Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

Interestingly enough, the term scholasticism is defined by Oxford dictionary as the system of theology and philosophy taught in medieval European universities, based on Aristotelian logic (Scholasticism), and while St-Anselm of Canterbury is known to be one of the founders of this system: one will note that his logic falls far from that of Aristotles. St-Anselm of Canterbury, several hundred years after Aristotles life, proposed an ingenious theory that would lend itself to the validation of the existence of God. Not only does he claim this, but moreover suggests that knowledge of Gods existence is a priori the cognition of which, apparently, can be found through reason and logic alone. A priori knowledge requires, fundamentally, the comprehension of an object or person in association to its definition, such as knowing what a square is due to the pre-existing comprehension that the definition of square belongs to an object with four sides. Anselm, comparatively, defines God as omni-benevolent, omniscient, and furthermore the greatest conceivable being. Conceptually, no being is greater than God, and if a person were to claim this, he or she would be fundamentally misunderstanding the meaning of God. Anselm follows his definition by clarifying that, because our knowledge of God is of a being that exists in our intellect, an actualized, existing version of God would be far greater in power than that of our mind. Subsequently, if by definition, God is the greatest conceivable being, the greatest version of God, that of which belonging on earth, necessarily exists. In response to this, one of Anselms contemporaries, Benedictine Monk Gaunilos refutes with an analogy of a lost island, greater than all islands though impossible to find. He argues: If a man should try to prove to me by such reasoning that this island truly exists, and that its existence should no longer be doubted, either I should believe he was jesting, or I know not which to regard as the greater fool: myself, supposing that I should allow this proof; or him, if he should suppose that he had established with any certainty the existence of this island (Davis, 436). While Anselms argument proves to be sound in reasoning, it falters in three distinct ways. The first being Anselms misunderstanding of a priori: because this form of knowledge is found through reason and justification, and justified knowledge must always be epistemic, Anselms definition of God lacks a realistic, logical component. The second flaw that can be detected in Anselms argument is, as the Benedict Monk Gaunilos analogously points out and French philosopher Michel Foucault explains, definition and language alone are not significant in reason enough to validate the existence of something. Lastly is the minimal credibility we can give to a conceivable idea, as Aristotles metaphysical theory will show. While Anselms scholasticism is defined as being based on Aristotelian logic (Scholasticism), one can see the misunderstanding

of this definition paralleled in Anselms ontological argument for the existence of God: our sense of the true, our will to truth, is, Foucault claims, a system of exclusion, a historical, modifiable, and institutionally constraining system (Hook, 523). Anselms ontological argument for the existence of God, he claims, is a priori knowledge. A priori, contrary to a posteriori knowledge, is comprehension that occurs without empirical data that is to say, it is justified information based on reason. As we know knowledge as being a justified true belief, the facet of justification is crucial in differentiating between a priori and a posteriori. In order for something to be truly justifiable, it must highly involve epistemic reasoning: since knowledge requires true belief, the kinds of reasons involved in justification are epistemic ones, not emotional or pragmatic ones (Hunter, 18). Epistemic reasons are the only valid forms of justification, as they are based on reality. For example, a square cannot exist independently from being four sided, because at some point in time, a person coined a physical, four sided object that he or she sensed a square. Similarly, a cat, we know, is a domesticated feline animal; but only through seeing this object and assigning it a title is this knowledge reason-based and epistemic. Anselm attempts to argue that knowledge of God is a priori, consequently suggesting that the definition of God is based on epistemic knowledge. God, however, though owning a definition, is an idea belonging solely in a persons intellect. It has never been actualized, viewed, or sensed, and therefore does not definitively exist. Anselm, falsely assuming his knowledge of God as a priori, unfortunately allows his argument to rely solely on the definition given to God. Anselm defines God as the greatest conceivable being, and while the justification and premises outlined in his argument are sound, his material ostensibly lacks depth. Because we know that by definition, God exists only in our intellect, evidently has never been sensed or seen and therefore accordingly is not justified by epistemic reasoning, the only qualification of God being real is a humans ability to understand ordinary words. French philosopher Michel Foucault notably writes on how discourse and language is in constant flux - its creation and alterations are at the hands of man-kind. Author Derek Hook explains Foucaults theory of discourse by suggesting that indeed, to realize that truth is a function of discourse is to realize that the conditions of truth are precisely rather than relatively contingent on current forms of discourse (Hook, 525). Anselms argument relies very heavily on language as a permanent source of truth. The trouble with this surely is that men utter falsehoods as well as truths, are obscure as well as lucid (McPherson, 124). Gaunilos' rebuttal against Anselms argument maintains that Anselm ought to show first the hypothetical existence of this island (God) as a real and indubitable fact, and in no wise as any unreal object, or one whose existence is uncertain, in his understanding (Davis, 436). Gaunilo confirms the notion that ordinary words alone are not sufficient justification in proving the reality of something. As language has and will continue to change vastly throughout cultures and generations, we cannot maintain words as being interconnected to truth. Due to these facts, definition alone cannot sustain the argument for the existence of God.

St-Anselm plaid a key role in the emergence of scholasticism, and as Aristotelian logic is a component to the definition, it would be noteworthy to consider Aristotles perspective on metaphysics in contrast with Anselms ontological argument. Anselm responds to Gaunilos lost island argument by distinguishing the vitality of the word conceivable, which Gaunilos omits from his definition of the greatest island possible. Conceivability, however, maintains that God, by definition, exists only in the intellect. Adding the word conceivable, Anselm proposes, forces a necessary existence as we know the greatest fathomable being would have to actually exist in order to fulfill greatness in its entirety. However, as the word conceivability literally means to form or develop in the mind (Conceivability), Anselms rebuttal to Gaunilos gives no validation to the real existence of something other than cognitively. Aristotles metaphysical theory centers on the potentiality of matter, and the final actualization of form: matter consisting of any individual, purposeless object, thing or item on its own, while form is the final composed object consisting of individual matter. Aristotles view on matter and form allows no room for immaterial form as a result of all objects primarily and fundamentally requiring matter. With that theory in consideration, it is difficult to understand how the founder of scholasticism and the creator of the ontological argument for the existence of God (an immaterial being), hold any logical similarities with Aristotle. As we know conceivability to exist within the mind, another issue at hand is: what does the greatest conceivable character consist of? It is certainly a subjective term, varying greatly from individual to individual and due to this inconsistency, once again it should be noted that the definition of God is not justified through epistemic reason; all people know that a square has 4 sides, while not all people have the exact same idea when considering the greatest conceivable being. Anselms definition of God leaves us to assume the following: Certainly, in so far as there could be different great-making properties/perfections for different species, it is not included in Anselms thought that God possesses all such properties, but only the greatest logically possible amount of them for his species. It is not required, for example, that God possess great-making properties of bowling games, but it is required that God possess all great-making properties of rational beings (Downey, 43). While determining the proper great-making properties and the greatest logically possible amount of them for his species might seem do-able, once again, it is entirely relative to the person conceiving such qualities. This demonstrates the inconsistency and lack of reason in Anselms argument. As Gaunilos and Foucault point out, it is difficult to assess an argument if the only crucial detail allowing for truth is dependent upon a definition. Discourse is in constant flux, and henceforth is an incredible task to associate language with definitive truth. The only way in which to do that is when a definition or knowledge is a priori and, consequently, founded on epistemic reason. While the majority (if not the entirety) of the world would agree that, technically and logically, two plus two equals four, a very small percentage of the world would have the exact same idea of what virtues the greatest conceivable being might possess. The

inconsistency of this theory creates a substantial amount of doubt. While Anselm insists that the existence of God is necessary by definition, I would argue that the existence of God is moreover contingent not necessarily existing or non-existing because logic - or rather, lack of logic/reason, requires neither to be true (Davis, 435). While Anselms argument itself is laid out soundly, the basis of his argument the definition of God itself is far too easily individualized, and subsequently lacks concrete, epistemic foundation. The will to truth the way in which knowledge is put to work, valorized, distributed makes for a vital component in the workings of a successful discourse, and as such a nodal point of analysis (Hook, 524). As Derek Foot points out upon the analysis of Michel Foucaults theories, the strongest discourses are those that have attempted to ground themselves on the natural, the sincere, the scientific in short, on the level of the various correlates of the true and reasonable (Hook, 524). Though Anselm constructs a sound series of premises that logically correlate to his conclusion, Gaunilos lost island analogy brings the ontological argument for the existence of God back down to earth, where it has no absolute correlation to the truth and moreover will continue to exist as beautifully and cleverly assembled series of words; the magician fooling us all being none other than language itself.

Works Cited

Conceivability. Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford Universities Press. 2013. Davis, T. Steven. Anselm and Gaunilo on the 'Lost Island'. Southern Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 13:4 (1975). 1-435.

Downey, Patrick James. A Primordial Reply to Modern Gaunilos. Cambridge University Press. Vol 22.1 (1986) 41-49

Hook, Derek. Discourse, Knowledge, Materiality, History: Foucault and Discourse

Analysis. University of the Witwatersrand. Theory & Psychology. Vol. 11.4 (2001). 521-547.

Hunter, David. A Practical Guide to Critical Thinking. John Wiley & Sons. New Jersey. 2009.

McPherson, Thomas. The Many-Faced Argument: Recent Studies on the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God. Cambridge University Press. Vol. 5.1 (1969) 123-125

Scholasticism. Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford Universities Press. 2013.