideals rather than a reporting of actual lived qualities.
Nevertheless, ideals are to be striven for and they point to what a
culture maintains as important. What then does this historical con-
text reveal about those ideal personal traits of the guru? Swami
Gnaneswaranda states:
The guru has had the excellences as well as the defects and difficulties of
human life. He has understood them thoroughly, and by means of his ex-
periences and experiments he has discovered a method by which to rise above
them.'
9
Thus, first of all, the guru is fully human; because of this, he is wise.
He has the ability to rightly interact with persons and situations
based on a broad range of knowledge, experience and understan-
ding. For the guru has already walked the path chosen by the
seeker. The guru, therefore, is in a position to show the way and to
transmit the value of his experience to the disciple. The guru's
wisdom is born of meditativeness,
50
that is, reflection on and ab-
sorption in his experiences. Thus, the guru speaks little.
51
When he
does speak, however, it is with personal equanimity.
52
He does not
show an extreme of emotions: he is not overly depressed in grief nor
overly exhilarated in joy. It is not the exigencies of the external
world which direct his life; his illumination, strength, and serenity
come from within. Though he does not deny the external reality,
his vision of it is sacramental. Swami Krishananda has written:
Seeing the diversity of characters, whether in a learned savant or a low caste,
a cow, a dog or an elephant, the sage of equal vision recognizes the Divine
Presence in them all, without disturbing the course of life based on such dif-
ference.53
Since the guru possesses the knowledge and experience of deeper
Reality, he possesses all and requires nothing further. Therefore,
he is described as desireless,
54
free from both temptation of acquisi-
tion and of renunciation. Though he possesses relatively nothing,
paradoxically, the guru is a giver; he gives compassion 55 and, most
importantly, he facilitates serenity or peace of mind.
56
This is the
guru in the Hindu tradition.
Department of Philosophy, joEL D. MLECKO
Indiana University, Pennsylvania 15 705
1
Jan Gonda, Change and Continuiry in Indian Religion (The Hague: Mouton and
Co., 1965), p. 237.
2
Kirpal Singh, Godman (Delhi: Ruhani Satsang, 1967), p. 8.
3
Peter Brent, Godmen of India (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), p. 28.
Radha Kumud Mookerji, Ancient Indian Education (London: Macmillan and
Co., Ltd., 1951), p. 114.
5
Jogendranath Bhattacharya, Hindu Castes and Sects (Calcutta: Editions Indian,
1896), p. 20.
6
A distinction was maintained between Srauta rites and Griha or domestic rites.
The former were performed by priests who used Vedic hymns and special sacrificial
fires. The latter were performed by the Aryan householder.
7
P. Spratt, Hindu Culture and Personali!Ji (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1966), p. 29.
8
The Riimiiyana, abridged and trans. C. V. Srinivasa Rao (Bangalore, India:
Bangalore Press, 1970), p. 11.
9
Troy Wilson Organ, The Hindu Quest for the of Man (Athens, Ohio:
Ohio University, 1970), p. 279.
10
R. C. Hazra, Studies in the Puranic Records on Hindu Rites and Customs (Dacca:
The University of Dacca, 1940), p. 262.
11
Shashibhusan Dasgupta, Obscure Religious Cults (Calcutta: Firma K. L.
Mukhopadhyay, 1962), p. 88.
12
M. P. Pandit, "Guru-Sishya Tradition," Prabuddha Bharata 68 Guly 1963):
389-92.
13
Dasgupta, Obscure Religious Cults, p. 88.
14
M.P. Pandit, Gems from the Tantras (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1969), p. 21.
15
Sir John Woodroffe, Shakti and Shiikta (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1951),
pp. 491-492.
16
Quoted in Pandit, "Guru-Sishya Tradition," p. 390.
17
Niirada Bhakti Siitras quoted from: William Theodore DeBary et al., Sources of
Indian Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 334.
18
Pratima Kale, "The Guru and the Professional: The Dilemma of the Secon-
dary School Teacher in Poona, India,'' Comparative Education Review 14 (October
1970): 371.
60 Joel D. Mlecko
19
Sal)kara's Vivekacudamani, trans. Ramana Maharshi in The Collected Works of
Ramana Maharshi, ed. Arthur Osborne (Tiruvannamalai: Sri Ramanasramam,
1968), pp. 198, 200, 201.
20
Ashirbadi La! Srivastava, Medieval Indian Culture Qaipur, Shiva La! Agarwala
and Co., Ltd., 1964), pp. 54-55.
21
Sundarabhatta, "Mantrartha Rahasya," quoted in Rom a Bose, Doctn'nes of
Nimbarka and His Followers, p. 116 [no further bibliographical information j.
22
Quoted in R. D. Ranade, Pathway to God in Hindi Literature (Bombay:
Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1959), pp. 136, 143.
23
See the Guru-miihiitmya, one of the important products of the Kabir Panth (F.
E. Keay, Kabirand His Followers [London: Oxford University Press, 1931], p. 115).
24
Quoted in K. B. Gajendragadkar, "The Maharastra Saints and Their
Teachings," in The Cultural Heritage of India, ed. Haridas Bhattacharyya, 4 vols.
(Calcutta: The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1956), 4: 375.
25
Ramanuja, Ramananda, Anandatirtha, Basava and many others who
established sects or who were distinguished as saints or poets were regarded as
avatiiras. Caitanya, Vallabhacarya, Nanak, and the majority of reformers of more
recent times, were treated as such during their lifetimes. Even some of the most or-
thodox of Vedantins claims as much for Sal)kara. See A. Barth, The Religions of In-
dia, trans. J. Wood (Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1969), p. 229.
26
Gonda, Change and Continuity, p. 281.
27
Bhattacharya, Hindu Castes and Sects, p. 103.
28
S. C. Nandimath, A Handbook of Virasaivism (Bangalore: Basel Mission Press,
1942), p. 54. '
29
J. Gonda, Visnuism and Sivaism (London: The Althone Press, 1970), p. 64.
30
Sidney Spencer, Mysticism in World Religion (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith,
1971), p. 50.
31
Srisa Chandra Vasu, The Daily Practices of the Hindus (Allahabad:
Bhuvaneshvari Ashram, 1909), pp. 7-8.
32
Swami Nirvedananda, "Sri Ramakrishna and Spiritual Renaissance," in
The Cultural Heritage of India, ed. Haridas Bhattacharyya, 4 vols. (Calcutta: The
Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1956), 4:685-86.
33
Sayings of Sri Ramakrishna (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1949), p. 214.
34
Quoted in Swami Prabhavananda, The Eternal Companion (Hollywood:
Vedanta Press, 1947), pp. 135-36.
35
Swami Vivekananda, "Discipleship," The Voice if India, November 1946,
p. 170.
36
Swami Sivananda, Bliss Divine (Rishikesh: Yoga-Vedanta Forest Academy,
1965), p. 191.
37
Swami Sivananda, Necessity for Samryasa (Rishikesh: Yoga-Vedanta Forest
Academy, 1963), p. XXXV.
38
Sivananda, Bliss Divine, p. 182.
39
Ibid., p. 182.
40
Sita Wiener, Swami Satchidananda (New York: Bantam Books, 1972), p. 79.
41
Swami Muktananda, Guru (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 11.
42
Khushwant Singh, "Godmen and Their Disciples," The Illustrated Weekly of
India, 18 March 1973, p. 10.
43
Frederick G. Bailey, Tribe, Caste, and Nation: A Study of Political Activity and
Political Change in Highland Orissa (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1960), pp. 197-237.
.. David G. Mandelbaum, Society in India (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1970), 2:597.
5
Milton Singer, Krishna: Myths, Rites, and Attitudes (Honolulu: East-West
Center Press, 1966), p. 73.
46
Mandelbaum, Society in India, 2:527.
7
Richard Lannoy, The Speaking Tree: A Study of Indian Culture and Society (Lon-
don: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 347).
Marvin Henry Harper, Gurus, Swamis, and Avataras (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1972), p. 9.
9
Swami Gnaneswaranda, "Masters, True and False," Vedanta and the West,
September-October 1949, p. 139.
5
Krishnananda, A Short History of Religious and Philosophic Thought in In-
dia, pp. 91-92.
51
Ranade, Pathway to God in Hindi Literature, p. 394.
52
"K," Sat-Darshana Bhashya and Talks with Maharshi (Tiruvannamalai: Sri
Ramanasramam, 1968), p. 118.
53
Krishnananda, A Short History, p. 91.
54
Sivananda, Bliss Divine, p. 186.
55
John Moffitt,Joumry to Gorakhpur(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,
1972), pp. 144-45.
56
Editor, "Bhagawan Shri Neelkantha Tathaji," The Illustrated Weekry of India,
10 December 1972, p. 53.
Puru$ottama Bilimoria Perception in Advaita Vedanta
In this article the prama!Ja or "means of valid knowledge" of perception
(pratyakfja; or laukika pratyakfia, empirical or "ordinary" perception) will
be analyzed from the point of view of Advaita Vedanta.
1
Pratyakfia is defined by Monier Williams as 'present before the eyes,' hence
'visible,' 'perceptible,' 'direct perception,' 'apprehension by the senses'; and
prama!Ja as 'mode of proof.'
2
V.S. A pte, in not dissimilar manner, renders
pratyak!;a as 'cognizable by an organ of sense', "apprehension by the sense,"
"considered as a prama!Ja or mode of proof."
3
The terms of the definitions
are, in part, right and, in part, wrong, and could be quite misleading in charac-
terizing the Advaitic conception of perception. The terms 'perceptible', 'direct
perception', and 'mode of proof' are strictly the only ones that apply to its
definition of perception (pratyakfia ), the rest are in need of qualification as
they apply to one aspect of perception only. More precisely, the terms 'given
to senses', 'cognized by any organ of sense', 'present before the eye', 'visible'
are inadequate depictions of, and grossly limit the scope of pratyakfia in
Advaita. These can be said to more adequately furnish a characterization of
the Nyaya theory of perception. Pratyakfia in Nyaya is defined as the "cognition
which is produced through sense-organ coming into relation with an object."
4
While Nyaya makes the sense-object-contact (sannikarfia) the central point
in its definition of pratyakfia, Advaita differs in that it does not consider sense
contact as the chief characteristic of pratyakfia. Vedanta Paribhafia cites instances
of perceptual experience where no sense contact is involved
5
, such as pleasure,
pain, other internal perceptions where modes of mind are directly apprehended.
Further, it clearly states that the fact of the sense organ (contact) is not the
criterion of perception.
6
In light of these considerations pratyakfia, in Advaita
Vedanta, calls for a redefinition. What is characteristic of pratyakfia in Advaita
is the directness of the knowledge acquired through the perceptual process.
7
Clearly then, pratyakfia or perception as a prama!Ja may, in part, involve
activity of the sense organs, and the contact of the sense with objects, but
there are other attendant features and functions of perception that are not
brought out by the narrow characterization of pratyakfia in Nyaya. To give
a more adequate and epistemologically complete account of the perceptual
process, Vedanta Paribhafia divides the process into two phases and formulates
two criteria (prayojaka ),
8
corresponding to the two phases of the process,
namely:
(i) the determination of the perceptual character of cognition (jiiana-
pratyakfjatva)
Purushottama Bilimoria is a member of the Department of Philosophy at Deakin University Australia,
and also teaches at La Trobe University, Australia, where he is completing his Ph.D.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am grateful to Sri Ian Kesarcodi- Watson for his comments on an earlier draft
of this paper.
Philosophy East and West 30. no. I (January, 1980). by The University Press of Hawaii. All rights reserved.
36 Bilimoria
(ii) the determination of the perceptual character of the object
).
Before proceeding to give an account of the modus operandi of
on the basis of the preceding phases, some remarks need to be made about
the psychological aspects of the process which are unique to the Advaitic
theory of perception.
First, manas, which can be more or less rendered as 'mind', is an important
faculty postulated in Advaitic theory. Manas is not a sense organ (indriya ).
The reason for this denial is that such internal states as pleasure are completely
mind-produced and are apprehended directly. These are immediately perceived
without the need of mind to mediate in the manner of a sense organ.
9
And
further, inferential knowledge is not regarded as sense-produced; it is definitely
mind-produced.
1 0
Manas is not an independent reality existing outside the
subjective whole. Advaita regards manas to be part of a complex, unified
inner-organ which is termed antahkaral)a, literally, 'inner vehicle.' Manas
and antahkaral)a are sometimes used interchangeably.
11
Antahkaral)a is
described by Madhusiidana Saraswafi
12
as being composed of five subtle
elements (tan-matras), namely., the subtle essences of earth, water, air, fire,
ether with the predominance of the latter over the former. (The subtle
elements are not to be equated with the gross manifestations which bear the
same name.) Antahkaral)a is of light nature and "having therein at the time the
predominance of the sattva-gul)a (lightness tendency), being extremely clear
like a mirror, etc., (the antahkaral)a) is capable of flowing out through the sense,
and like the solar light it is capable of speedily contracting and expanding."
13
The antahkaral)a, unlike the 'mind' of Locke, is not a passive recipient of
data, it is an active instrument in the process of perception. Advaita maintains
that the antahkaral)a 'goes out'
14
through the respective sense-organs, say
the eye, pervades the object of attention and transforms itself in the form of
the object. The transformation or modification of the antahkaral)a is technically
termed vrtti,
15
often rendered as "mental state."
16
The specific 'transformation'
or mode-ification
1 7
(antahkaral)a vrtti) is the apprehending mental mode
which makes known the object.
Whether antahkaral)a "goes out" to receive the impressions of the object
of apprehension, need not be a problem if, for the moment, we take the "going
out" in a figurative sense; but we must not overlook the purpose for which the
"outgoing" is stressed, and that is to maintain the directness of the presentation
of data to the mind for its immediate apprehension (even though it may or
may not be through the senses).
Indeed the postulation of antahkaral)a, and the properties attributed to
it raise a host of empirical problems: Is there such an organ? Does it have the
properties attributed to it? Does it exist independently of the body? Is it not
just another term for "brain" or "brain state"? These and other questions,
however, are beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, the sense attributed
37
to antahkaraf}a is a functional one, and, as such, it can be conveniently adopted
to describe the nature of the perceptual process in Advaita. The account may
not be precise and acceptable to a scientific view, but our concern is not with
the precision with which the psychological account of perception, per se, is
given, but to show how Advaita views pratyak$a as a pramaf}a. Thus, it must
be deemed safe to regard antahkaraf}a, the inner organ, as the instrument
through which the subject acquires perceptual knowledge. We may also note
that the different aspects or functions of antahkaraf}a are: buddhi (intellect),
ahaJ?Zkara (I notion), citta (memory).
1 8
Another presupposition in Advaitic theory needs to be briefly stated. It
is that the ground of all objects, contents, and details of both the objective and
the subjective components of a knowledge situation is a luminous continuum
of the nature of consciousness (cit), or intelligence, which Advaita terms
Brahm.an-caitanya.
19
It is this consciousness that accounts for the data that
reaches the subject, and out of which the perceptual content is configured,
and which on the subjective side illumines the perceptual content that results
in a cognition. Whether there is such a consciousness underlying both the
objective phenomena and the subjective component, is an issue which cannot
be taken up here. For now, we need not assume Brahman-caitanya to be
anything more than simply light which the objects reflect, or rather have the
potentiality to reflect in normal conditions, and which presumably persists
were the objective phenomena to disappear. The Brahman-caitanya in the
subjective aspect may be assumed to be the flood of light analogous to that
used in a studio to illumine the objects to be photographed. And the antahkaraf}a
can be compared to the negative or film in the camera, which transforms as
light enters through the lens and accordingly registers the shape, color, and
so forth of the object focused upon. This transformation (mode-ification) of
antahkaraf}a, we said earlier, is termed vrtti, which corresponds to the form
of the object in attention.
Now, we have three major components in a knowledge situation, each of
which is associated with 'light' in some way or another. Again, they are the
subject, object, and mode of antahkaraf!a as the instrument of cognition.
Granted that there is the association of the components with light-consciousness
or intelligence and granted that the antaharaf!a in its various transformations
is instrumental in effecting cognitions, we can, after designating the appropriate
terms to these components, proceed to describe how perceptual knowledge
arises. Therefore, the subject-consciousness can be termed pramatr-caitanya;
the object-consciousness, prameya, or vi$aya-caitanya; and the instrument
of knowledge (or antahkaraf}a ), pramaf}a-caitanya.
The process may be briefly described as follows. In the initial stages when the
mind is not directed toward an object, there is no movement or transformation
within the antahkaraf}a, and the consciousness underlying "lightens up"
and overcomes the veil (that is, the seeming state of unconsciousness, or better,
38 Bilimoria
nonattentiveness). The antahkaral)a, like a lamp, serves as a transparent
transmitter of the light of consciousness which,
20
projecting it on the object,
removes the veil (the ignorance, the 'unknownness', ajiiiina) of the object
that has come within the purview of the respective sense-organ. A contact-
samyoga21-is established between the antahkaralJa that streams out through
the respective sense-organ and the object attended to. The light associated
with the object presents itself, in the form of the object, hence as data, to the
receptive antahkaralJa; the latter accordingly transforms into a vrtti-mental
state-determined by the data. As soon as the data is presented to antahkaralJa,
there is an identification of consciousness associated with antahkaral)a-vrtti
with the consciousness associated with the object.
22
The cidiibhiisa, which
streams out with the antahkaralJa and transforms upon being impressed by
the presentative data, becomes identified with the data; but the data is nothing
other than Brahman-caitanya-consciousness, or light as we assumed it to be,
which envelops the object and is reflected by it. Cidiibhiisa is also nothing but
the reflection of Brahman-caitanya associated with the antahkaralJa. And so,
when it is said that the vrtti and the data are identified, what is meant is that
the light in the mental state corresponds, if all goes well, one-to-one with the
light of the object, or simply that there is nondifference between the mental
state and the object contacted in their epistemic relation.
ghatii'deh tad-iikiir-vrtteh ca bahir-ekatra dese-samvadhiiniit tad-ubhayii ava-
chinnam caitanyam-ekameva, vibhiijaka-yoh-'py antahkara1J-vrtti ghatii'diyi!jaya-
yoh eka-desasthatvena bheda-ajanakatviit.
23
"The jar (object) and the mental state (antahkaral)a-vrtti) in the form of jar
are brought together in one and the same place outside, hence the consciousness
associated (limited) by them (object and the respective mental states) are
one and the same ( vrtti-light = data or vi!jaya-caitanya ), even though the
object and the mental state wrought division of consciousness." And as a
consequence of this identification of the mental state with the object, there
results the vrtti-jiiiina or cognition of the form "This is a jar."
24
This completes
the account of the first of the two phases of pratyak!ja demarcated earlier. If
the criteria for the perceptual character of cognition, on the other hand, is
said to be the identification of the reflected light of the mental state with that
of the object, one may ask, what of the qualities of objects; are they cognized
together with the object or separately? Vedanta Paribhii!iii, in describing the
first phase, remarks that "there is perception so far as the jar is concerned,"
which means that the qualities of the jar are cognized by mental states corres-
ponding to those particular forms of qualities. When color of an object is
cognized, its relation to the object is also cognized. This relation is known
as samyukta-tiidiitmya, which brings a cohesion among the three into a complex
perceptual judgment.
2 5
If the size or weight of a jar, for instance, fails to impress the antahkaralJa,
then there arises no information concerning the size of the jar though it may be
39
indirectly inferred. However, such an inference would not be an instance of
immediate apprehension, and thus cannot be regarded as an instance of
perceptual cognition.
Another point regarding the successful arising of perception is that the
object toward which the mind is directed has to be an appropriate object for
perception. This property of the object is called yogyatii,
26
or fitness, or com-
petency for perception. This condition rules out such ideas as dharma, right
conduct, natural laws, and a host of other salient features of reality which
are not directly presentable to the mind as objects of perception. The implica-
tion is that the scope of pratyakfia may not be as wide as would be desirable,
for this is the only method of common sense which makes the objects of the
search directly presentable to the mind, and hence gives rise to an immediate
apprehension of the object concerned. Again, the fire that is inferred at the
sight of smoke is a cognition which lacks perceptual character because it is
mediately and not immediately made presentative to the mind. If the need
for reconfirmation arises it would be easier to effect a test in the case of smoke,
being perceptual, than in the case of fire, being non perceptual in this instance.
However, before raising the question of validity of cognition, the second
phase of pratyakfia needs to be discussed.
The second phase of pratyakfia comes about when the consciousness asso-
ciated with the subject, pramiitr-caitanya, and the consciousness associated
with the object, vifjayacaitanya, coincide in mutual identification.
27
ghatii' deh-vifjayasya pratyakfjatvam tu pramiitr abhinnatvam
"The perceptuality of the object such as jar and so on consists in the non-
difference of the object from the subject." What is meant is that when the
subject, through the instrumentality of the antahkara!Ja-vrtti, is informed of
the vrtti-jiiiina, or cognition, he immediately relates to it, and thereby to the
object corresponding to the content of vrtti-jiiiina, as his cognition. When this
identification, that is, of the subject's reflexive awareness of his mental state,
occurs, he predicates the object to his being aware of something. He thus
reports "I see a jar." Another way of putting it would be to say that the light
of Brahman-caitanya associated with the subjective self (as distinct from the
light reflected on the antahkara!Ja, which was termed cidiibhiisa) further illu-
mines the mental state which is identified with the object, as seen earlier in
the first phase. The mental state subsides, and the subject becomes aware of
the object itself. The object is all the more clearly presented to the subject in
virtue of the double reflection it receives, the first from cidiibhiisa that streamed
out with the antahkara!Ja, and, second, from Brahman-caitanya that the subject
sheds. When the cognition is direct and immediate, as it is if the first phase
holds true, then the perception of object that results in the second phase, is
direct and immediate too. The cognition is self-evident to the subject; it is
as self-evident as the cognition of pleasure, of pain, and so on. And through
40 Bilimoria
the instrumentality of the cognitive, the object is brought to the immediate
awareness of the subject, and a "unity" of subject and object is effected. In
this reflective stage, there is assimilation of the mental contents corresponding
to the configuration of the object, its qualities, the relation between the two
and with familiar or recognized percepts. With the completion of this assimila-
tive function of antahkara!Ja, perception of the totality of the object presented
occurs. The perception of the object by the subject marks the effective role
of the second phase of pratyak:ja-prama!Ja.
The difficulty with accepting the account just given is that if there is a "unity"
or integration of the subjective and objective components (vi:jaya-caitanya-
pramatr-caitanya abhinna) what prevents the emergence of a cognition such
as, say, "I am the jar," "I am the book"? Vedanta Paribha:ja considers such
an objection, and answers that what is implied in the criteria is not the 'identi-
fication' or 'unity' as such, but the nondifference of the objective reality from
the subjective reality.
28
This, however, is no answer to the problem, for if
this were true, that is, that this stage marks the nondifference of the objective
reality from the subjective reality, and the underlying reality of both com-
ponents being ex hypothesis nondifferent according to Advaita, as discussed
earlier, then all that can be present at this stage would be Brahman-caitanya;
thus, there would simply be no cognitive configuration. To free its account
from this objection, Advaita would have to reinstate the constant presence of
the cognitive-vrtti-jiiana as the mode or condition which marks the difference
with reference to the subject and the object. The subjective self is not appre-
hended, in the reflective act at least, immediately as Brahman-caitanya, because
its own self-apprehension or self-illumination in the form of "I" is also marked
by a specific mental state or mode of antahkara!Ja
29
of that form, which
results in the reflexive ego-sense (ahamkara, literally, "I-maker"). This mode
must also be given at the second phase and thus the difference between the
subject and object is marked by the difference of the 'transformation' (that is,
the mode and vrtti, respectively) to which the two components give rise. But
because they arise in immediate succession to one another, their illumination,
or awareness, is immediate in their cognitive manifestations; their qualitative
difference in respect of the respective transformations the antahkara!}a assumes,
and the moment that separates them, may well be missed in an introspective
analysis, as the author of Vedanta Paribha:ja most probably did. But the
important point that Vedanta Paribha:ja attempted to make remains central
tl3 the Advaita theory, that through the operation of vrtti in the antahkara!}a,
as its agent, the subject and object are brought into a direct relation, and thus
in virtue of a mutual identification and not the identity, of their respective
cognitive effects-mode and vrtti-an immediate perception of the object is
acquired.
One other difficulty with the second criteria is: What marks the finality of
the 'coming together' of the (subjective) mode and the (objective) vrtti in
41
revealing the object? Is it inconceivable that another cognition may be necessary
for the apprehension of the relation between the subjective and the objective?
And if a second cognition is admitted, then another would be necessary to
apprehend this, and yet another for this? The answer to this was hinted at a
little earlier, when it was said that the content such as pain, and so on, is im-
mediately apprehended. However, the need for another cognition to apprehend
the mental state of pain is not necessarily obviated by this answer. But if another
cognition is admitted, then this leaves open the possibility of an infinite series
of cognitions needed to reveal ones preceding the other. If the regressus ad
infinitum is to be avoided, and any theory of perception has to meet this
challenge, then there has to be admitted one cognition which is self-illumined
and is not in need of being illumined by another cognition. Unless a basic
self-evident cognition is admissible, there can be no solution to this problem.
The Advaita bases its solution on the introspective evidence of the reflexive
"1-notion." Even if one could remove all mental states ( vrtti-jfziina) that may
be thought to illumine the "1-notion," nevertheless an 'awareness' of the self-
illumined mode of the subjective reality would remain. And it is by virtue of
the mutual conjunction (sannikar$a) of the subjective mode and the vrtti-jfziina
that the cognition too becomes illumined.
30
The vrtti in the form of the object
impresses itself as if it were the mode of the subject itself, and thereby comes
to be apprehended, but as a predicate-and not as the pure subject-content
which is the "1-notion" -in the subject's apperception. And hence the per-
ceputal judgment: "I see the jar; it is big and blue." But is it veridical percep-
tion? Advaita would answer in the affirmative on the grounds that, given
that the appropriate instrument of pramiif}a, in this case the antalfkaraf}a
operating through the sense organs, is present and is not defective, or diseased,
and given that the external environ is free from befogging obstacles, such as
dimness of light, smoke in the air (and so forth), and given that the object is
clearly presented, then it logically follows that the perception is veridical; in
other words, a valid cognition-pramii- is the result (phala) of pratyak$a. It
may be asked whether the ground for the claim to validity still holds true if
the anta/fkara!Ja was not assumed to "go out." That is to say, would the pre-
sentation of the object to a sense-organ or sense-organs give rise to the same
vrtti in the antalfkara!Ja as is supposed to occur when the antalfkaraf}a "goes
out" to establish contact with the object? For if the 'outgoing' of anta/fkara!Ja
is denied, then the instrumentality of the sense-organs would be required to
effect contact with the object, as it is in Nyiiya theory. And once the mediacy
of the sense-organs is admitted, a further objection may be raised that then
the data received by the anta/fkara1Ja cannot be regarded as immediate, with
the consequence that cognitive content loses its 'presentative' character. Thus,
the veracity of the cognition becomes doubtful.
The objection is a reasonable one, and it does leave Advaita with a problem
which may not easily resolved. The 'outgoing' of antalfkara1Ja runs into difficulty
42 Bilimoria
when we take the instance of the sight of a very distant object, such as the solar
star. The anatahkara!Ja would travel to and back very quickly only if it could
travel at almost the speed of light to cover the distance instantaneously. Advaita
maintains that the antahkara!Ja is composed of the sattva-guf}a, of the subtle
essence of the physical elements, and that when it streams out through the
eyes it streams out as light-tejas-which is the essence of the eye, and thus
travels at a great speed as light does. Still, however, difficulties arise with the
problem of traversing time for which Advaita gives no adequate solution.
Science tells us that some stars are so far away that their light takes some
light years to reach us. And moreover, though we may see a star now, there
is no way we can be sure of the existence of the star at the same place and time
-it may have moved away or may have even disappeared altogether! In view
of this evidence, or the lack of it, how can it be maintained that when we see
the star, our antahkara!Ja reaches out to the star? The difficulty can be avoided,
and with due respect to parsimony, it may be simpler to assume that light from
the star travels to the antahkara!Ja. Similarly, in the case of other cognitive
acts, such as hearing, touching, and so on, it would be more reasonable to
maintain that impulses or data-'sense data' (as is called in most present-day
analysis)-from different parts of the object and environ reaches the antah-
kara!Ja. But it is not inconsistent to maintain that the antahkara!Ja determines
which object, or features thereof, the sense organs are to focus upon, and
that it selects only such data as may be necessary for the specific cognitive act
to arise, being characteristic of the object and its features. And now, Advaita
would argue there is a clear case for veridical perception to arise for the data,
though it may be admitted to reach the antahkara!Ja through the sense organs,
need not therefore become nonpresentative. Let us take a simple particular
instance from everyday experience to see if Advaita's position holds true.
I see a blue pen on the table; I pick it up in my hand and begin to write with
it. Under normal circumstances, the perception of the pen is veridical, according
to Advaita. It explains in the present perceptual situation the mind is receiving
visual datum A, call this characteristic of the pen. There is thus an immediate
awarness of the pen. Since I have got it in my hand I am also receiving impulses
of tactile datum B. I can change the position of the pen in my hand, pass it on
to the other hand, handle it in a few different ways, throw it up and catch it,
and press its tip along the page. As I do these things with the pen, I am also
receiving a series of data, call these C, D, E, and so on. And I might say, 'now
I am certain I have a pen in my hand'. But does this mean that the veridicity
of my perception of a pen is acquired through the confirmation that B, C, D,
E constitute, or does the veridicity lie with A itself? Most present-day theories
would contend that on the basis of A, B, C, D, E, and so on. I make the inference
that I perceive a pen. Another, Nyaya, for example, would contend that A
gives me a vague picture of a pen, but A, B, C, D, E, and so on gives me a better
picture of the pen.
31
And if I add on other possible data of the relevant kind,
43
then my picture becomes clearer. Veridicity in most views, IS a quantative
measure, while for Advaita it is a qualitative measure.
Advaita would point out that the two views stated previously do not make
sufficient distinction between (a) A's presenting the pen; (b) my being sure
that A is presenting the pen.
32
First there is the presentation of the pen by A, then follows my conviction,
feeling of certainty, that A is presenting a pen. But for A to present the pen,
it is not necessary that B, C, D, and so on are presented as well. A is, no doubt,
a presentative in its own right; B, C, D, E. and so on do not in any way con-
stitute A's presentative character. If I am awake, and if no obstacles befog
my vision, then it is reasonable to maintain that I am seeing a pen presented
by A. There is no inference here, according to Advaita, it is a case of direct
presentation of the pen by A. But if for any reason I happen to doubt whether
A is presentative, then B is resorted to, to remove my doubt; and if I still wish
to ensure against further doubts, I would seek corroboration from C, D, E,
and so on. Such doubts, however, need not and do not always arise.
Hence what is given as direct presentation is the veridical content of my
perception.lt is not usual that I want to be absolutely certain about the veridicity
of my perception; I do not have to go through a long process of checking
against possible slips and errors if I take care to employ my perceptual faculty
adequately, and have a proper epistemological attitude at first counter. Oc-
casional errors there will be, still however, the fact of exceptions do not under-
mine the veridicity of those large numbers of perceptions which are errorless.
If the preceding argument is correct, then Advaita is justified in maintaining
that the proper employment of r t y k ~ leads to veridical perception; and
so long as it remains so, it is a pramii.
NOTES
I. It may be noted that in looking for an account of perception in Advaita, we do not get much
help from the earliest fathers and founders of the school. Sari.karacharya, for instance, though
he maintained a realist position regarding the phenomenal world, did not give a detailed account
of the process through which experience, and validation of the knowledge of the external world
are had. Padmapada (820 A.D.), his immediate disciple, in the opinion of S.N. Dasgupta (see
his A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II [Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1975], p. 105), was perhaps
the first to attempt a Vedantic explanation of the process of perception. Padmapada's cursory
attempts were taken over and developed by Prakasatman (thirteenth ceatury) and later writers
in that era. The views of the later Advaita writers on pratyak.ya, as on other pramiir)as, were
collected and systematized in the brilliant exposition of Vedanta Paribhii.yii by Dharmaraja
Adhvarlndra (Seventeenth century).
2. Monier Williams: A Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1976), p. 614. (prati-near, ak.ya-sense organ)
3. V. S. Apte, The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975),
p. 664. D. M. Datta notes that, broadly speaking, pratyak.ya is used to indicate immediacy. Confer
his Six Ways of Knowing (Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1972), p. 34.
44 Bilimoria
4. Indriya-artha-sannikar$a-janyam jiianam pratyak$am: Tarka-Samgraha (hereafter cited
as T.S.) according to Annambha{fa, ed. Kuppuswami Sastri in his A Primer of Indian Logic, 3d ed.
(Madras: Kupposwami Sastri Research Institute, 1961), 1.30(b), p. 15.
5. Vedanta Paribha$a (hereafter cited as V.P.). I. 42-44, ed. Miidhaviinanda (The Ramakrishna
Institute, 1972), p. 30. Also see notes inS. S. Suryunarayana Sastri, ed. and trans., Vedantaparibhasa,
(Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1971).
6. Ibid. I. 61.
7. Ibid. I. 14.
8. Ibid. I. 15.
9. Ibid. I. p. 13.
10. Ibid. I. p. 14.
II. Paiicadafi VI 70 (hereafter cited as P.C.) of
12. Siddhanta Bindu, (hereafter cited as S.B.), trans. D. Venkataramiah. (Baroda: Gaewkad's
Oriental, 1933), I: 30.
13. S.B. p. 30.
14. V.P. I. 18, p. 15. The function of 'going out' is compared to water from
a tank flowing out through a channel to a number of adjoining fields and assuming the respective
form, whether rectangular or any other shape.
15. Ibid. I. 18, p. 14.
16. Ibid. T. M.P. Mahadevan in his Philosophy of Advaita (New Delhi: Arnold Heinemann,
1976), p. 13, translates vrtti as 'psychosis'; but this has strong psychological and not epistemic
denotation.
17. The term 'mode-ification' is a rendering by Ian Kesarcodi-Watson in "Citta-vrtti", an
unpublished paper.
18. Vedantasara of Sadiinanda Swami. II. 67.
19. V.P. 6 Brahman-caitanya is identified with Brahman-sak$atkara and Sak$at-parok$at-
Brahman in ibid., I. 2, p. 7 and 8 respectively; also in P.C. VIII-4.
20. P.C. VIII-6. VidyiiraQya calls this light cidiibhasa (reflected light): "vrtti tipped with cidabhasa
like the steel-head of a spear pierces its (object's) cover of dullness". In Yogasutra this aspect is
the "citta" I. 2.
21. V.P. I. 57, p. 31.
22. V.P. I., p. 21.
23. Ibid. I. 21, also see Summary of points I. 40, p. 24.
24. Ibid. I. 20. The datum of jar in the form of vrtti corresponding to jar is the content of cognition,
for there is nondifference between datum and vrtti.
25. Ibid. I. 57., p. 31. Confer K. Bhattacharyya, "Psychology and Hindu Thought," in his
Philosophy, Logic and Language (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1965), p. 125.
26. Ibid., I. 27: Yogyatvasayapi-vi$ayavise$anatvat. Also S.B. p. 30, 33, abhivyakti-yogya:
fitness for manifestation of object.
27. Ibid., p. 25, I. 41.
28. V.P. I. 43. Confer Dasgupta, op. cit., II., p. 210. See also P. K. Sundaram, Advaita
Epistemology (Madras: Madras University, 1968), p. 17.
29. Vedanta Paribhfl$a, as said earlier, does not deny the "1-notion" to be a mental state, but
it denies it to be a vrtti-transformation, for there is no extraneous data that impinges on the
that gives rise to the "!-notion"; V.P. I. 45, p. 29.
30. Ibid. I. 50, p. 28-57, especially pp. 51 and 57. Other terms for sannfkar$a are: pratyasatti,
and, samapatti.
31. "Anuvyavasaya" is a Nyiiya theory, in V.P. I. 31, p. 20, where it is refuted.
32. I have adopted this formulation from N. Mishra; "The Role of Sense-Data in Perception",
Philosophical Quarterly (Amalner), Vol. 7, p. 47.
PLAYFUL ILLUSION: THE MAKING OF
WORLDS IN ADVAITA VEDANTA
The idea of creation as the play or If/a of the gods has been a significant
motif in Indian culture since Vedic times. While the tradition of Advaita
Vedanta is no exception to this generalization, it nevertheless presents
some distinct problems that are unique to this school of thought. One of
the central questions that inevitably arises has to do with the ontological
status of the world itself, given the fundamental metaphysical assumption
that Brahman alone is the sole Reality, One without a Second. The idea
of play will be addressed in the context of examining, first, several im-
portant paradoxes (some would say contradictions), and this will help
illuminate the Advaitic understanding of the world.
In order to make some approximation to an intellectual under-
standing of Advaita and to address the contention that this philosophy is
not metaphysically tenable, it is essential to emphasize a distinction that
is crucial for the Advaitin and which underlies the entire tradition: the
distinction between the absolutely real (paramarthika) and the empiri-
cally real (vyavaharika) points of view. What is true from one point of view
will not be so when viewed from the other. As john Grimes has noted,
"Without being entirely clear with regard to this distinction, it is likely that
one will accuse the Advaitin of inconsistencies and contradictions."
1
But even granting the centrality of this distinction, numerous prob-
lems remain that have generated endless debate between protagonists
and antagonists of nondualism. T.R.V. Murti has claimed that any philos-
ophy that distinguishes between an ultimately real, the Absolute, and a
merely pragmatically real, the realm of ordinary experience (a view which
Advaita Vedanta shares with Madhyamika Buddhism and the metaphysics
of F. H. Bradley), inescapably gives rise to a doctrine of two truths and
a theory of illusion.
2
Eliot Deutsch likewise argues that it is logically
impossible to have the full reality of Brahman and the full reality of the
world. "One must have either a limited God (subordinate in some sense
to the world) or an unlimited Reality and an 'appearance-only' world."
3
If Brahman is the sole Reality, then the cosmic manifold must be rele-
gated to the status of mere Appearance. The world is designated as
maya-that creative power (sakti) of Brahman that brings the illusory
appearance of multiplicity into existence, analogous to the way a magi-
cian makes one thing appear as something else.
4
Given the Advaitin's distinction between Reality and Appearance,
a curious problem arises, which A. L. Herman calls "the dilemma of
maya." The argument is as follows:
5
Frederic F. Fast
Professor of Philosophy
at Linfield College
Philosophy East & West
Volume 48, Number 3
July 1998
387-405
1998
by University of
Hawai'i Press
387
1. If maya is real, then Brahman is not the sole reality, and the advaita meta-
physics is destroyed.
2. If maya is unreal, then it could not be efficacious in producing the
appearance of the world, the Gods, and the Self.
3. But maya must be either real or unreal.
4. Therefore, either the advaita metaphysics is destroyed or maya is not
efficacious.
The dilemma may be avoided, however, by rejecting the third
premise, which is precisely what Sarilkara did when he explicitly
asserted that Appearance or maya is neither real nor unreal. Sarilkara
writes: "[the appearance] of plurality which is the [product] of igno-
rance, which is characterized by name and form, which is evolved as
well as non-evolved ... is not to be defined either as the existing or the
non-existing."
6
Ramanuja and other critics have argued that by defining Appearance
in this way, Sarilkara violates both the Law of Excluded Middle and
the Law of Contradiction. Let us examine each of these charges in turn,
following arguments set forth by Puligandla and Matesz?
The Law of Excluded Middle holds that a term and its complement
exhaust the universe. Thus, for example, the class of all Indian philos-
ophers has as its complement everything in the universe that is neither an
Indian nor a philosopher-the exhaustive complementary set of all non-
Indian non-philosophers. Now a violation of the Law of Excluded Middle
would seem to occur if one were to postulate some state of affairs not
represented by this exhaustive, all-inclusive division of a term and its
complement. Is not Sarilkara guilty of contravening the Law when he
asserts that Appearance is neither real nor unreal?
The charge may be countered by either a metaphysical or an epis-
temological move, with the two usually working together as correctives
to each other.
8
From a metaphysical point of view one may affirm
nondual Reality alone as exhaustive of the universe, or one may resort
to an epistemological perspective that recognizes different modes of
consciousness.
9
The metaphysical move in effect denies that the Real and Unreal
are complementary sets. Reality is the all-inclusive, all-comprehensive
set that "consumes all possible limits to consciousness (existence). "
1 0
Appearance must therefore lie outside the supposedly exhaustive dichot-
omy of the Real and Unreal. Thus, on the one hand, Appearance cannot
be Real because Appearance is always capable of being sublated in
principle and in fact. That is, everything about our experience of the
phenomenal world, which is characterized by the subject-object dis-
tinction, is susceptible of being disvalued and contradicted by some new
experience, whereas Reality, which includes only the state of objectless,
Philosophy East & West nondual consciousness, is in fact and in principle never sublatable.
11
388
Appearance and Reality are wholly incommensurable.
12
Appearance,
therefore, cannot be Real.
13
It should be noted, however, that to say that
Appearance is not Real is not to assert that it is nonexistent. Sarilkara
states: "There could be no non-existence (of external entities) because
external entities are actually perceived .... An external entity is invari-
ably perceived in every cognition such as pillar, wall, a pot or a piece of
cloth. It can never be that what is actually perceived is non-existent."
14
Appearance exists, then, but it is not Real.
15
On the other hand, however, Appearance cannot be Unreal either,
for in Advaita philosophy the Unreal refers to logical impossibilities,
such as square circles, married bachelors, horns of a hare, or sons of
barren women. The Unreal is thus a null set, the set of everything that is
self-contradictory, and cannot possibly exist. Unreality is therefore not
the complement of Reality but the contradictory of Reality. Reality alone
is exhaustive of the universe.16
The classic illustration that Sarilkara used to show that the phenom-
enal world is neither real nor unreal is the rope-snake analogy. A man
going into a barn in the dark of night steps on something that he believes
is a snake. He immediately cries out and displays all the signs of alarm-
a racing heart, profuse sweating, a blanched complexion. If, upon hear-
ing this cry, someone comes to the barn with a lantern and discovers
that the object is a loosely coiled strand of rope rather than a snake, the
question then arises as to the status of the original experience. According
to Sarilkara, the snake in this situation is neither real nor unreal. It cannot
be real, for if it were it could not have been sublated by the rope. On the
other hand, it cannot be unreal either, for then it could not have been an
object of experience in the first place. The snake is thus the result of
superimposition, that is, an erroneous attribution of qualities remembered
from previous perceptions of snakes now projected onto the rope.
17
The second way of responding to the charge that the Law of
Excluded Middle has been violated involves an epistemological move.
While Reality alone is exhaustive of the universe ontologically speaking,
it is not exhaustive of possible states of consciousness or what might be
called the perspective factor.
18
From the perspective of unenlightened
nescience, the phenomenal world of Appearance is complementary to
Reality, the former being distinguished from the latter by the factor of
sublatability. Together these two sets exhaust the universe of possible
states of consciousness. Puligandla and Matesz conclude:
Hence Reality and Appearance exhaust all possible modes of existence, for
they jointly include all realizable states of consciousness. Thus we see that,
phenomenologically, Sar'lkara clearly upholds the Law of Excluded Middle,
the complementary and exhaustive sets of modes of consciousness being
Reality and Neither-Reality-nor-Unreality [Appearance] ....
19
Frederic F. Fost
389
We now turn to the charge that Sarhkara has violated the Law
of Contradiction. It is easy to see how this charge arises if Sarhkara's
original statement is translated in the following way:
2
o
1 . It is not the case that Appearance is real or that Appearance is
unreal.
When the disjuncts are symbolized by substituting Rand not R we get:
2. not (R v not R).
Applying De Morgan's Theorem to this yields:
3. not Rand R.
When this symbolization is translated back into ordinary language we
have:
4. Appearance is unreal and Appearance is real.
Clearly, this is an outright contradiction.
However, in sentence (2) above, the assumption is made that the
Real and the Unreal are contradictories or mutually exclusive notions,
but this is not in keeping with what was indicated above as Sarhkara's
original intention. The term "Real" must be understood as "that which is
unsublatable," while the term "Unreal" must be understood as "that
which is self-contradictory." With these considerations in mind, sen-
tence (1) above becomes:
5. It is not the case that Appearance is that which is unsublatable or
that Appearance is that which is self-contradictory in concept.
When the disjuncts are now symbolized as not S and C, respectively, we
get the following:
6. not (not S v C).
And, by De Morgan's Theorem:
7. (Sand not C).
When this is translated back into ordinary language we have an accurate
rendition of Sarhkara's view:
8. Appearance is that which is sublatable and that which is not self-
contradictory in concept.
21
Philosophy East & West Obviously this statement is not in violation of the Law of Contradiction.
390
Some critics question the legitimacy of using the notion of sublation
to resolve the problem. For example, john D. White argues that sublation
(he uses "subration," following Deutsch) is a questionable ploy because
he believes that any experience may be subrated. What someone believes
to be an experience of Brahman might later be reinterpreted and hence
disvalued. White uses the example of someone who has had a device
implanted in his brain that is capable of triggering an experience of
oneness. If such an individual were later to discover that the electronic
gadget was the source of this experience, he would surely subrate the
experience as not being a genuine encounter of the Infinite. If the critic
replies that the example only shows that the Infinite has not really been
experienced, White asks how is it possible to distinguish a genuine from
an ersatz experience of the lnfinite?2
2
Having rejected the notion of subration, White contends that some
Advaitins do indeed seem to be asserting that the world both is and is
not in a contradictory manner.
23
In order to avoid this way of speaking,
White replaces the problematic expression with the more acceptable
although paradoxical formulation referred to earlier: the world exists but
is not Real. What White means by this is that from the perspective of
enlightenment the world ceases to be experienced-not that it ceases to
exist, for the world is not the kind of object that would cease to exist
when a particular person fails to experience it.
24
White believes that this
is the only way a nondualistic position may be defended. If this inter-
pretation is rejected in favor of the view that the world ceases to exist
from the standpoint of enlightenment, then, given the fact that there are
many unenlightened individuals as well, we are forced into the con-
clusion that the world at the same moment is both existent and non-
existent. This position clearly goes beyond paradox and ends in outright
contradiction.
25
The price for taking the paradoxical alternative, how-
ever, is one that White believes the Advaitin should find embarrassing
because it is unavoidably dualistic. He writes:
Although there are not two things (Brahman and a Real World), there are two
things (Brahman and an apparent world) .... The only way to save the non-
dualism is to assert that from the viewpoint of Brahman (enlightenment), the
world doesn't exist. Unfortunately, this assertion, as we have seen, leads us to
contradiction. Therefore, we must conclude thatthe doctrine ofTranscendence
without dualism [Brahman alone being Real) is philosophically untenable.
26
We shall review the Vedantic response to this shortly.
Another argument that finds contradiction in the view that the world
is illusory takes the following form: if the world were illusory or false, as
Samkara contends, then there could be no effective release from sam-
sara, for every one of the ways of salvation would be inherently and
irredeemably false as well.27 Frederic F. Fost
391
Finally, another puzzling logical problem arises when the phenom-
enal world is viewed as maya in that we are confronted with a self-
referential paradox similar to the "liar paradox." If the world is an
illusion, then Advaita philosophy with its doctrine of maya, which is part
of the world, is part of the illusion. As Richard W. Brooks remarks, "the
doctrine that the world is an illusion is itself an illusion!"
28
The Advaitic response to these and other philosophical conundrums
is predictable. All philosophical distinctions are on this side of enlight-
enment, that is, from the standpoint of Appearance. When knowledge of
Brahman is attained, there are no longer any questions about the status
of the world, since such questions arise only from the standpoint of
rational-empirical consciousness and presuppose the subject-object dis-
tinction.29 Advaitins do indeed recognize that a knowledge of the phe-
nomenal world, permeated as it is with avidya, necessarily has a dualistic
structure. It makes perfectly good sense, therefore, to say with Deutsch
that "When a distinction between subject and object is a necessary
condition for someone to know something ... there is no way in which
one can, without self-contradiction, deny either the subject or the
object."
30
With regard to the notion of subration, a few comments may be
added to what was said earlier. According to the Advaitin, the only
experience that is in principle unsubratable is the experience of Reality
as pure spiritual identity (nirvika/pa samadhi). "What kind of experi-
ence," Deutsch asks, "could conceivably subrate unqualified identity-
the experience of absolute value wherein the unique oneness of being
stands forth as the sole content of consciousness?"
31
Since the subject-
object distinction is transcended in nondual consciousness, there is no
longer the possibility of replacement by any other "object." This experi-
ence is not just one that is uncontradicted (abadhita) by some higher
experience; it is uncontradictable (abadhya). It is known as absolutely
true.
32
Knowledge of Brahman (para vidya) is immediate, intuitive, and
self-certifying.
33
The experience is felt to be "an implosion of ultimate
reality" in which all sense of duality is overcome. Richard H. jones
remarks:
It is a contentless awareness, a pure light not illuminating any object but being
its own content. There is no apprehension of unity, no object of awareness as
in sense-experience and thought (for this would involve differentiation), but
only the awareness, which itself is the reality.
34
In sum, with respect to the relation between Brahman and the world,
the Advaitin seeks "to lead the mind beyond the level of asking the
question to the level of seeing the answer."
35
Or, even more radically,
one could say that from the standpoint of enlightenment the questions
Philosophy East & West are not so much answered as rendered meaningless. It is similar to the
392
experience of coming to realize that the morning star and the evening
star are identical-that neither is actually a star at all. Nothing has
changed except our perspective.
36
II
When the question is raised as to why and how there should be a
world of appearance in the first place, a new problem appears that A. L.
Herman calls "the creator paradox."
37
The problem initially arose in
Badarayana's Brahma-Satra (third century C.E.?) where an objector
presents the following argument:
Brahman cannot be the cause of the world because to cause or create
involves motives or purposes (and if Brahman has either, He is imperfect).
(11.1.32)
38
Sarhkara puts the objector's argument in the form of a dilemma:
either Brahman had a purpose in creating the world or he didn't. If
Brahman created the world for a purpose, then there must have been
some goal; Brahman must be lacking something. But if that were the
case, then Brahman would not be perfect. "Now, if it were to be con-
ceived that this endeavor of the Highest Self is useful to itself because of
its own desire, then such supposition would contradict the scriptural
statement about the Highest Self being always quite contented."
39
This
horn is thus not tenable.
The second horn proposes that Brahman created without a purpose.
However, this view is not tenable either, for to act without purpose
would not be acting at all. Herman argues: "If one tries to create without
purpose, then one cannot create, for to create means to act purposefully.
[Brahman] ends up purposely purposing, a contradiction."
40
Sarhkara
states, "If, on the other hand, one were to conceive no such purpose
(behind such endeavor), one would have to concede that (in such a case)
there would not be any such endeavor."
4
1
Badarayana offers a solution that cleverly slips between the horns:
"But as with men at times, so with God [Brahman as Tsvara], creation is a
mere sport" (11.1.33).42
This notion of "sport" or "play" (/T/a) represents a third sort of activity,
one that is neither purposive nor purposeless. While there were approx-
imations to the idea of lrla in earlier Hindu religious literature, even in
the Vedic age, where mention is made of the frolicsome nature of the
gods and their carefree activity,
43
Badarayana's account and subsequent
commentaries on the passage were to have a pervasive influence in the
culture. The world is brought into being by Tsvara (who also sustains and
ultimately destroys it as well). He is moved not by need or necessity but
rather by a free, spontaneous, and joyous creativity, a release of energy
for its own sake.
44
Paul David Devanandan describes Tsvara's activity as
follows: Frederic F. Fost
393
394
His action in the world, instead of being the laborious working out of a con-
tinuous purpose, is' unself-conscious, unstrenuous, and ... of the nature of
playful sport. The idea behind such a belief is that we must not constrain God
to labour from a sense of need or attribute to Him an overwhelming desire to
accomplish some definite task. He needs nothing and is not troubled with the
burden of cosmic responsibility.
4
S
In his commentary on the passage, Sarhkara compares Tsvara's creative
IT/a to breathing:
[T]he process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without reference to
any extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature. Analo-
gously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, pro-
ceeding from his own nature, without reference to any purpose .... Although
the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it
is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited.
46
J.A.B. van Buitenen, in a note to his study of Ramanuja's Vedartha-
samgraha, makes the helpful observation that the idea of sport or play
is best understood by comparing it to its opposite, karman. In the latter
conception, action always occurs in the context of preceding action in
an endless retrogression of succession, whereas play is performed to no
purpose at all, out of no necessity that would result in new phalas (fruits,
consequences) for the agent to enjoy or suffer.
47
In summarizing the extraordinary role that the concept of lila has
played in Indian culture, Nita Kumar writes:
Ill
It presents some of the most creative, subtle, original, insightful paired oppo-
sitions in Hindu thought, putting the concept of dialectic itself to shame: the
idea of abandon but also control, playfulness but total application, freedom
achieved through discipline, amusement coexisting with purposefulness,
superhuman bliss and joy with the earthly mundane, divine presence evoked
by human craft, ecstasy that breaks the bound of the self while celebrating the
human senses.
48
While all schools of Vedanta accept the authoritativeness of the
Brahma-Sutra and hence accept its teaching about lila, the Advaita tra-
dition understands the divine playfulness as only a provisional teaching
about the deluding cosmic ignorance (maya) of the apparent world. We
shall examine this view in more detail shortly, but first it is instructive to
recognize the major contribution that the doctrine of lila has made in the
great monotheisms of Hindu religion.
4
9
WilliamS. Sax makes the following observation about the distinctive
role of lila in Indian culture:
[L]T/a appears to mark a delightful difference between European and South
Asian traditions, embodying a ludic dimension in Indian religious life that is
muted or even absent in the dominant religions of the West. Though there
may be examples of "playfulness" in Judaism, Christianity, or Islam, still it
seems fair to say that Hinduism has developed the doctrine of play more than
any of the other so-called world religions, and that this idea has supported,
particularly in the more recent religious history of the subcontinent, a perva-
sive attitude of joy and delight in God's IT/a. 5
In the Saivite tradition, Siva, an oftentimes violent deity not easily
associated with the spontaneity of playfulness, creates, sustains, and ulti-
mately destroys the universe by the cosmic rhythms of his dancing-
hence his designation as Nataraja, or Lord of Dancers. In the famous
bronzes depicting the "Dance of Siva," the way of release from bondage
to the world is symbolized by Siva's stamping on a dwarflike figure that
represents our ignorance. The raised left foot signifies his giving release,
the drum creation, and the flames the fire of destruction.
51
In the
Mahabharata, Siva is spoken of as follows: "Thou art fond of dancing.
Thou art he that is always engaged in dancing. Thou art he that causes
others to dance."
52
The world is simply Siva's plaything: "Thou art he
who sports with the universe as his marble ball." 5
3
In speaking of Siva as
the so-called founder of the city of Banaras, Nita Kumar colorfully
describes the god as "supreme dancer, unpredictable eccentric, potent
but controlled, terribly creative and horribly destructive, gentle to the
point of bovinity and femininity, raw, uncouth, beastlike, beyond all
mundane cares and trivial pursuits."
54
In Kashmir Saivism (Trika), the conception of divine playfulness per-
vades the entire tradition "like salt is mixed with food." 5
5
In the SivasOtra
3.9-11, the universe is depicted as a work of art in which Siva, as divine
artist, is the author, stage-director, and actor/dancer in the world drama. 5
6
In his commentary on the text, ~ e m a r a j a quotes a verse of Bhatta Nara-
yaQa's Stavacintamaoi (v. 59): "0 Siva, you have produced the drama of
the three worlds containing the real seed of all creation and the germ
within it. Having performed its prelude, is there any other artist but you
who is capable of bringing it to its conclusion?" 5
7
The world, as the manifestation (abhasa) of Siva, arises sponta-
neously from him by his sakti, the power by which he is able to realize
his own self. Sakti represents a kind of mirror in which Siva enjoys his
own bliss in the interplay between potentiality and actuality, enjoyer and
enjoyed.
58
When the liberated soul or jrvanmukta experiences the entire
sensuous world as the play of Siva, there is a resonating ecstatic experi-
ence that is at once aesthetic and mystical, producing an inner shaking
or reeling of the body that is savored as the "play of self-vibration." 5
9
In his commentary on the Brahma-SOtra, Ramanuja depicts the world
as a playground in which the jrvanmukta has the same power as Tsvara
to create worlds out of its own imagination and to move through such
worlds according to its desires-either in a dreaming manner or by taking Frederic F. Fost
395
on bodily presence in a form equivalent to a divine avatara.
60
Ramanuja
draws on Chandogya Upani$ad 8.12.1-3 for his inspiration, where the
liberated soul is described as "one [who] goes around laughing, sporting
(krfgan), having enjoyment with women or chariots or friends, not
remembering the appendage of this body."
61
These passages amply illustrate that in the great game of life, with its
suffering, despair, and hopelessness-in short, in a life of general world-
weariness that has so understandably characterized the Indian view of
samsara-one may escape the anguish of temporality. In the Hindu view
of time, each world cycle, lasting 4,320,000 years, is divided into four
yugas, with each of these diminishing in length of time because of a
decline in virtue. The very names of the four periods (krta, treta, dvapara,
and ka/i) designate various throws at dice, suggesting that time itself is
one great cosmic game of dice for the amusement of the gods.
62
Richard
Lannoy suggests that one interpretation of the ancient name of India,
Bharata Varsha, means literally "land of the actors," lending support to
the idea that sarnsara is an ongoing game or masquerade in which the
actors assume a succession of masks in fulfillment of their karma.
63
From the point of view of the jfvanmukta, the whole of creation may
be experienced as a joyous masquerade, a participation in the play of the
gods themselves in which the innocent vision and spontaneity of the
child is recaptured once again. The tyranny of time may be overcome,
for the temporal world is no longer experienced as profane; it has
become divine, even sacred.
64
At the conclusion of his detailed study of the play motif in Indian
culture, David R. Kinsley writes:
IV
[l)n play man may taste the divine .... [H)e may find the kind of joyous
activity he associates with the "other" realm of the gods .... When man plays
... he laughs at his predicament of being a mortal creature bound to the
inevitable wheel of birth, suffering, and death. Indeed, he transcends that
wheel, escapes its bondage by reveling in the moment. For play yields the
attitude that life is not a business to be worked out but an affair to be danced
out.Gs
As indicated earlier at the end of section II, in Samkara's Advaita
Vedanta the notion of divine playfulness is given an illusionistic inter-
pretation. That is to say, it is a provisional doctrine having to do only
with the phenomenal world of appearance. The metaphysical category is
maya not /ria, which is used only as a metaphor to defend the absolute
freedom of Brahman.
66
Robert E. Goodwin argues that Sarilkara used the
play motif in a figurative sense, as a part of "lower knowledge," in order
to aid in "the leap into the unfathomable." He believes that Sarilkara
Philosophy East & West was led to this position because of the paradoxical nature of play itself:
396
It must be absorbing, in order to bring delight. But whatever absorbs the
attention is obviously a threat to the autonomy and transcendence of con-
sciousness. Even an imaginary object tends to reify, causing forgetfulness of
Self. So SaQkara stoutly maintains that sarhsara is the superimposition of a
false vision on the absolute ground of being.
67
Somewhat ironically, one of the distinct etymological connotations
of the term IT/a lends support to the Advaitic interpretation of the world as
maya. In his classic study of the play element in culture, Johann Huizinga
notes that over and above the frivolous and effortless meanings of the term
IT/a, where the word expresses a rocking or swinging action, the primary
meaning has the sense of "as if," denoting "seeming," "imitation," or
"the appearance" of things.
68
One of the favorite analogies used by
Advaitins to depict the world of maya is that of the magician and his
deceptive ploys. Just as a magician, who with his conjuring tricks "plays"
with our perceptual faculties in order to create the illusion that some-
thing has come from nothing or that one thing has changed into another,
so Brahman by his mysterious, creative power deludes us into believing
that the phenomenal world is real.
69
Sarhkara writes: "As the magician is
not at any time affected by the magical effect produced by himself,
because it is unreal, so the highest Self is not affected by the world-
[effects (or appearances)]."
70
The status of the phenomenal world is ultimately an inexplicable and
incomprehensible mystery for one who is in the state of ignorance or
avidya. It is as if the principle of maya drops a curtain between the world
of Becoming of our everyday practical lives and the Absolute Being of
Brahman.
71
On this side of the veil, for the unenlightened, the world
is not One but Many-a multiplicity of constantly changing names and
forms. There is the Supreme Person, Tsvara, who, as both material and
efficient cause, playfully creates the world out of Himself through the
power or energy (sakti) of maya. Following Kinsley, another metaphor
one might adopt is that of the mask to describe the illusory power of
maya. A mask creates an illusion by disguising the identity of the wearer,
yet it may also be a vehicle for the epiphany of the Absolute.7
2
However, for the one who is on the other side of the veil, for one
who has seen through the mask's disguise and has realized Brahman
consciousness (Brahmavidya), there is only pure, undifferentiated one-
ness. All names and forms have been desuperimposed (apavada). All
limitations (upadhis) that have been falsely projected onto Reality have
been subrated. Brahman is one, and all is Brahman. Deutsch concludes
his classic study of Vedanta with these words:
To the jfvanmukta, to the man who is free while living, Brahman is every-
where seen. o k ~ a or mukti, freedom or liberation, as realized through jiiana-
yoga, is just this power of being and seeing that excludes nothing, that includes Frederic F. Fost
397
everything. Brahman is one. Everything has its being in Spirit: everything, in
its true being, is Brahman.
73
Given this bold, audacious, and ultimately liberating metaphysical
vision of Advaita Vedanta, it is understandable that many seekers after
philosophical wisdom, both East and West, have found their spiritual
fulfillment in this tradition.
NOTES
The term "nondualism," rather than "monism," is the more appropriate
way to refer to Advaita Vedanta, for if Brahman is not an object open
to discrimination, then no number, not even "one," is appropriate. See
Richard H. jones, Science and Mysticism: A Comparative Study of
Western Natural Science, Theravada Buddhism, and Advaita Vedanta
(Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Bucknell University Press, 1986), p. 60.
1 -John Grimes, "Some Problems in the Epistemology of Advaita,"
Philosophy East and West41 (3) (July 1991): 291. When considered
axiologically from the standpoint of Advaitic epistemology, the
distinction is made between para vidya, or knowledge of Brahman,
and apara vidya, or knowledge of the phenomenal world. See Eliot
Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction (Hono-
lulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1969), chap. 6, pp. 81-97. See
also P. T. Raju, Structural Depths of Indian Thought (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1985), pp. 41 0-412; Donald R. Tuck,
The Concept of Maya in Sarhkara and Radhakrishnan (Delhi:
Chanakya Publications, 1986), p. 18; Ramakrishna Puligandla,
]fiana-Yoga- The Way of Knowledge: An Analytical Interpretation
(Lanham and New York: University Press of America, 1985), pp.
51-54.
2- T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1955), p. 104.
3- Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, p. 44.
4 - Ibid., p. 30; The Vedanta Sutras with the Commentary by SaQkara-
karya, trans. George Thibaut, in Sacred Books of the East, vols. 24
and 38 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890), reprinted (with omissions)
in Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles Moore, eds., A Source
Book in Indian Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1957), p. 530.
5 - A. L. Herman, An Introduction to Indian Thought (Englewood Cliffs,
Philosophy East & West New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 220. In the context of the dis-
398
cussion in the text, Herman resolves the dilemma by arguing for
two separate stages of understanding, the religious and the meta-
physical, which he believes are needed to harmonize the discrep-
ant views in the Grta. The dilemma arises when one tries to see the
metaphysical stage from the religious stage's point of view.
6- Radhakrishnan and Moore, Source Book, p. 532.
7- R. Puligandla and D. Matesz, "Appearance and the Laws of Logic
in Advaita Vedanta," International Philosophical Quarterly 26
(March 1986): 79-83.
8- As Deutsch points out, some critics of Advaita contend that
the switch from one mode to the other often occurs when the
going gets rough (Advaita Vedanta, p. 29). Puligandla and Matesz
approach the problem from the standpoint that there is but one
Reality, with two epistemological modes, interpreting Sarilkara
as an epistemologist rather than as a metaphysician-ontologist
("Appearance and the Laws of Logic," pp. 84-85).
9 -John D. White, "God and the World from the Viewpoint of Advaita
Vedanta-A Critical Assessment," International Philosophical
Quarterly 21 (2) (1981 ): 190. As we shall see below, White argues
that this approach is unavoidably dualistic.
10- Puligandla and Matesz, "Appearance and the Laws of Logic," p. 82.
11 - Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, pp. 15, 88. Reality is in principle unsub-
latable because sublation presupposes at least three things: (1) the
agent doing the sublating, (2) the judgment to be sublated, and (3)
the sublating judgment. Sublation is thus possible only in a plural-
istic context. See Puligandla, ]nana-Yoga, p. 87.
12- Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, pp. 26 n. 82, 84; see also Natalia
lsayeva, Shankara and Indian Philosophy (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1993), p. 116.
13- Puligandla, ]nana-Yoga, p. 80.
14- Sarilkara, Brahmas0trabha$ya, 11.2.28, in Brahma-Satra Shankara-
Bhashya: Badarayana's Brahma-Satras with Shankaracharya's Com-
mentary, trans. V. M. Apte (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1960),
cited by Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, pp. 31, 95-96.
15 -White admits that this distinction is a tenable one. He argues, how-
ever, that some Advaitins appear to be asserting something beyond
the paradoxical, namely an outright contradiction: the world both
exists and doesn't exist at the same instant (d. "God and the World,"
p. 190). We shall deal with this below when we consider the charge
that Advaitins violate the Law of Contradiction. Frederic F. Fost
399
The authors are confusing and inconsistent (contradictory?) at this
point. They have just maintained that Unreality is the contradictory
of Reality. Two pages later they argue: "Unreality is ultimately a non-
existent set, simply because nothing (i.e., no state of consciousness)
belongs to it; and, needless to say, a non-existent set cannot
contradict (or complement) an all-inclusive set" (p. 82; emphasis
added). This apparent contradiction in the two statements could be
avoided by assuming that the first remark was made at a phenom-
enological level while the second was made on a higher onto-
logical level. In the text, however, just the reverse seems to be the
case.
1 7 - Puligandla, }nana-Yoga, p. 89; Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, pp. 33-
34; Raju, Structural Depths of Indian Thought, pp. 386-387. Another
favorite example is the illusory perception of silver in a conch-shell.
Once one discovers that there is only a piece of shell, not a piece of
silver at all, she is no longer deluded by its appearance or attracted
to it (cf. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy,
5 vols. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969], 1 :441 ).
18- White, "God and the World," p. 190. White goes on to argue
against the tenability of this position.
19 - Puligandla and Matesz, "Appearance and the Laws of Logic," p. 81;
italics in original. Instead of trying to accommodate Advaita to the
Law of Excluded Middle, P. T. Raju prefers to take the position of
four-cornered negation: the world neither exists, nor does not exist,
nor both, nor neither (Raju, Structural Depths of Indian Thought,
pp. 409, 413, 433 n. 67).
21 -Ibid., p. 82.
22 -White, "God and the World," pp. 190-191.
23 - He cites Prabhavananda and Satprakasananda (White, "God and
the World," p. 189).
24- White's position seems to be supported by Dasgupta when he says:
"It is only because there comes a stage in which the world-
appearance ceases to manifest itself that we have to say that
from the ultimate and absolute point of view the world-appearance
is false and unreal" (Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy,
1 : 446; emphasis added). Similarly, P. T. Raju states that "for the
consciousness that is able to rise to this highest level, there is no
experience of the world, and the question of relating the world to
Philosophy East & West the Brahman in any way does not arise" (Raju, Structural Depths of
400
Indian Thought, p. 399; emphasis added). Raju makes it clear in a
later passage, however, that the determinate world "continues to
exist for the unliberated souls" (ibid., p. 409). However, Sarhkara's
actual words were: "for him who has reached the state of truth and
reality the whole apparent world does not exist" (Radhakrishnan
and Moore, Source Book, p. 531 ).
25 - White, "God and the World," p. 190.
26- Ibid., p. 192.
27- J. Bruce Long, "God and Creativity in the Cosmologies of White-
head and Bhaskara," Philosophy East and West 29 (4) (October
1979): 396.
28- Richard W. Brooks, "Advaita Vedanta's Doctrine of Maya," in The
Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta, ed. Mervyn
Sprung (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1973), p. 105.
29- Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, p. 95; Raju, Structural Depths of Indian
Thought, p. 399.
30 - Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, p. 97; italics in original.
31 -Ibid., p. 19.
32 - Raju, Structural Depths of Indian 7houghC p. 392.
33 -Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, pp. 82-83.
34 -jones, Science and Mysticism, p. 45; italics in original.
35- Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, p. 30; also pp. 41-42, 82. Some Advai-
tins, such as the author of the Sar'lk$epasarfraka, declare that ques-
tions of cosmogony are for immature individuals, who, when told
that God created the world, ask "Who created God?" (Raju, Struc-
tural Depths of Indian Thought, p. 399).
36 -Jones, Science and Mysticism, pp. 69-70. Cf. A. Ray Chaudhuri,
The Doctrine of Maya, 2d ed. (Calcutta: Das Gupta, 1950), p. 11 0.
Deutsch says that the empirical world "disappears" when knowl-
edge of Brahman is realized, but he interprets this axiologically:
"nothing else needs to be known" (Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta,
p. 84; italics in original).
37- A. L. Herman, "Indian Theodicy: Sarhkara and Ramanuja on
Brahma-Satra 11.1.32-36," Philosophy East and West 21 (3) (July
1971 ): 266. This article forms the heart of a later work by Herman,
The Problem of Evil and Indian Thought (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1976).
38- Apte, Brahma-Satra Shankara-Bhashya, p. 337. Frederic F. Fast
401
39 - Ibid. In speaking of the activity of a creator God, Sarilkara is refer-
ring not to Nirgu!Ja Brahman, Brahman without qualities, but rather
Sagul)a Brahman, Brahman with qualities, personified in this con-
text as Tsvara. "Those who theorize about creation Sarilkara
writes, "think that creation is the expansion of Tsvara" (commentary
on MaQdiikya Karika 1.7., in Select Passages from SaQkara's Com-
mentary on MaQdiikya and Karika, trans. T.M.P. Maha-
devan [Madras: Ganesh, 1961]; cited in Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta,
p. 38).
40- Herman, An Introduction to Indian Thought, p. 266.
41 - Apte, Brahma-Siitra Shankara-Bhashya, p. 337.
42- Ibid.
43 - Norvin Hein, "LT/a," in William S. Sax, The Gods at Play: LJ/a
in South Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 13.
Hein's chapter originally appeared as an entry in M. Eliade et al.,
The Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1987), s.v.
"Lrla."
44 - Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, pp. 38-39.
45 - Paul David Devanandan, The Concept of Maya: An Essay in His-
torical Survey of the Hindu Theory of the World, with Special Ref-
erence to the Vedanta (London: Lutterworth Press, 1950), pp. 220-
221. Deutsch agrees that since lila removes all motive, purpose,
and responsibility from Tsvara's creative activity, the traditional
problem of evil is thereby avoided. William S. Sax notes that "The
doctrine of If/a [is] one way of dealing with the problem of theodicy
since, from an ultimate perspective, human suffering is part of the
mysterious play of God, and when Hindus are confronted with
baffling or tragic events, they are more apt to say 'it is God's play'
than 'it is God's will'" (The Gods at Play, p. 4). Herman refers to
"the If/a solution" of the problem of evil, but raises several critical
questions about the defensibility of this view. He supports a theo-
dicy based on "the rebirth solution" ("Indian Theodicy," pp. 266-
270). For a more sanguine defense of "the lila solution" to the
problem of evil in recent Indian philosophy, see L. Stafford Betty,
"Aurobindo's Concept of LT/a and the Problem of Evil," Interna-
tional Philosophical Quarterly 16 (Summer 1976): 315-329. The
foremost study of the problem of evil in Indian thought, though
limited to the study of mythology, is that of Wendy D. O'Fiaherty,
The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1976).
46- Radhakrishnan and Moore, Source Book, p. 533. Norvin Hein sug-
Philosophy East & West gests that the English word "sport" is only a rough approximation of
402
/ria, suggesting a frivolity not necessarily implied by the original
term (see the chapter titled "U/a" in Sax, The Gods at Play, pp. 13-
20). In his Bagiswari Lectures, the Indian aesthetician Avanindranath
Tagore carefully distinguished between play (/r/a) and sport (khe/a),
arguing that the latter term is not a true characterization of the uni-
versality of art but refers rather to a mere selfish, temporary activity
that appeals to individuals at different age levels-analogous to
having different hobbies at different times in life (S. K. Nandi, "The
Concept of Ula in Tagore's Aesthetics Examined," Philosophical
Quarterly 31 [2] [July 1958]: 128-129). More recently, Bettina
Baumer writes: "An action, even if it has the appearance of a game,
that does not spring from freedom, cannot be called /ria or krrr;Ja.
Modern sport based on strict rules and self-interested competition
does not share this characteristic of freedom and spontaneity,
whereas artistic activity comes much closer to the idea of play
implied in /r/a ("The Play of the Three Worlds: The Trika Concept of
Ula," in Sax, The Gods at Play, p. 46; compare the similar reflec-
tions made by Clifford Hospital in the same volume, p. 31 ).
47- Ramanuja, Vedarthasarngraha, ed. and trans. J.A.B. van Buitenen,
Deccan College Monograph Series 16 (Poona, 1960), p. 192. See
also Mariasusai Dhavamony, S.J., "Causality: Sarikara and Aris-
totle," International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (2) (June 1991 ):
173-179.
48 - "Class and Gender in the Ram/ria," in Sax, The Gods at Play, p. 159.
49 - For an excellent summary, see Norvin Hein, "Uta," in Sax, The Gods
at Play, pp. 13-20. Cf. also David R. Kinsley, The Divine Player: A
Study of Kr$1Ja Ula (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), pp. 1-55 and
passim.
50 - Sax, The Gods at Play, pp. 3-4.
51 -Eliot Deutsch, On Truth: An Ontological Theory (Honolulu: Uni-
versity of Hawai'i Press, 1979), p. 15.
52 - Mahabharata, Anusasana Parva XVII.50 (The Mahabharata of
Krishna-Dwaipayana, trans. K. M. Ganguly, published by Pratap
Chandra Roy in 12 vols. [Calcutta: Oriental Publishing Co., n.d.],
1 0: 86; quoted in Kinsley, The Divine Player, p. 6).
53 - Mahabharata, Anusasana Parva XVII (X.1 07); cited in Kinsley, The
Divine Player, p. 6. One is reminded of Plato, who wrote that
man is "made to be the plaything of the gods, and this, truly
understood, is the best of him" (Laws, Vll.803c, in The Dialogues
of Plato, trans. B. Jowett, 4th ed., 4 vols. [Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1953], 4: 91 ). Frederic F. Fost
403
54 - "Class and Gender in the Ramlfla," in Sax, The Gods at Play, p. 161.
55- Baumer, "The Play of the Three Worlds," p. 37.
56 - Ibid. Also, Robert E. Goodwin, "The Play World of Sanskrit
Poetry," in Sax, The Gods at Play, pp. 53-54.
57- Baumer, "The Play of the Three Worlds," p. 39. It is interesting
to note that as a young sannyasin under his teacher, Govinda,
Samkara composed a number of hymns to Siva (lsayeva, Shankara
and Indian Philosophy, p. 76). There is also reason to believe that
Sarilkara was himself a Sakta, worshipping the power of Tsvara as
creative energy manifested in a goddess (Devanandan, The Con-
cept of Maya, pp. 1 06-113; John F. Butler, "Creation, Art, and
Ula," Philosophy East and West 10 [1-2] [April-July 1960]: 6).
58 - Kinsley, The Divine Player, p. 14. There is a splendid iconographic
representation of this in the Androgyne Siva bronze in the Madras
Government Museum.
59 - Goodwin, "The Play World of Sanskrit Poetry," p. 54.
60 -Ibid., p. 52; Srf-Bhawa ofRamanuja, 4.14, 3.2.12.
61 - R. E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, 2d rev. ed. (London:
Oxford, 1931; reprint, 1979), p. 272.
62 - Kinsley, The Divine Player, pp. 254, 255 n. 1.
63 - Richard Lannoy, The Speaking Tree: A Study of Indian Culture and
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971 ), pp. 285-286.
64 - Ibid., p. 286.
65 - Kinsley, The Divine Player, p. 280.
66 - Baumer, "The Play of the Three Worlds," p. 3 7.
67- Goodwin, "The Play World of Sanskrit Poetry," pp. 51-52. Good-
win notes later that play inevitably leans toward the immanent
because of its erotic component. Indian thought has always recog-
nized kama as the basis of all pleasure (ibid., pp. 69, 86 n. 65).
With its sexual overtones, If/a was often applied to cosmic creation
in early texts (Butler, "Creation, Art, and Ula," p. 6). Another San-
skrit term for play is krfdati, which has a distinct erotic sense. The
word krfdaratnam means "the jewel of games" and refers to sexual
intercourse (Johann Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-
Element in Culture [Boston: Beacon Press, 1950], p. 43). The theme
of the unrestrained erotic dalliance of the gods and goddesses is
graphically depicted in stone at the temple complex at Khajuraho
(see Kanwar Lal, The Cult of Desire: An Interpretation of Erotic
Philosophy East & West Sculpture of India [Delhi: Asia Press, 1966]).
404
68- Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p. 32.
69 - Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, p. 30. However, it is important to
emphasize once again that to describe the phenomenal world as
maya, as illusory, is not to deny it existence; it is merely to deny it
Reality. As an illusion, the world has intersubjective character.
Sarilkara was not maintaining that the world is like a hallucination
or a dream, as was argued in the vijiianavada school of Buddhism
and by the later Advaitin Prakasananda (Deutsch, p. 31 n. 8).
Brooks distinguishes between "illusion" and "delusion," using the
latter term to characterize a purely subjective experience. While
this usage is helpful in the context of his essay, most writers use
the terms interchangeably ("Advaita Vedanta's Doctrine of Maya,"
pp. 103-1 04).
70- Radhakrishnan and Moore, Source Book, p. 523.
71 - Devanandan, The Concept of Maya, p. 113.
72- Kinsley, The Divine Player, pp. 12-13.
73 - Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, p. 11 0.
Frederic F. Fost
405
Four Basic Principles of Advaita Vedanta
by Swami Bhajanananda
(The author is Assistant Secretary, Ramakrishna Math
and Ramakrishna Mission.)
Source: Prabuddha Bharata !an"#eb $%&%
Table of Contents
Pre'iminary (onsiderations..............................................................$
The )''usoriness o* )ndi+idua'ity.........................................................,
A Two'e+e' Rea'ity........................................................................-
.nrea'ity o* the /or'd 0..................................................................1
The 2ondua'ity o* 3now'ed4e........................................................&&
5tmaj67na, Se'*know'ed4e ..........................................................&&
8i ayaj67na, 9bjecti+e 3now'ed4e .................................................&$
: : : :
Ad+aita 8edanta is the dominant and most we''known schoo' o* )ndian ;hi'oso;hy. )n
)ndian cu'ture darana is the word which corres;onds to the /estern idea o*
<;hi'oso;hy=.
Darana 'itera''y means +ision or insi4ht. There are si> daranas, each o* which ;ro+ides
a ;articu'ar +iew o*, or insi4ht into, Rea'ity. #rom the stand;oint o* the ;rinci;'e o*
harmony tau4ht by Sri Ramakrishna and Swami 8i+ekananda, the si> daranas may be
re4arded as *ormin4 a si>tiered ;yramid, the tiers ;ro+idin4 hi4her and hi4her +iews o*
Rea'ity, with 8edanta as the to;most tier. 8edanta itse'* consists o* se+era' schoo's.
These schoo's o* 8edanta may a'so be +isua'i?ed as *ormin4 a ;yramid with Ad+aita
occu;yin4 its ;innac'e.
8edanta, howe+er, is not a mere view of Reality@ it is a'so a way of lifeAnot ordinary
'i*e, but s;iritua' 'i*e. )ts aim is to enab'e human bein4s to so'+e the e>istentia'
;rob'ems o* 'i*e, transcend human 'imitations, 4o beyond su**erin4, and attain su;reme
*u'*i'ment and ;eace. A'thou4h there are si> daranas, 8edanta a'one has remained the
;hi'oso;hy o* the Bindu re'i4ious tradition *rom +ery ancient times to the ;resent day.
9* the di**erent schoo's o* 8edanta, Ad+aita has *or its domain the mainstream
Binduism, whereas the other schoo's o* 8edanta are associated with the di**erent sects
o* Binduism.
Four Basic Principles of Advaita Vedanta -- Swami Bhajanananda
Preliminary Considerations
Be*ore takin4 u; a study o* the basic ;rinci;'es o* Ad+aita 8edanta it is necessary to
kee; in mind two ;oints. 9ne is the distinction between Ad+aita as an e>;erience and
Ad+aita as a ;hi'oso;hy.
As a direct transcendenta' s;iritua' e>;erience, Ad+aita marks the hi4hest ;oint o*
s;iritua' rea'i?ation a human bein4 can attain. )n that c'imactic e>;erience the
distinction between the indi+idua' and the cosmic is 'ost, and the distinctions between
the knower, the thin4 known, and know'ed4e disa;;ear. )t is <Ad+aita as e>;erience= that
*orms the main theme o* the .;anishads.
<Ad+aita as a ;hi'oso;hy= is a conce;tua' *ramework that attem;ts to e>;'ain how the
im;ersona' Abso'ute a;;ears as the ;henomena' wor'd and indi+idua' se'+es. The
twe'*thcentury Ad+aita writer Sriharsha says in the introduction to his *amous work
handana-!handa-!hadya that the ;ur;ose o* ;hi'oso;hy, "str"rtha, is to determine the
nature o* truth, tattva-nir aya , and +ictory o+er the o;;onent, v"di-vijaya. Acharya
Shankara himse'* de+otes a considerab'e ;art o* his commentaries to re*utin4 the +iews
o* o;;onents. )n the ;resent artic'e we con*ine our discussion to the ;hi'oso;hica'
as;ect o* Ad+aita.
The second ;oint to be ke;t in mind is that, a'thou4h Ad+aita ;hi'oso;hy is bui't on the
immutab'e and indestructib'e *oundation o* time'ess truths and 'aws, its su;erstructure
o* conce;ts underwent se+era' chan4es durin4 di**erent ;eriods in the history o*
Binduism. #our main ;hases may be seen in the de+e'o;ment o* Ad+aita ;hi'oso;hy.
i# Advaita of the Upanishads 0 As stated ear'ier, this is the e>;erientia' as;ect o*
Ad+aita.
$
ii# Advaita of Shankara 0 )t is we'' known that the edi*ice o* Ad+aita ;hi'oso;hy,
which towers o+er a'' other systems o* ;hi'oso;hy, was bui't by Acharya Shankara in the
ei4hth century. Shankara=s main endea+our was to estab'ish the nondua' nature o*
Brahman as the u'timate Rea'ity. Bis most ori4ina' contribution, howe+er, was the
introduction o* the conce;t o* a cosmic ne4ati+e ;rinci;'e known as m"y" or aj$"na,
i4norance, in order to e>;'ain the ori4in o* the uni+erse and the e>istence o* dua'ity in
the ;henomena' wor'd without a**ectin4 the nondua' nature o* Brahman.
iii# Post-Shankara Advaita % This ;hase e>tends o+er a 'on4 ;eriod, *rom the ninth
century to the si>teenth. The writers on Ad+aita 8edanta o* this ;eriod inc'ude eminent
thinkers 'ike Padma;ada, Sureshwara, 8achas;ati, Prakashatman, 8imuktatman,
Sar+aj$atman, Sriharsha, (hitsukha, Madhusudana, and others, who added se+era' new
conce;ts into the ;hi'oso;hica' *ramework o* Ad+aita 8edanta. Curin4 this ;eriod Ad+aita
8edanta s;'it into three streams or schoo's. These are: (a) the Vartika schoo', based on
the +iews o* Sureshwara@ (b) the Vivarana schoo', based on the +iews o* Padma;ada and
Prakashatman@ and (c) the Bhamati schoo', based on the +iews o* 8achas;ati Mishra. The
;hi'oso;hy o* Ad+aita underwent 4reat re*inement and inte''ectua' so;histry durin4 the
;ostShankara ;hase. Bowe+er, the *ocus o* discussions shi*ted *rom Brahman to m"y" or
aj$"na.
iv# The Modern Phase of Advaita % The modern ;hase in the de+e'o;mnt o* Ad+aita
8edanta was inau4urated by Sri Ramakrishna and Swami 8i+ekananda. They introduced
se+era' im;ortant chan4es in the understandin4 o* Ad+aita in order to make it more
re'e+ant to the needs and conditions o* the modern wor'd. Some o* the chan4es brou4ht
about by them are brie*'y stated be'ow.
(a) The e>;erientia' as;ect o* 8edanta has come to be stressed, as it was durin4 the
8edic ;eriod, more than the ;hi'oso;hica' as;ect.
(b) Barmony o* the Ad+aitic +iew with the +iews o* other schoo's o* 8edanta has been
estab'ished by acce;tin4 a'' +iews as re;resentin4 di**erent sta4es in the rea'i?ation o*
Brahman. This has ;ut an end to unnecessary ;o'emica' attacks and sectarian sDuabb'es
within the *o'd o* 8edanta.
(c) The o'der *orm o* Ad+aita 4a+e 4reater im;ortance to the transcendent as;ect o*
Brahman, whereas the new +iew on Ad+aita 4i+es 4reater im;ortance to the immanent
as;ect.
(d) Swami 8i+ekananda *ound immense ;ractica' si4ni*icance *or Ad+aita 8edanta in
so'+in4 the indi+idua' and co''ecti+e ;rob'ems o* daytoday 'i*e. Swamiji has shown how
Ad+aitic know'ed4e can ser+e as the basis o* mora'ity, basis o* inner stren4th and
coura4e, and as the basis *or socia' justice and eDua'ity as we''. Abo+e a'', Ad+aita
;ro+ides the basis *or Sri Ramakrishna=s messa4e o* <ser+ice to man as ser+ice to Eod=,
ivaj$"ne j&va-sev", which Swami 8i+ekananda ;o;u'ari?ed as the new 4os;e' o* socia'
ser+ice. A'' the ser+ice acti+ities o* the Ramakrishna Math and Mission are ins;ired by
this 4os;e' o* ser+ice.
F
(e) Swami 8i+ekananda has brou4ht about the reconci'iation o* Ad+aita 8edanta with
modern science. #urthermore, Swamiji showed that 8edanta itse'* is a scienceAthe
science o* consciousness.
(* ) Swamiji iso'ated the uni+ersa' ;rinci;'es o* Ad+aita 8edanta *rom the
mytho'o4ica', institutiona', and cu'tic as;ects o* its ;arent matri> in Binduism and
con+erted the uni+ersa' ;rinci;'es o* Ad+aita into a uni+ersa' re'i4ionAwhich in the
modern idiom means uni+ersa' s;iritua'ityA*or a'' humanity.
The ;hi'oso;hica' ;resu;;ositions and meta;hysica' under;innin4s and im;'ications o*
this <2eo8edanta=, which is better ca''ed <)nte4ra' 8edanta=, are yet to be worked out,
or e+en studied, ;ro;er'y. G+erythin4 4oes to show that the ;rinci;'es o* 8edanta
de+e'o;ed by Swami 8i+ekananda are 'ike'y to ha+e a 4reat im;act on wor'd thou4ht,
4'oba' cu'ture, and human ;ro4ress in the comin4 decades and centuries o* the third
mi''ennium.
The aim o* the ;resent artic'e is to e>;'icate the main ;rinci;'es o* Ad+aita 8edanta
de+e'o;ed durin4 the ;ostShankara ;eriod. A ;ro;er understandin4 o* these basic
;rinci;'es is necessary to understand and e+a'uate the status, in*'uence, and ;ossibi'ities
o* 8edanta in the modern wor'd and the contributions made to it by Sri Ramakrishna and
Swami 8i+ekananda.
PostShankara Ad+aita 8edanta rests on *our *oundationa' ;rinci;'es:
(i) the i''usoriness o* j&vatva, indi+idua'ity@
(ii) a two'e+e' rea'ity@
(iii) aj$"na as the conjoint cause o* the wor'd@ and
(i+) the nondua'ity o* (onsciousness.
The Illusoriness of Individuality
By Ad+aita is meant the nondua'ity o* Brahman, or rather the denia' o* dua'ity in
Brahman. The centra' conce;t o* 8edanta darana is that Brahman is the u'timate cause
o* the uni+erse and the u'timate Rea'ity. This is acce;ted by a'' schoo's o* 8edantaA
dua'istic as we'' as nondua'istic. /hat then is the di**erence between C+aita and
Ad+aitaH 9ne basic di**erence is that accordin4 to dua'istic schoo's indi+idua'ity is rea'
and ;ersists e+en in the state o* mukti, whereas in Ad+aita indi+idua'ity is unrea' and
does not ;ersist in the state o* mukti. Shankara says: </hat is ca''ed ji+a is not
abso'ute'y di**erent *rom Brahman. Brahman itse'*, bein4 conditioned by adjuncts such
as 'uddhi, inte''ect, and the 'ike, comes to be ca''ed IdoerJ and Ie>;eriencerJ. =
&
<The
di**erence between the indi+idua' se'* and the su;reme Se'* is due to the ;resence o*
'imitin4 adjuncts, such as the body, which are set u; by names and *orms and are
created by avidy"@ there is actua''y no di**erence.=
$
)n the dua'istic schoo's the word
& (a hi j&vo n"m"tyanta-'hinno 'rahma a ) 'uddhy- 7dyu;7dhik ta tu +iKe am7Kritya brahmai+a
san-j&va !art" 'ho!t" cety-ucyate . Shankaracharya=s commentary on Brahma Sutra, &.&.F&.
$ Vij$"n"tma-param"tmanor-avidy"-pratyupasth"pita- n7marL;aracitadeh7dyu;7dhinimitto 'hedo na
,
<Atman= is used to re*er on'y to the indi+idua' se'*, and not to Brahman.
/hen the Atman identi*ies itse'* with mind and body, it is ca''ed ji+a. )n the state o*
mukti this identi*ication disa;;ears, but the Atman, a'thou4h it becomes a'most simi'ar
to Brahman, remains distinct and se;arate *rom Brahman. Bere, the re'ationshi;
between Atman and Brahman is an or4anic re'ationshi;, 'ike that between the ;art and
the who'e. The ty;e o* di**erence that e>ists between Brahman and the indi+idua' se'+es
is known as sva*ata-'heda.
F
Ad+aita denies sva*ata-'heda in Brahman. Accordin4 to Ad+aita, in the state o* mukti
the Atman does not remain distinct *rom Brahman but becomes one with it. )n *act,
there is no distinction between Atman and Brahman@ as soon as the identi*ication with
mind and body disa;;ears, the distinction between Atman and Brahman a'so disa;;ears.
Bence, Ad+aitins use the terms Atman and Brahman interchan4eab'y.
/e may conc'ude this section with a statement made by 3rishnachandra Bhattacharya,
one o* the ori4ina' thinkers and 4reat scho'ars o* )ndian ;hi'oso;hy o* the twentieth
century: <The i''usoriness o* the indi+idua' se'* is a;;arent'y the centra' notion o*
Ad+aita 8edanta. G+ery +ita' tenet o* the ;hi'oso;hyABrahman as the so'e rea'ity, the
object as *a'se, +"y" as neither rea' nor unrea', )K+ara as Brahman in re*erence to +"y",
mo! a ('iberation) throu4h know'ed4e o* Brahman and as identity with BrahmanAmay be
re4arded as an e'aboration o* this sin4'e notion.=
,
A Two-level eality
The most crucia' ;rob'em in Ad+aita 8edanta is to e>;'ain the coe>istence o* two
entire'y di**erent and incom;atib'e entities, Brahman and the wor'd. Brahman is in*inite
(onsciousness, which is nir*u a , abso'ute'y de+oid o* a'' attributes. /hat Brahman is
cannot be e>;ressed in words. The .;anishadic de*inition <Brahman is Truth, 3now'ed4e,
p"ram"rthi!a (&.,.$$).
F )n treatises on 8edanta three kinds o* 'heda, di**erence, are mentioned: (i) Vij"t&ya-'heda: the
di**erence between objects o* di**erent kinds or s;ecies@ as *or e>am;'e the di**erence between a tree
and a cow. The di**erence between Purusha and Prakriti in Sankhya ;hi'oso;hy is o* this kind.
The di**erence between Eod and the sou's in the !udeo(hristian and )s'amic traditions is a'so o* this
kind. !ust as the ;otter and the ;ot can ne+er be the same, so a'so the (reator and creature can ne+er
be the same. This is not the ty;e o* di**erence between the indi+idua' Se'* and the Su;reme Se'*
acce;ted in C+aita schoo's o* 8edanta. (ii) Saj"t&ya-'heda, the di**erence between objects o* the same
kind or s;ecies@ as *or instance the di**erences between two man4o trees. The di**erence between two
Purushas in Sankhya ;hi'oso;hy, and the di**erence between two 'iberated se'+es in Ramanuja=s
;hi'oso;hy, are o* this ty;e. (iii) Sva*ata-'heda, the di**erences *ound amon4 the ;arts o* the same
object@ as *or instance the di**erence amon4 the branches, 'ea+es, and *'owers o* a man4o tree, or the
di**erences between rind, ;u';, and seeds o* a be' *ruit. This is the ty;e o* di**erence between Atman,
the indi+idua' Se'*, and Brahman in the dua'istic schoo's o* Ramanuja, Madh+a, and others. This kind o*
di**erence is necessary *or the sou' to adore and 'o+e Eod and enjoy the b'iss o* Brahman. But Shankara
denies e+en sva*ata-'heda in Brahman@ accordin4 to him the indi+idua' Se'* attains oneness with
Brahman, so much so that it becomes B'iss itse'*.
, 3rishnachandra Bhattacharya, <The Ad+aita and )ts S;iritua' Si4ni*icance=, in -he .ultural /erita*e of
0ndia, M +o's (3o'kata: Ramakrishna Mission )nstitute o* (u'ture, $%%&), F.$,-.
-
)n*inity=
-
is on'y a symbo'ic indicator, la! ana , not a true descri;tion, o* the rea' nature
o* Brahman. The in*inite, the indi+isib'e, the attribute'ess cannot be characteri?ed in
terms o* *inite cate4ories.
As Sri Ramakrishna used to say, <Brahman is the on'y thin4 which has ne+er become
ucchi a , that is, de*i'ed by human mouth=. Brahman is the so'e Rea'ity. The .;anishads
dec'are: <A'' this is Brahman=@ <There is no mu'ti;'icity here.=
N

Bowe+er, the .;anishads and Brahma Sutra a'so re4ard Brahman as the cause o* the
uni+erse. A'' schoo's o* 8edanta ho'd that Brahman is both the materia' cause, up"d"na-
!"ra a , and the e**icient cause, nimitta !"ra a , o* the wor'd. The wor'd, which is
materia' in nature, consists o* count'ess 'i+in4 and non'i+in4 bein4s, is e+er chan4in4,
and is characteri?ed by dua'ities such as heat and co'd, joy and ;ain@ it is, in e+ery way,
the o;;osite o* Brahman. Bow can two tota''y dissimi'ar and incom;atib'e entities,
Brahman and the wor'd, ha+e any causa' re'ationshi; at a''H )* Brahman is the so'e
rea'ity, how and where can the wor'd e>istH
The common answer, based on a su;er*icia' understandin4 o* Ad+aita, is that Brahman
a'one is rea' whereas the wor'd is unrea', and the causa' re'ationshi; between the two is
a'so i''usory. This kind o* statement is usua''y nothin4 more than ;arrotin4 without any
dee; thinkin4. Bow can we re4ard as i''usory this unima4inab'y com;'e> wor'd which
a'most a'' ;eo;'e ;ercei+e to be rea'H /hen we actua''y see an i''usion, such as
mistakin4 a ro;e *or a snake, it takes on'y a 'itt'e time *or us to rea'i?e that it is an
i''usion. Moreo+er, the snake seen on a ro;e does not bite, the water seen in a mira4e
does not s'ake our thirst. But the wor'd we 'i+e in, which 4i+es us innumerab'e ty;es o*
joy*u' and ;ain*u' e>;eriences, cha''en4es, chan4es, re'ationshi;s, end'ess e+ents, Duest
*or meanin4, and so on, cannot be dismissed so easi'y as i''usory.
Shankara=s so'ution to the ;rob'em o* the coe>istence and causeande**ect re'ation
between nondua' Brahman and the *inite wor'd was to ;osit a two'e+e' rea'ity. 9ne
'e+e' is p"ram"rthi!a-satt", abso'ute Rea'ity@ this is what Brahman is. The other is
vy"vah"ri!a-satt", em;irica' or re'ati+e rea'ity@ this is what the wor'd is. But then, how
can there be two kinds o* rea'ityH )t is c'ear that the term <rea'ity= needs ;ro;er
understandin4.
Empirical Level % /hate+er is e>;erienced direct'y throu4h the senses, pratya! a , is
true and rea', at 'east as 'on4 as the e>;erience 'asts. 9ur senses ha+e 'imitations, we
may ha+e wron4 ;erce;tions, but science and techno'o4y enab'e us to o+ercome the
dece;tions o* the senses and 4ain correct know'ed4e. The acDuisition o* enormous ;ower
by the a;;'ication o* the know'ed4e 4ained throu4h the senses itse'* is the ;ra4matic
;roo* o* the rea'ity o* the wor'd. /hat bi''ions o* ;eo;'e ha+e direct'y e>;erienced *or
thousands o* years cannot be dismissed as unrea'. Thus, *rom the stand;oint o* direct
em;irica' e>;erience, the wor'd is rea'.
- Satya j$"nam-ananta 'rahma , -aittiriya 1panishad, $.&.&.
N Sarva !halvida 'rahma , .hhando*ya 1panishad, F.&,.&@ (eha n"n"sti !i2cana, Brihadaranya!a
1panishad, ,.,.&O@ atha 1panishad, $.&.&&.
N
But the authoritati+e scri;tures known as the .;anishads dec'are Brahman to be the so'e
rea'ity. Moreo+er, 4reat thinkers 'ike 2a4arjuna ha+e, throu4h ar4uments, shown that the
wor'd we see is unrea'.
This 'eads to the untenab'e ;ro;osition that the wor'd is both rea' and unrea', which is
se'*contradictory. )* the wor'd is sat, rea', it cannot be asat, unrea', and +ice +ersa.
#rom this contradiction the Ad+aitin conc'udes that the wor'd is di**erent *rom both sat
and asat@ it is sad-asad-vila! a a . Such a *act de*ies the 'aws o* 'o4ica' thinkin4@ hence,
it is anirvacan&ya. Another word used in the same sense is mithy". )n common ;ar'ance
mithy" means i''usion or *a'sehood, but in Ad+aita 8edanta it means somethin4
<mysterious=. The terms mithy", anirvacan&ya, and sad-asad-vila! a a are treated as
more or 'ess synonymous@ they describe what is known as vy"vah"ri!a-satt". )t is
Brahman a;;earin4 as the wor'd under the in*'uence o* its mysterious ;ower known as
m"y" or aj$"na.
Absolute Level % Brahman remains in its true nature as nondua', in*inite awareness at
the hi4her 'e+e' o* rea'ity known as p"ram"rthi!a-satt". )t is on'y at this 'e+e' that the
wor'd a;;ears to be unrea' or i''usory.
Abso'ute Rea'ity is a'so e>;erienced direct'y. (om;ared to this e>;erience, the
e>;erience o* em;irica' rea'ity may be described as indirect, because it is mediated by
the sense or4ans. The su;ersensuous e>;erience o* abso'ute Rea'ity is immediate,
aparo! a .
M
This is to be distin4uished *rom pratya! a , sensee>;erience. The aparo! a
e>;erience, which takes ;'ace without the mediation o* the senses, is the resu't o*
Brahman=s se'*re+e'ation. Brahman re+ea's itse'* because it is se'*'uminous. Brahman is
o* the nature o* ;ure (onsciousness, which shines in the hearts o* a'' as the Atman.
G+erythin4 is known throu4h consciousness, but consciousness cannot be known as an
object. (onsciousness is se'*'uminous@ it re+ea's itse'*Ait is svapra!"a. The we''known
de*inition o* svapra!"a 4i+en by the thirteenthcentury Ad+aita writer (itsukha says
that <se'*re+e'ation is the ca;abi'ity to 4i+e rise to immediate se'*awareness without
its becomin4 objecti+e know'ed4e=.
1

Shankara=s theory o* two 'e+e's o* rea'ity, the p"ram"rthi!a and the vy"vah"ri!a, is a
distinct and uniDue *eature o* Ad+aita 8edanta. Sri Ramakrishna has e>;ressed the same
idea in his own sim;'e way as nitya and l&la. This two'e+e' theory is o*ten com;ared to
2a4arjuna=s theory o* two 'e+e's o* truth: samv ti satya , con+entiona' truth, and
param"rtha satya, abso'ute truth. There is no doubt that Shankara was in*'uenced by
2a4arjuna=s dia'ectic, but the *ormer went *ar ahead and bui't a mi4hty ;hi'oso;hica'
edi*ice by inte4ratin4 2a4arjuna=s dia'ectica' a;;roach into 'rahmam&m" s" , the
;hi'oso;hy o* Brahman. There are, howe+er, basic di**erences between the two'e+e'
theory o* Shankara and that o* 2a4arjuna. )n the *irst ;'ace, 2a4arjuna=s theory ;ertains
to truth in 4enera', whereas Shankara=s theory co+ers the who'e o* rea'ity. Second'y,
2a4arjuna=s a;;roach is most'y ne4ati+e and is based so'e'y on 'o4ic, whereas Shankara=s
M 3at-s"! "d-aparo! "d-'rahma , Brihadaranya!a 1panishad, F.,.&P$@ a'so F.-.&.
1 Avedyatve sati aparo! a-vyavah"ra-yo*yat" @ (hitsukhacharya, -attvapradipi!a (2irnayasa4ar), O.
M
a;;roach is ;ositi+e and kee;s 8edantic scri;tures at the *ore*ront. A4ain, 2a4arjuna
denies the rea'ity o* the wor'd e+en at the em;irica' 'e+e', whereas Shankara denies the
rea'ity o* the wor'd on'y at the 'e+e' o* the Abso'ute. Qast'y, Shankara re4ards the wor'd
as somethin4 su;erim;osed on Brahman. This idea o* adhy"sa, su;erim;osition, is
Shankara=s ori4ina' idea which is absent in the ;hi'oso;hy o* 2a4arjuna or e+en in
8ij$ana+ada Buddhism.
!nreality of the "orld #
Shankara=s main interest was in estab'ishin4 the so'e rea'ity o* Brahman, and it was in
su;;ort o* this that he attem;ted to show the u'timate unrea'ity o* the wor'd, which he
did main'y by Duotin4 scri;tures. But *or ;ost Shankara Ad+aitins, the unrea'ity o* the
wor'd and the theory o* aj$"na became the chie* concern because o* the need to de*end
these doctrines a4ainst the ;o'emica' attacks o* ri+a' schoo's.
The crucia' ;rob'em *acin4 ;ostShankara Ad+aitins was to estab'ish the unrea'ity o* the
;henomena' wor'd. A;;ea'in4 to transcendenta' e>;erience was o* no use as many o* the
o;;onents, *or e>am;'e the 2aiyayikas, did not be'ie+e in it and, moreo+er, since
transcendenta' e>;erience is subjecti+e, each ;erson may c'aim his own e>;erience to
be the true one. There*ore, the unrea'ity o* the wor'd had to be estab'ished at the
em;irica' 'e+e' itse'*. #or this the *irst task was to de*ine <rea'ity=. /hat is the criterion
to distin4uish rea'ity *rom unrea'ityH
Two 'ines o* reasonin4 are *o''owed by Ad+aitins to estab'ish the unrea'ity o* the
;henomena' wor'd. 9ne is to eDuate im;ermanence with unrea'ity, and the other to
eDuate objecti+ity with unconsciousness.
(i) Anitya is asatya: The u'timate Rea'ity, known as Brahman, is unchan4in4 and
eterna'. #rom this it is natura' to conc'ude that whate+er is chan4in4 must be
im;ermanent, and whate+er is im;ermanent must be unrea'Aanitya is asatya. This
eDuation was, howe+er, *irst worked out by 2a4arjuna in the second century. )n
+ulamadhyama!a-!ari!a he states: <That which did not e>ist in the be4innin4 and wi''
not e>ist in the *uture, how can it be said to e>ist in the midd'eH
O
Eauda;ada, in his
+andu!ya ari!a, e>;resses e>act'y the same idea.
&%
#urthermore, 2a4arjuna showed the contradictory nature o* a'' dharmas, a'' ;henomena
and e>;eriences. /hat is contradictory cannot be true. Thus, contradictoriness became
a criterion o* *a'sity. #rom this the Ad+aitins deri+ed the idea that noncontradictoriness,
a'"dhitatva, is the test and criterion o* truth or true know'ed4e.
&&
)m;ermanence itse'* is a *orm o* contradiction. The e>terna' wor'd ceases to e>ist *or a
;erson who is in the dream, svapna, or dee;s'ee;, su upta , states. The e>;eriences o*
O (aiv"*ra n"vara yasya tasya madhya !uto 'havet@ 2a4arjuna, +ulamadhyama!a ari!a, &&.$.&.
&%. Eauda;ada, +andu!ya ari!a, $.-.
&&4 A'"dhit"rtha-vi aya!a- j$"na pram" @ see Charmaraja Adh+arindra, Ved"nta Pari'h" " , trans. Swami
Madha+ananda (3o'kata: Ad+aita Ashrama, $%%,), ,.
1
dream and dee;s'ee; states contradict the e>;eriences o* the wakin4 state. Bence, the
e>terna' wor'd must be re4arded as unrea'. Brahman as the inner Se'*, pratya*"tman,
a'ways abides within us as the unchan4in4 witness, s"! in . )t abides e+en in dee; s'ee;@
this is known *rom the *act that a*ter a dee; s'ee; we are ab'e to reco''ect, <) ha+e had
a sound s'ee;@ and ) did not know anythin4.= The dream and dee;s'ee; states do not
ne4ate or contradict awareness or consciousness. (onsciousness as AtmanBrahman is
unchan4in4, unbroken, e+er ;resent@ there*ore it a'one is rea', it is the on'y Rea'ity.
)n this connection it shou'd be noted that Ad+aitins acce;t e+en the dream state to be
rea' as 'on4 as the e>;erience o* the dream 'asts. )t be'on4s to a third kind o* rea'ity
known as pr"ti'h"si!asatt", i''usory e>istence. The dream becomes unrea' on'y when a
;erson wakes u;. Simi'ar'y, the wor'd a;;ears to be rea' unti' a ;erson awakens to the
rea'i?ation o* Brahman.
&$
)t shou'd a'so be ;ointed out here that the other schoo's o* 8edanta do not acce;t
Shankara=s conce;t o* a two'e+e' or three'e+e' rea'ity, nor the unrea'ity o* the wor'd.
They acce;t the wor'd as im;ermanent, no doubt, but *or them, im;ermanence does not
mean unrea'ity.
(ii) .it and ja a : The second 'ine o* reasonin4 that Ad+aitins *o''ow in order to ;ro+e
the unrea'ity o* the wor'd is based on the antinomic nature o* the subject and the
object. A major ;remise o* the Ad+aitins is that consciousness is a'ways the subject@ it
can ne+er be objecti*ied. )t is a *undamenta' ;rinci;'e that the subject and the object
can ne+er be the same. )n order to know an object we need consciousness@ but to know
consciousness nothin4 is necessary, because consciousness is se'*'uminous, svaya -jyoti ,
se'*re+ea'in4. This means, a'' objects be'on4 to the rea'm o* the unconscious, ja a .
(hitsukha ar4ues that there can be no re'ation between the subject, which is ;ure
consciousness, and the object, which is ja a . )n *act, the subjectobject re'ationshi; is
*a'se. Bowe+er, (hitsukha a'so shows that the wor'd is *a'se on'y when the Abso'ute is
rea'i?ed.
&F
Aj$na as the Con$oint Cause of the "orld
+"y" or aj$"na or avidy" or i4norance is re4arded in a'most a'' schoo's o* thou4ht as
absence o* know'ed4e, inadeDuate know'ed4e, or wron4 know'ed4e. The Ad+aita +iew o*
aj$"na di**ers *rom a'' other +iews in three ways:
(i) Aj$"na is not mere'y a ;sycho'o4ica' ;rocess takin4 ;'ace in a ;erson=s mind, but
a uni+ersa', onto'o4ica' ;henomenon ;resent e+erywhere.
(ii) Aj$"na is an adhy"sa or adhy"ropa, su;erim;osition. Rea'ity is o* the nature o*
know'ed4e, and aj$"na is a +ei'in4 or co+erin4 o* know'ed4e.
&$ See Shankaracharya=s commentary on Brahma Sutra, $.&.&,: <Sarva-vyavah"r" "m-eva
pr"*'rahm"tmat"- +ij$7n7tsatyat+o;a;atte s+a;na+ya+ah7rasye+a pr"!-pra'odh"t@ a'' em;irica'
usa4es are true be*ore the rea'i?ation o* Brahman as the Se'*, just as the e>;eriences in the dream
state are true be*ore one wakes u;.=
&F -attvapradipi!a, ,%PF.
O
(iii) Aj$"na is not mere ne4ation@ it is somethin4 ;ositi+e, 'h"var5pa. The count'ess
objects o* the uni+erse are not mere i''usions, they are rea' as 'on4 as the em;irica'
wor'd remains. They are a'' ;roduced by m"y". This shows that m"y" is somethin4
;ositi+e.
/hen it is said that Brahman is both materia' cause, up"d"na-!"ra a , and e**icient
cause, nimitta!"ra a , it on'y means that Brahman is the unchan4in4 nondua' Rea'ity
behind the uni+erse. The +arieties o* *orms and names that we encounter in the wor'd
are the creations o* m"y". The e>act re'ation between Brahman and m"y" is a matter o*
contro+ersy amon4 the di**erent schoo's o* Ad+aita. The more ;o;u'ar +iew is that
Brahman and m"y" act 'ike the two strands o* a ro;e. )n this case, the ro'e o* m"y" is
known as a saha!"ri-!"ra a , conjoint cause or coo;erati+e cause.
&,
+"y" or aj$"na is said to ha+e two ;owers: (i) "vara a-a!ti , which co+ers Brahman and
;re+ents Brahman=s true nature *rom bein4 known@ and (ii) vi! epa-a!ti , which conjures
u; the objects o* the uni+erse.
&-
#rom the abo+e it is c'ear that, *unctiona''y, m"y" or aj$"na is as rea' as the Prakriti o*
Sankhya ;hi'oso;hy and the Shakti o* Shaktism. At the same time, since aj$"na is a
ne4ati+e *actor and is itse'* i''usory, it can be e'iminated or sub'ated throu4h true
know'ed4e, 'ea+in4 the nondua' nature o* Brahman intact. This bri''iant stroke o* the
inte''ect e>ecuted by Shankara has *ew ;ara''e's in the history o* ;hi'oso;hy.
But this conce;t in+o'+es certain contradictions. )n the *irst ;'ace, i* Brahman is se'*
'uminous and is nothin4 but ;ure know'ed4e, how can i4norance e>ist in itH (an darkness
e>ist in 'i4htH Second'y, since Brahman is in*inite, aj$"na must be in*inite too. )n that
case, rea'i?ation o* Brahman by one ;erson wou'd im;'y the remo+a' o* the entire
aj$"na in the uni+erse, which is ob+ious'y an absurd ;ro;osition. A'thou4h attem;ts ha+e
been made to answer these and other objections, none o* them is satis*actory.
Aj$"na or avidy" is o* two kinds: !"ra a-a j$"na, a'so ca''ed m5l"vidy", and !"rya-
aj$"na, a'so ca''ed t5l"vidy". )t is !"ra a-a j$"na that is the cause o* the creation o* a''
the mani*o'd thin4s in the uni+erse, inc'udin4 the e4oAthis is known as &varas i , Eod=s
creation. 9ur attachment, hatred, *ear, dreams, and such other reactions with re4ard to
e>terna' objects are ;roduced by !"rya-aj$"naAthis is known as j&va-s i .
&N
&, #or di**erent theories on the causa' ro'e o* m"y" or aj$"na, see Cinesh (handra Bhattacharya,
<PostKankara Ad+aita=, -he .ultural /erita*e of 0ndia, M +o's (3o'kata: Ramakrishna Mission )nstitute o*
((a'cutta: Eu;ta Press, &ON$). See a'so Swami Tattwa+idananda, <Mu'a+idya, A+astha+idya, and
Tu'a+idya=, Bulletin of the Rama!rishna +ission 0nstitute of .ulture, ,O"- (May &OO1), $$,P-.
&- The "vara a-a!ti itse'*, accordin4 to Madhusudana Saraswati, consists o* three +ei's. The *irst +ei'
co+ers the sat as;ect o* Brahman, the second +ei' co+ers the cit as;ect, and the third +ei' co+ers the
"nanda as;ect. The Ad+aitic rea'i?ation is a ;ro4ressi+e 'i*tin4 o* these +ei's. See 2a'inikanta Brahma,
Philosophy of /indu Sadhana (Qondon: 3e4an Pau', Trench, Trubner, &OF$), &,M. Sri Ramakrishna a'so,
;unnin4 on the names o* three 4reat 8aishna+a saints o* Ben4a', used to say that Eodrea'i?ation has
three sta4es: Ad+aita, (haitanya, and 2ityananda. See M, -he 6ospel of Sri Rama!rishna, trans. Swami
2ikhi'ananda ((hennai: Ramakrishna Math, $%%$), $M$, F%1.
&N "ra a-a j$"na and !"rya-aj$"na are discussed in Madhusudana Saraswati=s Siddhanta-'indu.
7varas i and j&va-s i are discussed in 8idyaranya=s Panchadashi.
&%
Qast'y, we ha+e a'ready ;ointed out that in Ad+aita, aj$"na means adhy"sa or
adhy"ropa. Adhy"sa itse'* is o* *i+e ty;es, which are ;o'ar in nature (see Tab'e).
To ha+e a c'ear understandin4 o* Ad+aita it is necessary to understand *irst these *i+e
;o'arities in adhy"sa.
&M
9win4 to 'imitations o* s;ace they cannot be discussed here.
Dharm&adhy"sa (Substanti+e su;erim;os.) +s Dharmaadhy"sa (Attributi+e su;erim;;os.)
Anyonyaadhy"sa (Mutua' su;erim;osition) +s 8!onmu!haadhy"sa (.ni'atera' su;erim;os.)
-"d"tmyaadhy"sa ()denti*ication su;erim ) +s Samsar*aadhy"sa ((ontact su;erim;osition)
"ran a adhy"sa ((ausa' su;erim;osition) +s "ryaadhy"sa (G**ect su;erim;;osition)
Arthaadhy"sa (9bject su;erim;osition) +s j$"naadhy"sa (3now'ed4e su;erim;osition.)
The %on-duality of &nowled'e
9ne o* the most *undamenta' ideas o* 8edanta is that ;ure (onsciousness, cit, or ;ure
know'ed4e, j$ana, is se'*e>istent@ that is, it e>ists by itse'*, inde;endent o* body and
mind. This idea is shared by the Sankhya and Ro4a systems a'so, but by no other system
o* thou4ht in the wor'd. )n /estern thou4htAre'i4ious as we'' as secu'arAconsciousness
or know'ed4e has a'ways been re4arded as a ;ro;erty or *unction o* mind, or e+en o* the
brain, and can ne+er e>ist inde;endent'y.
Ad+aita 8edanta ad+anced the idea o* the inde;endence and se'*e>istence o*
consciousness sti'' *urtherAmore than Sankhya and Ro4a e+er didA and ;osited that ;ure
3now'ed4e or (onsciousness is one and nondua'. )t is to be remembered here that
<Ad+aita= does not mean mere oneness o* rea'ity. Se+era' /estern thinkers, *rom
Parmenides and Aristot'e in ancient Ereece to modern Duantum ;hysicists, ha+e s;oken
about oneness o* rea'ity, but it is in+ariab'y oneness o* either matter or mind, or e'se o*
<substance=, which is a tertium 9uid. Ad+aita a'one s;eaks o* the oneness o*
(onsciousness or 3now'ed4e. Accordin4 to it, (onsciousness is the so'e Rea'ity.
2ow, know'ed4e or consciousness is o* two main kinds: Se'*know'ed4e, "tmaj$"na, and
objecti+e know'ed4e, vi aya j$"na.
tma-j$(na) Self-knoled!e
This, a4ain, is o* two kinds: astitva-j$"na and svar5pa-j$"na.
(i) Astitva-"#na) knowled'e of one*s e+istence, )* Atman and Brahman were
com;'ete'y hidden by aj$"na, then we wou'd know nothin4 about our own e>istence or
about other thin4s, and we wou'd be no better than a stone or a c'od o* earth. But, 'ike
the 'i4ht o* the sun comin4 throu4h dark c'ouds, the 'i4ht o* the Atman comes throu4h
the co+erin4s o* aj$"na. )t is this *i'tered 'i4ht o* Atman that 4i+es us the notion <) e>ist=.
My own e>istence, astitva, does not need any ;roo*@ it is se'*e+ident, svata -siddha .
&M A sim;'e descri;tion o* these *i+e ;o'arities in adhy"sa is 4i+en in the Ben4a'i te>t
Vedantadarshanam,trans. and annot. Swami 8iswaru;ananda ((a'cutta: .dbodhan, &OM%), $N.
&&
This awareness o* our own e>istence comes *rom the Atman in us.
)t shou'd be mentioned here that the <)= or e4o in us is the resu't o* the association o*
the Atman, which is cit or ;ure (onsciousness, and 'uddhi, which is ja a or aj$"na. This
association is concei+ed as a <knot=, cit-ja a-*ranthi , or as a redhot iron ba''A*ire
stands *or the Atman, the iron ba'' *or 'uddhiAor as a trans;arent crysta' a;;earin4 as
red owin4 to the ;resence o* a red *'ower near it.
/hen we say <) e>ist=, the <e>ist= as;ect comes direct'y *rom the Atman.
(ii) Svar$pa-"#na) knowled'e of one*s true nature, /hat is the nature o* this
AtmanH .n*ortunate'y we are aware o* on'y the e>istence o* the Atman but, owin4 to the
co+erin4 o* !"ra a-a j$"na, we are not aware o* its true nature, svar5pa. Accordin4 to
Shankara, the true nature o* the Atman can be known on'y *rom 8edantic scri;tures. The
.;anishads state that the true nature o* Atman is Brahman.
This kind o* know'ed4e is at *irst on'y a conce;tua' know'ed4e ;roduced by menta'
v tti s, modi*ications.
But this v tti- j$"na is the startin4 ;oint. Accordin4 to Shankara, once this know'ed4e is
4ained, a'' that remains to be done is to sto; identi*yin4 onese'* with one=s body, mind,
and so on. This nonidenti*ication, ;ractised with the he'; o* the <neti, neti = ;rocess,
be4ins as d *-d ya-vive!a Adiscrimination between the seer and the seenAand
cu'minates in a hi4her ty;e o* inner absor;tion, known as nididhy"sana.
Sureshwaracharya eDuates nididhy"sana with savi!alpa sam"dhi. Beyond this 'ies
nirvi!alpa sam"dhi, in which a!ha d"!"ra-v tti , a unitary menta' mode, remo+es the
m5l"vidy", causa' i4norance.
/hen the m5l"vidy" is com;'ete'y remo+ed, the Atman is rea'i?ed as Brahman. /hen
this ha;;ens, astitvaj$"na is re;'aced by svar5pa-j$"na.
The ;o;u'ar notion that in Ad+aitic e>;erience the Atman <mer4es= into Brahman is not
Duite true.
The Atman remains as se'*e>istence. 9win4 to the co+erin4s o* aj$"na and its ;roducts,
the Atman is at *irst e>;erienced as <) e>ist=. But as the co+erin4s are remo+ed, the
Atman=s se'*e>istence e>;ands unti' it becomes in*inite. The same Atman that was at
the be4innin4 remains at the end a'so, on'y its co+erin4s are 4one@ we then ca'' it
Brahman.
%i a&a -j$(na) 'b"ective (noled!e
/e ha+e a'ready seen that the 'i4ht o* the Atman, in s;ite o* bein4 co+ered by aj$"na,
sti'' shines *orth, 4i+in4 rise to the notion o* <)=. The same *i'tered 'i4ht o* the Atman,
when directed towards the objects, re+ea's them. This is how we see objects. The
+unda!a 1panishad states: <-asya 'h"s" sarvamida vi'h"ti @ by Bis 'i4ht a'' this
&$
shines.=
A'thou4h the .;anishads s;eak o* the 'i4ht o* the Atman re+ea'in4 objects, accordin4 to
the e;istemo'o4y or theory o* know'ed4e de+e'o;ed by the Sankhya, Ro4a, and 8edanta
systems, the ;ure Atman by itse'* cannot ha+e objecti+e know'ed4e. To ha+e objecti+e
know'ed4e, the 'i4ht o* the Atman must be re*'ected by a modi*ication o* the
anta !ara a , inner or4an, known as v tti .
The ancient SankhyaRo4a teacher Panchashikha e>;ressed this ;rinci;'e as an a>iom:
<8!ameva daranam !hy"tireva daranam@ there is on'y one way o* seein4, v tti- j$"na is
the on'y way o* seein4.= Accordin4 to the SankhyaRo4a theory o* ;erce;tionA brie*'y
described by 8yasa in his commentary on 3o*a Sutra, &.MAthe anta !ara a 4oes out
throu4h the eyes to the object and takes the *orm o* the object@ this modi*ication o* the
anta !ara a is known as v tti . The 'i4ht o* the Purusha or the Atman then 4ets re*'ected
in this v tti , and this re*'ected 'i4ht re+ea's the object. Thus, vi aya j$"na or objecti+e
know'ed4e is in+ariab'y v tti j$"na.
The abo+e theory o* ;erce;tion was ado;ted by Ad+aitins. ;ostShankara Ad+aitins,
howe+er, added two more ;rocesses to those ;ro;ounded by yo4a teachers.
(i) Accordin4 to the Ad+aita +iew, a'' objects are co+ered by aj$"na, and it is owin4
to this aj$"na that the objects are not seen. There*ore, be*ore the anta !ara a takes
the *orm o* the object, it must *irst remo+e the aj$"na co+erin4 the object. )t shou'd be
noted that this co+erin4 aj$"na is di**erent *rom the !"ra a-a j$"na and !"rya-aj$"na
mentioned ear'ier. )t is known sim;'y as vi aya*ataaj2"na , or as avasth"-aj$"na.
&1
(ii) Second'y, Brahman is a'';er+adin4, and so there is caitanya, consciousness, not
on'y in the seer or subject, known as pram"t -caitanya , but a'so in the object seen,
known as vi aya-caitanya or prameya-caitanya. PostShankara Ad+aitins he'd that, in
order to see an object, mere re*'ection o* the 'i4ht o* the Atman on the v tti is not
enou4h. )t is a'so necessary that pram"t -caitanya and prameya-caitanya become
uni*ied. This is because true know'ed4e is nondua'. There*ore, e+en in ordinary
em;irica' ;erce;tion there must be unity o* the subject and the object.
Thus, the Ad+aitic theory o* ;erce;tion in+o'+es the *o''owin4 menta' ;rocesses:
(i) Be*ore a ;erson 'ooks at an object, say a cow, the object remains en+e'o;ed in
aj$"na. This i4norance is known as vi aya*ata-a j$"na or avasth"-aj$"na.
(ii) /hen the ;erson directs his 4a?e towards the object, his anta !ara a issues *orth
throu4h his eyes and remo+es the i4norance co+erin4 the object. This ;rocess is ca''ed
"vara a-'han*a .
(iii) The anta !ara a now takes the *orm o* the object. The resu'tin4 modi*ication o*
the anta !ara a is ca''ed a v tti . At this sta4e the anta !ara a has three ;arts or v tti s:
&1 The Vedanta Pari'hasha mentions vi aya*ataaj2"na on'y. The term avasth"-aj$"na is mentioned in
Ro4endranath Ba4chi, Advaitavade Avidya
&F
a) pram"t", the ;art within the ;erson@ b) pram" a , the ;art that issues *orth@ and c)
prameya, the ;art that takes the *orm o* the object.
(i+) The pram"t -caitanya in the ;erson e>tends throu4h the anta !ara a @ this
e>tension o* consciousness is ca''ed pram" a-caitanya or cid"'h"sa. .id"'h"sa 4ets
re*'ected on the v tti . This <taintin4= o* consciousness is ca''ed cidupar"*a.
(+) At this sta4e the unity o* consciousness takes ;'ace. Pram"t -caitanya , pram" a-
caitanya, and prameya-caitanya become one. This unity o* consciousness is ca''ed
a'heda-a'hivya!ti.
(+i) As a resu't, the know'ed4e <) see a cow= arises in the mind.
These menta' ;rocesses mentioned abo+e are shown dia4rammatica''y be'ow.
&O
The *o''owin4 im;ortant ;oints are to be noted in this conte>t:
(i) The se+era' menta' ;rocesses described here are a'' su;;osed to take ;'ace
simu'taneous'y, not in sta4es.
&O The descri;tion o* the menta' ;rocess in ;erce;tion 4i+en abo+e is based on Charmaraja Adh+arindra=s
Vedanta Pari'hasha. #or a detai'ed discussion on this subject see, C M Cutta, -he Si: ;ays of nowin*
((a'cutta: .ni+ersity o* (a'cutta, &OM$), N&PO&, and Swami Sat;rakashananda, +ethods of nowled*e
((a'cutta: Ad+aita Ashrama, &OM,), O1P&%O.(u'ture, $%%&), F.$--.
&,
(ii) )t is the 'i4ht o* the Atman that re+ea's an object@ this means that e+ery time we
see an object the Atman re+ea's itse'*. But owin4 to the co+erin4 o* ;rimordia'
i4norance, m5l"vidy", ordinary ;ersons are not aware o* this constant se'*re+e'ation
takin4 ;'ace in our daytoday 'i*e.
(iii) )n e+ery ;erce;tion there is a'so the e>;erience o* the nondua'ity o* know'ed4e,
but a4ain, owin4 to ;rimordia' i4norance, ordinary ;eo;'e are not aware o* this *act.
Accordin4 to Ad+aita, a'' true know'ed4e is the resu't o* the unity o* the Gye in a'' other
kinds o* ;erce;tion, inc'udin4 mystica' +isions o* deities. The di**erence between the
di**erent ty;es o* ;erce;tion 'ies in the nature o* the v tti in+o'+ed. )n ordinary
;erce;tion the v tti in+o'+ed is a 4ross and im;ure one. )n the +ision o* a deity the v tti
in+o'+ed is a ;ure, subt'e, satt+ic one. )n nirvi!alpa sam"dhi a'so a simi'ar ;rocess takes
;'ace, but here the v tti in+o'+ed is known as a!ha "!"ra-v tti , which is ca;ab'e o*
takin4 an in*inite dimension. Another major di**erence is that in ordinary ;erce;tion
on'y a 'itt'e avasth"-aj$"na co+erin4 the object is remo+ed.
But in nirvi!alpa sam"dhi, m5l"vidy" itse'* is remo+ed. Bowe+er, it is im;ortant to note
that the a!ha "!"ra-v tti on'y remo+es the m5l"vidy".
As soon as this takes ;'ace, Brahman re+ea's itse'*@ the cid"'h"sa cannot re+ea' Brahman
Athat wou'd be 'ike tryin4 to see the sun with the he'; o* a *'ash 'i4ht. That is to say,
the se'*re+e'ation o* Brahman takes ;'ace without any v tti . This rea'i?ation is what was
described abo+e as svar5pa-j$"na.
The di**erent ty;es o* know'ed4e discussed so *ar are shown in the *orm o* a chart
be'ow.
j$7na
3now'ed4e
SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
i i
5tmaj$7na 8i aya j$7na
Se'*know'ed4e 9bjecti+e know'ed4e
SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
i i i i
Astit+aj$7na S+arL;aj$7na SLk ma+ tti SthL'a+ tti
(<) e>ist=) (Brahman e>ists) 8ision o* Ce+ata Perce;tion o* senseobjects
To sum u;, i''usoriness o* indi+idua'ity, a two'e+e' rea'ity, aj$"na as the conjoint cause
&-
o* the wor'd, and the nondua'ity o* know'ed4e are the *our ;rinci;'es constitutin4 the
rea' essence o* Ad+aita 8edanta.
gh
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T
Appendi+
-. -/01A VIV2&A
8edanta ;hi'oso;hy describes at 4reat 'en4th the distinction between the <Seer= (dr. 4)
and the <seen= (dr. Kya), the Subject (+iKayU) and the object (+iKaya), the <G4o= (aham)
and the <nonG4o= (idam). The <Seer= is the ;ercei+er, identica' with the Subject and the
G4o, and is o* the nature o* (onsciousness and )nte''i4ence. The <seen= is the thin4
;ercei+ed, identica' with the object and the nonG4o, and is insentient by nature. The <
Seer= is a'' sentiency@ there*ore the <Seer= and the <seen=, the Subject and the object,
the <G4o= and the <nonG4o=, are mutua''y o;;osed and must ne+er be identi*ied with
each other.
)* one associates the attributes o* the Subject with the object, or, +ice +ersa, those o*
the object with the Subject, one is a +ictim o* an i''usory su;erim;osition, the resu't o*
one=s own i4norance. Ret it is a matter o* common e>;erience that in dai'y ;ractica' 'i*e
;eo;'e do not distin4uish between the Subject and the object, but su;erim;ose the
attributes o* the one u;on the other.
Throu4h i4norance they con*use the Subject with the object. This con*usion is
obser+ab'e in e+ery action and thou4ht o* our dai'y 'i*e, and is e>;ressed in such
common statements as <This is )= or <This is mine=, whereby we identi*y the <),= which is
o* the nature o* Pure (onsciousness, with such materia' objects as the body, the mind,
the senses, house, or country. 9n account o* the same con*usion we associate the
Gterna' Se'* with such characteristics o* the body as birth, 4rowth, disease, and death@
and this con*usion is e>;ressed in such statements as <) am born=, <) am 4rowin4=, <) am
i''=, or <) am dyin4=. Ciscrimination between the <Seer= and the <seen= is the road 'eadin4
to the rea'i?ation o* Truth. The <Seer= is the unchan4eab'e and homo4eneous
(onsciousness, or the knowin4 ;rinci;'e. )t is the ;ercei+er, the Subject, the rea' <G4o=.
The <seen= is what is ;ercei+ed@ it is outside the <Seer= and there*ore identica' with the
object. )t is matter, nonSe'*, and <nonG4o=. The <seen= is mu'ti;'e and chan4eab'e.A
Swami 2ikhi'ananda< Self-nowled*e< =>?= D *-D ya-Vive!a V
gh
#or simi'ar materia' and more in*ormation
+isit our website:
www.+edanta.4r
&N
Richard Brooks The meaning of 'real' in Advaita Vedanta
REALITY AND APPEARANCE
Advaita Vedanta is at once the most widely held philosophic position in
India today, the most startling in its claims about the nature of the world and
our perception of it, and the most difficult for Westerners to comprehend-
let alone accept. Volumes of literature have been written both in defense and
in exposition of it, but perhaps the most famous statement of its doctrine is in
the following sloka (stanza) from the Balabodhini, a work usually attributed
to that most famous of all Advaitins, Sri SaiJ.karacarya (A.D. 788-820) :
slokardhena 'yad ukta1n granthakofibhiiJ
brahma satyam jagan mithya jivo brahmaiva naparaiJ.
With half a sloka I will declare what has been said in thousands of volumes:
Brahman is real, the world is false, the soul is only Brahman, nothing else.
That is to say, there is only one thing which can, properly speaking, be called
"real" (sat), and that is Brahman. All else which we might call "real,"
including the human soul, is identical with that one reality. Anything which
cannot be so identified with that one reality is "false" ( mithya), or in other
words is only apparently real-is only an appearance, an illusion (maya).
This is a remarkable claim, indeed ! It implies that the whole of the world
of our ordinary experience is an illusion. It implies that you are not really
reading this article, that I did not really write it, that the room you are in does
not really exist, that you cannot really look out your window and see real
buildings, sky, and clouds, etc. It implies that all these things are only
apparently so. This is what Advaita means when it claims that the world is
"false."
And when Advaita states that the world is "false," in the sense of illusory,
that must mean not only the external physical world, but the internal psychical
world as well, since both are experienced as pluralistic and Advaita maintains
that reality is unitary. As Ras Vihari Das puts it in his article, "The Falsity
of the World":
The world does not mean merely the external visible world with its sensible
qualities. It means this and more than this .... In fact whatever can be pre-
sented to us either externally or internally, to the mind or the senses forms
part of the world which as a whole as well as every item in it is said to be
false. Falsity is thus asserted of everything that we can sense or feel, think of
or imagine as an object.
1
But clearly, the world cannot be totally unreal in the sense of being fictitious
or nonexistent. We do, after all, perceive it. Falsity, then, although it excludes
Richard Brooks is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Oakland University, Rochester,
Michigan.
1 Ras Vihari Das, "The Falsity of the World," Philosophical Quarterly [Amalner] XIX,
no. 2 (July 1943), 80.
386 Brooks
reality (sat), does not entail unreality (asat). This is what is meant by calling
the world an illusion. Although an illusion has a peculiar ontological status,
it is not that of nonbeing or nonexistence. The very word 'mithyii/ seems to
me to bring this out.
The word 'mithyii! is a contraction of 'mithuya! derived from the root
'ymith', which means either (1) "unite" or "couple," (2) "meet" or "engage"
(in altercation), or (3) "alternate." The word 'mithya' comes from the third
sense and is used adverbially (often with respect to a person's behavior)
as meaning "invertedly," "contrarily," "improperly,'' or "incorrectly." This
sense is extended to a nominal form meaning "false." Actually, it would seem
more literal to extend it to "mistaken," that is, "taken or perceived incor-
rectly," even though that translation might not always read well in English,
such as in the sloka quoted above. Such a translation would bring out more
clearly Advaita's claim that the judgments we normally make about the world,
on the basis of our sense perception of it, are mistaken. Certainly, if reality is
unitary, then the plurality of the world cannot be real; we must be mis-per-
ceiving the world and then mis-judging it on the basis of our ignorance of the
truth of the matter.
But why, one might ask, does Advaita take this very unusual attitude
toward the world? Why does Advaita refuse to accept anything except
Brahman to be worthy of the title "real"? Time and again in Advaita liter-
ature, one is confronted with arguments like : "This cannot be real because it is
changing," or "That cannot be real because it is dependent upon something
else for its existence." On the other hand, words like 'eternal', 'immutable',
'unlimited', 'unchanging', and 'permanent' are constantly used in conjunction
with the word 'real' (sat). Why do Advaitins refuse to acknowledge a thing
to be real unless it 1s eternal, immutable, unlimited, and unchanging? There
are, I believe, a number of considerations involved in an answer to these
questions, but perhaps the most basic of them involves Advaita's definition of
the word 'real'. A discussion of this may help throw light on some of the
basic tenets of d v ~ i t a and make those tenets a bit more intelligible-even if
no more credible.
Before turning to Advaita's definition of the word 'real', however, it
would be well to review first what we ordinarily mean in the West by that
term. We find that the word is not used in one single sense, but rather has
a number of different meanings. The following seem to me to be the most
important of these :
1. One common use of the word 'real' is "genuine"-as opposed to
"fraudulent" or "fake." This is what we mean when we speak of "real
diamonds" (as opposed to "paste" diamonds) or "a real Rembrandt" (as
opposed to a forgery) .
387
2. Another common use is "natural"-as opposed to "artificial." We find
this use in phrases like "a real pond" (as opposed to a man-made pond) or
"a real ruby" (as opposed to a synthetic ruby).
3. Then again, 'real' may mean "nonimaginary" or "nonillusory," e.g.,
real water (as opposed to that seen in a mirage) or a real dagger (as opposed
to the one Macbeth thinks he sees before him). This begins to sound more like
what Advaita seems to be saying.
4. The word 'real' is also used to mean "lasting" or "permanent," which,
again, is very close to the way Advaitins want to use the term. But this would
appear to be an axiological rather than an ontological use of the term in
English, whereas Advaita must clearly be using the term ontologically. That
is to say, this use of the word 'real' seems to imply the application of a system
of values to a situation, beyond the bare description of the facts. Thus, we
speak of "real satisfaction" (as opposed to a temporary satiation of desires)
or "real peace" (as opposed to a temporary cessation of hostilities). For, if
war is fighting and the fighting has stopped, is that not peace? It . certainly
would seem so, considering the situation ontologically; that is, considering the
bare state of affairs itself. And since the cessation of fighting is an actual state
of affairs, is not the peace real peace? The fact that we often do not consider
it so indicates that more than mere description of the situation is involved
in this use of the term 'real'; a system of values, that is, axiology, is involved
as well.
5. Finally, in a more general sense, 'real' means to most English-speaking
people simply "existent," just as does the word 'sat' in Sanskrit.
2
This, of
course, does not say very much, but it does rule out purely fictitious entities.
One common criterion for "existent" is "experienceable," a criterion I believe
Advaita wants to use for reality, though this criterion has some unfortunate
implications. More of this later.
Philosophically, the most interesting is the third use of the word 'real'
as "nonillusory" or "nonimaginary." A brief comment on this will serve to
lead into a discussion of Advaita' s use of the term.
How do we determine a thing to be illusory or imaginary? One way we
have of determining this in ordinary life is to look at the thing in question
again, or to scrutinize it more carefully. For instance, to take the most com-
mon example from Advaita, when we look at a rope coiled in a dimly lighted
room and misperceive it as a snake, we may take a closer look at our "snake";
upon doing so, the imagined "snake" disappears and we see the rope for what
it is-and for what it had been all along. As Advaita puts it, we sublate the
2 For a detailed discussion of the fact that 'sat' means both "real" and "existent," see
P. T. Raju, "The Conception of Sat (Existence) in Sankara's Advaita," Annals of the
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute XXXVI (1955), 33-45.
388 BrookJ
erroneous "snake" percept with a veridical rope percept. Sublation, then, is
one way of determining that a previously perceived thing was unreal in the
sense of "illusory" or "imaginary."
Another way we have of determining that a thing is not real in this sense
is by subjecting it to a wider range of scrutiny; for instance, trying to touch
it as well as see it, or looking at it under different circumstances, or submitting
it to some kind of test. In effect, this. is what Macbeth does when he sees the
dagger in front of him. He says:
Is this a dagger which I see before me,
The handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch thee.
I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.
Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible
To feeling as to sight? or art thou but
A dagger of the mind, a false creation,
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?
. . . I see thee still,
And on thy blade and dudgeon gouts of blood,
Which was not so before. There's no such thing:
It is the bloody business which informs
Thus to mine eyes.
This is also what we do when we see a stick apparently "bent" where it enters
the water; we pull the stick out of the water, see that it is straight, and
decide that its bent appearance in the water must be an illusion. In all such
cases, we examine the object in question under a wide range of circumstances
and determine that our initial perception of it must have been mistaken
because that perception is not consistent with the rest of our experience. Ex-
amining its consistency with a wider range of experience, then, is another
way we have of determining that a thing is unreal in the sense of "illusory"
or "imaginary."
We are now in a better position to appreciate Advaita's use of the word
'real' (sat), since both sublation and consistency are important considerations
in its use. In fact, Advaitins, I maintain, use the word 'real' in a combination
of the third, fourth, and fifth senses suggested above. That is to say, in order
for Advaitins to apply the word 'real' to something, that thing must be ( 1)
experienceable, (2) nonillusory or nonimaginary, and (3) stable, lasting, or
permanent. Three rather unusual consequences follow from this.
First, the third criterion, as was mentioned previously, seems to confuse
axiology and ontology. At best, it uses the word 'real' in a very special
philosophical .sense. Advaita has, I must hastily add, a reason for this use of
the word. It comes from Advaita's basic claim that direct
realization or knowledge of Brahman-is the experience which sublates all
other experiences but is itself unsublatable. I do not intend to question that
claim here, but it may be pointed out that if sublation is a criterion for
389
illusoriness, then reality must be unsublatable. And if Brahmajnana is indeed
the experience which sublates all others but which is itself unsublatable,
reality must be stable, lasting, permanent, eternal, and unchanging.
Second, the first criterion rules out, by definition, the existence of theoretical
entities (such as electrons, protons, and neutrinos) in modern physics, since
they cannot be directly perceived. Of course, Advaita could hardly have con-
sidered this a serious flaw in its system at the time of its formulation! This
is a problem for modern Advaitins to solve; I need not consider it further here.
Third, although Advaita will want to say that 'real' in the strict sense of
the term can only be applied to something which meets all three of the above
criteria, Advaita will also be able to use the word 'real' in a less strict sense
and to allow for degrees of reality insofar as some things are experienced
but are illusory and other things are nonillusory but are impermanent. A
statement of the form "this is more real than that" will be perfectly intelligible
in Advaita, however odd it may sound to many contemporary philosophers.
Advaita does, in fact, want to say something of that sort, so I believe that the
above three criteria for the use of the word 'real' bring out some of the funda-
mental aspects of Advaita philosophy in a uniquely clear way.
DEFINITIONS OF 'REAL' AND 'UNREAL' IN ADVAITA PHILOSOPHY
Let me now turn to the literature of Indian philosophy to support my con-
tention that Advaita's definition of 'real' is "that which is ( 1) experienceable,
(2) nonillusory or nonimaginary, and (3) stable, lasting, or permanent."
The closest Sati.kara comes to an actual definition of 'real' (sat) is in his
commentary on the Bhagavad Gita where he defines veridical perception in
terms of changelessness: "That awareness ( buddhi) which does not vary with
its object is 'real' (sat), that which does vary with its object is 'unreal'
(asat)."
3
It is tempting on the basis of this passage to say that the term 'real',
by extension, means "unchanging" as far as Sankara is concerned. But his
point here is that the reality-element in the perception does not change,
whereas the content-element does. That is to say, to use his example, in the
succession of judgments "real pot," "real cloth," real elephant," the object
(pot, cloth, elephant) constantly changes, whereas reality does not.4 But this
is merely "word-magic." One could as well use the expressions "blue dress,"
"blue water," and "blue sky" to prove that only blue is invariant, therefore
real, whereas dresses, water, and the sky are not. Even should Sankara avoid
this by claiming, as I suspect he is trying to, that all judgments implicitly refer
a Sankara, 2. 16. Cf. his Brahmasutrabhliiya 2. 1. 11, where he states
that correct knowledge (samyagjiitina) has a single form (ekarupa), because it is
dependent upon the object rather than upon the volition of the perceiver.
4 Bhagavadgittibhli.fya 2. 16.
390 Brooks
to reality,
5
this amounts to hypostatization of the word 'exists' (asti)-to
which the word 'real' (sat) is related (since they come from the same root,
y as). It amounts to saying that all things "have Being." But that is like
saying that all things "are Are" ! It is, of course, true that in Advaita all
judgments do implicitly refer to reality, but that is because all judgments
amount to superimpositions of name and form ( namarupa) upon Brahman, the
substratum of the world-illusion. If this is what Sru':tkara is trying to say,
he is putting it rather poorly.
In the post-Sailkara literature of Advaita, the word 'real' is usually defined
as "unsublatable throughout the three times (i.e., past, present, and future)"
( trikalabiidhyatva) .
6
Since it is illusory or imaginary objects that are said to be
sublated, this definition combines the second and third criteria I have listed
above. In the sense that it sums up the most important of the three criteria,
it might be said to be Advaita's "final" definition of 'real'. Furthermore, subla-
tion brings out the fact that there is, between the substratum of an illusion and
the illusion itself, a dependence relation. Professor Karl H. Potter has
observed that the word 'real' is generally accepted by most Indian philosophers
to refer to "the stable end of a dependence relation. "
7
This is straightforward
enough in the context of illusion. The rope coiled up there in the corner of
the garage is real relative to the snake which we mistakenly perceive it to be ;
as such, the rope is perceptually stable while the illusory snake is both per-
ceptually unstable, since upon further examination the snake vanishes, and
also dependent upon the rope for its very existence, since without a non-
snake substratum the snake would not be illusory. In other philosophic
systems, the notion of a dependence relation must mean something else, but
that is not Advaita's concern.
Another common definition of 'real' in Indian philosophy is "possessing
practical efficacy" (arthakriyatva).
8
This definition, interestingly, embodies
the first two criteria I have suggested. For a thing to be pragmatically useful,
it must satisfy the demands of practical life. To switch to another common
Advaita analogy, which is of the same basic logical structure as the previous
one, we realize that the post off there in the field is not a man when we shout to
it and it fails to respond. Or, as Professor Potter puts it, using still another
5 Raju (op. cit., p. 35) makes the same claim, quoting in support of it the phrase "sadamse
saruam abhrantam prakare tu i.e., "all [things] are nonillusory in [their]
aspect of existence, but with regard to [their] form are mistaken." Raju gives no refer-
ence for this phrase.
6 Cf. Karl H. Potter, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 221. (Hereafter cited as Presuppositions.)
7 Karl H. Potter, "Reality and Dependence in the Indian Darshanas," in Essays in
Philosophy, ed. C. T. K. Chari (Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1962), p. 155. See also his
Presuppositions, pp. 140-141, 162, and 226.
s Cf. Potter, Presuppositions, p. 141 ; and Sankara, Brahmasatrabhiiiya 2. 2. 26 and 3. 2. 3.
391
common and structu.rally similar analogy, we realize that the shell we picked
up on the beach is not a piece of silver when we "carry it to the market and
try to get a metallurgist to assay its worth."
9
But a nonillusory man does
respond to our shout, and nonillusory silver has purchasing power in the mar-
ketplace. Even if the Advaitin wants to claim that, in the final analysis, the
man and the silver (as well as the post and the shell) are illusory along with
the rest of the world, nevertheless he can accord a degree of reality to them
on the basis of their possessing practical efficacy, that is to say, possessing two
of the three criteria of reality.
Another obvious meaning of 'real' in Indian philosophy must be "being the
subject of a valid means of knowledge" (pramli1;ta), otherwise there would be
little sense in the elaborate defense of these pramli1Jas.
10
This is not the place
to go into a detailed discussion of what Advaita accepts as a valid means of
knowledge, but it may be observed that one such means-indeed, the first and
most fundamental one-is perception (pratyak{a). Insofar as the first cri-
terion of 'real' which I have suggested is experienceability, we might say
that this very minimal criterion is reflected in the definition of real as "being
the subject of a valid means of knowledge," although that definition will have
a wider application also. In this sense, even the illusory "rope-snake," "shell-
silver," etc., will have some degree of reality.
To sum up Advaita's use of the word 'real': in the very minimal sense of the
word, as Ras Vihari Das puts it, "Nothing experienced is absolutely unreal,
hence there must be levels of reality culminating in Brahman as the substratum
of all experienced objects."
11
In fact, Advaita "is so realistic that it grants some
reality even to illusory objects."
12
But, on the other hand, more strictly
speaking, only Brahman is real, since Brahmajiiana sublates all other ex-
periences.
Thus, in the strict sense, we may say that reality is ( 1) independent, in-
sofar as Brahman is the stable end of the only significant dependence relation ;
reality is (2) unlimited by anything else, insofar as it is independent of
anything else, therefore related to nothing that could limit it ; reality is ( 3)
nonpartite and ( 4) unchanging, insofar as it is unlimited and unrelated;
reality is (5) indivisible, insofar as it is nonpartite, and (6) nonacting, in-
sofar as it is unchanging; reality is (7) unitary, insofar as it is indivisible;
and reality is (8) eternal, insofar as it is nonpartite and unchanging. All of
these eight characteristics are predicated by Advaitins of Brahman at one
9 Presuppositions, p. 223.
10 Cf. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, 5 vols. (Cambridge:
At the University Press, 1957), I, 444.
11 Ras Vihari Das, "The Theory of Ignorance in Advaitism," in R. Das, G. R. Malkani,
and T. R V. Murti, Ajiiana (London: Luzac & Co., 1933), p. 82.
12 Ibid., p. 86.
392 Brooks
time or another, and all of them can be traced back to Brahman's being the
substratum of the alleged world illusion. This allegation, in turn, is based
upon Brahman's unsublatability. And that is based upon accepting Brahma-
jnana as the experience which sublates all other experiences. It is that claim,
then, which underlies Advaita's definition of the word 'real' (sat).
But, if this is Advaita' s meaning of the word 'real' (sat), what can Advaitins
mean by 'unreal' ( asat) ? sankara seems to use the word 'unreal' in three
different ways, corresponding to the contradictories of each of the three cri-
teria given for the word 'real'. He frequently applies the word 'unreal' to
everything other than Brahman. On other occasions, he will include the
commonly perceived world within the denotation of the word 'real,' reserving
the word 'unreal' for dreams, hallucinations, "rope-snakes," and the like. And
then again, he will sometimes use the word 'unreal' synonymously with 'non-
experienceable', giving as illustrations the examples so common in all Indian
philosophy: "hare's horn," "sky-flower," or "barren woman's son." Frequently,
in this latter context, he will use the phrase "completely unreal" (atyantiisat)
to refer to such imaginary entities. Therefore, although Satikara is by no
means consistent in his usage of these terms, what he says implies a fourfold
distinction between the completely real, the practically real, the illusory, and
the completely unreal. More often, however, he seems to make merely a
threefold distinction between the real, the unreal, and the completely unreal.
13
Later Advaitins, who tried to point up the peculiar ontological status of
the world more sharply, restricted the meaning of 'unreal' to imaginary objects.
Their usual term for the apparent world was 'false' (mithya). Occasionally
Satikara uses this term also.
14
Their position on the distinction between 'real'
and 'unreal' is summed up by Madhustidana Sarasvati (sixteenth century)
in his Advaitasiddhi, he states that "unreality is not the contradictory of
reality, whose nature is unsublatability in the three times, but rather is what
never forms the object of cognition as reality in any substratum whatever."
1
li
Or to phrase it in a slightly different way, 'unreal' means "having no per-
ceived instance at all." In this case, the real (sat) is what is unsublatable in
the three times, the unreal (asat) is what is completely uninstanced, and the
category termed 'false' (mithya) is everything left over, i.e., what is neither
real nor unreal (including both the "practically real" and the illusory).
18 Although this observation about Sankara is based upon my own reading of his works
over several years, I find that A. B. Shastri has made much the same observation in his
Studies in Post-Samkara Dialectics (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1936), p. 241.
14 Even if the B alabodhinl is not a genuine work of Sankara, there are other references
one could cite, e.g., Atmabodha 63.
111 Madhusildana Sarasvati, Advaitasiddhi, ed. with three commentaries and critical sum-
mary by MM. Anantakrishna Sastri (2d ed. rev.; Bombay: Nirnayasagar Press, 1937),
pp. 50-51: " .. trikaladhyatvarapasattva11yatireko nifsattvam, kimtu kvacid apy up4dhau
sattvena pratiyamanatvanadhikarat;Jatvam."
393
LEVELS OF REALITY
The one difficulty with Madhusiidana's analysis of the world is that it fails
to identify the clear division between pragmatically useful objects and illusory
objects, that is, the division between the substratum and the appearance in
ordinary perceptual illusions-the division between the rope and the "snake,"
the shell and the "silver," the post and the "man." To have only three terms
for this fourfold distinction is confusing. A more precise categorization of the
world into four levels of reality is needed. This is, in fact, to be found in a
common fourfold distinction that follows very neatly the division which I
suggested above in my discussion of the three criteria for the definition of
'real' and the final criterion that I suggested for the definition of 'unreal'.
These levels of reality are termed "ultimately real" (paramarthika), "prag-
matically real" ( vyavahiirika), "merely illusory" (pratibhiisika), and "utterly
unreal" ( tucchika) .
16
Actually, this distinction has a fairly long history in Indian philosophy. As
early as the Mu1Jaka probably is later than the Brhad-
ara't)yaka and Chiindogya U panifads (ca. 900 B.c.), but earlier than, for
example, the Pra$na and Maitri (ca. 500 B.c.)-a distinction was made
between two levels of knowledge, a higher (paravidya) and a lower (apara-
vidya).11 By Sailkara's time, the distinction had become known as that between
the "ultimate" or "final point of view" (paramiirthadarsina) and the "worldly"
or "pragmatic point of view" (lokavyavahiirika) .
18
Prior to Sailkara, the two
Schools of Northern (Mahayana) Buddhism, Madhyamika and Vijfianavada,
had reflected this U doctrine in a twofold distinction between the
"ultimate truth" (paramarthasatya) and "practical truth" ( samvrtisatya)'
suggesting that the latter was, at best, qualified truth and was based upon
ignorance.
19
They then made a further distinction between "practical truth of
the world" ( lokasamvrtisatya) and "practical illusions" ( mithyasamvrta),
the latter being "practical" only in contradistinction to calling the entire
world an illusion. As for things like "hare's horn" or "sky-lotus," they called
16 C. Potter, Presuppositions, pp. 166, 223; Dasgupta, History, II, 2; and Shastri,
Studies in Post-Samkara Dialectics, p. 18.
17 Mu1J-4aka Upaniiad 1. 4-5.
18 Sankara, Mu,.rf,akopani$adbho.$ya 1. 4. The word 'paramarthadariina' is the one Sankara
uses here, though he frequently uses merely 'paramtJrtha' or 'PtJramiirthika'; and he
glosses 'aparavidytJ' by the word 'dharmiidharmastJdhanatatphalavi$aytJ,' i.e., "that which
is the object of merit, demerit, holiness, and its result," one of several common ex-
pressions he has for what he often refers to as "practical worldly activity" (lokavytJvahtJ-
rika). See Works of Shankaracharya, II, part 1, ed. Hari Raghunath Bhagavat (2d ed.;
Poona: Ashtekar & Co., 1927), 500, lines 20-22.
19 Interestingly, this is very similar to what Sankara says in his commentary on the
Mu,.f/,aka Upaniiad passage mentioned above. He states: "The lower knowledge is
merely ignorance, that which is to be refuted" (apartJ hi vidytJ avidytl stJ nirtJkartavyll);
Works of Shankaracharya, II, part 1, 500, lines 23-24.
U>
\0
ol>.
tx:l
Levels of reality in Indian thought

0
llr-
.....
My
Mundaka Post-Sankara Mahayana Later Advaita's Criteria of
upanifad Saitkara Advaitins Buddhists Advaitins Definitions Application Examples
higher real real ultimate truth ultimate unsublatable permanent, Brahman
knowledge (sat) (sat) (paramarthasatya) reality throughout stable (3) (iitman)
(paravidyii) (paramarthika) the three
times
unreal false practical worldly pragmatic possessing non- ropes, snakes,
(asat) (mithya) truth reality practical illusory shells, silver
( lokasamvrtisatya) ( vyavahiirika) efficacy non-
imaginary
(2)
lower practical illusion mere illusion being the experience- "rope-snake,"
knowledge ( mithyasamvrta) (pratibhiisika) subject of able (1) "shell-silver,"
( aparavidyii) perception mirage, dream
completely unreal mere stupidity utter unreality never being totally "hare's horn,"
unreal (asat) ( avidyamana) (tucchika) the object of un- "barren
( atyantiisat) cognition instanced woman's
in any son"
substratum
whatever
395
them "mere stupidity" ( avidyamana).
20
Here you have, then, a fourfold
distinction between "ultimate reality," "worldly reality," "worldly illusion,"
and "mere stupidity," closely paralleling the later Advaita distinction, though
differing from it somewhat in terminology. Gauc;lapada (fifth century), in
his exegesis of the Advaita doctrine, adopts both this fourfold distinction
21
and
some of the Buddhist terminology. Sailkara often follows Gauc;lapada's lead-
although altering the terminology-but just as often he uses the terms 'real'
and 'unreal', as we have seen, rather imprecisely, leading to a threefold rather
than a fourfold distinction.
We may now catalogue these distinctions in the manner shown in the
accompanying chart (p. 394).
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE DISTINCTIONS FOR ADVAITA
Occasionally, there has been a movement among a few Advaitins either to
minimize these distinctions or even to dispense with them altogether, on the
grounds that they are more pragmatic than essential to Advaita. Such seems,
at times, to have been Gauc;lapada's attitude
22
and such very certainly was the
attitude of the sixteenth-century Advaitin Prakasananda.
23
More recently,
Indian philosophers like H. M. Bhattacharyya and S. K. Das have attempted
to blur the distinctions between these levels of reality. H. M. Bhattacharyya,
for instance, says:
lf we take the distinction between the vyavahiirika and the paramarthika strata
in a little wider sense we may very well maintain that the distinction is only
a general hint as to the Relativity of Apprehension. What is real or existent
... from the stand-point of a particular inquirer with a special interest and
a particular type of intellectual capacity, proves unreal or non-existent from
a higher point of view, where the interest is wider and the powers of apprehen-
sion keener and more penetrative. And the same stand-point which seems
paramiirthika or higher is itself found to be lower or vyavahiirika only by an
inquirer of higher intellectual powers. Thus the distinction between the two
strata is entirely relative and also truth is relative to the inquirer . ... 24
20 One interesting feature of Indian philosophy is that it makes no distinction between a
mere null class (cf. tuccha, empty) and a self-contradiction. Phrases like "hare's horn"
and "barren woman's son" are used interchangeably as examples of entities that have
no experienced instances. Undoubtedly this is due to the practical thrust of Indian
philosophy; it never remained mere speculation for speculation's sake, as has often
happened in Western philosophy. The speculative aspect of an Indian philosophic system
was aimed at convincing the inquirer that that particular system could lead to mokia;
cf. Potter, Presuppositions, pp. 45-52. Under such circumstances, there was little use
in logical refinements, such as the analytic-synthetic distinction.
21 Gau<;lapada, MatJ4ukyakiJrikiJ 1.18, 3. 28, and 4. 87-88.
22 Cf. Gau<;lapada, MIJf)gukyakiiriklJ 2. 1-10, 3. 10, 3. 30-31, 4. 26, 4. 32-52, and 4. 61-72.
23 Prakasananda, SiddhiJntamuktavali, ed. and trans. Arthur Venis, in The Pandit, Nos.
11-12 (1889-90; reprinted in Benares, 1898). See also Potter, Presuppositions, pp. 224-
225; and Shastri, Studies in Post-Samkara Dialectics, p. 11.
24 H. M. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy (1st ser.), Punjab Oriental Series, no. 22
(Lahore: Motilal Banarsidass, 1933), p. 6 ; italics are his.
396 Brooks
S. K. Das puts it as follows:
It is better, therefore, to speak of the degrees of adequacy with which Reality
is apprehended, and such apprehensions are endlessly various. . . . There are,
therefore, only degrees of completeness in our apprehension of objects, and
degrees of correctness in our beliefs about them. Indeed, the assumption of
the reality of Degreees, whether honorary or otherwise, looks more like an
academic prejudice than a matter of universal recognition.
25
Both of these philosophers, however, make the completely arbitrary and
dogmatic assumption that this "relativity of apprehension" holds for everyone
else except the Advaitin, who, of course, is in possession of the final truth.
H. M. Bhattacharyya states:
The wider one's outlook-the more analytic one's apprehension-the less and
less real do the objects with their individualities and differences begin to
appear-they seem to dismantle themselves of their cloaks of false realities
one after another as one's capacity of apprehension gains in depth and min-
uteness of analysis, until finally, the absolutely paramlirthika or real stage is
reached where there is no further vyavahlirika stratum possibly thinkable,
and in which the absolute reality of Brahman in its indeterminable homoge-
neous eternity is realised.
26
Now, you cannot have it both ways. Either you hold a view of relativism,
abandoning any supposed "absolute reality," or else you maintain an "absolute
reality," as Advaita clearly does, and abandon the completely relativistic
position. But together the views are incompatible.
Furthermore, these philosophers overlook a very important point. As
Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya observes: "Were it not for the experience of
pratibhlisika or illusory being, the possible unreality of the vyavahlirika or
empirically real world-the elimination of its given-ness-would be utterly
unintelligible."
27
That is to say, without clear-cut distinctions between the
paramarthika and vyavaharika realms on the one hand and the vyavahlirika
and pratibhasika realms on the other, the relation of superimposition
( adhyasa), which is supposed to account for the illusoriness of the world,
would be unintelligible. Furthermore, the alleged illusoriness of the world
would be inexplicable. It is my contention, which I cannot develop here, that
Advaita attempts an explanation of the illusoriness of the world by means
of analogy. Examples such as those of the "snake" being superimposed on the
rope and of water being superimposed on the desert (in a mirage) function,
I maintain, as models to explain how the allegedly illusory world is super-
imposed on Brahman. To deny the doctrine of levels of reality is to eliminate
25 S. K. Das, Towards a Systematic Study of the Vedanta (Calcutta : by the author,
1931), p. 117.
26 H. M. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, p. 7.
27 K. C. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, 2 vols. (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers,
1956), I, 96.
397
the possibility of explaining the illusoriness of the world, since the analogy
must have one of its elements (the substratum) in a relatively more real
realm than its other element (the superimposed entity) in order to be analo-
gous to the relation between the completely real Brahman and the illusory
world superimposed upon Brahman.
It might be possible to hold something like a "relativity of apprehension"
doctrine within the pragmatically real realm (insofar as a sadhu has more
insight into the nature of reality than a sophomore), but the lines delimiting
the four main levels of reality must be absolutely sharp or else Advaita's hopes
of explaining the alleged illusoriness of the world are lost. It is for this reason
that Gauc;l.apada uses the word 'sakrdvibhata' (sudden illumination) to charac-
terize Brahmajnana.
28
It is for this reason, too, that Sailkara finds no con-
tinuity between the higher and lower truths.
29
Professor Potter has character-
ized such a view as "leap philosophy,"
30
identifying Suresvara (ninth century)
and Prakasananda (sixteenth century) as the only Advaitins explicitly holding
such a view.
81
In point of fact, I believe, all Advaitins must subscribe to a
discontinuity between the vyavaharika and paramlirthika realms, so in that
sense all Advaitins are "leap philosophers."
32
But, on the other hand, all
Advaitins-Suresvara and Prakasananda included-agree that there is a path
to m o k ~ a that is, that there are certain more or less well-defined steps which
the aspirant must take, each of which leads him nearer the goal.
38
There is
nothing really inconsistent between these two positions ; in the final analysis,
all Indian philosophers are going to have to say that one only attains m o k ~ a
when one attains m o k ~ a and until then one is still bound to the cycle of
births and deaths ( samsara). One may even have to incarnate a number of
times as a holy man (sadhu) before attaining the final insight, Brahmajnana,
which confers release from the bondage of transmigration.
34
But, it must be
evident that Advaitins will say that one has to be a holy man before one can
even be eligible for insight. Thus, the Path is that which takes one out of the
ordinary affairs of the world and up to the point of illumination ; it can,
however, go no further-at that point illumination is sudden ( sakrdvibhiita)
as far as Advaita is concerned. This follows, indeed, from the fact that
28 Gau(lapada, MlJf)gukyaklirikl!. 3. 36 and 4. 81. Cf. Brhadi!.ranyaka Upanilad 2. 3. 6
(which uses the word 'sakrdvidyutta') and Sankara's commentary thereon.
29 Sankara, Muf)gakopaniladbhi!.lya 1. 4. Cf. Shastri, Studies in Post-Sathkara Dialectics,
p. 18; see also p. 11, where he makes the same observation about Vacaspati Misra.
80 Potter, Presuppositions, pp. 94, 99,,110-111, 140, and 236.
Bl Ibid., pp. 100, 174, 236, and 242-247.
32 Professor Potter also makes this observation, although he suggests that "some labor
harder to keep it as hidden as possible"; ibid., p. 181.
88 Even Gau(lapada admits that there are steps toward mokla; see his M l!.f)gukyakarikli
4. 81.
84 See Sailkara, BhagavadgUl!.bh/!.lya 6. 42-45.
398 Brooks
Brahman is unitary, indivisible. One cannot know pieces of Brahman; either
one has the final knowledge or one does not. Nor does this conflict with the
view that the sadhu is "nearer the goal" than, say, I am; this progress can
easily be defined in terms of ridding oneself of egoism, pride-ahamkara.
CONCLUSION
I have tried, in this paper, to show how some of the fundamental ideas of
Advaita metaphysics are related to Advaita's definition of the word 'real.' I
have also attempted to show why Advaitins feel constrained to define it in the
way they do. Reality, in Advaita, will be that which is ( 1) experienceable,
(2) nonillusory or nonimaginary, and (3) stable, lasting, or permanent. The
three criteria for reality will, correspondingly, be (1) "being the subject of a
valid means of knowledge" (prama1Ja), (2) "possessing practical efficacy"
( arthakriyatva), and ( 3) "being unsublatable throughout the three times"
( trikaliibhiidhyatva). In a loose sense of the term 'real', this will lead to the
doctrine of levels or degrees of reality, which I have argued is an indispensable
doctrine of Advaita metaphysics. In the strict sense of the term 'real', how-
ever, there is only one thing which fulfills all these three criteria, and that is
Brahman; this is why Advaitins say that reality is nondual ( a-dvaita). This
is why Advaitins claim that everything which is pluralistic must be an illusion
(maya). These startling claims rest directly upon Advaita's assertion that
the knowledge of Brahman (Brahmajfiana) is the experience which sublates
all other experiences but which is itself unsublatable-a very startling claim
itself!
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE STATUS OF THE WORLD
(.JAGAT) IN SAMKARITE ADVAITA VEDANTA
SANGllAMJTRi\ D ASGUPTA
The question about the status of the world (jagat) may be an age-old one
rn vcdiintie li terature; but it has become urgent and important, because of the
fact that there are almost opposing views regarding the world developed in the
writings of post-Sarilkara vedanta. The situation seems to be more complicated,
because each of the theorists further claimed to deri ve his legacy from Sarilraka's
own writings. Sarilkara' s writings on the other hand due to its richly suggestive
character seem to 'accommodate di verse interpretations with an apparent ease'.
Consequent upon thi s in the later writings of advaitic literature itself two
dominant theories have been evolved. They are popularly known as Vivartavada
and respectively. The first theory holds that the would is a mere
appearance of Brahman, the only reality and its exact nature cannot be
categori sed as either sat (Being) or as,?t (Non-being). It can not even be said as
' sadasat (combinati on both ' being and non-being'), because this would involve
explicit 'self-contradiction'. fts exact nature. strictly speaking, is 'anirvacaniya
(indeterminable). Accordi ng to the second theory, the world is as good aS a case
of ' total fi cti on' li ke a ' hare 's horn' . For it, ' its percept is perception and
anything external to perception does not exist ' . Under the spell of such contrary
claims among the later advaitins themselves, it is not easy to say which of the
views is more faithful development of the phi losophical position of Sarhkara.
But any effort in order to determine such an issue would exclusively require a
presentati on and a preliminary examination of the divergent claims. By way of
critical exposition of both the theories summaril y, here I shall try to argue that
we can not claim to have explained these contrary interpretations about the status
of the world (jagat) unless we have recognised each view as an outcome of a
particular time milieu. And my effort here is to argue that a careful consideration
Indian Philosophi cal Quarterly. Vol. XXIV No. 3
July 1997
160
Si\NGHAMlTRA DASGUPT A
of the historical and cultural situations of Smi1kara's own time would be a more
favourable condition in defence of the interpretation of the world by the
Yi vartavadi ns. A close look at the socio-cultural background of the philosophical
enterprise of the then India in which Sarhkara flouri shed would at on<.;e show
that Sarilkara was very eager to put an end to Buddhism which by then, had
lost its vitality and tried to formulate a philosophy with solid rational foundation
from the direct interpretation of the texts. He even went a step further
to declare his own philosophy as ' the philosophy'
darsanaril) ' If the world were assigned a fictitious status by Satnkara, then he
would not have built a comprehensi ve system which did not only speak of the
realization of the transcendental reality but also emphasised the religious, ethical
and social life of human beings at large. For him, there are levels of being or
reality (salta). His commentaries on vedantic texts constitute a strong rational
foundation of Advaita philo<;ophy which can claim to quench, the thirst of the
people who do not even believe in any revealed texts or mystic experience but
try to understand the nature of the world in the light of 'common experience
and reasoning'2. From this consideration also, Sari1kara would not support the
fictitious nature of the world. But before entering into the critical exposition of
the theories about the world, let us propose to di scuss summarily different levels
of being (saW/) in tht: advaita philosophy of Sathkari te tradition, because without
a clear picture of the grades of being (sattJ). it would be difficult to understand
the propriety of placing the world in certain grades, be it insignificant (tuccha)
or pragmatic ( Vyavahiirika).
LeYels Of Being: A comprehensive survey of philosophical literature of
nondualistic (advaita) school of vedanta makes us aware of the fact that there
are four levels of being (.mftfi). The lowest of this gradation is called
' tucchasatta' . (insignificant being). The cases of 'hares horn', sky-flower etc:.
have been ci ted as examples of this category of ' insignificant'. They are
imaginary and are acknowl edged as having no real status (alika)'J. They are
fictitious, mere thought constructions. They have being only as 'objects in
thought or mind' but they have no epistemic significance or import, because
here our reasoning is not maki ng any asserti on or decision with regard lo their
objecti ve status. "Logically speaking, fal sity arises only when reason makes the
assertion, as in the case of the perception of a snake"4
The second level which is higher than insignificant (tucclw) ts called
The World (JAGA T) In SatilkaJite Advitilil Vcd[inta 361
'apparent being (prfitibhiisika satt;I). Tht: perceptual cognition of ' a snake in a
rope' or 'a piece of silve1 in a piece of nacre' is often cited as example of thi s
category of being. In the fi rst glance w<:: huve th.e cognition "This is a snake"
and in subsequent cogniti on it is sublated. The next hi gher level is called
pragmatic or functional being (vyfivahfirika satt5)5. In case of pratibhasika sattii
(illusory bei ng) the subsequent cognition contradicts the previous perceptual
cognition within the world itself. But in case of ' vyiivaharika satta' (pragmatic
being) it is not contradicted either by subsequent perceptual cogniti on or action
but only by ' dialectical reason and realization of Brahman'. In the words of
Professor P. T. Raju. ''The innate and ultimate self-contradictions of the
pragmatic world are revealed to the light of reason by its own self-reflection.
That is why even if I am convinced di alectically of the rational incoherence of
the world, when I look in front of me, I see the same objects existing and not
contradicting my active )ife. whereas when once the perception of the illusory
snake is contradicted by the perception of the rope, I can no longer see the snake
with the same eyes, and my active li fe also contradicts the being of the illusory
snake"6 The reality of the world is called pragmatic or functional, because
although it serves practical purposes in the realm of action, it invol ves inherent
self-contradictions and for the eradication of this contradiction, it presupposes
the ultimate Being (pliramiirthika sattii). In other words, only on the reali zation
of the ultimate Being, the world's adhoc reality is contradicted Advaita Vedanta
literature contains three basic contegories - sat (being) asat (Non-being) and
mithyfit va (falsity). Being can never be suhlated or contradicted. In this sense
Brahman is the onl y sat, the highest being (Pfiramfir1hika sat) Again Non-being
or asat can not be presented in any locus; it is ' eternal negation' (alika) . The
fal se is that which can neither be categorised as Being nor Non-being. It can
not be called sat or being, for the reason that it is subsequently negated or
contradicted. It is also different from <tsar or non-being because on account of
the fact that 'it is presented in a locus'. Accordi ng to Advaitins, it is the false
alone whi ch can have presentation as well as subsequent negation. This is what
is expressed in the following :
" In one half verse I shall tell you what has been taught in thousands of
volumes : Brahman is true, the world is false, the soul is Brahman and nothing
else (slokardhena yaduktmi1 Brahma satyam
jaganmithya jivo brahmaiva
362 SANGHAMITRA DASGUPT A
Vivartaviida : With thi s short account of the levels of reality in Advaita
Vedanta, let us see how the post-Sarikara advaitins have propounded different
theories about the status of the world. Pandmapada (820 AD) traditionally
claimed as a direct disciple and a almost contemporary of Acharya Samkara
emphasises on the theory of vivarta (appearance), according to which the world
is a mere appearance of Brahman, the only reality. As Brahman is non-dual,
pure Being, It can not be the locus of any change or modification. Change or
modification in a realistic sense means the same as the change of gold into
ornaments or of milk into curd, is vikiira or pariniima. It is called 'satattvo
'nyatha prata'. 'Attattvato nyatha prata' on the other hand means the seeming
and not actual modification as it is the case with regard to the appearance of
water into waves, bubbles etc.; it is vivarta8. So the world can not be called a
transformation (pariniima) of Brahman. Tt can not, again be equated with the
state of dream, because it serves our purposes or needs and lasts until the
realization of Brahman takes place.9 The vivartavadins consider the world as
a fal se appearance of Brahman like the false perception of snake in place of
rope. The snake is appeared as real so long as the true perceptual cognition of
the rope does not take place. Similarly. the world is considered as real as long
as Brahman is not realized as the only reality. The Vivartaviidins contend that
the world is not unreal but indeterminable. It is indeterminable in the sense that
we cannot categorise it into our logical language which functions through the
' is' (sat) or ' is-not' (asat). This view has been developed in a sophisticated way
due to the contributions of the followers of Padmapiida, in the Vivaral)a school,
the chief exponent of which is Prakasatman ( 1200 AD). For among the traditional
advaintins who are more adherents to the vivara!)a school, the world can neither
be placed with Brahman, the ptiramtir-thika sat nor with tuccha (insignifact) or
pure fiction (i .e., hare's horn). ! 0 It is interesting to note here how Padmapiida
makes a distinction between two meanings of 'mithyll' (falsehood) which paves
the way for a distinctive status of the world from fiction. He says that we are
to make a distinction between absolutely negatable and indescribable. negation. Il
The first represents the class of negatables for all times whereas the second
stands for relatively negatable. The case of the world is neither absolutely
negatable nor absolutely affirmable. In other words, the world belongs to a
category or relatively negatable
and relatively affirmable (until
vivarta with their adjunctive
(negatable only when Brahman is realised)
Brahman is not realised). The theorists of
'indeterminability' try to emphasise a
The World (JAGA T) In Sarilkarite Advaita VedfinW 363
' nothing-yet-something' attitude to the world. For them Brahman is the non-self
transforming (vivarta) casual matter whereas maya is the self-transforming
(parinami) causal matter of the world. The term ' non- self-transforming' is used
to make it clear that the cause and the effect have different levels of reality, and
the term 'self-transforming' emphasises the same level of reality for both.12
The word ' relativity' has been used with regard to 'the affirmation and negation'
of the world in order to emphasise the fact that the worldly object is more real
than an illusory object and less real than the absolute Reality.
: But in the tradition Gf advaita vedanta itself, there are
thinkers who are not willing to assign the status even of pragmatic reality to the
world. Like the vijiHinavadi Buddhists, instead of calling the world as
indeterminable (anirvacya) they are interested to declare the world as a case of
total fiction like ' hare's hom' . They advocate the theory of The
derivative meaning of the word signifies the fact that 'creation is
nothing but appreher.sio1'. The chief exponent of this school is said to be
PrakMananda (1500 - : j()() AD) who authored ' Vedanta-siddhiinta-muktavali',
a post-Sarhkara advaita masterpiece mainly devoted to the exposition of

Explanation of some of the salient features of it may also be

gained from 'Advaitasiddht of Madhusudana Sarasvati.14 According to this
theory, subjective perception creates the so-called objects and there is no
objective phenomenon apart from the subjective perception. In order words, the
perceived object is nothing over and above the perception itself. This view
vehemently criticises the s theory of existential gradation or level s of
being. It holds that the distinction between the prlitibhasika and the vyavahlirika
is not justified, because when the knowledge of Brahman dawns, the knowledge
of the world stands cancelled. Since in thi s state the world becomes absolutely
zero apart from. Brahman, all distinctions are ultimately valueless, the so-called
pragmatic reality of the world thus becomes nothing but fictitionality
(alikatvameva vyavaharitvarh). The world for this theory, is not even an
indeterminable illusion but a total fi cti on just like 'a chimera' or a hare's horn.
According to the false perception of jiva (individualized soul ) is the
case of the creation of false objects in the world. ' Brahman appears as jiva' is
false as a matter of fact, only reality is Brahman as such (BrahmanaQ jivabhavaQ
mithya, bramhai va satyarh).15. It is called vada, because it advocates
that perception of jiva is responsible for the creation of jagat or the world
364
SANGHAMITRA DASGUPT A
(Jivasya karar:Jam iti ayam matevadah iti
ucyate) 16 The theorists of tried to justify their position from Sarhkara' s
own observations and compositions too. ln this context a minor work entitled
' da.Sa.loki' is often referred where Sarhkara said 'jagat tuccham etat samastam
tadanyat ' (The world is similar to insignifact being or fiction). I? One may also
trace the hidden seed of in Gau9apada's thought when he says
''There is neither dissolution nor creation, neither any bonded self, nor any
practi cing saint, neither a person striving for salvation nor an emancipated self.
This is the essence of truth" .18 In his commentary Sarhkara refers to the
insignificant being to ' hare's horn'. He says that "a hare's horn is neither created
nor destroyed".IIJ If this 'hare's horn' example is categorised as 'tuccha'
(insignificant) and if we remember Sarhkara's comments that 'jagat tuccham'
in 'Dasaslokt, the inevitable conclusion would be that ' the would is fictitious'
and the claim that 'the world is 'indeterminable' , an appearance of Brahman'
stands rejected. Prakasananda thus claims that 'the fictitious nature of the world
is the intention of ad vita', according to which everything except Brahman is
' pure nothing' . He vehemently criticises the vivaral)a's theory of 'existential
gradation' and concludes that there is no epistemological ground for maintaining
the distinction, between 'the perception itself and its object'. The world is a
subjective creation, a case of ' pure fiction'. He brings the charge of 'dualism'
agai nst vivartavadins. For, the appearance although it is false, is an appearance
which is different from 'pure consciousness'. That is why in vivartavada,
Prakasananda argues, we cannot maintain the pure character of advaitic (non-
dualistic) metaphysics. Brahman being pure consciousness, pure Being, is
unaffected and unrelated to any object. If pure consciousness would have
appeared as world, however, false it is, pure consciousness cannot remain
unaffected. So if Brahman alone is real we must admit that the world as well
as the avidya are 'pure fi ctions' , that is 'mere thought constructions'. For the
theorists of thi s is the hi ghest spirit of the teachings,
Mai)Qal)a Mi sra further considers the worldly objects as ' linguistic fictions'. He
holds that in our everyday life, we use many objects in our pattern of behaviour
that have no other character than ' linguistic fictitiousness' - such as 'positive
and negative injuncti ons, the 'sentential meaning' the 'hare's horn' and the world
too is to be treated likewise. Madhusudana Sar:tsvati who devotes two sections
of his ' Advaitasiddht to the doctrine of also claims it to be the
highest principle of advaita (non-dualism). But unlike Prakasananda, he tries to
The World (JAGA T) In Sari1karite Advaita Vedant<J 365
reconcile the divergent views of the advaita. In 'SiddiJtintabindu' he interprets
the term ' tuccha' as 'anirvacaniya'. But Prakasananda, the extreme subjectivist
is not ready to compromise to any view, according to which the world enjoys
some kind of reality. He denies any kind of appearance, however false it may
be. Thus the contention of the theorists of 'vivarta' that though the world
not exist from paramarthika (absolute) standpoint, it has seeming (functional)
existence, is denied. The very idea of 'seemingness', he argues, affects the
principle of ' non-dualism' (advaita), the 'seeming' being different from the
absolute. For him. neither the Brahman nor avidya, nor even Brahman
conditioned by avidya can explain the 'seemingness' of the world. Both avidya
and the world are fictions' , 'absolutely zero'. But his position should not be
confused with 'nihilism' according to which there is no reality, because he
accepts the reality of Brahman.
A Consideration of Social Milieu and Concluding Remarks :
From what has been explicated above, it appears that the philosophic
literature of advaita Vedanta contains at least two opposing theories regarding
the world. Now let us have a close look at the historical situation in which
Sarilkara flourished, because that may enable us to see why Sarilkara and his
immediate followers would consider the world as 'anirvacaniya' instead of
assigning fi ctitious status to it. This type of consideration, to take the account
of prevailing historical situation in society is important for an appraisal of any
philosophical views. Because it is indeed true that the thoughts and feelings that
were common to the community or masses in vague and difused forms are being
cyrstallised and concentrated in the philosophical writing of the age. Philosophers
are, to quote from Russell, 'both effects and causes : effects of their social
circumstances and of the politics and institutions of their time; cause (if they
are fortunate) of beliefs which mould the politics and institutions of later
days. "20 Sarhkara is surely one of such fortunate philosophers who tactfully
interpreting the concepts, gradually replaced the blind forces by
conscious and rational foundations and offered the prevailing ethical practices a
new direction. But we should not forget that he is also an of a particular
socio-cultural circumstances. Some of his comments may apparently leave
impression for the scope of subjectivist interpretation. But a .close examination
366
SANGHAMITRA DASGUPT A
of major writings with ' intended technical meaning' from the consideration of
the then socio-cultural context opposes such an assumption ('subjectivi st
account). It is true that in his commentary on karika' , Sarhkara has
made his voice in support of ajatavada but here he does not mean that ' the world
appearance' is unreal, but the ultimate Reality is uncaused and unmodifiable.
The word 'aj ata' is intended to mean that the world is " not really born nor
originated - that it is an insubstantial appearance deriving its validity from the
substance (vastu}, the ground on which it appears. It is not an active creation
or manifestation by the Absolute infinite Reality or Brahman which is
changeless. We may exemplify the 'universe-appearance' like this : when we
say ' light shines, it is not to say that light is doing any activity, but it is its very
nature to shine. And the shining appears to us in the duali stic state"2
1
.
A little dip into the historical situation of ancient India, where different
philosophical ideals had ari sen in different phases of time in order to cope with
the raving for the demand of the age would tell us that in social and spiritual
life, there was a revoluti onary change due to the advent of Buddhism in its first
appearance. At the time of Asoka, it was spread rapidly almost all over India
and many other countries as well. But soon after this, deteriorated and degrading
practices grew up in Buddhism. Samkara, historically speaking, was born and
li ved in an era when the Buddhist "monasteries became rich centres of vested
interests and their di scipline became lax; magic and superstition crept into the
popular forms of worship"_22 The influence of Buddhism upon Sarhkara is not
ignorable at all. He travelled throughout India and established four monasteries
in the North, South, East, and West in order to bring harmony among the diverse
thought currents that were prevalent in the then Indian Society. His conception
of ' Ma_tha' was an adoption of 'sailgha' of the Buddhist culture. He felt it
necessary to formulate a philosophy which is a direct interpretation of
texts as well as different from Buddhism. In view of the above, a person like
Sarilkara who did so much for establishing a new order of life in society cannot
extend support to the view that ' the world is fictitious or mere ' imaginary
creation' . In fact in his corrunentary on 'Brahma-sutra' he severely criticises the
viji'ianvadin's view that ' there is no external object but the knowledge itself .
Again, he dismisses the 'sunyavada' of NagaTjuna by saying that a philosophical
doctrine which depicts the empirical world as a transitory show of non-substantial
appearance is not even worthy of criticism. In explaining the Sutra
The World (.11\GAT) In Sa1i1karite Advaita Vedanta 367
''vaidharmyacca na svapnadivat', he emloreses the view that the mundane level
of reality cannot be linked to a dream.2
4
The apprehension of the external world
in every act of percepti on cannot be denied. Here he is on the same plat form
with the realists and the pragmati sts in admitting the existence of an external
world outside and independent of the subject mind and judges the validity of
knowledge by practical results. The world then, according to Sarhkara, is
''pervaded by truth and it has truth as its substratum, as such every experience
has an element of truth in it and is valid in its own sphere. However, we have
the right to transcend a particular experience on a different plane in the light of
higher and more general experience, but not to reject a valid experience in its
own sphere" _25
Again, in the 'Vivekaciiqamant Sarhkara .' highly speaks about the
gloriness of being human_26 He was quite aware of the good qualities of head
and heart of human being that were necessary for a balanced li fe in society. He
did not disregard the distinction between right and wrong in mundane level ,
rather he offers a more solid rational foundations of ethical ideal s. Against the
' svatantra vijnanavada's (of Dinnaga, the author of Alambanaparlk$ii) position
of 'sahopalambhaniyama' - to be perceived by the mind is to be a portion of
the mind' , Sarhkara developed several arguments. 27 In his commentary on
'Brahmasiitra' (II. 2; 28) he argues for the difference of ideas and the objects
in cognition (tasmad arthajfianayor The object of knowledge is not
knowledge created. Further when Dinnaga says that ' internal consciousness itself
appears as if it is something external' , Sarhkara refutes it by saying that 'if there
is no external world' , how can he say that consciousness appears as if it is
something externaJ?28
If we consider all these, it would be evident that Sarhkara was very eager
to establish hi s system of philosophy in such a way so that it could make a line
of distinction from the Buddhist subjecti vism. The of one eternal
Brahman was not enough to mark thi s borderline. The urgency was felt more
perhaps for another reason that Vasubandhu (420-500 AD). the author of
' Vijiiapti-Mlitrata-siddhi' advocated a type of idealism which was very ncar to
the monism of the Sarhkara and his immediate followers might
feel it necessary to make some departure from such subjectivistic approach in
philsosphy without sacrificing the creams of the teachings of the
oneness of reality and this might have tempted Smi1kara and his immedi ate
368 SANGHAMITRA DASGUPTA
followers to preach a philosophy which gives some indeterminable status to the
worid.30 Even Samkara' s assignment of the word 'tucclw' (insignificant) to the
world in 'Dasa.5/okt may be interpreted in the following way : That when a
sadhaka has realised the Reality, that is to say, his essential identity with the
Absolute, he would not attach any significance to the worldly tlh,,cts. In otl1er
words, the very method of neti neti - not this, not this, in thl' ::radual l'f'ocess
of spiritual development, all the means of knowledge say, perception, inference,
even the scriptural testimony) different types of worldly injunctions become
insignifant because these are said to be ladder which can be thrown away after
the goal is reached. This by no means, implies that they are mere 'thought
constructions or fictitious. This whole bulk' of consideration leads us to the
conclusion that Sarhkara' s own writings and their interpretations in the light of
the then socio-cultural milieu, may serve as a strong ground in defense of the
view of vivarai;Ja school that the exact nature of the world in terms of sat (Being)
or asat (Non- being), the popular categories of human reason accepted in Indian
philosophy, is 'indeterminable' (anirvacniya).31 Among the three ultimate
categories- Being, Non-being and Falsity, of Advaita vedanta tradition, the world
belongs to the category of falsity (mithyatva). Here the term 'falsity' stands for
'indeterminateness'. T.he term 'indeterminable' (anirvacaniya) stands for the
incapability of 'two-category-based' (sat and asat) human reasoning to describe
the exact nature of the world. Without disturbing the monism of
metaphysics, the vivartavadins assigning the indeterminate category to the world
have managed to maintain their distinction from the extreme subjectivists like
Vijfiaanavadins.
NOTES
I. Tasmadanastisankanlyamidam Brahma-Suitra
Siitilkarabb:i$ya 2.1.37.
2. See : Chatterjee and Datta : An llllroduction to Indian Philosophy. University of
Calcutta, 1968 p. 375
3. It may be noted here that the advaitins have not made any di stinction between
'what is logically impossible (i.e .. son of a bam:n woman) and what is factually
not true (i.e .. hare's horn).
The World (JAGAT) in SaJiJka.rite Advaita Vedanta
369
4. P. T. Raj u : Depths of Indian Thought, South Asian Publishing, New
Delhi 1985, p. 389 .
.'i The author of ' Sarvadars,1t!asarilgraha' tells us that empirical reality is a product
of maya and the illusory snake is a product of avidya- see; Anandarama edition,
Poona, 1928, p. 163.
6. P. T. Raju : op. cit. p. 389.
7. See : Max Muller : The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy Indian Edition,
Associated Publishing House, New Delhi, 1?88, p. 114.
8. 'Vivartavadasya hi purvahhiimir vedantaviide parinamavadah. This is to say
vivartavada and parinanavada are not absolutely opposed to each other. This is
the view of Sarvajiiatam Muni.
9. II. 2.29 thus reads 'Na Sakyate vaktum mithya
jagarito-palabdhir upalabdhitviit svapnopalabdhi vat ityubhayor antarm svayam
anubhaHi' .
According to Siirilkara. the dream state and the waking state can not be placed
on at par. There status are entirely different .... Dreams are private; working life
is publi c . .... Siirilkara's point is to reject subjective idealism and to emphasize
the phenomenal reality of the external world' - see C. D. Sharma : A Critical
Survey of Indian Philosophy' Motilal Banarsi Dass, Delhi 1987, p. 268.
I 0. Madhusudan Sarasvati says that 'absolute non-existent is that which is denied
for all time - past. present and future in such a way that it never be appreciated
as something identifiahle with an existent in any substratum whatsoever (Sarvatra
traikali ka pratiyogitvam yadyapi tucchanir vacyayoh siidhiiral)am tathiipi
kvacidapyupiidhau sauvena pratiyunarhatvam atyantasattvam) - Advaitasiddhi.
Nimaya Sagar Press. Bombay 1937, pp. 138- 139.
II . However, according to Madhusudana. the indeterminable is that which is
negatable for all time - past, present and future, though it can be appreciated as
something identi fiable with an existent in some at some time. - Ibid
pp. 50- 1.
12. ' Pariniimo nlima upiidiina-samasattii.kakiiryiipattih Vivarto nama
- kiiryapattih, pratibhasika rajatam ca
parinlima iti, vivarta iti anucyate - Vedanta paribhti$a of
Dharmaraja Adhvari ndra (Bengali Trans. Panchanna Sastri) Calcutta : Agama
AnusanJhani Samiti. pp. 95-96.
370 SANGHAMITRA DASGUPTA
13. Prakasananda : Vcdtinwsiddhiimamuktiivali. Achyuta Karyalaya. Banaras. pp.
273-75.
14. Advaitasiddhi op. cit. p. 534.
15. K. P. Sinha : SatiJkara-vedllnta Tauva-Mimiimsti, Vishwavidyalaya prakasan,
Baranasi. 1982. pp. 158-9.
16. Ibid
1'/. Sec : Hcmanta Kumar Gangul y : Radicatlism in Advanta Vedanta, Calcutta,
Indian Publishing Society. 1988. p. 93.
18. See : with SatiJkarabhii$ya- 2.61-32. (Na nirodho na cotpattirna
baddho na ca siidhakai:J Na vai mukta paramarthata.
19. Ibid.
20. B. Russell : A History of Western Philosophy Unwin, London, 1988 cd. See :
Preface. p. 7.
21 . Swami Mukhyananda : Acharya Sari1kara : An Interpretation, Sri Ramkrishna
Ashram. Kalady Kerala. 1987. p. 129.
22. Jawaharlal Nehru : The Discovery of lndi:., Oxford, ( 19th impression) 1989, p.
179.
23. ' Sunyavadipasastu sarvapramiina vipatisiddha iti tannirakaranaya nadarai:J
kriyate/Na hi ayam sarvapramiina pratisiddho lokasya vyavaharo nylit
tattvamanadhigamya sakyate pahanotum, apavadabhave utsargapratisiddhei:J. . -
Siirirakilbh;i;>ya on Brahmasutra 2.2.31.
24. Ibid, 2.2.29.
25. See : Swami Mukhyananda ( 1987) p. 122
26. : See. verses 2. 3, 5. With Bengali trans. by Swami
Yedantananda. Patna, Ramkrishna Missioon Ashram, 1984) pp. 2-4.
27. Alambanaparik$a of Dinniiga : (reconstructed by N. Aiyaswami Shastri) Adyar
Library, 1941 see verse No. 6.
. 28. 'Yadantarjiieya rupam tad bahirvad avabhlisate' - the first half of the 6th verse
of Diliniiga s Pariksil. This has been quoted by Samkara before
refuting vijaiUinavada in his lommentary on ' Brahma-Siitra'. For details sec. C.
D. Sharma : A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy ( 1987) p. 267.
29. Sec : S. N. Dasgupta : A History of Indian Philodophy, vol. I. Motilal
Banarsidass. Delhi. 1975. p. 437.
..
The World (JAGAT) In Sarhkarite Advaita Vedanta 371
30. See : H. K. Ganguly : Radicalism in Advaita Vedanta ( 1988) p. 69.
3 1. Curiously enough. Nagarjuna also says that Reality is beyond the scope of our
knowability that functions through the categories of sat, asat, sadlist, neither sat
nor asat. It is in other words. 'catul)kotivinirmukta'. The world (sarhsara) is called
'sunya' devoitl of selfessence. because it is contlitionally originated. The
Absolute is also called 'sunya' in the sense that our empirical concepts arc not
applicable there. The two-tire conception of satya (samvrti and
asamvrti/paramlirthika) has been developed in the atlvaita vedanta as 'four-tier'
being - tuccha (insignificant) pratibhasika (apparent), Vyavaharika (pragmatic)
and paramarthika (transccdental). The differnce between the two schools lies
mainly on emphasis only. while Nagarjuna emphasises on the unreality
of all phenomena - Sarhkara emphasises on the empirical reality of the
phenomena. Nagarjuna emphsises on the correct ' attitude of our knowing',
Samkara emphasises on the 'thing known'. Thus the difference is only
epistemic.
THE QUESTION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SAMADHI
IN MODERN AND CLASSICAL ADVAITA VEDANTA
The word samadhi
1
became a part of the vocabulary of a number of
Western intellectuals toward the end of the first half of this century. Two
well-known writers, Aldous Huxley and Christopher Isherwood, were
impressed by Eastern and specifically by Indian thought. Huxley made a
popular anthology of Eastern and Western mystical literature under the
title The Perennial Philosophy (1946), and in his last novel, Island (1962),
words such as and samadhi occur untranslated. In both these
works, Huxley uses the words "false samadhi," implying that the reader
was already conversant with what samadhi actually is. Isherwood wrote
an account of the life of the nineteenth-century Bengali mystic Sri
Ramakrishna and His Disciples (1959), and he published as the
second part of his autobiographical trilogy an account of the years he
spent with his own guru, Swami Prabhavananda of the Order,
in My Guru and His Disciple (1980). Why these writers were drawn toward
Eastern spiritual thought, and to the Vedanta teachings in particular, is
not the subject for discussion here. But perhaps one significant reason is
that with the decline in organized religion after World War I, these writers
found in the Vedanta, as presented to them by the followers of Sri
and his disciple Swami Vivekananda, a spirituality which
emphasized the authority of firsthand experience as the only way to
verify what was presented as the Truth. The Vedanta, as they saw it, was
a "minimum working hypothesis," which could be validated through
cultivating a certain type of experience, and that experience was seen to
be a mystical, super-conscious state of awareness called samadhi.
Isherwood edited a book of articles titled Vedanta for the Western
World (1948). In his introduction he emphasizes the centrality of having
a direct, personal experience of Reality, which, he says, the Christian
writers call "mystic union" and Vedantists call "samadhi." Isherwood
raises the question as to how Reality can be experienced if it is beyond
sense perception, and he answers the question in terms of samadhi
experience:
Samadhi is said to be a fourth kind of consciousness: it is beyond the states
of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep. Those who have witnessed it as an
external phenomenon report that the experiencer appeared to have fallen
into a kind of trance. The hair on the head and body stood erect. The
half-closed eyes became fixed. Sometimes there was an astonishing loss of
weight, or even levitation of the body from the ground. But these are mere
symptoms, and tell us nothing. There is only one way to find out what
samadhi is like: you must have it yourself.2
Michael Comans
Centre for Indian
Studies, University of
Sydney
Volume 43, Number 1
january 1993
19-38
1993
by University of
Hawaii Press
19
Huxley and Isherwood did not find Indian spirituality by journeying
to India-rather it was India which found them; and the variety of Indian
spirituality with which these Englishmen came into contact in California
in the late 1930s was that of the Vedanta Society, founded by Swami
Vivekananda and his followers, who were monks of the recently estab-
lished (1886) Order of If we seek to locate the source of
the orientation of spiritual life around the cultivation of samadhi experi-
ence, which has become one of the principal characteristics of modern
Vedanta, it must be traced to Sri himself. was not
a Vedantin in the orthodox sense of one who has received instruction
centered on the exegesis of the sacred texts (sastra), which are generally
in Sanskrit, from a teacher (acarya), and who then consciously locates
himself within that specific body of received teachings (sampradaya).
as is well known, affirmed that a variety of diverse disciplines
and traditions within Hinduism, and even outside of Hinduism, were valid
in that they were all efficacious means toward the same spiritual goal.
However, as has been pointed out, it would be most correct to locate
teachings within a Tantric paradigm.
3
Tantra is an expressly
experience-oriented discipline and it relies upon yoga techniques, par-
ticularly those of Hatha Yoga,
4
to bring about a samadhi experience.
frequently underwent trance-like states, which are referred to
in The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna as samadhi experiences. A typical
description in the Gospel would be the following passage:
At the mere mention of Krishna and Arjuna the Master went into samadhi. In
the twinkling of an eye his body became motionless and his eyeballs trans-
fixed, while his breathing could scarcely be noticed.
5
has himself linked the occurrence of samadhi with
Yoga, which is referred to in the treatises on Hatha Yoga and
is fundamental to Tantra soteriology. For example, is recorded
as having remarked:
A man's spiritual consciousness is not awakened unless his Kundalini is
aroused.
The Kundalini dwells in the Muladhara. When it is aroused, it passes along
the Sushumna nerve, goes through the centres of Svadhisthana, Manipura,
and so on, and at last reaches the head. This is called the movement of the
Mahavayu, the Spiritual Current. It culminates in samadhi.
6
From the above we should be able to see the importance that the
samadhi experience had in the life and teachings of Sri Such
an experience-oriented view of spirituality was a legacy which passed
from to Vivekananda. Vivekananda was receptive to this
view, for it seemed to agree with what he had studied of the British
Philosophy East & West empiricist philosophers and the positivist Auguste Comte, insofar as they
20
had stressed the centrality of empirical experience. Vivekananda ex-
tended the empiricist epistemology that all knowledge is derived from
sense experience into the domain of metaphysics, for he thought that
since experience is the basis of all knowledge, then if a metaphysical
Reality exists, it, too, ought to be available for direct experience? And
from his association with he gathered that samadhi was the
experience required in order to know God. In his writings he placed much
emphasis on the necessity of attaining samadhi. He loosely translated
samadhi as "super-consciousness,''
8
and he stated in his work Raja- Yoga,
a commentary in English on the Yogasutras of Patanjali, that samadhi
experience was the acme of spiritual life:
Samadhi is the property of every human being-nay, every animal. From the
lowest animal to the highest angel, some time or other, each one will have to
come to that state, and then, and then alone, will real religion begin for him.
Until then we only struggle towards that stage. There is no difference now
between us and those who have no religion, because we have no experience.
What is concentration good for, save to bring us to that experience? Each one
of the steps to attain samadhi has been reasoned out, properly adjusted,
scientifically organized, and, when faithfully practised, will surely lead us to
the desired end. Then all sorrows cease, all miseries vanish; the seeds of
actions will be burnt, and the soul will be free for ever.
9
Vivekananda was attracted to for reasons somewhat
similar to those that initially attracted Huxley and Isherwood to the
Vedanta taught by the followers of Vivekananda: they all sought some
direct, experiential verification of the propositions of religious metaphys-
ics, and they all came to believe that the key to such verification lay in
the attainment of a samadhi or "super-conscious" experience. This legacy
of the search for an extra-ordinary experience in order to
validate spiritual life, not only extended to the West via the
Order of monks that Vivekananda helped to found, but it also become a
dominant view within the Western-educated Indian middle class through
the spread of literature. The modern Indian
philosopher, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, an eloquent advocate of the im-
portance of experience in religion, has described samadhi in the follow-
ing manner: "In samadhi or enstatic consciousness we have a sense
of immediate contact with ultimate reality.... It is a state of pure
apprehension .... "1o
At this point the reader may wonder whether we are not stating the
obvious, for is it not precisely because samadhi is so important that
modern Vedantins such as Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan gave it such
emphasis? It is certainly important to modern Vedanta, but the question
can be legitimately raised as to what importance it has in the
the very source of the Vedanta, and in the classical Vedanta such as in Michael Comans
21
the works of Sarikara, the most famous of all the Vedanta teachers. That
is the topic which we shall now address.
The first point to be noted is that the word samadhi does not occur
in the ten major upon which Sarikara has commented.
11
This
is not a matter to be lightly passed over, for if the attainment of samadhi
is central to the experiential verification of the Vedanta, as we can gather
it is, judging by the statements of some modern Vedantins such as those
cited above, then one would legitimately expect the term to appear in
the major which are the very source of the Vedanta. Yet the
word does not occur. The closest approximation to the word samadhi
in the early is the past passive participle samahita in the
Chandogya and BrhadaraQyaka

In both texts the word
samahita is not used in the technical meaning of samadhi, that is, in the
sense of a meditative absorption or enstasis, although the closest approxi-
mation to this sense occurs in the BrhadaraQyaka. In the first refer-
ence (BU 4.2.1), Yajriavalkya tells Janaka: "You have fully equipped your
mind (samahitatma) with so many secret names [of Brahman, that is,

Here the word samahita should be translated as "concen-
trated, collected, brought together, or composed."
In the second occurrence (BU 4.4.23), Yajriavalkya tells Janaka that a
knower of Brahman becomes "calm (santa), controlled (danta), with-
drawn from sense pleasures (uparati), forbearing and collected in
mind (samahita). This reference to samahita is the closest approximation
in the to the term samadhi, which is well known in the later
yoga literature. However, the two terms are not synonyms, for in the
the word samahita means "collectedness of mind," and there
is no reference to a meditation practice leading to the suspension of the
faculties such as we find in the literature dealing with yoga. The five
mental qualities mentioned in BU 4.4.3 later formed, with the addition of
faith (sraddha), a list of six qualifications required of a Vedantic student,
and they are frequently to be found at the beginning of Vedantic texts.
14
In these texts, the past participles used in the are regularly
changed into nominal forms: santa becomes sama, danta becomes dama,
and samahita becomes samadhana, but not the cognate noun samadhi.
It would thus appear that, while Vedanta authors understood samahita
and samadhana as equivalent terms, they did not wish to equate them
with the word samadhi; otherwise there would have been no reason why
that term could not have been used instead of samadhana. But it seems
to have been deliberately avoided, except in the case of the later Vedanta
work, Vedantasara, to which we shall have occasion to refer. Thus we
would suggest that, in the Vedanta texts, samadhana does not have
the same meaning that the the word samadhi has in yoga texts. This is
borne out when we look at how Vedanta authors describe the terms
Philosophy East & West samahita and samadhana. Sarikara, in BU 4.2.1, glosses samahitatma as
22
samyuktama, "well equipped or connected." In BU 4.4.23, he explains the
term samahita as "becoming one-pointed (aikagrya) through dissocia-
tion from the movements of the sense-organs and the mind."
15
The
term occurs again in the Katha 1.2.24 in the negative form
asamahita, which Sarikara glosses as "one whose mind is not one-pointed
(anekagra), whose mind is scattered."
16
In introductory Vedanta manuals,
samadhana is also explained by the term "one-pointed" (ekagra)Y The
word samadhana can thus be understood as having the meaning of
"one-pointed" (ekagra). In the Yogasutra, "one-pointed" (ekagra) is used
to define concentration (dharaf}aJ,
18
which is the sixth of the eight limbs
of Yoga and a preliminary discipline to dhyana and samadhi. We may see,
then, that the Vedantic samadhana means "one-pointedness" and would
be equivalent to the yoga dharaf}a, but it is not equivalent to the yoga
samadhi.
The word samadhi first appears in the Hindu scriptures in the
Maitrayaf}l (6.18, 34), a text which does not belong to the
strata of the early

and which mentions five of the eight limbs
of classical Yoga. The word also occurs in some of the Yoga and Sannyasa
of the Atharvaveda.
20
Samadhi would thus seem to be a part
of yogic practice which has entered into the later literature
through such texts as the Yoga as a result of what Eliade calls
"the constant osmosis between the and yogic milieus."
21
The
diverse teachings of yoga were systematized in Patarijali's Yogasutras,
where it is explained that the goal of yoga is to restrain completely
all mental fluctuations (vrtti) so as to bring about the state of sama-
dhi. Samadhi itself has two stages, samprajiiatasamadhi, or an enstasis
where there is still object-consciousness, and asamprajiiatasamadhi or
nirbijasamadhi, where there is no longer any object-consciousness.
Asamprajiiatasamadhi became known in later Vedanta circles as nirvi-
ka!pasamadhi.22 The point to be noted about yoga is that its whole
soteriology is based upon the suppression of mental fluctuations so as to
pass firstly into samprajiiatasamadhi and from there, through the com-
plete suppression of all mental fluctuations, into asamprajiiatasamadhi,
in which state the Self remains solely in and as itself without being hidden
by external, conditioning factors imposed by the mind (citta).
When we examine the works of Sarikara, however, we find a very
sparing use of the word samadhi.
23
In the he makes
three references to samadhi as a condition of absorption or enstasis.
24
In
the first (2.1.9), he implicitly refutes the idea that samadhi is, of itself, the
means for liberation, for he says:
Though there is the natural eradication of difference in deep sleep and in
samadhi etc., because false knowledge has not been removed, differences
occur once again upon waking just like before.
25
Michael Comans
23
What Sarikara says is that duality, such as the fundamental distinc-
tion between subject and object, is obliterated in deep sleep and in
samadhi, as well as in other conditions such as fainting, but duality is only
temporarily obliterated for it reappears when one awakes from sleep or
regains consciousness after fainting, and it also reappears when the yogi
arises from samadhi. The reason why duality persists is because false
knowledge (mithyajnana) has not been removed. It is evident from this
brief statement that Sarikara does not consider the attainment of sama-
dhito be a sufficient cause to eradicate false knowledge, and, according
to Sarikara, since false knowledge is the cause of bondage, samadhi
cannot therefore be the cause of liberation. The only other significant
reference to samadhi in the occurs in the context of
a discussion as to whether agentship is an essential property of the self.
According to Sarikara's interpretation, sutras 2.3.33-39 accept agentship
as a property of the self, but sutra 2.3.40 presents the definitive view that
agentship is not an intrinsic property of the Self but is a superimposition.
The word samadhi occurs in 2.3.39 (samadhy-abhavac-ca), and here
Sarikara briefly comments, "samadhi, whose purpose is the ascertain-
ment of the Self known from the is taught in the Vedanta texts
such as: 'The Self, my dear, should be seen; it should be heard about,
thought about and meditated upon'" (BU 2.4.5).
26
Sarikara shows by the
phrase atmapratipattiprayojana ("whose purpose is the ascertainment of
the Self") that he acknowledges that the practice of samadhi has a role
in Vedanta. However, these two references do not in themselves present
a conclusive picture of Sarikara's thought, for in the first reference it is
evident that he does not consider samadhi to be a sufficient means for
liberation, while in the second he has clearly given it a more positive place
as a means for liberation. This second reference, however, has to be
treated with some circumspection as it forms the comment upon a sutra
which Sarikara does not consider to present the definitive view. Another
reference to samadhi, where it again seems to have a more positive value,
occurs in the commentary upon the MaQc;iukya-karika of Cau<;lapada,
where in verse 3.37 the word samadhi is given as a synonym for the Self.
Sarikara glosses the word samadhi in two different ways, and in the first
he says "samadhi = because [the Self] can be known through the wis-
dom arising from samadhi."
27
Thus we can see that, according to Sarikara,
samadhi has a role to play in Vedanta, but yet the first reference (2.1.9)
indicates that this role is perhaps more circumscribed than the modern
exponents of Vedanta would have us believe. We will attempt to resolve
the matter through a wider examination of Sarikara's thought, particularly
in regard to his use of yoga.
The first specific mention of yoga is in the Katha and there
Philosophy East & West is a verse in this which details a type of yoga meditation:
24
The discriminating person should restrain speech in the mind, he should
restrain the mind in the cognizing self, he should restrain the cognizing self in
the 'great self' and restrain that 'great self' in the peaceful Self.
28
Sarikara introduces this verse with the comment that the here
presents "a means for the ascertainment of that [Selfl."
29
In his commen-
tary upon Brahmasutra 1.4.1, Sarikara refers to this Katha verse with the
remark that the sruti "shows yoga as the means for the apprehension of
the Self."
30
In his commentary upon Brahmasutra 3.3.15, he again refers
to this verse when he says that it is "just for the sake of the clear
understanding of the Self that the sruti enjoins meditation, viz. 'the
discriminating person should restrain speech in the mind .... ' "
31
It is
therefore evident that Sarikara considers the verse above to present a
method of yoga meditation leading to Self-knowledge. As to his under-
standing of this Katha verse, he has explained it succinctly in his commen-
tary on Brahmasutra 1.4.1:
This is what is said. 'He should restrain speech in the mind' means that by
giving up the operations of the external senses such as the organ of speech
and so forth he should remain only as the mind. And since the mind is inclined
towards conjecturing about things, he should, by way of seeing the defect
involved in conjecturing, restrain it in the intellect whose characteristic con-
sists in determining and which is said here by the word 'cognizing self'. Then
bringing about an increase in subtlety, he should restrain that intellect in the
'great self', i.e. the experiencer, or the one-pointed intellect. And he should
establish the 'great self' in the peaceful Self, i.e. in that supreme who
is the topic under consideration, who is the 'highest goal'.
32
As part of his commentary upon the Brhadaraf)yaka 2.4.11,
which forms part of the well known Yajriavalkya-Maitreyl dialogue,
Sarikara briefly describes a method of contemplation which is similar to
the one mentioned in the Katha 1.3.13. It is as follows:
[text] ... as the skin is the one goal of all kinds of touch [commentary] such as
soft or hard, rough or smooth .... By the word 'skin', touch in general that is
perceived by the skin, is meant; in it different kinds of touch are merged, like
different kinds of water in the ocean, and become nonentities without it, for
they were merely its modifications. Similarly, that touch in general, denoted
by the word 'skin', is merged in the deliberation of the Manas [mind], that is
to say, in a general consideration by it, just as different kinds of touch are
included in touch in general perceived by the skin; without this consideration
by the Manas it becomes a non-entity. The consideration by the Manas also
is merged in a general cognition by the intellect, and becomes non-existent
without it. Becoming mere consciousness, it is merged in Pure Intelligence, the
Supreme Brahman, like different kinds of water in the ocean. When, through
these successive steps, sound and the rest, together with their receiving Michael Comans
25
organs, are merged in Pure Intelligence, there are no more limiting adjuncts,
and only Brahman, which is Pure Intelligence, comparable to a lump of salt,
homogeneous, infinite, boundless and without a break, remains. Therefore the
Self alone must be regarded as one without a second.JJ
We can see that the type of yoga which Sarikara presents here is a
method of merging, as it were, the particular into the general
(samanya). For example, diverse sounds are merged in the sense of
hearing, which has greater generality insofar as the sense of hearing is the
locus of all sounds. The sense of hearing is merged into the mind, whose
nature consists of thinking about things, and the mind is in turn merged
into the intellect, which Sarikara then says is made into 'mere cognition'
(vijnanamatra); that is, all particular cognitions resolve into their universal,
which is cognition as such, thought without any particular object. And
that in turn is merged into its universal, mere Consciousness (prajnana-
ghana), upon which everything previously referred to ultimately depends.
There are two points which ought to be noted concerning Sarikara's
presentation of yoga which differ from the model we find in Patanjali's
Yogasutra. The first concerns method. Sarikara does not say that all
thought forms must be restrained in the manner of the cittavrttinirodha
of the Yogasutras. While in other places Sarikara has mentioned that
meditation involves the withdrawal of the mind from sense objects,
34
he
has also made it clear that control of the mind (cittavrttinirodha) is "not
known as a means of liberation."
35
Rather, Sarikara's method involves
thinking, although it is thinking of a certain type, leading from the in-
volvement in particulars to a contemplation of what is more general and
finally to the contemplation of what is most general, that is, Conscious-
ness. Thus Sarikara's method of yoga is a meditative exercise of with-
drawal from the particular and identification with the universal, leading
to contemplation of oneself as the most universal, namely, Conscious-
ness. This approach is different from the classical Yoga of complete
thought suppression.
The second point is one of approach, for nowhere does Sarikara
present the Atman-Brahman as a goal to be reached. On the contrary,
his approach is that the Atman-Brahman is not something to be acquired
since it is one's own nature, and one's own nature is not something that
can be attained. This approach has its corollary in his method of negation:
the removal of superimpositions in order to discover what is already
there, although concealed as it were by all sorts of false identifications
based ultimately upon the ignorance of who we really are. Such an
approach is different from that of the classical Yoga of the Yogasutras,
where a goal is presented in terms of nirvikalpasamadhi, which one has
to achieve in order to gain liberation. That Sarikara's method is one of
Philosophy East & West negation in order to "reveal the ever revealed" is evident throughout
26
his whole discussion of the role of action in the matter of liberation.
In Brahmasutra 1.1.4, an opponent argues that the role of scripture is
injunctive-it is to enjoin a person either to do something or to refrain
from doing something-and the role of the too, after present-
ing the nature of Brahman, is to enjoin meditation upon Brahman as a
means of release.
36
Sarikara replies that if liberation is to be gained as a
result of an action, then liberation must be impermanent. He specifies
that actions can only be of four kinds: an action can produce something,
or it can modify a thing, or it can be used to obtain something or to
purify itY He takes up each action in turn and argues that liberation
is not something that can be either produced, attained, modified, or
purified by any action whether physical, oral, or mental. His main argu-
ment is that if liberation is an effect of some kind of action, then liberation
would have a beginning and would be time-bound and hence noneternal,
and that such a consequence would go against the whole tradition that
teaches that liberation is eternal. Sarikara's view is that liberation is
nothing but being Brahman, and that is one's inherent condition, al-
though it is obscured by ignorance. He says that the whole purpose of
the is just to remove duality, which is a construct of igno-
rance;38 there is no further need to produce oneness with Brahman,
because that already exists. Sarikara's frequent use of the phrase" na hey a
na-upadeya'' (cannot be rejected or accepted)
39
along with the word
Atman indicates that the Self cannot be made the object of any kind of
action whatsoever. Sarikara has summarized all this in his commentary
on the Brhadarar:waka:
... liberation is not something that can be brought into being. For liberation
is just the destruction of bondage, it is not the result of an action. And we
have already said that bondage is ignorance and it is not possible that
ignorance can be destroyed by action. And action has its capacity in some
visible sphere. Action has its capacity in the sphere of production, attainment,
modification and purification. Action is able to produce, to make one attain,
to modify or to purify. The capacity of an action has no other scope than this,
for in the world it is not known to have any other capacity. And liberation is
not one of these. We have already said that it is hidden merely by ignorance.
40
Thus we can see that the perspective of Sarikara is fundamentally differ-
ent from that of the yoga tradition where, although the is pre-
sented as not something to be acquired, liberation is nonetheless a real
goal to be attained through a process of mental discipline, which necessi-
tates the complete suppression of all mental activity.
That there is a certain ambivalence toward yoga on the part of
the followers of Vedanta can be seen in Brahmasutra 2.1.3, "Thereby the
Yoga is refuted," which offers a rejection of yoga following upon the
rejection of Sarikhya philosophy. The problem as sees it is that Michael Comans
27
yoga practices are found in the themselves, so the question
arises as to what it is about yoga that needs to be rejected. Sankara says
that the refutation of yoga has to do with its claim to be a means of
liberation independent from the Vedic revelation. He says, " ... the sruti
rejects the view that there is another means for liberation apart from the
knowledge of the oneness of the Self which is revealed in the Veda."
41
He
then makes the point that 'the followers of Sankhya and Yoga are
dualists, they do not see the oneness of the Self."
42
The point that "the
followers of Yoga are dualists" is an interesting one, for if the yogins are
dualists even while they are exponents of asamprajfiatasamadhi (nirvi-
kalpasamadhi), then such samadhi does not of itself give rise to the
knowledge of oneness as the modern exponents of Vedanta would have
us believe. For if it did, then it would not have been possible for the yogins
to be considered dualists. Clearly the modern Vedantins, in their expecta-
tion that samadhi is the key to the liberating oneness, have revalued the
word and have given it a meaning which it does not bear in the yoga
texts. And, we suggest, they have given it an importance which it does
not possess in the classical Vedanta, as we are able to discern it in the
writings of Sankara.
The matter to be decided is what place samadhi, and yoga in general,
holds in Sankara's thought. We suggest that his commentary upon the
Bhagavadglta contains certain programmatic statements that are of gen-
eral assistance in determining his views on the place of samadhi and yoga
in the Advaita scheme of liberation. In the Cita, Sankara very frequently
glosses the word yoga when it occurs in a verse by the word samadhi,
thereby indicating that on many occasions he understands yoga to mean
the practice of a certain discipline wherein samadhi is the key factor, as
in verse 6.19, " ... for one who engages in yoga concerning the Self"
(yunjato yogam atmana/:Jl, which sankara glosses as "practices samadhi
concerning the Self" (atmanal) samadhim anutiHhata/:1).
43
It is evident
that he considers samadhi as a state wherein normal distinctions are
obliterated, as is evident from his statement in 18.66, "the evils of agent-
ship and enjoyership etc. are not apprehended in deep sleep or in
samadhi etc. where there is discontinuation of the flow of the erroneous
idea that the Self is identical to the body."
44
Here, as in his commentary
upon Brahmasutra 2.1.9, Sankara links deep sleep and samadhi, and it is
evident that he recognizes samadhito be a state wherein distinctions are
temporarily resolved, as they are in deep sleep.
At the beginning of his commentary upon the Cita, Sankara makes a
significant statement concerning the relation of Sankhya to Yoga.
45
He
says that Sankhya means ascertaining the truth about the Self as it really
is and that has done this in his teaching from verses 2.11 up until
2.31. He says that sankhyabuddhi is the understanding which arises from
Philosophy East & West ascertaining the meaning in its context, and it consists in the understand-
28
ing that the Self is not an agent of action because the Self is free from the
sixfold modifications beginning with coming into being. He states that
those people to whom such an understanding becomes natural are called
Sarikhyas. He then says that Yoga is prior to the rise of the understand-
ing above. Yoga consists of performing disciplines (sadhana) that lead
to liberation; it presupposes the discrimination between virtue and its
opposite, and it depends upon the idea that the Self is other than the
body and that it is an agent and an enjoyer. Such an understanding is
yogabuddhi, and the people who have such an understanding are called
Yogins. From this it is clear that Sarikara relegates Yoga to the sphere
of ignorance (avidyal because the Yogins are those who, unlike the
Sarikhyas, take the Self to be an agent and an enjoyer while it is really
neither. They are, therefore, in Sarikara's eyes, not yet knowers of the
truth.
Sarikara again clearly demarcates Sarikhya and Yoga in his com-
ments on verse 2.39, where r ~ Q a says, "0 Partha, this understanding
about Sarikhya has been imparted to you. Now listen to this understand-
ing about Yoga .... " According to Sarikara, 'Sarikhya' means the "discrim-
ination concerning ultimate truth," and the 'understanding' pertaining to
Sarikhya means a "knowledge which is the direct cause for the termina-
tion of the defect which brings about samsara consisting of sorrow and
delusion and so forth." He then says that Yoga is the "means to that
knowledge" (tatpraptyupaya) and that Yoga consists of both (a) kar-
mayoga, that is, performing rites and duties as an offering to the Lord
once there has been a relinquishment of opposites (such as like and
dislike) through detachment, and (b) samadhiyoga.
46
In 4.38, Sarikara
again explains the word yoga occurring in the verse as referring to both
karmayoga and samadhiyogaY It is evident that Sarikara understands the
word yoga in the Clta to refer to both karma yoga and to the practice of
meditation, that is, samadhiyoga. It is also evident that he considers yoga
to be a means leading to Sarikhya-knowledge but that it is not the same
as Sarikhya-knowledge. In 6.20, Sarikara says that one apprehends the
Self by means of a "mind which has been purified through samadhi."
48
From the evidence of the above we suggest that according to Sari-
kara the role of samadhi is supportive-or purifying-and is preliminary
to, but not necessarily identical with, the rise of the liberating knowledge.
As is well known, Sarikara considers that knowledge alone, the insight
concerning the truth of things, is what liberates. To this end he places
great emphasis upon words, specifically the words of the Upanisads, as
providing the necessary and even the sufficient means to engender this
liberating knowledge. Sarikara repeatedly emphasizes the importance of
the role of the teacher (guru/acarya) and the sacred texts (sastra) in the
matter of liberation. For example the compound sastracaryopadesa, "the
instruction on the part of the teacher and the scriptures," occurs seven Michael Comans
29
times in his commentary on the Cita alone, along with other varia-
tions such as vedantacaryopadesa, and it regularly occurs in his other
works as well.
49
The modern Vedantin, on the other hand, has over-
looked, possibly unknowingly, the importance which sacred language
and instruction held in the classical Vedanta as a means of knowledge
(pramaQa) and has had to compensate for this by increasing the impor-
tance of yogic samadhi, which is then put forward to be the necessary
and sufficient condition for liberation.
The contrast between the Vedanta of Sarikara and some of its mod-
ern exponents is clear enough. But it should not be thought that the
modern emphasis on yogic samadhi is without precedent. As we have
mentioned, there is evidence of yoga techniques in the principal
themselves although it did not then have a dominant empha-
sis, and this is reflected in the approach of Sarikara in his commentaries.
However, in the centuries following Sarikara, Advaitins have exhibited a
gradual increase in their reliance upon yoga techniques. This can be
shown by examining a few of the Advaita PrakaraQagranthas, noncom-
mentarial compositions by Advaita authors.
The only noncommentarial work that is widely accepted as the
composition of Sarikara is the Upadesasahasrl. In this work the word
samadhi rarely occurs. The word samahita is used in 13.25, and we have
previously argued that samahita (concentrated) has a meaning equivalent
to the word samadhana, one-pointedness of mind, but it does not have
the same meaning as nirvikalpasamadhi.
50
Sarikara mentions samadhi
three times in the Upadesasahasr/,
51
but he does not extol it; on the
contrary, speaking from the understanding that the Self is nirvikalpa by
nature, he contrasts the Self and the mind and says:
As I have no restlessness (vik!jepa) I have hence no absorption (samadhi).
Restlessness or absorption belong to the mind which is changeable.
52
A similar view is expressed in 13.17 and 14.35. In 15.14 Sarikara presents
a critique of meditation as an essentially dualistically structured activity. 5
3
Furthermore, in 16.39-40, Sarikara implicitly criticizes the Sarikhya-Yoga
view that liberation is dissociation from the association of and
prakrti,
54
when he says:
It is not at all reasonable that liberation is either a connection [with Brahman]
or a dissociation [from prakrti]. For an association is non-eternal and the same
is true for dissociation also.
55
Thus it is evident from the above that Sarikara implicitly rejects both the
soteriology of yoga, namely, that liberation has to be accomplished
through the real dissociation of the from prakrti, and the
pursuit towards that end, that is, the achievement of nirvikalpa or
Philosophy East & West asamprajnatasamadhi.
30
However such a view became blurred in the writings of post-Sarikara
Advaitins. This can be briefly shown by examining some later Advaita
prakaraQa texts. For example, in the popular fourteenth-century text
Pancadasl, we find a mixture of Vedantic and Yogic ideas. Towards
the conclusion of the first chapter on the "Discrimination of the Real"
(tattvaviveka), the author explains the terms sravaQa, manana,
and nididhyasana (vv. 53-54), and then proceeds to describe the cultiva-
tion of samadhi as the means whereby the mediate verbal knowledge
derived from the is turned into immediate experience (vv. 59-
62). However, in chapter nine, "The Lamp of Meditation" (dhyanadlpa),
meditation is prescribed for those who do not have the intellectual
acuteness to undertake the Self-inquiry; and in chapter seven (v. 265), the
author repeats the verse of Sarikara from the Upadesasahasr/("As I have
no restlessness"), which was cited above. Therefore it would appear that
the Pancadaslis an early example of a Vedantic text which is consciously
making room for classical Yoga but which has not lost sight of Sarikara's
perspective.
56
The VivekacucjamaQi is a popular text in contemporary Vedanta
circles and is ascribed to Sarikara. However, it is highly unlikely that it is
a genuine work of Sarikara, for the fact that there are no Sanskrit com-
mentaries on this work by any of the well-known commentators on the
works of Sarikara would indicate that the VivekacucjamaQi is either a late
composition or that it was not regarded as a work of Sarikara by the
earlier AdvaitinsY In this text, samadhi comes in for considerable praise;
for example:
Reflection should be considered a hundred times superior to hearing, and
meditation a hundred thousand times superior even to reflection, but the
Nirvikalpaka Samadhi is infinite in its results. 5
8
We can observe in this text how samadhi is treated as the indispensable
requirement for liberation, and we can see in the following verse that
samadhi is advocated for the same reason as is given in Yogasutra 1.1.4:
"at other times [the Self] takes the same form as the mental modifications
( vrttisarupyamitaratra)":
By the Nirvikalpaka Samadhi the truth of Brahman is clearly and definitely
realized, but not otherwise, for then the mind, being unstable by nature, is apt
to be mixed up with other perceptions.
59
As a final example of the use of samadhi in this work we cite the following
verse:
Through the diversity of the supervening conditions (Upadhis), a man is apt to
think of himself as also full of diversity; but with the removal of these he is again
his own Self, the immutable. Therefore the wise man should ever devote himself
to the practice of Nirvikalpa Samadhifor the dissolution of the Upadhisf>'J Michael Comans
31
If we compare the idea contained in this verse with the ideas of the
Upadesasahasr/, we find that nowhere in the Upadesasahasrl does Sari-
kara advocate the dissolution of the upadhi: On the contrary, his attitude
throughout the Upadesasahasrlis to show that an upadhi is to be negated
merely through the knowledge that it is an object, for as an object it
cannot be identical with the perceiver; and because an upadhi is essen-
tially unreal (mithyii), it cannot negate the nondual truth, and therefore
no additional effort need be expended for its removal.
As a final example of the increasing tendency to identify Vedanta and
Yoga, we refer to a late Vedanta text, the Vedantasara of Sadananda
(fifteenth century A.D.). He, like the author of the Paiicadas/, has added
samadhi to the triad of sravaQa, manana, and nididhyasana. What is of
interest here is that he has reinterpreted samadhi to make it conform to
Advaitic ideas; for example, nirvikalpa samadhi is said to be the state
where the mind is without the distinctions of knower, knowledge, and
object of knowledge and has become totally merged in the "nondual
reality."
61
Furthermore, this text lists the eight limbs of Yoga practice
mentioned by Patanjali ( Yogasutra 2.29), suitably reinterpreted to con-
form to the Vedanta. There are other, later Vedanta texts which also do
this.
62
Thus we see that through the centuries Vedanta has increasingly
accommodated itself to Yoga, leading to the almost complete absence
of a distinction between the two in modern times.
Conclusion
Although the importance of concentration is evident from the early
(BU 4.4.23), a form of yoga practice leading to the absorptive
state of samiidhi is only in evidence in the later texts. We have seen that
Sarikara does speak of a type of concentration upon the Self which is akin
to yoga insofar as there is the withdrawal of the mind from sense objects,
but he does not advocate more than that and he does not put forward
the view that we find in classical Yoga about the necessity of total
thought suppression. We have seen that he has used the word samadhi
very sparingly, and when he has used it, it was not always in an unam-
biguously favorable context. It should be clear that Sankara does not set
up nirvikafpasamadhi as a spiritual goal. For if he had thought it to be an
indispensable requirement for liberation, then he would have said so. But
he has not said so. Contemplation on the Self is obviously a part of
Sarikara's teaching, but his contemplation is directed toward seeing the
ever present Self as free from all conditionings rather than toward the
attainment of nirvikalpasamadhi. This is in significant contrast to many
modern Advaitins for whom all of the Vedanta amounts to "theory"
which has its experimental counterpart in yoga "practice." I suggest that
their view of Vedanta is a departure from Sarikara's own position. The
Philosophy East & West modern Advaitins, however, are not without their forerunners, and I have
32
tried to indicate that there has been a gradual increase in samadhi-
oriented practice in the centuries after Sarikara, as we can judge from the
later Advaita texts.
NOTES
Abbreviations are used in the notes below as follows:
BSBh with the Commentaries
yaratnaprabha of Covindananda, Bhamati of Vacaspatimisra
and Nyaya-NirQaya of Anandagiri. Edited by J. L. Sastri. Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1980.
BU
ChU
US Upadesasahasri of Sankaracharya, A Thousand Teachings: in
Two Parts-Prose and Poetry. Translated by Swami Jagada-
nanda. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1979.
1 - When the word samadhi is used in this article, it refers only to the
higher stage of samadhi known as nirvikalpasamadhi, which is an
"enstasis without thought constructions."
2 - Vedanta for the Western World, ed. C. Isherwood (London: Unwin
Books, 1975), p. 15.
3- The three years of continuous Tantric sadhana under the direction of
the Bhairavl Brahmar:ll was his longest and most significant training.
See W. Neevel, "The Transformation of Sri Ramakrishna," in Hindu-
ism: New Essays in the History of Religions, ed. B. Smith (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1976). The time spent under the direction of Totapuri, who was
said to be an Advaitin, was much shorter than the time spent study-
ing Tantra, and the information available on Totapuri is very meager,
so it is difficult to be sure whether he was actually an Advaitin rather
than a follower of yoga.
4 - M. Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, Bollingen Series, no. 56
(New York: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 227 ff., and The
Hathayogapradipika of Svatmarama (Madras: Adyar Library, 1984),
p. 125.
5 - Ramakrishna, The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, trans. Swami Nikhi-
lananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1974), p. 195.
6 - Ibid., p. 814. Also cf. pp. 310, 576. Michael Comans
33
7 - Cf. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda (Calcutta: Advaita
Ashrama, 1970), vol. 1, p. 470, "If there is a God, you ought to be able
to see Him. If not, let Him go." Also cf. his introduction to Raja-Yoga,
pp. 125 ff., and vol. 2, p. 220, "Knowledge can only be got in one way,
the way of experience; there is no other way to know."
8- Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 137, 180, 181, 212, and vol. 5, p. 300.
9- Ibid., vol. 1, p. 188.
10- S. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1940), p. 51.
11 - G. A. jacob, A Concordance to the Principal and
Bhagavadgita (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971); G. M. Kurulkar,
SasandarbhanighaQtusahita (Pune: Tilak Maharastra
Vidyapitha, 1973).
12 - ChU 8.1.3, 4, 5; BU 4.2.1, 4.4.23.
13 - The BrhadaraQyaka with the Commentary of Sankara-
carya, trans. Swami Madhavananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama,
1975), p. 410.
14 - Cf. BSBh, p. 36; VivekacuqamaQi of Sri Sankaracarya, trans. Swami
Madhavananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1974), vv. 19-27; Apa-
or Self-realization of Sri Sankaracarya, trans. Swami
Vimuktananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1977), vv. 3-8.
15- Ten Principal with Works of Sankaracarya
in Original Sanskrit, vol. 1 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), p. 937,
"samahitaf:l indriyantaf:lkaraQacalanarupad vyavrtya aikagryarupena
samahito bhutva." (Hereafter, all references containing
Sankara's commentary will be to this work).
16 - Ibid., p. 78, "asamahitaf:l-anekagramana
17- Tattva Bodha of Sankaracharya (Bombay: Central Chinmaya Mission
Trust, n.d.), p. 7; (cited n. 14 above), v. 8.
18- Georg Feuerstein, The Philosophy of Classical Yoga (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1980), p. 84.
19- Paul Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanishads (New York: Dover,
1966), pp. 23-26. Also, see Winternitz quoted in S. Dasgupta, A
History of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), vol. 1,
p. 39. Eliade considers the MaitrayaQito belong to the same period
as the Bhagavadgita, i.e., between the second century B.c. and the
second century A.D. (Eiiade, Yoga, p. 124).
20- Amrtabindu 6, 16; AruQeya 2. It also occurs in the Bhagavadgita at
Philosophy East & West 2.44, 53, 54.
34
21 - Eliade, Yoga, p. 114, remarks: "It is true that the remain in
the line of metaphysics and contemplation, whereas yoga employs
asceticism and a technique of meditation. But this is not enough
to halt the constant osmosis between the and yogic
milieus."
22- I do not know why later Vedantins used the word nirvikalpa to
characterize what is essentially the yogic asamprajnatasamadhi. Per-
haps they wished to distinguish their practice from that of classical
Yoga. The word nirvikalpaka was first introduced into the astika
("orthodox") tradition by Kumarila Bhatta, who used it in his explana-
tion of perception, under the influence of the Buddhist philosopher
Dignaga. See D. N. Shastri, The Philosophy of and Its
Conflict with the Buddhist Dignaga School (Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya
Prakashan, 1976), p. 438.
23 - I am assuming that Sarikara is not the author of the
as this issue has not yet been settled. See W. Halbfass,
Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought (New York:
State University of New York Press, 1991), chap. 6.
24- BSBh 2.1.9 (p. 365, line 6), 2.3.39 (p. 545, line 10), 2.3.40 (p. 551, line
2); Word Index to the of Sankara, T. M. P.
Mahadevan, general ed., 2 vols. (Madras: University of Madras, 1973).
25- BSBh 2.1.9 (p. 365, line 6).
26- Ibid., 2.3.39 (p. 545, line 10).
27 - MaQcjukya 3.37 (p. 224, line 3).
28- Katha 1.3.13. Cf. J. Bader, Meditation in Sankara's Vedanta (Delhi:
Aditya Prakashan, 1990), chap. 3.
29 - Katha 1.3.13 (p. 83, line 11 ).
30- BSBh 1.4.1 (p. 295, line 10).
31 - Ibid., 3.3.15 (p. 694, line 12).
32- Ibid., 1.4.1 (p. 295, lines 12 ffJ
33- BU 2.4.11 (p. 764, lines 11 ff.). See also Madhavananda, trans., Brha-
daraQyaka (cited n. 13 above), pp. 253 ff. I have cited
Madhavananda's translation here as I cannot make any significant
improvement on it.
34- Cf. commentary on Katha 1.2.12 and Bhagavadglta 16.1.
35- BU 1.4.7 (p. 663, line 9).
36- BSBh 1.1.4 (p. 69, line 6).
Michael Comans
35
36
37 - Ibid., 1.1.4 (p. 79, lines 7 ff.). Also, for the reference to action as
consisting of four types, cf. BU 3.3.1 (p. 798, lines 22 ff., and p. 801,
lines 1 ff.), 4.4.22 (p. 933, lines 21 ff.); Mur:u;faka 1.2.12 (p. 152, lines 25
ff.); US 17.50; Shrl Shankaracharya's Upadeshasahasrl with the Closs
Padayojanika, ed. D. V. Gokhale (Bombay: The Gujarati Printing Press,
1917); Shri Shankarabhagavatpada's Upadeshasahasri with the Tika of
Shri Anandagiri Acharya, ed. S. Subramanyasastri (Varanasi: Mahesh
Research Institute, 1978).
38- BSBh 1.1.4 (p. 79, line 1); also BU2.1.20 (p. 739, lines 20 and 24).
39- BSBh 1.1.4 (p. 64, lines 2 and 4; p. 84, lines 3 ff.; p. 85, lines 1 ff.; p. 87,
lines 4 ff.).
40- BU 3.3.1 (p. 798, lines 19 ff.).
41 - BSBh 2.1.3 (p. 354, lines 1 ff.).
42 - Ibid., 2.1.3 (p. 354, line 3).
43- Bhagavadglta with Works of Sarikaracarya in Original
Sanskrit, val. 11 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978) 6.19 (p. 107, lines 9
ff.), and also 5.21, 6.4, 8.10, 12.6, 13.10, 18.33.
44 - Ibid., 18.66 (p. 296, lines 6 ff.).
45- Ibid., introd., 2.11 (p. 9, lines 14 ff.).
46 - Ibid., 2.39 (p. 27, lines 13 ff.).
47- Ibid., 4. 38 (p. 80, line 18).
48- Ibid., 6.20 (p. 107, line 16 [my emphasis]).
49 - Ibid., 2.21 (p. 20, line 12), 2.63 (p. 36, line 12), 8.8 (p. 128, line 16), 13.30
(p. 215, line 23), 13.34 (p. 217, line 19), 18.16 (p. 263, line 19), 18.17 (p.
264, line 4), 18.50 (p. 281, line 7), 18.55 (p. 284, line 9); Word-Index to
Sankara's ed. Francis X. D'Sa (Pune: Institute for the Study
of Religion, 1985). Also cf. BU 2.1.20 (p. 744, line 23), 2.4.2 (p. 767,
line 5), 2.5.15 (p. 776, line 12); ChU6.15.2 (p. 537, line 12), 8.1.6 (p. 571,
line 2); Katha 1.5.12 (p. 96, line 1); MuQc;/aka 1.2.12 (p. 153, line 5),
2.2.7 (p. 162, line 22); US 17.51-52.
In an otherwise interesting and insightful article, "The Path of
No-path: Sarikara and Dagen on the Paradox of Practice" (Philoso-
phy East and West 38, no. 2 [April 1988]), David Loy has come to
an erroneous conclusion (p. 133) that "there can be no means-
not even sruti-to realize Brahman .... " But if that were the case,
it would not be possible to explain Sarikara's concerted effort in
meticulously commenting on sruti; and such a statement also over-
looks the numerous references where he states that the sruti is the
means of knowledge for Brahman. It is precisely because Sarikara sees
no other way to arrive at the knowledge of the unconditioned Abso-
lute that he resorts to the sacred words of the as the
means to dispel the ignorance of the ever present Self. Among
Western scholars, Sarikara's views on srutihave been well articulated
by w. Halbfass in his discussion of the role of sruti in Sarikara's
thought; see his Tradition and Reflection (cited n. 23 above), chap. 5.
50- Samadhana is mentioned in US17.23-24. Cf. Tattvabodha (cited n.
17 above), p. 7: "samadhanam kim? cittaikagrata."
51 - US13.14, 17 and 14.35.
52- Ibid., 13.14.
53 - Ibid., 15.14.
54 - The Sankhyakarika of Jsvara ed. and trans. S. S. Suryanarayana
Sastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1973), vv. 20, 21, 66, 68.
55- US16.39-40.
56 - Cf. Paiicadasl of Sri VidyaraQya Swami; trans. Swami Swahananda
(Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1975).
57 - There are two commentaries on the Vivekaci:ujamani: one is by a
little known writer, Harinathabatta, and the other is a recent com-
mentary by Sri Chandrasekhara Bharat'i, who was the Sarikaracarya
of Sririgiri Matha from 1912 to 1954. See R. Thangaswami, Advaita-
Vedanta Literature: A Bibliographical Survey (Madras: University of
Madras, 1980), p. 218; Advaita Crantha Kosa, prepared by a disciple
of Sri Siddhindra Saraswati Swami of the Brahmendra
Mutt (Kancheepuram: n.n., n.d.), p. 67. Perhaps the Vivekacu(jamaf)i
is itself a work of one of the Sririgiri Sarikaracaryas?
58 - Vivekacut;iamaf)i (cited n. 14 above), v. 364.
59 - Ibid., v. 365.
60 - Ibid., v. 357.
61 - Vedantasara or the Essence of Vedanta of Sadananda Yoglndra,
trans. Swami Nikhilananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1974), p. 110.
62 - The has been ascribed to Sarikara but is unlikely to
be a genuine work. See Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, ed. Karl
Potter, vol. 3, Advaita Vedanta up to Saf!7kara and His Pupils (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), p. 320. The final forty-four verses (out of
144) describe yoga. Here, however, yoga is consciously reinterpreted
within a Vedantic manner: "The complete forgetfulness of all thought
by first making it changeless and then identifying it with Brahman
is called Samadhi known as knowledge" (Vimuktananda's trans.,
cited n. 14 above, v. 124). The Sarvavedantasiddh.intasarasangraha is Michael Comans
37
38
another work which is most likely not a work of Sankara. See
Thangaswami, Advaita- Vedanta Literature (cited n. 57 above), p. 220;
Potter, Advaita Vedanta up to Saf!7kara, p. 339; Advaita Crantha Kosa
(cited n. 57 above), p. 68. In this work we again find the grafting of
yogic nirvikalpasamadhi onto Vedanta teachings; see The Quintes-
sence of Vedanta, trans. Swami Tattwananda (Ernakulam: Sri Rama-
krishna Advaita Ashrama, 1960), pp. 171 ff.
Review Article
THE YOGACARA IDEALISM
1
ALEX WAYMAN
A GENERAL SURVEY of idealism in India has already been made
by Raju,
2
but some other authors do not concede the validity of his inclusion
of so many schools of Indian philosophy as well as leading philosophers of
India in this philosophical category. Thus, Chatterjee, in the book under con-
admits as an idealistic school in Hinduism only the special inter-
pretation of the AdVaita Vedanta known as duti-sr.f!i-viida (the school of
those holding that perception is creation).
3
On the other hand, Padmarajiah
understands the latter interpretation (by Praka.sananda) as a reasonable one
for the Advaita, which thus holds to an Absolute Idealism rather than to the
"so-called Objective Idealism" (which "attributes 'objectivism' to a philosophy
of objectless reality"). Certain mystic or occult doctrines of the
seem to favor the growth of idealistic philosophy, and thus to provide a ratio-
nale for the generality of Raju's coverage. It may be valuable to expand upon
this idea by relevant considerations which Chatterjee does not touch upon or
deal with as the present writer would.
The almost universal acceptance in India of the doctrine of rebirth, along
with the consequences of karma, could easily have swung all Indian philo-
sophical systems to idealism. This doctrine holds that the multitudinous personal
experiences of the present, as well as the characteristics of the body holding
the experiencing self, are the expression of past acts carried in some residual
and seminal form by a transmigrating principle. When such a doctrine comes
to be implemented by theories of being and knowledge, philosophy enters the
discussion. And then it turns out that this doctrine could, but need not, give
rise to an idealistic philosophy. While Max Miiller thought the Samkhya was
idealistic-after all, it teaches that the sense organs evolve from ahamkara
1 Ashok Kumar Chatterjee, The YogdclJra Idealism, Banaras Hindu University
Darsana Series, No.3 (Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1962). Pp. xii + 309.-
2 P. T. Raju, Idealistic Thought of India (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1953).
a The YogaclJra Idealism, p. 244.
4 Y. J. Padmarajiah, A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and
Knowledge (Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandai, 1963), pp. 291 ff. (Published post-
humously.)
65
66 ALEX WAYMAN
(egotism )-his was an unaccepted conclusion. The Samkhya teaches a
material evolution from prakrti (primordial substance), each successively
coarser grade of substance being invested with, and variously exemplifying, the
passive consciousness of purufa (person). The first evolute is buddhi ( intel-
lect) ; the second, ahamkara, which is the grade of substance through which
identifying and "belonging" consciousness first manifests, to become the source
of all attachment. In this system, a subtle body is the transmigrating principle.
Early Buddhism emphasized karma ("actibn") as what transmigrates-and
this is as surprising to a first reading as is the Samkhya theory of evolutes. If
one goes further into the Buddhist texts he finds out that the karma that
determines destination (gati) after death is explained as an important meaning
of manas-karma ("acts of mind") and finds out that this particular manas-
karma is cetan4 ("volition"). This word "cetana" has the root cit- ("to
think"), which is the root of the word citta, often translated "mind/: as in the
expression "Mind Only" ( cittanriitra), a frequent title for doctrines of the
Y ogaci.ra school. Later Buddhism used the expression u citta-samtana" or
ucitta-samtati" (both: "stream of thoughts") for the transmigrating entity.
Thus, the words ((karma" and "citta" are doctrinally equivalent to indicate
the transmigrating entity. If a "stream of thoughts" can bring about a set of
external circumstances compensatory and retributive of past acts, we have at
once the idealistic picture of a subjective element of a conscious or subconscious
nature projecting the "world." If this is true for early Buddhism, it cannot be
the whole truth, because early Buddhism was certainly realistic and pluralistic
also.
The Buddhist Y ogaci.ra text called M adhyiinta-vibhanga sets up a rival
theory to that of the Sarhkhya for showing the evolution and resolution of the
worlds, but in common with other Indian schools has the influential Samkhya
system before it as a guide. Thus, the Buddhist text replaces the Sarilkhya
purufa with the "imagination of unreality" ( abhutaparikalpa) and replaces
prakrti with "voidness" ( iunyata). In this Buddhist system, both the
"imagination of unreality" and "voidness" are real, co-exist, and are yet
distinct
5
Apparently, these identifications have not been recognized by modern
writers on Indian philosophy, although some have come close. "Voidness" is
the Absolute in this system, and agrees for the most part with what is said by
Raju :
6
"One significant point is that this Absolute is conceived to be the
material cause of the world. This conception belongs not only to the Vedantic
but also to Buddhistic idealism. Ultimate reality, paramarthasatya, even as
5 Cf. Alex Wayman, "The Buddhist 'Not This, Not This,'" Philosophy East and
West, XI, No. 3 (Oct., 1961), 102.
6 Idealistic Thought of India, p. 417.
THE YOGA.CA.RA IDEALISM 67
sunya, is said to be the tathi'igata-garbha or the womb of the tathagata, which
is the source of everything." Where Raju goes astray is in including the
tathi'igata-garbha-oten equated with the Y ogacara iilayavijnana (ideation
store )-which should be translated by Buddhist usage as "embryo of tathii-
gata" (one who has come the same way, i.e., a buddha) and which pertains to
the "imagination of unreality," rather than to the "voidness" principle. Das-
gupta comes close when he says, "I am led to think that Sailkara's philosophy
is largely a compound of Vijnanavada and Siinyavada Buddhism with the
p a n i ~ a d notion of the permanence of self superadded."
7
Here the word
"Vijnanavada" refers to the Yogacara kind of idealism. In short, Voidness,
or the pure dharmadhatu (realm of natures) , is the material cause of the world,
while the "imagination of unreality" is the formal cause. In respect to content,
this system is realistic; in respect to form, it is idealistic. For example, the
shape of a pot stems from the mind of the potter, but not the clay. The latter
comes from nature (dharma) and abides whether a potter arises or not.
That is certainly not understood by Chatterjee, as he often and variously
says, e.g., "The Yogacara holds that consciousness is the sole reality."
8
This
half-truth does not originate with Chatterjee; indeed, he simply inherits an
evaluation of the Y ogacara almost omnipresent in surveys of Indian philos-
ophy. European writers who deal with Buddhism in the English language also
take for granted the basic idea of the Y ogacara and develop the theme accord-
ingly. At the outset, Chatterjee is given the supposed "sole" reality of Yoga-
cara philosophy ; and, as a philosophical dissertation, exerts a kind of tempo-
rary philosophical empat?y with this "sole" reality, expanding upon it with
fine philosophical sentences to the point where he can compare it with other
systems of thought, such as realism and the Advaita as well as with other
forms of idealism (in which he does not include the Advaita). For this
purpose, it is not a serious drawback that he does not employ Tibetan or
Chinese texts, or their French translations, of the Yogacara school.
9
Such
works would have enriched his source material. But, as long as he holds to his
presupposition of the fundamental Y ogacara position, and has control over one
language of the relevant texts-it was Sanskrit-to write a philosophical
dissertation on the subject required his obvious training in philosophical ways
of thinking rather than more philological background.
7 Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I (Cambridge: At
the University Press, 1932), p. 494.
8 The Y ogiiciira Idealism, p. 59.
9 One work can be mentioned that might have been helpful: Etienne Lamotte, La
somme du grand vehicule d'Asmiga (Mahiiyiinasamgraha), Tome II, Traduction et com-
mentaire, Fascicule 2 (Chapitres III a X) (Louvain: Bureaux du Museon, 1939). The
very first pages deal with the problem of the relation between the bodhisattva and the
dharmadhatu.
68 ALEX WAYMAN
Of course, there is a good reason for thinking, "The Yogacara holds that
consciousness is the sole reality." This is an interpretation of Vasubandhu's
intent in his two little treatises-Twenty Stanzas [on Ideation Only] and
Thirty Stanzas [on Ideation Only] .
10
In the former work, Vasubandhu stresses
ideation-only ( vijnaptimatra) because he is setting forth the process of world
illusion created by the Madhyanta-vibhanga's "imagination of unreality."
However, in verse 10 (numbering of the Sanskrit text) he sets forth the neces-
sity to enter first the "selflessness of personality" (pudgalanairatmya). and
then the "selflessness of dharmas" (dharmanairatmya), thereby indicating the
two aspects of reality and inferring as well the two truth
( samvrtiratya) and absolute truth (paramarthasatya). In the latter work,
V asubandhu again stresses ideation-only because he is setting forth the re-
moval of the world illusion. However, throughout this second work he speaks
of two elements, beginning the first verse with the expression atmadharmopa-
caro ("attachment to self and dharmtl'). Sthiramati's commentary explains
these two as the corruption-covering ( kleiavaraf}fJ) and the knowable:-eovering
(jneyavaraf}fJ), which are, respectively, removed by the two kinds of selfless-
ness mentioned in the former work. Again, V asubandhu alludes to the voidness
reality in verse 25 of the second work with the words dharma1JD.m paramarthai
ca ("the supreme state of dharmas''). In eaily Buddhism, it was said that
whether tathagatas do or do not arise, the true nature (dharmatil) of dharmas
abides, meaning the moral law, impermanence of natures.
11
In Mahayana
Buddhism, it is again said that whether tathagatas do or do not arise, the
dharmadhatu remains, and this is the voidness of all the dharmas. The adepts
of the Hinayana and of the Mahayana attain this "non-discerning true nature"
(avikalpadharmata), but the adept of the Mahayana, i.e., the tathiJgata, has in
addition the knowledge and glory of a buddha.
12
The Mahayana text teaching
that, namely, the Daiabhumika-siltra, is the one with the celebrated doctrine
that the three worlds are "Mind Only" (cittamatra).
13
1o The original Sanskrit for the two treatises, each with Sanskrit commentary, was
published by Sylvain Levi, Vijnaptim4trat4siddhi, (Paris: Librairie ancienne honore
champion, 1925), as No. 245 in the series Bibliotheque de !':&ole des bautes etudes,
Sciences historiques et philologiques. The two works as translated from Chinese into
English are in S. Radhakrisbnan and C. A. Moore, eds., A Source Book i11 India"
Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 328-337. The commentarial
tradition as translated from Sanskrit into Chinese is rendered and annotated in French
by Louis de La Vallee-Poussin, Vijnaptim4trat4siddhi, 1.4 Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang (Paris:
Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928, 1929), Tomes I and II; Index (Paris: same
publisher, 1948).
11Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought m India (London: George Allen and Unwin
Ltd., 1962), p. 93, remarks based on the Pili A11guttara-nikiiya, i.285.
12 ]. Rahder, DaJabhumika.sUtra et Bodhisattvabhumi (Chapitres Vihara et Bhumi)
(Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1926), p. 65.
1s Ibid., p. 49.
THE YOG.AC.ARA IDEALISM 69
Vasubandhu's stress on Ideation Only is consistent with the standard doc-
trine of Buddhism through all its periods that the person whose mind is
stabilized or concentrated sees things as they really are. From the beginning,
the theory was that an entity can be somehow visualized mentally in better,
more real or truer form than in ordinary sense perception. To remove error
and illusion, one has to do something about the foundations of mind, rehabili-
tate or transform it. In an ethical sense, the acts of speech and body are
dependent upon the acts of mind ; the latter are the real villain or saint. In
yoga training, one should transfer the object to the mind, then eliminate all
mental straying from the meditative object and avoid any alteration of the
meditative object itself. In the final stage of such meditation, the object ceases
to be the object, since the subject-object relation has been transcended. With
the "eye of prajna"-which is no "eye"-the mediator sees the entity in the
form of the void: he has carried it back to the realm where it abides in itself,
devoid of all adventitious relations, and so it is not the "object" of a "subject."
The M adhyanta-vibhanga teaches that the "imagination of unreality" creates
dependent origination (pratitya-samutpada) and the unreal subject-object
relation, and that liberation is achieved by elimination of the subject-object
duality. It is no wonder, then, that Vasubandhu should write his two classic
treatises about Ideation Only. But he does not forget the viewpoint of the
Madhyanta-vibhanga, on which he wrote the basic commentary. The Buddhist
path is principally in terms of mental training and reorienting, but the goal of
the Y ogacara school was the condition of the dharmadhatu or voidness free
from subject-object duality-the condition called parinf4panna (perfect). Then
the "imagination of unreality" is in voidness, and voidness in it. So, the two
inseparable reals.
The distinctness of the two reals is shown by such statements as whether or
not a tathiigata arises, the void dharmadhiUu abides-eomparable to saying,
whether or not a potter arises, the void clay abides. Immediately it follows that
a tathagata, foremost of all, and all other beings, selves, persons, pertain to
the category called "imagination of unreality." And all grades of matter, subtle
or coarse, pertain to the void dharmadhatu. The inseparability of the two
reals derives from the fact that man has devised this system of thought ; and
man cannot conceive of an act of thinking apart from a substantial vehicle for
thought, cannot conceive of a form without a content. It is significant that the
theory of three buddha bodies arose in the Y ogacara school. The one called
dharmakaya (body of natures) is on the side of the Void Absolute, the self-
abiding D harmadhatu (realm of natures). The two other realms, sambhoga-
kaya (body of bliss) and nirmii:'}akaya (body of transformation), are on the
side of the "imagination of unreality" in the sense, respectively, of the p u r ~
70 ALEX WAYMAN
(person) and maya (illusion-creating power). Hence, Maha.yana Buddhism
teaches that the sambhogakaya has the thirty-two characteristics of the Great
Person ( and teaches that the nirm41!fJk4ya has the power of
magical creation of different bodies, comparable to the illusory power that is
maya (and the two expressions are based on the same Sanskrit root, ma-). So,
the Yogacira school does have a subjective kind of idealistic philosophy limited
to formal cause. The myriad forms of things are no more real than the forms
seen in dream: they are all projections of mind-foundation mind or evolving
mind ( alaya:uijnana or Jwavrttivijnana; citta or caitta the blank screen
(voidness) that is the Absolute in this system, pure substance of unlimited
impressionability, capability, efficiency. The reality of voidness is paramartha-
satya, literally : the actual fact of the supreme thing ( artha). The reality of the
"imagination of unreality" is samvrtisatya, literally : the actual fact of the
covering process. Thus, the "imagination of unreality" covers the pure dhar-
madhatu with transient dharma.s (sams/q'ta-dharma.s), which arise and pass
away with "dependency characteristic" , while it covers
itself with corruptions ( klesa) having the "imaginary characteristic" (parikal-
pita-lakiatJa). And when the pure dharmadhatu is free from those transient
dharma.s evoked by the subject-object covering, it has the "perfect character-
istic" (parl.ipanna-lakiaf}(l). But, before the dharmadhatu can become free of
the "dependency characteristic," the "imagination of unreality" must become
free of the "imaginary characteristic." Therefore the prescription: first, selfless-
ness of personality, and, next, selflessness of dharma.s. That is the Yogidra in
brief.
While the Madhyanta-vibhanga does not discuss how the system takes
account of the multiplicity of beings, one can infer this topic in Sa.mkhya-like
fashion, according to the explanations of Dasgupta. He explains that the first
evolute of pra/q'ti, called buddhi, has a preponderance of intelligence-stuff
( satwa) ; "it thus holds within it the minds ( buddhi) of all purufas which were
lost in prakrti during the pralaya [the quiescent period]." At the beginning of
the new evolution, there is a separating out of the old buddhis, or minds,
belonging to the from beginningless time, and each of these buddhis
holds the old specific ignorance (avidya). This stage is called mahat (the great
one) because it is the synthetic unity of all the minds of the purufas .H There
is as yet no individual evolution, as this will begin with the next evolute, that
called ahamkara. The equivalent statement in Y ogacara terminology is that the
"imagination of unreality" is the synthetic unity of individual citta-samtanas
("streams of thoughts"), each with its specific dharma. Individual evolution
H A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 248-249.
begins at the next stage with dependent origination. Elsewhere I have equated
its first three members with the three kinds of Samkhya ahamkara, as follows :
( 1) unwisdom ( avidya) tamasika ahamkara
(2) motivation (samskara) = rajasika ahamkara
(3) perception (vijnana) = sattvika ahamkara.
15
The pre-ahamkiira stages of the "imagination of unreality" are difficult to
describe. Before the equilibrium is upset it seems to be what some Mahayana
scriptures call the tathagata-garbha (embryo of the tathagata). At this point,
since there is as yet no subject-object duality, this element is not "aimed" at
the pure dharmadhatu. The first change that occurs is a kind of "turning
around" which causes the tathagata-garbha to be reversed into the alayavijnana
(the basic perception), which, the M adhyanta-vibhanga explains, has as object
the mere object (artha). As such, the alayavijnana corresponds to the Siirilk-
hya buddhi, which, as Dasgupta explains, has a mere understanding as "this-
ness."16 The first of the evolving perceptions is called the kl4famanas, and, ac-
cording to the same text, its object is the qualities of the thing (arthavisefa).
This kl4famanas must then correspond to ahamkara and inaugurate dependent
origination.
Chatterjee writes, "For the Vedantin the function of Avidya consists in
covering up the real, which is the unrelated object, the rope, and showing in
its place, the snake; the snake is false because it is subjective which has being
only as it is related with consciousness ( Pratibhasika). The Y ogacara holds
that the function of Avidya is just the reverse; the snake is perfectly real as
the form of the subjective; its illusoriness consists in its objectification; the
snake is false because it is objective."
17
The foregoing discussion leads to the
comment that the person Chatterjee here calls the "Vedantin" could just as
well have been called the "Yogacara" person, with one qualification. That is,
when one goes into the foundations of the Yogacii.ra school to expound the
Yogacara in ways Chatterjee does not--one finds that at the stage of alayavi-
jnana there is still no positive falsification because there is mere object and
nothing else, and so the initial subjectivity does not alter the rope into the
snake: this is the one qualification. But this initial subjectivity has "set the ball
rolling": it is a privation of snake, a forecast of snake. Once the subject-object
duality has been posited, the next stage of "evolving perception" (
is inevitable and necessarily introduces the positive falsification, because the
re-emerging ignorance (avidya) causes the subject to project various transient
15 Alex Wayman, "Buddhist Dependent Origination and the Sarilkhya Gu'l)as," Ethnos,
1962 (The Ethnographical Museum of Sweden, Stockholm), pp. 14-22.
16A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 250.
1i The Y ogacara I deal ism, p. 183.
72
ALEX WAYMAN
dharmas onto the object in the dharmadhiltu. From that time on, the rope is al-
ways falsified into the snake; that is, unless one reverses the process by yoga
meditation or other means to the point where he re-attains the stage of
alayavijnana and then introduces a transmutation (paravrtti) or "turning
around" of this element so that it re-becomes the tathagata-garbha. Then what
shall we say of the person Chatterjee calls the "Yogaci.ra"? The latter is the
one who "holds that consciousness is the sole reality." Chatterjee very well
states how this so-called "Y ogaci.ra" individual regards the function of avidya.
In Chatterjee's excellent chapter entitled "Dharma Theory in the Yogaci.ra,"
he brings forth some facts that might have been, or at least ought to have been,
disquieting to him regarding the thesis of consciousness-only as the sole reality.
Besides the caita"ika-dharmas (the dharmas related to thought), there are the
dharmas called rupas, "out of which the objective world is made." Since
Chatterjee is consistent to the last with this imputation to the Yogaci.ra that
for it subjectivity is the only reality, the objective world false by virtue of
objectivity, he is now forced to say, "It is consciousness itself which creates
and projects these rupas, making them seem as though external and inde-
pendent." This amounts to saying that the rupas, which include such things
as the four elements (fire, wind, etc.) and their derivatives, are projections
of thought, but unaccountably the Y ogaci.ra school believes in these rupas
and still does not classify them as caita"ika-dharmas, which would have proved
Chatterjee's point. The next group of dharmas, called citta-viprayukta-
samskara-dharmas, are even harder to fit into the usual theory-the expression
means "the dharmas or samskaras that are independent of mind ( citta) ."
Chatterjee now writes, "Though they must ultimately pertain to consciousness
in order to attain reality, their relation to consciousness is not very apparent.
They are really 'forces' or functions which are neither specifically material nor
mental; they can belong to either indifferently." However, one need not be
forced into this logical corner if one admits at the beginning of the discussion
the two realities which the Madhyanta-vibhanga set forth in its first verse.
18
These considerations could be continued in extenso, but the conclusion
would be the same. If Chatterjee's "Yogaci.ra" is indeed the Yogaci.ra person
that Vasubandhu was, then Chatterjee's book is certainly a wonderful exposi-
tion of the Yogaci.ra philosophy. But, if the Yogaci.ra fundamentals are what
I have indicated above, happening to be in rough agreement with Raju and
with Dasgupta, the Chatterjee book is still worth reading as a philosophical
exegesis of what was traditionally held, principally by non-Yogaci.rins, to be
the Y ogacara position. And I cannot help admiring the sinewy thread of
philosophical discourse by which he expands his presupposition.
18 Ibid., pp. 143-166, especially pp. 163-165.
The that are independent of mind" deserve some further con-
sideration. These dharmas are included in the Abhidharma-samuccaya of
Asailga, the elder brother of V asubandhu and founder of the Y ogacira school.
Among this class of dharmas, nine seem to correspond to V reals, and
eight of these are designations (prajiiapti) for some feature of the cause-and-
effect continuum. For example, "time" (kala) is among these and is defined by
Asailga as a designation for the evolution of the cause-and-effect continuum.
19
In Yogacara philosophy, the cause-and-effect continuum is what is meant by
the "dependency characteristic" which covers the dhar-
madhatu.20 The dharmadhiitu as voidness is the foundation for objectivity as
impressed upon the dharmadhiitu by the "imagination of unreality." While
the various forms conjured up by that imagination are unreal, the underlying
substance, the content of those forms, is real. So, the cause-and-effect con-
tinuum is not quite real, not quite unreal. However, Asailga has no qualms
about including dharmas equivalent to V reals. One interpretation is
that Asailga intends these particular dharmas to mean something quite dif-
ferent from what they mean in the V system. Asailga employs them
in roughly the same way as does the for .ASail.ga in adhering to an
idealistic viewpoint of the Mahayana did not thereby reject or forget the
realistic viewpoint of the Hinayana.21
19 Pralhad Pradhan, ed., ( Santiniketa.n: Visva-Bharati, 1950),
text, p. 11.
20 Cf. Vijiiaptimlltrati!.siddhi, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang, II, p. 526.
21 Cf. Alex Wayman, Analysis of the Sril'Vakabhumi Manuscript, University of Cali-
fornia Publications in Oassical Philology, Vol. 17 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1961), p. 29.

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