WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: 9/11 Commission Team 5, FRC Box 31
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 51095 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30383

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/06/2008

BOX: 00009 FOLDER: 0008 TAB: 1 DOC ID: 31205007

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 9

_ _ RE STRICTED]
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Commission Report Comments

DOCUMENT DATE: 07/06/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Draft

FROM:

TO:

SUBJECT: Chapter 10, Version 7/1/04

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
JUN.25.2004 5:58PM NO.156 P.1/3

Flights of Saudi Nationals Leaving the United States

During the morning of September 11, the FAA suspended all non-emergency air activity in the
national airspace. While the national airspace was closed, decisions to allow aircraft to fly were
made by the FAA working with the Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Secret
Service, and the FBI.17 The Department of Transportation reopened the national airspace
effective 11:00 a.m. on September 13,2001, for flights out of airports that had implemented the
FAA's new security requirements.18

We have investigated allegations that Saudi nationals were allowed to fly within or out of the
U.S. on chartered aircraft while the national airspace was still closed and that these special
flights were permitted because of political intervention from the White House. Upon
investigation, we found no credible evidence to support either of these allegations. Because the
allegations have been so widely circulated and have produced numerous questions to us from
concerned members of Congress, we believe it is necessary to summarize the relevant details in
this report

After 9/11, many government decisions were coordinated by personnel working in the various
agencies' emergency operations centers. FBI personnel working in their operations center, for
example, spent long hours working with a shifting array of personnel from other agencies—often
by video teleconference—to address issues that arose, One of the issues dealt with primarily
through this process was whether flights of Saudi Arabian nationals should be allowed to depart
the United States after 9/11.

Within days of September 11, fearing reprisals against Saudi nationals, Rihab Massoud, the
deputy chief of mission at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC, called Dale Watson, the FBI's
assistant director for counterterrorism and asked for help in getting some of its citizens out of the
country. As Richard Clarke explained to us, this is a courtesy that the U.S. sometimes requests
from other countries in order to protect American citizens.19 At about the same time, Michael
Rolince, chief of the FBI's international terrorism operations section, also heard from an FBI
official in Newark about a proposed flight of Saudi students out of the country funded by the
Saudi Embassy.20 Rolince says he told the Newark official that the students should not be
allowed to leave without having the names on their passports matched to their faces, and their
names run through FBI case records to see whether they had surfaced before.21 Rolince and

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Watson briefed Robert Mueller, the director of the FBI, about the issue and how they were
handling it. The State Department played a role as well, in flights involving government officials
or members of the royal family.22 23 State apparently coordinated with the FBI and FAA to allow
screening by the FBI of flights with Saudi nationals on board. ™ A Saudi flight carrying the
deputy defense minister and an official delegation did leave without screening after the airspace
reopened, but there is no evidence that State tried to limit the screening.25

The issue came up in one of the many video teleconferences of the interagency group Clarke
chaired. Clarke said he had already heard about the issue, either from the State Department or
someone at the White House, but that he approved how the FBI was handling it when it came up
for interagency discussion at his level.26 2 Clarke told us, "I asked the FBI, Dale Watson ... to
handle that, to check to see if that was all right with them, to see if they wanted access to any of
these people, and to get back to me. And if they had no objections, it would be fine with me."
Clarke said "I have no recollection of clearing it with anybody at the White House."28 We found
no evidence that anyone at the White House above Clarke participated in these decisions.
Although White House chief of staff Card remembered someone telling him about the Saudi
request shortly after September 11, he said he had not talked to the Saudis and did not ask
anyone to do anything about their request. The President and Vice President told us they were
not aware of the issue at all until it surfaced much later in the media. The Saudi ambassador,
Prince Bandar, told us he did not call anyone about the problem. None of the officials we
interviewed recalled receiving any intervention or direction on the issue from any political
appointee,29

The FBI effectively approved the Saudi flights, at the level of a section chief.30 The Bureau
facilitated the Saudi departures. Having an opportunity to check the Saudis was useful to the
FBI, This was because the U.S. government did not, and does not, routinely run checks on
foreigners who are leaving the United States. This procedure was convenient, as the Saudis who
wished to leave in this way would gather and present themselves for record checks and
interviews, an opportunity that would not be available if they simply left on regularly scheduled
commercial flights. The Saudi government was advised of the requirements the FBI wanted met
before the flights could leave, and agreed.31 The FAA representative working in the FBI
operations center made sure the FBI was aware of flights of Saudi nationals and were able to
screen the passengers before they were allowed to depart.32 33

After the airspace reopened, six chartered flights with 142 people, mostly Saudi Arabian
nationals, departed from the United States between September 14 and 24. Every airport involved
in a Saudi flight was open when the flight departed, and no inappropriate actions were taken to
allow these flights to depart. These flights were screened by law enforcement officials, primarily
the FBI. For example, one flight, the so-called Bin Ladin flight, departed the United States on
September 20 with 26 passengers, most of them relatives of Usama Bin Ladin. Screening of this
flight was directed by an FBI agent in the Baltimore Field Office who was also a pilot,34 This
agent, coordinating with FBI headquarters, sent an electronic communication to each of the field
offices through which the Bin Laden flight was scheduled to pass including the proposed flight
manifest and directing what screening should occur.35 He also monitored the flight as it moved
around the country—from St. Louis to Los Angeles to Orlando to Washington-Dulles, and to
Boston-Logan—correcting for any changes in itinerary to make sure there was no lapse in FBI

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screening at these locations.36 Again, each of the airports through which the Bin Ladin flight
passed was open and no special restrictions were lifted to accommodate its passage.

The Bin Ladin flight and other flights we examined were screened in accordance with policies
set by FBI headquarters and coordinated through working-level interagency processes. Thirty of
the 142 people on these six flights were interviewed by the FBI, including 22 of the 26 people
(23 passengers and 3 private security guards) on the Bin Ladin flight. Many were asked detailed
questions. None of the passengers stated that they had any recent contact with Usama Bin Ladin
or knew anything about terrorist activity. Two of the passengers on this flight had been the
subjects of preliminary investigations by the FBI, but both their cases had been closed, in 1999
and March 2001, respectively, because the FBI had uncovered no derogatory information on
either person linking them to terrorist activity. Their cases remained closed as of September 11,
2001, and were not reopened before they departed the country on this flight, nor since then.37

The FBI checked a variety of databases for information on the Bin Ladin flight passengers and
searched the aircraft Because it was not clear to the Commission whether the TTPOFF terrorist
watchlist was checked by the FBI, at our request prior to our hearing in April 2004, tie Terrorist
Screening Center checked the names of individuals on the flight manifests of these six Saudi
flights against the current TTPOFF watchlist There were no matches.38 At our request, the
Terrorist Screening Center in June 2004, rechecked all the names of individuals believed to be on
these six flights, and the names of individuals on three more flights (including scheduled
commercial flights) that journalists have alleged are suspect39 There were no matches.

The FBI has concluded that nobody was allowed to depart on any of these flights who the FBI
wanted to interview in connection with the 9/11 attacks, or who the FBI later concluded had any
involvement in those attacks. To date, we have uncovered no evidence to contradict this
conclusion. Thus, it is our view that the FBI handled the screening of these flights in a
professional manner consistent with the other pressing priorities they faced after September 11,
oarticularly the need to prevent future terrorist attacks many then feared were imminent40
Law Enforcement Privacy p

Tom Eldridge

FV<3>m: Tom Eldridge

Seni^ Friday. July 09, 2004 5:30 PM
To: \e Dunne
Cc; pan Marcus; Chris Kpjm; Susan Ginsburg; Yoel Tobin
Subject: Proposed edits to Chapter 10

Steve- \\1 Detainees

Based on corrtments by DOJ that I think are on point, I would propose the following changes to the two detainee
paragraphs:

In the first paragraph, delete". New regulations made it easier to keep detainees in custody longer," and change
"until such time as they" to "until such time as the detainees...."

In the second paragraph, Change the last sentence to read, "The Inspector General of the Justice Department
found some of the 9/il detainees suffered physical and verbal abuse." And then move this sentence up to follow
the sentence ending".. .U.S. Marshals Service." This is more accurate than the previous sentence that referred
to abuse of "fights." . .

Saudi Flights

(Using the version produced by Yoel Tobin with my responses to his bolded comments)

Endnote 19: In response to the comment, thevCRU Special Interest Cases" list was produced to the Commission
in an interview of QHS attorney! Ton March 15, 2004; however, it would be better if we did not
identify her as the source. The date on the list is 9/16(03.

Endnote 21: The citation in support of the verbal and physical abuse of the 9/11 detainees (discussed above) is:
DOJ report, Office of the Inspector General, "The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens
Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks," Apr. 2003, pp.
142-150. \

Endnote 26: It should read "Deputy Defense Minister" as suggested; I have the LAX citation support and will
forward it to you; add after Logan International Airport "and Hanscbm Airfield". The QFR response referred to
both. Add at the end"; Pc-rt Authority of New York and New Jersey/Newark Airport, Response to Supplemental
Question for the Record, July 9, 2004." I will forward to you this supplemental email. Change "Perez" to
"Ramirez." Change sentence about the phantom pilot to read: The plane's pilot told us there was 'nothing
unusual whatsoever" about the flight other than there were few airplanes in the sky." The FAA has confirmed that
their records are in "Zulu" time, so what appears to be "8:38" really is "4:38", If you want, I can send the email
confirming Zulu time.

Endnote 28: Should read "Deputy Defense Minister". Rolince, Clarke andl I all support the conclusion that
these decisions were made through a working-level interagency process, so we could cite their interviews as
well—MFRs have already beeri provided. I would change the FBI citation to: "FBI report of investigation,
interview of Mohammed Saleh Bin Ladin, Sept. 13,2001." On the question about Massoud, he said that the
Saudi embassy was formally involved in only two flights, one of which was the Bin Laedn flight.

Endnote 32: Should read: "Tim flI interviews (Apr. 12, June 30, and July 9, 2004)." C| I has confirmed that
they have checked the names of passengers on all 10 flights against TIPOFF.

-Tom

7/9/2004
 Page 2 of2

7/9/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Tom Eldridge

From: Philip Zelikow

Sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2004 11:32 PM
To: Tom Eldridge
Cc: Stephanie Kaplan
Subject: RE: Saudi Flights

Tom —

If you come by K Street, you can review how we've digested your excellent work for a portion of draft
chapter 10.

Of the three points you're still working, you may already know that #3 is the one Moore fell back to
when quizzed by Stephanopoulos on Sunday. Moore didn't cite the Tampa flight in the brief excerpt.

Philip

Original Message
From: Tom Eldridge
Sent: Tue 6/22/2004 10:34 AM
To: Philip Zelikow
Cc:
Subject: Saudi Flights

Philip -

By now I hope you received the latest writing on this topic.

Please let me know if and when you need more information.
I continue to research the following issues:
1. The screening if any of the 9/13 Defense Minister flight (with FBI and Saudi Embassy officials);
2. Whether anyone of interest is on the Judicial Watch list of passengers (with DHS and FBI);
3. Whether there were any restrictions on charter or other flights still in effect once the airports and
airspace were reopened (with TSA).

TSA has been very difficult to get answers from.

- Tom

6/24/2004