Eleazar Quinto and Gerino Tolentino vs Comelec (Puno, 2010) Facts: The assailed Decision declared as unconstitutional Section

n 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. COMELEC and movants-intervenors filed an MR. SC now reverses this decision.

Issue/ Held: W/N the laws stated above are unconstitutional. | NO. Ratio: Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.: o Under Section 13 of RA 9369, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat. These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. The constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. This is because elected public officials engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period. The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to vote, as well as express their views on political issues, or mention the names of certain candidates for public office whom they support

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. There is a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. The provisions challenged in the case at bar, are not violative of the equal protection clause. The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii) avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the

prospect of favor from political activity). These are interests that are important enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive officials and employees to seek elective office. Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of position being held by the employee running for elective office and the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto. Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are extant only when the incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post. Such a view fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has amassed "the scattered powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power." The alleged overbreadth is more apparent than real. The rules and guidelines set forth in Resolution 8678 refer to the filing of certificates of candidacy and nomination of official candidates of registered political parties, in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. These rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. On this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against Section 4(a) is clearly unsustainable. Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code are likewise not intended to apply to elections for nonpartisan public offices. Elections for barangay offices are the only elections in this country which involve nonpartisan public offices. As far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code in 1985, Congress has intended

that these nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by special rules, including a separate rule on deemed resignations which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election Code. Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail. Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional or void on its face for being overly broad, particularly where, as in this case, "conduct" and not "pure speech" is involved, the overbreadth must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statutes plainly legitimate sweep.

SWS v. COMELEC (2001, Mendoza) Facts: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to

support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective. Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that: (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and 3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the press? Held: yes, it constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression, speech and the press. Ratio:5.4 is invalid because: (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. The O 'Brien test was employed to determine the constitutional validity of 5.4. The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: Government regulation is sufficiently justified: [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;

[2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is "not unrelated to the Expression of free expression." Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question. First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers. In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring personal opinion to statistical results. The prohibition imposed by 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local election. Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation

of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. MR JUSTICE KAPUNAN dissents. He rejects as inappropriate the test of clear and present danger for determining the validity of 5.4. Hence, while it may be useful for determining the validity of laws dealing with inciting to sedition or incendiary speech, it may not be adequate for such regulations as the one in question. For such a test is concerned with questions of the gravity and imminence of the danger as basis for curtailing free speech, which is not the case of 5.4 and similar regulations. Instead, MR JUSTICE KAPUNAN purports to engage in a form of balancing by "weighing and balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights". The dissenting opinion simply concludes that the objectives of Section 5.4 are valid. It may be seen that its limiting impact on the rights of free speech and of the press is not unduly repressive or unreasonable. ABSCBN v Comelec (2000, Panganiban) FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing Comelec en banc Resolution No. 98-1419 1 dated April 21, 1998 which issued a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit survey for the 1998 elections. Comelec insists that the issuance of the resolution was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the [losers] in the election," which in turn may result in "violence and anarchy." Comelec further argues that "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution; and relevant provisions of the

Omnibus Election Code. It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case. The solicitor general, in support of Comelec, adds that the exit polls pose a "clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process," considering that they are not supervised by any government agency and can in general be manipulated easily. He insists that these polls would sow confusion among the voters and would undermine the official tabulation of votes conducted by the Commission, as well as the quick count undertaken by the Namfrel. ISSUE: WON there is a valid justification for the comelec resolution? HELD: NO Freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of a democratic government. It is a 'preferred' right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. The realities of life in a complex society, however, preclude an absolute exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. They are not immune to regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power. There are two theoretical tests in determining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms, these are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. Unquestionably, this Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its validity. And it is respondent's burden to overthrow such presumption. To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown. Thus:

"A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government, if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed. These freedoms have additional importance, because exit polls generate important research data which may be used to study influencing factors and trends in voting behavior. An absolute prohibition would thus be unreasonably restrictive, because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election-day projections, but also for long-term research. The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad. It does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys. The interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, exit polls -- properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud and other electoral ills. The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here. The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus,

voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for. In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people. Phil. Press v. Comelec (1995, Feliciano) Facts: ! ! ! ! Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is assailing the constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by Comelec PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers. Resolution No. 2772 Comelec through Commissioner Maambong sent identical letters to various publishers of newspapers like the Business World, the Philippine Star, the Malaya and the Philippine Times Journal, all members of PPI. These letters read as follows: you are directed to provide free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as "Comelec Space"or similar to the print support which you have extended during the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections which was 2 full pages for each political party fielding senatorial candidates, from March 6, 1995 to May 6, 1995, to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. PPI: declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.

It also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, 1 of the press and of expression. OSG: Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. o Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. Comelec: Resolution No. 2772, particularly Section 2 thereof and the 22 March 1995 letters dispatched to various members of petitioner PPI, were not intended to compel those members to supply Comelec with free print space. o Resolution and the related letterdirectives were merely designed to solicit from the publishers the same free print space which many publishers had voluntarily given to Comelec during the election period relating to the 11 May 1992 elections. That Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express terms, threaten publishers who would disregard it or its implementing letters with some criminal or other sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the Comelec's original intention was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from publishers. A written communication officially directing a print media company to supply free print space, dispatched by a government (here a constitutional) agency and signed by a member of the Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the company so addressed.

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That the agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the imposition of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such directions, only aggravates the constitutional difficulties in hearing in the present situation. To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory "donation:" only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often as Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed. The taking of print space may first be appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use o the necessity for the taking; o legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. it has not been suggested that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the free "Comelec space" would be used not only for informing the public about the identities, qualifications and programs of government of candidates for elective office but also for "dissemination of vital election information"

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(including, presumably, circulars, regulations, notices, directives, etc. issued by Comelec). government offices and agencies (including the Supreme Court) simply purchase print space, in the ordinary course of events, when their rules and regulations, circulars, notices and so forth need officially to be brought to the attention of the general public. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by COMELEC, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. On police power: there was no effort to show that the police power has been constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission. while private property may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police 5 power. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State. On Sec. 8: Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. No newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or

political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest. Section 8 should be viewed in the context of our decision in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections. o There the Court sustained the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and airtime for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Comelec. o the Court carefully distinguished (a) paid political advertisements which are reached by the prohibition of Section 11 (b), from (b) the reporting of news, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentators or columnists which fall outside the scope of Section 11 (b) and which are protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of the Comelec to establish a guideline for implementation doctrine in National Press Club an effort not blessed with evident success. The distinction between paid political advertisements on the one hand and news reports, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be given operative meaning only in actual cases or controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts. At all events, PPI has failed to allege any specific affirmative action on the part of Comelec designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under Section 8. the precise constitutional issue here sought to be raised whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the Comelec's power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution to

supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits for the operation of media of communication or information [for the purpose of ensuring] equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly honest, peaceful and credible elections not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8. o