I

Between the Grounds for Reason and Climate Change: A Revisionary Approach to Palmer James Dohm 56796113 PHIL 435-001 November 22, 2013

II
Ethical debates about the issue of climate change has arose concerns about the effects that it has on species, organisms, ecosystems and sentient animals. Implications of these effects converge on the grounds that if these entities can directly be harmed independent of impacts on humans. I will pursue to summarize Palmer points in the article, and evaluate a selection of central ones, making some objections and revisions throughout her reasoning. Palmer seeks to argue that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases cannot always equate to substantial harm to the non-human world. She begins her reasoning with the following (3) assumptions about the reality of climate change.

1) Climate change is really happening, and that human beings are causally responsible for this. 2) Humans are actors in climate change and have moral responsibility for climate change. 3) Non-humans are of direct moral considerability independent of their utility to humans. Species, ecosystems, non-conscious living organisms, and conscious sentient animals have moral status in their right not to be directly harmed. 1

That being said, assumption 3) is controversial in nature, and if Palmer grants this statement, it doesnt always give way to posit that climate change causes harm. Palmer highlights (5) important facets that deserve consideration when outlining impacts of climate change on nonhuman entities.

a) Climate change does not always bring all entities in question harm, for instance, there may be cases where change may be in an entities interest, and climate change brings about that change. b) Climate change is not always destructive, and in some cases may lead to creation of new entities. Some of what climate change produces will be morally considerable, in addition to what it eliminates. c) Climate change will impact total numbers of entities of different sophistication and advancement.
1

Palmer considers that that the entities listed in 3) may possibly be of moral relevance,

and what climate change might mean ethically if they are accepted to have morally relevant interests.

III
d) Climate change will bring about different entities in the future that would have not existed if climate change never occurred. e) Climate change brings about uncertainty for the concern if more of fewer psychologically sophisticated entities come into existence. Palmers reasoning alternates between a consequentialist view of climate change and a deontological one. Consequentially, climate change can aim to promote existing species, create new species, or allow speciation. From a deontological standpoint, climate change can be viewed in a non-maleficent attitude toward non-human entities. A consequentialist view will be less problematic in the long run. Palmer maintains that climate change will be good for some species and bad for others depending on their sensitivity and susceptibility to the environment. In attempt to advance Palmers argument in connection with c) numbers, I will explain how this argument can be revised. The total numbers view exclaims that climate change affects future non-human entities total number of, and complexity of the consciousness of the entity in question. Assuming that a future-earth has pre-existing entities that are conscious or not conscious or new entities that are conscious or not conscious- there are (2) possibilities adopted by Palmer.

i) Simpler, non-conscious entities will come into being and instead of more complex nonconscious or conscious ones. Palmer calls this the simplification worry. ii) Entities will be affected negatively, this means, that for the simplification worry to be of moral concern, adopting that some organisms have greater moral significance than others must be employed.

I submit to explain how these points are not sufficient in covering the grounds of the numbers argument. I do accept that climate change will have a vast effect on numbers of organisms in a certain environment; however in specific instances, there may be such severe cases where some vulnerable species would have minimal benefits and be threatened in devastating ways to force non-existence. Yes, similar entities will exist and they may be insignificant due to the deficit of sentient properties, yet that doesnt permit acts that kill of certain species because their lack for a criterion of our choosing.

IV
Palmer makes a claim in b) about climate change not always destroying entities, and sometimes it can produce entities. The entities created by climate change are a byproduct of greenhouse gas emissions on the planetary atmosphere. I may propose a similar argument as follows:

If I present a small shark, and then expose it to pollution and harm, does it follow that the act in itself is not destructive? Even if morally considerable entities emerge from this destruction?

Propositions that effect climate change confront serious issues in responsibilities across individuals, countries and nature2. All nations collectively contribute to climate change and global warming- albeit some more than others. Hence a tragedy of the commons structure unfolds into the hands of Planet Earth. However let me explore another point regarding b). In light of the unfortunate misdemeanor of human err; global warming and climate change is an undeniable reality. Because that reality exists, there serves no purpose to speculate about organisms that previously existed with new ones that could potentially also have moral consideration. Exploring some topics Palmer lacked in her article was consideration of countries and demographics with their involuntary exposure to climate change. Ethical considerations following non-human entities, living amongst societies that value health and wellness in their species has some concerns in itself. A recent study showed that those regions experiencing the largest increase in climate change, causing diseases that foster that breed in high temperatures in the past 30 years, was surprisingly those populations that had the least carbon emissions3. Another topic that Palmer fails to address is the question of endangered species and their stance in conservation policy and ethics surrounding climate change. It is clear that environmental policies and regulations deal with endangered species, but often they fail in

2 3

Gardiner. Ethics and global climate change. 555-600. Patz et al., Climate change and global health: quantifying a growing ethical crisis. 397-

405.

V
considering the interaction between species within its familial system4. Most ecologists have a belief that the current knowledge of resource scientists may actually be harming the species they are protecting- nonetheless, ecologists attempt to adhere to the best conservation practice based on the best science. Biological consequences are having effects on species across the globe because of increased amounts of greenhouse gas concentrations5. Some strength of Palmers article was when it referred to consequentialism and the concept that good can be summed. This is an important observation as it refers to utility and the comparing of options. The more complex organisms often mean the more valuable the world. There will always be a spectrum of entities that exist in a conscious sense and entities that exist in a less conscious sense. Often the proper action will be the action which maximizes the most utility6. Weighing the pros and cons of an idea will sometimes create a good future that will be self-dictated and possess control. When climate change is practically considered, consequentialism fits the bill quite well. On the consequentialist view, Palmer points out that what matters is based on whether climate change creates a better or worse world over allindependent of human preference satisfaction. Viewing climate change as an inevitable fact (irreversible reality), consequentialism is an attractive option to consider, especially if the importance is placed on the consequences of an action. Alternatively, a deontological view, or a rights view, suggests animals have fundamental rights. If climate change kills animals, then the reality that some animals benefit, doesnt justify the harm. A deontological perspective would be one that has most probability to be rejected, because if concludes that animals hold rights and we are guilty for violating those rights. Humans are primarily responsible for global warming; therefore climate change harming animals is the fault of humans and doesnt depend on consequences. Deontological perspectives are excellent for deciding justice and rights; however they dont consider situations characteristics and the benefits or downfalls to a decision. Both consequentialist and deontological concerns should be recognized in the two areas of justice7. A
4

Soul et al., Strongly interacting species: conservation policy, management, and ethics. Hughes. Biological consequences of global warming: is the signal already apparent?. Utility: maximizing happiness and reducing suffering. Paavola et al. "Justice and adaptation to climate change. 23.

55.
5

56-61.
6 7

VI
distinction between a rights based approach and a utility based approach is not only a scholarly distinction. It is something that lies in the decisions of governments, local municipalities, academia and the stress between decisions to be made8. The greatest number or the greatest good is the question. Deontology and consequentialism is the answer. In conclusion, Palmer sought to defend her proposition that ethical decisions about climate change should target their focus toward her 5 criteria. The criteria include that not all climate change is harmful to entities, not all climate change is destructive, climate change impacts the total number of entities, climate change produces different entities that would have not existed had climate change not occurred, and climate change brings out uncertainty for concern that less psychologically sophisticated entities come to existence. Palmer alternates between consequentialism and deontology relating to utilitarianism and the rights view. Palmer promotes that climate change does not always destroy entities- besides that fact; it doesnt always make it right. In addition to this, propositions that I demonstrated represented that the roles that countries and entities play did not always contribute to the misdemeanor of climate change. Deontological perspectives often place rights that some entities possess and must always possess; while utilitarianism takes the utility approach where good can be summed. Palmer sought to show that climate change can sometimes have effects that are not always negative, although, in this case the negatives outweigh the positives by and large. More importantly, considering the arguments presented, one needs to evaluate rights and benefits based on their moral compass.

Rayner et al.,Equity Concerns in Climate Change.

11-43.

VII
Bibliography Gardiner, Stephen M. "Ethics and global climate change." Ethics 114, no. 3 (2004): 555-600. Paavola, Jouni, and W. Neil Adger. "Justice and adaptation to climate change."Tyndall Centre Working Pap 23 (2002). Rayner, S., Malone, E. L. and Thompson, M. (1999) Equity issues and integrated assessment. In Toth, F. L. (ed.) Fair Weather? Equity Concerns in Climate Change. Earthscan: London pp. 11-43. Soul, Michael E., James A. Estes, Brian Miller, and Douglas L. Honnold. "Strongly interacting species: conservation policy, management, and ethics."BioScience 55, no. 2 (2005): 168176. Patz, Jonathan A., Holly K. Gibbs, Jonathan A. Foley, Jamesine V. Rogers, and Kirk R. Smith. "Climate change and global health: quantifying a growing ethical crisis." EcoHealth 4, no. 4 (2007): 397-405.