Rachelle Bonita LLB-2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Cases to Digest : 1. Pp vs. Nitafan, 302 SCRA 424 2. Garcia vs.

Ca, 266 SCRA 678 3. Go vs. BSP, Oct. 23, 2009 4. People vs. Tabio, 544 SCRA 156 5. Miranda vs. Tuliao, March 31, 2006 6. Pp vs. Garfin, March 29, 2004/RSP Turingan vs. Garfin, April 7, 2007 7. Binay vs. Sandigabayan, 316 SCRA 65 8. Pp vs. Magat, 332 SCRA 517 9. Argel vs. Pascua, 363 SCRA 381 10. Pp vs. De la Torre 380 SCRA 596 11. Pp vs. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383 12. Ivler vs. Mondesto- San Pedro, Nov. 17, 2010 13. Olaque, et al vs. Military Commission 14. Pp vs. Balisacan 15. Teehankee vs. Madayag 16. Pp vs. Adil, 76 SCRA 462 17. Melo vs. People, 85 Phil 766 18. Pp vs. Buling, 107 Phil 112 19. Pp vs. Yorac 42 SCRA 230 20. Galman vs. Pamaran 21. Pp vs. CA, 423 SCRA 605 22. Pp vs. Lacson, April 1, 2003

People vs Nitafan Facts: On January 9, 1992, three criminal information for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 were filed against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos before Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig. Said Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 90384-92, 90385-92 and 90386-92 were amended prior to arraignment. After arraignment, where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the RTC of Pasig granted the motion for consolidation. Before the Manila RTC, the three (3) informations were re-raffled and re-assigned instead to Branch 52-Manila presided by public respondent Judge Nitafan wherein the three informations (CriminalCases Nos. 90384-92, 90385-92 and 90386-92) were re-numbered as Criminal Case Nos. 92-107942; 92-107943 and 92-107944. Thereafter, without private respondent yet taking any action of filing any motion to quash the informations, respondent judge issued an order requiring petitioners to show cause why criminal case number 92-107942 should not be dismissed on the ground that it violates private respondent's right against ex post facto law, and on the same day, respondent judge issued another order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the two other criminal informations (92-107943 and 92-107944) should not be dismissed on the ground that private respondent's right to double jeopardy was violated. It is respondent judge's posture that based on the Solicitor-General's allegations in its Motion for Consolidation filed on Branch 58-Pasig that the three cases form part of a series of transactions which are subject of the cases pending before Branch 26-Manila, all these cases constitute one continuous crime. Respondent judge further stated that to separately prosecute private respondent for a series of transaction would endow it with the "functional ability of a worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction". Thus, accused would be unduly vexed with multiple jeopardy. In the two orders, respondent judge likewise said that the dismissal of the three "seemingly unmeritorious" and "duplicitous" cases would help unclogged his docket in favor of more serious suits. The prosecution complied with the twin show cause orders accompanied by a motion to inhibit respondent judge. However respondent judge denied motion for consolidation embodied in the prosecution's compliance with the show cause orders for some reasons. Thereafter, respondent judge issued an 8-page order dismissing criminal case no. 92107942 on the ground that the subject CB Circular is an ex post facto law. In a separate17-page order dated August 10, 1992, respondent judge also dismissed the two remaining criminal cases (92-107943 & 92-107944) ruling that the prosecution of private respondent was "part of a sustained political vendetta" by some people in the government aside from what he considered as a violation of private respondent's right against double jeopardy. From his disquisition regarding continuing, continuous and continued offenses and his discussion of mala prohibita, respondent judge further ratiocinated his dismissal order in that the pendency of the other cases before Branch

26-Manila had placed private respondent in double jeopardy because of the three cases before his sala. The prosecution filed two separate motions for reconsideration which respondent judge denied in a single order dated September 7, 1992 containing 19 pages. Hence this petition for certiorari filed by the prosecution. Issue: Whether a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latter's right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy. Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information. (emphasis supplied). It is clear from the above rule that the accused may file a motion to quash an information at an information time before entering a plea or before arraignment. Thereafter, no motion to quash can be entertained by the court except under the circumstances mentioned in Section 8 of Rule 117 which adopts the omnibus motion to rule. In the case at at bench, private respondent pleaded to the charges without filing any motion to quash. As such, she is deemed to have waived and abandoned her right to avail of any legal ground which she may have properly and timely invoke to challenge the complaint or information pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 1 17 which provides: Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefore The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in his motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except, the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied) It is also clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. A motion contemplates an initial action originating from the accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to know on what ground/s he will based his objection to the information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution but also takes side with the accused. This would violate the right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal.

That the initial act to quash an information is lodged with the accused is further supported by Sections 2, 3 and 8 of Rule 117. Sec. 2 requires that the motion must be signed by "accused" or "his counsel"; Section 3 states that "the accused" may file a motion, and; Section 8 refers to the consequence if "the accused" do not file such motion. Neither the court nor the judge was mentioned. Section 2 further ordains that the court is proscribed from considering any ground other than those stated in the motion which should be "specify(ied) distinctly" therein. Thus, the filing of a motion to quash is a right that belong to the accused who may waived it by inaction and not an authority for the court to assume. It is therefore clear that the only grounds which the court may consider in resolving a motion to quash an information or complaint are (1) those grounds stated in the motion and (2) the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, whether or not mentioned in the motion. Other than that, grounds which have not been sharply pleaded in the motion cannot be taken cognizance of by the court, even if at the time of the filing thereof, it may be properly invoked by the defendant. Such proscription on considerations of other grounds than those specially pleaded in the motion to quash is premised on the rationale that the rights to these defenses are waivable on the part of the accused, and that by claiming to wave said right, he is deemed to have desired these matters to be litigated upon in a full-blown trial. Pursuant to the Rules, the sole exception is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged which goes into the competence of the court to hear and pass judgment on the cause. On ex post facto law, suffice it to say that every laws carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court. To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However, neither private respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more the lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action. With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the same is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy connotes the concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. In this case, it is manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such jeopardy terminated. Sec. 7, Rule 117 provides: When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused

or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. xxx xxx xxx Under said Section, the first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Petition Granted.

Garcia vs. Ca Facts: Jose Garcia, herein petitioner charged his wife Adela Santos, herein private respondent for committing the crime of Bigamy having been married twice. On January 8, 1992, the City Prosecutor filed an information charging private respondent for Bigamy at the Regional Trial Court. On March 2, 1992, private respondent, Adela Santos filed a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that the offense has already prescribed. Private respondent contends that the crime of Bigamy prescribes after fifteen (15) years from the discovery of the offended party of such offense. Accordingly, petitioner discovered the offense on 1972, and that the Information was filed on 1991, eighteen (18) years from discovery of the offense thereof. On the part of the petitioner, he contends that the period of prescription was interrupted by the series of travels made by private respondent outside the coutry. That the filing of the Motion to Quash must be based on the information. The Regional Trial Court granted the Motion to Quash and dismissed the case based on prescription. The petitioner appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which ruled in favor of the private respondent and uplifting the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence, this petition. Issue: (1) Bigamy as a public offense, prescription should have been counted from the time the state discovered its commission; (2) A Motion to Quash cannot also go beyond what is stated in the information; (3) The factual bases of the Motion to Quash are not conclusive; and (4) The prescriptivre period has been interrupted several times. Held:

Petitioner's position is untenable. On the first issue, It is true that bigamy is a public offense. Article 91 of the RPC provides that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . . ." This rule makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the "offended party, the authorities, or their agents." Article 91 does not define the term "offended party." We find its definition in Section 12, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court as "the person against whom or against whose property, the offense was committed." It is settled that in bigamy, both the first and the second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances. On the second issue, the petitioner's contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the information which states that the crime was discovered in 1989, is palpably unmeritorious. Even People v. Alagao, which he cites, mentions the exceptions to the rule as provided in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117: (a) extinction of criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. SEC. 2. Form and contents. - The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the accused or his counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor and the court shall consider no grounds other than those stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds. On the third issue, The petitioner likewise claims that the factual bases of the private respondent's motion to quash are inconclusive. The petitioner cannot be allowed to disown statements he made under oath and in open court when it serves his purpose. It is immaterial to whom the private respondent was first married; what is relevant in this case is that the petitioner was informed of a prior marriage contracted by the private respondent. Lastly, the petitioner draws our attention to the private respondent's several trips abroad. We agree with the Court of Appeals that these trips abroad did not constitute the "absence" contemplated in Article 91. These trips were brief, and in every case the private respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the petitioner discovered the offense and even if the aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still the information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period.

GO vs. BSP Facts: On August 20, 1999, an Information for violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337otherwise known as the General Banking Act was filed against Jose Go, herein petitioner. Upon arraignment, Jose Go pleaded not guilty. Before the commencement of the trial, Jose Go filed a Motion to Quash information on the claiming that the Information was defective, as the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense under Section 83 of RA 337. Jose Go contends averred that based on the facts alleged in the Information, he was being prosecuted for borrowing the deposits or funds of the Orient Bank and/or acting as a guarantor, indorser or obligor for the banks loans to other persons. The use of the word and/or meant that he was charged for being either a borrower or a guarantor, or for being both a borrower and guarantor. Go claimed that the charge was not only vague, but also did not constitute an offense. He posited that Section 83 of RA 337 penalized only directors and officers of banking institutions who acted either as borrower or as guarantor, but not as both. The Regional Trial Court granted the Motion to Quash and dismissed the said case. The prosecution, not contented with the ruling of the Regional Trial Court appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the Regional Trial Court erred in granting the motion. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor of the prosecution and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court. Hence, the filing of this petition. Issue: Whether the information charging Jose Go for violation of Section 83 of RA 337 is sufficient. Held: The Court does not find the petition meritorious and accordingly denies it. The facts and circumstances necessary to be included in the Information are determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. HOWEVER, assuming that the facts charged in the Information do not constitute an offense, we find it erroneous for the RTC to immediately order the dismissal of the Information, without giving the prosecution a chance to amend it. Although an Information may be defective because the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the dismissal of the case will not necessarily follow. The Rules specifically require that the prosecution should be given a chance to correct the defect; the court can order the dismissal only upon the prosecutions failure to do so.

The RTCs failure to provide the prosecution this opportunity twice1[21] constitutes an arbitrary exercise of power that was correctly addressed by the CA through the certiorari petition. This defect in the RTCs action on the case, while not central to the issue before us, strengthens our conclusion that this criminal case should be resolved through full-blown trial on the merits.

People vs Tabio Facts: Appellant Jimmy Tabio was charged with three (3) counts of rape in a single Information Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.Trial on the merits ensued. The victim, AAA testified that one night in June 2002, while she was alone in her home, appellant entered her house. He pressed a knife on AAAs breast, removed her clothing, fondled her breast, undressed himself, and mounted her as she was seated on a bed. He inserted his penis in her vagina and ejaculated. AAA was able to recognize the appellant as her house was lighted with a gas lamp. AAA further testified that the appellant on two succeeding occasions again entered her home and repeated the same acts on her. Other witnesses for the prosecution presented testimony concerning AAAs mental condition. A doctor who had trained with the National Center for Mental Health testified that he had examined AAA and concluded that while she was 23 years old at the time of the rape, she nonetheless had the mental age of a six-year old child. AAAs mother and grand aunt also testified on her mental retardation and the occurrences after she had reported the rape to them. Appellant testified in his own behalf, denying that he had raped AAA and offering as alibi that he was up in the mountain at the time of the rape. Appellants wife and his brother-in-law, Jaime Bautista, tried to corroborate his alibi through their own testimony. The RTC handed down a decision finding appellant guilty and imposing the penalty of death on three (3) counts of qualified rape. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The appellate court found appellant guilty of all three (3) counts for simple rape only and not qualified rape. Hence, the case is now before the Supreme Court for final decision.

Issue: Whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of qualified rape with the penalty of death in view of the prosecutions failure to allege a qualifying circumstance in the information; Held: In the case at bar, the appellant presented three errors, but in relation to Criminal procedure we will discuss only the first issue. The SC held, that the CA properly resolved the error, with modifications. Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and unequivocal that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged with specificity in the information. The Court also observes that there is duplicity of the offenses charged in the information, which is a ground for a motion to quash. Three (3) separate acts of rape were charged in one information only. But the failure of appellant to interpose an objection on this ground constitutes waiver. Therefore, the effect of failure to move to quash or allege any of the ground therefore is deemed a waiver and the accused can be convicted as many offenses as alleged in the information. However, the Court acquitted the appellant in the second and third count of rape since it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and modified the civil liabilities. Wherefore, the Appellant is found GUILTY of only ONE count of simple rape and ACQUITTED of the TWO other counts of qualified rape. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay to the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Miranda vs. Tuliao Facts: On Mar. 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tulio who is now under the witness protection program. 2 informations for murder were filed against the 5 police officer including SPO2 Maderal in RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. RTC Manila convicted all the accused and sentenced them 2 counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the four accused on the ground of reasonable doubt. In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the herein petitioner Miranda and 4 others responsible for the death of the victims. Respondent Tuliao then filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners.

Acting Presiding Judge Tumalian issued warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumalian noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the said urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. The petitioners appealed the resolution of the Public prosecutor to the DOJ. The new Presiding Judge named Judge Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumalian. He also ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest. Respondent Tulia filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for TRO seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding of the case and seeking to nullify the Joint Orders of the said Judge. The SC issued a resolution granting the prayer. Notwithstanding the said resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dismissing the information against the petition. Respondent Tuliao filed a motion to cite Judge Anghad in contempt. The SC referred the said motion to the CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City as well as the issuance of warrant of arrest. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court Held: Petition is dismissed and cost against the petitioners. It has been held that an accused cannot seek judicial relief is he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrender to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court. Since, petitioner were not arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty, they cannot seek judicial relief. Pp vs. Garfin Facts: On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of the "Social Security Act,". That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of Naga, Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga Branch and the territorial

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, while being the proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums due for his employee to the SSS in the amount of (P6,533.00), representing SSS and EC premiums for the period from January 1990 to December 1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTYTHREE PESOS and 28/100 (P11,143.28) computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands by letter in violation of the above-cited provisions of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the SSS and the public in general. The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City. Accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for pre-trial.5 Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss6 on the ground that the information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in its first questioned Order dated Feb. 26, 2002, to wit: After considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court believes and so resolves that the Information has not been filed in accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal ProcedureRule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. Expresio un ius est exclusio alterius. The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it has not been approved by the City Prosecutor. This Court holds that the defendants plea to the Information is not a waiver to file a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. By express provision of the rules and by a long line of decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Issue: Whether the approval of the city or provincial prosecutor is no longer required. Held: No. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275. The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no power to direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At most, he can request for their inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is questionable to say the least.

Petitioner argues that the word "may" is permissive. Hence, there are cases when prior written approval is not required, and this is one such instance. This is too simplistic an interpretation. Whether the word "may" is mandatory or directory depends on the context of its use. We agree with the OSG that the use of the permissive word "may" should be read together with the other provisions in the same section of the Rule. The paragraph immediately preceding the quoted provision shows that the word "may" is mandatory. It states: Sec. 4, Rule 112. x x x Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action. In sum, we hold that, im the absence of a directive from the secretary of justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the info. By the provincial or city prosecutor, the info. In Criminal case No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Binay vs. Sandigabayan Facts: Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity) against Mayor Binay of Makati for Illegal Use of Public Funds (RPC A220) and Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) on September 1994. The informations filed constituted crimes which were committed by the petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987. The petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6 years constituted a violation of his constitutional right of due process. His arraignment therefore was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the SB issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to quash and further the latters motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused pendente lite (benefits) which was later granted and ordered for a 90day suspension. Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he was denied of his rights when the suspension was ordered even before he could file his reply

to the petitioners opposition. SC then, directed the SB to permit petitioner to file said reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions and order after the submission of the reply. Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on May 1995 so much so that the petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of Makati alleging that the SB has no jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its resolutions and suspension order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution denied the petitioners motion. Hence this present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of SB over the criminal cases.

Issue: Whether SB has jurisdiction over the case of after the passage of RA 7975.

Held: YES. RA 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249 states that the SB shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense: 1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 Under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, mayors are "local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher. Pp vs. Magat Facts: Private respondent Santiago A. Guerrero was President and Chairman of "Guerrero Transport Services", a single proprietorship. Sometime in 1972, Guerrero Transport Services won a bid for the operation of a fleet of taxicabs within the Subic Naval Base, in Olongapo. As highest bidder, Guerrero was to "provide radio-controlled taxi service within the U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, utilizing as demand requires . . . 160 operational

taxis consisting of four wheel, four-door, four passenger, radio controlled, meter controlled, sedans, not more than one year . . . " On September 22, 1972, with the advent of martial law, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 1. On September 25, 1972, pursuant to the aforequoted Letter of Instruction, the Radio Control Office issued Administrative Circular No. 4: Subject: Suspending the acceptance and processing of applications for radio station construction permits and for permits to own and/or possess radio transmitters or transceivers. On September 25, 1972, Guerrero and Victorino D. Magat, as General Manager of Spectrum Electronic Laboratories, a single proprietorship, executed a letter-contract for the purchase of transceivers at a quoted price of US$77,620.59, FOB Yokohoma. Victorino was to deliver the transceivers within 60 to 90 days after receiving notice from Guerrero of the assigned radio frequency, "taking note of Government Regulations. The contract was signed and Victorino contacted his Japanese supplier, Koide & Co., Ltd. and placed an order for the transceivers. On September 29, 1972, Navy Exchange Officer, A. G. Mason confirmed that Guerrero won the bid for the commercial transportation contract. On October 4, 1972, middle man and broker Isidro Q. Aligada of Reliance Group Engineers, Inc. , wrote Victorino, informing him that a radio frequency was not yet assigned to Guerrero and that government regulations might complicate the importation of the transceivers. However, in the same letter, Victorino was advised to advise his supplier "to proceed (with) production pending frequency information." Victorino was also assured of Guerrero's financial capability to comply with the contract. On October 6, 1972, Guerrero informed Aligada of the frequency number assigned by Subic Naval Base authorities. Aligada was instructed to "proceed with the order thru Spectrum Electronics Laboratories." On October 7, 1972, Aligada informed Magat of the assigned frequency number. Aligada also advised Victorino to "proceed with the order upon receipt of letter of credit." On January 10, 1973, Guerrero applied for a letter of credit with the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. This application was not pursued. On March 27, 1973, Victorino, represented by his lawyer, Atty. Sinesio S. Vergara, informed Guererro that the order with the Japanese supplier has not been canceled. Should the contract be canceled, the Japanese firm would forfeit 30% of the deposit and charge a cancellation fee in an amount not yet known, Guerrero to bear the loss. Further, should the contract be canceled, Victorino would demand an additional amount equivalent to 10% of the contract price. Unable to get a letter of credit from the Central Bank due to the refusal of the Philippine government to issue a permit to import the transceivers, Guerrero commenced operation of the taxicabs within Subic Naval Base, using radio units borrowed from the U.S. government. Victorino thus canceled his order with his Japanese supplier.

On May 22, 1973, Victorino filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati a complaint for damages arising from breach of contract against Guerrero. On June 7, 1973, Guerrero moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. On June 16, 1973, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. On July 11, 1973, Victorino filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing the dismissal of the complaint. On April 20, 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that the complaint sufficiently averred a cause of action. The Court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. On November 27, 1984, the trial court ordered that the case be archived for failure of Victorino to prosecute. On March 11, 1985, petitioners, Olivia, Dulce, Ma. Magnolia, Ronald and Dennis Magat, moved to reinstate the case and to substitute Victorino in its prosecution. Apparently, Victorino died on February 18, 1985. On April 29, 1985, the trial court granted the motion. On July 12, 1991, the trial court decided in favor of the heirs of Victorino and ordered Guerrero to pay temperate, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. On August 21, 1991, Guerrero appealed to the Court of Appeals. However it was dismissed. On October 26, 1995, the heirs of Victorino filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration. On March 12, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. Issue: (1) Whether or not the transceivers were contraband items prohibited by the LOI and Administrative Circular to import; hence, the contract is void. (2) Whether or not the contract was breached. Held: (1) NO. The contract was not void ab initio. Nowhere in the LOI and Administrative Circular is there an express ban on the importation of transceivers. The LOI and Administrative Circular did not render radios and transceivers illegally per se. The Administrative Circular merely ordered the Radio Control Office to suspend the acceptance and processing of application for permits to possess, own, transfer, purchase and sell radio transmitters and transceivers therefore; possession and importation of the radio transmitters and transceivers was legal provided one had the necessary license for it. The LOI and Administrative Circular did not render the transceivers outside the commerce of man. They were valid objects of the contract. (2) NO. The contract was not breached. Affirming the validity of the contract, the law provides that when the service (required by the contract) has become so manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also be

released there from in whole or in parts. Here, Guerreros inability to secure a letter of credit and to comply with his obligation was a direct consequence of the denial of the permit to import. For this, he cannot be faulted. Even if the Court assumes that there was a breach of contract, damages cannot be awarded. Damnum absque injuria comes into the fore. Argel vs. Pascua Facts: Petitioner who was charged with murder was previously acquitted by Judge Pascua. After his acquittal, said Judge modified her decision on the account that she made a mistake of rendering her previous judgment believing there was no witness against the accused due to the fact that the testimony of the witness was not attached to the records when she wrote her decision. After finding the accused guilty of murder she ordered the arrest of the accused. Issue: Whether a final judgment by the court can be susceptible for amendment or modification.

Held: No. The final judgment becomes the law of the case and is immune from alteration or modification regardless of claims of incorrectness or error. A judgment of acquittal in criminal cases becomes immediately effective upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for amendment only in case of any clerical error, clarify any ambiguity caused by omission or mistake in the dispositive portion. The inherent power of the court to modify its decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.

Pp vs. De la Torre Facts: Wilfredo dela Torre, appellee, has three children from a common-law relationship, the eldest of which is Mary Rose. When Mary Rose was 7 yearsold, her mother left them together with her youngest brother so she and her other brother were left to the care of her father. Mary Rose was the brightest in her class despite their poverty. However, in January 1997, a sudden change in Mary Roses behavior behavior was noticed. She was twelve years old at that time. She appeared sleepy, snobbish and she also urinated on her panty.

When confronted by her head teacher, Mary Rose admitted that she was abused repeatedly by her father. Her father, however, denied vehemently the charges being imputed to him by her daughter. The RTC convicted appellee of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of murder. However, the RTC refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses such as the absence of any actual physical violence or intimidation on the commission of the acts, that after the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother were living together as a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her father. The prosecution seeks to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death of the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was below eighteen years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court should have been imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. 7659. . Issue: Whether or Not the Court erred in penalizing the appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four indictments of rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. 7659. Held: Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a judgment or final order unless the accused will be put in double jeopardy. In People vs. Leones, it declared that: while it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, t here are allegations of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against double jeopardyWhen the accused after conviction by the trial court did not appeal his decision, an appeal by the government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and should therefore be dismissed. The ban on double jeopardy primarily prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves as a deterrent from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the appeal of the prosecution cannot prosper.

Pp vs. Rondero Facts: The accused was seen by the victims father with an ice pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9 year old victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He was convicted of homicide only. For his conviction, several circumstantial pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his hair for comparison with the strands of hair found in the victims r ight hand at the scene of the crime as well as blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from his house. The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his hair strands without his express written consent and without the presence of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit: Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Issue:

Wether the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellants hair strands can be admitted as evidence against him? Held: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although accusedappellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI

for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress. On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellants wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the fruit of the poisonous tree, evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused-appellants garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence. Ivler vs. Mondesto- San Pedro Facts: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved. Issue: (1)Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and (2)Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband.

Held: (1) On Petition for Certiorari. The RTC dismissed Ivlers petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain said petition arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in the second offense. Thus, without reaching the merits of the said petition, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, the Court granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel. Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions. (2) On Double Jeopardy. The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the

certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy. Olaquer et al vs. Military Commission Facts: In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. Issue: (1) Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted. (2) The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.

Held:

(1) The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic. But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist. (2) The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.

Pp vs. Balisacan Facts: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. Held: The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but

however testified that he acted incomplete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. Teehankee vs. Madayag Facts: Here, Claudio Teehankee, Jr. was originally charged for the crime of frustrated murder for shooting Hultman who was comatosed some time. In the course of the trial, Hultman died. The prosecution sought to change the information from frustrated murder to consummated murder. Teehankee Jr. questioned the new charge for lack of preliminary investigation thereon . Issue: (1) Was there an amend ment of the information or substitut ion when the information was changed from frustrated murder to consummated murder? (2) What kind of amendment? Formal or substantial? (3) Is there a need of a preliminary investigation on the new charge? Held: (1) There is an amendment. There is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended information [murder pa rin!]. What is involved here is not a variance of the nature of different offenses charge, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper. (2) Formal. An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information for murder. So halimbawa sabihin ng prosecutor: You shot Hultman who almost died. Teehankee Jr.:W ala man ako dun ba! I was at home asleep! Alibi ang defense niya ba. Now, namatay si Hultman. Ano

man ang depensa mo? Mao man gihapon: Wala man ako dun! The accused is not prejudiced since the same defense is still available to him.

(3) No need because you have not changed the crime. If you change the crime or when there is substitution, kailangan ng preliminary investigation. Since it is only a formal amendment, preliminary investigation is not necessary. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary. Nota Bene: A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription. Pp vs. Adil Facts: This is a Petition for certiorari; to set aside the orders of respondent judge against private respondent Margarito Fama, Jr., On April 12, 1975, at Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo an information of the Criminal Case No. 3335 against accused Fama Jr. was submitted indicating the herein facts: while armed with a piece of stone, attack and use personal violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone, hitting said Miguel Viajar on the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries which would have required and will require medical attendance for a period from 5 to 9 days barring complication as per medical certificate of the physician hereto attached. The Accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. On June 8, 1975, complainant Viajar filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo charging Atty. Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama and herein respondent Margarito Fama, Jr. with serious physical injuries arising from the same incident alleged. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an information of Criminal Case No. 5241 but only against respondent Fama Jr. On August 1, 1975, Fama Jr. filed an urgent motion to defer the second proceeding, claiming that since he was already charged and pleaded not guilty in the first case, therefore, he would be in double jeopardy, if the subsequent case were to be prosecuted.

Issue: Whether or not the additional allegation of deformity in the information in Case No. 5241 constitutes a supervening element Held: No. what happened here was that when Case No. 3335 was filed in the inferior court of January, the charge against Fama Jr. had to be for slight physical injuries only, because according to the certification of the attending physician, the injuries suffered by the offended party Viajar, would require medical attendance from 5 to 9 days only "baring complications." Indeed, when the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed since the incident in which the injuries were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be suffered by said offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had already been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent. Expert evidence is not needed for anyone to understand that the scar or deformity that would be left by a wound on the face of a person cannot be pre-determined. In other words, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. It was, therefore, a grave error correctible by certiorari for respondent court to have dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241. Melo vs. People Facts: Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on 27 December 1949, with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. On 29 December 1949, at 8:00 a.m., Melo pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15 p.m. of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on 3 January 1950, and on the following day, 4 January 1950, an amended information was filed charging Melo with consummated homicide. Melo filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied by the court. Melo filed the petition for prohibition to enjoin the court from further entertaining the amended information. Issue: Whether the second information, filed after the death of the victim, violates the accuseds right against double jeopardy.

Held: Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, provides that "If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial." Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the first information and order the filing of a new one for the reason that the proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter did not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical offense. There is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Further, when a person who has already suffered his penalty for an offense, is charged with a new and greater of greater offense, said penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense. Pp vs. Buling Facts: Accused was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries for inflicting wounds on a person which, according to the complaint, would require medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days. having pleaded guilty, he served his sentence fully. Later, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against the accused charging him with serious physical injuries, the information alleging that the same woulnds inflicted by the accused would require medical attendance for a period from 1 months to 2 months. it appeas that a different physician examined the offended party anew, taking an X-ray picture of the arm of the offended party which had been wounded, which metiod of examination was not adopted by the first physician. The second physicians certification was the basis of the second complaint. Issue: Whether or not the prosecution and conviction of the accused for less serious physical injuries a bar to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries Held: Yes, it is a bar. if the X-ray examination disclosed the existence of a fracture when the second examination was made, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made. But such circumstances do not exist in the case at bar. if the X-

ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that frature must have existed when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956. there is therefore no new or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action, which would justify the application of the ruling enunciated by us in the case of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong.

Pp vs. Yorac Facts: The accused Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the offended party being a certain Lam Hock who, according to the medical certificate issued in April 10, 1968 by a Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, a resident physician of the Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital, was confined "since April 8, 1968 up to the present time for head injury." Then came a plea of guilty by the accused on April 16, 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer ten days of arresto menor. He started serving his sentence forthwith. On April 18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an information, this time in the CFI of Negros Occidental, charging the same defendant with frustrated murder arising from the same act against the aforesaid victim Lam Hock upon another medical certificate dated April 17, 1968 issued by the same Dr. Zulueta. In the medical certificate of April 17, 1968, it was made to appear that the confinement of the offended party in the hospital was the result of: "1. Contusion with lacerated wound 4 inches parieto-occipital region scalp mid portion. 2. Cerebral concussion, moderately severe, secondary." Moreover, it further contained a statement that the X-ray finding did not yield any "radiographic evidence of fracture." Afterwards, a motion to quash was filed by the accused on June 10, 1968 on the ground that, having been previously convicted of slight physical injuries by the City Court of Bacolod and having already served the penalty imposed on him for the very same offense, the prosecution for frustrated murder arising out of the same act committed against the same offended party, the crime of slight physical injuries necessarily being included in that of frustrated murder, he would be placed in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. The lower court through Judge Alampay granted the motion to quash and ordered the dismissal of a criminal case for frustrated murder against the accused, stating that "nothing in the later medical certificate [indicated] that a new or supervening fact had developed or arisen since the time of the filing of the original action" against the accused. A motion for reconsideration being unavailing, an appeal was elevated to us. Issue:

Whether or not the new medical findings warrant the filing of the new information against the accused, is a violation of double jeopardy. Held: Yes. "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." A defendant in a criminal case should be adjudged either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in the latter case the State being precluded from taking an appeal. It is in that sense that the right against being twice put in jeopardy is considered as possessing many features in common with the rule of finality in civil cases. There is then the indispensable requirement of the existence of "a new fact which supervenes for which the defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense. Herein, if the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956. There is, therefore, no new or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action. The new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on December 10, 1956. Had an X-ray examination been taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the very superficial examination then made. Therefore, there is no supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the Melo doctrine , for which reason the general rule of double jeopardy should be applied.

Galman vs. Pamaran Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom. The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot

him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them. Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer. Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution. But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them). Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process. However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. Issue: (1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. (2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'. The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stagemanaged in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office. More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its

bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

Pp vs. CA Pp vs. Lacson

Facts: Respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons identified as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases against the accused were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the following: ... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; (3) whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims; (7) whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2year bar. The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the two-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court. However, the State is not precluded from presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar. The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to the Criminal Cases because the essential requirements for its

application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29, 1999. The petitioners maintain that the respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr. of the Criminal Cases. The respondent allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during the hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the respondents express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The petitioners further contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of the Criminal Cases and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondents motion before the hearing thereon and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. Issue: (1) WhetherSection 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to the Criminal Cases (2) Whether the time-bar in said rule should be applied retroactively Held: (1) YES. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: 1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the timebar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent. A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.

In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the Criminal Cases. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise of the Criminal Cases. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. - In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of the Criminal Cases, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenas were issued to and received by them Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile the Criminal Cases or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent. (2) NO. The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the Criminal Cases on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year

period fixed under the new rule. - On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice. The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the twoyear period under the new rule. To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State. Dispositive Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED