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IN RE DICK, 38 Phil. 41 Facts: R.

McCulloch Dick, is the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press, a periodical published weekly in the city of Manila. There was a publication of certain articles in that paper which tends to obstruct the Government of the Philippine Islands in policies inaugurated for the prosecution of the war between the United States and the German Empire, and other articles which have tended to create a feeling of unrest and uneasiness in the community. He is being detained because the Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his deportation but before the Governor-General gave his order, there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code. Petitioner, filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief of police of the city of Manila. Issue: Whether or not the Governor General could exercise the deportation power in the absence of statutory authority? Held: Yes, the Governor -Gener al has the power t o i nst itute and mai ntain deportation proceedings. The discretionary power to deport "undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the Philippine Islands is a menace to the peace and safety of the community," as an act of state, having been conferred upon the Governor-General, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion as to whether the facts disclosed by an investigation had in accord with section 69 of the Administrative Code justify or necessitate deportation in a particular case, he is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal is at liberty to re examine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.

IN RE EDILLION, 84 SCRA 554 In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION

Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. The respondent contends that the provisions : (a) par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys) (b) Section 10 of the Court Rule Effect of non-payment of dues and (c) Sec. 9 of the Court Rule - Membership dues (obligation to pay membership dues) is an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a

pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. Issue: Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues to IBP? Held: Marcial Edillon was stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court for being a delinquent member of the bar. IBP is an official national body of which the lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the bar. When he entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, subject to the power of the body and it require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.

The provisions assailed do not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is valid exercise power of the State. The right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.