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G.R. No.

L-21676

February 28, 1969

Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 49996 and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel Bautista were issued in lieu thereof. Emmanuel Bautista then required Dr. Vicente Aldaba to vacate the lots in question and, upon the latter's refusal, filed an ejectment case against him in the City Court of Manila. Without awaiting the final result of the ejectment case, herein petitioners filed, on August 22, 1959, a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 41260, against herein respondents Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista and the Register of Deeds of Manila, alleging that they had become the owners of the two lots in question, and praying that the deed of partition entered into by Estanislao Bautista and Cesar Aldaba be declared null and void with respect to Lot No. 32, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1334, and lot No. 34 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No 1335; that said lots be declared the property of therein plaintiffs (herein petitioners); and that the Register of Deeds of Manila be ordered to cancel TCT Nos. 49996 and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel Bautista and in lieu thereof issue two new TCTs in the name of therein plaintiffs. After hearing, the court a quo rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, and declaring, among others, that if the deceased Belen Aldaba intended to convey the lots in question to Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, by way of donation, the conveyance should be considered a donation inter vivos, for the validity of which a public instrument was necessary pursuant to Article 749 of the Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court reads as follows: IN VIEW WHEREOF both complaint and counterclaim dismissed; the Court holds Emmanuel Bautista to be the absolute owner of the property in question, land and improvement, but with the right of plaintiffs to stay until they should have been reimbursed of P5,000.00 but without any obligation, until such reimbursement, to pay any rental unto defendant Emmanuel Bautista. No pronouncement as to costs. From this decision, therein plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter court rendered a decision, on June 21, 1963, raising from P5,000 to P8,000 the amount to be reimbursed to plaintiffs-appellants, but affirming in all other respects the decision of the lower court. Herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals, they forthwith filed the present petition in this Court. Before this Court, petitioners now contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance; (2) in holding that the donation, as found by the Court of First Instance of Manila, was a simple donation inter vivos and not a donation "con causa onerosa and so it was void for it did not follow the requirements of Article 749 of the Civil Code; (3) in not holding that the property in question had already been donated to herein petitioners in consideration of the latter's services; (4) in not declaring

VICENTE ALDABA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR ALDABA, ET AL., respondents. Rodas and Almeda for petitioners. Dakila F. Castro and Associates for respondents. ZALDIVAR, J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in case CAG.R. No. 27561-R, entitled "Vicente Aldaba, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, versus Cesar Aldaba, et al., defendants-appellees", affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 41260. When Belen Aldaba, a rich woman of Malolos, Bulacan, died on February 25, 1955, she left as her presumptive heirs her surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother Cesar Aldaba. Belen Aldaba was childless. Among the properties that she left were the two lots involved in this case, situated at 427 Maganda Street, Santa Mesa, Manila. Petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, father and daughter, respectively, lived during the last war in their house in Malate, Manila. Belen Aldaba used to go to their house to seek the advice and medical assistance of Dr. Vicente Aldaba. When the latter's house was burned during the liberation of Manila in 1945, Belen Aldaba invited Dr. Aldaba and his daughter, who was then a student in medicine, to live in one of her two houses standing on the lots in question, and the Aldaba father and daughter accepted the offer of Belen and they actually lived in one of those two houses until sometime in 1957 when respondent Emmanuel Bautista filed an ejectment case against them in the city court of Manila. Dr. Vicente Aldaba continued to act as a sort of adviser of Belen and Jane, after becoming a qualified doctor of medicine, became the personal physician of Belen until the latter's death on February 25, 1955. On June 24, 1955, the presumptive heirs Estanislao Bautista and Cesar Aldaba, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition of the properties left by the deceased Belen Aldaba, by virtue of which deed the two lots in question were alloted to Cesar Aldaba. Subsequently, on August 26, 1957, herein respondents Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, the latter being a grandson of Estanislao Bautista by his first marriage, executed a deed whereby the two lots that were alloted to Cesar Aldaba were ceded to Emmanuel Bautista in exchange of the latter's lot situated at San Juan, Rizal. By virtue of the deed of extra-judicial partition and the deed of exchange, Transfer certificates of Title Nos. 1334 and 1335, respectively, covering lots Nos. 32 and 34 now in question both in the name of Belen Aldaba, were cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Manila, and

petitioners to be the absolute owners of the property in dispute; and (5) in considering testimonies which had been stricken out. The errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated, We are going to discuss them together. Petitioners contend that petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba had rendered services to the deceased Belen Aldaba for more than ten years without receiving any compensation, and so in compensation for their services Belen Aldaba gave them the lots in dispute including the improvements thereon. It is the stand of petitioners that the property in question was conveyed to them by way of an onerous donation which is governed by Article 733, and not Article 749, of the Civil Code. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code an onerous donation does not have to be done by virtue of a public instrument. The petitioners point to the note, Exhibit 6, as indicating that a donation had been made, which note reads as follows: June 18, 1953 Jane, Huag kayong umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan ay sa inyo. Belen A. Bautista. Petitioners maintain that the note, although it could not transmit title, showed, nevertheless, that a donation had already been made long before its writing, in consideration of the services rendered before the writing and to be rendered after its writing. And the donation being with an onerous cause, petitioners maintain that it was valid even if it was done orally. Petitioners further maintain that if Exhibit 6 labors under some ambiguity, this ambiguity is cured by Exhibit 7, which reads as follows: June 27, 1956 Dear Nana Tering, Narito po ang notice tungkol sa amillaramiento na pagbabayaran diyan sa lupa at bahay na kinatatayuan ninyo. Sa Malolos po ito tinanggap. Ang pagbabayaran po ng Inkong ay bayad na. Gumagalang, "Cely."

The addressee, Tering, was the wife of Dr. Vicente Aldaba, and the sender, Cely was the wife of respondent Emmanuel Bautista. This note, petitioners argue, proves that respondents had recognized the ownership of the petitioners of the house and lot, for, otherwise, Cely should have sent the notice of real estate tax to respondent Cesar Aldaba, to whom was alloted the property in question by virtue of the extra-judicial partition. Respondents, Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, on the other hand, contend that the evidence of the plaintiff does not disclose clearly that a donation had been made. Respondents point out that the note, Exhibit 6, as worded, is vague, in that it could not be interpreted as referring to the lots in question, or that which was given therein was given for a valuable consideration. And finally, respondents contend that if the property had really been given to petitioners, why did they not take any step to transfer the property in their names? The Court of Appeals, in its decision, made the following findings and conclusions: (1) The note Exhibit 6 did not make any reference to the lots in question, nor to the services rendered, or to be rendered, in favor of Belen. The note was insufficient is a conveyance, and hence could not be considered as evidence of a donation with onerous cause. This note can be considered, at most, as indicative of the intention to donate. (2) There is no satisfactory explanation why from 1945 to 1955, no notarial document was executed by Belen in favor of petitioners who were educated persons. The reason given was "extremada delicadeza" which reason the Court of Appeals considered as unsatisfactory. (3) The evidence regarding the value of the services (P53,000.00) rendered by petitioners (father and daughter) to Belen does not improve the proof regarding the alleged donation. If petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the property was not sufficient to compensate them for their services, they could have presented their claims in the intestate proceedings, which they themselves could have initiated, if none was instituted. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals, as well as that of the trial court, that there was no onerous donation made by Belen Aldaba to petitioners is based upon their appreciation of the evidence, and this Court will not disturb the factual findings of those courts.lawphi1.nt The question to be resolved in the instant case is: Was there a disposition of the property in question made by the deceased Belen Aldaba in favor of herein petitioners? The note, Exhibit 6, considered alone, was, as held by the Court of Appeals, confirming the opinion of the lower court, only an indication

of the intention of Belen Aldaba to donate to the petitioners the property occupied by the latter. We agree with this conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The note, in fact, expressed that the property was really intended for the petitioners, "talagang iyan ay para sa inyo." If the property was only intended for petitioners then, at the time of its writing, the property had not yet been disposed of in their favor. There is no evidence in the record that such intention was effectively carried out after the writing of the note. Inasmuch as the mere expression of an intention is not a promise, because a promise is an undertaking to carry the intention into effect, 1 We cannot, considering Exhibit 6 alone, conclude that the deceased promised, much less did convey, the property in question to the petitioners. That the note, Exhibit 6, was only an indication of an intention to give was also the interpretation given by petitioners themselves, when they said in their memorandum, dated February 2, 1960, in the lower court 2 thus: Legally speaking, there was a contractual relation created between Belen Aldaba and the plaintiff since 1945 whereby the former would give to the latter the two parcels of land, together with the house standing thereon, upon the rendition of said services. This fact can be gleaned from the note (Exh. "6", Plaintiffs) which in part says: TALAGANG IYAN AY PARA SAINYO We have said that Exhibit 6 expressed only the intention to donate. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that previous to the writing of the note there had already been a disposition of the property in favor of the petitioners. This disposition alone, would not make the donation a donation for a valuable consideration. We still have to ask: What was the consideration of such disposition? We do not find in the record that there had been an express agreement between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that the latter would pay for the services of the former. If there was no express agreement, could it not be at least implied? There could not be an implied contract for payment because We find in the record that Jane did not expect to be paid for her services. In the memorandum of counsel for the petitioners in the trial court We find this statement: For all she did to her aunt she expected not to be paid.3 When a person does not expect to be paid for his services, there cannot be a contract implied in fact to make compensation for said services. However, no contract implied in fact to make compensation for personal services performed for another arises unless the party furnishing the services then expected or had reason to expect the payment or compensation by the other party. To give rise to an implied contract to pay for services, they must have been rendered by one party in expectation that the other party would pay for them, and have

been accepted by the other party with knowledge of that expectation. (58 Am. Jur. p. 512 and cases cited therein). In the same manner when the person rendering the services has renounced his fees, the services are not demandable obligations. 4 Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the services of petitioners constituted a demandable debt, We still have to ask whether in the instant case this was the consideration for which the deceased made the (alleged) disposition of the property to the petitioners. As we have adverted to, we have not come across in the record even a claim that there was an express agreement between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that the latter would give the property in question in consideration of the services of petitioners. All that petitioners could claim regarding this matter was that "it was impliedly understood" between them. 5 How said agreement was implied and from what facts it was implied, petitioners did not make clear. The question of whether or not what is relied upon as a consideration had been knowingly accepted by the parties as a consideration, is a question of fact, 6 and the Court of Appeals has not found in the instant case that the lots in question were given to petitioners in consideration of the services rendered by them to Belen Aldaba. We find, therefore, that the conditions to constitute a donation cum causa onerosa are not present in the instant case, and the claim of petitioners that the two lots in question were donated to them by Belen Aldaba cannot be sustained. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur. Sanchez, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-44628 August 27, 1987 CONSUELO SEVILLE JUTIC, JUAN JUTIC, CELESTINO SEVILLE, TIBURCIO SEVILLE, RAVELLO SEVILLE, SONITA SEVILLE, LUCY SEVILLE, EPIFANIA SEVILLE, NARACY SEVILLE, EMMANUEL SEVILLE, ORLANDO MANICAN, and PACIFICO MANICAN, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, VICENTE SULLAN, TRINIDAD SULLAN, TERESITA SULLAN, ULYSSES SULLAN, ALEJANDRINO SULLAN, BUENAVENTURA SEVILLE, and ZOILO SEVILLE, respondents.

xxx xxx xxx 9. That Melquiades Seville and his family have been in actual possession, occupation and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and 172, Cad-283, since 1954 continuously and peacefully in concept of owner, up to the time of his death, and had introduced valuable improvements thereon. After his demise his heirs, the defendants herein, succeeded to the occupation and possession of the said parcel of land and improvements with the knowledge of the plaintiffs and with the acquiescence of Arsenio Seville during his lifetime. 10. That even during the lifetime of the deceased Arsenio Seville it had been his desire, intention and his wish that Lots 170 and 172 shall be owned by Melquiades Seville, the father of the herein defendants. 11. That the ownership over the said Lots l7O and l72, Cad-283 and improvements had been vested, transmitted, conveyed and/or descended unto the defendants by virtue of Exhibit "1" of this answer and through continuous possession and cultivation of the land since 1954 continuously up to the present, in concept of owner as alleged under paragraph "9" hereof. 12. That by reason of this unfounded action by the plaintiffs, defendants have been compelled to engage services of counsel for which they bound themselves to pay P3,000.00 as attomey's fees. 13. That Melquiades Seville during his lifetime had taken legal steps to perfect titles to these parcels of land in his name." (pp. 11, 14-15, Record on Appeal). On September 19, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Involved in this appeal is the issue of whether or not there was a valid donation from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville. The facts of the case are briefly stated as follows During his lifetime, Arsenio Seville owned (1) a parcel of agricultural land described as Lot No. 170 situated at Anquibit, Asuncion (Saug), Davao del Norte containing an area of 11-9499 hectares, more or less; (2) a parcel of agricultural

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review on appeal by certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte, Branch 9. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and this case is remanded to the courta quo for implementation of, and compliance with Rule 69, Revised Rules of Court, and to partition the property in accordance with the rights as herein determined, defined and declared, with costs against defendants-appellants. (p. 48, Petitioner's brief) Vicente Sullan and the other respondents filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance at Tagum, Davao del Norte against the petitioners for partition and accounting of the properties of Arsenio Seville, alleging they are heirs of the decedent. The petitioners, averred the following in their answer: xxx xxx xxx 7. That the defendants are the owners of Lots 170 and 172 and improvements thereon, containing an area of 11.9499 and 9.6862 hectares, respectively, both covered by Original Certificates of Title No. P-15964 . 8. That defendants are the surviving heirs of Melquiades Seville. Melquiades Seville in turn is the brother of the deceased Arsenio Seville. Arsenio Seville died ahead. Melquiades Seville died later. During the lifetime of Arsenio Seville he executed an instrument ... .

land described as Lot No. 172 likewise situated at Anquibit, Asuncion (Saug), Davao del Norte with an area of 9.6862 hectares; (3) a residential house erected on Lot 172; (4) rice and corn mills and their respective paraphernalia valued at P5,000.00; and (5) five (5) carabaos in the possession of the then defendants (pp. 6-9, Petitioners' brief). On March 4, 1963, Arsenio Seville executed an affidavit in favor of Melquiades Seville, which reads: AFFIDAVIT I, ARSENIO SEVILLE, of legal age, WIDOWER, Filipino, and a resident of Anquibit, Cambanogoy, Saug, Davao, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law do hereby depose and say, as follows: That I am the declared and legal owner of a certain parcel of land otherwise known as Lot Nos. 172 and 170 Cad- 283, containing an area of 21.6361 has., and situated at Cambanogoy, Saug, Davao and covered by HA No. V-77791 (E-69793) and approved by the Director of Lands as per Order issued on March 5, 1954; That I am a widower as indicated above and that I have no one to inherit all my properties except my brother Melquiades Seville who appears to be the only and rightful person upon whom I have the most sympathy since I have no wife and children; That it is my desire that in case I will die I will assign all my rights, interest, share and participation over the above- mentioned property and that he shall succeed to me in case of my death, however, as long as I am alive I will be the one to possess, enjoy and benefit from the produce of my said land and that whatever benefits it will give me in the future I shall be the one to enjoy it; That I make this affidavit to make manifest my intention and desire as to the way the above-mentioned property shall be dispose of and for whatever purpose it may serve. xxx xxx xxx (p. 7. Appellees' brief; Exh. 4, p. 52, Folder of Exhibits).

On May 24, 1968, Arsenio Seville mortgaged said properties to the Philippine National Bank in consideration of a loan. This was done with the knowledge and acquiescence of Melquiades Seville. On May 15, 1970, Arsenio Seville died intestate, single, without issue, and without any debt. He was survived by his brothers, Buenaventura Seville and Zoilo Seville who are included as respondents; brother Melquiades Seville; and sisters Encarnacion Seville and Petra Seville. Thereafter, Melquiades died and is survived by his children Consuelo, Celestino, Tiburcio, Ravelo, Sonita, Lucy, Epifania, Naracy and Emmanuel, all surnamed Seville. Sisters Encarnacion and Petra died later. Encarnacion is survived by her children Trinidad, Teresita, Ulysses and Alejandrino, all surnamed Sullan and her husband Vicente Sullan while Petra Seville is survived by her children Orlando Manican and Pacifico Manican. The children of Melquiades Seville are now claiming exclusive ownership of the properties and improvements thereon on the basis of the instrument executed by Arsenio Seville in favor of Melquiades Seville and on their alleged actual possession, occupation, and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and 172 since 1954 continuously and peacefully in the concept of owner up to the time of Arsenio Seville's death. The petitioners assign the following alleged errors of the respondent court: I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE AFFIDAVIT IN QUESTION A DEED OR INSTRUMENT OF DONATION INTER VIVOS: II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING CATEGORICALLY THAT ARSENIO SEVILLE COULD VALIDLY DISPOSE OR DONATE THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION. III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT VACATING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT AND ENTERED (SIC) A NEW ONE HOLDING THAT THE AFFIDAVIT IN QUESTION IS A DEED OF DONATION AND THAT THE DONATION IS A DONATION INTER VIVOS THUS VALIDLY CONVEYING THE LAND UNTO THE DONEE MELQUIADES SEVILLE. (p. 10, Petitioners' brief). All the above assigned errors discuss the issues as relating to a donation. The trial court was correct in stating that "a close reading reveals that Exhibit 4 is not a donation inter vivos or mortis causa but a mere declaration of an intention and a desire. Certainly, it is not a concrete and formal act of giving or donating. The

form and contents of said Exhibit 4 amply support this conclusion." (p. 3 7, Record on Appeal). A discussion of the different kinds of donations and the requisites for their effectivity is irrelevant in the case at bar. There clearly was no intention to transfer ownership from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville at the time of the instrument's execution. It was a mere intention or a desire on the part of Arsenio Seville that in the event of his death at some future time, his properties should go to Melquiades Seville. In Aldaba v. Court of Appeals (27 SCRA 263, 269-270) we ruled on a similar expression of an intention, as follows: The question to be resolved in the instant case is: Was there a disposition of the property in question made by the deceased Belen Aldaba in favor of herein petitioners? The note, Exhibit 6, considered alone, was, as held by the Court of Appeals, confirming the opinion of the lower court, only an indication of the intention of Belen Aldaba to donate to the petitioners the property occupied by the latter. We agree with this conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The note, in fact, expressed that the property was really intended for the petitioners, "talagang iyan ay para sa inyo." If the property was only intended for petitioners then, at the time of its writing, the property had not yet been disposed of in their favor. There is no evidence in the record that such intention was effectively carried out after the writing of the note. Inasmuch as the mere expression of an intention is not a promise, because a promise is an undertaking to carry the intention into effect, (17 American Jurisprudence, 2d p. 334) We cannot, considering Exhibit 6 alone, conclude that the deceased promised, much less did convey, the property in question to the petitioners. ... . It is quite apparent that Arsenio Seville was thinking of succession ("... in case I win die, I will assign all my rights, share and participation over the abovementioned properties and that he shall succeed to me in case of my death ..."). Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and shall be governed by the rules established in the title on succession (Art. 728, Civil Code). The petitioners likewise contend that the document was a valid donation as only donations are accepted by the donees. However, the petitioners could not have accepted something, which by the terms of the supposed "donation" was not given to them at the time. The affidavit could not transmit ownership except in clear and express terms.

Furthermore, the homestead application was later prosecuted in the name of Arsenio Seville and the land, much later, was mortgaged by him to the Philippine National Bank (Annex 1, p. 100, Rollo) in consideration of a loan. Arsenio dealt with the land and entered into transactions as its owner. All these happened with the knowledge and acquiescence of the supposed donee, Melquiades Seville. Contrary to the petitioners' allegations in their brief, there was no immediate transfer of title upon the execution of Exhibit 4. Contrary to what the petitioners aver, private respondents as legal heirs of Arsenio Seville have actual and substantial interests in the subject of litigation thus qualifying them as real parties-in-interest. Common ownership is shown by the records. Therefore, any claim of ownership of the petitioners is not based on Exhibit 4 but on the fact that they are heirs of Arsenio Seville together with the private respondents. It is likewise significant to note the respondents' assertion that the signed affidavit is a forgery because Arsenio Seville was illiterate during his lifetime. He could not write his name. He executed documents by affixing his thumbmark as shown in the Real Estate Mortgage (Exhibit A-4), which he executed on May 24, 1968 in favor of the Philippine National Bank. The real estate mortgage came much later or more than five years after the supposed donation (Exhibit 4) to Melquiades Seville where Arsenio Seville allegedly affixed his signature. This fact was not disputed by the petitioners. Moreover, the petitioners' actions do not support their claim of ownership. During the lifetime of Arsenio Seville, he paid the PNB amortization out of his personal funds and out of the income on his property. The payments were not continued by the petitioners when Arsenio Seville died so much so that the property was extrajudicially foreclosed and had to be repurchased by Zoilo Seville, one of the respondents, through installment arrangements. (Deed of Promise to Sell appended as Annex 4 to respondents' brief). The actions of the respondents are in consonance with their claim of co-ownership. Finally, it is a well-established rule that the factual findings of the trial court are generally not disturbed except where there is a clear cause or a strong reason appearing in the record to warrant a departure from such findings (Alcaraz v. Racimo, 125 SCRA 328; People v. Tala, 141 SCRA 240; and People v. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280). There is no such clear cause or strong reason in this case. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

[Nos. L-7064 & L-7098. April 22, 1955] MARIE HOWARD, petitioner, vs. CONSTANCIA PADILLA and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. CONSTANCIA PADILLA, petitioner, vs. MARIE HOWARD and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Two petitions for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals which declares that the donation in question is by its nature inter vivos, and not mortis causa, and as such is valid and irrevocable, 984 though it likewise declares that it is valid in so far only as the share of the donor of the property donated is concerned, because it cannot prejudice the share of Marie Howard, widow of the donor, it being conjugal in nature, ordering at the same time that the adjudication be noted on the title covering the property. HELD: The donation in question is mortis causa or one to take effect after death, and not having been executed with the formalities of the law regarding wills, the same is null and void and without effect. In this respect, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, but is affirmed in so far as it holds that Marie Howard is the legal widow of the deceased. The decision of the Court of First Instance is hereby revived and given effect, without pronouncement as to costs. Bautista Angelo, J., ponente

G.R. No. L-15939

January 31, 1966

ANGELES UBALDE PUIG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ESTELLA MAGBANUA PEAFLORIDA, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Salonga and Ordonez for the plaintiffs-appellants. Fulgencio Vega for the defendants-appellants. RESOLUTION (Main opinion was promulgated on November 29, 1965). REYES, J.B.L., J.: Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, et al., insist that the reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed of December 28, 1949 indicates that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime, otherwise, it is argued, the reservation would be superfluous, and they cite American authorities in support. This thesis would be plausible if the reservation of the power to dispose were the only indication to be considered in deciding whether the donation of December 28, 1949 was mortis causa or inter vivos. But such is not the case. The Court in its decision took to account not only the foregoing circumstance but also the fact that the deceased expressly and consistently declared her conveyance to be one of donation mortis causa, and further forbade the registration of the deed until after her death. All these features concordantly indicated that the conveyance was not intended to produce any definitive effects, nor to finally pass any interest to the grantee, except from and after the death of the grantor. We see nothing in the deed itself to indicate that any right, title or interest in the properties described was meant to be transferred to Doa Estela Magbanua prior to the death of the grantor, Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon. Not ownership, certainly, for the stipulation: Que esta escritura de donacion mortis causa no se registrara en la oficina del Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo sino despues del fallecimiento de la Donante necessarily meant, according to section 50 of the Land Registration Act, that the deed in question should not take effect as a conveyance nor bind the land until after the death of the "donor".

Neither did the document operate to vest possession upon Doa Estela Magbanua, in view of the express condition that (paragraph 3) if at the date of her death the donor had not transferred, sold, or conveyed one-half of lot 58 of the Pototan Cadastre to other persons or entities, the donee would be bound to pay to Caridad Ubalde, married to Tomas Pedrola, the amount of P600.00, and such payment was to be made on the date the donee took possession of Lot No. 58. As the obligation to pay the legacy to Caridad Ubalde would not definitely arise until after the death of the donor, because only by then would it become certain that the "donor" could not transfer the property to someone else, and such payment must precede the taking possession of the property "donated", it necessarily follows that the "donee's" taking of possession could not occur before the death of the donor. It being thus clear that the disposition contained in the deed is one that produces no effect until the death of the grantor, we are clearly faced by an act mortis causa of the Roman and Spanish law. We thus see no need of resorting to American authorities as to the import of the reservation of the donor's right to dispose of the donated property, for the Spanish authorities are very clear on this point: Desde el momento en que la muerte del donante es la que determina la adquisicion o el derecho a los bienes; desde el montento en que la disposicion puede ser revocada voluntariamente, se salva la linea divisoria entre unos y otros actos: la donacion equivale a un legado; mas aun que esto: es un legado en realidad. (5 Manresa, 5th Ed., p. 107) Ahora bien: si el mal llamado donante no solo dilata la fecha de la ejecucion para el momento de su muerte, sino que ademas se reserva la facultad de revocar a su arbitrio la disposicion , entonces el acto no es valido bajo la forma de contrato; hay en realidad una disposicion mortis causa que exige las solemnidades del testamento. (V Manresa, 5th Ed., p. 109) (Emphasis supplied) The presence of an acceptance is but a consequence of the erroneous concept of the true nature of the juridical act, and does not indicate that in the same is a true donation inter vivos. Appellant Magbanua further argues that the reserved power of the donor to convey the donated property to other parties during her lifetime is but a resolutory condition (albeit a potestative one) that confirms the passing of the title to the donee. In reality, this argument is a veritable petitio principii ; it takes for granted what has to be proved, i.e., that some proprietary right has passed under the terms of the deed, which, as we have shown, is not true until the donor has died.

It is highly illuminating to compare the condition imposed in the deed of donation of December 28, 1949 with that established in the contract dealt with in Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao & Tau Liuan, 43 Phil. 874, invoked by appellants. In the alleged deed of donation of December 28, 1949, the late Doa Carmen Ubalde imposed expressly that: Que antes de su muerte, la Donante podra enajenar, vender, traspasar e hipotecar a cualesquiera personas o entidades los bienes aqui donados a favor de la Donataria en concepto de Donacion mortis causa. In the Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao case, on the other hand, the condition read: It is understood and agreed that should the machinery to be installed in said factory fail, for any reason, to arrive, in the City of Manila within the period of six (6) months from date hereof, this contract may be cancelled by the party of the second part at its option, such cancellation, however, not to occur before the expiration of such six (6) months. (pp. 874-875, cas. cit.). In the Uy Tieng Piao case the contract could only be cancelled after six months, so that there could be no doubt that it was in force at least for that long, and the optional cancellation can be viewed as a resolutory condition (or more properly, a non-retroactive revocatory one); but no such restriction limited the power of the donor, Doa Carmen Ubalde, to set at naught the alleged conveyance in favor of Doa Estela Magbanua by conveying the property to other parties at any time, even at the very next instant after executing the donation, if she so chose. It requires no argument to demonstrate that the power, as reserved in the deed, was a power to destroy the donation at any time, and that it meant that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her death made it impossible to channel the property elsewhere. Which, in the last analysis, as held in our main decision, signifies that the liberality is testamentary in nature, and must appear with the solemnities required of last wills and testaments in order to be legally valid. Wherefore, the motion to reconsider is denied.

G.R. No. 125888 August 13, 1998 SPOUSES ERNESTO and EVELYN SICAD, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CATALINO VALDERRAMA, JUDY CRISTINA M. VALDERRAMA and JESUS ANTONIO VALDERRAMA, respondents.

recover the donated property, since she had not pursued the matter of its revocation after having it annotated as an adverse claim. The case, originally treated as a special proceeding, was subsequently considered by the lower Court as an ordinary civil action in view of the allegations and issues raised in the pleadings. Pre-trial was had, followed by trial on the merits which was concluded with the filing of the parties' memoranda. The Trial Court then rendered judgment on March 27, 1991, holding that the donation was indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing Aurora Montinola's petition for lack of merit. 4 The matter of its revocation was not passed upon. Montinola elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, her appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33202. She however died on March 10, 1993, 5 while the appeal was pending. Shortly after Montinola's demise, a "Manifestation and Motion" dated March 31, 1993 was filed by Ernesto Sicad and Evelyn Bofill-Sicad, herein petitioners, 6 in which they (a) alleged that they had become the owners of the property covered by TCT No. T-16622 in virtue of a "deed of definite sale dated May 25, 1992" accomplished by Montinola in their favor, which was confirmed by "an affidavit dated November 26, 1997 also executed by the latter, and (b) prayed that they be substituted as appellants and allowed to prosecute the case in their own behalf. Another motion was subsequently presented under date of April 7, 1993, this time by the legal heirs of Aurora Montinola, namely: Ofelia M. de Leon, Estela M. Jaen and Teresita M. Valderama. They declared that they were not interested in pursuing the case, and asked that the appeal be withdrawn. Montinola's counsel opposed the motion. On June 21, 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution: (a) ordering the substitution of the persons above mentioned Ofelia de Leon, Estela M, Jaen, and Teresita M. Valderama as plaintiffs-appellants in place of the late Aurora Montinola, as well as the joinder of the spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Bofill-Sicad as additional appellants; 7 and (b) denying the motion for the withdrawal of the appeal. On June 30, 1995, the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on the case affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court; 8 and on July 31, 1996, it denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by Ofelia M. de Leon, Estela M. Jaen, and Teresita M. Valderrama, on the one hand, and by the spouses, Ernest and Evelyn Sicad, on the other. 9 The Sicad Spouses have appealed to this Court; and here, they contend that the following errors were committed by the Appellate Tribunal, to wit:

NARVASA, C.J.: The issue raised in the appeal by certiorari at bar centers on the character of a deed of donation executed by the late Aurora Virto DA. de Motinola of the City of Iloilo as either inter vivos or mortis causa. That deed, entitled "DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS," 1 was executed by Montinola on December 11, 1979. It named as donees her grandchildren, namely: Catalino Valderrama, Judy Cristina Valderrama and Jesus Antonio Valderrama: and treated of a parcel of land, Lot 3231 of the Cadastral Survey of Panay, located at Brgy. Pawa, Panay, Capiz, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16105 in the name of Montinola. The deed also contained the signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of their acceptance of the donation. Montinola's Secretary, Gloria Salvilla, afterwards presented the deed for recording in the Property Registry, and the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. T-16105 (the donor's title) and, in its place, issued TCT No. T-16622 on February 7, 1980, in the names of the donees. 2 Montinola however retained the owner's duplicate copy of the new title (No. T-16622), as well as the property itself, until she transferred the same ten (10) years later, on July 10, 1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. On March 12, 1987, Aurora Montinola drew up a deed of revocation of the donation, 3 and caused it to be annotated as an adverse claim on TCT No. T16622 (issued, as aforestated, in her grandchildren's names). Then, on August 24, 1990, she filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court in Roxas City for the cancellation of said TCT No. T-16622 and the reinstatement of TCT No. T- 16105 (in her name), the case being docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3311. Her petition was founded on the theory that the donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which thus had to comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the donation was void and could not effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of TCT No. T-16105 and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-16622. The donees (Montinola's grandchildren) opposed the petition. In their opposition dated August 29, 1990, they averred that the donation in their favor was one inter vivos which, having fully complied with the requirements therefor set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code, was perfectly valid and efficacious. They also expressed doubt about the sincerity of their grandmother's intention to

1) ** in ruling that the donation was inter vivos and in not giving due weight to the revocation of the donation; and 2) ** in not ordering that the case be remanded for further reception of evidence. 10 The Comment filed for private respondents (the donees) under date of December 19, 1996 deals with what they consider the "principal issue in this case ** (i .e.) whether the donation is mortis causa or inter vivos," and sets forth the argument that the "donor clearly intended to effect the immediate transfer of ownership to the donees." that the prohibition in the deed of donation "against selling the property within ten (10) years after the death of the donor does not indicate that the donation ismortis causa," that the donor's "alleged act of physically keeping the title does not suggest any intention to defer the effectivity of the donation," that the "payment of real property taxes is consistent with the donor's' reservation of the right of usufruct," that the donor's intent "is not determined by ** (her) self-serving post-execution declarations," the "donation was never effectively revoked," and petitioners "have waived their right to question the proceedings in the trial court." 11 The Reply of the Sicad Spouses dated March 14, 1997 reiterates their thesis that the donation was mortis causa, that "the provisions of the deed of donation indicate that it was intended to take effect upon the death of the donor," that "the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed, and the subsequent actions of the donor incontrovertibly signify the donor's intent to transfer the property only after her death," that the donor "did not intend to give effect to the donation," and that the procedure adopted by the Trial Court in the case was fatally defective. 12 A "Rejoinder" dated April 3, 1997 was then submitted by the Valderramas, traversing the assertions of the Reply. 13 Considering the focus of the opposing parties, and their conflicting theories, on the intention of Aurora Montinola in executing the document entitled "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," it is needful to review the circumstances of the signing of that document by Montinola, as ostensible donor, and her grandchildren, as ostensible donees. The evidence establishes that on December 11, 1979, when the deed of donation prepared by Montinola's lawyer (Atty. Treas) was read and explained by the latter to the parties, Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the property for such period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the deed reading: "however, the donees shall not sell or encumber the properties herein donated within 10 years after the death of the donor." 14 The actuality of the subsequent insertion of this new proviso is apparent on the face of the instrument: the intercalation is easily perceived and identified it was clearly typed on a different machine, and is crammed

into the space between the penultimate paragraph of the deed and that immediately preceding it. 15 Not only did Aurora Montinola order the insertion in the deed of that restrictive proviso, but also, after recordation of the deed of donation, she never stopped treating the property as her own. She continued, as explicity authorized in the deed itself, to possess the property, enjoy its fruits and otherwise exercise the rights of dominion, paying the property taxes as they fell due all these she did until she transferred the Property to the Sicad Spouses on July 10, 1990. She did not give the new certificate of title to the ostensible donees but retained it, too, until she delivered it to the Sicads on the occasion of the sale of the property to them. In any event, the delivery of the title to the donees would have served no useful purpose since, as just stated, they were prohibited to effect any sale or encumbrance thereof for a period of ten (10) years after the ostensible donor's decease. And consistent with these acts denoting retention of ownership of the property was Montinola's openly expressed view that the donation was ineffectual and could not be given effect even after ten (10) years from her death. For this view she sought to obtain judicial approval. She brought suit on August 24, 1990 to cancel TCT No. T-16622 (issued to her grandchildren) premised precisely on the invalidity of the donation for failure to comply with the requisites of testamentary dispositions. Before that, she attempted to undo the conveyance to her grandchildren by executing a deed of revocation of the donation on March 12, 1987, and causing annotation thereof as an adverse claim on said TCT No. T-16622. She also exercised indisputable acts of ownership over said property by executing, as just stated, deeds intended to pass title over it to third parties petitioners herein. 16 As already intimated, the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution. In this respect, case law has laid down significant parameters. Thus, in a decision handed down in 1946, 17 this Court construed a deed purporting to be a donation inter vivosto be in truth one mortis causa because it stipulated (like the one now being inquired into) "that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for the exclusive benefit and disposal of the donor, Margarita David, during her lifetime; and that, without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or in any other way possible," On these essential premises, the Court said, such a donation must be deemed one "mortis causa, because the combined effect of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation and of the above-quoted clauses thereof ** (was that) the most essential elements of ownership the right to dispose of the donated properties and the right to enjoy the products, profits, possession remained with Margarita David during her lifetime, and would accrue to the donees only after Margarita David's death." So, too, in the case at bar, did these rights remain with Aurora Montinola during her lifetime, and could not pass to the donees until ten (10) years after her death.

In another case decided in 1954 involving a similar issue, Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, 18 this Court emphasized that the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa, which it had taken into account in David v. Sison, were that "the donor not only reserved for herself all the fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important, specially provided that "without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any way,; thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute of ownership, the power to dispose of the properties." A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right to dispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive." 19 In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of donation in question to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the property this would accrue to them only after ten (10) years from Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate of title to the same. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated property. All these circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of donation reserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the property until ten (10) years after her death ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor's demise. The case of Alejandro v. Geraldez 20 cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its challenged judgment is not quite relevant. For in the deed of donation there in issue, there was a partial relinquishment of the right to dispose of the property, in the event only that this became necessary "to defray the expenses and support of the donors." That limited right to dispose of the donated lots, said this Court, "implies that ownership had passed to ** (the donees) by means of the donation and **, therefore, the donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. That is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos." On the other hand, in the case at bar, the donees were expressly prohibited to make any disposition of any nature or for any purpose whatever during the donor's lifetime, and until ten (10) years after her death a prohibition which, it may be added, makes inapplicable the ruling in Castro v. Court of Appeals, 21 where no such prohibition was imposed, and the donor retained only the usufruct over the property. The Valderramas' argument that the donation is inter vivos in character and that the prohibition against their disposition of the donated property is merely a condition which, if violated, would give cause for its revocation, begs the

question. It assumes that they have the right to make a disposition of the property, which they do not. The argument also makes no sense, because if they had the right to dispose of the property and did in fact dispose of it to a third person, the revocation of the donation they speak of would be of no utility or benefit to the donor, since such a revocation would not necessarily result in the restoration of the donor's ownership and enjoyment of the property. It is also error to suppose that the donation under review should be deemed one inter vivos simply because founded on considerations of love and affection. In Alejandro v. Geraldez, supra, 22 this Court also observed that "the fact that the donation is given in consideration of love and affection ** is not a characteristic of donations inter vivos (solely) because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason." Similarly, in Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, supra, this Court opined that the fact "that the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the services rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds, Exhs. "1" and "2," constitute transfers inter vivosor not, because a legacy may have identical motivation." 23 Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the Civil Code to the effect that in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the construction must be that entailing "the least transmission of rights and interests," 24 The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis causa; it is void because the essential requisites for its validity have not been complied with. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33202 dated June 30, 1995 as well as the Resolution denying reconsideration thereof, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Special Case No. 3311 are SET ASIDE. The Deed of Donation Inter Vivos (Exh. "A") executed by Aurora Virto Vda. de Montinola on December 11, 1979 in favor of Catalino M. Valderrama, Judy Cristina M. Valderrama and Jesus Antonio M. Valderrama is declared null and void. The Register of Deeds of Roxas City is directed to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16622, revive and reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16105. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 49108

March 28, 1946

In the matter of the testate estate of the late Margarita David. GONZALO D. DAVID, petitioner-appellant, vs. CARLOS SISON, oppositor-appellant. Gonzalo D. David in his own behalf. Carlos M. Sison in his own behalf. PERFECTO, J.: This is an appeal against a resolution issued by Judge Gervasio Diaz, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering the administrator of the estate of Margarita David to pay petitioner as attorney's fees, for services rendered to the estate, from March, 1941, to March, 1943, in the amount of P18,000. In the petition filed in the lower court on March 24, 1943, petitioner prayed that he be awarded an amount equivalent to 5 per cent of the original inventoried estate, namely, the sum of P72, 779.10, although in his brief, dated April 11, 1944, he claims that the 5 per cent he is charging should be estimated not only on the basis of the inventoried estate but including besides the income thereof for two and one-half years, totalling P1,627,507.24, the 5 per cent thereof would amount to P81,375.36, more or less. The oppositor contended that the amount granted by the lower court is exorbitant, but failed to state in his brief what reasonable amount should be. At the hearing of this case he manifested he would consider reasonable the amount of P3,000, although he would not mind any amount that may be fixed, provided the payment of any part of said attorney's fees would not be shouldered by his wife, Priscila F. Sison, one of the heiresses of the estate, nor affected any part of the property adjudicated to her. From the above, it can be seen that the two contending parties went to possible extremes, allowed by their respective feelings and imaginations, and that the reasonable amount should be found between the two extremes. It is inconceivable that two reasonable persons, such as we presume the petitioner and the oppositor to be, neither one showing that he is beyond any standard of normality, both cultured and trained in the science of law, disagree from P3,000 to P81,375.36 in appraising the pecuniary value of the legal services in question. The reason for this so wide a difference must be found in the fact that both allowed themselves to give way, not to fair dealing and fair judgment, but to uncontrollable emotions aroused by intransigent conflict of monetary interest. The parties thresh in this appeal three main questions:

(1) Whether the donation executed by the deceased on September 6, 1940, as appears in Exhibit FFFFF, should be considered as inter vivos or mortis causa, the parties placing great importance on this question under the theory that, in the first place, the donated properties must be excluded from the estate proceedings; but in case the donation is mortis causa, that should be included in the inventory of the estate. (2) Whether heiress Priscila F. Sison should or should not shoulder the corresponding burden in the payment of petitioner's fees for the properties adjudicated to her. (3) The reasonable amount that must be granted to petitioner as attorney's fees. The lower court, after considering the facts in the case, arrived at the conclusion that the donation was inter vivos,on the strength of the doctrine that a donation in order to be mortis causa must have for consideration the donor's death. We do not have before us the full text of the deed of donation, but only the following paragraphs of the same as quoted in the record on appeal of petitioner and in the briefs of both parties: "Na and naturang "donor," Margarita David y Puato, alang-alang sa malaki niyang pagtigin, pagligap at pagmamahal sa mga nabanguit na "donees" Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de la Fuente, sa pamamagitan nang kasulatang ito, malayang ibinigay at ipinagkakaloob sa mga naturang Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de la Fuente, at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana, "albacea" at "Administradores", sa habang panahon, ang kanyang mga titulo, interes at participacion sa mag sumusunod na ari-arian na pawang malines sa lahat nang mga pananagutan: (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 209, 210.) Datapwa't ang lahat nang mga tubo at pakinabangan nang nagbibigay o "donor" na si Margarita David y Puato hanggang siya ay hindi binabawian nang buhay nang maykapal; at ang mga pinagbibigyan na si Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de la Fuente ay hindi maaaring maipagbili, maisangal, a maipagpalit o sa ano pa man paraan, kung walang kaalaman at pahintulot nang naturang Margarita David y Puato. (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 212, 213.) The following facts are pointed to us concerning the deed of donation: (1) That on December 20, 1938, Margarita David executed her first and only last will and testament in favor of her grandnieces Narcisa de la Fuente de Teodoro

and Priscila de la Fuente de Sison as residuary heiresses, and other relatives of the same degree as legatees and devisees. (2) That on October 21, 1939, Margarita David adopted, in special proceedings No. 55861 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, said grandnieces Narcisa de la Fuente de Teodoro and Priscila de la Fuente de Sison, making them her adopted children. (3) That on September 6, 1940, Margarita David executed the deed of donation in question in favor of her newly adopted children, the same testamentary residuary heiresses, donating to them practically the same properties disposed of in the will. (4) That on November 18, 1940, the Collector of Internal Revenue rejected the donor's and donee's gift tax returns on the deed of donation in question, on the ground that the donation is a transfer in contemplation of death and subject to an estate and inheritance taxes, which should be paid upon Margarita David's death in accordance with section paid upon Margarita David's death in accordance with section 88 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code. (5) That, in fact, after the death of Margarita David the estate and inheritance taxes on the properties were paid. (6) That, acting upon the claim made by the probate clerk and by the cashier of the Court of First Instance of Manila, said court ordered the executor to pay an additional docketing fee of P786 based on the inventory of the estate as valued at P1,415,581.99, including the properties disposed of in the deed of donation. (7) That when Margarita David signed the deed of donation she was already irretrievably ill and she knew that the end was near and inevitable. (8) That since the donation was executed on September 6, 1940, until Margarita David's death on February 24, 1941, less than six months had elapsed. (9) That from the execution of the deed of donation up to the donor's death, the donation properties remained in her office entitled: "Margarita David, Administrator's office." (10) That Margarita David has reserved to herself the usufruct of all the donated properties during her lifetime, and provided that the donated properties could not be alienated by the donees without the knowledge and consent of the donor, Margarita David.

(11) That the donees, being the universal heirs of Margarita David, as her adopted daughters, without the deed of donation or any will, were to inherit the donated properties by operation of law. Petitioner mentions, furthermore, that by the adoption of the above-mentioned grandnieces, the inheritance tax was reduced to about one-third of the amount it would have been paid if the said grandnieces were not adopted as children of Margarita David, the inheritance tax actually paid being P224,000, while, otherwise, the amount would have been P672,000; and, lastly, the tax to be paid could have been further reduced by the execution of the deed of donation, as the rate schedule for gift tax is lower than the rate schedule for inheritance tax. In one of the paragraphs of the deed of donation above quoted, it appears that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for the exclusive benefit and disposal of the donor, Margartia David, during her lifetime; and that, without the knowledge consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or in any other way possible, thus making the donees just as paper owners of the properties which , for all practical purposes, remained the properties of Margarita David. From all the foregoing, we conclude that the donation in question is, in fact, a donation mortis causa, because the combined effect of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation and of the above-quoted clauses thereof could not have taken effect before the death of Margarita David. According to the terms of the deed, the most essential elements of ownership the right to dispose of the donated properties and the right to enjoy the products, profits, possession remained with Margarita David during her lifetime, and would accrue to the donees only after Margarita David's death. Although we arrived at the conclusion that the donation in question is a donation mortis causa, we are not inclined to support petitioner's contention that, in the present case, the donated properties should be included in the inventory of the estate and should follow the same proceedings as if they were not donated at all, it appearing that the donated properties (which, by the way, were the object of an extrajudicial partition between the donees) are not necessary to answer for the obligation left by the deceased, there being enough properties not included in the donation to answer for said obligations. The second question, that is, whether heiress Priscila F. Sison should or should not shoulder the corresponding burden in the payment of petitioner's fees for the properties adjudicated to her, our opinion is that the question must be answered affirmatively. No heir, legatee, or devisee may elude the payment of any obligation of the estate which should be answered by the estate as a

whole in which no discrimination can be made in favor of or against any heir or heiress. The third question is not so easy to dispose of, as no fast rules can be se up upon which the reasonable attorney's fees of petitioner can be estimated with mathematical accuracy. Memorandum of legal services rendered by petitioner from March, 1941, to March, 1943, appears as part of his petition dated March 24, 1943, reproduced in his record on appeal, pages 6 to 42. An additional memorandum of services rendered until August, 1943, is included in the supplement pleading, pages 121128 of the same record on appeal. We have examined both memoranda of legal services and, although petitioner spent about two years and a half, the services appear to be generally of routinary character, not needing any special skill nor the exertion of unusual efforts, nor the employment of long hours of legal study and research, nor the waste or expenditure of extraordinary length of time that might deprive him of the opportunity to render legal services in other cases and collect profitable legal fees. But, at the same time, while there is nothing in the services to require of justify a special compensation, in estimating the reasonable fees that should be awarded to petitioner, we have considered, among other factors and circumstances, the length of time which ran from the first service to the last around two years and a half the number of services rendered, and the fact that petitioner, being a near relative of the deceased, would have received a substantial share in the numerous properties left by the deceased, if the latter had died intestate and had not decided to adopt as her children two nieces who were in the same rank of relationship with the deceased as petitioner. It appears that petitioner had received only a small legacy valued at less than P1,000. After considering all the facts and circumstances in this case, in an effort to fix an amount that could be as reasonable as possible, the court decided that petitioner is entitled to the sum of P10,000, as attorney's fees, to be paid by the estate of the deceased Margarita David, and so modify the appealed resolution, without pronouncement as to costs. Ozaeta, De Joya, Hilado, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 131953

June 5, 2002

MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S. CABATINGAN, petitioners, vs. THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M. BOQUIA, PERLA M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAETE, LOURDES M. YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD namely, OSCAR C. NATIVIDAD, OLGA NATIVIDAD, ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA NATIVIDAD, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND NATIVIDAD, RICHIE NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD and ENCARNACION CABATINGAN VDA. DE TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN and JESUSA C. NAVADA, respondents. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Posed for resolution before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the sole issue of whether the donations made by the late Conchita Cabatingan are donations inter vivos ormortis causa. The facts of the case are as follows: On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half () portion of the former's house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu.1 Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land one located in Cogon, Cebu (307 sq. m.) and the other, a portion of a parcel of land in Masbate (50,232 sq. m.); (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land located in Masbate (80,000 sq. m.); and (c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of the Masbate property (80,000 sq. m.). 2 These deeds of donation contain similar provisions, to wit: "That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the abovedescribed property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect; x x x"3 (Emphasis Ours) On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.

Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 55, an action for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2599, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation executed on January 14, 1995. Respondents allege, inter alia, that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa.4 Respondents prayed that a receiver be appointed in order to preserve the disputed properties, and, that they be declared as co-owners of the properties in equal shares, together with petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan.5 Petitioners in their Amended Answer, deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments.6 On respondents' motion, the court a quo rendered a partial judgment on the pleadings on December 2, 1997 in favor of respondents, with the following dispositive portion: "WHEREREFORE, and in consideration of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant and unwilling co-plaintiff with regards (sic) to the four Deeds of Donation Annexes "A", "A-1", "B" and Annex "C" which is the subject of this partial decision by: Declaring the four Deeds of Donation as null and void ab initio for being a donation Mortis Causa and for failure to comply with formal and solemn requisite under Art. 806 of the New Civil Code; b) To declare the plaintiffs and defendants as well as unwilling co-plaintiff as the heirs of the deceased Conchita Cabatingan and therefore hereditary co-owners of the properties subject of this partial decision, as mandated under Art. 777 of the New Civil Code; SO ORDERED."7 The court a quo ruled that the donations are donations mortis causa and therefore the four (4) deeds in question executed on January 14, 1995 are null and void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 806 of the Civil Code on solemnities of wills and testaments.8

Raising questions of law, petitioners elevated the court a quo's decision to this Court,9 alleging that: "THE LOWER COURT PALPABLY DISREGARDED THE LONG-AND-WELLESTABLISHED RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON THE CHARACTERIZATION OF DONATIONS AS INTER VIVOSOR MORTIS CAUSA AND, INSTEAD, PROCEEDED TO INTERPRET THE DONATIONS IN QUESTION IN A MANNER CONTRARY THERETO."10 Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late Conchita Cabatingan "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan's death.11 In addition, petitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners die ahead of Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos. Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit. In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive."12In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.13 In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death.14 The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation, to wit:

"That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis causa under the terms and conditions set forth therein, and avail herself of this occasion to express her profound gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the DONOR." xxx "SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot of this Deed of Donation mortis causa, which consists of two (2) pages x x x."15 That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" does not qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason.16 Well in point is National Treasurer of the Phils. v. Vda. de Meimban.17 In said case, the questioned donation contained the provision: "That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, the said Donor by these presents does hereby give, transfer, and convey unto the DONEE, her heirs and assigns a portion of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (100,000) SQUARE METERS, on the southeastern part Pro-indiviso of the above described property. (The portion herein donated is within Lot 2-B of the proposed amendment Plan Subdivision of Lots Nos. 1 and 2, Psu-109393), with all the buildings and improvements thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR. (italics supplied.)"18 Notably, the foregoing provision is similar to that contained in the donation executed by Cabatingan. We held in Meimban case that the donation is a mortis causa donation, and that the above quoted provision establishes the donor's intention to transfer the ownership and possession of the donated property to the donee only after the former's death. Further: "As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will should have been complied with under Article 728 of the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect. As we have held in Alejandro v. Geraldez (78 SCRA 245,253), "If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament. (Citing Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 481)."19 We apply the above rulings to the present case. The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case petitioners

predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda,20 one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be transferred to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would have not expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.1wphi1.nt Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same partake of the nature of testamentary provisions21 and as such, said deeds must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to wit: "ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n) ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (n)" The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the donor and the donee, the documents were not executed in the manner provided for under the above-quoted provisions of law.

Thus, the trial court did not commit any reversible error in declaring the subject deeds of donation null and void. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6600

July 30, 1954

because they had not been executed with the formalities required for testamentary disposition. A division of five of the Court of Appeals took the case under consideration, and on January 12, 1953, the majority rendered judgment holding the aforesaid donations to be null and void, because they were donations mortis causaand were executed without the testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. Two Justices dissented, claiming that the said donations should be considered as donations inter vivos and voted for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of First Instance. The donees then sought a review by this Court. The sole issue submitted to this Court, therefore, is the juridical nature of the donations in question. Both deeds (Exhs. 1 and 2) are couched in identical terms, with the exception of the names of the donees and the number and description of the properties donated. The principal provisions are the following. ESCRITURA DE DONATION Yo, Domingo Bonsato, viudo de Andrea Nacario, mayor de edad, vencino y residente del municipio de Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., por la presente declaro lo siguiente: Que mi osbrino Felipe Bonsato, casado, tambien mayor de edad, vecino de Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., en consideracion de su largo servicio a Domingo Bonsato, por la presente hagor y otorgo una donacion perfecta e irrevocable consumada a favor del citado Felipe Bonsato de dos parcelas de terreno palayero como se describe mas abajo. (Description omitted) Que durante su menor de edad de mi citado sobrino Felipe Bonsato hasta en estos dias, siempre me ha apreciado y estimado como uno de mis hijos y siempre ha cumplido todas mis ordenes, y por esta razon bajo su pobriza sea movido mi sentimiento para dar una recompensa de sus trabajos y aprecios a mi favor. Que en este de 1939 el donante Domingo Bonsato ha entregado a Felipe Bonsato dichos terrenos donados y arriba citados pero de los productos mientras vive el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo y la parte como inquilino tomara Felipe Bonsato. Que en vista de la vejez del donante, el donatorio Felipe Bonsato tomara posesion inmediatamente de dichos terrenos a su favor.

HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL., respondents. Benedict C. Balderrama for petitioners. Inocencio Rosete for respondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals holding two deeds of donation executed on the first day of December, 1939 by the late Domingo Bonsato in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, to be void for being donations mortis causa accomplished without the formalities required by law for testamentary dispositions. The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Case No. 8892) on June 27, 1945, by respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint (for annulment and damages) charged that on the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and 12052, situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered its decision on November 13, 1949, finding that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein. Thereupon the plaintiffs duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning as primary error the holding of the court below that the donations are inter vivos; appellants contending that they were mortis causa donations, and invalid

Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donancion y el donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos los derechos de dichos terrenos en concepto de dueo absoluto de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidad y gravamen y pueda ejercitar su derecho que crea conveniente. En Testimonio de todo lo Cual, signo la presente en Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., hoy dia 1.0 de Diciembre, 1939. Domingo (His thumbmark) Bonsato

ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions. Commenting on this article, Mucius Scaevola (Codigo Civl, Vol. XI, 2 parte, pp. 573, 575 says: No ha mucho formulabamos esta pregunta: Subsisten las donaciones mortis causa como institucion independiente, con propia autonomia y propio compo jurisdiccional? La respuesta debe ser negativa. xxx xxx xxx

Yo, Felipe Bonsato, mayor de edad, casado, Vecino de Mabini, Pangasinan, I.F., declaro por la presente que acepto la donacion anterior otorgado por Domingo Bonsato a mi favor. (Sgd.) Felipe Bonsato

Las donaciones mortis causa se consevan en el Codigo como se conserva un cuerpo fosil en las vitrinas de un Museo. La asimilacion entre las donaciones por causa de muerte y las transmissiones por testamento es perfecta. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th ed.), Vol. V. p. 83, expresses the same opinion:

SIGNADO Y FIRMADO EN PRESENCIA DE: (Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Illegible

The majority of the special divisions of five of the Court of Appeals that took cognizance of this case relied primarily on the last paragraph, stressing the passage: Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion . . . while the minority opinion lay emphasis on the second paragraph, wherein the donor states that he makes "perfect, irrevocable, and consummated donation" of the properties to the respective donees, petitioners herein. Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the documents in question embody valid donations, or else legacies void for failure to observe the formalities of wills (testaments). Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-established at present that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away from the Roman Law tradition, and followed the French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions, thus suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept.

"La disposicion del articulo 620 significa, por lo tanto: 1..o, que han desaparecido las llamas antes donaciones mortis causa por lo que el Codigo no se ocupa de ellas en absoluto; 2.o, que toda disposicion de bienes para despues de la muerte sigue las reglas establecidas para la sucesion testamentaria. And Castan, in his Derecho Civil, Vol. IV (7th Ed., 1953), p. 176, reiterates: (b) Subsisten hoy en nuestro derecho las donaciones mortis causa? De lo que acabamos de decir se desprende que las donaciones mortis causa han perdido en el Codigo Civil su caracter distintivo y su naturaleza y hay que considerarlos hoy como una institucion suprimida, refundida en el legado ... . Las tesis de la desaparcion de las donaciones mortis causa en nuestro Codigo Civil, acusada ya precedentemente por el pryecto de 1851 puede decirse que constituye una communis opinion entre nuestros expositores, incluso los mas recientes. We have insisted on this phase of the legal theory in order to emphasize that the term "donations mortis causa" as commonly employed is merely a convenient name to designate those dispositions of property that are void when made in the form of donations.

Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics: (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidalvs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633); (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R. L-4326, November 18, 1952); (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2, executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce ("de los productos mientras viva el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo"), a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art. 828). It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective" (que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion"). However, said expression must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would become vested in the donees. Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion y el donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos derechos de dichos terrenos en concepto de dueo absoluto de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidad y gravamen y puede ejercitar su derecho que crea conveniente.

Any other interpretation of this paragraph would cause it to conflict with the irrevocability of the donation and its consummated character, as expressed in the first part of the deeds of donation, a conflict that should be avoided (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1285; New Civil Code, Art. 1374; Rule 123, sec. 59, Rules of Court). Que mi sobrino FILIPINO BONSATO, casado, tambien mayor de edad, vecino de Agno, Pangasinan, I. F., en consideracion de su largo servicio a Domingo Bonsato, por la presente hago y otorgo una donacion perfecta e irrevocable consumada a favor del citado Felipe Bonsato de dos parcelas de terreno palayero como se describe mas abajo. In the cases held by this Court to be transfers mortis causa and declared invalid for not having been executed with the formalities of testaments, the circumstances clearly indicated the transferor's intention to defer the passing of title until after his death. Thus, in Cario vs. Abaya, 70 Phil., 182, not only were the properties not to be given until thirty days after the death of the last of the donors, but the deed also referred to the donees as "those who had been mentioned to inherit from us", the verb "to inherit" clearly implying the acquisition of property only from and after the death of the alleged donors. In Bautista vs. Sabiniano, 49 Off. Gaz., 549; 92 Phil., 244, the alleged donor expressly reserved the right to dispose of the properties conveyed at any time before his death, and limited the donation "to whatever property or properties left undisposed by me during my lifetime", thus clearly retaining their ownership until his death. While in David vs. Sison, 42 Off. Gaz. (Dec, 1946) 3155, the donor not only reserved for herself all the fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important, specially provided that "without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any way", thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute of ownership, the power to dispose of the properties. No similar restrictions are found in the deeds of donation involved in this appeal. That the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the services rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds Exhibits 1 and 2 constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have identical motivation. Nevertheless, the existence of such consideration corroborates the express irrevocability of the transfers and the absence of any reservation by the donor of title to, or control over, the properties donated, and reinforces the conclusion that the act was inter vivos. Hence, it was error for the Court of Appeals to declare that Exhibits 1 and 2 were invalid because the formalities of testaments were not observed. Being donations inter vivos, the solemnities required for them were those prescribed by Article 633 of the Civil Code of 1889 (reproduced in Art. 749 of the new Code, and it is undisputed that these were duly complied with. As the properties involved were conjugal, the Court of First Instance correctly decided that the donations could not affect the half interest inherited by the respondents Josefa Utea, et al. from the predeceased wife of the donor.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is revived and given effect. Costs against respondents.

G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990 RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN, in his capacity as Special Administrator, petitioners, vs. HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and URSULA D. PASCUAL,respondents. G.R. No. L-45394 July 23, 1990 PEDRO DALUSONG, petitioner, vs HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, JUDGE, BRANCH VII, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, and URSULA D. PASCUAL, respondents. G.R. Nos. 73241-42 July 23, 1990 OFELIA D. PARUNGAO and ROSARIO DUNCIL, petitioners, vs. THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (Third Civil Cases Division), BENJAMIN P. REYES and OSCAR REYES, respondents.

On August 1, 1976; the trial court issued an order excluding from the inventory of the estate the properties donated to Ursula, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussion, let the properties listed in paragraph 2 of the motion of February 12, 1976 filed by Ursula D. Pascual thru counsel be, as it is hereby ordered, excluded from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. Special Administrator Reynaldo San Juan is hereby ordered to return to Court the custody of the corresponding certificates of titles of these properties, until the issue of ownership is finally determined in a separate action. (G.R. No. 45262, pp. 23-24) The Order is now the subject of G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394. On January 5, 1977, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the trial court from enforcing the August 1, 1976 Order. Among the properties included in the "donation mortis causa" in favor of Ursula was Lot 24, Block No. 15 of the subdivision plan Psd-3231, located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St., Tondo, Manila as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17854. The records show that on May 15, 1969, Emilio Pascual executed a deed of donation of real property inter vivos over the abovementioned lot in Manila in favor of Ofelia D. Parungao, petitioner in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 a minor with her mother, Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift and donation for and in her behalf. When Parungao reached the age of majority or on December 20, 1976, she tried to have the donation registered. However, she found out that the certificate of title was missing from where it was supposed to be kept, prompting her to file a petition for reconstitution of title with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The petition was granted in October 1977. Parungao registered the deed of donation with the Register of Deeds of Manila who cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17854 and issued in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao. She then filed a motion for exclusion in Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M. In the meantime, on September 23, 1976, Ursula Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes. On May 2, 1978, Benjamin Reyes, private respondent in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092, Register of Deeds of Manila and/or reconveyance of deed of title against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil, with the then Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 115164. In their answer with compulsory counterclaim Parungao and Duncil, denied Reyes' assertion of ownership over the Tondo property. On November 6, 1978,

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: The instant petitions have been consolidated as they arose from the same facts and involve similar issues. Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18,1972. He was survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes- Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual Reyes-Jose P. Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Manna Reyes Manalastas; (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes and Benjamin Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half- blood Pedro Dalusong. On December 3, 1973, the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 7330-M in the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the administration of his estate. Atty. Marcela Macapagal, Clerk of Court of Branch VII was appointed special administratrix. Macapagal was, however, replaced by Reynaldo San Juan. On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2, 1966 executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in the estate of Dr. Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No. 73-30M) and therefore should be excluded from the inventory.

Ofelia Parungao filed a complaint for recovery of possession over the Tondo property against Benjamin Reyes and his nephew Oscar Reyes with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 119359. In her complaint, Parungao also alleged that as early as 1973, the defendants occupied two (2) doors of the apartment situated at the Tondo property by mere tolerance of the previous owner, Dr. Emilio Pascual, and later by her until April 8, 1978 when she formally demanded that the defendants vacate the premises. Parungao prayed that the defendants be evicted from the premises. The two cases were consolidated. On June 3, 1982, the then Court of First Instance, Branch 8 rendered a joint decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: In Civil Case No. 115164 1) Declaring TCT No. 129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao null and void; and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel said title and to restore, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 17854 in the name of Emilio D. Pascual; 2) Ordering Ofelia D. Parungao to pay plaintiff Benjamin P. Reyes the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, as and for attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of suit including all fees which the Register of Deeds may prescribe for the full implementation of this decision. For lack of merit, the counterclaim is dismissed. In Civil Case No. 119359 1) Dismissing the complaint for want of merit; and 2) On the counterclaim, ordering Ofelia Parungao to pay defendant defendants the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos as and for attorney's fees.' Parungao appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. The decision was, however, affirmed, with costs against the appellant. The Intermediate Appellate Court decision is now the subject matter in G.R. Nos. 73241-42. On January 29, 1986, we issued a minute resolution denying the above petition for lack of merit. The resolution became final and executory on March 10, 1986 and on this same day the entry of judgment was effected. The entry of judgment was however set aside in the resolution dated January 19, 1987 on

the ground that the January 29, 1986 resolution was not received by the petitioners' counsel of record. The petitioner was granted leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the January 29, 1986 resolution. The motion for reconsideration is now before us for resolution petition. The issues raised in these petitions are two-fold: (1) In G.R. No. L-45394, petitioner Pedro Dalusong questions the jurisdiction of the probate court to exclude the properties donated to Ursula Pascual in its Order dated August 1, 1976, and (2) In G.R. No. L-45262 and G.R. Nos. 73241-42 Ruperto Reyes, Reynaldo C. San Juan, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of Emilio Pascual (petitioner in G.R. No. L- 45262), Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 7324142) question the appellate court's finding that the "Donation Mortis Causa" executed by Emilio Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual was actually a Donation Inter Vivos. We first discuss the issue on jurisdiction. The questioned August 1, 1976 order of the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga in S.P. Proc. No. 73-30-M categorically stated that the exclusion from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Dr. Emilio D. Pascual was "without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action." The provisional character of the exclusion of the contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the probate court. This was stressed in the case of Cuizon v. Ramolete (129 SCRA 495 [1984]) which we cited in the case of Morales v. Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V (146 SCRA 373 [1986]): It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so (Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).itc-asl Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, (91 SCRA 540) we held that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which

may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448449 and 473; Lachenal v. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). On the second issue, it may be noted that the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the authenticity of the 1969 donation to Parungao because of its finding that the 1966 donation to Pascual was inter vivos. The petitioners do not press the authenticity of the 1969 donation as their challenge centers on whether or not the 1966 donation was inter vivos. However, the trial court has a lengthy discussion reflecting adversely on the authenticity of the 1969 donation to Parungao. The petitioners assert that the 1966 donation was null and void since it was not executed with the formalities of a will. Therefore, the petitioners in G.R. No. L45262 insist that the donated properties should revert to the estate of Emilio Pascual while the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 insist that the donation of real property inter vivos in favor of Ofelia Parungao be given effect. The subject deed of donation titled "DONATION MORTIS CAUSA" duly notarized by a certain Cornelio M. Sigua states: That Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, Filipino, single, of age and resident of Apalit, Pampanga, hereinafter called the DONOR and Ursula D. Pascual, Filipino, single, also of age, resident of and with postal address at Apalit, Pampanga, hereinafter called the DONEE, have agreed, as they do hereby agree, to the following, to wit: That the said DONOR, Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, for and in consideration of the love and affection which he has and bears unto the said DONEE, as also for the personal services rendered by the said DONEE to the said DONOR, does hereby by these presents voluntarily GIVE, GRANT, and DONATE MORTIS CAUSA unto the said DONEE URSULA D. PASCUAL, her heirs and assigns, all of my rights, title and interest, in and to the following parcels of land with all the improvements thereon, situated in the Municipality of Apalit, Pampanga, and more particularly described and Identified as follows: xxx xxx xxx (Enumerated herein are 41 parcels of land) Also included in this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA are all personal properties of the DONOR in the form of cash money or bank deposits and insurance in his favor, and his real properties

situated in other towns of Pampanga, such as San Simon, and in the province of Rizal, San Francisco del Monte and in the City of Manila. That the said donor has reserved for himself sufficient property to maintain him for life; and that the said DONEE does hereby ACCEPT and RECEIVE this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA and further does express his appreciation and gratefulness for the generosity of said DONOR; (Rollo of G.R. No. L-45262, pp. 12-16) xxx xxx xxx Considering the provisions of the DONATION MORTIS CAUSA the appellate court ruled that the deed of donation was actually a donation inter vivos although denominated as DONATION MORTIS CAUSA. It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al., (44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation but on the provisions stated in such deed. This Court explained in Concepcion v. Concepcion (91 Phil. 823 [1952]) ...But, it is a rule consistently followed by the courts that it is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained therein, and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor. Here, the donation is entitled and called donacion onerosa mortis causa. From the body, however, we find that the donation was of a nature remunerative rather than onerous. It was for past services rendered, services which may not be considered as a debt to be paid by the donee but services rendered to her freely and in goodwill. The donation instead of being onerous or for a valuable consideration, as in payment of a legal obligation, was more of remuneratory or compensatory nature, besides being partly motivated by affection. We should not give too much importance or significance to or be guided by the use of the phrase 'mortis causa in a donation and thereby to conclude that the donation is not one of inter vivos. In the case of De Guzman et al. v. Ibea et al. (67 Phil. 633), this Court through Mr. Chief Justice Avancena said that if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.

In the case of Laureta v. Mata, et al. (44 Phil. 668), the court held that the donation involved was inter vivos. There, the donor Severa Magno y Laureta gave the properties involved as ... a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my affection toward him and of the fact that he stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate 'mortis causa to said youth all the properties described as follows: xxx xxx xxx I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot take possession of the properties donated before the death of the donor, and in the event of her death the said donee shall be under obligation to cause a mass to be held annually as a suffrage in behalf of my sold, and also to defray the expenses of my burial and funerals.' It will be observed that the present case and that of Laureta above cited are similar in that in both cases the donation was being made as a reward for services rendered and being rendered, and as a token of affection for the donee; the phrase 'mortis causa was used; the donee to take possession of the property donated only after the death of the donor; the donee was under obligation to defray the expenses incident to the celebration of the anniversary of the donor's death, including church fees. The donation in both cases were duly accepted. In said case of Laureta this Court held that the donation was in praesenti and not a gift in futuro. In the later case of Bonsato et al. v. Court of appeals, et al . (95 Phil. 481 [1954]) this Court, distinguished the characteristics of a donation inter vivos and "mortis causa" in this wise: Did the late Domingo Bonsato, make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics: (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (fun or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal v. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman v. Ibea 67 Phil., 633);

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista v. Sabiniano, G.R. No. L- 4326, November 18, 1952); (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. These principles were repeated in the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (27 SCRA 1076 [1969]), to wit: Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition made. 'Did the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property donated upon the execution of the donation? If this is so, as reflected from the provisions contained in the donation, then it is inter vivos; otherwise, it is merely mortis causa, or made to take effect after death.' (Howard v. Padilla and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L7064 and L-7098, April 22, 1955. Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the donee was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the execution of the deed of donation. With these findings we find no need to discuss the other arguments raised by the petitioners. WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows: 1) In G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394 the petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on January 5, 1977 is hereby LIFTED; and 2) In G.R. Nos. 73241-42, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This DENIAL is FINAL. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111904

October 5, 2000

SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA and ISABEL SILARIO GESTOPA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDES DANLAG y PILAPIL, respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: This petition for review,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assails the decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38266, which reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5. The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, two of which are dated March 4, 1965 and another dated October 13, 1966, in favor of private respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil.4 The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2 with Tax Declaration Nos. 11345 and 11347, respectively. The second deed pertained to parcel 3, with TD No. 018613. The last deed pertained to parcel 4 with TD No. 016821. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary. On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, Catalina Danlag, executed a deed of donationinter vivos5 covering the aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels with TD Nos. 11351 and 11343, respectively, again in favor of private respondent Mercedes. This contained two conditions, that (1) the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime, and that (2) the donee can not sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent and approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them. On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Agripino Gestopa. On September 29, 1979, the Danlags executed a deed of revocation6 recovering the six parcels of land subject of the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos. On March 1, 1983, Mercedes Pilapil (herein private respondent) filed with the RTC a petition against the Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of title 7 over the above parcels of land. She alleged that she was an illegitimate daughter of

Diego Danlag; that she lived and rendered incalculable beneficial services to Diego and his mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter was still alive. In recognition of the services she rendered, Diego executed a Deed of Donation on March 20, 1973, conveying to her the six (6) parcels of land. She accepted the donation in the same instrument, openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the donated properties, and caused the transfer of the tax declarations to her name. Through machination, intimidation and undue influence, Diego persuaded the husband of Mercedes, Eulalio Pilapil, to buy two of the six parcels covered by the deed of donation. Said donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and, according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty of any act of ingratitude; and that respondent Diego had no legal basis in revoking the subject donation and then in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopas. In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that the deed of donation dated January 16, 1973 was null and void because it was obtained by Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it was validly executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of the donor. Further, the donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without any property at all. On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, thus: "WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff: 1. Declaring the Donations Mortis Causa and Inter Vivos as revoked, and, therefore, has (sic) no legal effect and force of law. 2. Declaring Diego Danlag the absolute and exclusive owner of the six (6) parcels of land mentioned in the Deed of revocation (Exh. P-plaintiff, Exh. 6-defendant Diego Danlag). 3. Declaring the Deeds of Sale executed by Diego Danlag in favor of spouses Agripino Gestopa and Isabel Gestopa dated June 28, 1979 (Exh. S-plaintiff; Exh. 18-defendant); Deed of Sale dated December 18, 1979 (Exh. T plaintiff; Exh. 9-defendant); Deed of Sale dated September 14, 1979 (Exh. 8); Deed of Sale dated June 30, 1975 (Exh. U); Deed of Sale dated March 13, 1978 (Exh. X) as valid and enforceable duly executed in accordance with the formalities required by law. 4. Ordering all tax declaration issued in the name of Mercedes Danlag Y Pilapil covering the parcel of land donated cancelled and further restoring all the tax declarations previously cancelled, except parcels nos. 1 and 5 described, in the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos (Exh. "1")

and Deed of Sale (Exh. "2") executed by defendant in favor of plaintiff and her husband. [5.] With respect to the contract of sale of abovestated parcels of land, vendor Diego Danlag and spouse or their estate have the alternative remedies of demanding the balance of the agreed price with legal interest, or rescission of the contract of sale. SO ORDERED."8 In rendering the above decision, the trial court found that the reservation clause in all the deeds of donation indicated that Diego Danlag did not make any donation; that the purchase by Mercedes of the two parcels of land covered by the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos bolstered this conclusion; that Mercedes failed to rebut the allegations of ingratitude she committed against Diego Danlag; and that Mercedes committed fraud and machination in preparing all the deeds of donation without explaining to Diego Danlag their contents. Mercedes appealed to the Court of Appeals and argued that the trial court erred in (1) declaring the donation dated January 16, 1973 as mortis causa and that the same was already revoked on the ground of ingratitude; (2) finding that Mercedes purchased from Diego Danlag the two parcels of land already covered by the above donation and that she was only able to pay three thousand pesos, out of the total amount of twenty thousand pesos; (3) failing to declare that Mercedes was an acknowledged natural child of Diego Danlag. On August 31, 1993, the appellate court reversed the trial court. It ruled: "PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and a new judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Declaring the deed of donation inter vivos dated January 16, 1973 as not having been revoked and consequently the same remains in full force and effect; 2. Declaring the Revocation of Donation dated June 4, 1979 to be null and void and therefore of no force and effect; 3. Declaring Mercedes Danlag Pilapil as the absolute and exclusive owner of the six (6) parcels of land specified in the above-cited deed of donation inter vivos; 4. Declaring the Deed of Sale executed by Diego Danlag in favor of spouses Agripino and Isabel Gestopa dated June 28, 1979 (Exhibits S and 18), Deed of Sale dated December 18, 1979 (Exhibits T and 19), Deed of Sale dated September 14, 1979 (Exhibit 8), Deed of Sale dated

June 30, 1975 (Exhibit U), Deed of Sale dated March 13, 1978 (Exhibit X) as well as the Deed of Sale in favor of Eulalio Danlag dated December 27, 1978 (Exhibit 2) not to have been validly executed; 5. Declaring the above-mentioned deeds of sale to be null and void and therefore of no force and effect; 6. Ordering spouses Agripino Gestopa and Isabel Silerio Gestopa to reconvey within thirty (30) days from the finality of the instant judgment to Mercedes Danlag Pilapil the parcels of land above-specified, regarding which titles have been subsequently fraudulently secured, namely those covered by O.C.T. T-17836 and O.C.T. No. 17523. 7. Failing to do so, ordering the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (Branch V) at Cebu City to effect such reconveyance of the parcels of land covered by O.C.T. T-17836 and 17523. SO ORDERED."9 The Court of Appeals held that the reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred to Mercedes the ownership over the donated properties; that the right to sell belonged to the donee, and the donor's right referred to that of merely giving consent; that the donor changed his intention by donating inter vivosproperties already donated mortis causa; that the transfer to Mercedes' name of the tax declarations pertaining to the donated properties implied that the donation was inter vivos; and that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six parcels of land donated to her. Hence, this instant petition for review filed by the Gestopa spouses, asserting that: "THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TWELFTH DIVISION, HAS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO."10 Before us, petitioners allege that the appellate court overlooked the fact that the donor did not only reserve the right to enjoy the fruits of the properties, but also prohibited the donee from selling or disposing the land without the consent and approval of the Danlag spouses. This implied that the donor still had control and ownership over the donated properties. Hence, the donation was post mortem. Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.11

In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read together.12 The deed of donation dated January 16, 1973, in favor of Mercedes contained the following: "That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the Donor inspires in the Donee and as an act of liberality and generosity, the Donor hereby gives, donates, transfer and conveys by way of donation unto the herein Donee, her heirs, assigns and successors, the above-described parcels of land; That it is the condition of this donation that the Donor shall continue to enjoy all the fruits of the land during his lifetime and that of his spouse and that the donee cannot sell or otherwise, dispose of the lands without the prior consent and approval by the Donor and her spouse during their lifetime. xxx That for the same purpose as hereinbefore stated, the Donor further states that he has reserved for himself sufficient properties in full ownership or in usufruct enough for his maintenance of a decent livelihood in consonance with his standing in society. That the Donee hereby accepts the donation and expresses her thanks and gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the Donor."13 Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos.14 Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of the properties? Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land.15 Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. In the case ofAlejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we said that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation isinter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. In Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime.

The attending circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also demonstrated the real intent of the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject properties upon its execution.16 Prior to the execution of donationinter vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed three donations mortis causa. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations. If they did not intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the four lots already donated mortis causa. Petitioners' counter argument that this proposition was erroneous because six years after, the spouses changed their intention with the deed of revocation, is not only disingenious but also fallacious. Petitioners cannot use the deed of revocation to show the spouses' intent because its validity is one of the issues in this case. Petitioners aver that Mercedes' tax declarations in her name can not be a basis in determining the donor's intent. They claim that it is easy to get tax declarations from the government offices such that tax declarations are not considered proofs of ownership. However, unless proven otherwise, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. 17 We find that petitioners did not overcome this presumption of regularity in the issuance of the tax declarations. We also note that the Court of Appeals did not refer to the tax declarations as proofs of ownership but only as evidence of the intent by the donor to transfer ownership. Petitioners assert that since private respondent purchased two of the six parcels of land from the donor, she herself did not believe the donation was inter vivos. As aptly noted by the Court of Appeals, however, it was private respondent's husband who purchased the two parcels of land. As a rule, a finding of fact by the appellate court, especially when it is supported by evidence on record, is binding on us.18 On the alleged purchase by her husband of two parcels, it is reasonable to infer that the purchase was without private respondent's consent. Purchase by her husband would make the properties conjugal to her own disadvantage. That the purchase is against her self-interest, weighs strongly in her favor and gives credence to her claim that her husband was manipulated and unduly influenced to make the purchase, in the first place.1wphi1 Was the revocation valid? A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.19 The donor-spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of revocation. The deed merely stated: "WHEREAS, while the said donation was a donation Inter Vivos, our intention thereof is that of Mortis Causa so as we could be sure that in case of our death, the above-described properties will be inherited and/or succeeded by Mercedes Danlag de Pilapil; and that said intention is clearly shown in

paragraph 3 of said donation to the effect that the Donee cannot dispose and/or sell the properties donated during our life-time, and that we are the one enjoying all the fruits thereof."20 Petitioners cited Mercedes' vehemence in prohibiting the donor to gather coconut trees and her filing of instant petition for quieting of title. There is nothing on record, however, showing that private respondent prohibited the donors from gathering coconuts. Even assuming that Mercedes prevented the donor from gathering coconuts, this could hardly be considered an act covered by Article 765 of the Civil Code.21 Nor does this Article cover respondent's filing of the petition for quieting of title, where she merely asserted what she believed was her right under the law. Finally, the records do not show that the donor-spouses instituted any action to revoke the donation in accordance with Article 769 of the Civil Code.22 Consequently, the supposed revocation on September 29, 1979, had no legal effect. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993, is AFFIRMED . Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187056

September 20, 2010

JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, vs. ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA, Respondents. DECISION ABAD, J.: This case pertains to a gift, otherwise denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in reality is a donation inter vivos made effective upon its execution by the donors and acceptance thereof by the donees, and immediately transmitting ownership of the donated property to the latter, thus precluding a subsequent assignment thereof by one of the donors. The Facts and the Case On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document entitled "DonationMortis Causa"1 in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses 126 -square meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila2 in equal shares. The deed of donation reads: It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse. It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano Gonzales will continue to occupy the portions now occupied by them. It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way affect any other distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or intestate and where ever situated. It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right, ownership, possession and administration of this property herein donated and accepted and this Disposition and Donation shall be operative and effective upon the death of the DONORS.3 Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document.

Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few months later or on December 19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972. In 1998 Jarabini filed a "petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Sp. Proc. 98-90589.4 Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his father Leopoldos assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dated June 20, 2003,5 finding that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos, the donors intention being to transfer title over the property to the donees during the donors lifetime, given its irrevocability. Consequently, said the RTC, Leopoldos subsequent assignment of his rights and interest in the property was void since he had nothing to assign. The RTC thus directed the registration of the property in the name of the donees in equal shares.6 On Asuncions appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision on December 23, 2008,7reversing that of the RTC. The CA held that Jarabini cannot, through her petition for the probate of the deed of donation mortis causa, collaterally attack Leopoldos deed of assignment in Asuncions favor. The CA further held that, since no proceeding exists for the allowance of what Jarabini claimed was actually a donation inter vivos, the RTC erred in deciding the case the way it did. Finally, the CA held that the donation, being one given mortis causa, did not comply with the requirements of a notarial will,8 rendering the same void. Following the CAs denial of Jarabinis motion for reconsideration,9 she filed the present petition with this Court. Issue Presented The key issue in this case is whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupes donation to Asuncion, Emiliano, and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos. The Courts Ruling That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles itmortis causa.10 In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa,

where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics: 1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; 2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and 3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.12 (Underscoring supplied) The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos. The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.13 Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required.14 This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations.1awphi1 Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donors lifetime.15 Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peaflorida,16 in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed. Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donees acceptance of

the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated.17 Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldos subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat quod non habet.18 The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a petition for probate of what was initially supposed to be a donation mortis causa, the validity of the document as a donation inter vivos and the nullity of one of the donors subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property. The Court has held before that the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute.19 Moreover, in opposing the petition for probate and in putting the validity of the deed of assignment squarely in issue, Asuncion or those who substituted her may not now claim that the trial court improperly allowed a collateral attack on such assignment. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the assailed December 23, 2008 Decision and March 6, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV 80549, and REINSTATES in toto the June 20, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, in Sp. Proc. 98-90589. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172804

January 24, 2011

GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This resolves the petition for review 1 of the ruling2 of the Court of Appeals dismissing a suit to recover a realty. The Facts Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs,3 sued respondents, spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran (trial court) to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte (Property) and collect damages. Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere (Vere), who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo (Rodrigo) in August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it. In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965. The two-page deed of donation (Deed), signed at the bottom by the parties and two witnesses, reads in full: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, widow of the late Juan Arcillas, a resident of Barrio Bool, municipality of Culaba, subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del Norte, Philippines, hereby depose and say: That as we live[d] together as husband and wife with Juan Arcillas, we begot children, namely: LUCIO, VICENTA, SEGUNDINA, and ADELAIDA, all surnamed ARCILLAS, and by reason of poverty which I suffered while our children were still young; and because my husband Juan Arcillas aware as he was with our destitution separated us [sic] and left for Cebu; and from then on never cared what happened to his family; and because of that one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one of my nieces who also suffered with our poverty, obedient as she was to all the works in our house, and because of the love and affection which I feel [for]

her, I have one parcel of land located at Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax Decl. No. 1878 declared in the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I give (devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her heirs, successors, and assigns together with all the improvements existing thereon, which parcel of land is more or less described and bounded as follows: 1. Bounded North by Amambajag River; East, Benito Picao; South, Teofilo Uyvico; and West, by Public land; 2. It has an area of 3,492 square meters more or less; 3. It is planted to coconuts now bearing fruits; 4. Having an assessed value of P240.00; 5. It is now in the possession of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the concept of an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on her upon my demise. That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above described, I already devise in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the herein Donee predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ; That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above described from Inay Alvegia Rodrigo and I am much grateful to her and praying further for a longer life; however, I will give one half (1/2) of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime.4 Respondents entered the Property in 1983 and paid taxes afterwards. The Ruling of the Trial Court The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared him owner of the Property, and ordered respondents to surrender possession to petitioner, and to pay damages, the value of the Propertys produce since 1982 until petitioners repossession and the costs.5 The trial court rejected respondents claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere in 1970.6 Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents in 1983, she had no title to transfer. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), imputing error in the trial courts interpretation of the Deed as a testamentary disposition instead of an inter vivos donation, passing title to Rodriguez upon its execution. Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA granted respondents appeal and set aside the trial courts ruling. While conceding that the "language of the [Deed is] x x x confusing and which could admit of possible different interpretations," 7 the CA found the following factors pivotal to its reading of the Deed as donation inter vivos: (1) Rodriguez had

been in possession of the Property as owner since 21 May 1962, subject to the delivery of part of the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deeds consideration was not Rodrigos death but her "love and affection" for Rodriguez, considering the services the latter rendered; (3) Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her, implying its inclusion in Rodriguezs estate; and (4) Rodriguez accepted the donation in the Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate donations inter vivos, not devises.8 Accordingly, the CA upheld the sale between Rodriguez and respondents, and, conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for Rodrigos lack of title. In this petition, petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the trial courts ruling. Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership over the Property through acquisitive prescription, having allegedly occupied it for more than 10 years.9 Respondents see no reversible error in the CAs ruling and pray for its affirmance. The Issue The threshold question is whether petitioners title over the Property is superior to respondents. The resolution of this issue rests, in turn, on whether the contract between the parties predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez, was a donation or a devise. If the former, respondents hold superior title, having bought the Property from Rodriguez. If the latter, petitioner prevails, having obtained title from Rodrigo under a deed of sale the execution of which impliedly revoked the earlier devise to Rodriguez. The Ruling of the Court We find respondents title superior, and thus, affirm the CA. Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a Perfected Donation We examine the juridical nature of the Deed whether it passed title to Rodriguez upon its execution or is effective only upon Rodrigos death using principles distilled from relevant jurisprudence. Post-mortem dispositions typically (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before the [donors] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for

indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.10 Further [4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa[;] [5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling criteria; such statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor[;] [and] (6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.11 It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguezs estate, waiving Rodrigos right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguezs acceptance of the disposition 12 which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigos acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti , not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.13 Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x" 14 or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her. In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulations damning effect on his case, petitioner tries to profit from it, contending it is a fideicommissary substitution clause.15 Petitioner assumes the fact he is laboring to prove. The question of the Deeds juridical nature, whether it is a will or a donation, is the crux of the present controversy. By treating the clause in question as mandating fideicommissary substitution, a mode of testamentary disposition by which the first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance,16 petitioner assumes that the

Deed is a will. Neither the Deeds text nor the import of the contested clause supports petitioners theory. Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguezs undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime." 17 Thus, the Deeds stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigos beneficial title. We arrived at the same conclusion in Balaqui v. Dongso18 where, as here, the donor, while "b[inding] herself to answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x that none shall question or disturb [the donees] right," also stipulated that the donation "does not pass title to [the donee] during my lifetime; but when I die, [the donee] shall be the true owner" of the donated parcels of land. In finding the disposition as a gift inter vivos, the Court reasoned: Taking the deed x x x as a whole, x x x x it is noted that in the same deed [the donor] guaranteed to [the donee] and her heirs and successors, the right to said property thus conferred. From the moment [the donor] guaranteed the right granted by her to [the donee] to the two parcels of land by virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered such right; otherwise there would be no need to guarantee said right. Therefore, when [the donor] used the words upon which the appellants base their contention that the gift in question is a donation mortis causa [that the gift "does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of them freely.19(Emphasis supplied) Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it.20 Third. The existence of consideration other than the donors death, such as the donors love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers."21 Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigos statement of "love and affection" for Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding. It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed tending to serve his cause (e.g. "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise" and "devise"). Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the donors intent. In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations styled as "mortis causa" dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter vivos,22 consistent with the principle that "the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is to take effect at the death of the donor are not controlling criteria [but] x x x are

to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor."23 Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved to favor inter vivostransfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed."24 Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigos post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels against licensing such practice.25 Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another."26 Thus, Rodrigos post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Veres successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand, respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latters title which they may invoke against all adverse claimants, including petitioner. Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property Alternatively, petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over the Property through his and Veres combined possession of the Property for more than ten years, counted from Veres purchase of the Property from Rodrigo in 1970 until petitioner initiated his suit in the trial court in February 1986.27 Petitioner anchors his contention on an unfounded legal assumption. The ten year ordinary prescriptive period to acquire title through possession of real property in the concept of an owner requires uninterrupted possession coupled with just title and good faith.28There is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.29 Good faith, on the other hand, consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.30 Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having successively acquired the Property through sale, neither was a good faith possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the Deed, Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the Property "in the concept of an owner" ("como tag-iya"31) since 21 May 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigos donation in 3 May 1965 and seven years before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. This admission against interest binds Rodrigo and all those tracing title to the Property through her, including Vere and petitioner. Indeed, petitioners insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the Property only in 1982, when she started paying taxes, finds no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought the Property from

Rodrigo in 1970, Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a fact that prevented Vere from being a buyer in good faith. Lacking good faith possession, petitioners only other recourse to maintain his claim of ownership by prescription is to show open, continuous and adverse possession of the Property for 30 years. 32 Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this requirement.1avvphil Ancillary Matters Petitioner Raises Irrelevant Petitioner brings to the Courts attention facts which, according to him, support his theory that Rodrigo never passed ownership over the Property to Rodriguez, namely, that Rodriguez registered the Deed and paid taxes on the Property only in 1982 and Rodriguez obtained from Vere in 1981 a waiver of the latters "right of ownership" over the Property. None of these facts detract from our conclusion that under the text of the Deed and based on the contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo and Rodriguez, the latter, already in possession of the Property since 1962 as Rodrigo admitted, obtained naked title over it upon the Deeds execution in 1965. Neither registration nor tax payment is required to perfect donations. On the relevance of the waiver agreement, suffice it to say that Vere had nothing to waive to Rodriguez, having obtained no title from Rodrigo. Irrespective of Rodriguezs motivation in obtaining the waiver, that document, legally a scrap of paper, added nothing to the title Rodriguez obtained from Rodrigo under the Deed. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 6 June 2005 and the Resolution dated 5 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126444 December 4, 1998 ALFONSO QUIJADA, CRESENTE QUIJADA, REYNELDA QUIJADA, DEMETRIO QUIJADA, ELIUTERIA QUIJADA, EULALIO QUIJADA, and WARLITO QUIJADA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGALADO MONDEJAR, RODULFO GOLORAN, ALBERTO ASIS, SEGUNDINO RAS, ERNESTO GOLORAN, CELSO ABISO, FERNANDO BAUTISTA, ANTONIO MACASERO, and NESTOR MAGUINSAY, respondents.

donated back to the donors (Exh. D). In the meantime, defendant-appellant (respondent) Regalado Mondejar sold portions of the land to defendants-appellants (respondents) Fernando Bautista (Exh. 5), Rodolfo Goloran (Exh. 6), Efren Guden (Exh. 7) and Ernesto Goloran (Exh. 8). On July 5, 1988, plaintiffs-appellees (petitioners) filed this action against defendants-appellants (respondents). In the complaint, plaintiffs-appellees (petitioners) alleged that their deceased mother never sold, conveyed, transferred or disposed of the property in question to any person or entity much less to Regalado Mondejar save the donation made to the Municipality of Talacogon in 1956; that at the time of the alleged sale to Regalado Mondejar by Trinidad Quijada, the land still belongs to the Municipality of Talacogon, hence, the supposed sale is null and void. Defendants-appellants (respondents), on the other hand, in their answer claimed that the land in dispute was sold to Regalado Mondejar, the one (1) hectare on July 29, 1962, and the remaining one (1) hectare on installment basis until fully paid. As affirmative and/or special defense, defendantsappellants (respondents) alleged that plaintiffs action is barred by laches or has prescribed. The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffsappellees (petitioners): firstly because "Trinidad Quijada had no legal title or right to sell the land to defendant Mondejar in 1962, 1966, 1967 and 1968, the same not being hers to dispose of because ownership belongs to the Municipality of Talacogon (Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 39) and, secondly, that the deed of sale executed by Trinidad Quijada in favor of Mondejar did not carry with it the conformity and acquiescence of her children, more so that she was already 63 years old at the time, and a widow (Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 41)." 1 The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads: WHEREFORE, viewed from the above perceptions, the scale of justice having tilted in favor of the plaintiffs, judgment is, as it is hereby rendered: 1) ordering the Defendants to return and vacate the two (2) hectares of land to Plaintiffs as described in Tax Declaration

MARTINEZ, J.: Petitioners, as heirs of the late Trinidad Quijada, filed a complaint against private respondents for quieting of title, recovery of possession and ownership of parcels of land with claim for attorney's fees and damages. The suit was premised on the following facts found by the court of Appeals which is materially the same as that found by the trial court: Plaintiffs-appellees (petitioners) are the children of the late Trinidad Corvera Vda, de Quijada. Trinidad was one of the heirs of the late Pedro Corvera and inherited from the latter the twohectare parcel of land subject of the case, situated in the barrio of San Agustin, Talacogon, Agusan del Sur. On April 5, 1956, Trinidad Quijada together with her sisters Leonila Corvera Vda. de Sequea and Paz Corvera Cabiltes and brother Epapiadito Corvera executed a conditional deed of donation (Exh. C) of the two-hectare parcel of land subject of the case in favor of the Municipality of Talacogon, the condition being that the parcel of land shall be used solely and exclusively as part of the campus of the proposed provincial high school in Talacogon. Apparently, Trinidad remained in possession of the parcel of land despite the donation. On July 29, 1962, Trinidad sold one (1) hectare of the subject parcel of land to defendant-appellant Regalado Mondejar (Exh. 1). Subsequently, Trinidad verbally sold the remaining one (1) hectare to defendant-appellant (respondent) Regalado Mondejar without the benefit of a written deed of sale and evidenced solely by receipts of payment. In 1980, the heirs of Trinidad, who at that time was already dead, filed a complaint for forcible entry (Exh. E) against defendant-appellant (respondent) Regalado Mondejar, which complaint was, however, dismissed for failure to prosecute (Exh. F). In 1987, the proposed provincial high school having failed to materialize, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Talacogon enacted a resolution reverting the two (2) hectares of land

No. 1209 in the name of Trinidad Quijada; 2) ordering any person acting in Defendants' behalf to vacate and restore the peaceful possession of the land in question to Plaintiffs; 3) ordering the cancellation of the Deed of Sale executed by the late Trinidad Quijada in favor of Defendant Regalado Mondejar as well as the Deeds of Sale/Relinquishments executed by Mondejar in favor of the other Defendants; 4) ordering Defendants to remove their improvements constructed on the questioned lot; 5) ordering the Defendants to pay Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the amount of P10,000.00 representing attorney's fees; 6) ordering Defendants to pays the amount of P8,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and 7) ordering Defendants to pay the sum of P30,000.00 representing moral damages. SO ORDERED. 2 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the judgment a quo 3 ruling that the sale made by Trinidad Quijada to respondent Mondejar was valid as the former retained an inchoate interest on the lots by virtue of the automatic reversion clause in the deed of donation. 4 Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. When the CA denied their motion, 5 petitioners instituted a petition for review to this Court arguing principally that the sale of the subject property made by Trinidad Quijada to

respondent Mondejar is void, considering that at that time, ownership was already transferred to the Municipality of Talacogon. On the contrary, private respondents contend that the sale was valid, that they are buyers in good faith, and that petitioners' case is barred by laches. 6 We affirm the decision of the respondent court. The donation made on April 5, 1956 by Trinidad Quijada and her brother and sisters 7 was subject to the condition that the donated property shall be "used solely and exclusively as a part of the campus of the proposed Provincial High School in Talacogon." 8 The donation further provides that should "the proposed Provincial High School be discontinued or if the same shall be opened but for some reason or another, the same may in the future be closed" the donated property shall automatically revert to the donor. 9 Such condition, not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy was validly imposed in the donation. 10 When the Municipality's acceptance of the donation was made known to the donor, the former became the new owner of the donated property donation being a mode of acquiring and transmitting ownership 11 notwithstanding the condition imposed by the donee. The donation is perfected once the acceptance by the donee is made known to the donor. 12 According, ownership is immediately transferred to the latter and that ownership will only revert to the donor if the resolutory condition is not fulfilled. In this case, that resolutory condition is the construction of the school. It has been ruled that when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed is not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one. 13 Thus, at the time of the sales made in 1962 towards 1968, the alleged seller (Trinidad) could not have sold the lots since she had earlier transferred ownership thereof by virtue of the deed of donation. So long as the resolutory condition subsists and is capable of fulfillment, the donation remains effective and the donee continues to be the owner subject only to the rights of the donor or his successors-in-interest under the deed of donation. Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must the donee comply with the condition, the latter remains the owner so long as he has tried to comply with the condition within a reasonable period. Such period, however, became irrelevant herein when the donee-Municipality manifested through a resolution that it cannot comply with the condition of building a school and the same was made known to the donor. Only then when the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought to the donor's knowledge that ownership of the donated property reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic reversion clause of the deed of donation. The donor may have an inchoate interest in the donated property during the time that ownership of the land has not reverted to her. Such inchoate interest

may be the subject of contracts including a contract of sale. In this case, however, what the donor sold was the land itself which she no longer owns. It would have been different if the donor-seller sold her interests over the property under the deed of donation which is subject to the possibility of reversion of ownership arising from the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition. As to laches, petitioners' action is not yet barred thereby. Laches presupposes failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; 14 "it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it." 15 Its essential elements of: a) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; b) Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue; c) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and, d) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. 16 are absent in this case. Petioners' cause of action to quiet title commenced only when the property reverted to the donor and/or his successors-in-interest in 1987. Certainly, when the suit was initiated the following year, it cannot be said that petioners had slept on their rights for a long time. The 1960's sales made by Trinidad Quijada cannot be the reckoning point as to when petitioners' cause of action arose. They had no interest over the property at that time except under the deed of donation to which private respondents were not privy. Moreover, petitioners had previously filed an ejectment suit against private respondents only that it did not prosper on a technicality.

Be that at it may, there is one thing which militates against the claim of petitioners. Sale, being a consensual contract, is perfected by mere consent, which is manifested the moment there is a meeting of the minds 17 as to the offer and acceptance thereof on three (3) elements: subject matter, price and terms of payment of the price.18 Ownership by the seller on the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract of sale is not an element for its perfection. What the law requires is that the seller has the right to transfer ownership at the time the thing sold is delivered. 19 Perfection per se does not transfer ownership which occurs upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold. 20 A perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged on the ground of nonownership on the part of the seller at the time of its perfection; hence, the sale is still valid. The consummation, however, of the perfected contract is another matter. It occurs upon the constructive or actual delivery of the subject matter to the buyer when the seller or her successors-in-interest subsequently acquires ownership thereof. Such circumstance happened in this case when petitioners who are Trinidad Quijada's heirs and successors-in-interest became the owners of the subject property upon the reversion of the ownership of the land to them. Consequently, ownership is transferred to respondent Mondejar and those who claim their right from him. Article 1434 of the New Civil Code supports the ruling that the seller's "title passes by operation of law to the buyer." 21 This rule applies not only when the subject matter of the contract of sale is goods, 22 but also to other kinds of property, including real property. 23 There is also no merit in petitioners' contention that since the lots were owned by the municipality at the time of the sale, they were outside the commerce of men under Article 1409 (4) of the NCC; 24 thus, the contract involving the same is inexistent and void from the beginning. However, nowhere in Article 1409 (4) is it provided that the properties of a municipality, whether it be those for public use or its patrimonial property 25 are outside the commerce of men. Besides, the lots in this case were conditionally owned by the municipality. To rule that the donated properties are outside the commerce of men would render nugatory the unchallenged reasonableness and justness of the condition which the donor has the right to impose as owner thereof. Moreover, the objects referred to as outsides the commerce of man are those which cannot be appropriated, such as the open seas and the heavenly bodies. With respect to the trial court's award of attorney's fees, litigation expenses and moral damages, there is neither factual nor legal basis thereof. Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation cannot, following the general rule in Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, be recovered in this case, there being no stipulation to that effect and the case does not fall under any of the exceptions. 26 It cannot be said that private respondents had compelled petitioners to litigate with third persons. Neither can it be ruled that the former acted in "gross and evident bad faith" in refusing to satisfy the latter's claims considering that private respondents were under an honest belief that they have a legal right over the property by virtue of the deed of sale. Moral

damages cannot likewise be justified as none of the circumstances enumerated under Articles 2219. 27 and 2220 28 of the New Civil Code concur in this case WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 112796 March 5, 1998 TITO R. LAGAZO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO CABANLIT, respondents.

Although the legal conclusions and dispositions of the trial and the appellate courts are conflicting, the factual antecedents of the case are not substantially disputed. 5 We reproduce their narration from the assailed Decision: Civil Case No. 83-39133 involves an action filed by plaintiffappellee [herein petitioner] on January 22, 1987 seeking to recover from defendant-appellant [a] parcel of land which the former claims to have acquired from his grandmother by donation. Defendant-appellant [herein private respondent], on the other hand, put up the defense that when the alleged donation was executed, he had already acquired the property by a Deed of Assignment from a transferee of plaintiffappellee's grandmother. The evidence for plaintiff-appellee [herein petitioner] is summarized as follows: Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of plaintiff-appellee, was awarded in July 1975 a 60.10-square meter lot which is a portion of the Monserrat Estate, more particularly described as Lot 8W, Block 6 of Psd-135834, located at 3320 2nd St., V. Mapa, Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The Monserrat Estate is a public land owned by the City of Manila and distributed for sale to bona fidetenants under its land-for-thelandless program. Catalina Jacob constructed a house on the lot. On October 3, 1977, or shortly before she left for Canada where she is now a permanent resident, Catalina Jacob executed a special power of attorney (Exh. "A") in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo B. Espaol authorizing him to execute all documents necessary for the final adjudication of her claim as awardee of the lot. Due to the failure of Eduardo B. Espaol to accomplish the purpose of the power of attorney granted to him, Catalina Jacob revoked said authority in an instrument executed in Canada on April 16, 1984 (Exh. "D"). Simultaneous with the revocation, Catalina Jacob executed another power of attorney of the same tenor in favor plaintiff-appellee. On January 30, 1985, Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over a Lot 8W in favor of plaintiff-appellee (Exh. "E"). Following the donation, plaintiff-appellee checked with the Register of Deeds and found out that the property was in the delinquent list, so that he paid the installments in arrears and the remaining balance on the lot (Exhs. "F", "F-1" and "F-2")

PANGANIBAN, J.: Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument but not formally communicated to the donor, may the donation be nonetheless considered complete, valid and subsisting? Where, the deed of donation did not expressly impose any burden the expressed consideration being purely one of liberality and generosity a separate but the recipient actually paid charges imposed on the property like land taxes and installment arrearages, may the donation be deemed onerous and thus governed by the law on ordinary contracts? The Case The Court answers these questions in the negative as it resolves this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR CV No. 38050 promulgated on November 29, 1993. The assailed Decision reversed the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila, in Civil Case No. 87-39133 which had disposed 3 of the controversy in favor of herein petitioner in the following manner: 4 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows: 1. Ordering the defendant, or any person claiming rights under him, to surrender to plaintiff possession of the premises known as Lot 8w, Block 6, Psd-135534 of the Monserrat Estate, and the improvement standing thereon, located at 3320 2nd St., V. Mapa, Old Sta. Mesa, Manila; 2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, as and for attorney's fees; and 3. Costs against the defendant. The defendant's counterclaims are hereby dismissed. The Facts

and declared the said property in the name of Catalina Jacob (Exhs. "G", "G-1", "G-2" and "G-3"). On January 29, 1986, plaintiff-appellee sent a demand letter to defendant-appellant asking him to vacate the premises (Exh. "H"). A similar letter was sent by plaintiff-appellee's counsel to defendant on September 11, 1986 (Exh. "I"). However, defendant-appellant refused to vacate the premises claiming ownership thereof. Hence, plaintiff-appellee instituted the complaint for recovery of possession and damages against defendant-appellant. Opposing plaintiff-appellee's version, defendant-appellant claimed that the house and lot in controversy were his by virtue of the following documents: 1. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Catalina Jacob dated October 7, 1977 in favor of Eduardo B. Espaol covering the residential house located at the premises (Exh. "4"). 2. Deed of Assignment over Lot 8W executed by Catalina Jacob in favor of Eduardo Espaol dated September 30, 1980 (Exh. "5"); and 3. Deed of Assignment executed by Eduardo B. Espaol over Lot 8W and a residential house thereon in favor of defendantappellant dated October 2, 1982 (Exh. "6"). After trial, the lower court decided in favor of plaintiff-appellee and against defendant-appellant, rationalizing that the version of the former is more credible than that of the latter. According to the lower court: From the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties[,] it appears that the plaintiff- has a better right over the property, subject matter of the case. The version of the plaintiff is more credible than that of the defendant. The theory of the plaintiff is that the house and lot belong to him by virtue of the Deed of Donation in his favor executed by his grandmother Mrs. Jacob Vda. de Reyes, the real awardee of the lot in question. The defendant's theory is that he is the owner thereof because he bought the house and lot from Eduardo Espaol, after the latter had shown and given to him Exhibits 1, 4 and 5. He

admitted that he signed the Deed of Assignment in favor of Eduardo Espaol on September 30, 1980, but did not see awardee Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes signed [sic] it. In fact, the acknowledgement in Exhibit "5" shows that the assignor/awardee did not appear before the notary public. It may be noted that on said date, the original awardee of the lot was no longer in the Philippines, as both parties admitted that she had not come back to the Philippines since 1977. (Exhs. K, K1). Defendant, claiming to be the owner of the lot, unbelievably did not take any action to have the said house and lot be registered or had them declared in his own name. Even his Exhibit 7 was not mailed or served to the addressee. Such attitude and laxity is very unnatural for a buyer/owner of a property, in stark contrast of [sic] the interest shown by the plaintiff who saw to it that the lot was removed from the delinquent list for non-payment of installments and taxes due thereto [sic]. 6 Ruling of the Appellate Court In reversing the trial court's decision, 7 Respondent Court of Appeals anchored its ruling upon the absence of any showing that petitioner accepted his grandmother's donation of the subject land. Citing jurisprudence that the donee's failure to accept a donation whether in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument renders the donation null and void, Respondent Court denied petitioner's claim of ownership over the disputed land. The appellate court also struck down petitioner's contention that the formalities for a donation of real property should not apply to his case since it was an onerous one he paid for the amortizations due on the land before and after the execution of the deed of donation reasoning that the deed showed no burden, charge or condition imposed upon the donee; thus, the payments made by petitioner were his voluntary acts. Dissatisfied with the foregoing ruling, petitioner now seeks a favorable disposition from this Court. 8 Issues Petitioner anchors his petition on the following grounds: 9 [I.] In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals decided a question of substance in a way not in

accord with the law and applicable decisions of this Honorable Court. [II.] Even granting the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals, certain fact and circumstances transpired in the meantime which would render said decision manifestly unjust, unfair and inequitable to petitioner. We believe that the resolution of this case hinges on the issue of whether the donation was simple or onerous. The Court's Ruling The petition lacks merit. Main Issue: Simple or Onerous Donation? At the outset, let us differentiate between a simple donation and an onerous one. A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in value than the thing donated. 10 Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not applicable. Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a donation need not be stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus, although the deed did not categorically impose any charge, burden or condition to be satisfied by him, the donation was onerous since he in fact and in reality paid for the installments in arrears and for the remaining balance of the lot in question. Being an onerous donation, his acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil Code, and need not comply with the formalities required by Art. 749 of the same code. His payment of the arrearages and balance and his assertion of his right of possession against private respondent clearly indicate his acceptance of the donation. We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that petitioner's full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the donor as a condition for the donation. Rather, the deed explicitly stated: That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity and considering further that the DONEE is a grandson of the DONOR, the DONOR hereby voluntarily and

freely gives, transfer[s] and conveys, by way of donation unto said DONEE, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, all the right, title and interest which the said DONOR has in the above described real property, together with all the buildings and improvements found therein, free from all lines [sic] and encumbrances and charges whatsoever; 11 [emphasis supplied] It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with Respondent Court that the payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts. This much can be gathered from his testimony in court, in which he never even claimed that a burden or charge had been imposed by his grandmother. ATTY FORONDA: q After you have received this [sic] documents, the . . . revocation of power of attorney and the Special Power of Attorney in your favor, what did you do? WITNESS: a I went here in City Hall and verif[ied] the status of the award of my grandmother. q When you say the award, are you referring to the award in particular [of the] lot in favor of your grandmother? a Yes, Sir. q What was the result of your verification? a According to the person in the office, the papers of my grandmother is [sic] includ[ed] in the dilinquent [sic] list. q What did you do then when you found out that the lot was includ[ed] in the dilinquent [sic] list? a I talked to the person in charged [sic] in the office and I asked him what to do so that the

lot should not [be] included in the dilinquent [sic] list. ATTY. FORONDA: q And what was the anwer [sic] given to you to the inquiry which you made? WITNESS: a According to the person in the office, that I would pay the at least [sic] one half of the installment in order to take [out] the document [from] the delinquent list. q And [were] you able to pay? a I was able to pay, sir. q What were you able to pay, one half of the balance or the entire amounts [ sic]? a First, I paid the [sic] one half of the balance since the time the lot was awarded to us. q What about the remaining balance, were you able to pay it? a I was able to pay that, sir. q So, as of now, the amount in the City of Manila of the lot has already been duly paid, is it not? a Yes, sir. 12 The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney 13 executed by Catalina Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the records shows that such acts were meant to be a burden in the donation. As a pure or simple donation, the following provisions of the Civil Code are applicable:

Art. 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. Art. 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and the donee. Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public instrument, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation and in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. In the words of the esteemed Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, 14 "Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. The donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee." Furthermore, "[i]f the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments." 15 Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the donation null and void. 16 The perfection and the validity of a donation are well explained by former Sen. Arturo M. Tolentino in this wise: . . . Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Solemn words are not necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept. But in this case it is necessary that formal notice thereof be given to the donor, and the fact that due notice has been given must be noted in both instruments (that containing the offer to donate and that showing the acceptance). Then and only then is the donation perfected. If the instrument of donation has been recorded in the registry of property, the instrument that shows the acceptance should also be recorded. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given

to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void. 17 Exhibit E (the deed of donation) does not show any indication that petitionerdonee accepted the gift. During the trial, he did not present any instrument evidencing such acceptance despite the fact that private respondent already raised this allegation in his supplemental pleading 18 to which petitioner raised no objection. It was only after the Court of Appeals had rendered its decision, when petitioner came before this Court, that he submitted an affidavit 19 dated August 28, 1990, manifesting that he "wholeheartedly accepted" the lot given to him by his grandmother, Catalina Reyes. This is too late, because arguments, evidence, causes of action and matters not raised in the trial court may no longer be raised on appeal. 20 True, the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the lifetime of the donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was received by the donor and noted in both the deed of donation and the separate instrument embodying the acceptance. At the very least, this last legal requisite of annotation in both instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by petitioner. For this reason, the subject lot cannot be adjudicated to him. Secondary Issue: Supervening Events Petitioner also contends that certain supervening events have transpired which render the assailed Decision "manifestly unjust, unfair and inequitable" to him. The City of Manila has granted his request for the transfer to his name of the lot originally awarded in favor of Catalina Reyes. A deed of sale 21 covering the subject lot has in fact been executed between the City of Manila, as the vendor; and petitioner, as the vendee. The corresponding certificate of title 22 has also been issued in petitioner's name. A close perusal of the city government's resolution 23 granting petitioner's request reveals that the request for and the grant of the transfer of the award were premised on the validity and perfection of the deed of donation executed by the original awardee, petitioner's grandmother. This is the same document upon which petitioner, as against private respondent, asserts his right over the lot. But, as earlier discussed and ruled, this document has no force and effect and, therefore, passes no title, right or interest. Furthermore, the same resolution states: WHEREAS, in a report submitted by Ms. [Menchu C.] Bello [, Special Investigator,] on February 7, 1990, it is stated that . . . constructed on the lot is a make-shift structure used for

residential purposes by the proposed transferee Tito Lagazo and his family; . . . and that constructed at Lot 8, Block 6, former Monserrat Estate is a make-shift structure used as a dwelling place by Lagazo and family because the front portion of their house which was constructed on a road lot was demolished, and the structure was extended backward covering a portion of the old temporary road lot. . . . The above findings of the investigator are, however, directly contradictory to the testimonies in court of petitioner himself and of private respondent. Petitioner claimed the following: that the house constructed on the subject lot was owned by his grandmother Catalina Jacob; that before the latter left for Canada in 1977, Eduardo Espaol had already been living in the same house and continued to do so until 1982; and that private respondent occupied the premises after Espaol left. 24 On the other hand, private respondent testified that he bought the subject house and lot from Eduardo Espaol in 1982, after which he and his family occupied the same; but sometime in 1985, they had to leave the place due to a road-widening project which reduced the house to "about three meters [in] length and one arm[']s width." 25 Between the testimonies under oath of the contending parties and the report not subjected to cross-examination which was prepared by the investigator who recommended the approval of petitioner's request for transfer, it is the former to which the Court is inclined to give more credence. The investigator's report must have been based on the misrepresentations of petitioner who arrogated unto himself the prerogatives of both Espaol and private respondent. Further, it is on record that petitioner had required private respondent to vacate the subject premises before he instituted this complaint. This shows he was not in actual possession of the property, contrary to the report of the investigator. Cabanlit's Claim of Ownership Petitioner also assails Respondent Court's conclusion that it is unnecessary to pass upon private respondent's claim over the property. Petitioner insists that the principal issue in the case, as agreed upon by the parties during pretrial, is "who between the parties is the owner of the house and lot in question." In disposing of the principal issue of the right of petitioner over the subject property under the deed of donation, we arrive at one definite conclusion: on the basis of the alleged donation, petitioner cannot be considered the lawful owner of the subject property. This does not necessarily mean, however, that private respondent is automatically the rightful owner. In resolving private respondent's claim of ownership, the examination of the genuineness of the documents (deeds of assignment over the lot between

Catalina Reyes and Eduardo Espaol and between Espaol and private respondent) upon which he asserts his right is necessary, especially in light of petitioner's allegations of forgery. However, the respective assignors in both documents are not parties to the instant case. Not having been impleaded in the trial court, they had no participation whatsoever in the proceedings at bar. Elementary norms of fair play and due process bar us from making any disposition which may affect their rights. Verily, there can be no valid judgment for or against them. 26 Anyhow, since petitioner, who was the plaintiff below, failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence his ownership claim over the subject property, the parties thus resume their status quo ante. The trial court should have dismissed his complaint for his failure to prove a right superior to that of private respondent, but without prejudice to any action that Catalina Reyes or Eduardo Espaol or both may have against said private respondent. Stating this point otherwise, we are not ruling in this case on the rights and obligations between, on the one hand, Catalina Reyes, her assigns and/or representatives; and, on the other, Private Respondent Cabanlit. Not having proven any right to a valid, just and demandable claim that compelled him to litigate or to incur expenses in order to protect his interests by reason of an unjustified act or omission of private respondent, petitioner cannot be awarded attorney's fees. 27 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-69970 November 28, 1988 FELIX DANGUILAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, APOLONIA MELAD, assisted by her husband, JOSE TAGACAY,respondents. Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for petitioner. Teodoro B. Mallonga for private respondent.

the cultivation of the farm. Domingo Melad signed in 1941 a private instrument in which he gave the defendant the farm and in 1943 another private instrument in which he also gave him the residential lot, on the understanding that the latter would take care of the grantor and would bury him upon his death. 6 Danguilan presented three other witnesses 7 to corroborate his statements and to prove that he had been living in the land since his marriage to Isidra and had remained in possession thereof after Domingo Melad's death in 1945. Two of said witnesses declared that neither the plaintiff nor her mother lived in the land with Domingo Melad. 8 The decision of the trial court was based mainly on the issue of possession. Weighing the evidence presented by the parties, the judge 9 held that the defendant was more believable and that the plaintiff's evidence was "unpersuasive and unconvincing." It was held that the plaintiff's own declaration that she moved out of the property in 1946 and left it in the possession of the defendant was contradictory to her claim of ownership. She was also inconsistent when she testified first that the defendant was her tenant and later in rebuttal that he was her administrator. The decision concluded that where there was doubt as to the ownership of the property, the presumption was in favor of the one actually occupying the same, which in this case was the defendant. 10 The review by the respondent court 11 of this decision was manifestly less than thorough. For the most part it merely affirmed the factual findings of the trial court except for an irrelevant modification, and it was only toward the end that it went to and resolved what it considered the lone decisive issue. The respondent court held that Exhibits 2-b and 3-a, by virtue of which Domingo Melad had conveyed the two parcels of land to the petitioner, were null and void. The reason was that they were donations of real property and as such should have been effected through a public instrument. It then set aside the appealed decision and declared the respondents the true and lawful owners of the disputed property. The said exhibits read as follows: EXHIBIT 2-b is quoted as follows: 12 I, DOMINGO MELAD, of legal age, married, do hereby declare in this receipt the truth of my giving to Felix Danguilan, my agricultural land located at Barrio Fugu-Macusi, Penablanca, Province of Cagayan, Philippine Islands; that this land is registered under my name; that I hereby declare and bind myself that there is no one to whom I will deliver this land except to him as he will be the one responsible for me in the event that I will die and also for all other things needed and necessary for me, he will be responsible because of this land I

CRUZ, J.: The subject of this dispute is the two lots owned by Domingo Melad which is claimed by both the petitioner and the respondent. The trial court believed the petitioner but the respondent court, on appeal, upheld the respondent. The case is now before us for a resolution of the issues once and for all. On January 29, 1962, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan for recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot which she claimed she had purchased from Domingo Melad in 1943 and were now being unlawfully withheld by the defendant. 1 In his answer, the petitioner denied the allegation and averred that he was the owner of the said lots of which he had been in open, continuous and adverse possession, having acquired them from Domingo Melad in 1941 and 1943. 2 The case was dismissed for failure to prosecute but was refiled in 1967. 3 At the trial, the plaintiff presented a deed of sale dated December 4, 1943, purportedly signed by Domingo Melad and duly notarized, which conveyed the said properties to her for the sum of P80.00. 4 She said the amount was earned by her mother as a worker at the Tabacalera factory. She claimed to be the illegitimate daughter of Domingo Melad, with whom she and her mother were living when he died in 1945. She moved out of the farm only when in 1946 Felix Danguilan approached her and asked permission to cultivate the land and to stay therein. She had agreed on condition that he would deliver part of the harvest from the farm to her, which he did from that year to 1958. The deliveries having stopped, she then consulted the municipal judge who advised her to file the complaint against Danguilan. The plaintiff 's mother, her only other witness, corroborated this testimony. 5 For his part, the defendant testified that he was the husband of Isidra Melad, Domingo's niece, whom he and his wife Juana Malupang had taken into their home as their ward as they had no children of their own. He and his wife lived with the couple in their house on the residential lot and helped Domingo with

am giving to him; that it is true that I have nieces and nephews but they are not living with us and there is no one to whom I will give my land except to Felix Danguilan for he lives with me and this is the length 175 m. and the width is 150 m. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby sign my name below and also those present in the execution of this receipt this 14th day of September 1941. Penablanca Cagayan, September 14, 1941. (SGD.) DOMINGO MELAD WITNESSES: 1. (T.M.) ISIDRO MELAD 2. (SGD.) FELIX DANGUILAN 3. (T.M.) ILLEGIBLE EXHIBIT 3-a is quoted as follows: 13 I, DOMINGO MELAD, a resident of Centro, Penablanca, Province of Cagayan, do hereby swear and declare the truth that I have delivered my residential lot at Centro, Penablanca, Cagayan, to Felix Danguilan, my son-in-law because I have no child; that I have thought of giving him my land because he will be the one to take care of SHELTERING me or bury me when I die and this is why I have thought of executing this document; that the boundaries of this lot ison the east, Cresencio Danguilan; on the north, Arellano Street; on the south by Pastor Lagundi and on the west, Pablo Pelagio and the area of this lot is 35 meters going south; width and length beginning west to east is 40 meters. IN WITNESS HEREOF, I hereby sign this receipt this 18th day of December 1943. (SGD.) DOMINGO MELAD WITNESSES: (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) DANIEL ARAO It is our view, considering the language of the two instruments, that Domingo Melad did intend to donate the properties to the petitioner, as the private

respondent contends. We do not think, however, that the donee was moved by pure liberality. While truly donations, the conveyances were onerous donations as the properties were given to the petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his burial. Hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 of the Civil Code requiring donations of real properties to be effected through a public instrument. The case at bar comes squarely under the doctrine laid down in Manalo v. De Mesa, 14 where the Court held: There can be no doubt that the donation in question was made for a valuable consideration, since the donors made it conditional upon the donees' bearing the expenses that might be occasioned by the death and burial of the donor Placida Manalo, a condition and obligation which the donee Gregorio de Mesa carried out in his own behalf and for his wife Leoncia Manalo; therefore, in order to determine whether or not said donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to demonstrate that, as a contract, it embraces the conditions the law requires and is valid and effective, although not recorded in a public instrument. The private respondent argues that as there was no equivalence between the value of the lands donated and the services for which they were being exchanged, the two transactions should be considered pure or gratuitous donations of real rights, hence, they should have been effected through a public instrument and not mere private writings. However, no evidence has been adduced to support her contention that the values exchanged were disproportionate or unequal. On the other hand, both the trial court and the respondent court have affirmed the factual allegation that the petitioner did take care of Domingo Melad and later arranged for his burial in accordance with the condition imposed by the donor. It is alleged and not denied that he died when he was almost one hundred years old, 15which would mean that the petitioner farmed the land practically by himself and so provided for the donee (and his wife) during the latter part of Domingo Melad's life. We may assume that there was a fair exchange between the donor and the donee that made the transaction an onerous donation. Regarding the private respondent's claim that she had purchased the properties by virtue of a deed of sale, the respondent court had only the following to say: "Exhibit 'E' taken together with the documentary and oral evidence shows that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the appellants." This was, we think, a rather superficial way of resolving such a basic and important issue.

The deed of sale was allegedly executed when the respondent was only three years old and the consideration was supposedly paid by her mother, Maria Yedan from her earnings as a wage worker in a factory. 16 This was itself a suspicious circumstance, one may well wonder why the transfer was not made to the mother herself, who was after all the one paying for the lands. The sale was made out in favor of Apolonia Melad although she had been using the surname Yedan her mother's surname, before that instrument was signed and in fact even after she got married. 17 The averment was also made that the contract was simulated and prepared after Domingo Melad's death in 1945. 18 It was also alleged that even after the supposed execution of the said contract, the respondent considered Domingo Melad the owner of the properties and that she had never occupied the same. 19 Considering these serious challenges, the appellate court could have devoted a little more time to examining Exhibit "E" and the circumstances surrounding its execution before pronouncing its validity in the manner described above. While it is true that the due execution of a public instrument is presumed, the presumption is disputable and will yield to contradictory evidence, which in this case was not refuted. At any rate, even assuming the validity of the deed of sale, the record shows that the private respondent did not take possession of the disputed properties and indeed waited until 1962 to file this action for recovery of the lands from the petitioner. If she did have possession, she transferred the same to the petitioner in 1946, by her own sworn admission, and moved out to another lot belonging to her step-brother. 20 Her claim that the petitioner was her tenant (later changed to administrator) was disbelieved by the trial court, and properly so, for its inconsistency. In short, she failed to show that she consummated the contract of sale by actual delivery of the properties to her and her actual possession thereof in concept of purchaser-owner. As was held in Garchitorena v. Almeda: 21 Since in this jurisdiction it is a fundamental and elementary principle that ownership does not pass by mere stipulation but only by delivery (Civil Code, Art. 1095; Fidelity and Surety Co. v. Wilson, 8 Phil. 51), and the execution of a public document does not constitute sufficient delivery where the property involved is in the actual and adverse possession of third persons (Addison vs. Felix, 38 Phil. 404; Masallo vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134), it becomes incontestable that even if included in the contract, the ownership of the property in dispute did not pass thereby to Mariano Garchitorena. Not having become the owner for lack of delivery, Mariano Garchitorena cannot presume to recover the property from its present possessors. His action, therefore, is not one of revindicacion, but one against his vendor for specific performance of the sale to him.

In the aforecited case of Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Wilson, 22 Justice Mapa declared for the Court: Therefore, in our Civil Code it is a fundamental principle in all matters of contracts and a well- known doctrine of law that "non mudis pactis sed traditione dominia rerum transferuntur". In conformity with said doctrine as established in paragraph 2 of article 609 of said code, that "the ownership and other property rights are acquired and transmitted by law, by gift, by testate or intestate succession, and, in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition". And as the logical application of this disposition article 1095 prescribes the following: "A creditor has the rights to the fruits of a thing from the time the obligation to deliver it arises. However, he shall not acquire a real right" (and the ownership is surely such) "until the property has been delivered to him." In accordance with such disposition and provisions the delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring the ownership of the same by virtue of a contract. As Manresa states in his Commentaries on the Civil Code, volume 10, pages 339 and 340: "Our law does not admit the doctrine of the transfer of property by mere consent but limits the effect of the agreement to the due execution of the contract. ... The ownership, the property right, is only derived from the delivery of a thing ... " As for the argument that symbolic delivery was effected through the deed of sale, which was a public instrument, the Court has held: The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing is considered to be delivered when it is placed "in the hands and possession of the vendee." (Civil Code, art. 1462). It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and theright of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control. When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the

enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or through another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of another will, then fiction yields to realitythe delivery has not been effected. 23 There is no dispute that it is the petitioner and not the private respondent who is in actual possession of the litigated properties. Even if the respective claims of the parties were both to be discarded as being inherently weak, the decision should still incline in favor of the petitioner pursuant to the doctrine announced in Santos & Espinosa v. Estejada 24 where the Court announced: If the claim of both the plaintiff and the defendant are weak, judgment must be for the defendant, for the latter being in possession is presumed to be the owner, and cannot be obliged to show or prove a better right. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court REINSTATED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered. Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 137887

February 28, 2000

at the back of the certificates of title to be issued to the petitioners pursuant to the judgment of this Court. SO ORDERED.3 As earlier mentioned, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, said judgment was affirmed and the petition for registration of private respondents over the subject parcels of land was approved. Hence, the instant Petition, anchored upon the following assignments of error I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF THEIR FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LANDS ARE PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.4 We find merit in the instant Petition. It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land only in 19655 while the petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private respondents only in 1991.6 Thus the period of occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time the application was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26) years, four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year period possession requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29 andR.A. No. 6940. In finding that private respondents' possession of the subject property complied with law, the Court of Appeals reasoned out that (W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and disposable only in December, 1965, however, records indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitao, appellees' predecessor-in-interest, was already in possession of the property, cultivating it and planting various crops thereon. It follows that appellees' possession as of the time of the filing of the petition in 1991 when tacked to Pedro Ermitao's possession is 63 years or more than the required 30 years period of possession. The land, which is agricultural, has been converted to private property.7

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DAMIAN ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DEOGRACIAS ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ALICIA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, SALVADOR ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DOMINGA ERMITAO, NATIVIDAD ENCARNACION, MELBA E. TORRES, FLORA MANALO, SOCORRO DELA ROSA, JOSE ERMITAO, ESMERANDO ERMITAO, TRICOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and FILOMENO ERMITAO, respondents. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay, Branch 18, in LRC Cases No. TG-362 and TG-396.2 The facts are simple: Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and private respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De Guzman, to wit WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court as follows: (1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies the application for registration of the parcels of land mentioned therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for lack of factual and legal bases; (2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves the petition for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Psu-67537-Amd-2 and containing an area of 308,638 square meters, as supported by its technical descriptions now forming parts of the records of these cases, in addition to other proofs adduced in the names of petitioners Damian Ermitao De Guzman, Deogracias Ermitao De Guzman, Zenaida Ermitao De Guzman, Alicia Ermitao De Guzman and Salvador De Guzman, all married, of legal age and with residence and postal addresses at Magallanes Street, Carmona, Cavite, subject to the claims of oppositors Dominga Ermitao, Natividad Encarnacion, Melba E. Torres, Flora Manalo, Socorro de la Rosa, Jose Ermitao and Esmeranso Ermitao under an instrument entitled "Waiver of Rights with Conformity" the terms and conditions of which are hereby ordered by this Court to be annotated

We disagree. The Court of Appeals' consideration of the period of possession prior to the time the subject land was released as agricultural is in direct contravention of the pronouncement in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals,8 to wit The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of the 30year open and continuous possession in concept of owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that: Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679). Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vamo vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 17 Phil. 410 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]). (emphasis ours) So, too, is the Court of Appeals' reliance on the case of Director of Land Management vs. Court of Appeals9misplaced. There, while the period of possession of the applicant's predecessor-in-interest was tacked to his own possession to comply with the required thirty year period possession requirement, the land involved therein was not forest land but alienable public land. On the other hand, in the case before us, the property subject of private respondents' application was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It was not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private property, (unless) and until such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. 10

In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year possession requirement. This is in accord with the ruling in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, (supra), and because the rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. 11 While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject land for sixty three (63) years at the time of the application of their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws and jurisprudence in giving practical relief to them. The fact remains that from the time the subject land was declared alienable until the time of their application, private respondents' occupation thereof was only twenty six (26) years. We cannot consider their thirty seven (37) years of possession prior to the release of the land as alienable because absent the fact of declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained classified as forest or timberland,which he could not have acquired by prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which reiterate that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property. Possession of the land by private respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership. This Court is constrained to abide by the latin maxim "(d)ura lex, sed lex". 12 WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the February 26, 1998 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48785 as well as that of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 38, in LRC Case No. TG-396 are both REVERSED. Judgment is rendered dismissing LRC Case No. 396 for failure of the applicants therein to comply with the thirty year occupancy and possessory requirements of law for confirmation of imperfect title. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-17900

June 21, 1922

EUGENIO CAGAOAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FELIX CAGAOAN and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, defendants-appellees. E. G. Turner for plaintiff-appellant. C. W. Rheberg for defendant-appellee. OSTRAND, J.: It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff and the defendant Felix Cagaoan are brothers, the sons of Gregorio Cagaoan. On November 3, 1915, Gregorio Cagaoan executed a deed of gift of four parcels of land situated in the municipality of Tayug, Province of Pangasinan, in favor of Felix Cagaoan and on October 26, 1918, he executed a similar deed in favor of Eugenio Cagaoan for a parcel of land which, apparently, is the same as that described as parcel No. 4 in the deed of gift executed in favor of Felix. Both of the deeds of gift are free from formal defects and were duly accepted by the donees. Eugenio Cagaoan went into possession of the parcel donated to him immediately after the execution of the deed of gift in his favor, but on account of variance between the land description given in the deed and that appearing in the registry, he failed to get the donation recorded with the register of deeds. The deed given Felix was duly recorded on June 10, 1919, but though he appears to have held possession of parcels Nos. 1,2, and 3 described in his deed, at least since the year 1915, he has never had possession of parcel No. 4. Gregorio Cagaoan died on December 16, 1918. This action was brought to have Eugenio Cagaoan declared the owner of the parcel donated to him, to set aside for fraud the donation made in favor of Felix Cagaoan and to have the record of the same in the registry of deeds cancelled. The defendant Felix Cagaoan has presented cross-complaint asking that he awarded the possession of the land, with damages for its unlawful detention by the plaintiff. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendant ordering that the plaintiff surrender possession of the parcel in question to him and pay the costs. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed. There is no doubt that Gregorio Cagaoan signed both of the deeds of gift by means of his thumb-print and that therefore both of them are authentic, but there are strong indications in the evidence that some form of deception was practiced upon him at the time of the execution of the deed in favor of Felix Cagaoan and that he never intended to donate the parcel now in dispute to

Felix. In fact, in view of the difficulty of obtaining direct evidence of fraud where the person deceived cannot be produced as witness, we might, perhaps be justified in holding that the circumstances shown by the evidence and which remain unexplained by the defendant, constitute sufficient evidence of fraud. But, be this as tit may, we think the judgment of the court below must be reversed for another reason. The case seems to use to be analogous to one where the same real property has been sold by the same vendor to two difference vendees. In such cases, under article 1473 of the Civil Code, the property goes to the vendee who first records his title in the registry of property. If the sale is not recorded by either vendee, the property goes to the one who first takes possession of its in good, faith, and in the absence of both record and possession, to the one who present oldest title, provided there is good faith. The supreme court of Spain has frequently held that inscription in the registry of property gives no preference of priority where the person relying on the inscription had full notice beforehand of the adverse claim. For instance, in sentence of July 9, 1900, the court held that "the provision of article 34 of the Mortgage Law presuppose that the cause of annulment or resolution of the right of the obligor which is not recorded in the property registry were unknown to the obligee at the time of contracting, because if the latter knew those causes, he did not have the character of a third person, and the basis of that legal fiction upon which the guaranty of registry rests was lacking." In sentence of May 123, 1908, it was held that "although article 1473, in its second paragraph, creates a preference for the title of ownership of realty first registered, this provision must be understood as being based always upon the good faith required in the first paragraph thereof, and it cannot be conceived that the legislator had intended to do away with, or to sanction, bad faith by requiring compliance with a mere formality (the act of registration) which does not always control even when third persons are involved." (See also Obras Pias vs.Devera Ignacio, 17 Phil., 45.) It clearly appears that Felix Cagaoan had full notice of the plaintiff's claim to the land before he had his deed of gift recorded with the register of deeds. Under the decisions above cited he was therefore not a third person within the meaning of article 34 of the Mortgage Law, and his position was, consequently, in now wise improved by the inscription of his document. The plaintiff Eugenio Cagaoan having first taken possession in good faith must therefore be considered to have the better right to the land in question. The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed, the plaintiff Eugenio Cagaoan is declared the owner of the land in question, the cross-complaint of the defendant Felix Cagaoan is dismissed, and it is ordered that the register of deeds cancel the inscription of The land in question in the name of Felix Cagaoan, who will pay the costs of this action in both instances. So Ordered.

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