Ideally therefore the Critique should be read again and.

again until each sentence can be interpreted in the light of the entire book. on the plausibility of its conclusions rests the entire Critical Phi losophy., yo mentionbut one of these valuable glimpses into Kant's thought, the problem of the relation between transcendental and empirical mentalactivities is; as it were, debated in the first edition, but. avoided in the second. Kant never resolved the contradictions which stem from this problem, the passage in' the nrst, edition called the subjective eduction,. which Kant omitted entirely from the second edition is the key. to the interpretation of the entire Critique that without the !ub"ective eduction Kant's argument is incomprehensible, while by means of its suggestions, the argument becomes perfectly clear.

#s presented by Kemp !mith,$ the theory is that the first edition eduction comprises passages e%pounding four stages in the development of Kant's thought. &hese are described by Kemp !mith as being 'I( the doctrine of the Dissertation, which is distinctly pre)critical; '*( a semi)critical, or early, revision of this; '+( the mature, or Critical, doctrine, which reappears in the second edition; and ',( a super) or post)critical theory which Kant developed on the eve of the publication of the Critique and then dropped when he reali-ed its incompatibility with the rest of his argument. This last layer is the so)called !ub"ective eduction,
.hat I wish to protest against is the doctrine that Kant took isolated and contradictory notes, dating. from different,periods, and "oined them together in a purely e%ternal manner.s

Paton long and conscientious commentary

which outweighs the measure of historical accuracy/ he does not e%plain the te%t. 0e tells us that the several parts of the cllapfe&are'consisrerii, but he never shows us how they fit together. .ith the !ub"ective eduction it is entirely otherwise. &he e%position "erks and "umps, strange phrases abound which seem to contradict Kant's most cherished dogmas, problems are introduced which bear no relation to one another and solutions

offered, which do not hang together. 1or the most provocative and e%citing suggestions of the !ub"ective eduction do not reappear in ordered form in the 2b"ective eduction. &o mention '(lllythe two most striking cases/ neither the discussion ofthe concept of an ob"ectof knowledge nor the detailed analysis of the activity of .'synthesis is ever.recapitulated in the supposedly progressive e%position of the 2b)' fective eduction.

my aim is philosophical clarity rather than historical accuracy.

&he second section contaius the collection of passages known as the !ub"ective eduction, and the third section presents in orderly form theofficia!..Q!?'j~~edl:!ction of the Pure Concept~. !ections I and + are reasonably clear and straightforward; it is only !ection * which can be called a $patchwork.$ In the second edition!ections * and + were replaced by a new 2b"ective educ t~ on which glosses over most of the problems dealt with in Sec~ non *. 0ence, if deduction be the establishing of the credentials of a concept, it is a transcendental rather than an empirical deduction which these concepts re3uire &he pure concepts of understanding, however, are not thus limited. &hey abstract from all sensible conditions, and relate to ob"ects universally 2b"ects must conform to the conditions of intuition in order to be ob"ects for us, or appeatances 4Par. 56, but there is not, on the face of it, any reason to suppose that they must also conform to the categories.

&he entire Critical Philosophy, as I have indicated above, can b'fl. viewed as a systematic inventory of the possessions of the minc7 8ore strictly, a deduction is a demonstration o.f th..e ob"ec.). 9 rive validity of a concept ) a proof, that is, that, its employment yields knowledge.
<,

&hus, a deduction seeks to establish the possibility of a concept, and Kant's new transcendental methode consists in discovering the conditions, other than the merely logical, for the

$possibility of certain basic a priori concepts.

if we have knowledge of non)e%perienced ob"ects, it will necessarily be a priori knowledge. :ut the reverse is not at all the case, for we might 3uite well have a priori knowledge of ob"ects of e%perience ) physics and geometry are the e%amples Kant often cites.

I1;<;=CI# ;=&<; ;> P<2:>;8# ; ># P2!I:I>I # ;> C2=2CI8I;=&2 ; ># <;#>I # I= ;P;= I;=&; '&<#!C;= ;=&;(, ? ;> P<2:>;8# ; ># P2!I:I>I # ;> C2=2CI8I;=&2 # P<I2<I C282 &#> '&<#!C;= ;=&; 2 &<#!C;= ;=&#>(

Kant will solve his problem by denying the uncondi//l tionality of the pure concepts. &hey, like the forms of sensibility, have only a conditional universality. #ll events have causes, but events are only appearances, not reality. &he converse, $whatever is somewhere, e%ists,$ is valid, as the realm of the predicate includes the realm of the sub"ect. the pure concepts are not at first sight conditions of e%perience, so that we must prove their a priori applicability to e%perience. additional proof is needed that these appearances actually do conform to the pure concepts.
~ome

what Kant aims to prove ,is precisely that .. appearances cannot be given to us unless they conform to the pure. concepts. &he categories are conditions of the possibility of con) 9@ sciousness itself, Kant later argues,. &here can be no appearances $given in intuition independently of functions of the understanding.$
1'

.e may formulate this new problem by saying that the pure concepts, unlike space and time, are not conditions of something appearing, and hence need a special "ustification. 0owever, by the time we have finished, it will turn out that in fact the pure concepts are conditions 'of something appearing, and have a cognitive status like that of space and time. .hen this point is reached, we will be able to see that intuitions and concepts are actually "oint elements in cognition, each one indispensable for knowledge.
&hus, the only/ way to e%plain the a priori

validity of the pure concepts is to claim that they determine their ob"ects. !pace and time determine the way in which ob"ects appear, and the categories determine the way in which ob"ects are thought. The epistemological turn. =ow such a picture makes ontology logically prior to6 epistemology/ what is is decided independently of what we can know to be. &he Critique of Pure Reason records Kant's effort . to reverse this order of dependence. the very act of first working out a doctrine of epistemological priority. &his is a perfectly legitimate mode of speech, for according to the Critique the self is known only through its activities and the contents of its consciousness. Kant identifies a faculty with its activity, or an activity with its product. ;ither the representation must 1ait upon the ob"ect, in which case the knowledge based upon/' it is a posteriori, or the representation precedes and determines the ob"ect, in whichcase the knowledge is a priori. &he causal dependence gives way to logical or evidential dependence as the problem of a priori knowledge comes to the fore. &he representation determines the ob"ect in the sense that only through it is the object knowlable. known.$ Knowledge therefore was conditional upon an independently e%isting realm of being. =ow., however, Kant propose..A; to reverse this order, making the realm of e%isting ob"ects dependent upon the sub"ective conditions of knowledge, &he a

&he realms of lielng and knowledge' are coterminous, and even more significantly, the'lauer defines the former. .hat can I knowB becomes the first and fundamental 3uestion of all philosophy. 0ence when Kant says, in the ne%t paragraph of C D,, that the categories are a priori conditions of the possibility of e%perience, this means that they are conditions of knotoledge."
It contains material, found nowhere else in the. Critique,

which we must have in order to understand the very terms, in which, Kant uses his argument. &his is most clear with regard to the central term of the #nalytic/synthesis r ! ) &he !ub"ective eduction oes not mere y give us a physiological account. of the origins of synthesis; it tells us what the word $synthesis$ means. Entil know that, we know nothing about the criti3ue. the apparently contradictory notion of synthetic unity. 2n. the face of it, there can be no such thing as the unity 0 a manifo>d 'literally, the oneness of a manyness(, ?et con;ciousness e%hibits "ust this property, for all the varied and everchanging contents of consciousness are united as my thoughts, # serious philosophical argu/ ment cannot be based on a metaphorical premise. &herefore the$$,F,. 2b"ective eduction must be .pre.ceded by an analysis of synthetiC. ,@' ,,@ unity which will e"plain what it is. by telling h#$ it is produced. Synthesis is reproduction according to a rule. the unity of consciousness is not some ob"e1t which can be sepaf rated from the process which creates it. It is( characteristic which the contents of consciousness have by %irtue of ha%ing been synthesi&ed. 0ence it is 3uite misguided to assert that we can describe the unity without committing ourselves to any definite theory about the synthesis 'nidad es product de la s(ntesis. &his enthymeme, which proves to be the key to the early stages of the eduction proof, is the assertion that the representations contained in consciousness can be. viewed in two ways, either as ob"ects of awareness simpliciter or as representations of something other' than themselves.
&he unity of consciousness is a fact of logic, not a datum of introspective psychology/

&houghts are not like stones in a heap, or rabbits in a hat. &hey do not simply lie in the mind as an aggregate of unconnected contents. &hey are all bound up together as the thoughts of one mind. &hey are all my thoughts, and only mine.
Kant claims that ifk mamf2Id of representations are bound up in one consciousness, then it follows that they are related to one another by association.

:ut he denies the converse/ perceptions' or concepts may stand in V associative relations without being part of the same consciousness.

&he analysis of the unity of consciousness, though it played an essential role in the eduction, was never carried far enough to resolve its difficulties and obscurities. .here they concentrated their attention on the ob"ects 0 awareness, he sought the nature of awareness itself, this referential function e%ists whether or not there really is CV5 some ob"ect to be represented. It is precisely because the concept., '9 of a unicorn purports to represent that we can call it fictitious. Ideas: como datos o eventos de la conciencia. O como datos o eventos de la conciencia con sentido , esto es, con un grado de validez objetiva (o por lo menos pretensin de ella).
# visual perception of a table is not, on any )reasonable phenomenalist.theory, a piece of the table, like a leg or drawer. #s Kant makes brilliantly clear in the !econd #nalogy, an ob"ect viewed as a perceptual construct is a collection of "udgments, not a "igsaw pu--le of little bits of immaterial matter.

&he task which Kants set himself in the Criti3ue is to prove rigorously that we have genuine empirical knowledge, assuming as his only premise the fact of the unity of consciousness.
&he problem of the first )stageB, then, is to discover. a chain of argument which will link the unity ofconsciousness with the possibility of knowledge. In fact he does meetm ili!t~middle with the proposition that the concept of the &ranscendental 2b"ect X must have universal applicability to the contents of consciousness. necessity. Knowledge is the assertion of a necessary connection bet; eenthe sub"ect and the predicate of a "udgment. I am asserting that there is an ob"ective connection'D among these properties, such that!l"~~!~! connect them in my "udgment.

lifIi;'"

0ence there must be some other kind' of necessity of connection between $body$ and $weight.$ Kant calls such a connection a synthetic unity and the problem thus becomes that of synthetic "udgments a)priori*" what bindsthese diverse representations

together is simply the idea that they are all representations of the same object. &he shape and solidity of the desk do not go together by virtue of some direct identity or similarity between them; they are the shape andsolidity of the desk, and hence we can "oin them in the "udgment, $the rectangular desk is solid.$ &his is what we mean when we say that the "udgmentis true, and not "ust an idle fancy. In Kant's lan ua e#i~is.a! r$%~~?#?&:t:n'tyof representations,$ .hich means .a.gf'(und..(o&~ynth~'i~)'!!*ity .. :ut, Kant argues,.$it is easiFy) seen.that this o~i~ct"""ust. be thought only

)%/..Gsmce..olrtslde'gur knowledge we have D9~:s~~~~i::~+t:+,)~o~~~- ~e:no~~:# as~:~:s.v~~a:n'e:~:d:/0:y~~~j)

a!!ometllltigingeneraC.... H our representations, ~he source of the~ unity /nust. be sought in the concept of an ob"ect = ", and not in the ob"ect itself. It has shown, Kant believes, that if the concept of the &rascendental 2b"ect I % is applicable to all the contents of consciousness, then they will all be capable of being "oined in valid empirical "udgements.
=ow we see that there I! a way in which the con tents of consciousness can establish necessary relations with one another. &his is possible only if they are referred, qua representations, to an ob"ect which serves 'as $the ground of their unity.

If
I am conscious and my consciousness has a unity, then .it must be possible for me to ac3uire valid empirical knowledge.
I!)

Kant clearly must work out a more detailed and ade3uate account of the notion of ob"ectivity, and connect it with an e%panded theory of the concept of an ob"ect ".

how an a priori but empty concept can shed an aura of necessity on rcontent)ful but a posteriori empirical concepts.