A2 Philosophy Revision

Platos Republic: Appearance and reality

Platos epistemology is passive i.e., he believes that there is an objective form of truth that e can discover! this is opposed to active "herefore, he believes that there are absolute moral values to hich e should adhere #iet$sche holds the opposite, perspectivist vie point: truth is subjective and socially determined Plato holds a t o% orld vie : &' "he realm of appearance the e(ternal orld, consisting of objects)particulars, hich are those of opinion and belief 2' "he intelligible realm reality only accessible through reason! true *no ledge +the ,orms

The Forms
"he ,orms cannot be accessed through e(perience, so are a priori

,orms -n.ualified bearers of predicates they are simple and cannot be bro*en do n into further parts

Particulars /ualified bearers of predicates they are comple( and can al ays be analysed in terms of parts

0mmutable they do not change over time 1utable they change over time! notably by decaying 3tatic As they do not change over time, it 0n motion follo s that they do not move either 2ternal they have al ays e(isted and al ays ill e(ist. 3ome commentators interpret this as meaning that they are outside of time "ranscendent the intelligible realm is outside of space A priori "ransitory they come into e(istence and then fade a ay over time 2ss enti ally , the

0mmanent the orld of appearances is the spatial orld e e(ist in A posteriori

intelligible realm is one here everything is fi(ed and not subject to change! and the realm of appearances is one of constant change and flu(

Plato as influenced by 4eraclitus, he reports: 5Heraclitus says somewhere that everything gives way and nothing stands fast, and likening the things that are to the flowing of a river, he says that you cannot step into the same river twice Plato, 6ratylus 7&889a, p&2:' Plato agreed ith 4eraclitus, but as deeply unsatisfied ith this as an account to ultimate nature of being 4e thought that the realm of the ,orms must e(ist in order to provide a set of values e must aspire to and live by

"he argument from opposites 6ommencing from line ;9< in The Republic, Plato offers an argument for the ,orms, as follo s: 4e distinguishes bet een those ho have access to the ,orms and those ho only have access to the realm of appearances "he former are the philosophers! the latter are =Sight-lovers and art-lovers and practical men !who" are delighted #y #eautiful sounds and colours and shapes, and the works of art which make use of them$ Plato 7&8>9, ;9?b' Plato is distinguishing bet een the beauty conceived in its pure form, and the beauty displayed in particulars "he sight%lover perceives beauty at the level of the particular, but Plato believes e can contemplate a pure ,orm in the abstract 4e dra s a distinction bet een the ,orm and its particulars according to the above table 4e argues that .ualities all have opposites these include: &' @eauty)ugliness 2' Austice)injustice B' Cood)evil 0f a particular possesses one .uality, it must also possess the opposite ,or e(ample, a painting may contain some elements hich are less harmonious than others, and a beautiful person may become less beautiful as he or she ages

 Particulars contain opposites as they are relative to each other ,or e(ample, the statement painting A is more beautiful than painting @, also means that painting A is not as ugly as painting @. Dhen applied to particulars, difference in individual perspective means that binary opposites dont function as mutually e(clusive terms Plato claims that there are absolute versions of .ualities % hich are accessible through reason % and are the basis on hich the particulars are judged 0f a particular contains both a .uality and its opposite, then *no ledge of the relationship of that .uality to the particular is impossible "his leads to the faculties argument

The faculties argument

Plato argues that our faculties, e.g. the faculty of reason and the faculty of sight, have rigid boundaries i.e. a facultys field is uni.ue to that faculty 4e argues that *no ledge and opinion are separate faculties, hich leads to this critical piece of dialogue: 5Since knowledge is related to what is, and ignorance, necessarily to what is not, we shall have to find out whether what lies #etween them there corresponds something #etween ignorance and knowledge, if there is such a thing$ +%es$ +&snt there something we call opinion' +(f course +&s it the same faculty as knowledge or different' +)ifferent$ +So opinion and knowledge must have different correlates corresponding to their difference of faculty' +They must$ +Then knowledge is related to what is, and knows what is as it is$ Plato 7&8>9, ;99a%c'

 0t is disputed hat Plato means by +is in this passage 4e is not concerned ith the e(istential +is, found in a proposition such as =he is5 0f e accept that he means e can only truly *no that hich e(ists, the corollary ould be that Plato ould be committed to the absurd position of e could only be ignorant of hat doesnt e(ist 0f opinion lies bet een *no ledge and opinion, Plato is surely not implying that its objects simultaneously do and do not e(ist 0t seems li*ely his focus is upon +is as a form of prediction, or attribute of a property "his ould give us the follo ing definitions: &' Eno ledge is related to hat is 0 *no property p of x, if and only if 0 attribute p to x, and p is true of x 2' 0gnorance is related to hat is not 0 am ignorant of property p of x, if and only if 0 attribute p to x and p is not true of x. B' Fpinion lies bet een *no ledge and ignorance 0 believe property p of x, if 0 attribute p to x, hether or not p is true of x. 3o a ,orm is an un.ualified bearer of a predicate "he ,orms 7e.g. beauty' capture the essence of a ,orm they are pure Particulars never possess the .uality 7e.g. beauty' in its +pure state "he Mona Lisa painting is a concrete e(ample e may say ="he 1ona Gisa is beautiful5, but this isnt a necessary truth, as it is my not be perceived as beautiful from all cultural positions ,urthermore, it may degrade in time and become less beautiful "hus, the 1ona Gisa is not un.ualified, pure beauty. 3o the statement ="he 1ona Gisa is beautiful5 is both true and not true "o Plato, this is opinion, not *no ledge 4e ma*es a further claim about the distinction bet een *no ledge and opinion: 5* little while ago you agreed that knowledge and opinion were different$ %es, he replied, #ecause no reasona#le person would identify the infalli#le with the falli#le Plato 7&8>9, ;99e' Eno ledge is infallible and necessarily true! opinion is fallible and may or not be true Dhen e have *no ledge of something e are certain of the fact. Plato ta*es this as common *no ledge De may thin* e *no things in the realm of the particulars, but e can never be certain, as everything is contingent.

Plato lin*s infallibility ith the intelligible realm if e can contemplate a thing, e can distinguish it from particulars, hich e hold just opinion of "his leaves the .uestion open as to hether a reasonable person ould dispute this point, as it less commonsensical as Plato ma*es it out to be "his is only an argument for some of the ,orms! Plato e(plicitly states that every object in the orld has a ,orm "he argument from opposites succeeds if, in order to have certain *no ledge of one part of a binary opposition, one must be able to have access to the pure ,orm of it 4o ever, it is hard to see ho an object li*e a bed or a toaster ould have an opposite "he material bed is only a partial representation of its ,orm, but it difficult to see ho this or*s in the same ay as the distinction bet een, say, beauty and ugliness ,or Plato, there is a sharp distinction bet een objects as particulars and objects as self% predicating ,orms

*ccess to the Forms 0n seeing the oppositions ithin particulars, our minds are actively dra n to focus upon these, and to abstract the .ualities from the particular in order to focus on the un.ualified aspect 3o e move from the visible 7particular' to the intelligible 7the ,orm' 0n reply to the criticism about the ,orm of the @ed, e can focus on the essentials that constitute the particulars Plato is a rationalist this can be contrasted ith the empiricist vie points of @er*eley and 4ume. 4e denies that e(perience itself leads to *no ledge 4e believes that reason itself leads us to genuine truths, unli*e Hescartes 6lassical rationalism that employs hyperbolic doubt on a firm epistemological basis to discover truths

+evels of truth
Hifferent levels of reality imply a hierarchy of truth! particulars parta*e less in the ,orms as they move do n the scale

 "he ,orm is the pure version of the object, the particular is less pure, and the artists representation of the object is less pure still. As Plato says, 5The artists representation stands at third remove from reality Plato 7&8>9, <89e' "his theory forms the basis of Platos argument for the censorship and banning of art in "he Republic: 5&f he the poet Homer" really knew a#out the things he represented, he would devote himself to them and not to their representations, he would try to leave #ehind him the memory of many deeds well done, and #e more an-ious to #e praised himself than to write in praise of others$ Plato 7&8>9, <88b' Plato also divides the ,orms themselves he does this by claiming there is a superior ,orm that the rest are dependent on "his is the ,orm of the Cood: +good meant in both .ualitative and ethical terms 0n this case, the Cood relates both to that hich is the most perfect e(ample of something, and that hich provides actions ith positive moral value ,or neo%Platonic 6hristians, the ,orm of the Cood corresponds to Cod

The Sun
"here is no direct argument for the ,orm of the Cood in "he Republic Gi*e the concept of infallibility, Plato imports it as a given:

5%ou have certainly often #een told that the highest form of knowledge is knowledge of the form of the good, from which things are .ust and so on derive their usefulness and value$ Plato 7&8>9, <:<a' 4e ta*es it for granted that his audience shares his conception of the Cood "he simile of the sun illustrates the role of the ,orm of the Cood in his metaphysics, as belo :

3un 3ource of light in the visible realm Allo s particulars to gro

,orm of the Cood 3ource of truth in the intelligible realm 0mparts reality to the ,orms

Gights the orld and allo s the eyes to see 0mparts intelligibility and allo s the mind to *no

Plato is not claiming that reason cannot function only directly in light of the Cood, just that e can use it more efficiently and reliably ith the Cood "his is analogous to the eye e can see ith the aid of artificial light or the light of the moon, but not as ell as e could ith light from the sun De cannot fully access the ,orms ithout reason:

5/ust as it was right to think of light and sight as #eing like the sun, #ut wrong to think of them as #eing the sun itself, so here again it is right to think of knowledge and truth as #eing like the good, #ut wrong to think of either of them as #eing the good, whose positions must #e ranked still higher$ Plato 7&8>9, <:>e%<:8c' "he ,orm of the Cood imparts reality onto the other ,orms as they parta*e in it 0f one is able to separate the ,orms from the Cood, surely they are not so simple after all Fne response is that the ,orm of the Cood supplies a notion of +complete perfection to the other ,orms so any ,orm ould be comprehensible if one understood this notion of perfection "he generalised notion of perfection may be re.uired to access the other ,orms

The divided line

"he divided line illustrates different levels of truth "he gradations in the line illustrate ho one moves up the line in order to arrive at

contemplation and the ,orm of the Cood 0t is part of his educational programme, and justifies hy mathematics is an important part of the education of the philosopher Platos claim for mathematics as a route to the ,orms is that, as mathematical figures are more abstract than most particulars that e encounter, or*ing through mathematical proofs is training our mind to thin* in the abstract De can then move from mathematics to dialectic, here e abstract un.ualified predicates from particulars 1athematicians such as A.#. Dhitehead have been dra n to ards Platonic theories /uestions about the reality of numbers are amenable to e(planation in terms of the theory of the ,orms #umbers are universal there is an issue s to hat it means to claim the number t o is a +real number Fther accomplished philosophers, such as Hescartes and Geibni$, have been mathematicians perhaps the t o disciplines lend themselves to each otherI "he lo er end of the line divides into illusion and belief @elief is associated ith studies of the material orld 0llusion corresponds to copies of the objects of belief, such as artistic representation

The cave
"he cave is the most important simile in "he Republic it encapsulates the similes of the sun and divided line, and represents Platos many concerns "he main concerns are: &' "o illustrate Platos metaphysical claims about appearance and reality and *no ledge and belief, and the process of education as the philosopher moves to ards *no ledge of the Cood 2' "o reinforce the role of the ,orm of the Cood by e(tending the simile of the sun B' "o illustrate the role of the ,orms in Platos ethical theory and the political implications ;' "o illustrate hat Plato thin*s that the role of the philosopher in society should be, his actual status, and hy it is undervalued De shall address the first t o points

JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ 0nsert)refer to diagram of the caveJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ

"he cave corresponds to the visible realm, hile the orld outside the cave corresponds to the intelligible "here are subdivisions of each realm according to the line "he journey of the prisoner ho is mysteriously released from his bonds then illustrates the results of thorough philosophical education on one ho is suited to it Eey aspects are: &' the bound prisoners are at the level of illusion all they see are shado s and reflections. 0t is not obvious hether seeing nothing but shado s is ever a feature of everyday life. De must assume that, as the cave d ellers are at the level of opinion, that the shado s and reflected noises stand for opinions pic*ed up from others, and possibly ra sensory e(perience 2' the prisoner turns and becomes accustomed to the light he notices men ma*ing shado s ith objects, but copies of objects. "his is *no n as double deception! sometimes characterised by those ho carry them. "he passage of the prisoner seeing the shado s arent real, to the fact the objects arent real, to the fact that the men are carrying the objects is indicative of the passage from ignorance to even firmer belief B' "he fire performs the same role in the cave as the sun does outside the fire is a false ,orm of the Cood that the prisoners opinions are based upon and judged upon ;' "he prisoner is forcibly dragged up the steep slope this represents the rigours of education. Presumably, those forcing him along are his teachers. 2very stage in the simile is either difficult to traverse or painful on the eyes. "he implication is that many ill either turn bac* or stop before they reach the final stage! they are reluctant to see the truth <' "he outside the reflections of objects in ater represent the geometrical figures and so on that comprise mathematical studies. "hey are more real than the objects in the cave, but not as real as the objects themselves, hich are of course, the ,orms ?' "he sun at first, the ,orms can only be seen in a dim manner, but as the philosophers training reaches completion, he is able to see them in the full light of the sun, or Cood, and finally loo* at the sun itself. 0t is by loo*ing at the objects in relation to the sun that he is able to understand the seasons, etc. hich is to say, ho the forms relate to, and parta*e of, the ,orm of the Cood

0ounter arguments1 knowledge2opinion

1any commentators thin* Platos claim about *no ledge and opinion is unsustainable, or constitutes a radical definition of hat *no ledge is 0t is .uestionable hether Plato is tal*ing about *no ledge as e commonly understand the term De can argue that if *no ledge is to be e.uated ith certainty, e can be certain about things ithout reference to the ,orms ,or e(ample, 0 can be sure of the relationship bet een particulars. ,or e(ample, 0 may not be certain of all aspects of a bed or pillo , but the statement that a pillo is laying on my bed is surely true and not just a matter of opinion. 3o once a proposition is conte(tualised, it can become certain. ,or instance, the proposition, =the 1ona Gisa is beautiful5 may not be true for all time, but to claim that it as)is beautiful from a particular cultural perspective at a point in time does seem to be true for all time De can attac* Plato ith Havid 4umes +necessary relations of ideas. 0t can be argued that e can be certain of statements that are true independent of e(perience, for e(ample, +bachelors are unmarried men. 3urely e can believe this ithout *no ing it to be the case. Platos account brea*s do n here 4o ever, Aulia Annas offered a revised reading of Plato, claiming he is not committed to saying e can only have *no ledge of the ,orms rather e can only hold *no ledge of the ,orms, never opinion Although, Annas admits that some passages of "he Republic cannot be read in this ay 2ssentially, these commentators are saying that Platos account of the ,orms is inconsistent

0ontradiction'
"here is a further problem of consistency in Platos set up of the argument of opposites: 5Since #eauty and ugliness are opposites, they are two$ (f course$ *nd as they are two, each of them is single$ That is so$ Plato 7&8>9, ;9<e%;9?a' "his introduces the idea that particulars can simultaneously parta*e of a ,orm and its

opposite in order to sho that e cannot have *no ledge of them

4o ever, it is clearly stated in the simile of the sun that all ,orms parta*e in the ,orm of the Cood and a movement a ay from the ,orm, via particulars, and so forth is one of decay or corruption "he clear implication is that the ,orm isnt in an opposing pair, but is the appro(imated the further one moves a ay from it "his seems reasonable in terms of the simile of the sun, but it is hard to see ho the perfect ,orm of ugliness parta*es in the ,orm of the Cood. "here seems to be no reconciling argument ith the argument from opposites Also, one of Platos e(amples of paired opposites is good and evil. 0t is hard to see ho the ,orm of 2vil could parta*e in the ,orm of the Cood 0n the simile of the sun, e ould say there is light and dar*ness, and the latter is absence of the former dar*ness does no parta*e in the sun in any ay hatsoever "here seems to be no ay to resolve the contradiction here

The status of 3latos similes

Are Platos similes framed as arguments or just simply illustrationsI 0f the latter, cant e simply reject the analogyI 0n the simile of the cave, if e grant Plato his initial premises, the rest of the steps are corollaries, but hy ould e grant this set upI A realist could object that our situation is in no ay analogous to that of the prisoners! they may respond that there is no cave and the only orld is that of the sunlight in hich e spend our days 0f e ta*e this position, it is hard to see ho a simile could have the po er to convince us other ise "here is also a tension bet een Platos attitude to ards art i.e. that artistic representation is in the category of illusion and is removed from reality and his use of similes Dhat is a simile if it is not a representation of an argument opposed to the proper argument itselfI 0f Plato is correct in saying that art or* is someho second%hand and distorts the truth, then his similes must suffer from the same objection! the similes are inferior to rational argument

*ristotle on the Forms

Aristotle found the ,orms deeply unsatisfactory for many reasons "he first objection is *no n as the problem of the third man 7Metaphysics, &8>;'

0f e ta*e man as an e(ample, Plato claims there are particular men, all of hom share a common .uality hich defines them as men done by parta*ing in the ,orm of 1an Aristotle argues that in order for the t o categories of particulars and ,orms to relate to each other, they must share something in common hich can be identified as such 0f e ta*e Plato seriously as to the relationship bet een .ualities, this ne common .uality must be due to another entity that they all parta*e in, and e call this +the third man 3o e have introduced another element. 0f e loo* at a group of three elements, the reason they relate to each other is because they share something identifiable in common: e re.uire a +fourth man in order to relate them all together De can continue in this process ad infinitum and are stuc* in vicious infinite regress, here the ,orms of the ,orms have ,orms, and so on Aristotles second objection, found in The Nichomachean Ethics is a t o%fold attac*. ,irstly, he points out there is not one universal +good that means the same henever e apply it: 5Things can #e called good in two senses1 some as good in their own right, and others as means to secure these! Therefore good is not a common characteristic corresponding to one idea$ Aristotle 72::;, p&&%&2'

"his ould imply there is no single, unifying, ,orm of the Cood ,urthermore, Aristotle .uestions hether the ,orm of the Cood could have any practical advantage gained from contemplating it:

54hat advantage is his art will a weaver or a .oiner get from knowledge of the good-itself' (r how will one who has had a vision of the idea itself #ecome there#y a #etter doctor or general' Aristotle 72::;, p&B' Plato fails to distinguish bet een the theoretical and practical *no ledge he assumes that *no ing something in the abstract puts that *no ledge to practical use Aust because 0 might *no hat a doctor does and have a good *no ledge of medicine, that does not mean 0 ill necessarily have the s*ills to ma*e a good doctor

&mitation

Plato thin*s there is a hierarchy of imitation that moves a ay from the ,orms and

decreases in value as it does so 4o ever, just because something, li*e a or* of art, is far removed from the ,orms, does this mean e cannot learn anything from itI Rosalind 4ursthouse gives the follo ing e(ample:

5(ne might still think that some knowledge of reality could #e gained even from something which stood at a third remove from it$ &f & am trying to gain true knowledge of the Form of the 5ird, for e-ample, might not my search for this knowledge #e aided #y pictures of #irds the like of which & have never seen, #rought from other countries' Few of us have seen kiwis, it is the pictures of them that aid us towards the knowledge that 6as 3lato might say7 the Form of the 5ird is not that of a winged creature$ 4ursthouses e(ample indicates there is a possibility of improving ones grasp of the ,orm by a consideration of the imitations of particulars Perhaps a different approach to the problem of universals and particulars is re.uired. Dittgenstein highlights one such approach:

50onsider for e-ample the proceedings we call games$ & mean #oard games, card-games, #all games, (lympic games, and so on$ 4hat is common to them all' 8 )ont say1 There must #e something common, or they would not #e called 9games 8 #ut look and see whether there is anything common to all$ For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, #ut similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that$ To repeat1 dont think, #ut look: 8 +ook for e-ample at #oard games, with multifarious relationships$ ;ow pass to card games, here you find many correspondences with the first group, #ut many common features drop out and others appear$ !" *nd the result of this e-amination is1 we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing, sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail$ & can think of no #etter e-pression to characteri<e these similarities than family resem#lances$ Dittgenstein 7&882, pB&%2' Dittgensteins approach could accommodate 4ursthouses e(ample of the *i i ,urthermore, his claim about the grouping of particulars by a net or* of resemblances debases Platos argument for the ,orms, as it is no longer the case that a given particular need to share any resemblances ith a second one! they could be grouped by a third "o ta*e the e(ample of games: % K is said to be a game because it possesses property p % L is said to be a game because it shares property p ith K. 0t also possesses property q

% M is said to be a game because it shares property q ith L. Although it shares no properties ith K 7including property p), both are games because of their 7differing' resemblances to L. Fn Platos account, p ould be the ,orm of the Came, so M could not possibly be a game 4o ever, the definition is much more informal than Plato ould have us believe, as M can be identified as a game because of its relation to L, via q "he definition of +game can shift as ne resemblances are recognised or generated "his e(planation complies ith Aristotles +third man argument as, far from particulars having to share a common .uality via an entity above them, the relationship is entirely bet een particulars ithout the ,orm "his position also solves the problem of infinite regress, and there is no necessity of a +third man to relate ,orms to particulars