Utolo vs Pasion Nature: This is an appeal taken by the Leona Pasion Vda de Garcia from the order of the

Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac appointing the applicant as judicial administrator of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia. Facts: Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the administration of his property. Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the surviving spouse and the herein oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix. The said deceased left legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during the pendency of the administration proceedings of the said deceased, she died in the province without any legitimate descendants, her only forced heirs being her mother and her husband. The latter commenced in the same court the judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife (special proceedings No. 4188), stating in his petition that her only heirs were he himself and his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only property left by the deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator of the property of said deceased. Leona Pasion Vda de Garcia objected to the petition, opposing the judicial administration of the property of her daughter and the appointment of the applicant as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial administration. Issue: Whether or not there is a need of appointing judicial administrator Ruling: There is no need to appoint judicial administrator. As a general rule that when a person dies living property in the Philippine Islands, his property should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name an executor therein. This rule, however, is subject to the exceptions established by sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as finally amended. According to the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly held that when a

person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings (Ilustre vs.Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemorvs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317). The SC finally held that, there is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to the effect that his appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the right of the representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an interested and necessary party if she were living. In order to intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the property it is not necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased wife be instituted an administration which will take up time and occasion inconvenience and unnecessary expenses. N B: This case was decided on Sept 30, 1938 VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents. [G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989, GANCAYCO, J.:] FACTS: 1. Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away without a will a. survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent. 2. Nagac filed before RTC for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. a. REASONS: i. he and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased ii. deceased left no will iii. there are no creditors of the deceased iv. deceased left several properties v. the spouse of the deceased had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased. b. Victoria opposed: there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration

relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse. c. RULING: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate 3. CA: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate ISSUE: Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts? HELD: 1. GENERAL RULE: when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator a. EXCEPTION: when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. 2. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. a. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings . 3. what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case. a. questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir. b. merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. c. to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings

estate to be administered and in the alternative she be appointed administratix. The RTC appointed Nagac as administratix which was upheld by the CA hence this petition. Issue: W/N there is a need for a special proceeding Held: NO! The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator. An exception to this rule is sec. 1 of Rule 74 which provides that when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. However, this does not preclude them from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort FOR GOOD REASONS to an ordinary action for partition. Now the question is what constitutes good re ason"? The court has time and again refused to sanction administration proceedings when the issues to be resolved can be properly be ventilated in an action for partition as administration proceedings are always long and costly. In the case at bar, the reason why Nagac instituted the spec. Proc. is because she and the widow are not in good terms and she wants to obtain possession of the properties for her own purpose. This is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate.

G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958 BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent. FACTS: Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left 4 parcels of land in San Manuel, Pangasinan. He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, alone to inherit the above properties".

Pereira v. Court of Appeals Facts: Andres Pereira died leaving his wife Pereira and his sister Nagac as his only heirs. Nagac then instituted special proceedings to be appointed administrator of her brothers estate to which the widow opposed alleging to

On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. On June 17, 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000. In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete (Special Proceeding No. 3694, Pangasinan), and having secured her appointment as administratrix, brought the present action on June 20, 1950. The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and the invalidity of the sale. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; and that if such a cause exists the same is barred. The CFI rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera, declaring that the affidavit of adjudication and the deeds of sale as all null and void. The case was appealed to the CA. It held that the sale is valid as to the one-half share of the land. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to recover her and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had not prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed. RULING: YES. It is argued that as the action was instituted almost 4 years after the affidavit of adjudication was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not brought within the period of 2 years as prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, and as decided in the cases of McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869. Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows: SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall appear at any time within two years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation of the such heir or such other person may compel the settlement estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. . . . Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:

SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs . If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent. There are two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" indicates the persons to answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and both the distributees and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest. But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision. Thus, it is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication. Hence, the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years

from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.