ECOSCIENCE:

POPULATION,
RESOURCES,
ENVIRONMENT

PAUL R. EHRLICH
STANFORD UNIVERSITY

ANNE H. EHRLICH
STANFORD UNIVERSITY

JOHN P. HOLDREN
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

W. H. FREEMAN AND COMPANY

San Francisco
 RICH NATIONS, POOR NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT /
uses of outer space and Antarctica. More recently, there
have been extensive negotiations on a treaty to control
the use of oceans.
( JLaw of the Sea.) What has been described as "the
greatest international conference ever held"126 met in
Caracas in summer 1974 to begin work on a treaty
dealing with the control of the oceans. The second
session of the third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)127 reached no final agree-
ments, but in its tortuous proceedings several trends
could be discerned. The emphasis was on dividing up the
pie—on how to allocate rights to exploit the oceans rather
than how to protect their vital functioning in the
ecosystems of Earth. The less developed nations were
anxious to "augment their meager natural resources with
none of the unpleasant connotations of economic aid."128
The overdeveloped countries, on the other hand, were
primarily trying to retain as much as possible of their
hegemony over the seas (which they, far more than the
LDCs, have the ability to exploit).
A dominant trend has been toward establishing a
200-mile economic zone, which would effectively bal-
kanize most of the oceans' known wealth. One view is
that this would lead to having humanity's common
heritage decimated piecemeal as individual nations exer-
cised dominion over all living and nonliving resources
within their zones. About the only good thing that can be
said about the 200-mile zone is that its establishment
might lead eventually to more rational use of those
resources since their individual ownership by nations
would at least tend to avoid the problems involved in
multilateral exploitation of a commons.
Other topics discussed in detail at the ongoing confer-
ence have been rights of passage through straits, the
rights of landlocked nations to a share of oceanic
resources, the establishment of an international authority
'"Elizabeth Mann Borgese, Report from Caracas, the law of the sea,
Center Magazine, November/December, 1974.
'"The first session in New York in 1973 dealt only with procedures;
the first and second conferences in 1958 and 1960 had accomplished little
but reveal the complexities of the problems and the diverse positions of
states and blocs (see Edward Weak, Jr., The politics of the ocean, chapter
6).
»«C. R. Pinto of Sri Lanka, quoted in Time, July 29,1974. It has been
suggested that "The uses of international commons should be taxed for
the benefit of the poorest strata of the poor countries" (Barbara Ward. The
Cocoyoc Declaration), but there is thus far little sign that this will occur.
for the mining of seabed minerals outside the economic
zones, the responsibility of nations to control pollution
originating from their shores and to protect the marine
environment, and the establishment of means of settling
disputes and enforcing agreements.
A third eight-week session of UNCLOS in Geneva in
May 1975 produced a draft treaty, which was not voted
on by the participating nations but was instead consid-
ered the basis for further negotiation.12' The draft
extended the territorial waters of all nations to 12 miles
from shore, provided for a 200-mile economic zone,
specified means to control polluting activities, and en-
couraged the transfer of technology from rich to poor
nations. The most controversial provision was for an
International Seabed Authority, controlled de facto by
the LDCs (who would be a majority in the agency), that
would regulate deep-sea mining. The United States has
held out for "private initiative" to share in managing the
seabed resource.
Further negotiations are scheduled for 1977. In part,
their success will depend on what unilateral actions are
taken by nations in the meantime. The United States, for
example, has extended its jurisdiction over fisheries up to
200 miles from shore, which conforms with the draft
treaty. Several other countries, including Mexico and
Canada, have followed suit. But legislation being con-
sidered by Congress on deep-sea mining does not
conform to the draft treaty. This places U.S. negotiators,
who have tried to dissuade other nations from taking
unilateral action, in an awkward position. If Congress
passes such legislation, it could have a less than salu-
brious effect on future negotiations—especially if Amer-
ican firms are permitted to begin deep-sea mining before
the treaty is finally passed and ratified. On the other hand,
these unilateral actions may be pushing negotiators to
examine other alternatives. By 1977, Elizabeth Mann-
Borgese was envisioning a third possibility for the
Seabed Authority as "a comprehensive and flexible
system of joint ventures, acceptable to states and compa-
nies under the control of the [Authority and for the
benefit of all countries, especially the poorer
ones. . . ,"> 2 > a
'"Material in this paragraph is based primarily on Deborah Shapley,
Now, a draft sea law treaty: But what comes after?
1
^"Quoted its Claiborue Pell, The most complex treaty ever negotiated
in history, World Issues, vol II, no. 1 (February/March), 1977.
942 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT
The complexity and comprehensiveness of the treaty
account for the lengthiness of the negotiations. But,
unfortunately, even a definitive treaty may fail to pro-
vide the kind of apparatus required to administer,
conserve, and distribute the resources of the seas in a way
that is equitable and that fully protects the vitally
important ecosystems of the oceans, just because an
exploitative view of the environment continues to domi-
nate all such discussions.
U.N. Environment Program, The exploitative view
of the environment first surfaced explicitly at the inter-
national level at the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment at Stockholm in 1972. That gath-
ering featured platitudes from the ODCs, who are busily
engaged in looting the planet and destroying its ecologi-
cal systems, and demands from the LDCs that they get a
piece of the action. One could only take heart that the
world's nations even took the condition of the environ-
ment seriously enough to attend such a conference. That
they did was a tribute to the brilliance, persuasiveness,
and persistance of one man, Canadian businessman.
Maurice Strong, secretary general of the conference^
Strong became the first executive director of the
United Nations Environment Program (ITNF.P)1 rhp
major positive result of the Stockholm conference.
UNEP was given only a small budget, and its head-
quarters was tucked away in Nairobi, perhaps in the hope
that it would not make waves. Under Strong's leadership,
it nevertheless began to serve several vital functions. For
instance, it has established the Earth Watch monitoring
system to serve as an international clearinghouse for
environmental information. Earth Watch is explicitly
designed also to help bridge the gap between scientists
and technologists on one hand and political decision-
makers on the other.130 The kinds of information to be
collected include an international register of toxic chem-
icals, which list properties of those chemicals, their uses,
their effects, and their known or inferred pathways in the
environment.
UNEP's very location in Nairobi (the first such United
Nations agency headquartered in an LDC) has resulted
in its first major contribution—an enormous and growing
""Maurice Strong, A global imperative for the environment.
interest and concern in poor nations about environmental
problems.131 This concern was already well established
in some areas among the people132 but had been notably
absent in most LDC governments.
Under Strong's leadership a list of high-priority areas
was established at UNEP: (1) human settlement, health,
habitat, and well-being; (2) land, water, and desertifica-
tion; (3) trade, economics, technology, and the transfer of
technology; (4) oceans; (5) conservation of nature, wild-
life, and genetic resources; (6) energy.
A program has been started in each area, and by early
1975 more than 200 projects had been initiated^ projects
that according to Strong were designed "to create a
leverage to move the programme towards our pr;or-_
ities."133 Unfortunately for UNEP. Maurice Strong left^
the agency in 1975; whether the<icorn)of UNEP will ever
grow into thejjgreatoakfcf ari^ternationaXenvironrnentaD
^protection organization^ so desppratply nppHfdj will -
depend on many things—not least of which will be the
quality of its leadership.
Toward a Planetary Regime
International attempts to tackle global problems—or at
least to start a dialogue among nations—have proliferated
in recent years. Besidesmie UNCTAjD^Law of the SeaT)
andfEnvironmental conference^, the United Nations has_
sponsored World Population and World Food confer-
ences (discussed earlier) in 1974, a conference on the
Status of Women in 1975. the Pabitar Cnnfen-nrc nf
1976 (dealing with the problems of cities), and^a confer-
ence on Water Resources in 1971. A Conference on
Science and Technology is scheduled for 1978, and it is
expected to create a new agency for World Science and _
Technology Development. The agency's mission will be
to facilitate the transfer of needed technologies to LDCs
and to foster development of indigenous scientific and
technological education and research in those
"countries.134
'"Roger Lewin, Environment in a developing world; Jon Sigurdson,
Resources and environment in China; Conor Reilly, Environmental
action in Zambia.
132
For example, see Amil Agarwal, Ghandi's ghost saves the Himala-
yan trees.
'"Lewin, Environment in a developing world, p. 632.
134
Salam, Ideals and realities.
 RICH NATIONS, POOR NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT /
Superficially, it usually appears that such conferences
do little more than highlight the political differences
between rich and poor countries, but in fact they can lead
to constructive action on the problems discussed. Be-
cause of the diversity of interests and viewpoints of
individual nations, and because of the inequities of the
world economy, it seems to take an unconscionably long
time to reach a consensus on dealing with each problem.
But an important Step often is tn nht{^r| agrpf mpnr That a
Problem exists, first of all, and, second, that international
action is appropriate and necessary. Each of the confer-
ences named has been the culmination of this process;
but what counts for the future is whether agreement can
be reached on solutions to the problems and whether
controls can be established before it is too late.
[Regulation of one vital global common^ has not yet
been seriously discussed—that commons is the atmo-
sphere. Even more than the resources of the oceans, the_
atmosphere is shared by all human beings—and other
organisms as well. It is crucial to preserve the atmo-
sphere's quality and the stability of global climate.135 But
that these are now threatened and should be protected by
international agreement is only beginning to be recog-
nized in a few quarters.
Should jiLaw of the^e&be successfully established, it
could serve as a model for a future(Law of the Atmc
Csphere)to regulate the use of airspace, to monitor climate
change, and to control atmospheric pollution.! Perhaps_
those agencies, combined with UNEP and the United_
Nations population agencies, might eventually be devel-
oped into a Planetary Regime—sort of an international
superagency for population, resources, and environment. _
"Such a comprehensive Planetary Regime could control
the development, administration, conservation, and dis-
tribution of all natural resources, renewable or nonre-
newable, at least insofar as international implications
exist. Thus, the Regime could have the power to control
pollution not only in the atmosphere and the oceans, but
also in such freshwater bodies as rivers and lakes that
cross international boundaries or that discharge into the
oceans. The Regime might also be a logical central
agency for regulating all international trade, perhaps
including assistance from DCs to LDCs, and including
"*S. H. Schneider and L. E. Mesirow, The genesis strategy.
943
all food on the international market. . '^
The Planetary Regime might be given responsibility
for determining the optimum population for the world
and for each region and for arbitrating various countries'
shares within their regional limits. Control of population
size might remain the responsibility of each govern-
ment, but the Regime should have some power to enforce
the agreed limits. As with the Law of the Sea and other
international agreements, all agreements for regulating
population sizes, resource development, and pollution
should be subject to revision and modification in accord-
ance with changing conditions.
The Planetary Regime might have the advantage over
earlier proposed world government schemes in not being
primarily political in its emphasis—even though politics
would inevitably be a part of all discussions, implicitly or
explicitly. Since most of the areas the Regime would
control are not now being regulated or controlled by
nations or anyone else, establishment of the Regime
would involve far less surrendering of national power.
Nevertheless, it might function powerfully to suppress
international conflict simply because the interrelated
global resource-environment structure would not permit
such an outdated luxury.
What the Human Community Can Do
Humanity has reached a critical point in its history.
Either the fissioning of societies into two distinct
groups—rich and poor—will proceed, leading inevitably
to conflict and possibly to economic collapse of some
regions, at least; or serious efforts will be made to bring
the two groups closer together. With regard to the latter
course, as we have discussed at some length, there are
plenty of ideas on how to go about it. The main obstacles
are, as usual, social, political, and economic. Too few
people in ODCs are convinced of the absolute necessity
of reducing their consumption of material and environ-
mental resources—of de-development. Too few people
in all countries appreciate the environmental and re-
source constraints within which society must operate.
And too many people with power oppose changing the
present course because, for the time being, they are
profiting from the status quo. And it may not be possible