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Schiller, The Aesthetical Essays http://www.gutenberg.net/browse/BIBREC/BR6 !".

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The %ro&ect 'utenberg EBoo( The Aesthetical Essays o) *re+erich Schiller Title: The Aesthetical Essays Author: *re+erich Schiller Schiller, ,n the Subli-e .$an is ne/er oblige+ to say, I -ust00-ust,. says the 1ew 2athan 34essing5s play, .2athan the 6ise,. act i. scene 7.8 to the +er/ish9 an+ this e:pression is true in a wi+er sense than -an -ight be te-pte+ to suppose. The will is the speci)ic character o) -an, an+ reason itsel) is only the eternal rule o) his will. All nature acts reasonably9 all our prerogati/e is to act reasonably, with consciousness an+ with will. All other ob&ects obey necessity9 -an is the being who wills. It is e:actly )or this reason that there is nothing -ore inconsistent with the +ignity o) -an than to su))er /iolence, )or /iolence e))aces hi-. #e who +oes /iolence to us +isputes nothing less than our hu-anity9 he who sub-its in a cowar+ly spirit to the /iolence ab+icates his ;uality o) -an. But this pretension to re-ain absolutely )ree )ro- all that is /iolence see-s to i-ply a being in possession o) a )orce su))iciently great to (eep o)) all other )orces. But i) this pretension is )oun+ in a being who, in the or+er o) )orces, cannot clai- the )irst ran(, the result is an un)ortunate contra+iction between his instinct an+ his power. $an is precisely in this case. Surroun+e+ by nu-berless )orces, which are all superior to hi- an+ hol+ sway o/er hi-, he aspires by his nature not to ha/e to su))er any in&ury at their han+s. It is true that by his intelligence he a++s arti)icially to his natural )orces, an+ that up to a certain point he actually succee+s in reigning physically o/er e/erything that is physical. The pro/erb says, .there is a re-e+y )or e/erything e:cept +eath9. but this e:ception, i) it is one in the strictest acceptation o) the ter-, woul+ su))ice to entirely ruin the /ery i+ea o) our nature. 2e/er will -an be the cause that wills, i) there is a case, a single case, in which, with or without his consent, he is )orce+ to what he +oes not wish. This single terrible e:ception, to be or to +o what is necessary an+ not what he wishes, this i+ea will pursue hi- as a phanto-9 an+ as we see in )act a-ong the greater part o) -en, it will gi/e hi- up a prey to the blin+ terrors o) i-agination. #is boaste+

liberty is nothing, i) there is a single point where he is un+er constraint an+ boun+. It is e+ucation that -ust gi/e bac( liberty to -an, an+ help hi- to co-plete the whole i+ea o) his nature. It ought, there)ore, to -a(e hi- capable o) -a(ing his will pre/ail, )or, I repeat it, -an is the being who wills. It is possible to reach this en+ in two ways: either really, by opposing )orce to )orce, by co--an+ing nature, as nature yoursel)9 or by the i+ea, issuing )ro- nature, an+ by thus +estroying in relation to sel) the /ery i+ea o) /iolence. All that helps -an really to hol+ sway o/er nature is what is style+ physical e+ucation. $an culti/ates his un+erstan+ing an+ +e/elops his physical )orce, either to con/ert the )orces o) nature, accor+ing to their proper laws, into the instru-ents o) his will, or to secure hi-sel) against their e))ects when he cannot +irect the-. But the )orces o) nature can only be +irecte+ or turne+ asi+e up to a certain point9 beyon+ that point they with+raw )ro- the in)luence o) -an an+ place hi- un+er theirs. Thus beyon+ the point in ;uestion his )ree+o- woul+ be lost, were he only susceptible o) physical e+ucation. But he -ust be -an in the )ull sense o) the ter-, an+ conse;uently he -ust ha/e nothing to en+ure, in any case, contrary to his will. Accor+ingly, when he can no longer oppose to the physical )orces any proportional physical )orce, only one resource re-ains to hi- to a/oi+ su))ering any /iolence: that is, to cause to cease entirely that relation which is so )atal to hi-. It is, in short, to annihilate as an i+ea the /iolence he is oblige+ to su))er in )act. The e+ucation that )its -an )or this is calle+ -oral e+ucation. The -an )ashione+ by -oral e+ucation, an+ he only, is entirely )ree. #e is either superior to nature as a power, or he is in har-ony with her. 2one o) the actions that she brings to bear upon hi- is /iolence, )or be)ore reaching hi- it has beco-e an act o) his own will, an+ +yna-ic nature coul+ ne/er touch hi-, because he spontaneously (eeps away )roall to which she can reach. But to attain to this state o) -in+, which -orality +esignates as resignation to necessary things, an+ religion styles absolute sub-ission to the counsels o) %ro/i+ence, to reach this by an e))ort o) his )ree will an+ with re)lection, a certain clearness is re;uire+ in thought, an+ a certain energy in the will, superior to what -an co--only possesses in acti/e li)e. #appily )or hi-, -an )in+s here not only in his rational nature a -oral aptitu+e that can be +e/elope+ by the un+erstan+ing, but also in his reasonable an+ sensible nature00that is, in his hu-an nature00an aesthetic ten+ency which see-s to ha/e been place+ there e:pressly: a )aculty awa(ens o) itsel) in the presence o) certain sensuous ob&ects, an+ which, a)ter our )eelings are puri)ie+, can be culti/ate+ to such a point as to beco-e a power)ul i+eal +e/elop-ent. This aptitu+e, I grant, is i+ealistic in its principle an+ in its essence, but one which e/en the realist allows to be seen clearly enough

in his con+uct, though he +oes not ac(nowle+ge this in theory. I a- now about to +iscuss this )aculty. I a+-it that the sense o) the beauti)ul, when it is +e/elope+ by culture, su))ices o) itsel) e/en to -a(e us, in a certain sense, in+epen+ent o) nature as )ar as it is a )orce. A -in+ that has ennoble+ itsel) su))iciently to be -ore sensible o) the )or- than o) the -atter o) things, contains in itsel) a plenitu+e o) e:istence that nothing coul+ -a(e it lose, especially as it +oes not trouble itsel) about the possession o) the things in ;uestion, an+ )in+s a /ery liberal pleasure in the -ere conte-plation o) the pheno-enon. As this -in+ has no want to appropriate the ob&ects in the -i+st o) which it li/es, it has no )ear o) being +epri/e+ o) the-. But it is ne/ertheless necessary that these pheno-ena shoul+ ha/e a bo+y, through which they -ani)est the-sel/es9 an+, conse;uently, as long as we )eel the want e/en only o) )in+ing a beauti)ul appearance or a beauti)ul pheno-enon, this want i-plies that o) the e:istence o) certain ob&ects9 an+ it )ollows that our satis)action still +epen+s on nature, consi+ere+ as a )orce, because it is nature who +isposes o) all e:istence in a so/ereign -anner. It is a +i))erent thing, in )act, to )eel in yoursel) the want o) ob&ects en+owe+ with beauty an+ goo+ness, or si-ply to re;uire that the ob&ects which surroun+ us are goo+ an+ beauti)ul. This last +esire is co-patible with the -ost per)ect )ree+o- o) the soul9 but it is not so with the other. 6e are entitle+ to re;uire that the ob&ect be)ore us shoul+ be beauti)ul an+ goo+, but we can only wish that the beauti)ul an+ the goo+ shoul+ be reali<e+ ob&ecti/ely be)ore us. 2ow the +isposition o) -in+ is, par e:cellence, calle+ gran+ an+ subli-e, in which no attention is gi/en to the ;uestion o) (nowing i) the beauti)ul, the goo+, an+ the per)ect e:ist9 but when it is rigorously re;uire+ that that which e:ists shoul+ be goo+, beauti)ul an+ per)ect, this character o) -in+ is calle+ subli-e, because it contains in it positi/ely all the characteristics o) a )ine -in+ without sharing its negati/e )eatures. A sign by which beauti)ul an+ goo+ -in+s, but ha/ing wea(nesses, are recogni<e+, is the aspiring always to )in+ their -oral i+eal reali<e+ in the worl+ o) )acts, an+ their being pain)ully a))ecte+ by all that places an obstacle to it. A -in+ thus constitute+ is re+uce+ to a sa+ state o) +epen+ence in relation to chance, an+ it -ay always be pre+icte+ o) it, without )ear o) +eception, that it will gi/e too large a share to the -atter in -oral an+ aesthetical things, an+ that it will not sustain the -ore critical trials o) character an+ taste. $oral i-per)ections ought not to be to us a cause o) su))ering an+ o) pain: su))ering an+ pain bespea( rather an ungrati)ie+ wish than an unsatis)ie+ -oral want. An unsatis)ie+ -oral want ought to be acco-panie+ by a -ore -anly )eeling, an+ )orti)y our -in+ an+ con)ir- it in its energy rather than -a(e us unhappy an+ pusillani-ous. 2ature has gi/en to us two genii as co-panions in our li)e in this lower

worl+. The one, a-iable an+ o) goo+ co-panionship, shortens the troubles o) the &ourney by the gayety o) its plays. It -a(es the chains o) necessity light to us, an+ lea+s us a-i+st &oy an+ laughter, to the -ost perilous spots, where we -ust act as pure spirits an+ strip oursel/es o) all that is bo+y, on the (nowle+ge o) the true an+ the practice o) +uty. ,nce when we are there, it aban+ons us, )or its real- is li-ite+ to the worl+ o) sense9 its earthly wings coul+ not carry it beyon+. But at this -o-ent the other co-panion steps upon the stage, silent an+ gra/e, an+ with his power)ul ar- carries us beyon+ the precipice that -a+e us gi++y. In the )or-er o) these genii we recogni<e the )eeling o) the beauti)ul, in the other the )eeling o) the subli-e. 2o +oubt the beauti)ul itsel) is alrea+y an e:pression o) liberty. This liberty is not the (in+ that raises us abo/e the power o) nature, an+ that sets us )ree )ro- all bo+ily in)luence, but it is only the liberty which we en&oy as -en, without issuing )ro- the li-its o) nature. In the presence o) beauty we )eel oursel/es )ree, because the sensuous instincts are in har-ony with the laws o) reason. In presence o) the subli-e we )eel oursel/es subli-e, because the sensuous instincts ha/e no in)luence o/er the &uris+iction o) reason, because it is then the pure spirit that acts in us as i) it were not absolutely sub&ect to any other laws than its own. The )eeling o) the subli-e is a -i:e+ )eeling. It is at once a pain)ul state, which in its paro:ys- is -ani)este+ by a (in+ o) shu++er, an+ a &oyous state, that -ay rise to rapture, an+ which, without being properly a pleasure, is greatly pre)erre+ to e/ery (in+ o) pleasure by +elicate souls. This union o) two contrary sensations in one an+ the sa-e )eeling pro/es in a pere-ptory -anner our -oral in+epen+ence. *or as it is absolutely i-possible that the sa-e ob&ect shoul+ be with us in two opposite relations, it )ollows that it is we oursel/es who sustain two +i))erent relations with the ob&ect. It )ollows that these two oppose+ natures shoul+ be unite+ in us, which, on the i+ea o) this ob&ect, are brought into play in two per)ectly opposite ways. Thus we e:perience by the )eeling o) the beauti)ul that the state o) our spiritual nature is not necessarily +eter-ine+ by the state o) our sensuous nature9 that the laws o) nature are not necessarily our laws9 an+ that there is in us an autono-ous principle in+epen+ent o) all sensuous i-pressions. The subli-e ob&ect -ay be consi+ere+ in two lights. 6e either represent it to our co-prehension, an+ we try in /ain to -a(e an i-age or i+ea o) it, or we re)er it to our /ital )orce, an+ we consi+er it as a power be)ore which ours is nothing. But though in both cases we e:perience in connection with this ob&ect the pain)ul )eeling o) our li-its, yet we +o not see( to a/oi+ it9 on the contrary we are attracte+ to it by an irresistible )orce. Coul+ this be the case i) the li-its o) our i-agination were at the sa-e ti-e those o) our co-prehension= Shoul+ we be willingly calle+ bac( to the )eeling o) the o-nipotence o) the )orces

o) nature i) we ha+ not in us so-ething that cannot be a prey o) these )orces. 6e are please+ with the spectacle o) the sensuous in)inite, because we are able to attain by thought what the senses can no longer e-brace an+ what the un+erstan+ing cannot grasp. The sight o) a terrible ob&ect transports us with enthusias-, because we are capable o) willing what the instincts re&ect with horror, an+ o) re&ecting what they +esire. 6e willingly allow our i-agination to )in+ so-ething in the worl+ o) pheno-ena that passes beyon+ it9 because, a)ter all, it is only one sensuous )orce that triu-phs o/er another sensuous )orce, but nature, notwithstan+ing all her in)inity, cannot attain to the absolute gran+eur which is in oursel/es. 6e sub-it willingly to physical necessity both our well0being an+ our e:istence. This is because the /ery power re-in+s us that there are in us principles that escape its e-pire. $an is in the han+s o) nature, but the will o) -an is in his own han+s. 2ature hersel) has actually use+ a sensuous -eans to teach us that we are so-ething -ore than -ere sensuous natures. She has e/en (nown how to -a(e use o) our sensations to put us on the trac( o) this +isco/ery00that we are by no -eans sub&ect as sla/es to the /iolence o) the sensations. An+ this is ;uite a +i))erent e))ect )ro- that which can be pro+uce+ by the beauti)ul9 I -ean the beauti)ul o) the real worl+, )or the subli-e itsel) is surpasse+ by the i+eal. In the presence o) beauty, reason an+ sense are in har-ony, an+ it is only on account o) this har-ony that the beauti)ul has attraction )or us. Conse;uently, beauty alone coul+ ne/er teach us that our +estination is to act as pure intelligences, an+ that we are capable o) showing oursel/es such. In the presence o) the subli-e, on the contrary, reason an+ the sensuous are not in har-ony, an+ it is precisely this contra+iction between the two which -a(es the charo) the subli-e00its irresistible action on our -in+s. #ere the physical -an an+ the -oral -an separate in the -ost -ar(e+ -anner9 )or it is e:actly in the presence o) ob&ects that -a(e us )eel at once how li-ite+ the )or-er is that the other -a(es the e:perience o) its )orce. The /ery thing that lowers one to the earth is precisely that which raises the other to the in)inite. 4et us i-agine a -an en+owe+ with all the /irtues o) which the union constitutes a )ine character. 4et us suppose a -an who )in+s his +elight in practising &ustice, bene)icence, -o+eration, constancy, an+ goo+ )aith. All the +uties whose acco-plish-ent is prescribe+ to hi- by circu-stances are only a play to hi-, an+ I a+-it that )ortune )a/ors hiin such wise that none o) the actions which his goo+ heart -ay +e-an+ o) hi- will be har+ to hi-. 6ho woul+ not be char-e+ with such a +elight)ul har-ony between the instincts o) nature an+ the prescriptions o) reason= an+ who coul+ help a+-iring such a -an= 2e/ertheless, though he -ay inspire us with a))ection, are we ;uite sure that he is really /irtuous= ,r in general that he has anything that correspon+s to the i+ea o) /irtue= I) this -an ha+ only in /iew to obtain agreeable sensations,

unless he were -a+ he coul+ not act in any other possible way9 an+ he woul+ ha/e to be his own ene-y to wish to be /icious. %erhaps the principle o) his actions is pure, but this is a ;uestion to be +iscusse+ between hi-sel) an+ his conscience. *or our part, we see nothing o) it9 we +o not see hi- +o anything -ore than a si-ply cle/er -an woul+ +o who ha+ no other go+ than pleasure. Thus all his /irtue is a pheno-enon that is e:plaine+ by reasons +eri/e+ )ro- the sensuous or+er, an+ we are by no -eans +ri/en to see( )or reasons beyon+ the worl+ o) sense. 4et us suppose that this sa-e -an )alls su++enly un+er -is)ortune. #e is +epri/e+ o) his possessions9 his reputation is +estroye+9 he is chaine+ to his be+ by sic(ness an+ su))ering9 he is robbe+ by +eath o) all those he lo/es9 he is )orsa(en in his +istress by all in who- he ha+ truste+. 4et us un+er these circu-stances again see( hi-, an+ +e-an+ the practice o) the sa-e /irtues un+er trial as he )or-erly ha+ practise+ +uring the perio+ o) his prosperity. I) he is )oun+ to be absolutely the sa-e as be)ore, i) his po/erty has not +eteriorate+ his bene/olence, or ingratitu+e his (in+ly o))ices o) goo+0will, or bo+ily su))ering his e;uani-ity, or a+/ersity his &oy in the happiness o) others9 i) his change o) )ortune is perceptible in e:ternals, but not in his habits, in the -atter, but not in the )or- o) his con+uct9 then, +oubtless, his /irtue coul+ not be e:plaine+ by any reason +rawn )ro- the physical or+er9 the i+ea o) nature00which always necessarily supposes that actual pheno-ena rest upon so-e anterior pheno-enon, as e))ects upon cause00this i+ea no longer su))ices to enable us to co-prehen+ this -an9 because there is nothing -ore contra+ictory than to a+-it that e))ect can re-ain the sa-e when the cause has change+ to its contrary. 6e -ust then gi/e up all natural e:planation or thought o) )in+ing the reason o) his acts in his con+ition9 we -ust o) necessity go beyon+ the physical or+er, an+ see( the principle o) his con+uct in ;uite another worl+, to which the reason can in+ee+ raise itsel) with its i+eas, but which the un+erstan+ing cannot grasp by its conceptions. It is this re/elation o) the absolute -oral power which is sub&ecte+ to no con+ition o) nature, it is this which gi/es to the -elancholy )eeling that sei<es our heart at the sight o) such a -an that peculiar, ine:pressible char-, which no +elight o) the senses, howe/er re)ine+, coul+ arouse in us to the sa-e e:tent as the subli-e. Thus the subli-e opens to us a roa+ to o/erstep the li-its o) the worl+ o) sense, in which the )eeling o) the beauti)ul woul+ )ore/er i-prison us. It is not little by little >)or between absolute +epen+ence an+ absolute liberty there is no possible transition?, it is su++enly an+ by a shoc( that the subli-e wrenches our spiritual an+ in+epen+ent nature away )ro- the net which )eeling has spun roun+ us, an+ which enchains the soul the -ore tightly because o) its subtle te:ture. 6hate/er -ay be the e:tent to which )eeling has gaine+ a -astery o/er -en by the latent in)luence o) a so)tening taste, when e/en it shoul+ ha/e succee+e+ in

penetrating into the -ost secret recesses o) -oral &uris+iction un+er the +ecepti/e en/elope o) spiritual beauty, an+ there poisoning the holiness o) principle at its source00one single subli-e e-otion o)ten su))ices to brea( all this tissue o) i-posture, at one blow to gi/e )ree+o- to the )ettere+ elasticity o) spiritual nature, to re/eal its true +estination, an+ to oblige it to concei/e, )or one instant at least, the )eeling o) its liberty. Beauty, un+er the shape o) the +i/ine Calypso, bewitche+ the /irtuous son o) @lysses, an+ the power o) her char-s hel+ hi- long a prisoner in her islan+. *or long he belie/e+ he was obeying an i--ortal +i/inity, whilst he was only the sla/e o) sense9 but su++enly an i-pression o) the subli-e in the )or- o) $entor sei<es hi-9 he re-e-bers that he is calle+ to a higher +estiny00he throws hi-sel) into the wa/es, an+ is )ree. The subli-e, li(e the beauti)ul, is sprea+ pro)usely throughout nature, an+ the )aculty to )eel both one an+ the other has been gi/en to all -en9 but the ger- +oes not +e/elop e;ually9 it is necessary that art shoul+ len+ its ai+. The ai- o) nature supposes alrea+y that we ought spontaneously to a+/ance towar+s the beauti)ul, although we still a/oi+ the subli-e: )or the beauti)ul is li(e the nurse o) our chil+hoo+, an+ it is )or her to re)ine our soul in with+rawing it )ro- the ru+e state o) nature. But though she is our )irst a))ection, an+ our )aculty o) )eeling is )irst +e/elope+ )or her, nature has so pro/i+e+, ne/ertheless, that this )aculty ripens slowly an+ awaits its )ull +e/elop-ent until the un+erstan+ing an+ the heart are )or-e+. I) taste attains its )ull -aturity be)ore truth an+ -orality ha/e been establishe+ in our heart by a better roa+ than that which taste woul+ ta(e, the sensuous worl+ woul+ re-ain the li-it o) our aspirations. 6e shoul+ not (now, either in our i+eas or in our )eelings, how to pass beyon+ the worl+ o) sense, an+ all that i-agination )aile+ to represent woul+ be without reality to us. But happily it enters into the plan o) nature, that taste, although it )irst co-es into bloo-, is the last to ripen o) all the )aculties o) the -in+. Auring this inter/al, -an has ti-e to store up in his -in+ a pro/ision o) i+eas, a treasure o) principles in his heart, an+ then to +e/elop especially, in +rawing )ro- reason, his )eeling )or the great an+ the subli-e. As long as -an was only the sla/e o) physical necessity, while he ha+ )oun+ no issue to escape )ro- the narrow circle o) his appetites, an+ while he as yet )elt none o) that superior liberty which connects hiwith the angels, nature, so )ar as she is inco-prehensible, coul+ not )ail to i-press hi- with the insu))iciency o) his i-agination, an+ again, as )ar as she is a +estructi/e )orce, to recall his physical powerlessness. #e is )orce+ then to pass ti-i+ly towar+s one, an+ to turn away with a))right )ro- the other. But scarcely has )ree conte-plation assure+ hi- against the blin+ oppression o) the )orces o) nature00scarcely has he recogni<e+ a-i+st the ti+e o) pheno-ena so-ething

per-anent in his own being00than at once the coarse agglo-eration o) nature that surroun+s hi- begins to spea( in another language to his heart, an+ the relati/e gran+eur which is without beco-es )or hi- a -irror in which he conte-plates the absolute greatness which is within hi-sel). #e approaches without )ear, an+ with a thrill o) pleasure, those pictures which terri)ie+ his i-agination, an+ intentionally -a(es an appeal to the whole strength o) that )aculty by which we represent the in)inite percei/e+ by the senses, in or+er i) she )ails in this atte-pt, to )eel all the -ore /i/i+ly how -uch these i+eas are superior to all that the highest sensuous )aculty can gi/e. The sight o) a +istant in)inity00o) heights beyon+ /ision, this /ast ocean which is at his )eet, that other ocean still -ore /ast which stretches abo/e his hea+, transport an+ ra/ish his -in+ beyon+ the narrow circle o) the real, beyon+ this narrow an+ oppressi/e prison o) physical li)e. The si-ple -a&esty o) nature o))ers hi- a less circu-scribe+ -easure )or esti-ating its gran+eur, an+, surroun+e+ by the gran+ outlines which it presents to hi-, he can no longer bear anything -ean in his way o) thin(ing. 6ho can tell how -any lu-inous i+eas, how -any heroic resolutions, which woul+ ne/er ha/e been concei/e+ in the +ar( stu+y o) the i-prisone+ -an o) science, nor in the saloons where the people o) society elbow each other, ha/e been inspire+ on a su++en +uring a wal(, only by the contact an+ the generous struggle o) the soul with the great spirit o) nature= 6ho (nows i) it is not owing to a less )re;uent intercourse with this subli-e spirit that we -ust partially attribute the narrowness o) -in+ so co--on to the +wellers in towns, always bent un+er the -inutiae which +war) an+ wither their soul, whilst the soul o) the no-a+ re-ains open an+ )ree as the )ir-a-ent beneath which he pitches his tent= But it is not only the uni-aginable or the subli-e in ;uantity, it is also the inco-prehensible, that which escapes the un+erstan+ing an+ that which troubles it, which can ser/e to gi/e us an i+ea o) the super0sensuous in)inity. As soon as this ele-ent attains the gran+iose an+ announces itsel) to us as the wor( o) nature >)or otherwise it is only +espicable?, it then ai+s the soul to represent to itsel) the i+eal, an+ i-prints upon it a noble +e/elop-ent. 6ho +oes not lo/e the elo;uent +isor+er o) natural scenery to the insipi+ regularity o) a *rench gar+en= 6ho +oes not a+-ire in the plains o) Sicily the -ar/ellous co-bat o) nature with hersel)00o) her creati/e )orce an+ her +estructi/e power= 6ho +oes not pre)er to )east his eyes upon the wil+ strea-s an+ water)alls o) Scotlan+, upon its -isty -ountains, upon that ro-antic nature )ro- which ,ssian +rew his inspiration00rather than to grow enthusiastic in this sti)) #ollan+, be)ore the laborious triu-ph o) patience o/er the -ost stubborn o) ele-ents= 2o one will +eny that in the rich gra<ing0groun+s o) #ollan+, things are not better or+ere+ )or the wants o) physical -an than upon the per)i+ crater o) Besu/ius, an+ that the un+erstan+ing which li(es to co-prehen+ an+ arrange all things, +oes not )in+ its re;uire-ents rather in the regularly plante+

)ar-0gar+en than in the unculti/ate+ beauty o) natural scenery. But -an has re;uire-ents which go beyon+ those o) natural li)e an+ co-)ort or well0being9 he has another +estiny than -erely to co-prehen+ the pheno-ena which surroun+ hi-. In the sa-e -anner as )or the obser/ant tra/eller, the strange wil+ness o) nature is so attracti/e in physical nature00thus, an+ )or the sa-e reason, e/ery soul capable o) enthusias- )in+s e/en in the regrettable anarchy )oun+ in the -oral worl+ a source o) singular pleasure. 6ithout +oubt he who sees the gran+ econo-y o) nature only )ro- the i-po/erishe+ light o) the un+erstan+ing9 he who has ne/er any other thought than to re)or- its +e)iant +isor+er an+ to substitute har-ony, such a one coul+ not )in+ pleasure in a worl+ which see-s gi/en up to the caprice o) chance rather than go/erne+ accor+ing to a wise or+ination, an+ where -erit an+ )ortune are )or the -ost part in opposition. #e +esires that the whole worl+ throughout its /ast space shoul+ be rule+ li(e a house well regulate+9 an+ when this -uch0+esire+ regularity is not )oun+, he has no other resource than to +e)er to a )uture li)e, an+ to another an+ better nature, the satis)action which is his +ue, but which neither the present nor the past a))or+ hi-. ,n the contrary, he renounces willingly the pretension o) restoring this chaos o) pheno-ena to one single notion9 he regains on another si+e, an+ with interest, what he loses on this si+e. 1ust this want o) connection, this anarchy, in the pheno-ena, -a(ing the- useless to the un+erstan+ing, is what -a(es the- /aluable to reason. The -ore they are +isor+erly the -ore they represent the )ree+oo) nature. In a sense, i) you suppress all connection, you ha/e in+epen+ence. Thus, un+er the i+ea o) liberty, reason brings bac( to unity o) thought that which the un+erstan+ing coul+ not bring to unity o) notion. It thus shows its superiority o/er the un+erstan+ing, as a )aculty sub&ect to the con+itions o) a sensuous or+er. 6hen we consi+er o) what /alue it is to a rational being to be in+epen+ent o) natural laws, we see how -uch -an )in+s in the liberty o) subli-e ob&ects as a set0o)) against the chec(s o) his cogniti/e )aculty. 4iberty, with all its +rawbac(s, is e/erywhere /astly -ore attracti/e to a noble soul than goo+ social or+er without it00than society li(e a )loc( o) sheep, or a -achine wor(ing li(e a watch. This -echanis- -a(es o) -an only a pro+uct9 liberty -a(es hi- the citi<en o) a better worl+. It is only thus /iewe+ that history is subli-e to -e. The worl+, as a historic ob&ect, is only the stri)e o) natural )orces9 with one another an+ with -an5s )ree+o-. #istory registers -ore actions re)erable to nature than to )ree will9 it is only in a )ew cases, li(e Cato an+ %hocion, that reason has -a+e its power )elt. I) we e:pect a treasury o) (nowle+ge in history how we are +ecei/e+C All atte-pts o) philosophy to reconcile what the -oral worl+ +e-an+s with what the real worl+ gi/es is belie+ by e:perience, an+ nature see-s as illogical in history as she is logical in the organic (ing+o-s.

But i) we gi/e up e:planation it is +i))erent. 2ature, in being capricious an+ +e)ying logic, in pulling +own great an+ little, in crushing the noblest wor(s o) -an, ta(ing centuries to )or-00nature, by +e/iating )ro- intellectual laws, pro/es that you cannot e:plain nature by nature5s laws the-sel/es, an+ this sight +ri/es the -in+ to the worl+ o) i+eas, to the absolute. But though nature as a sensuous acti/ity +ri/es us to the i+eal, it throws us still -ore into the worl+ o) i+eas by the terrible. ,ur highest aspiration is to be in goo+ relations with physical nature, without /iolating -orality. But it is not always con/enient to ser/e two -asters9 an+ though +uty an+ the appetites shoul+ ne/er be at stri)e, physical necessity is pere-ptory, an+ nothing can sa/e -en )ro- e/il +estiny. #appy is he who learns to bear what he cannot changeC There are cases where )ate o/erpowers all ra-parts, an+ where the only resistance is, li(e a pure spirit, to throw )reely o)) all interest o) sense, an+ strip yoursel) o) your bo+y. 2ow this )orce co-es )rosubli-e e-otions, an+ a )re;uent co--erce with +estructi/e nature. %athos is a sort o) arti)icial -is)ortune, an+ brings us to the spiritual law that co--an+s our soul. Real -is)ortune +oes not always choose its ti-e opportunely, while pathos )in+s us ar-e+ at all points. By )re;uently renewing this e:ercise o) its own acti/ity the -in+ controls the sensuous, so that when real -is)ortune co-es, it can treat it as an arti)icial su))ering, an+ -a(e it a subli-e e-otion. Thus pathos ta(es away so-e o) the -alignity o) +estiny, an+ war+s o)) its blows. Away then with that )alse theory which supposes )alsely a har-ony bin+ing well being an+ well +oing. 4et e/il +estiny show its )ace. ,ur sa)ety is not in blin+ness, but in )acing our +angers. 6hat can +o so better than )a-iliarity with the splen+i+ an+ terrible e/olution o) e/ents, or than pictures showing -an in con)lict with chance9 e/il triu-phant, security +ecei/e+00pictures shown us throughout history, an+ place+ be)ore us by trage+y= 6hoe/er passes in re/iew the terrible )ate o) $ithri+ates, o) Syracuse, an+ Carthage, cannot help (eeping his appetite in chec(, at least )or a ti-e, an+, seeing the /anity o) things, stri/e a)ter that which is per-anent. The capacity o) the subli-e is one o) the noblest aptitu+es o) -an. Beauty is use)ul, but +oes not go beyon+ -an. The subli-e applies to the pure spirit. The subli-e -ust be &oine+ to the beauti)ul to co-plete the aesthetic e+ucation, an+ to enlarge -an5s heart beyon+ the sensuous worl+. 6ithout the beauti)ul there woul+ be an eternal stri)e between our natural an+ rational +estiny. I) we only thought o) our /ocation as spirits we shoul+ be strangers to this sphere o) li)e. 6ithout the subli-e, beauty woul+ -a(e us )orget our +ignity. Ener/ate+00we++e+ to this transient state, we shoul+ lose sight o) our true country. 6e are

only per)ect citi<ens o) nature when the subli-e is we++e+ to the beauti)ul. $any things in nature o))er -an the beauti)ul an+ subli-e. But here again he is better ser/e+ at secon+0han+. #e pre)ers to ha/e therea+y0-a+e in art rather than see( the- pain)ully in nature. This instinct )or i-itation in art has the a+/antage o) being able to -a(e those points essential that nature has -a+e secon+ary. 6hile nature su))ers /iolence in the organic worl+, or e:ercises /iolence, wor(ing with power upon -an, though she can only be aesthetical as an ob&ect o) pure conte-plation, art, plastic art, is )ully )ree, because it throws o)) all acci+ental restrictions an+ lea/es the -in+ )ree, because it i-itates the appearance, not the reality o) ob&ects. As all subli-ity an+ beauty consists in the appearance, an+ not in the /alue o) the ob&ect, it )ollows that art has all the a+/antages o) nature without her shac(les.

T#E %AT#ETIC. The +epicting o) su))ering, in the shape o) si-ple su))ering, is ne/er the en+ o) art, but it is o) the greatest i-portance as a -eans o) attaining its en+. The highest ai- o) art is to represent the super0sensuous, an+ this is e))ecte+ in particular by tragic art, because it represents by sensible -ar(s the -oral -an, -aintaining hi-sel) in a state o) passion, in+epen+ently o) the laws o) nature. The principle o) )ree+o- in -an beco-es conscious o) itsel) only by the resistance it o))ers to the /iolence o) the )eelings. 2ow the resistance can only be -easure+ by the strength o) the attac(. In or+er, there)ore, that the intelligence -ay re/eal itsel) in -an as a )orce in+epen+ent o) nature, it is necessary that nature shoul+ ha/e )irst +isplaye+ all her power be)ore our eyes. The sensuous being -ust be pro)oun+ly an+ strongly a))ecte+, passion -ust be in play, that the reasonable being -ay be able to testi)y his in+epen+ence an+ -ani)est hi-sel) in action. It is i-possible to (now i) the e-pire which -an has o/er his a))ections is the e))ect o) a -oral )orce, till we ha/e ac;uire+ the certainty that it is not an e))ect o) insensibility. There is no -erit in -astering the )eelings which only lightly an+ transitorily s(i- o/er the sur)ace o) the soul. But to resist a te-pest which stirs up the whole o) sensuous nature, an+ to preser/e in it the )ree+o- o) the soul, a )aculty o) resistance is re;uire+ in)initely superior to the act o) natural )orce. Accor+ingly it will not be possible to represent -oral )ree+o-, e:cept by e:pressing passion, or su))ering nature, with the greatest /i/i+ness9 an+

the hero o) trage+y -ust )irst ha/e &usti)ie+ his clai- to be a sensuous being be)ore aspiring to our ho-age as a reasonable being, an+ -a(ing us belie/e in his strength o) -in+. There)ore the pathetic is the )irst con+ition re;uire+ -ost strictly in a tragic author, an+ he is allowe+ to carry his +escription o) su))ering as )ar as possible, without pre&u+ice to the highest en+ o) his art, that is, without -oral )ree+o- being oppresse+ by it. #e -ust gi/e in so-e sort to his hero, as to his rea+er, their )ull loa+ o) su))ering, without which the ;uestion will always be put whether the resistance oppose+ to su))ering is an act o) the soul, so-ething positi/e, or whether it is not rather a purely negati/e thing, a si-ple +e)iciency. The latter case is o))ere+ in the purer *rench trage+y, where it is /ery rare, or perhaps une:a-ple+, )or the author to place be)ore the rea+er su))ering nature, an+ where generally, on the contrary, it is only the poet who war-s up an+ +eclai-s, or the co-e+ian who struts about on stilts. The icy tone o) +ecla-ation e:tinguishes all nature here, an+ the *rench trage+ians, with their superstitious worship o) +ecoru-, -a(e it ;uite i-possible )or the- to paint hu-an nature truly. Aecoru-, where/er it is, e/en in its proper place, always )alsi)ies the e:pression o) nature, an+ yet this e:pression is rigorously re;uire+ by art. In a *rench trage+y, it is +i))icult )or us to belie/e that the hero e/er su))ers, )or he e:plains the state o) his soul, as the coolest -an woul+ +o, an+ always thin(ing o) the e))ect he is -a(ing on others, he ne/er lets nature pour )orth )reely. The (ings, the princesses, an+ the heroes o) Corneille or Boltaire ne/er )orget their ran( e/en in the -ost /iolent e:cess o) passion9 an+ they part with their hu-anity -uch sooner than with their +ignity. They are li(e those (ings an+ e-perors o) our ol+ picture0boo(s, who go to be+ with their crowns on. 6hat a +i))erence )ro- the 'ree(s an+ those o) the -o+erns who ha/e been inspire+ with their spirit in poetryC 2e/er +oes the 'ree( poet blush at nature9 he lea/es to the sensuous all its rights, an+ yet he is ;uite certain ne/er to be sub+ue+ by it. #e has too -uch +epth an+ too -uch rectitu+e in his -in+ not to +istinguish the acci+ental, which is the principal point with )alse taste, )ro- the really necessary9 but all that is not hu-anity itsel) is acci+ental in -an. The 'ree( artist who has to represent a 4aocoon, a 2iobe, an+ a %hiloctetes, +oes not care )or the (ing, the princess, or the (ing5s son9 he (eeps to the -an. Accor+ingly the s(il)ul statuary sets asi+e the +rapery, an+ shows us nu+e )igures, though he (nows ;uite well it is not so in real li)e. This is because +rapery is to hi- an acci+ental thing, an+ because the necessary ought ne/er to be sacri)ice+ to the acci+ental. It is also because, i) +ecency an+ physical necessities ha/e their laws, these laws are not those o) art. The statuary ought to show us, an+ wishes to show us, the -an hi-sel)9 +rapery conceals hi-, there)ore he sets that asi+e, an+ with

reason. The 'ree( sculptor re&ects +rapery as a useless an+ e-barrassing loa+, to -a(e way )or hu-an nature9 an+ in li(e -anner the 'ree( poet e-ancipates the hu-an personages he brings )orwar+ )ro- the e;ually useless constraint o) +ecoru-, an+ all those icy laws o) propriety, which put nothing but what is arti)icial in -an, an+ conceal nature in it. Ta(e #o-er an+ the trage+ians9 su))ering nature spea(s the language o) truth an+ ingenuousness in their pages, an+ in a way to penetrate to the +epths o) our hearts. All the passions play their part )reely, nor +o the rules o) propriety co-press any )eeling with the 'ree(s. The heroes are &ust as -uch un+er the in)luence o) su))ering as other -en, an+ what -a(es the- heroes is the /ery )act that they )eel su))ering strongly an+ +eeply, without su))ering o/erco-ing the-. They lo/e li)e as ar+ently as others9 but they are not so rule+ by this )eeling as to be unable to gi/e up li)e when the +uties o) honor or hu-anity call on the- to +o so. %hiloctetes )ille+ the 'ree( stage with his la-entations9 #ercules hi-sel), when in )ury, +oes not (eep un+er his grie). Iphigenia, on the point o) being sacri)ice+, con)esses with a touching ingenuousness that she grie/es to part with the light o) the sun. 2e/er +oes the 'ree( place his glory in being insensible or in+i))erent to su))ering, but rather in supporting it, though )eeling it in its )ulness. The /ery go+s o) the 'ree(s -ust pay their tribute to nature, when the poet wishes to -a(e the- appro:i-ate to hu-anity. $ars, when woun+e+, roars li(e ten thousan+ -en together, an+ Benus, scratche+ by an iron lance, -ounts again to ,ly-pus, weeping, an+ cursing all battles. This li/ely susceptibility on the score o) su))ering, this war-, ingenuous nature, showing itsel) unco/ere+ an+ in all truth in the -onu-ents o) 'ree( art, an+ )illing us with such +eep an+ li/ely e-otions00this is a -o+el presente+ )or the i-itation o) all artists9 it is a law which 'ree( genius has lai+ +own )or the )ine arts. It is always an+ eternally nature which has the )irst rights o/er -an9 she ought ne/er to be )ettere+, because -an, be)ore being anything else, is a sensuous creature. A)ter the rights o) nature co-e those o) reason, because -an is a rational, sensuous being, a -oral person, an+ because it is a +uty )or this person not to let hi-sel) be rule+ by nature, but to rule her. It is only a)ter satis)action has been gi/en in the )irst place to nature, an+ a)ter reason in the secon+ place has -a+e its rights ac(nowle+ge+, that it is per-itte+ )or +ecoru- in the thir+ place to -a(e goo+ its clai-s, to i-pose on -an, in the e:pression o) his -oral )eelings an+ o) his sensations, consi+erations towar+s society, an+ to show in it the social being, the ci/ili<e+ -an. The )irst law o) the tragic art was to represent su))ering nature. The secon+ law is to represent the resistance o) -orality oppose+ to su))ering. A))ection, as a))ection, is an uni-portant thing9 an+ the portraiture o)

a))ection, consi+ere+ in itsel), woul+ be without any aesthetic /alue9 )or, I repeat it, nothing that only interests sensuous nature is worthy o) being represente+ by art. Thus not only the a))ections that +o nothing but ener/ate an+ so)ten -an, but in general all a))ections, e/en those that are e:alte+, ecstatic, whate/er -ay be their nature, are beneath the +ignity o) tragic art. The so)t e-otions, only pro+ucing ten+erness, are o) the nature o) the agreeable, with which the )ine arts are not concerne+. They only caress the senses, while rela:ing an+ creating langui+ness, an+ only relate to e:ternal nature, not at all to the inner nature o) -an. A goo+ nu-ber o) our ro-ances an+ o) our trage+ies, particularly those that bear the na-e o) +ra-as00a sort o) co-pro-ise between trage+y an+ co-e+y00a goo+ nu-ber also o) those highly0appreciate+ )a-ily portraits, belong to this class. The only e))ect o) these wor(s is to e-pty the lachry-al +uct, an+ soothe the o/er)lowing )eelings9 but the -in+ co-es bac( )ro- the- e-pty, an+ the -oral being, the noblest part o) our nature, gathers no new strength whate/er )ro- the-. .It is thus,. says Dant, .that -any persons )eel the-sel/es e+i)ie+ by a ser-on that has nothing e+i)ying in it.. It see-s also that -o+ern -usic only ai-s at interesting the sensuous, an+ in this it )latters the taste o) the +ay, which see(s to be agreeably tic(le+, but not to be startle+, nor strongly -o/e+ an+ ele/ate+. Accor+ingly we see -usic pre)er all that is ten+er9 an+ whate/er be the noise in a concert0roo-, silence is i--e+iately restore+, an+ e/ery one is all ears +irectly a senti-ental passage is per)or-e+. Then an e:pression o) sensibility co--on to ani-alis- shows itsel) co--only on all )aces9 the eyes are swi--ing with into:ication, the open -outh is all +esire, a /oluptuous tre-bling ta(es hol+ o) the entire bo+y, the breath is ;uic( an+ )ull, in short, all the sy-pto-s o) into:ication appear. This is an e/i+ent proo) that the senses swi- in +elight, but that the -in+ or the principle o) )ree+o- in -an has beco-e a prey to the /iolence o) the sensuous i-pression. Real taste, that o) noble an+ -anly -in+s, re&ects all these e-otions as unworthy o) art, because they only please the senses, with which art has nothing in co--on. But, on the other han+, real taste e:clu+es all e:tre-e a))ections, which only put sensuousness to the torture, without gi/ing the -in+ any co-pensation. These a))ections oppress -oral liberty by pain, as the others by /oluptuousness9 conse;uently they can e:cite a/ersion, an+ not the e-otion that woul+ alone be worthy o) art. Art ought to char- the -in+ an+ gi/e satis)action to the )eeling o) -oral )ree+o-. This -an who is a prey to his pain is to -e si-ply a torture+ ani-ate being, an+ not a -an trie+ by su))ering. *or a -oral resistance to pain)ul a))ections is alrea+y re;uire+ o) -an00a resistance which can alone allow the principle o) -oral )ree+o-, the intelligence, to -a(e itsel) (nown in it. I) it is so, the poets an+ the artists are poor a+epts in their art when

they see( to reach the pathetic only by the sensuous )orce o) a))ection an+ by representing su))ering in the -ost /i/i+ -anner. They )orget that su))ering in itsel) can ne/er be the last en+ o) i-itation, nor the i--e+iate source o) the pleasure we e:perience in trage+y. The pathetic only has aesthetic /alue in as )ar as it is subli-e. 2ow, e))ects that only allow us to in)er a purely sensuous cause, an+ that are )oun+e+ only on the a))ection e:perience+ by the )aculty o) sense, are ne/er subli-e, whate/er energy they -ay +isplay, )or e/erything subli-e procee+s e:clusi/ely )ro- the reason. I i-ply by passion the a))ections o) pleasure as well as the pain)ul a))ections, an+ to represent passion only, without coupling with it the e:pression o) the super0sensuous )aculty which resists it, is to )all into what is properly calle+ /ulgarity9 an+ the opposite is calle+ nobility. Bulgarity an+ nobility are two i+eas which, where/er they are applie+, ha/e -ore or less relation with the super0sensuous share a -an ta(es in a wor(. There is nothing noble but what has its source in the reason9 all that issues )ro- sensuousness alone is /ulgar or co--on. 6e say o) a -an that he acts in a /ulgar -anner when he is satis)ie+ with obeying the suggestions o) his sensuous instinct9 that he acts suitably when he only obeys his instinct in con)or-ity with the laws9 that he acts nobly when he obeys reason only, without ha/ing regar+ to his instincts. 6e say o) a physiogno-y that it is co--on when it +oes not show any trace o) the spiritual -an, the intelligence9 we say it has e:pression when it is the -in+ which has +eter-ine+ its )eatures: an+ that it is noble when a pure spirit has +eter-ine+ the-. I) an architectural wor( is in ;uestion we ;uali)y it as co--on i) it ai-s at nothing but a physical en+9 we na-e it noble i), in+epen+ently o) all physical ai-, we )in+ in it at the sa-e ti-e the e:pression o) a conception. Accor+ingly, I repeat it, correct taste +isallows all painting o) the a))ections, howe/er energetic, which rests satis)ie+ with e:pressing physical su))ering an+ the physical resistance oppose+ to it by the sub&ect, without -a(ing /isible at the sa-e ti-e the superior principle o) the nature o) -an, the presence o) a super0sensuous )aculty. It +oes this in /irtue o) the principle +e/elope+ )arther bac(, na-ely, that it is not su))ering in itsel), but only the resistance oppose+ to su))ering, that is pathetic an+ +eser/ing o) being represente+. It is )or this reason that all the absolutely e:tre-e +egrees o) the a))ections are )orbi++en to the artist as well as to the poet. All o) these, in )act, oppress the )orce that resists )ro- within or rather, all betray o) the-sel/es, an+ without any necessity o) other sy-pto-s, the oppression o) this )orce, because no a))ection can reach this last +egree o) intensity as long as the intelligence in -an -a(es any resistance. Then another ;uestion presents itsel). #ow is this principle o) resistance, this super0sensuous )orce, -ani)este+ in the pheno-enon o)

the a))ections= ,nly in one way, by -astering or, -ore co--only, by co-bating a))ection. I say a))ection, )or sensuousness can also )ight, but this co-bat o) sensuousness is not carrie+ on with the a))ection, but with the cause that pro+uces it9 a contest which has no -oral character, but is all physical, the sa-e co-bat that the earthwor-, tro++en un+er )oot, an+ the woun+e+ bull engage in, without thereby e:citing the pathetic. 6hen su))ering -an see(s to gi/e an e:pression to his )eelings, to re-o/e his ene-y, to shelter the su))ering li-b, he +oes all this in co--on with the ani-als, an+ instinct alone ta(es the initiati/e here, without the will being applie+ to. There)ore, this is not an act that e-anates )ro- the -an hi-sel), nor +oes it show hi- as an intelligence. Sensuous nature will always )ight the ene-y that -a(es it su))er, but it will ne/er )ight against itsel). ,n the other han+, the contest with a))ection is a contest with sensuousness, an+ conse;uently presupposes so-ething that is +istinct )ro- sensuous nature. $an can +e)en+ hi-sel) with the help o) co--on sense an+ his -uscular strength against the ob&ect that -a(es hi- su))er9 against su))ering itsel) he has no other ar-s than those o) reason. These i+eas -ust present the-sel/es to the eye in the portraiture o) the a))ections, or be awa(ene+ by this portraiture in or+er that the pathetic -ay e:ist. But it is i-possible to represent i+eas, in the proper sense o) the wor+, an+ positi/ely, as nothing correspon+s to pure i+eas in the worl+ o) sense. But they can be always represente+ negati/ely an+ in an in+irect way i) the sensuous pheno-enon by which they are -ani)este+ has so-e character o) which you woul+ see( in /ain the con+itions in physical nature. All pheno-ena o) which the ulti-ate principle cannot be +eri/e+ )ro- the worl+ o) sense are an in+irect representation o) the upper0sensuous ele-ent. An+ how +oes one succee+ in representing so-ething that is abo/e nature without ha/ing recourse to supernatural -eans= 6hat can this pheno-enon be which is acco-plishe+ by natural )orces00otherwise it woul+ not be a pheno-enon00an+ yet which cannot be +eri/e+ )ro- physical causes without a contra+iction= This is the proble-9 how can the artist sol/e it= It -ust be re-e-bere+ that the pheno-ena obser/able in a -an in a state o) passion are o) two (in+s. They are either pheno-ena connecte+ si-ply with ani-al nature, an+ which, there)ore, only obey the physical law, without the will being able to -aster the-, or the in+epen+ent )orce in hi- being able to e:ercise an i--e+iate in)luence o/er the-. It is the instinct which i--e+iately pro+uces these pheno-ena, an+ they obey blin+ly the laws o) instinct. To this (in+ belong, )or e:a-ple, the organs o) the circulation o) the bloo+, o) respiration, an+ all the sur)ace o) the s(in. But, -oreo/er, the other organs, an+ those sub&ect to the will, +o not always await the +ecision o) the will9 an+ o)ten

instinct itsel) sets the- i--e+iately in play, especially when the physical state is threatene+ with pain or with +anger. Thus, the -o/e-ents o) -y ar- +epen+, it is true, on -y will9 but i) I place -y han+, without (nowing it, on a burning bo+y, the -o/e-ent by which I +raw it bac( is certainly not a /oluntary act, but a purely instincti/e pheno-enon. 2ay -ore, speech is assure+ly sub&ect to the e-pire o) the will, an+ yet instinct can also +ispose o) this organ accor+ing to its whi-, an+ e/en o) this an+ o) the -in+, without consulting be)orehan+ the will, +irectly a sharp pain, or e/en an energetic a))ection, ta(es us by surprise. Ta(e the -ost i-passible stoic an+ -a(e hi- see su++enly so-ething /ery won+er)ul, or a terrible an+ une:pecte+ ob&ect. *ancy hi-, )or e:a-ple, present when a -an slips an+ )alls to the botto- o) an abyss. A shout, a resoun+ing cry, an+ not only inarticulate, but a +istinct wor+ will escape his lips, an+ nature will ha/e acte+ in hibe)ore the will: a certain proo) that there are in -an pheno-ena which cannot be re)erre+ to his person as an intelligence, but only to his instinct as a natural )orce. But there is also in -an a secon+ or+er o) pheno-ena, which are sub&ect to the in)luence an+ e-pire o) the will, or which -ay be consi+ere+ at all e/ents as being o) such a (in+ that will -ight always ha/e pre/ente+ the-, conse;uently pheno-ena )or which the person an+ not instinct is responsible. It is the o))ice o) instinct to watch with a blin+ <eal o/er the interests o) the senses9 but it is the o))ice o) the person to hol+ instinct in proper boun+s, out o) respect )or the -oral law. Instinct in itsel) +oes not hol+ account o) any law9 but the person ought to watch that instinct -ay not in)ringe in any way on the +ecrees o) reason. It is there)ore e/i+ent that it is not )or instinct alone to +eter-ine uncon+itionally all the pheno-ena that ta(e place in -an in the state o) a))ection, an+ that on the contrary the will o) -an can place li-its to instinct. 6hen instinct only +eter-ines all pheno-ena in -an, there is nothing -ore that can recall the person9 there is only a physical creature be)ore you, an+ conse;uently an ani-al9 )or e/ery physical creature sub&ect to the sway o) instinct is nothing else. There)ore, i) you wish to represent the person itsel), you -ust propose to yoursel) in -an certain pheno-ena that ha/e been +eter-ine+ in opposition to instinct, or at least that ha/e not been +eter-ine+ by instinct. That they ha/e not been +eter-ine+ by instinct is su))icient to re)er the- to a higher source, the -o-ent we see that instinct woul+ no +oubt ha/e +eter-ine+ the- in another way i) its )orce ha+ not been bro(en by so-e obstacle. 6e are now in a position to point out in what way the super0sensuous ele-ent, the -oral an+ in+epen+ent )orce o) -an, his Ego in short, can be represente+ in the pheno-ena o) the a))ections. I un+erstan+ that this is possible i) the parts which only obey physical nature, those where will either +isposes nothing at all, or only un+er certain circu-stances,

betray the presence o) su))ering9 an+ i) those, on the contrary, that escape the blin+ sway o) instinct, that only obey physical nature, show no trace, or only a /ery )eeble trace, o) su))ering, an+ conse;uently appear to ha/e a certain +egree o) )ree+o-. 2ow this want o) har-ony between the )eatures i-printe+ on ani-al nature in /irtue o) the laws o) physical necessity, an+ those +eter-ine+ with the spiritual an+ in+epen+ent )aculty o) -an, is precisely the point by which that super0sensuous principle is +isco/ere+ in -an capable o) placing li-its to the e))ects pro+uce+ by physical nature, an+ there)ore +istinct )rothe latter. The purely ani-al part o) -an obeys the physical law, an+ conse;uently -ay show itsel) oppresse+ by the a))ection. It is, there)ore, in this part that all the strength o) passion shows itsel), an+ it answers in so-e +egree as a -easure to esti-ate the resistance00 that is to say, o) the energy o) the -oral )aculty in -an00which can only be &u+ge+ accor+ing to the )orce o) the attac(. Thus in proportion as the a))ection -ani)ests itsel) with +ecision an+ /iolence in the )iel+ o) ani-al nature, without being able to e:ercise the sa-e power in the )iel+ o) hu-an nature, so in proportion the latter -a(es itsel) -ani)estly (nown00in the sa-e proportion the -oral in+epen+ence o) -an shows itsel) gloriously: the portraiture beco-es pathetic an+ the pathetic subli-e. The statues o) the ancients -a(e this principle o) aesthetics sensible to us9 but it is +i))icult to re+uce to conceptions an+ e:press in wor+s what the /ery inspection o) ancient statues -a(es the senses )eel in so li/ely a -anner. The group o) 4aocoon an+ his chil+ren can gi/e to a great e:tent the -easure o) what the plastic art o) the ancients was capable o) pro+ucing in the -atter o) pathos. 6inc(el-ann, in his .#istory o) Art,., says: .4aocoon is nature sei<e+ in the highest +egree o) su))ering, un+er the )eatures o) a -an who see(s to gather up against pain all the strength o) which the -in+ is conscious. #ence while his su))ering swells his -uscles an+ stretches his ner/es, the -in+, ar-e+ with an interior )orce shows itsel) on his contracte+ brow, an+ the breast rises, because the breathing is bro(en, an+ because there is an internal struggle to (eep in the e:pression o) pain, an+ press it bac( into his heart. The sigh o) anguish he wishes to (eep in, his /ery breath which he s-others, e:haust the lower part o) his trun(, an+ wor(s into his )lan(s, which -a(e us &u+ge in so-e +egree o) the palpitations o) his /isceral organs. But his own su))ering appears to occasion less anguish than the pain o) his chil+ren, who turn their )aces towar+ their )ather, an+ i-plore hi-, crying )or help. #is )ather5s heart shows itsel) in his eyes, )ull o) sa+ness, an+ where pity see-s to swi- in a trouble+ clou+. #is )ace e:presses la-ent, but he +oes not cry9 his eyes are turne+ to hea/en, an+ i-plore help )ro- on high. #is -outh also -ar(s a supre-e sa+ness, which +epresses the lower lip an+ see-s to weigh upon it, while the upper lip, contracte+ )ro- the top to the botto-, e:presses at once both physical su))ering an+ that o) the soul. @n+er the -outh there is an e:pression o) in+ignation that see-s to protest

against an un+eser/e+ su))ering, an+ is re/eale+ in the nostrils, which swell out an+ enlarge an+ +raw upwar+s. @n+er the )orehea+, the struggle between pain an+ -oral strength, unite+ as it were in a single point, is represente+ with great truth, )or, while pain contracts an+ raises the eyebrows, the e))ort oppose+ to it by the will +raws +own towar+s the upper eyeli+ all the -uscles abo/e it, so that the eyeli+ is al-ost co/ere+ by the-. The artist, not being able to e-bellish nature, has sought at least to +e/elop its -eans, to increase its e))ect an+ power. 6here is the greatest a-ount o) pain is also the highest beauty. The le)t si+e, which the serpent besets with his )urious bites, an+ where he instils his poison, is that which appears to su))er the -ost intensely, because sensation is there nearest to the heart. The legs stri/e to raise the-sel/es as i) to shun the e/il9 the whole bo+y is nothing but -o/e-ent, an+ e/en the traces o) the chisel contribute to the illusion9 we see- to see the shu++ering an+ icy0col+ s(in.. #ow great is the truth an+ acuteness o) this analysisC In what a superior style is this struggle between spirit an+ the su))ering o) nature +e/elope+C #ow correctly the author has sei<e+ each o) the pheno-ena in which the ani-al ele-ent an+ the hu-an ele-ent -ani)est the-sel/es, the constraint o) nature an+ the in+epen+ence o) reasonC It is well (nown that Birgil has +escribe+ this sa-e scene in his .Aenei+,. but it +i+ not enter into the plan o) the epic poet to pause as the sculptor +i+, an+ +escribe the -oral nature o) 4aocoon9 )or this recital is in Birgil only an episo+e9 an+ the ob&ect he proposes is su))iciently attaine+ by the si-ple +escription o) the physical pheno-enon, without the necessity on his part o) loo(ing into the soul o) the unhappy su))erer, as his ai- is less to inspire us with pity than to )ill us with terror. The +uty o) the poet )ro- this point o) /iew was purely negati/e9 I -ean he ha+ only to a/oi+ carrying the picture o) physical su))ering to such a +egree that all e:pression o) hu-an +ignity or o) -oral resistance woul+ cease, )or i) he ha+ +one this in+ignation an+ +isgust woul+ certainly be )elt. #e, there)ore, pre)erre+ to con)ine hi-sel) to the representation o) the least o) the su))ering, an+ he )oun+ it a+/isable to +well at length on the )or-i+able nature o) the two serpents, an+ on the rage with which they attac( their /icti-s, rather than on the )eelings o) 4aocoon. #e only s(i-s o/er those )eelings, because his )irst ob&ect was to represent a chastise-ent sent by the go+s, an+ to pro+uce an i-pression o) terror that nothing coul+ +i-inish. I) he ha+, on the contrary, +etaine+ our loo(s on the person o) 4aocoon hi-sel) with as -uch perse/erance as the statuary, instea+ o) on the chasti<ing +eity, the su))ering -an woul+ ha/e beco-e the hero o) the scene, an+ the episo+e woul+ ha/e lost its propriety in connection with the whole piece. The narrati/e o) Birgil is well (nown through the e:cellent co--entary o) 4essing. But 4essing only propose+ to -a(e e/i+ent by this e:a-ple the

li-its that separate partial +escription )ro- painting, an+ not to -a(e the notion o) the pathetic issue )ro- it. Eet the passage o) Birgil +oes not appear to -e less /aluable )or this latter ob&ect, an+ I cra/e per-ission to bring it )orwar+ again un+er this point o) /iew:00 Ecce aute- ge-ini Tene+o tran;uilla per alta >#orresco re)erens? i--ensis orbibus angues Incu-bunt pelago, pariter;ue a+ litora ten+unt9 %ectora ;uoru- inter )luctus arrecta &ubae;ue Sanguineae e:superant un+as9 pars caetera pontu%one legit, sinuat;ue i--ensa /olu-ine terga. *it sonitus spu-ante salo, &a-;ue ar/a tenebant, Ar+entes oculos su))ecti sanguine et igni, Sibila la-bebant linguis /ibrantibus oraC Aenei+, ii. FG70FHH. 6e )in+ here reali<e+ the )irst o) the three con+itions o) the subli-e that ha/e been -entione+ )urther bac(,00a /ery power)ul natural )orce, ar-e+ )or +estruction, an+ ri+iculing all resistance. But that this strong ele-ent -ay at the sa-e ti-e be terrible, an+ thereby subli-e, two +istinct operations o) the -in+ are wante+9 I -ean two representations that we pro+uce in oursel/es by our own acti/ity. *irst, we recogni<e this irresistible natural )orce as terrible by co-paring it with the wea(ness o) the )aculty o) resistance that the physical -an can oppose to it9 an+, secon+ly, it is by re)erring it to our will, an+ recalling to our consciousness that the will is absolutely in+epen+ent o) all in)luence o) physical nature, that this )orce beco-es to us a subli-e ob&ect. But it is we oursel/es who represent these two relations9 the poet has only gi/en us an ob&ect ar-e+ with a great )orce see(ing to -ani)est itsel). I) this ob&ect -a(es us tre-ble, it is only because we in thought suppose oursel/es, or so-e one li(e us, engage+ with this )orce. An+ i) tre-bling in this way, we e:perience the )eeling o) the subli-e, it is because our consciousness tells us that, i) we are the /icti-s o) this )orce, we shoul+ ha/e nothing to )ear, )ro- the )ree+oo) our Ego, )or the autono-y o) the +eter-inations o) our will. In short the +escription up to here is subli-e, but ;uite a conte-plati/e, intuiti/e subli-ity:00 Ai))ugi-us /isu e:sangues, illi ag-ine certo 4aocoonta petunt . . .00Aenei+, ii. FHF0FH7. #ere the )orce is presente+ to us as terrible also9 an+ conte-plati/e subli-ity passes into the pathetic. 6e see that )orce enter really into stri)e with -an5s i-potence. 6hether it concerns 4aocoon or oursel/es is only a ;uestion o) +egree. The instinct o) sy-pathy e:cites an+ )rightens in us the instinct o) preser/ation: there are the -onsters, they are +arting00on oursel/es9 there is no -ore sa)ety, )light is /ain.

It is no -ore in our power to -easure this )orce with ours, an+ to re)er it or not to our own e:istence. This happens without our co0operation, an+ is gi/en us by the ob&ect itsel). Accor+ingly our )ear has not, as in the prece+ing -o-ent, a purely sub&ecti/e groun+, resi+ing in our soul9 it has an ob&ecti/e groun+, resi+ing in the ob&ect. *or, e/en i) we recogni<e in this entire scene a si-ple )iction o) the i-agination, we ne/ertheless +istinguish in this )iction a conception co--unicate+ to us )ro- without, )ro- another conception that we pro+uce spontaneously in oursel/es. Thus the -in+ loses a part o) her )ree+o-, inas-uch as she recei/es now )ro- without that which she pro+uce+ be)ore her own acti/ity. The i+ea o) +anger puts on an appearance o) ob&ecti/e reality, an+ a))ection beco-es now a serious a))air. I) we were only sensuous creatures, obeying no other instinct than that o) sel)0preser/ation, we shoul+ stop here, an+ we shoul+ re-ain in a state o) -ere an+ pure a))ection. But there is so-ething in us which ta(es no part in the a))ections o) sensuous nature, an+ whose acti/ity is not +irecte+ accor+ing to physical con+itions. Accor+ing, then, as this in+epen+ently acting principle >the +isposition, the -oral )aculty? has beco-e to a +egree +e/elope+ in the soul, there is le)t -ore or less space )or passi/e nature, an+ there re-ains -ore or less o) the in+epen+ent principle in the a))ection. In the truly -oral soul the terrible trial >o) the i-agination? passes ;uic(ly an+ rea+ily into the subli-e. In proportion as i-agination loses its liberty, reason -a(es its own pre/ail, an+ the soul ceases not to enlarge within when it thus )in+s outwar+ li-its. Ari/en )ro- all the intrench-ents which woul+ gi/e physical protection to sensuous creatures, we see( re)uge in the stronghol+ o) our -oral liberty, an+ we arri/e by that -eans at an absolute an+ unli-ite+ sa)ety, at the /ery -o-ent when we see- to be +epri/e+ in the worl+ o) pheno-ena o) a relati/e an+ precarious ra-part. But precisely because it was necessary to ha/e arri/e+ at the physical oppression be)ore ha/ing recourse to the assistance o) our -oral nature, we can only buy this high senti-ent o) our liberty through su))ering. An or+inary soul con)ines itsel) entirely to this su))ering, an+ ne/er co-prehen+s in the subli-e or the pathetic anything beyon+ the terrible. An in+epen+ent soul, on the contrary, precisely sei<es this occasion to rise to the )eeling o) his -oral )orce, in all that is -ost -agni)icent in this )orce, an+ )ro- e/ery terrible ob&ect (nows how to +raw out the subli-e. The -oral -an >the )ather? 3see Aenei+, ii. FH70FHI8 is here attac(e+ be)ore the physical -an, an+ that has a gran+ e))ect. All the a))ections beco-e -ore aesthetic when we recei/e the- secon+0han+9 there is no

stronger sy-pathy than that we )eel )or sy-pathy. The -o-ent 3see Aenei+, ii. FH60FH 8 ha+ arri/e+ when the hero hi-sel) ha+ to be reco--en+e+ to our respect as a -oral personage, an+ the poet sei<e+ upon that -o-ent. 6e alrea+y (now by his +escription all the )orce, all the rage o) the two -onsters who -enace 4aocoon, an+ we (now how all resistance woul+ be in /ain. I) 4aocoon were only a co--on -an he woul+ better un+erstan+ his own interests, an+, li(e the rest o) the Tro&ans, he woul+ )in+ sa)ety in rapi+ )light. But there is a heart in that breast9 the +anger to his chil+ren hol+s hi- bac(, an+ +eci+es hito -eet his )ate. This trait alone ren+ers hi- worthy o) our pity. At whate/er -o-ent the serpents ha+ assaile+ hi-, we shoul+ ha/e always been touche+ an+ trouble+. But because it happens &ust at the -o-ent when as )ather he shows hi-sel) so worthy o) respect, his )ate appears to us as the result o) ha/ing )ul)ille+ his +uty as parent, o) his ten+er +is;uietu+e )or his chil+ren. It is this which calls )orth our sy-pathy in the highest +egree. It appears, in )act, as i) he +eliberately +e/ote+ hi-sel) to +estruction, an+ his +eath beco-es an act o) the will. Thus there are two con+itions in e/ery (in+ o) the pathetic: Hst. Su))ering, to interest our sensuous nature9 F+. $oral liberty, to interest our spiritual nature. All portraiture in which the e:pression o) su))ering nature is wanting re-ains without aesthetic action, an+ our heart is untouche+. All portraiture in which the e:pression o) -oral aptitu+e is wanting, e/en +i+ it possess all the sensuous )orce possible, coul+ not attain to the pathetic, an+ woul+ in)allibly re/olt our )eelings. Throughout -oral liberty we re;uire the hu-an being who su))ers9 throughout all the su))erings o) hu-an nature we always +esire to percei/e the in+epen+ent spirit, or the capacity )or in+epen+ence. But the in+epen+ence o) the spiritual being in the state o) su))ering can -ani)est itsel) in two ways. Either negati/ely, when the -oral -an +oes not recei/e the law )ro- the physical -an, an+ his state e:ercises no in)luence o/er his -anner o) )eeling9 or positi/ely, when the -oral -an is a ruler o/er the physical being, an+ his -anner o) )eeling e:ercises an in)luence upon his state. In the )irst case, it is the subli-e o) +isposition9 in the secon+, it is the subli-e o) action. The subli-e o) +isposition is seen in all character in+epen+ent o) the acci+ents o) )ate. .A noble heart struggling against a+/ersity,. says Seneca, .is a spectacle )ull o) attraction e/en )or the go+s.. Such )or e:a-ple is that which the Ro-an Senate o))ere+ a)ter the +isaster o) Cannae. 4uci)er e/en, in $ilton, when )or the )irst ti-e he conte-plates hell00which is to be his )uture abo+e00penetrates us with a senti-ent o) a+-iration by the )orce o) soul he +isplays:00 .#ail, horrors, hail.

In)ernal worl+, an+ thou, pro)oun+est #ell9 Recei/e thy new possessorC00one who brings A -in+ not to be change+ by place or ti-e9 The -in+ is its own place, an+ in itsel) Can -a(e a #ea/en o) #ell. . . . #ere at least 6e shall be )ree,. etc. The reply o) $e+ea in the trage+y belongs also to this or+er o) the subli-e. The subli-e o) +isposition -a(es itsel) seen, it is /isible to the spectator, because it rests upon co0e:istence, the si-ultaneous9 the subli-e action, on the contrary, is concei/e+ only by the thought, because the i-pression an+ the act are successi/e, an+ the inter/ention o) the -in+ is necessary to in)er )ro- a )ree +eter-ination the i+ea o) pre/ious su))ering. It )ollows that the )irst alone can be e:presse+ by the plastic arts, because these arts gi/e but that which is si-ultaneous9 but the poet can e:ten+ his +o-ain o/er one an+ the other. E/en -ore9 when the plastic art has to represent a subli-e action, it -ust necessarily bring it bac( to subli-ity. In or+er that the subli-ity o) action shoul+ ta(e place, not only -ust the su))ering o) -an ha/e no in)luence upon the -oral constitution, but rather the opposite -ust be the case. The a))ection is the wor( o) his -oral character. This can happen in two ways: either -e+iately, or accor+ing to the law o) liberty, when out o) respect )or such an+ such a +uty it +eci+es )ro- )ree choice to su))er00in this case, the i+ea o) +uty +eter-ines as a -oti/e, an+ its su))ering is a /oluntary act00or i--e+iately, an+ accor+ing to the necessity o) nature, when he e:piates by a -oral su))ering the /iolation o) +uty9 in this secon+ case, the i+ea o) +uty +eter-ines hi- as a )orce, an+ his su))ering is no longer an e))ect. Regulus o))ers us an e:a-ple o) the )irst (in+, when, to (eep his wor+, he gi/es hi-sel) up to the /engeance o) the Carthaginians9 an+ he woul+ ser/e as an e:a-ple o) the secon+ class, i), ha/ing betraye+ his trust, the consciousness o) this cri-e woul+ ha/e -a+e hi- -iserable. In both cases su))ering has a -oral course, but with this +i))erence, that on the one part Regulus shows us its -oral character, an+ that, on the other, he only shows us that he was -a+e to ha/e such a character. In the )irst case he is in our eyes a -orally great person9 in the secon+ he is only aesthetically great. This last +istinction is i-portant )or the tragic art9 it conse;uently +eser/es to be e:a-ine+ -ore closely.

$an is alrea+y a subli-e ob&ect, but only in the aesthetic sense, when the state in which he is gi/es us an i+ea o) his hu-an +estination, e/en though we -ight not )in+ this +estination reali<e+ in his person. #e only beco-es subli-e to us in a -oral point o) /iew, when he acts, -oreo/er, as a person, in a -anner con)or-able with this +estination9 i) our respect bears not only on his -oral )aculty, but on the use he -a(es o) this )aculty9 i) +ignity, in his case, is +ue, not only to his -oral aptitu+e9 but to the real -orality o) his con+uct. It is ;uite a +i))erent thing to +irect our &u+g-ent an+ attention to the -oral )aculty generally, an+ to the possibility o) a will absolutely )ree, an+ to be +irecting it to the use o) this )aculty, an+ to the reality o) this absolute )ree+o- o) willing. It is, I repeat, ;uite a +i))erent thing9 an+ this +i))erence is connecte+ not only with the ob&ects to which we -ay ha/e to +irect our &u+g-ent, but to the /ery criterion o) our &u+g-ent. The sa-e ob&ect can +isplease us i) we appreciate it in a -oral point o) /iew, an+ be /ery attracti/e to us in the aesthetical point o) /iew. But e/en i) the -oral &u+g-ent an+ the aesthetical &u+g-ent were both satis)ie+, this ob&ect woul+ pro+uce this e))ect on one an+ the other in ;uite a +i))erent way. It is not -orally satis)actory because it has an aesthetical /alue, nor has it an aesthetical /alue because it satis)ies us -orally. 4et us ta(e, as e:a-ple, 4eoni+as an+ his +e/otion at Ther-opylae. 1u+ge+ )rothe -oral point o) /iew, this action represents to -e the -oral law carrie+ out notwithstan+ing all the repugnance o) instinct. 1u+ge+ )rothe aesthetic point o) /iew, it gi/es -e the i+ea o) the -oral )aculty, in+epen+ent o) e/ery constraint o) instinct. The act o) 4eoni+as satis)ies the -oral sense, the reason9 it enraptures the aesthetical sense, the i-agination. 6hence co-es this +i))erence in the )eelings in connection with the sa-e ob&ect= I account )or it thus:00 In the sa-e way that our being consists o) two principles an+ natures, so also an+ conse;uently our )eelings are +i/i+e+ into two (in+s, entirely +i))erent. As reasonable beings we e:perience a )eeling o) approbation or o) +isapprobation9 as sensuous creatures we e:perience pleasure or +ispleasure. The two )eelings, approbation an+ pleasure, repose on satis)action: one on a satis)action gi/en to a re;uire-ent o) reason00 reason has only re;uire-ents, an+ not wants. The other +epen+s on a satis)action gi/en to a sensuous want00sense only (nows o) wants, an+ cannot prescribe anything. These two ter-s00re;uire-ents o) reason, wants o) the senses00are -utually relate+, as absolute necessity an+ the necessity o) nature. Accor+ingly, both are inclu+e+ in the i+ea o) necessity, but with this +i))erence, that the necessity o) reason is uncon+itional, an+ the necessity o) sense only ta(es place un+er con+itions. But, )or both, satis)action is a purely contingent thing.

Accor+ingly e/ery )eeling, whether o) pleasure or approbation, rests +e)initi/ely on an agree-ent between the contingent an+ the necessary. I) the necessary has thus an i-perati/e character, the )eeling e:perience+ will be that o) approbation. I) necessity has the character o) a want, the )eeling e:perience+ will be that o) pleasure, an+ both will be strong in proportion as the satis)action will be contingent. 2ow, un+erlying e/ery -oral &u+g-ent there is a re;uire-ent o) reason which re;uires us to act con)or-ably with the -oral law, an+ it is an absolute necessity that we shoul+ wish what is goo+. But as the will is )ree, it is physically an acci+ental thing that we shoul+ +o in )act what is goo+. I) we actually +o it, this agree-ent between the contingent in the use o) )ree will an+ the i-perati/e +e-an+ o) reason gi/es rise to our assent or approbation, which will be greater in proportion as the resistance o) the inclinations -a+e this use that we -a(e o) our )ree will -ore acci+ental an+ -ore +oubt)ul. E/ery aesthetic &u+g-ent, on the contrary, re)ers the ob&ect to the necessity which cannot help willing i-perati/ely, but only +esires that there shoul+ be an agree-ent between the acci+ental an+ its own interest. 2ow what is the interest o) i-agination= It is to e-ancipate itsel) )ro- all laws, an+ to play its part )reely. The obligation i-pose+ on the will by the -oral law, which prescribes its ob&ect in the strictest -anner, is by no -eans )a/orable to this nee+ o) in+epen+ence. An+ as the -oral obligation o) the will is the ob&ect o) the -oral &u+g-ent, it is clear that in this -o+e o) &u+ging, the i-agination coul+ not )in+ its interest. But a -oral obligation i-pose+ on the will cannot be concei/e+, e:cept by supposing this sa-e will absolutely in+epen+ent o) the -oral instincts an+ )rotheir constraint. Accor+ingly the possibility o) the -oral act re;uires liberty, an+ there)ore agrees here in the -ost per)ect -anner with the interest o) i-agination. But as i-agination, through the -e+iu- o) its wants, cannot gi/e or+ers to the will o) the in+i/i+ual, as reason +oes by its i-perati/e character, it )ollows that the )aculty o) )ree+o-, in relation to i-agination, is so-ething acci+ental, an+ conse;uently that the agree-ent between the acci+ental an+ the necessary >con+itionally necessary? -ust e:cite pleasure. There)ore, i) we bring to bear a -oral &u+g-ent on this act o) 4eoni+as, we shall consi+er it )ro- a point o) /iew where its acci+ental character stri(es the eye less than its necessary si+e. I), on the other han+, we apply the aesthetical &u+g-ent to it, this is another point o) /iew, where its character o) necessity stri(es us less )orcibly than its acci+ental character. It is a +uty )or e/ery will to act thus, +irectly it is a )ree will9 but the )act that there is a )ree will that -a(es this act possible is a )a/or o) nature in regar+ to this )aculty, to which )ree+o- is a necessity. Thus an act o) /irtue &u+ge+ by the -oral sense00by reason00will gi/e us as its only satis)action the )eeling o) approbation, because reason can ne/er )in+ -ore, an+ sel+o- )in+s as -uch as it re;uires. This sa-e act, &u+ge+, on the contrary, by the aesthetic sense00by i-agination00will gi/e us a positi/e pleasure, because the i-agination, ne/er re;uiring the en+ to

agree with the +e-an+, -ust be surprise+, enrapture+, at the real satis)action o) this +e-an+ as at a happy chance. ,ur reason will -erely appro/e, an+ only appro/e, o) 4eoni+as actually ta(ing this heroic resolution9 but that he coul+ ta(e this resolution is what +elights an+ enraptures us. This +istinction between the two sorts o) &u+g-ents beco-es -ore e/i+ent still, i) we ta(e an e:a-ple where the -oral sense an+ the aesthetic sense pronounce a +i))erent /er+ict. Suppose we ta(e the act o) %erigrinus %roteus burning hi-sel) at ,ly-pia. 1u+ging this act -orally, I cannot gi/e it -y approbation, inas-uch as I see it +eter-ine+ by i-pure -oti/es, to which %roteus sacri)ices the +uty o) respecting his own e:istence. But in the aesthetic &u+g-ent this sa-e act +elights -e9 it +elights -e precisely because it testi)ies to a power o) will capable o) resisting e/en the -ost potent o) instincts, that o) sel)0preser/ation. 6as it a -oral )eeling, or only a -ore power)ul sensuous attraction, that silence+ the instinct o) sel)0preser/ation in this enthusiast. It -atters little, when I appreciate the act )ro- an aesthetic point o) /iew. I then +rop the in+i/i+ual, I ta(e away the relation o) his will to the law that ought to go/ern hi-9 I thin( o) hu-an will in general, consi+ere+ as a co--on )aculty o) the race, an+ I regar+ it in connection with all the )orces o) nature. 6e ha/e seen that in a -oral point o) /iew, the preser/ation o) our being see-e+ to us a +uty, an+ there)ore we were o))en+e+ at seeing %roteus /iolate this +uty. In an aesthetic point o) /iew the sel)0preser/ation only appears as an interest, an+ there)ore the sacri)ice o) this interest pleases us. Thus the operation that we per)or- in the &u+g-ents o) the secon+ (in+ is precisely the in/erse o) that which we per)or- in those o) the )irst. In the )or-er we oppose the in+i/i+ual, a sensuous an+ li-ite+ being, an+ his personal will, which can be e))ecte+ pathologically, to the absolute law o) the will in general, an+ o) uncon+itional +uty which bin+s e/ery spiritual being9 in the secon+ case, on the contrary, we oppose the )aculty o) willing, absolute /olition, an+ the spiritual )orce as an in)inite thing, to the solicitations o) nature an+ the i-pe+i-ents o) sense. This is the reason why the aesthetical &u+g-ent lea/es us )ree, an+ +elights an+ enraptures us. It is because the -ere conception o) this )aculty o) willing in an absolute -anner, the -ere i+ea o) this -oral aptitu+e, gi/es us in itsel) a consciousness o) a -ani)est a+/antage o/er the sensuous. It is because the -ere possibility o) e-ancipating oursel/es )ro- the i-pe+i-ents o) nature is in itsel) a satis)action that )latters our thirst )or )ree+o-. This is the reason why -oral &u+g-ent, on the contrary, -a(es us e:perience a )eeling o) constraint that hu-bles us. It is because in connection with each /oluntary act we appreciate in this -anner, we )eel, as regar+s the absolute law that ought to rule the will in general, in a position o) in)eriority -ore or less +eci+e+, an+ because the constraint o) the will thus li-ite+ to a single +eter-ination, which +uty re;uires o) it at all

costs, contra+icts the instinct o) )ree+o- which is the property o) i-agination. In the )or-er case we soare+ )ro- the real to the possible, an+ )ro- the in+i/i+ual to the species9 in the latter, on the contrary, we +escen+ )ro- the possible to the real, an+ we shut up the species in the narrow li-its o) the in+i/i+ual. 6e cannot there)ore be surprise+ i) the aesthetical &u+g-ent enlarges the heart, while the -oral &u+g-ent constrains an+ straitens it. It results, there)ore, )ro- all that which prece+es, that the -oral &u+g-ent an+ the aesthetic, )ar )ro- -utually corroborating each other, i-pe+e an+ hin+er each other, because they i-press on the soul two +irections entirely opposite. In )act, this obser/ance o) rule which reason re;uires o) us as -oral &u+ge is inco-patible with the in+epen+ence which the i-agination calls )or as aesthetic &u+ge. It )ollows that an ob&ect will ha/e so -uch the less aesthetic /alue the -ore it has the character o) a -oral ob&ect, an+ i) the poet were oblige+ notwithstan+ing that to choose it, he woul+ +o well in treating o) it, not to call the attention o) our reason to the rule o) the will, but that o) our i-agination to the power o) the will. In his own interest it is necessary )or the poet to enter on this path, )or with our liberty his e-pire )inishes. 6e belong to hi- only inas-uch as we loo( beyon+ oursel/es9 we escape )ro- hi- the -o-ent we re0enter into our inner-ost sel/es, an+ that is what in)allibly ta(es place the -o-ent an ob&ect ceases to be a pheno-enon in our consi+eration, an+ ta(es the character o) a law which &u+ges us. E/en in the -ani)estation o) the -ost subli-e /irtue, the poet can only e-ploy )or his own /iews that which in those acts belongs to )orce. As to the +irection o) the )orce, he has no reason to be an:ious. The poet, e/en when he places be)ore our eyes the -ost per)ect -o+els o) -orality, has not, an+ ought not to ha/e, any other en+ than that o) re&oicing our soul by the conte-plation o) this spectacle. $oreo/er, nothing can re&oice our soul e:cept that which i-pro/es our personality, an+ nothing can gi/e us a spiritual &oy e:cept that which ele/ates the spiritual )aculty. But in what way can the -orality o) another i-pro/e our own personality, an+ raise our spiritual )orce= That this other one acco-plishes really his +uty results )ro- an acci+ental use which he -a(es o) his liberty, an+ which )or that /ery reason can pro/e nothing to us. 6e only ha/e in co--on with hi- the )aculty to con)or- oursel/es e;ually to +uty9 the -oral power which he e:hibits re-in+s us also o) our own, an+ that is why we then )eel so-ething which upraises our spiritual )orce. Thus it is only the i+ea o) the possibility o) an absolutely )ree will which -a(es the real e:ercise o) this will in us char-ing to the aesthetic )eeling. 6e shall be still -ore con/ince+ when we thin( how little the poetic )orce o) i-pression which is awa(ene+ in us by an act or a -oral

character is +epen+ent on their historic reality. The pleasure which we ta(e in consi+ering an i+eal character will in no way be lessene+ when we co-e to thin( that this character is nothing -ore than a poetic )iction9 )or it is on the poetic truth, an+ not on historic truth, that e/ery aesthetic i-pression o) the )eelings rest. $oreo/er, poetic truth +oes not consist in that this or that thing has e))ectually ta(en place, but in that it -ay ha/e happene+, that is to say, that the thing is in itsel) possible. Thus the aesthetic )orce is necessarily oblige+ to rest in the )irst place in the i+ea o) possibility. E/en in real sub&ects, )or which the actors are borrowe+ )ro- history, it is not the reality o) the si-ple possibility o) the )act, but that which is guarantee+ to us by its /ery reality which constitutes the poetic ele-ent. That these personages ha/e in+ee+ e:iste+, an+ that these e/ents ha/e in truth ta(en place, is a circu-stance which can, it is true, in -any cases a++ to our pleasure, but that which it a++s to it is li(e a )oreign a++ition, -uch rather un)a/orable than a+/antageous to the poetical i-pression. It was long thought that a great ser/ice was ren+ere+ to 'er-an poetry by reco--en+ing 'er-an poets to treat o) national the-es. 6hy, it was as(e+, +i+ 'ree( poetry ha/e so -uch power o/er the -in+= Because it brought )orwar+ national e/ents an+ i--ortali<e+ +o-estic e:ploits. 2o +oubt the poetry o) the ancients -ay ha/e been in+ebte+ to this circu-stance )or certain e))ects o) which -o+ern poetry cannot boast9 but +o these e))ects belong to art an+ the poet= It is s-all glory )or the 'ree( genius i) it ha+ only this acci+ental a+/antage o/er -o+ern genius9 still -ore i) it were necessary )or the poets, in or+er to gain this a+/antage, to obtain it by this con)or-ity o) their in/ention with real historyC It is only a barbarous taste that re;uires this sti-ulant o) a national interest to be capti/ate+ by beauti)ul things9 an+ it is only a scribbler who borrows )ro- -atter a )orce to which he +espairs o) gi/ing a )or-. %oetry ought not to ta(e its course through the )rigi+ region o) -e-ory9 it ought ne/er to con/ert learning into its interpreter, nor pri/ate interest its a+/ocate with the popular -in+. It ought to go straight to the heart, because it has co-e )ro- the heart9 an+ ai- at the -an in the citi<en, not the citi<en in the -an. #appily, true genius +oes not -a(e -uch account o) all these counsels that people are so an:ious to gi/e her with better intentions than co-petence. ,therwise, Sul<er an+ his school -ight ha/e -a+e 'er-an poetry a+opt a /ery e;ui/ocal style. It is no +oubt a /ery honorable aiin a poet to -orali<e the -an, an+ e:cite the patriotis- o) the citi<en, an+ the $uses (now better than any one how well the arts o) the subli-e an+ o) the beauti)ul are a+apte+ to e:ercise this in)luence. But that

which poetry obtains e:cellently by in+irect -eans it woul+ acco-plish /ery ba+ly as an i--e+iate en+. %oetry is not -a+e to ser/e in -an )or the acco-plish-ent o) a particular -atter, nor coul+ any instru-ent be selecte+ less )itte+ to cause a particular ob&ect to succee+, or to carry out special pro&ects an+ +etails. %oetry acts on the whole o) hu-an nature, an+ it is only by its general in)luence on the character o) a -an that it can in)luence particular acts. %oetry can be )or -an what lo/e is )or the hero. It can neither counsel hi-, nor stri(e )or hi-, nor +o anything )or hi- in short9 but it can )or- a hero in hi-, call hi- to great +ee+s, an+ ar- hi- with a strength to be all that he ought to be. Thus the +egree o) aesthetical energy with which subli-e )eelings an+ subli-e acts ta(e possession o) our souls, +oes not rest at all on the interest o) reason, which re;uires e/ery action to be really con)or-able with the i+ea o) goo+. But it rests on the interest o) the i-agination, which re;uires con)or-ity with goo+ shoul+ be possible, or, in other ter-s, that no )eeling, howe/er strong, shoul+ oppress the )ree+o- o) the soul. 2ow this possibility is )oun+ in e/ery act that testi)ies with energy to liberty, an+ to the )orce o) the will9 an+ i) the poet -eets with an action o) this (in+, it -atters little where, he has a sub&ect suitable )or his art. To hi-, an+ to the interest we ha/e in hi-, it is ;uite the sa-e, to ta(e his hero in one class o) characters or in another, a-ong the goo+ or the wic(e+, as it o)ten re;uires as -uch strength o) character to +o e/il conscientiously an+ persistently as to +o goo+. I) a proo) be re;uire+ that in our aesthetic &u+g-ents we atten+ -ore to the )orce than to its +irection, to its )ree+o- than to its law)ulness, this is su))icient )or our e/i+ence. 6e pre)er to see )orce an+ )ree+o- -ani)est the-sel/es at the cost o) -oral regularity, rather than regularity at the cost o) )ree+o- an+ strength. *or +irectly one o) those cases o))ers itsel), in which the general law agrees with the instincts which by their strength threaten to carry away the will, the aesthetic /alue o) the character is increase+, i) he be capable o) resisting these instincts. A /icious person begins to interest us as soon as he -ust ris( his happiness an+ li)e to carry out his per/erse +esigns9 on the contrary, a /irtuous person loses in proportion as he )in+s it use)ul to be /irtuous. Bengeance, )or instance, is certainly an ignoble an+ a /ile a))ection, but this +oes not pre/ent it )ro- beco-ing aesthetical, i) to satis)y it we -ust en+ure pain)ul sacri)ice. $e+ea slaying her chil+ren ai-s at the heart o) 1ason, but at the sa-e ti-e she stri(es a hea/y blow at her own heart, an+ her /engeance aesthetically beco-es subli-e +irectly we see in her a ten+er -other. In this sense the aesthetic &u+g-ent has -ore o) truth than is or+inarily belie/e+. The /ices which show a great )orce o) will e/i+ently announce a greater aptitu+e )or real -oral liberty than +o /irtues which borrow support )ro- inclination9 seeing that it only re;uires o) the -an who persistently +oes e/il to gain a single /ictory o/er hi-sel), one si-ple

upset o) his -a:i-s, to gain e/er a)ter to the ser/ice o) /irtue his whole plan o) li)e, an+ all the )orce o) will which he la/ishe+ on e/il. An+ why is it we recei/e with +isli(e -e+iu- characters, whilst we at ti-es )ollow with tre-bling a+-iration one which is altogether wic(e+= It is e/i+ent, that with regar+ to the )or-er, we renounce all hope, we cannot e/en concei/e the possibility o) )in+ing absolute liberty o) the will9 whilst with the other, on the contrary, each ti-e he +isplays his )aculties, we )eel that one single act o) the will woul+ su))ice to raise hi- up to the )ullest height o) hu-an +ignity. Thus, in the aesthetic &u+g-ent, that which e:cites our interest is not -orality itsel), but liberty alone9 an+ -oral purity can only please our i-agination when it places in relie) the )orces o) the will. It is then -ani)estly to con)oun+ two /ery +istinct or+ers o) i+eas, to re;uire in aesthetic things so e:act a -orality, an+, in or+er to stretch the +o-ain o) reason, to e:clu+e the i-agination )ro- its own legiti-ate sphere. Either it woul+ be necessary to sub&ect it entirely, then there woul+ be an en+ to all aesthetic e))ect9 or it woul+ share the real- o) reason, then -orality woul+ not gain -uch. *or i) we preten+ to pursue at the sa-e ti-e two +i))erent en+s, there woul+ be ris( o) -issing both one an+ the other. The liberty o) the i-agination woul+ be )ettere+ by too great respect )or the -oral law9 an+ /iolence woul+ be +one to the character o) necessity which is in the reason, in -issing the liberty which belongs to the i-agination.

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