China’s New Leadership:
Paradoxes, Characteristics and Implications
Cheng Li, Ph.D.
Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Professor of Government, Hamilton College
In his seven-decade-long academic career,
the great British historian, Joseph Needham,
tried to explain what Sinologists later called
“the Needham Paradox.” It was a paradox that,
while traditional China had many talented peo-
ple and was advanced in science, the country
declined during the middle part of the last mil-
lennium. According to Needham, a primary
reason for the decline of China was that the
country “lost its edge” by suppressing techni-
cians and merchants “whose power posed a
threat to the Emperor.”
The conditions in China that Needham
described have changed profoundly since the
mid-1990s. This is particularly evident in the
recently held 16th National Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The nine
members of the new Politburo Standing
Committee, the highest decision-making body
in the country, are all engineers by training.
Furthermore, the Party Congress has codified
in the CCP constitution what is already true in
practice—enthusiastically recruiting mer-
chants, known as “entrepreneurs” by the
Chinese, or “capitalists” to western reporters.
Do the new leadership and the new constitu-
tion that was amended in the 16th Party
Congress mean the end of the “Needham
Paradox?” Will Chinese economic and political
development, as a result of this historical
change, be particularly dynamic in the future?
To a certain extent, China has already
reemerged as an economic powerhouse in
today’s world. On the political front, this Party
Congress marked a shift of power to the so-
called “fourth generation” of Chinese leaders
(the first three generations were represented by
Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin,
respectively). The fourth generation of leaders
led by Hu Jintao has not only held almost all top
ministerial and provincial leadership posts, but
has also occupied over 80 percent of the seats on
the 16th Central Committee. It was the first time
in the history of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) that a power transition took place in an
orderly, peaceful and institutionalized way.
It is too early, however, to determine the true
significance of China’s ongoing transformation
and the 16th Party Congress. China’s twists and
turns in the past century, as well as the roller-
coaster ride of Sino-U.S. relations during the
past few years, have taught us to be cautious.
Even today, China remains a paradox in many
important ways.
The Paradox of China and its Political
Succession
Present-day China is indeed a dialectic of
hope and fear—a paradox of promises and pit-
falls. While that has always been true to some
degree, the broad scale of contrasting scenarios
is remarkable. On the positive side, there has
been a triumphant mood in the country over
the past two years. Beijing’s successful bid to
host the 2008 Olympics, Shanghai’s equally
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successful bid to host the 2010 World Expo, the
Chinese soccer team’s qualifying for its first-
ever World Cup Games (although it did not
score), and China’s accession to the WTO have
all brought pride, optimism and a sense of ful-
fillment to the Chinese people. Never since the
Opium Wars has the Chinese nation spoken
more loudly and clearly about its courage, com-
mitment and confidence in integrating with the
outside world than today.
On the negative side, enormous economic
disparity has become, in my view, the most
daunting problem the country now faces.
During the past two decades, China has
changed from one of the most equitable coun-
tries in the world in terms of income distribu-
tion to one of the least equitable. In addition,
rampant official corruption; an unprecedent-
ed, high unemployment rate; growing rural dis-
content, especially in the wake of China’s entry
into the WTO; environmental degradation; and
frequently occurring industrial incidents (the
so-called tofu projects that are as breakable as
bean curd, as Premier Zhu Rongji has charac-
terized them); all seem to suggest that the
Chinese regime is sitting atop a volcano of mass
social disturbance.
China’s political succession and leadership
change have also been filled with paradoxes.
Jockeying for power among various factions has
been fervent and protracted, but the power
struggle has not led to a systemic crisis as was
true during the reigns of Mao and Deng. While
nepotism and favoritism in elite recruitment
have become prevalent, educational credentials
and technical expertise have, at the same time,
become prerequisites. Regional representation
has gained importance in the selection of
Central Committee members, but leaders who
come from coastal regions dominate the new
Politburo, especially its Standing Committee.
Regulations such as term limits and an age
requirement for retirement have been imple-
mented at various levels of the Chinese leader-
ship, but these regulations and norms do not
appear to restrain the power of Jiang Zemin,
the 76-year-old “new paramount” leader. While
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the military’s influence on political succession
has declined during the past decade, the
Central Military Commission (CMC) is still very
powerful. Although Hu Jintao did succeed
Jiang as general secretary of the Party, Jiang’s
decision to retain his chairmanship of the CMC
and to appoint many of his cronies to the new
Politburo Standing Committee apparently
made this transition of power incomplete.
Not surprisingly, these contradictory scenes
in China and these paradoxical phenomena in
Chinese elite politics have created much confu-
sion and uncertainty. Unfortunately, there are
more myths and speculations than thoughtful
analysis and well-grounded assessment among
China scholars. Most China watchers have been
obsessed with the issue of Jiang Zemin’s retire-
ment. While the issue of Jiang’s role after the
16th Party Congress is important, many stu-
dents of Chinese politics have failed to under-
stand the institutional restraints that individual
leaders, including Jiang himself, have to con-
front. Some speculate about the power struggle
among rising political stars without paying
much attention to the political forces and
regional interests that these new leaders repre-
sent. Others assume that the future will emulate
the recent past with Jiang playing the same
behind-the-scenes role that Deng did, and that
the fourth generation leaders will continue the
policies of their predecessors.
Jiang’s political manipulation and his seem-
ing “political triumphs” in the Party Congress
might, in fact, have revealed his own weakness-
es and insecurities. It is revealing that the dele-
gates gave Hu Jintao the highest number of
votes (only one of the 2,132 delegates did not
vote for him), while by contrast, Jiang’s body
guard, You Xigui, received the lowest vote in
the election of alternates; his former personal
secretary Huang Liman received the third low-
est vote; and his confidant, Minister of
Education Chen Zhili, failed to obtain a seat on
the Politburo. Though Hu Jintao is surrounded
by Jiang’s protégés on the Standing Committee,
these protégés are also vulnerable because of
the political favoritism through which they
obtained their seats. Some may soon climb on
Hu’s bandwagon.
It is also too simplistic to assume that the new
leaders will merely follow Jiang’s policies. Of
course, China will not take a dramatic turn as
the new leaders assume power. In fact, mem-
bers of the fourth generation have already par-
ticipated in the policy-making process and
many have served as chief advisers to Jiang
Zemin and Zhu Rongji. Yet, the history of the
PRC indicates that each generation of leaders
has its own mandate and its own policy priori-
ties. New leaders often strive to fix the problems
of their predecessors. This raises some impor-
tant questions: How will the fourth generation
leaders regard Jiang’s legacy—the accomplish-
ments achieved and the problems that have
arisen in both domestic and foreign policy?
How capable as a team will the fourth genera-
tion leaders be in overcoming the pitfalls of the
Jiang era and in carrying out their own man-
date? What, then, is the mandate of the fourth
generation? The answers to these questions lie
in an analysis of the characteristics of the fourth
generation of leaders.
Characteristics of the Fourth Generation
of Leaders
Each generation has distinctive characteris-
tics fostered by the socio-political environment
during its formative years. Consequently, gener-
ational cohorts often share collective behavioral
attributes. In the PRC, the concept of genera-
tions—or more precisely, political elite genera-
tions—has also been based on the distinctive
past experiences of elites. The first three elite
generations in the PRC have been identified as:
the “Long March generation,” the “Anti-
Japanese War generation,” and the “Socialist
Transformation generation.”
China’s fourth generation of leaders is com-
prised of those who had their formative years
during the Cultural Revolution (CR). Now they
are in their late 40s and 50s. Most of them were
at various levels in their education (elementary
school, high school or college) or had just grad-
uated from college in 1966 when the CR began.
While there is a 15-year span between the oldest
and youngest, all members of this generation
acquired their first political experiences during
the course of the CR. The Cultural Revolution,
arguably the most extraordinary event in con-
temporary China, and the dramatic changes
that occurred thereafter, had an ever-lasting
impact on the collective characteristics of this
generation. As a result, the fourth generation of
leaders is probably the least ideological, most
capable, most diverse, and most concerned with
coalition building of all elite generations in the
history of the CCP. These generalizations con-
stitute four main characteristics of the fourth
generation leaders.
First, the new leaders are less dogmatic and
more open-minded than their predecessors
were. This is because most of them were Mao’s
“Red Guards,” the most active participants in
the CR. They grew up in a political environ-
ment characterized by idealism, moralism, and
radicalism. They were taught to sacrifice them-
selves for socialism and revolution. But as time
passed, their faith was eroded, their devotion
was betrayed, their dream was shattered, their
education was lost, and their careers were inter-
rupted. They had firsthand knowledge of the
human catastrophes caused by the Communist
ideology. Compared to their predecessors,
fourth generation leaders are far more interest-
ed in discussing issues than defending “isms.”
Similar to the leadership of post-Communist
Russia, China’s new generation of leaders may
lack a shared commitment to the existing polit-
ical system.
Second, the new leaders are more capable
than their predecessors were. This is largely
because of the hardships they endured at a
young age. A majority of the fourth generation
leaders, though almost all attended college,
had work experience as farmers and workers.
For example, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (who
will likely succeed Zhu Rongji as premier next
March), both spent over a decade in Gansu,
one of the poorest provinces in the country.
Many ministers and governors in the fourth
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generation were “sent-down youths” who
worked as farmers in the early 1970s. Enormous
physical hardship and an ever-changing politi-
cal environment nurtured within them valuable
traits such as adaptability, endurance, grassroots
consciousness and political sophistication.
The new leaders have a deep understanding
of the “real China,” and its severe problems. As
a result, they are probably more innovative in
dealing with these problems. For example,
Zeng Qinghong, a new member of the
Politburo Standing Committee, is often identi-
fied as Jiang Zemin’s “brain.” As Jiang’s chief
strategist, Zeng helped orchestrate many
important political moves and policy initiatives.
A large number of prominent leaders of the
fourth generation have served as provincial
chiefs. The first and foremost responsibility of a
provincial chief is usually to foster economic
development in the province in which he or she
serves. At the 16th Party Congress, provincial
leaders obtained the largest representation on
both the Politburo and the Central Committee.
All four provincial Party secretaries who served
on the 15th Politburo were promoted to serve
on the 16th Politburo Standing Committee.
Within the new 24-member Politburo, twenty
(83.3 percent) have served as top provincial
leaders, and ten (41.7 percent) held provincial
leadership posts when they were selected. At
present, eight Politburo members (33.3 per-
cent) remain as provincial Party secretaries.
The provinces that these leaders have governed
are large socioeconomic entities. It is often said
that a province is to China what a country is to
Europe. China’s provincial chiefs, like top lead-
ers in European nations, have constantly been
concerned about regional economic develop-
ment and have coped with daunting challenges
such as unemployment, political stability and
social welfare needs in their jurisdictions. For
China’s future national leaders, provincial
administration provides an ideal training
ground.
Third, the new leaders are more diverse than
their predecessors were in terms of political sol-
idarity. Although fourth generation leaders
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share similar memories of the Cultural
Revolution, they often have a wide spectrum of
political affiliations and class backgrounds.
Some were on opposite sides during the
Cultural Revolution. This is evident by the three
different periods during which they joined the
CCP, since the criteria for political recruitment
during these periods were profoundly different.
This is in sharp contrast to the previous genera-
tions of leaders, who usually shared strong
bonding experiences such as the Long March
and the Anti-Japanese War.
Another important indication of the diversity
of the new leaders is reflected in the difference
in their educational and occupational back-
grounds. Although technocrats have dominat-
ed the top leadership, there are more econo-
mists, financial experts and lawyers on the 16th
Central Committee than any previous one. For
example, Xi Jinping (Party secretary of
Zhejiang), Li Keqiang (governor of Henan),
Cao Jianming (vice president of Supreme
Court), Zhan Xuan (president of Higher
People’s Court), Yin Yicui (deputy Party secre-
tary of Shanghai), and Yuan Chunqing (deputy
Party secretary of Shaanxi) all received law
degrees. They were all born in the 1950s, and
all serve on the 16th Central Committee.
Engineers, economists, financial experts and
lawyers are all professional experts, but varia-
tions in their expertise will likely lead to differ-
ences in their political perspectives and policy
choices.
The diversification of leaders in terms of pro-
fessional backgrounds is partially related to the
dissimilar sources of elite recruitment. There
are now more diversified channels through
which new leaders can advance their political
careers. Political networks such as the
“Shanghai gang,” the “princelings” (taizidang),
“the Qinghua clique,” the “fellow provincials”
(tongxiang), the “Chinese Communist Youth
League officials” (tuanpai), and the “personal
secretary clusters” (mishuqun) have served as
important sources of elite recruitment among
the fourth generation leaders. In addition,
some new political groups, for example,
“entrepreneurs from stock-holding firms and
joint ventures” (hezi qiyejia) and “the returnees
from study overseas” (haiguipai), have also
emerged as distinct elite groups within the cen-
tral leadership. The growing diversification of
political networks may contribute to the disper-
sion of power and highlight the need for shar-
ing power.
The most important intra-generational ten-
sion within the new leadership may be geo-
graphical. In fact, conflicts of interest between
region-based factions during this time of politi-
cal succession are more transparent than ever
before. This is exemplified by the contrasts
between Hu Jintao and Zeng Qinghong, the
two most powerful figures in the post-Jiang era.
Hu and Zeng represent two different socio-
political groups and geographical regions.
These differences are reflected in their distinct
personal careers and political associations.
Hu Jintao comes from a non-official family
background. His political association was large-
ly with the Chinese Communist Youth League.
Hu has spent most of his adult life in some of
the poorest provinces in China’s inland region,
including 14 years in Gansu, three years in
Guizhou, and four years in Tibet. It might not
be merely a coincidence that in the months
prior to the 16th Party Congress, Hu frequently
visited inland provinces such as Yunnan,
Guangxi, Heilongjiang, Qinghai, and Sichuan.
In contrast, Zeng is a princeling with strong
family ties. He is known for his political associa-
tion with the “Shanghai gang.” Zeng has thus
far spent almost his entire career in coastal
regions such as Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangdong. This explains why, in recent years,
he has attempted to form a political coalition
primarily among those who live in the coastal
region. Many provincial leaders in coastal
provinces are princelings, for example,
Governor of Liaoing, Bo Xilai; Party Secretary
of Zhejiang, Xi Jinping; Party Secretary of
Hebei, Bai Keming; and Party Secretary of
Hainan, Wang Qishan. Zeng has also deliber-
ately associated himself with returnees of study
overseas, a main source of the future fifth gen-
eration of leaders. A large number of returnees,
who do not necessarily come from Shanghai,
have chosen to settle in Shanghai and other
parts of coastal China.
The tension and difference between Hu and
Zeng, or what we may call “inland Hu” versus
“coastal Zeng,” are obvious, but they may not
lead to a vicious power struggle. This is because
they share a need for cooperation. Hu has a
majority of votes in the 16th Central
Committee, but his inland officials have less
experience or expertise in foreign trade,
finance, technological development and large-
scale urban construction than their counter-
parts in coastal regions. As for Zeng, he has a
majority of the votes in the Politburo and has
been able to control economic and human
resources. But if he does not demonstrate will-
ingness to share power and resources, the
potential backlash against him, the Shanghai
Gang and the rich coastal region will be over-
whelming.
The dynamic interaction between Hu and
Zeng is related to the fourth main characteris-
tics of the new leaders: they are more aware of
the need for coalition-building than their pre-
decessors were. This is mainly due to the shift of
the criteria for elite recruitment from revolu-
tionary credentials to administrative skills. This
explains why the top leaders of the fourth gen-
eration are all capable administrators and polit-
ical tacticians. Wen Jiabao, for example, worked
as a chief-of-staff for three bosses (Hu Yaobang,
Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin), two of whom
were purged. He not only survived but also fur-
ther advanced his career. Wen’s caliber as a
superb administrator explains his legendary
survival and success.
All these characteristics of new leaders will
shape their policies, both domestic and inter-
national. The fact that both Hu Jintao and Wen
Jiabao were able to advance their careers from
within China’s poorest region indicates they will
be more sensitive to the needs and concerns of
inland provinces. The Jiang era has been
known for the growing economic disparity.
Jiang has allocated too much economic
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resource to Shanghai and other coastal cities
while many inland cities have lagged far
behind. Consequently, the issue of economic
growth and social justice has reemerged. It is
not difficult to imagine that the “Hu adminis-
tration” will make a greater effort to reallocate
resources from the coast to the inland in order
to reduce regional economic disparity. The
establishment of a social safety net, the stimula-
tion of demand in the domestic market, and
the development of an infrastructure in China’s
inland region will be important agenda items
for the fourth generation of leaders. The antic-
ipated effort of the new leaders to achieve a bal-
ance between economic development and
social justice is rational and timely.
The mandate of the fourth generation is like-
ly to accelerate political reforms. This is not
because the new leaders are motivated by
democratic ideals or ideas, but because they
realize that their mission is to prevent the CCP’s
sudden fall from power, which has occurred in
many Communist or Leninist one-party regimes
during the past decade. To a certain extent,
China has experienced some important politi-
cal developments during the Jiang era, for
example, the emergence of NGOs, the rapid
development of the legal profession, the grow-
ing concern about human rights, the commer-
cialization of media, the diversification of
sources of information, and local elections.
All of the developments mentioned above—
plus Jiang’s “three represents,” which broaden
the CCP’s power base by recruiting entrepre-
neurs—have paved the way for further political
transformation of the country. It is too early to
assess how far and how fast the new leadership’s
political reform will progress. To a certain
extent, China’s political reform depends on a
political environment, both domestic and inter-
national, that is conducive to bold political
experimentation. Based on political discourse,
initiatives, and signals articulated by new lead-
ers and members of their think tanks, we may
anticipate political reforms in the following five
areas:
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1. The so-called “intra-Party democracy” (dan-
gnei minzhu), including elections in all levels
of leadership, will be more effectively insti-
tutionalized. It will gradually make factional
politics more transparent and legitimate.
2. A division among the functions of decision-
making, policy implementation, and super-
vision will be better defined. Major policy
decisions will be subjected to approval by a
more collective leadership.
3. Provincial governments will have more say
in the decision-making process in both the
Party Congress and the National People’s
Congress.
4. A consolidation of the legal system will take
place, since some new leaders have been
trained in law and the social sciences.
5. The new leaders will pursue structural
change to better define the relationship
among the State, the Party and the military.
They may establish a national security coun-
cil, a new state institution that will be above
the Party and the military. The fact that
none of the top leaders in the fourth gen-
eration has military background will lead
them to consolidate civilian command over
the military.
These five aspects of political reform may not
be seen as important in the eyes of some China
watchers because none of these changes will
lead to a multiparty system of democracy.
Indeed, China does not seem ready for a multi-
party political system. It is unlikely that any
organized opposition will emerge to compete
with the CCP in the near future. Yet, the legiti-
macy and transparency of factional politics
within the CCP may turn out to be an impor-
tant step toward a far-reaching transformation
of China’s political system.
New Chinese leaders’ inclination to pursue
political reforms is not only driven by domestic
pressure, but also by foreign policy concerns.
The fourth generation of leaders will not change
China’s foreign policy in terms of substance, but
will make a great effort to change China’s image
in international affairs. Taiwan leader, Chen
Shui-bian, often argues that a democratic Taiwan
will not have any common ground with an
authoritarian China. The new generation of
leaders in China may well play the card of politi-
cal reform on the mainland in order to lure the
hearts and minds of the Taiwanese. Any major
political move toward a more liberal and democ-
ratic China will have a strong impact on cross-
strait relations.
A factor that will contribute to the image
change of China’s foreign policy is the growing
number of western-trained leaders in China’s
foreign policy circle. Many vice minister-level
positions are held by western-trained leaders.
They will be more visible in the years to come.
Since these Chinese leaders attended the same
schools as their counterparts in Taiwan and the
United States, it will be difficult for them to crit-
icize each other in ideological terms. It will be
interesting to see the impact of this change on
public opinion toward China.
Top leaders in the fourth generation have lit-
tle experience in foreign affairs. In fact, none of
the nine members of the Politburo Standing
Committee has a previous career in foreign ser-
vices or foreign policy. Their primary agenda
will be domestic economic growth, political
institution building and social stability. Yet, this
does not mean that they are ill-informed about
the outside world. Many of them previously
served as top leaders in China’s coastal cities
and provinces such as Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang—some of
the most cosmopolitan areas in the world. They
have been deeply concerned with foreign poli-
cy issues, especially China’s economic integra-
tion with the global economy in an ever-chang-
ing environment.
These new Chinese leaders are cynical about
the moral superiority of the West, resentful of
Western arrogance, and doubtful about the
complete adoption of a Western political system
in China. Yet, they will not refuse to learn from
the West, including Western political ideas and
governmental structures. They are interested in
having a dialogue with the West. Even during
crises such as the tragic incidents in Belgrade
and the EP-3 incident, they understood the
need for cooperation rather than confronta-
tion. What has emerged from the recent inci-
dents should not be apprehension over how
quickly and unpredictably Sino-U.S. relations
may change, but rather how rationally and
capably the top leaders, on both sides, are able
to respond to crises.
Implications for the United States
Interests
What are the implications of new Chinese
leaders and the political trends in China for the
United States? One can argue that these politi-
cal developments in China, especially the ongo-
ing peaceful transition of power to the fourth
generation, converge with the interests of the
United States. The United States does not want
to see the reemergence of a paramount author-
itarian Chinese leader or the rise of a strong
Chinese military regime. Chinese history shows
that a radical and xenophobic foreign policy
often required a charismatic (and paranoid)
leader. None of top leaders of the fourth gen-
eration seems to have such characteristics.
China’s new leaders are, of course, not a
monolithic group. There have been and will con-
tinue to be important variations among them.
But, it is important that we do not identify these
leaders using stereotypes such as conservatives
and liberals, hardliners and softliners, pro-West
and anti-West, pro-globalization and anti-global-
ization. The tension of these Chinese leaders has
more to do with their conflicting interests, deter-
mined by their generational differences, fac-
tions, regions, and social strata, than their differ-
ences in ideologies. These leaders generally have
valid concerns. The United States’ leaders
should attempt to meet with, and continue dia-
logue with, various groups in the Chinese lead-
ership. The United States leaders should explain
more fully U.S. interests, values and principals. It
would be ineffective, with possible unintended
consequences, if the United States should sup-
port one group and oppose another.
15
 Because of the collective characteristics of fundamentally hostile to American values. The
the fourth generation leaders, they will likely Chinese leadership will become increasingly
run the country for ten years or beyond. The diversified. More lawyers, entrepreneurs, public
fifth generation of leaders, which will include intellectuals, and social advocates will permeate
more Western-trained returnees, may take a the upper tiers of power and participate in the
long time to move to a more centrist position in political process and discourse. China's road to
Chinese politics. Therefore, it will be a mistake a more open and liberal state will not be
for the United States to place hope solely on smooth. But its ongoing effort to achieve politi-
the fifth generation, and thus lose the great cal institutionalization and a more collective
opportunity to work with the fourth generation leadership will most likely proceed in that direc-
in various arenas that are important to both tion. The United States should welcome this
countries. development, because global peace and pros-
The fourth generation leaders are capable perity in the 21st century requires a stable,
people, but it remains to be seen whether they cooperative, and responsible China.
are capable enough to handle the daunting
challenges that China faces today. One can
argue that some cleavages within the fourth
generation of leaders, especially the lack of
consensus on major social and economic poli-
cies, are so fundamental that compromise will
become very difficult, if not impossible. On the
international front, while the September 11th
terrorist attacks reduced tensions in U.S.-China
relations, China has been surrounded by an
extremely unstable and increasingly unpre-
dictable external environment. Besides, the
issue of Taiwan and other problems in U.S.-
China relations, though no longer imminent,
still exist. Therefore, the United States should
also be prepared for a scenario that may be
unpleasant for both China and the rest of the
world, including the United States.
New technocratic leaders in China are not
democrats, but they do not have an ideology

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