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OPLE VS. TORRES, July 23, 1998 Puno, J. Facts: On December 12, 1996, then President FIDEL V.

RAMOS issued Administrative Order No. 308 entitled ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM. The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY . The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the following grounds: 1. The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress of the Philippines; 2. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said AO is unconstitutional since Congress has the exclusive authority to appropriate funds for such expenditure; and 3. Held: 1. The AO establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and therefore, it is supposed to be a law passed by Congress that implements it, not by an Administrative Order issued by the President. Administrative Power, which is supposed to be exercised by the President, is concerned with the work of applying policies and The AO violates the citizens right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.

enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an Administrative Order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of the government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The subject of AO 308 therefore is beyond the power of the President to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power. 2. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide a common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of a biological data. It is the confirmation of an individuals identity through a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. Through the PRN, the government offices has the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files of every citizen. The data, however, may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. Further, the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how these informations gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data and under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. The computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. YET, THERE ARE NO CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS. WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF THE CONTROL PROGRAMS

OF THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT FEAR OF SANCTION OR PENALTY, CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR WORSE, MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM. AO No. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal information gathered about our people will be used only for specified purposes thereby violating the citizens right to privacy ------------------------------

What is Administrative Power? Held: Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno])

What is an Administrative Order? Held: An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the 1998 [Puno])

administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, ------------------------------------------------------------Case Digest, 02-2005Legal Unit, DILG XIBLAS F. OPLE, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES et alEN BANC[G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998] V. Ramos issued Administrative Order (A.O.) 308 onDecember 12, ition before the Supreme Courtquestioning the

constitutionality of the said executive issuance ontwo important grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on ourcitizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for therights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need strongerbarriers against further erosion.ISSUE: DOES A.0 308 VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY? SUPREME COURT:Yes. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrativelegislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. A.O. 308 is sovague. The vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and presentdanger. There are no vital safeguards.A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will showthat it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biologicalinformation alone for identification purposes. In fact, the SolicitorGeneral claims that the adoption of the Identification ReferenceSystem will contribute to the "generation of population data fordevelopment planning." 54 This is an admission that the PopulationReference Number (PRN) will not be used solely for identification butfor the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowedpurposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieveinformation for a purpose other than the identification of the individualthrough his PRN .The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to saidadministrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime hedeals with a government agency to avail of basic services andsecurity. His transactions with the government agency will necessarilybe recorded -- whether it be in the computer or in the documentaryfile of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions forloan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities,reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequentthe use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge andformidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files.The data may be gathered for gainful and useful governmentpurposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal informationconstitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be toogreat for some of our authorities to resist.We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be

limited to the name, address and other basic personal informationabout the individual. Even that hospitable assumption will not saveA.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does nottell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gatheredshall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access thedata, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factorsare essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of theinformation. Well to note, the computer linkage gives othergovernment agencies access to the information. Yet, there are nocontrols to guard against leakage of information. When the accesscode of the control programs of the particular computer system isbroken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make useof the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the datastored within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring thatpersonal information which will be gathered about our people will onlybe processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of propersafeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with theindividual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to trackdown his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons toaccess confidential information and circumvent the right against selfincrimination; it may pave the way for "fishingexpeditions" bygovernment authorities and evade the right against unreasonablesearches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN,biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when weconsider that the individual lacks control over what can be read orplaced on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the dataencoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks toprevent.Excerpts from the concurring opinion of the Supreme Court justices:Justice ROMERO, ying are the possibilities of a law such as Administrative OrderNo. 308 in making inroads into the private lives of the citizens, a virtualBig Brother looking over our shoulders, that it must, without delay, be"slain upon sight" before our society turns to so extensively drawn thatcould, indeed, allow unbridled options to become available to itimplementors beyond the reasonable comfort of the citizens and of residents alike.RIGHT TO PRIVACY RECOGNIZED UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONHereunder are the provisions in the 1987 Constitution which recognize ourRight to Privacy :Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall beinviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public

safety ororder requires otherwise as prescribed by law."Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: 34"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without dueprocess of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of thelaws. Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no searchwarrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to bedetermined personally by the judge after examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, andparticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or thingsto be seized.xxx xxx xxxSec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limitsprescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of thecourt. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided bylaw.xxx xxx xxx.Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the publicand private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposesnot contrary to law shall not be abridged.Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.Personal Analysis:A.O. 308 was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court en banc forreasons above stated. It bears stressing that the bulk of discussion in thecase focused more on the issue of infringement of the right to privacy. Ascan be gleaned from A.O. 308, the provisions were so general that therewere no clear and vital guidelines to safeguard the information stored inthe Identification Card. Had President Fidel V. Ramos issued a morecomplete and detailed guidelines providing for the metes and bounds of the ID System, the decision could have been otherwise.Even the argument of the respondents that rules and regulations wouldbe issued by the committee later, the court still reject the same. The courtsaid.: The rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot remedythis fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the policy of thelaw or order. On its face, A.O. No. 308 gives the Inter-AgencyCoordinating Committee (IACC) virtually unfettered discretion todetermine the metes and bounds of the ID System.In one press conference last month, Presidential Spokesperson IgnacioBunye said that there is really no need to pass a law to push through withthe plan of the National ID System. An executive issuance by thePresident would suffice provided this time the said order will

now bedetailed, comprehensive and contains all the vital safeguards. From hisstatement, it can be deduced therefrom that the reservation andbacklash by the supreme court on the on the Ople case (A.O 308) havebeen taken into consideration by Malacanang. ------------------------------------------------------. CORONA VS. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOC. substantive vs. procedural due process

The Phil. Ports Authority (PPA), was created to control, regulate, and supervise pilots and the pilotage profession. It promulgated AO 03-85 providing that : that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. Later however, another AO 04-92 was issued: all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance." In the meantime, PPA issued a Memorandum laying down the criteria or factors to be considered for the reappointment of harbor pilots. The United Harbor Pilots Association questioned this AO 04-92. They requested for the suspension of implementation of AO 04-92 before DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia.

Sec. Garcia however said that the matter is within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. The Association thus appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP). The OP gave due course to the appeal and directed the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of the questioned AO 04-92. Now, the OP, through then Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato Corona, dismissed the appeal and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. Secretary Corona opined that: "The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of this case, PPA-A0 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointee's performance. PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA's jurisdictional area." As to the claim by the Association that there was absence of prior consultation before the issuance of the AO, Secretary Corona likewise ruled that the law has been sufficiently complied with by PPA. (the law merely requires PPA to consult with relevant government agencies. Since the PPA itself is already composed of representatives from the DOTC, DENR, DPWH, DOF, NEDA, secretary Corona deemed this sufficient compliance with consultation). ISSUES: Was procedural due process satisfied? Was substantive due process satisfied? SC: Procedural YES. Substantive NO.

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, x x x."

In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," while substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just."

PROCEDURAL: Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPAAO No. 04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government agencies" and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment.

SC: As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." Here, the Pilots Association, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, "which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots' examinations," was not consulted, the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the

Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted. Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.

SUBSTANTIVE: There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process.

Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "the granting of license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with established standards."21 A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.22

Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each followed by actual training and practice.

Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal." It is this preevaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law. --------------------------------------------TOPIC: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION (Necessity for Notice and Hearing)

The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) General Manager issued an administrative order to the fact that all existing regular appointments to harbor pilot positions shall remain valid only up to December 31 of the current year and that henceforth all appointments to harbor pilot positions shall be only for a term of one year from date of effectivity, subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the PPA after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance. Pilotage as a profession may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals, who have to pass five government professional examinations. The Harbor Pilot Association challenged the validity of said administrative order arguing that it violated the harbor pilots' right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law and that the said administrative order was issued without prior notice and hearing. The PPA countered that the administrative order was valid as it was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under PPA's legislative charter; and that in issuing the order as a rule or regulation, it was performing its executive or legislative, and not a quasi-judicial function. Due process of law is classified into two kinds, namely, procedural due process and substantive due process of law. Was there, or, was

there no violation of the harbor pilots' right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law? Suggested Answer: The right of the pilots to due process was violated. As held, in Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, 283 SCRA 31 (1997), pilotage as a profession is a property right protected by the guarantee of due process. The pre-evaluation cancellation of the licenses of the harbor pilots every year is unreasonable and violated their right to substantive due process. The renewal is dependent on the evaluation after the licenses have been cancelled. The issuance of the administrative order also violated procedural due process, since no prior public hearing was conducted. As held in Commissioner r of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 237 (199 , when a regulation is being issued under the quasi-legislative authority of an administrative agency, the requirements of notice, hearing and publication must be observed. ------------------------------------------------THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant G.R. No. 121777 (350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001

KAPUNAN, J. FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down. They listened to the recruiter who was then talking about the breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore. Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money. Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos even heard a

woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand. Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed. Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment. Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime. First, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. The provision in question reads: ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x. (b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause. (2) Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and

therefore should be exculpated HELD: (1) For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court criticized the definition of recruitment and placement. The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness. Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute

recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth since by merely referring a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment. That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral (referring an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth. A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute. (2) Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equal protection clause in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, she concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City. The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty

are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination. In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a clear and intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials. Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001 Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal

prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge. Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose

activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit. ---------------------------------------------------------Estrada v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001. 07/13/2010 0 Comments Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of

FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS. RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN MALA IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.

Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Ratio: In view of vagueness and ambiguity Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:" Combination the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters. Series a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession. Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the

observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. In view of due process

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth. In view of mens rea As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion . . . Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effect and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in

death, and drug offenses involving government official, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts. To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it. In view of presumption of innocence At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially judicial. To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been is judicial. Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be expected to spell out with mathematical precision how the law should be interpreted under any and all given situations. The application of the law will depend on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence which will then be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the constitutionally mandated function of the courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as would give flesh and blood to the true meaning of legislative enactments. A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted and that tends to defeat the ends that are sought to be attained by its enactment. Viewed broadly, "plunder involves not just plain thievery but economic

depredation which affects not just private parties or personal interests but the nation as a whole." Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of "a crime against national interest which must be stopped, and if possible, stopped permanently." In view of estoppel Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080. The case at bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that one of petitioner's counsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to him, but to all others who may be held liable under this statute. What is RICO Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a United States federal law that provides for extended criminal penalties and a civil cause of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization. RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted October 15, 1970). RICO is codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. 19611968. While its intended use was to prosecute the Mafia as well as others who were actively engaged in organized crime, its application has been more widespread. In view of facial challenge

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.' This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. -------------------------------------------------------------ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001 Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.

The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge. Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in

striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit. ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN Issues: 1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. 2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime chargedthe element of the offense.

Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that pattern is a very important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy. What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733 Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or

conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being. There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit -------------------------------------------------------------------

Case Digest on Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000 By virtue of an extradition treaty between the US and the Philippines, the US requested for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for violations of US tax and election laws. Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the Philippine government, Jimenez requested for copies of the US extradition request. The Secetary of Justice denied that request. ISSUE: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? HELD: Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Extradition is a proceeding sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Dissent (original decision): Under the extradition treaty, the prospective extraditee may be provisionally arrested pending the submission of the request. Because of this possible consequence, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, and partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Thus, the basic due process rights of notice and hearing are indispensable. Assuming that the extradition treaty does not allow for such rights, the Constitutional right to procedural due process must override treaty obligations. When there is a conflict between international law obligations and the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail. -------------------------------In fact in the case of Philip Morris, Inc v.

Court of Appeals [8] the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of the international law over the national law in the municipal sphere. Clearly therefore, extradition treaty asdomestic law cannot be superior to the Constitution. In interpreting provisions of a treaty one cannot depart from the constraints and limitations of the Constitutionby saying, like in the case of extradition, that extradition rules are sui generis. Finally, the government should always bear in mind that the cherished libertiesguaranteed by the Constitution are non-negotiable rights. In the words of Justice Isagani Cruz, while authority and liberty must co-exist, the highest function of In light of the recent Olalia case, this writer respectfully posits that the original ruling laid down in Lantion should be reinstated for beingin consonance with the libertarian principle of justice. Secretary of Justice vs. Judge Lantion GR 139465 Facts: On June 1 8 , 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of MarkJimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the r Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Government of the Philippines andthe Go with proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technicalevaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty. The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well asthe documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature toprovide such document as

the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yetavailable.Issue: 1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access to the official extradition request and documents with an opportunity to file acomment on or opposition the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of thePhilippine Government under the RP-US Extradition TreatyRuling: The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonableperiod of time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the PhilippineGovernment to comply with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right of due process. The processes outlined inthe treaty and in the presidential decree already imaginedthreat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand, granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process.The rule of pacta suntservanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. Thedoctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where theconflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should beupheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, nationallegislative enactments.In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concernabout the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to theirrespective citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a prospective extradite. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

[3 22 SCRA 160 (2000) ] Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTCFacts: On June 1 8 , 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenezto the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Chargesinclude:1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax 3 . Fraud by wire, radio, or television4. False statement or entries5. Election contribution in name of anotherThe Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they foundhaving matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be givenample time to assess it.The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether theprocedures and requirements under the relevant law treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by theRequesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights

of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents. 3 . Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue acopy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.Issues:1. WON private respondent is entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearingYes. 2(a) of PD 10 8 an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities toenable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminalinvestigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheelsfor the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages:The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. stage. Because of suchconsequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminalsince such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In

essence, therefore, theevaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution.But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, theadministrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation,the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to thedeprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A 3 14(1) & (2), as well as A 3 public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documentsThe court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of theprospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may the arrest and imprisonment of therespondent.The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present their side.Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, & the respondent hearing at a later time (summarydistraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee)c. Twin rights have been offered,

but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty?No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord commondue process protection to their respective citizens. The administrative of notice and hearing inthe Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court. 3 P-US Extradition treatyNo. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are notsuperior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veilat any stage.Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to apreliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forciblytaken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right tocontrovert them.Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at ation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction.Panganiban, dissenting: Instant petition refers only to the evaluation stage. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 1 3

9465, Oct. 17, 2000 F ACTS: On June 1 8 , 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extraditiondocuments, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and thathe be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for theconsistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in anyproceedings arising out of a request for extradition. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent has right to notice and hearing RULING: Rationale of Extradition Treaty; Summary ProceedingIt cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to arrest the dramatic rise of international and transnational crimes liketerrorism and drug trafficking. Extradition treaties provide the assurance that the punishment of these crimes will not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorialsovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be the unbending commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not be coddled by any signatory state.It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not prevent the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the lawand expedite their trial. The submission of the private respondent, that as a probable extraditee under the RP-US Extradition Treaty he should be furnished a copy of the US government request for his extradition and its supporting documents even while they are still under evaluation

by petitioner Secretary of Justice, does notmeet this desideratum. The fear of the petitioner Secretary of Justice that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee must be deeply rooted on theexperience of the executive branch of our government. As it comes from the branch of our government in charge of the faithful execution of our laws, it deserves thecareful consideration of this Court. In addition, it cannot be gainsaid that advance notice can delay the summary process of executive evaluation of the extradition request and its accompanying papers. The foresight of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes did not miss this danger. In 1911, he held:"It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious niceties of a criminal trial at common law. But it is a waste of time . . . if there ispresented, even in somewhat untechnical form according to our ideas, such reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to make it proper that he should be tried,good faith to the demanding government requires his surrender." (emphasis supplied)We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow time to stand still on his prosecution. Justice is best served when done without delay.Extradition Proceeding is Sui Generis; Not CriminalAn extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Tobegin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the courtof the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot beinvoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:"An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accusedfrom extradition pursuant to a valid treaty."There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedingsinvolve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under lessstringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive maybe ordered extradited "upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case." Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon beingrendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts

may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The UnitedStates adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation'sforeign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the dueprocess safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "mustbegin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure."Constitutional Right to Due Process vis-aonly at its evaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent isnebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitionerSecretary of Justice. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we held that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to theexecutive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." Under our constitutional scheme, executive power is vested in the President of thePhilippines. Executive power includes, among others, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans and the power to enter into treaties or internationalagreements. The task of safeguarding that these treaties are duly honored devolves upon the executive department which has the competence and authority to soact in the international arena. It is traditionally held that the President has power and on information about theinternational scene of which he is regularly briefed by our diplomatic and consular officials. His access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data is also unlimited. Thedeference we give to the executive department is dictated by the principle of separation of powers. This principle is one of the cornerstones of our democraticgovernment. It cannot be eroded without endangering our government.

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Secretary of Justice vs Judge Lantion GR 139465 Jan 18 2000 Facts On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country and the established Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America , the department proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty. The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available. Issue 1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access to the official extradition request and documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition thereto 2.Whether or not private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition

Treaty Ruling The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right of due process. The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand, granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process. The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a prospective extradite.

-----------------------------------------13. What is extradition? To whom does it apply?

Held: It is the process by which persons charged with or convicted of crime against the law of a State and found in a foreign State are returned by the latter to the former for trial or punishment. It applies to those who are merely charged with an offense but have not been brought to trial; to those who have been tried and convicted and have subsequently escaped from custody; and those who have been convicted in absentia. It does not apply to persons merely suspected of having committed an offense but against whom no charge has been laid or to a person whose presence is desired as a witness or for obtaining or enforcing a civil judgment. (Weston, Falk, D' Amato, International Law and Order, 2nd ed., p. 630 [199 , cited in Dissenting Opinion, Puno, J., in Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc) 14. Discuss the basis for allowing extradition.

Held: Extradition was first practiced by the Egyptians, Chinese, Chaldeans and Assyro-Babylonians but their basis for allowing extradition was unclear. Sometimes, it was granted due to pacts; at other times, due to plain good will. The classical commentators on international law thus focused their early views on the nature of the duty to surrender an extraditee --- whether the duty is legal or moral in character. Grotius and Vattel led the school of thought that international law imposed a legal duty called civitas maxima to extradite criminals. In sharp contrast, Puffendorf and Billot led the school of thought that the so-called duty was but an "imperfect obligation which could become enforceable only by a contract or agreement between states.

Modern nations tilted towards the view of Puffendorf and Billot that under international law there is no duty to extradite in the absence of treaty, whether bilateral or multilateral. Thus, the US Supreme Court in US v. Rauscher (119 US 407, 411, 7 S Ct. 234, 236, 30 L. ed. 425 [1886]), held: x x x it is only in modern times that the nations of the earth have imposed upon themselves the obligation of delivering up these fugitives from justice to the states where their crimes were committed, for trial and punishment. This has been done generally by treaties x x x Prior to these treaties, and apart from them there was no well-defined obligation on one country to deliver up such fugitives to another; and though such delivery was often made it was upon the principle of comity x x x. (Dissenting Opinion, Puno, J., in Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc) 15. What is the nature of an extradition proceeding? Is it akin to a criminal proceeding?

Held: [A]n extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis: An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty. (Wiehl, Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend Toward Extending Greater Constitutional Procedural Protections To Fugitives Fighting Extradition from the United States, 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 729, 741

[1998], citing United States v. Galanis, 429 F. Supp. 1215 [D. Conn. 1977]) There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in natural while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite. As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action. The concept of due process is flexible for not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure. (Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000, En Banc [Puno]) 16. Will the retroactive application of an extradition treaty violate the constitutional prohibition against "ex post facto" laws?

Held: The prohibition against ex post facto law applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no merit in the contention that the ruling sustaining an extradition treatys retroactive application violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. The treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. (Wright v. CA, 235 SCRA 341, Aug. 15, 1994 [Kapunan]) 17. Discuss the rules in the interpretation of extradition treaties.

Held: [A]ll treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. X x x. It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to arrest the dramatic rise of international and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug trafficking. Extradition treaties provide the assurance that the punishment of these crimes will not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be the unbending commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not be coddled by any signatory state. It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not prevent the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial. X x x [A]n equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the parties themselves to the RP-US Extradition Treaty as well as the general interpretation of the issue in question by other countries with similar

treaties with the Philippines. The rule is recognized that while courts have the power to interpret treaties, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is accorded great weight. The reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, et al. (210 SCRA 256, 261 [1992]), where we stressed that a treaty is a joint executive-legislative act which enjoys the presumption that it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in the country. (Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000, En Banc [Puno]) ----------------------

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW A. EXTRADITION

Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000

overturning 322 SCRA 160 (Jan. 18, 2000)

By virtue of an extradition treaty between the US and the Philippines, the US requested for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for violations of US tax and election laws. Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the Philippine government, Jimenez requested for copies of the US' extradition request. The Secetary of Justice denied that request. ISSUE: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing?

HELD: Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Extradition is a proceeding sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.

Dissent (original decision): Under the extradition treaty, the prospective extraditee may be provisionally arrested
pending the submission of the request. Because of this possible consequence, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, and partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Thus, the basic due process rights of notice and hearing are indispensable.

Assuming that the extradition treaty does not allow for such rights, the Constitutional right to procedural due process must override treaty obligations. When there is a conflict between international law obligations and the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail.

B. CONFLICTS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PHILIPPINE LAW

Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez 322 SCRA 160 (Jan. 18, 2000)

The observance of our country's duties under a treaty is compelled by, first, the principle of pacta sunt servanda (the obligation to keep their agreement in good faith), and seond by the Constitution's doctrine of incorporation, as the Constitution provides that the generally accepted principles of international law form "part of the law of the land." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action id needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. Thus, a treaty obligation has the force and effect of a statute, and is given equal treatment with the latter. The Constitution, as the Supreme law of the Land, may invalidate a treaty inconsistent with it, as it does in case of an unconstitutional statute. In the case of a conflict between a treaty and a statute, the principle of lex posterior derogat priori appliesa treaty may repeal a prior statute, and a later statute may repeal an existing treaty.

C.

EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

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International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing and International School G.R. No. 128845 (June 1, 2000)

International School (IS) pays its teachers who are hired from abroad, or foreign-hires, a higher salary than its local-hires, whether the latter are Filipino or not (most are Filipino, but some are American). It justifies this under the 'dislocation factor' that foreigners must be given a higher salary both to attract them to teach here, and to compensate them for the "significant economic disadvantages" involved in coming here. The Teacher's Union cries discrimination.

HELD: Discrimination exists. Equal pay for equal work is a principal long honored in this jurisdiction, as it rests on fundamental norms of justice

1.

Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution (Social Justice and Human Rights) exhorts Congress to give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and ennhance the right od all people to human dignity,

reduce social, economic, and political inequalitites." The Constitution also provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work.". These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace, but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees. Lastly, the Constitution directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all," "regardless of sex, race, or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and the letter of these provisions if the State closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. 2. International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and numerous other international Conventions all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws ---------------------ISAE v Quisimbing G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000 J. Kapunan Facts: The ISM, under Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul over the disparity in wages that they got compared to that of their foreign teaching counterparts. These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a local or foreign hire. a.....What is one's domicile?

b.....Where is one's home economy? c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance? d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines? Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is a local hire. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits to the foreign hires such as housing, transportation, and 25% more pay than locals under the theory of (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The first was grounded on leaving his home country, the second was on the lack of tenure when he returns home. The negotiations between the school and the union caused a deadlock between the parties. The DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole Secretary Quisimbing denied the unions mfr. He said, The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School. The union appealed to the Supreme Court. The petitioner called the hiring system discriminatory and racist. The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign origin. They were paid local salaries. Issue: Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection clause Held: Yes, Petition granted

Ratio: Public policy abhors discrimination. The Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." International law prohibits discrimination, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The latter promises Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind. In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible. The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. In this jurisdiction, there is the term equal pay for equal work, pertaining to persons being paid with equal salaries and have similar skills and similar conditions. There was no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.[ For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are

adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. Obiter: However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. The housing and other benefits accorded foreign hires were not given to local hires, thereby such admixture will nbot assure any group the power to exercise bargaining rights. The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. -------------------------Case Digest on International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing and International School G.R. No. 128845 (June 1, 2000) International School (IS) pays its teachers who are hired from abroad, or foreign-hires, a higher salary than its local-hires, whether the latter are Filipino or not (most are Filipino, but some are American). It justifies this under the dislocation factor that foreigners must be given a higher salary both to attract them to teach here, and to compensate them for the significant economic disadvantages involved in coming here. The Teachers Union cries discrimination.

HELD: Discrimination exists. Equal pay for equal work is a principal long honored in this jurisdiction, as it rests on fundamental norms of justice 1. Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution (Social Justice and Human Rights) exhorts Congress to give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and ennhance the right od all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalitites. The Constitution also provides that labor is entitled to humane conditions of work.. These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace, but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees. Lastly, the Constitution directs the State to promote equality of employment opportunities for all, regardless of sex, race, or creed. It would be an affront to both the spirit and the letter of these provisions if the State closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. 2. International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and numerous other international Conventions all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. --------------------------------------Quinto vs Comelec G. R. No. 189698 FACTS: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369. ISSUE: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid. HELD: NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials.

Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause. However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world. The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 provides that, Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Be it noted that petitioners of the above-entitled case are appointive officials who intend to be elected in the previously held 2010 elections and who felt aggrieved by the issuance of the questioned resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional. RULING: The Supreme Court overruled its previous decision declaring the assailed resolution unconstitutional. Here, it strongly upholds the constitutionality of the resolution saying that it does not violate the equal protection clause. It is settled that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The test used is reasonableness which requires that: 1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions; 2. It is germane to the purposes of the law; 3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4. It applies equally to all members of the same class. In the case under consideration, there is a substantial distinction between public and elective officials which has been rendered moot and academic by the ruling made in the case of Farinas, etl. al. vs. Executive Secretary, et. al. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional. ----------------------------------------------------------

QUINTO vs COMELEC G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010 ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. RESOLUTION PUNO, C.J.: ETO DIGEST NG CASE PRIOR TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. RESOLUTION YUNG ASSIGNED CASE SA ATIN Facts: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide: SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position. Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.

Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause Held: Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle. Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the law. The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign. As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure

encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. RA 9369 provides that For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional Held: No

To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain." In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the intervenors Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. ============== Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office. Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail. ---------------------------------------------------Quinto vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) G.R. No. 189698; 1 December 2009 Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners, who held appointive positions in government and who intended to run in the 2010 elections, assailed Section 4(a) of COMELECs Resolution No. 8678,* which deemed appointed officials automatically (ipso facto) resigned from office upon the filing of their Certificate of Candidacy (CoC). Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369.** The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.***

Petitioners averred that they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by law, already considered as candidates. (Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 provides that any person filing his certificate of candidacy within the period set by COMELEC shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.) Petitioners further averred that the assailed provision is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Representing the COMELEC, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the petition was premature and petitioners had no legal standing since they were not yet affected by the assailed provision, not having as yet filed their CoCs. The OSG also argued that petitioners could not avail the remedy of certiorari since what they were questioning was an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of its rule-making power. The OSG further averred that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of its Resolution No. 8678 since it merely copied what was in the law. The OSG, however, agreed that there is no basis to consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned upon filing their CoCs because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time. Issues:

Main Issue:

1. Whether or not Section 4(a) of COMELECs Resolution No. 8678 and the laws upon which it was based (second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 and Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) are unconstitutional.

Other Issues:

2. Whether or not certiorari is petitioners proper remedy. 3. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) to file the case, and whether or

not there is an actual controversy. Ruling: 1. On the Constitutionality of the Assailed Provisions The second provision in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 were declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. There are 4 requisites for a valid classification that will justify differential treatment between classes: (a) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (b) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (c) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) It must apply equally to all members of the class. The differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. (W)hether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. An appointive official could wield the same dangerous and coercive influence on the electorate as the elective official. Both may be motivated by political considerations rather than the publics welfare, use their governmental positions to promote their candidacies, or neglect their duties to attend to their campaign. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The challenged provision is also overbroad because: (a) It pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in

government or not (It would be absurd to consider a utility worker in the government as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC; it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.); and (b) It is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. 2. On the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy Certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be availed of because what petitioners assailed in their petition was a resolution issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari is a remedy to question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Prohibition is also an improper remedy, because what petitioners actually sought was the proper construction of a statute and a declaration of their rights thereunder. What they filed was a petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court does not exercise original jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court decided to resolve the petition considering that: (a) it challenged the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of the COMELEC Resolution and the law; (b) the transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised; (c) the compelling state interest involved in the early resolution of the issues (considering that the period for filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections had started and hundreds of civil servants intending to run for elective offices were to lose their employment and the governments manpower might be crippled); and (d) the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice or technicalities of procedure and resolve the merits of a case, otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion. 3. On the Legal Standing of Petitioners to File the Case and the Existence of an Actual

Controversy While petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the legal standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged provisions, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. Both candidates and voters may question challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the assailed provisions, on grounds of equal protection, because of its impact on voting rights. At any rate, the Supreme Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. There is an actual case or controversy between petitioners and the COMELEC. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would file their CoCs for the 2010 elections. Given that the assailed provisions provide for automatic resignation upon filing the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners candidacy. * Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections ** An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, entitled An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefore and for Other Purposes *** The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines Ponente: J. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura Vote: 8-6 ---------------------------------------