1

Presley v. Bel-Air Village Association 201 SCRA 13 FACTS:Plaintiff- appellee, Bel- Air Village Association Inc. (BAVA) filed a complaint for specific performance and damages with preliminary injunction against defendantappellant for violation of the Deed Restrictions of Bel- Air Subdivision, which provides among others that the house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial purposes. Plaintiff- appelle was alleged to have violated the Deed after the latter operated a hot Pan de Sal store in the house and lot located in the said Subdivision. The trial court rendered a decision in favour of BAVA which was affirmed by the respondent CA. Thus, appellant filed an instant petition before the SC. ISSUE:W/N the defendant- appellant violated the Deed of Restrictions of Bel- Air Subdivision. HELD:No. The SC ruled that the street (Jupiter) where the house and lot is located is not covered by the restrictive easements based on the 'deed restrictions' but chiefly because the National Government itself, through Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), had reclassified it into a 'high density commercial (C-3) zone. Hence, the petitioners have no cause of action on the strength alone of the said deed restrictions. As far as the Bel-Air subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, the restrictive easements are valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the 'law between the contracting parties, but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.' Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. Decision of the respondent court is reversed. Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance 235 SCRA 630 FACTS:These are motions seeking reconsideration of a decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation." It is claimed that the application of the tax to existing contracts of the sale of real property by installment or on deferred payment basis would result in substantial increases in the monthly amortizations to be paid because of the 10% VAT. The additional amount, it is pointed out, is something that the buyer did not anticipate at the time he entered into the contract. ISSUE: Whether RA 7716 impairs obligations of contracts and is therefore unconstitutional. HELD:No. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read onto contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CREBA that the imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effecting of the law would violate the constitutional provision that No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the state. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure peace and good order of society. Siska Development v. Office of the President 231 SCRA 674 FACTS:Petitioner, a subdivision owner-developer, entered into a Contract to Sell with Guadalupe Sering, involving a lot situated at the Mira-Nila Subdivision in Quezon City. With the consent of the petitioner, Guadalupe transferred all her rights and interests over the aforesaid lot in favor of respondent Socorro Sering. Thereafter, private respondents assumed the transferors obligation by paying the monthly amortizations for the lot. Private respondents defaulted in the payment of their monthly amortizations, but petitioner still accepted the late payments. Petitioner sent private respondents a notice of rescission of the Contract to Sell for failure to pay the monthly amortizations on time but it was cancelled after private respondents updated their payments, and imposed the condition that should it be necessary to rescind the contract for a second time, the second rescission would be final. Private respondents again defaulted in paying their monthly amortizations .When private respondent offered to pay the remaining balance of

2
the purchase price, a representative of petitioner refused to accept the payment, alleging that the contract had already been cancelled. However, said respondent protested that he had not received any notice of rescission from petitioner. To compel the execution by petitioner of the final deed of sale, private respondents filed an action for specific performance in the CFI but it was dismissed. When the case was elevated to the Office of the President, the latter ruled in favor of private respondents, directing petitioner to execute a final deed of sale on the lot covered by the Contract to Sell in favor of private respondents upon payment of the unpaid balance of P9, 341.24. Petitioner argues that the relationship between the parties is governed solely by the Contract to sell because said contract was entered into long before the passage of the Maceda Law. Without expressly stating so, petitioners line of argument invokes the non-impairment clause of the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 10). ISSUE: WON there was a violation of non-impairment clause of the constitution. HELD: None. The purpose of said clause is to safeguard the integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, contract should not be tampered with by subsequent laws that would change or modify the rights and obligations of the parties. As noted by Justice Isagani A. Cruz The will of the obligor and obligee must be observed; the obligation of their contract must not be impaired. Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. Miners Association v. Factoran 240 SCRA 100 FACTS: Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources. The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the two Department Administrative Orders valid. HELD: Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus: Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect. Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations

3
through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being coextensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Juarez v. CA 214 SCRA 475 FACTS: The subject of this controversy is a lot located at 502 Quezon Boulevard, Manila. It was leased in the early 1900s to Servillano Ocampo, who built a house thereon where he lived with his parents and his sister Angela. The lease was taken over by Angela Ocampo, who continued to stay in the house together with her children, including herein petitioner Virginia Ocampo Juarez. In 1976, Angela moved to her daughter Virginias house in Pasay City. The house on Quezon Boulevard she leased to Roberto Capuchino, reserving only one room for her personal belongings. Meantime, the lot had been sold by the Aranetas to Susanna Realty, Inc., which in turn sold it in 1985 to Cetus Development Corporation, the herein private respondent. Immediately after acquiring the lot, Cetus filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioner with the Municipal Court of Manila on the ground that the lessee had subleased the property without its consent in violation of BP 877. The case was dismissed. The court held that the statute was inapplicable because the sublease was made prior to its effectivity. The Court of Appeals reversed. It ruled that BP 877 was applicable because the original contract of lease did not specify a fixed term and payment of the rental was made on a monthly basis. The contract was deemed terminated from month to month. Hence, when it was renewed in July 1985, it became subject to BP 877, which had come into effect on June 12, 1985. ISSUE: Whether or not BP 877 is violative of the Impairment Clause. HELD: No. The impairment clause is now no longer inviolate; in fact, there are many who now believe it is an anachronism in the present-day society. It was quite useful before in protecting the integrity of private agreements from government meddling, but that was when such agreements did not affect the community in general. They were indeed purely private agreements then. Any interference with them at that time was really an unwarranted intrusion that could be properly struck down. But things are different now. More and more, the interests of the public have become involved in what are supposed to be still private agreements, which have as a result been removed from the protection of the impairment clause. These agreements have come within the embrace of the police power, that obtrusive protector of the public interest. It is a ubiquitous policeman indeed. As long as the contract affects the public welfare one way or another so as to require the interference of the State, then must the police power be asserted, and prevail, over the impairment clause. FPIB v. CA 252 SCRA 259 FACTS: Producers Bank (now called First Philippine International Bank), which has been under conservatorship since 1984, is the owner of 6 parcels of land. The Bank had an agreement with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the two to purchase the parcels of land for a purchase price of P5.5 million pesos. The said agreement was made by Demetria and Janolo with the Banks manager, Mercurio Rivera. Later however, the Bank, through its conservator, Leonida Encarnacion, sought the repudiation of the agreement as it alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter into such an agreement; hence there was no valid contract of sale. Subsequently, Demetria and Janolo sued Producers Bank. The regional trial court ruled in favor of Demetria et al. The Bank filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with the said Bank, filed a motion for intervention with the trial court. The trial court denied the motion since the trial has been concluded already and the case is now pending appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a perfected contract of sale. HELD: Yes. There is a perfected contract of sale because the bank manager, Rivera, entered into the agreement with apparent authority. This apparent authority has been duly proved by the evidence presented which showed that in all the dealings and transactions, Rivera participated actively without the opposition of the conservator. In fact, in the advertisements and announcements of the bank, Rivera was

4
designated as the go-to guy in relation to the disposition of the Banks assets. of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them. 19 Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general, well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. 20 And under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State because they are not ordinary contracts but are impresses with public interest. The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract clause. The Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit with costs against the petitioners. PNB v. O.P. 252 SCRA 5 FACTS: May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale dispossess prior purchasers on installment of individual lots therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots which they previously bought from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision developer, on the theory that P.D. 957, The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, is not applicable to the mortgage contract in question, the same having been executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957? This is the question confronting the Court in this Petition challenging the Decision dated March 10, 1992 of the Office of the President of the Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249, signed by. the Executive Secretary, Franklin M. Drilon, by authority of the President. Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements it executed over said lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the petitioner, PNB. Unaware of this mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in question.Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots.

CMMA v. POEA 243 SCRA 666 FACTS: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign ship-owner-principals, urge the Court to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on one of the grounds that the resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution. The said resolution and memorandum resolved to amend and increase the compensation and other benefits in cases of death, disability, and loss or damage to a Filipino seaman working in ocean-going vessels. In their, comment the public respondents contend that the petition is without merit and should be dismissed because the issuance of the challenged resolution and memorandum circular was a valid exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority or power of subordinate legislation. ISSUE: Whether or not POEA resolution and memorandum is unconstitutional. HELD: There is no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and memorandum circular violate the equal protection and contract clauses of the Constitution nor is there-merit in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular violate the contract clause of the Bill of Rights. The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or general welfare

5
Acting on suits brought by private respondents, the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) in a decision rendered ruled that PNB -- without prejudice to seeking relief against Marikina Village, -- Inc. may collect from private respondents only the remaining amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase agreements they had previously entered into with Marikina Village, Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for the lots they had already bought from said subdivision developer. The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board affirmed this decision. The Office of the President likewise concurred with the HLURB. Hence, the present recourse to this Court. The petitioner complains that the retroactive application of the law would violate the impairment clause. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Bank is a privy to the contracts between private respondents and mortgagorsubdivision developer, hence, the Office of the President erred in ordering petitioner Bank to accept private respondents remaining amortizations and issue the corresponding titles after payment thereof. HELD: Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract. Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the police power as long as the agreement deals with a matter affecting the public welfare. Such a contract, it has been held, suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change by the legislature as a postulate of the legal order.Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grants to the buyer the option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for. Wherefore petitioner Bank was enjoin to focus not only on the strictly legal issues involved in this case but also to take another look at the larger issues including social justice and the protection of human rights as enshrined in the Constitution; firstly, because legal issues are raised and decided not in a vacuum but within the context of existing social, economic and political conditions, law being merely a brick in the up-building of the social edifice; and secondly, petitioner, being THE state bank, is for all intents and purposes an instrument for the implementation of state policies so cherished in our fundamental law.

Eugenio v. Drilon 252 SCRA 106 FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of non-development on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and conveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondents purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to give retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the statute is the law. Meralco v. Province of Laguna 306 SCRA 750 FACTS: On various dates, certain municipalities of the Province of Laguna, including, Bian, Sta. Rosa, San Pedro, Luisiana, Calauan and Cabuyao, by virtue of existing laws then in effect, issued resolutions through their respective municipal councils granting franchise in favor of petitioner Manila Electric Company ("MERALCO") for the supply of electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas. On 19 January 1983, MERALCO was likewise granted a franchise by the National Electrification Administration to operate an electric light and power service in the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna.

6
On 12 September 1991, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991," was enacted to take effect on 01 January 1992 enjoining local government units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges, subject to the limitations expressed therein, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Pursuant to the provisions of the Code, respondent province enacted Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, effective 01 January 1993, providing, in part, Sec. 2.09. Franchise Tax which states there is hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on account realized during the preceding calendar year within this province, including the territorial limits on any city located in the province. Respondent Provincial Treasurer sent a demand letter to MERALCO for the corresponding tax payment. Petitioner MERALCO paid the tax, which then amounted to P19, 520.628.42, under protest. A formal claim for refund was thereafter sent by MERALCO to the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna claiming that the franchise tax it had paid and continued to pay to the National Government pursuant to P.D. 551 already included the franchise tax imposed by the Provincial Tax Ordinance. MERALCO contended that the imposition of a franchise tax under Section 2.09 of Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, insofar as it concerned MERALCO, contravened the provisions of Section 1 of P.D. 551 on 28 August 1995, the claim for refund of petitioner was denied. On 14 February 1996, petitioner MERALCO filed with the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a complaint for refund, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, against the Province of Laguna and also Benito R. Balazo in his capacity as the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna. The trial court, in its assailed decision of 30 September 1997, dismissed the complaint ISSUE: W/N the imposition of a franchise tax under Section 2.09 of Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92 is invalid. HELD Prefatorily, it might be well to recall that local governments do not have the inherent power to tax 4 except to the extent that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by statute. Presently, under Article X of the 1987 Constitution, a general delegation of that power has been given in favor of local government units. While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax exemptions contained in special franchises as being in the nature of contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying on the franchise, these exemptions, nevertheless, are far from being strictly contractual in nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution can rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as those contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairing the obligations of contracts. These contractual tax exemptions, however, are not to be confused with tax exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution. Indeed, Article XII, Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its precursor provisions in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that such privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as and when the common good so requires. XII. Section 12 1. Rights in Custodial Investigation Miranda v. Arizona 384 US 436 Gamboa v. Judge Cruz 162 SCRA 675 FACTS: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition. ISSUE: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated. HELD: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest; hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

7
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. People v. Pinlac 165 SCRA 675 FACTS: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. He assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused. HELD: The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the failure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused. People v. Loveria 187 SCRA 47 FACTS: The accused-appellant David S. Loveria was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide. After being convicted by the RTC, accusedappellant filed an appeal, assailing, among others, assails the manner in which he was identified by one of the victims at the headquarters of the 225th Philippine Constabulary (PC) in Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal, claiming violation of his constitutional right to counsel. Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time the events under review occurred reads: Sec. 20.No person shall be compelled to be witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in the evidence. ISSUE: W/N accused-appellants constitutional right to counsel has been violated. HELD: No, the Court ruled that Loverias constitutional right to counsel was not violated when he was identified in a police line-up by one of the victims and neither can he now invoked that right because a case is already pending in court. The Court emphasized that the so-called Miranda rights contained in the above-quoted constitutional provisions may be invoked by a person only while he is under custodial investigation. Since the appellant was not being investigated when Manzanero was in the process of identifying him, he cannot claim that his right to counsel was violated because at that stage, he was not entitled to the constitutional guarantee invoked. Furthermore, since custodial investigation is defined as the "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way", these constitutional rights may no longer be claimed by a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court. People v. Alegria 190 SCRA 122 FACTS: Antonio Corporal, a security guard with multiple stab wounds was found dead in the premises of the Warebank Phil., Inc., in Tondo, Manila, where he was working. Among the four suspects, Trial proceeded only against Labuac and Buenaflor, who were both eventually convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The lower court found that on the above-mentioned date, the four accused agreed to enter the compound of Warebank to steal empty bottles. However, they were seen by Corporal, who was then on duty. After stabbing the guard, the men fled the scene. These findings were based on the sworn statements taken from Labuac, Buenaflor and Alegria (one of the four), and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, principally Alex Sto. Domingo and Perla Balde, who both declared that they saw Buenaflor carrying Corporal's shotgun. Police officer, who took the sworn statement of Labuac, and Police officer Josefino Rey, who took the sworn statements of Buenaflor and Alegria, both swore that the affiants were informed of their constitutional rights and freely confessed their participation in the murder of the guard. The suspects took the witness stand and denounced their supposed confessions as having been taken from them through threats and violence, were made to sign paper of which content they did not understand, were not informed of

8
their constitutional rights nor were they represented and assisted by counsel. HELD: In the case at bar, Labuac was hardly literate, not even having finished Grade 1, and, like Buenaflor and Alegria, was not represented by counsel. While there was a lawyer who was allegedly called to be present at their interrogation, he did not actively assist and advise them, being there merely to give a semblance of legality to the proceedings. There is nothing in the record to show that the lawyer made a single manifestation or representation on behalf of the person he was supposed to protect against any possible abuse of the investigators. The lawyer who was supposed to have advised the suspects were the same person who took their oaths and certified that he was "satisfied" that the statements were freely and knowingly given. The lawyer was also a member of the police organization investigating the suspects and, no less remarkably, were not presented as witnesses to authenticate the confessions. The police officer who took their confession had admitted to have prepared in advance the suspects statement to be signed by the latter. The court then ruled in favor of the suspects as having found their confessions inadmissible in evidence due to the evident non-conformity with the constitutional right to a counsel to prevent confessions given under coercion. In absence of any other evidence due to the inadmissibility of the confession, the charges against the suspects were dismissed. In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, it must be presumed that they did not kill the guard. People v. De Guzman 194 SCRA 191 FACTS: De Guzman was arrested for allegedly selling marijuana after a buy-bust operation conducted by the NARCOM District Office in Malolos, Bulacan. The case for the prosecution was based mainly on the testimony of Sgt. Ruben S. Bazar who stated that the operation was done after receiving a tip from a confidential informer that the accused would be selling marijuana at Virgen de los Flores, Baliwag, Bulacan from six in the evening until midnight. The only other witness presented by the prosecution was Capt. Marlene Salangad of the PC Crime Laboratory, who affirmed the findings in the field test and declared verbally and in her report that the contents of the plastic bag from De Guzman were marijuana fruiting tops. The defense of De Guzman was flat denial stating that the NARCOM agents simply arrested him without cause and without warrant and took him to NARCOM headquarters, where they manhandled him. His ring and P2,000 cash belonging to his sister was confiscated by the agents and then dumped him in a fishpond where he was left until the following morning, when he signed the Receipt of Seized Property because he was afraid of further punishment. Also, two other witnesses testified that in the evening of the arrest of the accused, they saw three men pointing their guns at De Guzman and twisted his arm and tied his hands with wire before taking him away. The RTC did not believe the testimony of the accused. He was later convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, sentencing him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20, 000.00.The case was brought to the Supreme Court asking for a reversal of his conviction on the ground that the evidence against him was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused facing custodial investigation. HELD: This Court is also not inclined to believe De Gu zmans testimony. It is not because it is incredible but because there is no evidence to sustain it, especially that such evidence is not easily come by, given the circumstances of the accused, who is an ordinary individual without convenient connection with a lawyer or the wherewithal to retain one. Neither can it be supposed that by himself alone, this chicharon vendor would be aware of his rights under the Constitution and have the boldness to assert them against the authorities holding him captive. The receipt was in reality an admission which the accusedappellant was forced to make without the assistance of counsel and without being first informed of the constitutional rights of a person facing custodial investigation. That evidence was totally inadmissible under the Bill of Rights and the consistent rulings of this Court since the case of People v. Galit. People v. Lim 196 SCRA 809 FACTS: In the morning of Sunday, April 20, 1969, Santiago Tumaliuan, a 37-yr old businessman, drove his jeep to Tuguegarao. He was accompanied by his daughter Vilma, whom he dropped off at St Paul College, and Fausto Guiyab, Juan Malillin and Patrolman Cesar Binag who was his escort in civilian clothes. They first played mahjong at the house of one Mallabo. Guiyab remained in the jeep to guard it. At

9
noon, they proceeded to the cockpit. Guiyab again watched the jeep. At about 4PM, Santiago and Binag left the cockpit. On their way out, they passed by Antonio Lim and his bodyguard near the exit. Genaro and Alberto, Lims companions, were standing at the gate talking to each other. Upon reaching the jeep, Santiago took the drivers seat. Binag seated himself at the passengers and Guiyab occupied the back seat. They first went to the gas station to fill up. Binag saw Genaro and Alberto on the street 10 meters away to his right. Genaro shouted in Ibanag dialect translated, Fire now. 3 successive gunshots were fired in a few seconds. The 1st show killed Santiago hitting him in the head. The 2nd shot was fired at Guiyab who also shot in the head, killing him instantly. The 3rd shot hit Patrolman Binag in the jaw. He fell on the cement pavement and lost consciousness. But before that, he saw Lim firing the first 2 shots w/ his .38 caliber nickel-plated Smith & Wesson revolver. Being a patrolman himself and having served in the army, he was familiar w/ firearms. Lim was then wearing a yellow polojacket. Binag had known him for a long time since they both came from San Pablo and used to drink liquor together. Binag sustained a gunshot wound above the left jaw, near the mouth, injuring his tongue. If not for blood transfusion, he would have died. In the hospital, on the night following the shooting, the chief of police interviewed him and asked him who had fired at him and his companions. As Binag could not talk, he wrote on a piece of paper the name of his assailant: Antonio Lim with his bodyguard. Prior to the shooting, Santiagos brother, Vice-Mayor Carlos Tumaliuan was charged w/ the murder of Antionio Lims mother and sister. Moreover, in another case, the brothers of Lim were charged w/ murder and Binag was a prosecution witness there. Santiago was known to be financier of his brother, the vice-mayor, while Guiyab was a buyer of tobacco for Santiago and was responsible for obtaining bail bonds for the vice-mayor. ISSUE: HELD: The guilt of Lim was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The shooting was indubitably treacherous for Lim employed a form of assault w/c directly and specially insured its execution w/o risk to himself arising from the defense w/c the victims might have made (Art 14 RPC). The surprise assault precluded them from making any defense at all. Premeditation was not proven. The prosecution failed to establish (a) the time when Lim determined to commit the crimes, (b) the act showing that he had clung to his determination, and (c) a sufficient interval between the determination and the execution that would have afforded him full opportunity for meditation and reflection and allowed his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. There being no generic circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the 2 murders was properly imposed (Art 64 & 248 RPC). An indeterminate sentence of 6 yrs. of prision correctional, as minimum, to 12 yrs. & 1 day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum, is imposed for the frustrated murder. Judgment affirmed. People v. Arceo 202 SCRA 170 FACTS: Accused- appellants, Arceo and Zapanta were charged and convicted for conspiring and confederating together, and mutually aiding and abetting one another in the sale and or deliver of dried marijuana fruit tops. Accused Arceo was arrested in a buy bust operation conducted by a composite team of Filipino and American Drug Enforcement officers. Upon interrogation, he confessed without the assistance of counsel that the marijuana leaves came from co- accused Zapanta, his marijuana supplier who was thereafter arrested in his apartment. The accused appellants were convicted by the trial court. ISSUE: W/N the unwritten confession made by accusedappellant Arceo against Zapanta without the assistance of counsel valid. HELD: No. The accused-appellant Zapanta's guilt was based haphazardly on the strength of Librado's unwritten extrajudicial confession that he (Zapanta) was the supplier of marijuana. Librado's confession was thus not only unfounded, but obtained in gross violation of his fundamental right to counsel. He was never provided with a counsel at the preliminary stage of the investigation in which incriminatory questions were asked him. Hence, the confession is inadmissible as evidence of Pancho's guilt, or for any purpose. The decision appealed from is MODIFIED, AFFIRMING Librado Arceo's penalty of life imprisonment, and ACQUITTING the other accused-appellant, Pancho A. Zapanta, whose immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered. rroyo v. CA 203 SCRA 750 FACTS: Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial Court of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo committed on November 2, 1982 in the City of Baguio. Both defendants pleaded not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery.

10
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband, private complain ant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later con traded marriage with another woman with whom he is presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals. Petitioners then filed their respective motions praying for the dismissal or for the granting of new trial of the case claiming as basis for their motions Dr. Neri's manifestation. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of his constitutional rights on custodial investigation. HELD: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from respondent-accused. In the present case, Dr. Neri was not a peace officer or an investigating officer conducting a custodial interrogation; hence petitioner cannot now claim that Mrs. Neris admission should have been rejected.In short, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting Dr. Neri's testimony as he was a competent witness. Neither was said testimony rendered inadmissible by the constitutional provision on the right to remain silent and the right to counsel of a "person under investigation for the commission of an offense." People v. Parojinog 203 SCRA 673 FACTS: On March 31, 1984, a group of police and PC soldiers were ambushed by the members of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People's Army. On August 1, 1987, appellant was investigated at the INP station in Ozamiz City. During which investigation, he confessed that he surrendered to Governor Fortunato Sagrado of Misamis Occidental in connection with the ambush of a group of police and PC soldiers. Before the start of the investigation, Pcpl. Santos apprised appellant of his constitutional rights to counsel of his own choice and if he did not have one a certain Atty. Fernando Fuentes III of the CLAO will be his lawyer who will help him. He agreed to have Atty. Fuentes as his lawyer thereafter; he was informed of his right to remain silent or not to answer any questions if he did not like to answer or if he had nothing to answer. Finally, he was warned that his statement may be used as evidence against him before the court. Atty. Fuentes III assisted appellant during the entire investigation which lasted for about an hour. After the investigation, appellant signed his extra-judicial investigation. Atty. Fuentes III also signed the document. Thereafter, two policemen escorted appellant to the Office of City Fiscal Luzminda Uy for him to swear to his written confession. Before swearing in appellant, Fiscal Uy verified whether the statements therein were indeed his. At the trial, the prosecution presented some witnesses. Appellant imputes involuntariness to said confession because he was allegedly denied his constitutional right to counsel during his custodial investigation by the police. He claims that the lawyer assigned to him did not actually attend the investigation as the latter went out and that said lawyer was not his choice and was only forced on him. ISSUE: WON there was a denial of constitutional right to counsel on the part of the appellant. HELD: None. Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 12 (l). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense may choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. In the instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced by the accused throughout the entire proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only during trial. Thus, it was too late. People v. Nicolas 204 SCRA 191 FACTS: The accused-appellant, in two separate information, was charged with the crimes of robbery with homicide and arson allegedly committed with two other co-accuseds, namely, Rodolfo Nicolas y. delos Reyes and Roque Dilao y. Adayo. At the arraignment, the accused-appellant and his co-accused entered separate pleas of not guilty in both cases.

11
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellants admissions are not admissible in evidence. HELD: No.The admissions made by the accused-appellant during custodial investigation as reflected in his sworn statement dated October 8, 1983 cannot be admissible in evidence for his statement before Patrolman Bataller was given in gross violation of his constitutional rights as guaranteed under Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution (now Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution). In the case at bar, the accused-appellant gave an uncounselled confession before the investigating officer who simply asked as one of the preliminary questions before the accused-appellant made his declarations relating to the crime. Inasmuch as the records are bereft of any proof that the accused-appellant knowingly rejected having a lawyer assist him during the taking of the extrajudicial confession in question, our ruling in the case of People v. Jara, bears reiteration. Thus; Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case. The ban against uncounselled confessions is even more pronounced under the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, after 1987 regardless of whether or not the confession of the accused is true, as long as it was given without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence although it was a product of the accuseds own free will and volition in view of the current policy with respect to extrajudicial confessions based on the Bill of Rights. People v. Marra 236 SCRA 565 FACTS: In information filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City, Samuel Marra y Zarate, John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe and Tom Doe were charged with the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of one Nelson Tandoc on March 7, 1992. On June 4, 1992, amended information was filed wherein Allan Tan, alias "Allan Yao," was indicated as an accused instead of John Doe. A warrant of arrest was thereafter issued against Allan Tan but the same was returned un served; hence trial proceeded with regard to herein accused-appellant Samuel Marra alone. Duly assisted by counsel, appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on May 15, 1992. After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered by the court below on October 8, 1992 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, attended by the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was further ordered to pay the heirs of Nelson Tandoc the sums of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P50,000.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs. After a careful scrutiny of the records and an objective evaluation of the evidence, the Court is not disposed to reverse the judgment of the lower court, the decision of the latter being amply supported by the established facts and fully sustained by the applicable law. Marra contended that he was under custodial investigation when he admitted the killing but invoked self-defense. ISSUE: Whether or not Marra was under custodial investigation when he admitted the killing but invoked selfdefense. HELD: Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(a)ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial investigation when he made the admission. There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement. Indeed, he could have refused to answer questions from the very start when the policemen requested that they all go to his residence. The police inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they considered him as a particular suspect. They were just probing into a number of possibilities, having been merely informed that the suspect was wearing what could be a security guard's uniform. As we held in People vs. Dy: 25 "What was told by the accused to

12
Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. The trial Court, therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial investigation is not applicable in the instant case. In addition, the law provides that the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein may be given in evidence against him and, in certain circumstances, this admission may be considered as part of the res gestae. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Samuel Marra y Zarate guilty of the crime of murder and imposing upon him the penalty and civil liabilities therein stated. Navallo v. Sandiganbayan 234 SCRA 175 FACTS: Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of Numancia National Vocational School found to have misappropriated public funds for private benefit after a COA audit. He failed to restitute the amount despite COA demands. A warrant of arrest was issued but petitioner pleaded not guilty and invokes his right to custodial investigation since during the COA audit and actual cash count he was made to sign the certification on the fund shortage in the absence of a counsel. He further contends that the shortage of funds was due to the assurance of certain Macasemo to settle his unliquidated cash advance and his failure to do so resulted to the fund shortage. ISSUE: Whether or not the right to counsel be invoked during the COA audit. HELD: No, the right to counsel could not be invoked during the COA audit since the procedure is not within the ambit of custodial investigation. A person may be subject to malversation of funds even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation as long as there is evidence of fund shortage which the petitioner failed to explain with convincing justification. People v. Frago 232 SCRA 653 FACTS: Orlando Frago was charged with rape and attempted rape docketed as criminal cases nos. 9144 and 9145 respectively. Frago was acquitted on criminal case no 9145 and conviction on criminal case no 9144 undergone review. Frago stated on his appeal that he was not assisted by a counsel on any part of proceedings to include during his identification by the victim on a police lineup. ISSUE: W/N respondent was denied with the right to counsel. HELD: Right to counsel attaches upon the start of investigation, any person under investigation must among other things be assisted by a counsel however during police lineup accused was not yet entitled to such stage, to counsel since he had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense because police lineup is not yet a part of custodial inquest. There is nothing in the record which shows that in the course of identification from police line up the police investigator sought to extract admission or confession from appellant. People v. Ruelan 231 SCRA 650 FACTS: Fordito Ruelan is the store helper of Ricardo & Rosa Jardiel. He stayed in the Jardiels residence but he had sep arate quarters for sleeping. One day, Ricardo awoke to Rosa leaving his room. He saw Rosa meet with Ruelan at the gate of the house as they were about to open the store. Rosa ordered Ruelan to get an axe to be used in repairing some fixtures and a sack. Then Rosas house dog got loose & went out towards the street. Rosa scolded Ruelan while the latter pleaded that she stops berating him. Rosa didnt heed to his request & Ruelan got fed up & using his axe, he struck Rosa behind her right ear causing her to fall face down. Then, appellant dragged her to a grassy portion at the side of the street & immediately left the place. Ruelan was thus charged by the RTC of the crime of murder and imposing on him the penalty of life imprisonment. ISSUE: WON he can be found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged based on the established facts, without the alleged written extrajudicial confession HELD: Ruelan contends that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible as he was never apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel, & to be informed of such rights. But a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved & the burden of proof is upon the person making the confession. In this case, the presumption hasnt been overcome. Not only is the appellants confession replete with details only he couldve supplied, but the circumstances surrounding its execution belie his claim. By voluntarily

13
executing his extrajudicial confession after having been informed by Atty. Luz Cortez of his constitutional rights, and in the presence of and with the assistance of said counsel, appellant Ruelan effectively waived his right to remain silent. People v. Barasina - 229 SCRA 450 FACTS: The accused was charged of robbery with homicide. During investigation he was investigated and made an extrajudicial confession during the interrogation in the absence of a counsel. It was 2 weeks later that he was provided with one in the person of Atty. Zena, a municipality attorney where he was made to sign a sworn statement admitting the shooting of the victim. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was accorded with due process of custodial investigation. HELD: No, the right of the accused for due process was clearly violated since the authorities failed to provide him counsel during the interrogation and he was not informed of his right to remain silent and right to a counsel. Furthermore, the counsel to be provided to the accused should be one who is impartial, independent and of his own choice. If the accused cannot afford to have his own counsel then he will be provided by the authorities with one. Providing the accused with municipality attorney as counsel would be prejudicial because of conflict of interest involved in the performance of duty of said counsel. The court held the evidence inadmissible to court for failure to meet the requisites of due process for conducting custodial investigation. People v. Barlis 231 SCRA 426 FACTS: Eliza Merceada reported for work at the store of Romeo Abad. On her way, near the bamboo gr(o)ve, she heard two shouts. She saw the three suspects coming out of the bamboo grove. When the suspects were caught, they were brought to the station for questioning. Galvante, one of the suspects, admitted his guilt without counsel. During the trial of the case, the moved for the exclusion of accused Ernesto Galvante from the information for murder so that he could become a witness for the Government. The two accused denied the charges by interposing an alibi but such was dismissed by the court in favor of the first hand testimony of the Galvante who has no motive to kill the victim. The contention of appellants is the alleged violation of the Constitution, particularly Section 12 of Article III, when in accordance with the present rule for the qualification of a state witness,23 Galvante executed a sworn statement wherein he categorically admitted his guilt but without the assistance of a counsel. Appellants also claim that Galvante made his sworn statement in the presence of Atty. Alejandro, the counsel of the plaintiff (sic), Mr. Matic, the two brothers of the deceased, the Mayor of Pandi and another person whom he did not know. With this battery of persons surrounding him, we could imagine the pressure exerted on Galvante. ISSUE: WON the admission of guilt made by Galvante without counsel may be questioned by his co-accused HELD: Section 12 and Section 17 of the same Article shall be inadmissible in evidence against him, meaning the confessant. Thus this objection can be raised only by the confessant whose rights have been violated as such right is personal in nature. Galvante repeated in court what he had stated in his affidavit and, although he was likewise subjected to a thorough cross-examination, he stood fast on his confession and the revelations therein. Appellants imputations of pressure and coercion are refuted thereby. Also, by repeating his confession in court, Galvante converted it into a judicial confession which, having been allowed by the trial court eliminated the need for assistance of counsel which is required in extrajudicial confessions. People v. Bandula 232 SCRA 566 FACTS: On 5 May 1989, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused Aurelio Bandula guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. However, his three (3) co-accused were acquitted "for insufficiency of evidence." Among the evidence admitted to the lower court were the alleged extrajudicial confessions of accused Bandula and Teofio Dionanao. According to the trial court, these extrajudicial confessions which were executed during custodial investigation, "have all the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an admissible confession, it appearing from the confession itself that accused were informed of their rights under the law regarding custodial investigation and were duly represented by counsel (Atty. Ruben Zerna)." Appellant Bandula argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice. Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged.

14
ISSUE: W/N the constitutional rights of the accused to counsel was violated? HELD: Yes, the Court ruled that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated and acquitted him of the crime charged. From the records, it can be gleaned that when accusedappellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. People v. Balisteros 237 SCRA 499 FACTS: Eliza Merceada reported for work at the store of Romeo Abad. On her way, near the bamboo grove, she heard two shouts. She saw the three suspects coming out of the bamboo grove. When the suspects were caught, they were brought to the station for questioning. Galvante, one of the suspects, admitted his guilt without counsel. During the trial of the case, the moved for the exclusion of accused Ernesto Galvante from the information for murder so that he could become a witness for the Government. The two accused denied the charges by interposing an alibi but such was dismissed by the court in favor of the first hand testimony of the Galvante who has no motive to kill the victim. The contention of appellants is the alleged violation of the Constitution, particularly Section 12 of Article III, when in accordance with the present rule for the qualification of a state witness,23 Galvante executed a sworn statement wherein he categorically admitted his guilt but without the assistance of a counsel. Appellants also claim that Galvante made his sworn statement in the presence of Atty. Alejandro, the counsel of the plaintiff (sic), Mr. Matic, the two brothers of the deceased, the Mayor of Pandi and another person whom he did not know. With this battery of persons surrounding him, we could imagine the pressure exerted on Galvante. ISSUE: WON the admission of guilt made by Galvante without counsel may be questioned by his co-accused. HELD: Section 12 and Section 17 of the same Article shall be inadmissible in evidence against him, meaning the confessant. Thus this objection can be raised only by the confessant whose rights have been violated as such right is personal in nature. Galvante repeated in court what he had stated in his affidavit and, although he was likewise subjected to a thorough cross-examination, he stood fast on his confession and the revelations therein. Appellants imputations of pressure and coercion are refuted thereby. Also, by repeating his confession in court, Galvante converted it into a judicial confession which, having been allowed by the trial court eliminated the need for assistance of counsel which is required in extrajudicial confessions. People v. Maqueda 242 SCRA 565 FACTS: Horace William Barker, a British consultant of the World Bank, was brutally slain while his wife Teresita Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery in their country home at Tuba, Benguet. Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victims former houseboy, as one of the perpetrators of the ghastly crime. One Richard Malig was arrested but was later on released after his motion, to drop him from the case as there was no sufficient evidence against him and that Hector Maqueda (also known as Putol) is impleaded as coaccused in the said case, was granted by the court. The court issued warrants for the arrest of Maqueda and Salvamante. However, only Maqueda was arrested, leaving Salvamante at large. Maqueda had been taken to the headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, and Quezon where SPO3 Molleno got Maquedas statement. According to him, he informed the accused of his rights under the Constitution. The accused thereafter signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (sworn statement) wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house. Shortly after his arrest, Maqueda filed an application for bail stating that he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the said case since he is the least guilty among the accused. This was opposed by the prosecutor after receiving an affirmative answer from the accused to his question if he was in the company of Salvamante in entering the house of the Barkers. During his detention, the accused also narrated to Ray Dean Salvosa, a civilian, that Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only then when they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his real purpose in going to Baguio City was to rob the Barkers. The trial proceeded against him only, after he entered a plea of not guilty and put up the defense of denial and alibi. The trial court found the accused Hector Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the

15
victim for damages. The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the accused although it was taken without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already been filed in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial investigation. Maqueda seasonably appealed to the Supreme Court his conviction, highlighting the lone error of the trial court that he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the accused was admissible in court although it was taken without the assistance of a counsel. HELD: While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or information had been filed against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such filing an accused no longer, *has+ the right to remain silent and to counsel but he [has] the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. If this were so, then there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of his constitutional rights remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view would not only give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said accuseds rights under Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at the stage when a person is under investigation for the commission of an offense. The provision also has the following safeguards: (a) the council must be competent and independent, preferably of his own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of such counsel, he must be provided with one, and (c) the rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.It was therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then the police authorities and other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel. People v. Morico 246 SCRA 214 FACTS: Appellant in this case was caught in a buy-bust operation conducted by the Anti-Narcotics Command (NARCOM) upon an information from their confidential informant that a certain "Sixto," a resident of Barangay Sabutan, Silang, Cavite, was engaged in the sale of marijuana leaves. The three hand-rolled sticks of marijuana leaves confiscated from appellant were found positive for marijuana by the National Bureau of Investigation. Appellant claimed that he was working as a mason at Barangay Sabutan when he was arrested. When appellant asked why he was arrested, he was told that he was peddling marijuana. Appellant was then brought to the municipal building in Silang, Cavite. From Silang, appellant was brought to Imus. He related that he saw the sticks of marijuana presented in evidence against him for the first time in Imus. On the third day of his detention, he was manhandled and ordered to sign the "Receipt of Seized property" without the assistance of counsel. He was threatened with bodily harm if he failed to sign the document. Appellant also claimed that when he signed the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report the same was never explained to him nor was he assisted by counsel. On the fourth day of his detention, the policemen demanded money from him for his release. He refused. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erroneously convicted the appellant of an offense which is not charged in the information HELD: An accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged in the information. To do so would constitute a violation of his constitutional rights to be informed of the charges against him and his right to due process. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses refer to minor or trivial matters and incidents which do not detract us from the fact that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of the buy-bust operation. Moreover, as long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate each other on material points, the minor

16
inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Such inconsistencies are but natural and even enhance their truthfulness as they wipe out any suspicion of a counseled testimony. This Court has laid down the rule, in a long line of cases that the matter of presentation of prosecution witnesses is not for the appellant or for the trial court to decide as it is the prerogative of the prosecutor. Apparently, the prosecution deemed it unnecessary to present their informant poseurbuyer as there was already sufficient evidence to pin down appellant. Besides, if appellant believed that the testimony of the poseur-buyer could have exculpated him, he could have availed of the compulsory process to have the latter produced as his witness. People v. Cabintoy 247 SCRA 442 FACTS: Herein accused-Appellants were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. In the course of the trial, the facts revealed that the accused were not informed of their rights while under custodial investigation and executed waiver of the right to counsel and extrajudicial confessions without the assistance of counsel. It was further revealed that the waiver and extrajudicial confessions were signed by the counsel the day after it was executed by the accusedappellants. The trial court finds the accused- appellants guilty. ISSUE: W/N confessions executed by appellants during their custodial investigation admissible. HELD: No. From the foregoing, one is led to the inevitable conclusion that at the time the questioned confessions were executed, there were no prior valid waivers of their constitutional rights by accused appellants. This defect alone is sufficient to render the confessions inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellants. Moreover, the confessions do not indicate that both accused were represented by counsel during the investigation. The settled rule is that an uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel in writing and in the presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. People v. Agustin 240 SCRA 541 FACTS: Dr. Bayquen, together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa; his daughter, Dominic; and Danny, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Malvar Street, Baguio City. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came out from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Accused Quiao, an alleged former military agent who had been picked up by the police authorities, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiao was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiao was signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of Quijano. Agustins defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quijano escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was established. ISSUE: Whether or Not accused-appellants extrajudicial statements are admissible as evidence. HELD: No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while an admission is a statement direct or implied of facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on inadmissibility, however expressly includes admissions, not just confessions. The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-two pages appear to be signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes which consists of twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the court cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes it cannot be expected that appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read or decipher its contents. The appellant therefore was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. The appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have a competent and

17
independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its existence. In short, after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through suggestive language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him. More so said counsel is not independent since he is an associate of the private prosecutor. People v. Lamsing 248 SCRA 471 FACTS: The case arose from the killing of Winnie Cabunilas, a security guard, while on duty at the construction site of a Synergy building , Quezon City. Four days after the killing, accused-appellant was arrested by police officers while in a drinking spree with friends at a basketball court near the scene of the crime. He was detained and, in a police lineup, was identified by witnesses as one of those responsible for the death of Winnie Cabunilas. Information was filed against him and a John Doe for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. As the other accused was at large, trial proceeded against accused-appellant alone. When the trial court found the testimony of Elizabeth de los Santos credible even as it rejected accused-appellants alibi, it rendered a decision convicting the accused- appellant of special complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him accordingly. Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant complains that he was made to join a police lineup where he was identified by three persons, including Elizabeth De los Santos, without the assistance of counsel. ISSUE: WON there was a violation of petitioners constitutional right to counsel as when he was made to join the police line up without the assistance of a counsel. HELD: None. Settled in Gamboa v. Cruz, however, that the right to counsel guaranteed in Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution does not extend to police lineups because they are not part of custodial investigations. The reason for this is that at that point, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory. The accuseds right to counsel attaches only from the time that adversary judicial proceedings are taken against him. People v. Compil 244 SCRA 135 FACTS: On the belief that the case for the prosecution depends in the main on his own extrajudicial confession which he claims is inadmissible, accused Marlo Compil y Litaban filed a demurrer to evidence instead of presenting evidence in his behalf. The trial court however denied his demurrer, admitted his extrajudicial confession, and found him guilty of robbery with homicide. Petitioner maintains that his extrajudicial confession was extracted without the assistance of counsel, thus constitutionally flawed. ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant is admissible in evidence. HELD: No. In the case at bench, it is evident that accusedappellant was immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those instances, he was not assisted by counsel. The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from accused-appellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it mentions details which could not have been merely concocted, and jibes with the other pieces of evidence uncovered by the investigators, still we cannot admit it in evidence because of its implicit constitutional infirmity. People v. Deniego 251 SCRA 626 FACTS: The accused-appellants were convicted of rape and homicide. The prosecution was based solely on the alleged extrajudicial confessions taken by the police officers without the presence of a counsel during custodial investigation. It was also notable that the prosecution did not present any witness to the actual commission of the crime and the basis

18
of the lower courts conviction to the accused was based on their alleged extrajudicial confessions. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the appellants based on their extrajudicial confession. HELD: The court held that under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express and 4) the confession must be in writing. The court noted that the assistance of a counsel provided for the accused was inadequate to meet the standard requirements of the constitution for custodial investigation. It seems that the lawyers were not around throughout the custodial investigation. Citing People vs Javar, the court reiterated that any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional provision, or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. Thus, because of these defects in observing the proper procedural requirements of the constitution on custodial investigation the accused-appellants were acquitted. People v. Llenaresas 248 SCRA 629 FACTS: Romeo Jabil, Armando Depusoy, Rufo Llenaresas, Jesus Capistrano, Herminio de Ramos and Rolly Hernandez were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. At arraignment, three (3) of the accused, that is, Romeo Jabil, Armando Depusoy and Rufo Llenaresas, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. The other three (3) accused, being still at large, were not arraigned.The three (3) accused who had been arraigned preceded to trial. However, on 16 September 1988, the accused Romeo Jabil escaped from detention and has since then remained at large. The trial continued in respect of Armanda Depusoy and Rufo Llenaresas. The trial also continued in respect of Romeo Jabil in absentia, being represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. On 15 May 1991, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Jabil and Rufo Llenaresas guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Antonio Maligaya the amount of P30, 000.00 as indemnity, plus P68, 771.08 as funeral expenses and P10, 000.00 as reimbursement of the cost of the repair of the stolen jeep, and costs. Armando Depusoy was, however, acquitted by the trial court. Hence, Rufo Llenaresas is the sole appellant in the instant case. The extrajudicial confessions executed by Romeo Jabil and Rufo Llenaresas indicated that the six (6) accused had planned and agreed to "carnap" a car as they had a buyer for such car. However, on the evening of 31 January 1988, having been unable to pinpoint a car that they could steal, the accused decided to steal a jeepney instead. At about 8:00 o'clock that evening, they all boarded a passenger jeepney which was owned and driven by Antonio Maligaya. There were no passengers other than the six (6) accused. Sometime after boarding the jeepney, they threatened the driver Antonio Maligaya with knives, yanked him out of the driver's seat; and accused Capistrano then took the wheel and drove the jeepney to Pleasantville Subdivision in Lucena City. Inside the subdivision, at the end of one of the concrete roads therein, the accused forced Antonio Maligaya out from the jeep with the intention of tying him to a lamp post. Antonio Maligaya was, however, able suddenly to free himself and ran away. Four (4) of the accused chased him; the other two (2) stayed in the jeepney. When the four (4) caught up with the luckless Maligaya, Llenaresas stabbed him many times while the others held on to the victim. The accused left Maligaya on the ground and ran back to the jeepney and proceeded from Lucena to Cainta, Rizal to offer the jeepney for sale. The sale did not materialize because the prospective buyer insisted upon a car rather than a jeepney. Appellant Llenaresas said that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant and making it the basis of his conviction despite the fact that it is inadmissible for having been extracted in violation of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant and making it the basis of his conviction despite the fact that it is inadmissible for having been extracted in violation of the Constitution. HELD: The principal issue posed by appellant Llenaresas is the admissibility of his extra-judicial confession. At the trial, he contended that he had been coerced into executing his confession by force and intimidation and had done so without the assistance of counsel. Llenaresas also denied participation in the crime charged, claiming that on the date the robbery with homicide took place he was in Calumpang,

19
Marikina, Province of Rizal, at the house of his parents. He testified that he and Armando Depusoy had been arrested at his (Rufo Llanaresa's) parents' house in Marikina on 21 February 1988 at around one o'clock in the morning. They were allegedly hogtied and forced into a jeep. Inside the jeep, Llanaresas also testified, they were mauled by the police who demanded that Rufo and Armando own the robbery and killing of Antonio Maligaya. They were brought by the police to Lucena City. At the police headquarters in Lucena City, Llanaresas continued, he was first thrown into a dark room. Inside the darkened room, he was boxed while the police demanded that he admit his guilt. He claimed that he was beaten into unconsciousness and that when he woke up, about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he found himself in jail. Thereafter, he was asked to sign a document with the promise that if he signed, the beatings would stop. Llanaresas stated that after some further beating, he signed the document. He also testified that when the police began to investigate him, he was not informed of his constitutional rights and that there was no lawyer around when he signed his confession. The Pedro S. Nantes who executed the preceding "certification" was Second Assistant City Prosecutor of Lucena City. He testified that the extra-judicial statement of Rufo Llenaresas was already signed by Rufo at the time such statement was brought to him (Nantes) to be subscribed and sworn to and that before the sworn statement was authenticated by him (Nantes), he asked Rufo whether the latter had been informed of his constitutional rights during custodial investigation, e.g., the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. Rufo had answered in the affirmative. Prosecutor Nantes also questioned Rufo whether the latter had voluntarily executed the extra-judicial statement and whether the contents of such statement signed by Rufo were true and correct. Rufo Llenaresas once more answered in the affirmative and Prosecutor Nantes accordingly asked Rufo to sign his extra-judicial statement once more before him and Rufo did so. Finally, Prosecutor Nantes also testified that he had asked both Romeo Jabil and Rufo Llenaresas whether they had in fact been assisted by counsel and each had said yes. Nantes in fact stated that he then and there telephoned Atty. Angeles and asked him whether he had actually given assistance to Jabil and Llenaresas in the execution of their sworn statements in the course of the custodial investigation and that Atty. Angeles confirmed that he had assisted the two (2) accused in the custodial investigation. 8 In addition, P/Cpl. Ernesto Ginauli of the Lucena City Police, who had taken the written statement of Rufo Llanaresas, testified that he had informed Rufo of his constitutional rights and that Atty. Meliton Angeles had been present during the taking down and execution of Rufo's statement and that Rufo had not been tortured or beaten up by the Lucena police authorities to compel him to give the statement. 9 Cpl. Ginauli's testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Sgt. Eduardo Somera 10 who had taken down the sworn statement executed by Romeo Jabil. Thus, the testimony given by appellant Rufo Llenaresas is directly contradicted both by the written confession and by the testimony of the police officers who had directly participated in the custodial investigation of Romeo Jabil and Rufo Llenaresas. The trial court heard the testimony given by appellant Llenaresas and by the police officers involved and Prosecutor Nantes and the court chose to believe the statements made by the police officers and the prosecutor. The Court found no sufficient basis for overturning the conclusion reached by the trial court. It is true, that the prosecution did not present Atty. Meliton Angeles as a witness to confirm his presence during the custodial investigation of Jabil and Llenaresas. Such failure is not, however, fatal to the case of the prosecution since the testimonies of the police officers and of Prosecutor Pedro S. Nantes, in conjunction with the statements found in the extrajudicial confession itself, were quite adequate to sustain the conclusion reached by the trial court. Upon the other hand, appellant Llenaresas had failed to submit any evidence, apart from his own testimony, that violence and intimidation had been inflicted upon him to extort from him his sworn confession. Llenaresas had not previously complained to Prosecutor Nantes nor to anyone else about the physical beatings that he claims had been inflicted upon him. He submitted no medical and physical evidence of any injury sustained by him to the trial court. The circumstance that he was under detention during custodial investigation did not necessarily mean that he could not have demanded the assistance of a physician had he in fact been beaten as savagely and as frequently as he claimed. It may be noted that Llenaresas did not assert that he had asked for medical assistance and had been denied such assistance by the police. It remains only to note that the extra-judicial statements of Romeo Jabil and Rufo Llenaresas are replete with details and they corroborate and complement each other so substantially that it is very difficult to suppose that the statements had been merely derived from the creative imagination of the police officers involved. The confessions in other words, have the ring of truth about them.

20
The Court affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court, except the indemnity for the death of Antonio Maligaya which was hereby increased to P50, 000.00 in accordance with the current case law of the Court. People v. Taylaran 108 SCRA 373 FACTS: Charged with murder ill the Court of First Instance of Bohol, appellant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P 12,000 and to pay costs. Appealing to this Court, appellant insists on his defense of accidental, not deliberate killing. We quote hereunder from the appealed decision the versions of both the prosecution and the defense, as set forth therein: That the deceased died from wounds inflicted by the appellant is not disputed. As gleaned from the opposing versions set forth above, the conflict is in how the wounds were inflicted whether with deliberate intent, or purely by accident. It is extremely difficult to accept the accident version of appellant which he purveyed without corroboration. It was just natural for appellant to explain to the police why he was surrendering. For Basilad to testify on what appellant said on this score is thus perfectly proper, and full credence must be accorded to him, being obviously an impartial witness. It is not a matter of whether the statement is a part of the res gestae to be admissible. Appellant of course denies having made the admission, but in the light of the other evidence of the prosecution, his denial is not convincing. As demonstrated earlier, his accident theory of the killing merits not much credibility from the mere fact that more than one wound was inflicted which could not have resulted from just one blow. Repeated blows easily negate any claim of wounding by mere accident. The testimony of both Basilad and Juanita Busalla on the inculpatory statement of appellant is legally admissible not because the statement is part of the res gestae, but for said witnesses having heard appellant made the statement on their own perception. ISSUE: Whether or not the statement of appellant is legally admissible even the petitioner is not informed of his right to silence and to counsel. HELD: The applicability of the foregoing provision does not seem to contemplate cases like the print where no written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. What was testified to be only what appellant told the police why he is surrendering to them. It is but natural for one who surrenders to the police to give reason or explanation for his act of surrendering. It can hardly be said that under such circumstance, the surrendered is already "under investigation within the meaning of the constitutional provision. As the Solicitor General correctly observes on the circumstances of this case: "If however, he voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because he surrendered to admit the killing, the constitutional safeguards to be informed of his rights to silence and to counsel may not be invoked" Verily, the issue is one of credibility. The lower court gave more of it to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. We find no reason to disturb the lower court's appreciation of the relative credibility of the opposing witnesses. 2Moreover, appellant having admitted the killing, the burden of proving the exempting circumstance he has invoked in his defense calls for clear and convincing evidence, as is required of similar defenses as that of self-defense. 3This, he failed dismally to fulfill. Galman v. Pamaran 138 SCRA 295 FACTS: In order to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the killing of Sen Aquino at MIA, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board aka the Agrava Board. The board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the board. Among those who testified and produced evidence before the board are the respondents in this petition. Respondents contend that their individual testimonies before said board should not be admitted in evidence and prayed that the same be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. However, said prayer was denied by the Sandiganbayan contending that their testimonies could not be excluded because the immunity was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc FFB. ISSUES: 1. WON the testimonies given by the 8 respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board is admissible in evidence.

21
2. WON the right against self-incrimination extends to testimonies given before the Agrava board and not to an investigating officer. HELD 1. NO. The Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefore so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction. In the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein. This notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leaves them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. 2. YES. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by him, hang on the balance. The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. Estacio v. Sandiganbayan 183 SCRA 12 FACTS: Estacio was investigated under a complaint of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation and the Central Bank for alleged Estate falsification committed at the CBP. He made an extra-judicial confession and now claims he was not informed of his constitutional rights. The extra-judicial statement made clearly showed that the investigator advised the petitioner of his constitutional rights. Estacio also contends that there was no valid waiver because it was made without assistance of counsel, as in the case of People v. Galit. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners right to counsel was violated. HELD: The court agreed that the prevailing rules is that laid down by Galit, but that the defect was cured and the requirement laid down in Galit substantially fulfilled when Atty. Madarietta arrived at the closing stage of the interrogation, read the statement and talked to Estacio before the latter signed it. The court agreed with the Sandiganbayan that if the accused had voluntarily waived his rights prior to the investigation or had wanted to change his mind by availing of his right to remain silent after his counsel arrived and read the statement before the accused signed it, then he could easily have refused to sign it and demand possession of the unsigned statement