Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION ADM. CASE No.

3319 June 8, 2000

LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent. DE LEON, JR., J.: Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui. The relevant facts are: On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City1 and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982. Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end. However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company. A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 19853. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the

children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.4 In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm5 she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her. It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents' funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent. In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads: Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989. It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same. From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant's evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).

It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation. WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8 Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar. In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession. Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely: (i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and (ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner. In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. 18

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter. Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him. In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date. In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24, respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent. Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that: In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience. Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.

The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together. Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl. xxx xxx xxx

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty. We agree with the findings aforequoted. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are: a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines; b. a resident thereof; c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age; d. a person of good moral character; e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court; f. possess the required educational qualifications; and g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied) Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).26 In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him. Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him. Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her. All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28 We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of immediately

distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do. On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable. Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand. It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.
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WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 6492 November 18, 2004

MELANIO L. ZORETA, complainant, vs. ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for allegedly notarizing several documents during the year 2002 after his commission as notary public had expired. Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that on 02 August 2001, he filed before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, a complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to the latter's failure to honor SPAC's Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano was the latter's counsel. In said cases, respondent who was not a duly commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications1 issued by the Clerk of Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following documents, viz: 1. Verification2 executed by Aurora C. Galvez, President of defendant SPAC, subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 18, 2002 as alleged notary public, in Quezon City and attached to defendants' Very Urgent Motion (1) To Lift the Order of Default; and (2) To defer Plaintiff's Presentation of Evidence Ex-Parte dated February 18, 2002; 2. Affidavits of Merit3 signed by Aurora Galvez attached to the pleading mentioned in par. 1 hereof, likewise notarized by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as alleged "Notary Public" in Quezon City, on February 18, 2002; 3. The Affidavit of Service4 signed by a certain Renee L. Ramos, a Legal Assistant in Simpliciano and Capela Law Office, and subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 19, 2002 as alleged "Notary Public" in Quezon City. Said Affidavit of Service was attached to the pleading mentioned in Par. 1 hereof;

4. The Affidavit of Service5 of one Nestor Abayon, another Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 01 April 2002 at Quezon City, as "Notary Public." This Affidavit of Service was attached to defendants' Motion (1) For Reconsideration of the Order dated 05 March 2002; and (2) To allow defendants to Present Defensive Evidence dated 27 March 2002. 5. The Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping6 signed this time by a certain Celso N. Sarto, as affiant, "notarized" on 16 August 2002 by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano. This Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping was attached to defendant's Motion For Extension of Time To File Petition Under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals; 6. The Affidavit of Service7 signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, another Legal Assistant in Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as "Notary Public" on 16 August 2002. This Affidavit of Service signed by Aganan was also attached to that Motion For Extension of Time To File Petition under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals; 7. Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping8 executed by one Celso N. Sarto, alleged Executive Vice President and Claims Manager of defendant SPAC and "notarized" by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, attached to the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, etc., filed before the Court of Appeals; and 8. Affidavit of Service9 signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, as alleged "Notary Public" for Quezon City with notarized commission to expire by December 31, 2002. On 23 April 2003, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) of Pasig required respondent Atty. Simpliciano to submit his answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order.10 On 26 May 2003, counsel of respondent filed an ex-parte motion11 for extension of time to file answer. On 30 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion12 to resolve the complaint after the extension requested by respondent ended on 30 May 2003, and almost a month had lapsed from 30 May 2003, with no comment or pleading filed by respondent. On 17 July 2003, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued an order,13 giving respondent a last chance to file his answer, otherwise the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent failed to do so. Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted her report and recommendation14 dated 12 February 2004, pertinent portions of which read: A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the petitioner showed that respondent notarized up to Document No. 590, Page 118, Book No. II, Series of 2002 and his commission expires December 31, 2002 which referred to the Affidavit of Service signed and executed by Joseph B. Aganan Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano whose commission expires December 31, 2002.

All the other documents aforementioned were entered in Book II of respondent's alleged notarial book which reflected that his commission expires on December 31, 2002 as notary public. However, the Clerk of Court of Quezon City in her certification dated October 4, 2002 stated that as per records on file with their office respondent was not duly commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002. Another certification issued by the Clerk of Court of RTC Quezon City dated April 15, 2003 showed that as per records on file with their office respondent was commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City from January 14, 2000 to December 31, 2001 and for the year 2002 and 2003 he did not apply for notarial commission for Quezon City. It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent notarized the aforementioned documents, he was not commissioned as notary public, which was in violation of the Notarial Law; for having notarized the 590 documents after the expiration of his commission as notary public without having renewed said commission amounting to gross misconduct as a member of the legal profession. Wherefore, in view of the foregoing the Undersigned respectfully recommends the revocation of respondent's commission as notary public permanently if he is commissioned as such at present and his suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months from receipt hereof furnishing the IBP Chapter where he is a registered member a copy hereof for implementation should this recommendation be approved by the Honorable members of the Board of Governors.15 Per Resolution No. XVI-2004-236 dated 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors modified the report and recommendation of Commissioner Navarro of suspension of three (3) months to a suspension of six (6) months.16 We concur in the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. Simpliciano did not have a commission as notary public in 2002 when he notarized the assailed documents as evidenced by the two (2) certifications issued by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated 04 October 2002.17Records also show, and as confirmed by IBP Commissioner Navarro, that as of 02 August 2002, respondent had already notarized a total of 590 documents.18 The evidence presented by complainant conclusively establishes the misconduct imputed to respondent. The eight (8) notarized documents for the year 2002 submitted by complainant, consisting of affidavits of merit, certifications and verifications against non-forum shopping, and affidavits of service, were used and presented in the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 01-6240, and in respondent's petition forcertiorari filed in the Court of Appeals. Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not even attempt to present any evidence. His counsel filed an ex-parte motion for extension to file answer, which was granted, but no answer was forthcoming. Still, Hearing Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro gave respondent a last chance to file his answer; which was again unheeded. Thus, respondent was unable to rebut complainant's evidence that he was not so commissioned for the year in question. His lack of interest and indifference in presenting his defense to the charge and the evidence against him can only mean he has no strong and valid defense to offer. Conclusively, respondent Atty. Simpliciano is not a duly commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.

At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.19 Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney's right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney.20 Elaborating on this, we said in Maligsa v. Cabanting21 that "[t]he bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession."22 Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred, or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.23 Apropos to the case at bar, it has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.24 The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer's act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as "reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents."25 For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.26 In the case of Nunga v. Viray,27 the Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

On different occasions, this Court had disbarred or suspended lawyers for notarizing documents with an expired commission: 1. In Flores v. Lozada,28 the court disbarred a lawyer who notarized six documents such as the extrajudicial partition of an estate, deed of sale with right of repurchase, and four (4) deeds of absolute sale - all involving unregistered lands, after his commission as Notary Public expired; 2. In Joson v. Baltazar,29 the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) months since only one (1) instance of unauthorized notarization of a deed of sale was involved. 3. In Nunga v. Viray,30 the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) years when he notarized an absolute deed of sale of the buyer minor, who was his son and, at the same time, he was a stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank, and when he entered in his notarial registry an annotation of the cancellation of the loan in favor of a certain bank, at a time when he was not commissioned as a Notary Public. What aggravated respondent's unlawful notarization was the fact that the transaction involved was in favor of his son, who was then only eighteen years old and, therefore, a minor. 4. In Buensuceso v. Barrera,31 the lawyer was suspended for one (1) year when he notarized five (5) documents such as a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale and a contract to sell, after his commission as Notary Public expired. Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary public and as a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the IBP must be increased. Respondent must be barred from being commissioned as a notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. WHEREFORE, this Court hereby adopts the findings of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but hereby MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO is hereby BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public. He is furthermore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal files of respondent himself. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ., concur. Corona, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. FLORA QUINGWA complainant, vs. ARMANDO PUNO, respondent. Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant. Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent. REGALA, J.: On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court. The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child. After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality. The complaint recites: That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged

respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child. That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar. The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent. A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November, 1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed. This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for the respondents. Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court. After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M. Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a

telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry her.
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Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified by the respondent to be his. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital. To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant. The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to discredit complainant's testimony. In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.) Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) . One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said: An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is

particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him. With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: ... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice. Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent. BARRERA, J.: In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows: The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959). She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959). The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office

of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2). The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960). xxx xxx xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor .... But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him. The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.." But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage

still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer. xxx xxx xxx

RECOMMENDATION Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys. In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys." In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed. On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t

At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows: ... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia AngelesRoyong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n.

24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]." Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the following:. ... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962). After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even

after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed. It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present. The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment. It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.

Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar. The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied). Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar. The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).

The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:. SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently. SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days. The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation.. The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 997 September 10, 1979 PILAR ABAIGAR, complainant, vs. DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.: On April 27, 1971, Pilar Abaigar filed this administrative case for disbarment against David D. C. Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar. The verified complaint alleged that sometime in March 1970, the complainant, Pilar Abaigar sought the aid of a legal counsel regarding her divorce case filed by her husband in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, U.S.A.; that she called on the telephone the office of Congressman Bagatsing in Manila; that the respondent David D.C. Paz, answered the telephone call and volunteered his legal services; that believing that the respondent had the necessary legal experience, the complainant confided her legal problems to him: that after the termination of the divorce case, the respondent became exceedingly friendly with the complainant and started to profess his love for her; that at the start, the complainant was hesitant in continuing the cordial relations between her and the respondent but the respondent made her believe that although he was living with another woman, his relations with said woman were no impediment that the respondent convinced the complainant that he had been compelled to contract a civil marriage with the woman and that since it was not a marriage under the church laws, it was no bar for him to get married under the church laws with the complainant; that the respondent proposed marriage to the complainant; that believing in this good faith, the complainant accepted the proposal of the respondent; that sometime in the latter part of November 1970, an application for the issuance of a marriage license to the complainant and the respondent was made and executed: that thereafter, the respondent convinced the complainant that since they were going to get married anyway, they should act as husband and wife; that because of the confidence which the complainant reposed upon the respondent, she reluctantly acceded to said demands; that as a result of their being together, the complainant became pregnant but due to causes beyond her control, the pregnancy was lost; that sometime in the third week of April 1971, one Virginia Paz was introduced to the complainant by the respondent; that said Virginia Paz was the woman previously referred to by the respondent as his wife with whom he had contracted a forced civil marriage; that said Virginia Paz, in the course of the meeting, informed the complainant that there had been actually two marriages between Virginia Paz and the respondent, one under the civil law and one under the church law; that upon being confronted by the complainant, the respondent made no explanation whatsoever and merely kept silent; that since that time, the respondent had done nothing to make amends for having deceived the complainant and for having taken advantage of her; and that the complainant has no other recourse but to ask for the disbarment of the respondent who is a member of the Philippine Bar and an officer of the courts of justice. 1

In his answer filed on June 10, 1971, the respondent denied having had any illicit relations with the complainant and alleged that when the complainant called by telephone Congressman Ramon D. Bagatsing, the respondent advised complainant to come to the office; that on the next day when the complainant came to the office of Congressman Bagatsing, she was at first referred to Atty. Geronimo Flores of the Legal Assistance Service to handle the case; that two or three days thereafter, the complainant requested the respondent to personally handle her case; that on October 30, 1970, the respondent prepared a letter to complainant's husband, Samuel L. Navales, which letter was signed by Congressman Bagatsing; that sometime in the latter part of October 1970, the complainant borrowed from the respondent the sum of P200.00 to complete the payment for the hospitalization and treatment of her brother, Eric, at the Makati Medical Center: that as a act of pity, the respondent gave her the loan; that after the election for delegates to the Constitutional Convention in November 1970, the complainant called at the residence of the respondent and asked help in filing a case against the assailant of her brother who was stabbed in Olongapo City; that the wound sustained by complainant's brother was only superficial and he could not Identify his assailant, hence, no criminal case was filed; that after the trip to Olongapo, the complainant requested the help of the respondent to recommend her admission to a hospital because of abdominal and chest pains; that the respondent recommended complainant to be admitted to the Singian Clinic located at General Solano Street, San Miguel Manila; that on December 20, 1970, the complainant caged up the respondent at his residence by telephone and requested him to assist her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar to file a criminal action against her minor sister, Vilma Abaigar for disobedience; that the respondent prepares a complaint on the same night and a sworn statement of her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar that he accompanied the complainant to the Fiscal's Office at Pasig, Rizal and to the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal where Criminal Case No. 23994 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Vilma Abaigar was filed by her mother; that the respondent also helped the mother of the complainant to prepare and file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that by reason of said petition for habeas corpus, the mother of the complainant was able to take Vilma Abaigar into her custody although the petition was denied; that the respondent had never informed the complainant that he was compelled to contract a civil marriage with his wife; that the respondent never proposed marriage to the complainant; that the respondent has no recollection of the supposed application for the issuance of a marriage license in the latter part of November 1970; that respondent and complainant had never acted as husband and wife; and that the respondent had not deceived complainant nor taken advantage of her. 2 In a resolution dated August 20, 1971, this Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 3 After hearing the parties, the Solicitor General submitted on June 30, 1973 his report and recommendation containing the following findings: The complaint seeks the disbarment of respondent Paz on grounds that may properly fall under the category of deceit and grossly immoral conduct as found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Assuming for the moment that there had been sexual intercourse between complainant and respondent, the first inquiry, we respectfully submit, is whether respondent Paz practiced demotion on complainant by making her believe that notwithstanding their subsisting marriages to their respective spouses, they could legally get married to each other and based on his promise of marriage, she consented to go to bed with him. Complainant admitted that during her alleged romantic liason with respondent, she was married to a certain Samuel Navales, also a Filipino, who divorced her in the

U.S.A. sometime in the middle of 1970 (par. 2, Complaint; p. 46, t.s.n., November 18, 1971). She also admitted that before she submitted herself to his sexual desires, she was informed by him that, he had a wife with whom he was civilly married but that the marriage was void because it was either fake or 'forced' (sic). Whether there was deceit hinges on whether complainant actually believed the representation of respondent that they could legally marry. Highly intelligent that she is and with the educational background that she has, it is difficult to accept the proposition that she swallowed hook, line and sinker his supposed assurances that notwithstanding full awareness by both of the existence of each other's previous marriages, no legal impediment stood in the way of their getting married ecclesiastically. It is worthwhile repeating that complainant was a fifth placer in the Board Examinations for Chemical Engineering. She was licensed as a chemical engineer in 1964 or 1965, after which she taught at one time or another in different schools and colleges in Manila. In 1970 or 1971 when she was supposedly tricked into surrendering her body on a promise of marriage, she was already in her late twenties. It is improbable that at this age, she was still ignorant of the law regarding indissolubility of marriage. Before jumping headlong into accepting respondent's proposal that they act as husband and wife, she should have pondered upon the serious legal implications and complications of a second marriage for both of them. She could have easily asked a lawyer for advice on the matter. Complainant's own neighbor in Mandaluyong, Rizal is a lawyer by the name of Atty. Paler whose wife testified on her behalf. According to Mrs. Paler, her husband and complainant used to converse (p. 18, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). In these conversations complainant could have asked, perhaps in a casual manner, Mrs. Paler's husband as to the legal effects of a divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen or the effects of a marriage brought about through the use of force and intimidation in order to settle whatever doubts she had in her mind. The truth however, of the matter is that complainant did not even have to consult a lawyer to know that she could not legally marry respondent. It is of no little significance that some persons utilized by complainant as witnesses on her behalf because of their supposed knowledge of her relations with respondent, were themselves aware that divorce is not recognized in this country. Thus Mrs. Paler categorically stated that she knew for a fact that divorce obtained abroad is not recognized in the Philippines (p. 19, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). The same admission was elicited from Fr. Troy de los Santos, another witness for the complainant. Fr. de los Santos who used to be her spiritual adviser admitted at one point of his testimony that divorce obtained abroad cannot be recognized in the Philippines insofar as state laws are concerned and complainant knew about this (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). Thus, the Jesuit priest declared under crossexamination: Q Do you know that complainant's husband is still alive? A Yes. Q Up to the present? A Yes. Q Do you know that divorce is not recognized in the Philippines?

A I know, but the church does not recognize divorce. Q How about the State, do you know that the State recognize divorce? A As far as my knowledge, I do not think that our laws permit divorce. Continuing with his testimony, Fr. de los Santos stated: Q Did not the fact that complainant's husband is still have and that divorce is not recognized in ' the Philippines be considered an impediment to complainant's marriage to anyone? A Yes. Q Did you inform her so? A She knows about that. (33,34, t.s.n., Id.) Again, granting that complainant did not actually comprehend the existence of a legal bar to her remarriage, 'not being steeped in the intricacies of the law'. just the mere realization that both respondent's wife and her own husband being still have was enough to stir her mind and to impel her to make her own investigation. She could have, for instance, made discreet inquiries as to who was the woman respondent was married to and verified his claim whether he was forced into the marriage. Or, perhaps, she could simply have asked Congressman Bagatsing about respondent's personal status. After all she was competent enough to prepare, without anyone's help her own affidavit, Exhibit 'A', and resourceful enough to make research in the Supreme Court's Library on the subject of disbarment (pp. 63, 89, t.s.n., November 18, 1971). What conclusion then can a reasonable mind draw from the given premises? Either complainant was so helplessly naive as to be beguiled by respondent's blandishments or. comprehending fully the legal impossibility of the fulfillment of his marriage proposals, she unconditionally laid herself prostrate to his charms, too much enamored of him to care about anything else. For, as philosopher Blaise Pascal has so pithily stated of the profundity of human love, 'love has reasons that reason cannot explain.' Since complainant cannot hide behind the camouflage of innocence, considering her intellectual capacity and educational background, no other conclusion is possible 'except that she voluntarily submitted to sexual intimacy with respondent without entertaining any illusion or hope of sublimating the illicit relations by legal union. The question is intriguing whether respondent ever made vehement protestations of love and actually made an offer of marriage to complainant. If there was, the evidence adduced does not clearly show. Complainant asserted that she had evidence in the form of love letters and the marriage application form showing respondent's sustained courtship and offer of marriage. However, such purported documents were not presented, complainant making the excuse that respondent

tricked her into giving him the envelope containing the evidence. Such explanation, however, staggers human credulity considering that the supposed documents were vital to establish the case. It is simply preposterous that she would easily Dart with the documents and give them to no other than the respondent himself . Be that as it may, if respondent had made an offer of marriage, it is not clearly established that complainant's submission to his sexual desires was not on account of the offer but for the gratification of her mundane human longings.
The next question is whether there was sexual intimacy between complainant and respondent. Complainant testified that she acceded to his proposal that they live as husband and wife and as a matter of fact they had three sexual intercourses that took place in the Tower Hotel and Singian Clinic in Manila and in the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. While there is no proof that sexual intimacy took place in Singian Clinic except her testimony, her allegation that they had trysts at the Tower Hotel and Sulo Hotel was supported by the guest cards at said hotels, Exhibits 'A' and 'B'. Notwithstanding respondent's denial that the 'Mrs.' stated in the entry in said guest cards was a 'goodtime' woman, not the complainant, common sense will tell us that complainant could not have known that respondent lodged in said hotels on those particular dates unless she was the woman whom respondent brought there. On this score, we are inclined to believe that evidence has been sufficiently adduced to establish that intimacy between complainant and respondent took place once in the Tower Hotel and once in the Sulo Hotel. As the Honorable Court has stated, when the lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issues and overcome the evidence for the relator and to show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times he is expected of him (Quingwa vs. Puno, Adm. Case No. 389, Feb. 28, 1967; 19 SCRA 439). Insofar as this point is concerned, the evidence of the complainant as to the trysts they had in the two hotels has not been met and overthrown by respondent. 4

Upon considering the report and recommendation filed by the Solicitor General, this Court, in a resolution dated July 29, 1972, resolved to require the Solicitor General to file the corresponding complaint against the respondent, David D.C. Paz, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. 5 On September 4, 1975, the Solicitor General filed the corresponding complaint against David D.C. Paz praying that the respondent be suspended for a period of at least six months from the practice of law, with a warning that similar transgressions in the future win be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile the complainant sent a verified letter-petition dated March 29, 1974 to the then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal wherein the complainant asked this Court to look into the suspicious activities of a certain Rodolfo del Prado, who allegedly in connivance with the respondent, David D.C. Paz, made her sign an affidavit prejudicial to her interest. Among other allegations, the complainant stated in her verified complaint the following. 6. That there never is an illicit relationship between Atty. Paz and me at present because I believed all along that he was single and able to marry me. In fact, our relationship is above- board just like any engaged couple. 7. That I was made to understand by the Citizens Legal Assistant Office that the tenor of the affidavit made by Mr. Rudolfo Del Prado is such that the consideration for the illicit relationship was promissory note which to all intents and purposes is immoral and illegal.

8. That I am only after the collection of the loan which Atty. Paz got from me and not revenge for his deception.6

The foregoing portions of her letter militate against the credibility of the complainant. In her complainant for disbarment, she pictured the respondent as morally perverse. However, in the aforementioned letter, she states that there never was an illicit relationship between her and the respondent, Atty. David D.C. Paz, and that their relationship was aboveboard just like any engaged couple. And finally, she avers that she was only after the collection of the loan which the respondent got from her and not for revenge for his deception. It has been held that the power of this Court to disbar a lawyer should be exercised with caution because of its serious consequences. 7 The burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the case against a respondent must be established by convincing proof. 8 In Arboleda vs. Gatchalian, this Court held:
The Court has held that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the charge against the lawyer must be established by convincing proof (Go vs. Candoy, A.C. No. 736, Oct. 23, 1967, 21 SCRA 439; Toquib vs. Tomol, Jr., A.C. No. 554, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 156; in re Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, A.C. No. 838, Jan. 21. 1974, 55 SCRA 139). The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The corrupt character of the act done must be clearly demonstrated. Moreover' considering the serious consequences, of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, We have consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of either penalty (De Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554; Lim vs. Antonio, A.C. No. 848, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 44). This Court likewise held that where there is no proof that respondent lawyer was guilty of any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice, the disbarment case against him should be dismissed (Ricafort vs. Baltazar, A.C. No. 661, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 418; Delos Santos vs. Bolanos A.C. No. 483, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 763). 9

The evidence adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any cause for disciplinary action against the respondent. As the Solicitor General said in his report, "From all indications, there is little room for doubt that she filed his disbarment case not in redress of a wrong, for there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two consenting adults who were fully aware of the consequences of their deed and for which they were responsible only to their own private consciences." WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio- Herrera, JJ., concur. Aquino, J., concurs in the result. Fernando, C.J.,Teehankee, Antonio JJ., took no part.

Santos,J., is on leave

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting: Suspension for three months of respondent, from the practice of law, is justified by the adulterous acts in the hotel as the complainant was and is not legally divorced from her husband.

epublic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 8390 July 2, 2010 [Formerly CBD 06-1641] A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Complainant, vs. ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO, Respondent. DECISION PERALTA, J.: Before us is a Complaint1 dated January 18, 2006 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio filed by A-1 Financial Services, Inc., represented by Diego S. Reunilla, its account officer, with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1642, now A.C. No. 8390, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) and non-payment of debt. On November 13, 2001, A-1 Financial Services, Inc., a financing corporation, granted the loan application of Atty. Valerio amounting to P50,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan obligation, Atty. Valerio issued a postdated check, to wit: Check No. 0000012725; dated April 1, 2002, in the amount: P50,000.00.2 However, upon presentation at the bank for payment on its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to insufficient funds. As of the filing of the instant case, despite repeated demands to pay her obligation, Atty. Valerio failed to pay the whole amount of her obligation. Thus, on November 10, 2003, complainant filed a B.P. 22 case against Atty. Valerio, docketed as Criminal Case No. 124779. Atty. Valerios arraignment was scheduled for August 31, 2004; however, she failed to appear despite due notice.3 Subsequently, a Warrant of Arrest4 was issued but Atty. Valerio posted no bail. On November 22, 2004, complainant sent a letter5 to Atty. Valerio calling her attention to the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest against her and requested her to submit to the jurisdiction of the court by posting bail. The said letter was received by Atty. Valerio, as evidenced by the postal registry return cards.6 Despite court orders and notices, Atty. Valerio refused to abide. On January 18, 2006, complainant filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Valerio before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). On January 26, 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) required Atty. Valerio to file an answer, but she did not file any responsive pleading at all. However, in a letter7 dated March 16, 2006, respondents mother, Gorgonia N. Valerio (Mrs. Valerio), explained that her daughter had been diagnosed with schizophrenia; thus, could not properly respond to the complaint against her. Futhermore, Mrs. Valerio undertook to personally settle her daughters obligation. On September 13, 2007, the IBP-CBD directed Atty. Valerio to appear before the mandatory conference. Atty. Valerio, again, failed to attend the conference. Subsequently, in an Order dated November 15, 2007, the IBP ordered the parties to submit their position papers. No position paper was submitted by Atty. Valerio.

Thus, in its Report and Recommendation dated September 16, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Valerio be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, having found her guilty of gross misconduct. The IBP-CBD gave no credence to the medical certificate submitted by Atty. Valerios mother, in view of the latters failure to appear before the IBP-CBD hearings to affirm the truthfulness thereof or present the physician who issued the same. The IBP-CBD, further, pointed out that Atty. Valerios failure to obey court processes, more particularly her failure to appear at her arraignment despite due notice and to surrender to the Court despite the issuance of a warrant of arrest, showed her lack of respect for authority and, thus, rendered her morally unfit to be a member of the bar.8 On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Atty. Valerio was instead ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Nevertheless, to provide Atty. Valerio further opportunity to explain her side, the Court, in a Resolution dated December 15, 2010, directed Atty. Valerio and/or her mother, to submit a duly notarized medical certificate issued by a duly licensed physician and/or certified copies of medical records to support the claim of schizophrenia on the part of Atty. Valerio within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof. However, despite the lapse of considerable time after the receipt of notice9 to comply with the said Resolution, no medical certificate or medical records were submitted to this Court by either respondent and/or her mother. Thus, this resolution. We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD. In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,10 we held that: x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that: Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes. Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In the instant case, there is no denial of the existence of the loan obligation despite respondents failure to cooperate before any proceedings in relation to the complaint. Prior to the filing of the complaint against her, Atty. Valerios act of making partial payments of the loan and interest suffices as proof that indeed there is an obligation to pay on her part. Respondents mother, Mrs. Valerio, likewise, acknowledged her daughters obligation.

The Court, likewise, finds unmeritorious Mrs. Valerios justification that her daughter, Atty. Valerio, is suffering from a health condition, i.e. schizophrenia, which has prevented her from properly answering the complaint against her. Indeed, we cannot take the "medical certificate" on its face, considering Mrs. Valerios failure to prove the contents of the certificate or present the physician who issued it. Atty. Valerios conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings is also a matter of serious concern. She failed to answer the complaint against her. Despite due notice, she failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. She also ignored the proceedings before the court as she likewise failed to both answer the complaint against her and appear during her arraignment, despite orders and notices from the court. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Atty. Valerio has failed to live up to the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
1avvphil

In Ngayan v. Tugade,11 we ruled that "[a lawyers] failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. We come to the penalty imposable in this case. In Lao v. Medel,12 we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino,13 having found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property, the title to which was only entrusted to him by the complainant. However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio was ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years,14 because, aside from issuing worthless checks and failing to pay her debts, she has also shown wanton disregard of the IBPs and Court Orders in the course of the proceedings. WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-647 dated December 11, 2008 of the IBP, which found respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. She is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Atty. Valerio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance. This Decision shall be immediately executory. SO ORDERED. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice On Leave ARTURO D. BRION* Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice

Footnotes
*

On leave. Rollo, pp. 1-2. Id. at 5. Id. at 6. Id. at 7. Id. at 8. Id. at 9. Id. at 11-12. Id. The Resolution dated December 15, 2009 was received on January 6, 2010.

10

480 Phil. 661, 671 (2004). A.C. No. 2490, February 7, 1991, 193 SCRA 779, 784. 453 Phil. 115, 121, citing Co v. Bernardino, 285 SCRA 102 (1998). 486 Phil. 8 (2004). Wong v. Atty. Moya, A.C. No. 6972, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 256.

11

12

13

14

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION Adm. Case No. 5436 May 27, 2004

ALFREDO BON, complainant, vs. ATTYS. VICTOR S. ZIGA and ANTONIO A. ARCANGEL, respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: On May 9, 2001, Alfredo Bon (complainant) filed a Complaint1 dated April 3, 2001 for disbarment against the respondents, Attys. Victor S. Ziga (Ziga) and Antonio A. Arcangel (Arcangel). Allegedly, the respondents, conspiring with each other and with the use of fraud, intimidation, stealth, deception and monetary consideration, caused Amalia Bon-Padre Borjal, Teresa Bon-Padre Patenio, Felecito Bon and Angelina Bon (collectively, the Bons) to sign a document entitled Waiver and Quitclaim. According to the complainant, the Bons signed theWaiver and Quitclaim because of Zigas representation that the document was merely a withdrawal of a previously executed Special Power of Attorney. As it turned out, the document was a waiver in favor of Ziga of all the properties which the Bons inherited from their parents and predecessors-in-interest. Attached to the Complaint areAffidavits2 executed by the Bons renouncing the Waiver and Quitclaim. Moreover, the complainant claims that the Bons are residents of Manila and did not appear before Arcangel who was then in Albay to acknowledge the Waiver and Quitclaim. Despite this fact, Arcangel notarized the documentand even made it appear that the Bons personally appeared before him to acknowledge the same. On November 20, 2001, the respondents filed their Joint Comment3 dated October 6, 2001. According to them, the allegations in the Complaint that the Bons did not understand the contents of the Waiver and Quitclaim and that they did not personally appear to acknowledge the same before Arcangel indicate that the cause of action is based on alleged intrinsic defects in the document. As such, only the parties to the document, i.e., the Bons, whose rights were violated can file the Complaint. Being a stranger to the allegedly defective document, the complainant cannot file the Complaint. Besides, Maria Bon Borjal and Rafael Bon-Canafe who are co-signatories to the Waiver and Quitclaim both declared in their Joint Affidavit4 that Ziga thoroughly explained the contents of the Waiver and Quitclaim to the Bons before they signed the document. The subscribing witnesses, Rogelio Bon-Borjal and Nida Barrameda, also declared in their Joint Affidavit5 that the contents of the document were explained to the signatories. The respondents also aver that it is difficult to believe that the Bons did not understand the contents of the document they were signing since Amalia and Angelina Bon are both high school graduates, while Teresa Bon is a college graduate.6 Further, the fact that the Bons admit having accepted P5,000.00 from Ziga to sign the Waiver and Quitclaim precludes them from questioning the document.

For Arcangels part, he explains that assuming that he notarized the Waiver and Quitclaim in the absence of the signatories, his act is merely a violation of the Notarial Law but not a ground for disbarment. He further avers that he was able to talk to Maria Bon and Rafael Bon-Canafe, both cosignatories to the document, over the phone. Maria Bon and Rafael Bon-Canafe allegedly declared that they signed the Waiver and Quitclaim. The two, in fact, personally delivered the document for notarization in his office. Thus, he posits that there was substantial compliance with the Notarial Law since a notary publics primordial undertaking is merely to ensure that the signatures on a document are genuine. As long as they are so, the notary public can allegedly take the risk of notarizing the document although the signatories are not present. In conclusion, the respondents aver that the complainant must first prove that the Waiver and Quitclaim is defective before he can file an administrative case against them. The complainant filed a Reply, Opposition and Comment to Joint Comment of Respondents7 dated April 5, 2001 asserting that he has a right to complain over the acquisition of the properties subject of the Waiver and Quitclaimhaving been mentioned therein. He also avers that he has the right to inform the Court of the deception committed by the respondents. He further states that the Bons signed the document after having been deceived and intimidated by Ziga who, he claims, exercises moral ascendancy over the Bons. That the Bons are educated does not necessarily mean they could not have been intimidated and deceived. He maintains that the Bons were misled into believing that what they were signing was a withdrawal of a previously issued Special Power of Attorney and were given P5,000.00 each to induce them to sign the Waiver and Quitclaim. Even assuming that the signatures appearing on the Waiver and Quitclaim are genuine, he asserts that it was still highly irregular for Arcangel to notarize the document by telephone when it could have been notarized in Manila where the signatories reside. Lastly, he avers that it is not necessary for a court to declare that the Waiver and Quitclaim is defective before the instant administrative case can proceed. The respondents filed their Comment on Complainants Reply8 dated April 12, 2002 alleging that in his reply, the complainant changed his cause of action from fraud and deception to intimidation and moral ascendancy. According to them, the complainant is incompetent to charge Ziga with intimidation as he was not a party to the document and was not even present when it was executed. The respondents insist that the only instance when anyone can file a disbarment complaint against a lawyer is when the ground therefore is a public offense like immorality, misbehavior, betrayal of trust and the like. When, as in the instant case, the parties to the alleged defective document have not formally impugned the document themselves, no one else can. In the Courts Resolution9 dated July 22, 2002, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Citing the Report and Recommendation10 dated November 7, 2002 of its Investigating Commissioner, the IBP passed Resolution No. XV-2002-60411 on December 14, 2002 dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit. According to the Report and Recommendation, the Bons failure to file the appropriate action to set aside the Waiver and Quitclaim casts doubt on their claim that Ziga misled or deceived them into signing the document. As regards Arcangel, the IBP concluded that while he may have been remiss in his duties as a notary public, the same does not constitute a ground for disbarment. The complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 dated February 24, 2003 which the IBP denied in Resolution No. XV-2003-14913 issued on March 22, 2003 since it no longer has jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter already endorsed to the Supreme Court. The complainant then filed with this Court a Motion for Re-Examination of the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines14dated September 10, 2003 mainly rehashing

his claim that the respondents induced the Bons to sign the Waiver and Quitclaim by means of deceit and abuse of moral ascendancy. We are hard put to ascribe to Ziga the fraud, intimidation, stealth and deception with which the complainant labels his actuations. The fact that Amalia and Angelina Bon are both high school graduates, while Teresa Bon is a college graduate15 makes it difficult to believe that they were deceived into thinking that the contents of theWaiver and Quitclaim were other than what they themselves could have easily ascertained from a reading of the document. As held by the Court in Bernardo v. Court of Appeals:16 The rule that one who signs a contract is presumed to know its contents has been applied even to contracts of illiterate persons on the ground that if such persons are unable to read, they are negligent if they fail to have the contract read to them. If a person cannot read the instrument, it is as much his duty to procure some reliable persons to read and explain it to him, before he signs it, as it would be to read it before he signed it if he were able to do so and his failure to obtain a reading and explanation of it is such gross negligence as will estop him from avoiding it on the ground that he was ignorant of its contents17 Besides, the Waiver and Quitclaim is plainly worded. It does not contain complicated terms that might be misconstrued by anyone who has half the education attained by Amalia, Angelina and Teresa Bon. Moreover, the Bons admitted therein that in 1930, their predecessors sold to the Ziga family the properties to which they now lay claim. They also declared in the document that it was only their brother, Alfredo, the complainant in this case, who still claimed rights over the properties. The relevant provisions of the Waiver and Quitclaim state: 1. We are heirs and direct descendants of the late Santiago Bon of Tabaco, Albay; 2. We had been named as formal parties in DARAB Case No. V-RC-010, Albay Branch 11 99 entitled Virginia Desuyo, et al. vs. Alfredo Bon, et al.; 3. We admit that, we the descendants and relatives of the late Santiago Bon do not have any right or interest anymore over Lots No. 1911, 1917-A, 1917-B, 1970, 1988, all of Tabaco, Cadastre, because the above lots had been already sold by our predecessor in favor of the Ziga Family, predecessor of Ex-Senator Victor Ziga since 1930, and that the above family had been continuously in possession thereof, thru their tenants since 1930, or for more than 70 years already, to our exclusion; 4. It is only our brother, Alfredo Bon, who adamantly refuses to admit the above fact and still claim rights over said properties despite the explanation of our ancestors that the above mentioned lots had been long sold by our predecessor to the Zigas18 Significantly, as pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the Bons have not filed the appropriate action to set aside the Waiver and Quitclaim. The complainant, however, explains that they "will pursue that the Waiver and Quit Claim be annulled by the court"19 in Civil Case No. T-2163 pending with the Regional Trial Court Branch 18, Tabaco City. That they have yet to do so almost four (4) years after the execution of the Waiver and Quitclaimdiminishes, if not totally discredits, their position that they were defrauded, intimidated and deceived into signing the document. At this time, all that the complainant offers to boost his claim that Ziga employed deceit in procuring the Bons signatures are the latters bare allegations to the effect that Ziga told them there was nothing wrong with the document except that they were withdrawing the Special Power of Attorney.

These allegations are belied by theJoint Affidavit20 of Maria Bon-Borjal and Rafael Bon-Canafe, the Bons co-signatories, and the Joint Affidavit21 of Rogelio Bon Borjal and Nida Barrameda, the subscribing witnesses to the Waiver and Quitclaim, both of which assert that the contents of the document were sufficiently explained to the Bons. Given these circumstances, the presumptions that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;22 that private transactions have been fair and regular;23 and that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact24 have not been sufficiently overcome. However, we do find the act of Arcangel in notarizing the Waiver and Quitclaim without requiring all the persons who executed the document to personally appear before him and acknowledge that the same is their free act and deed an unpardonable breach of his duty as a notary public. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides: (a) The acknowledgement shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgement shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.25 The Acknowledgement contained in the Waiver and Quitclaim executed in Zigas house in Manila specifically states: "BEFORE ME, a Notary Public, for and in the above mentioned locality personally appeared"26 However, the Bons did not personally appear before Arcangel to acknowledge the document. Arcangel himself admits as much but posits that he was able to talk to the Bons co-signatories over the phone, i.e., Maria Bon and Rafael Bon-Canafe, and that the two promised to bring the document to Albay for notarization. Hence, Arcangel claims that there was substantial compliance with the Notarial Law. He adds that as long as the signatures on the instrument are genuine, the notary public can take the risk of notarizing the document although the signatories are not present. Arcangel seems to be laboring under a misguided understanding of the basic principles of the Notarial Law. It is well to remind him that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.27 Thus, a member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The acts of the

affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts of which they have personal knowledge. They should swear to the document personally and not through any representative. Otherwise, their representatives name should appear in the said documents as the one who executed the same. That is the only time the representative can affix his signature and personally appear before the notary public for notarization of the said document.28 Simply put, the party or parties who executed the instrument must be the ones to personally appear before the Notary Public to acknowledge the document.29 From his admission, we find that Arcangel failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public. He violated Rules 1.0130 and 10.0131 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well. However, his transgression does not warrant disbarment, which is the severest form of disciplinary sanction. In Ocampo v. Yrreverre,32 the Court, taking note of the remorseful attitude of the respondent who was found guilty of breach of the notarial law for notarizing a document in the absence of the signatories, revoked his notarial commission for a period of two (2) years and suspended him from the practice of law for six (6) months. WHEREFORE, the Complaint filed against Atty. Victor S. Ziga is DISMISSED for lack of merit. As regards Atty. Antonio A. Arcangel, his commission as Notary Public, if still existing, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that a repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely. He is further DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to the Court within five (5) days from such receipt. The Clerk of Court of this Court is DIRECTED to immediately circularize this Decision for the proper guidance of all concerned. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and recorded in the personal files of the respondents. SO ORDERED. Puno*, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975 VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners, vs. PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners. Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for more than a decade. In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda, L14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties. However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of

execution was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then rerestored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining order. While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140). We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
1wph1.t

The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to costs. Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision. 1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in one case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the present case. In Comilang the

actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business venture.

3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was issued, and even up to the present. 4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to 2 assert it.

5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the community. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise. 4 (b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.

6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court). We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of 6 justice.

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice. A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his 7 duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We find that (a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not even started; (b) after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants; (c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion); (d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and (e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815) We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint

Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint. Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the Castaedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal. It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castaeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages. Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court) The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castaedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo. Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966. This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover barred by prior judgment. The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail. The Counterclaim As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castaedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.

The Supplemental Complaint Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith. The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions. The Amended Supplemental Complaint The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation. Discussion on The Causes of Action of The Supplemental Complaint And The Amended Supplemental Complaint Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castaedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred. For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court. Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur. Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, vs. ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent. Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant. Francisco Claravall for respondent. OZAETA, J.: The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows: Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential. Legal assistance service 12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105 Tel. 2-41-60. Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof. Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision. It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and

fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.) In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent. Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded. Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.