ADM. CASE NO.

5151

October 19, 2004

PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR., complainants, vs. ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA, respondent. Facts: This is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M. Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct. Complainants allege that respondent, a former Municipal Trial Court Judge, abandoned his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour, Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G. Marcos; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente have been cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy. Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro; respondent had fathered two children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates of their two daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986, making it appear that their two children are legitimate, while in respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC during the 1995 elections, respondent declared that his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia; in respondents certificate of candidacy for the 1998 elections, he declared his civil status as separated; such declarations in the birth certificates of his children and in his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting falsification of public documents; and respondents acts betray his lack of good moral characte r and constitute grounds for his removal as a member of the bar. Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states complainants illegally procured copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such documents are inadmissible in evidence; respondent did not participate in the preparation and submission with the local civil registry of subject birth certificates; respondent never declared that he had two wives, as he has always declared that he is separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V. Valderia; and complainants have used this issue against him during elections and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected him as Mayor, hence, respondent has not offended the publics sense of morality. The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings. Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit that he received a letter from a concerned citizen, informing him that respondent was married to Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael, Bulacan, on January 16, 1980, but respondent abandoned his wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente. Attached to the letter was a photocopy of a Certification issued by the Civil Register attesting to the marriage between respondent and Felicitas Valderia. He also received information from concerned citizens that Marilyn dela Fuente is also legally married to one Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by a Certification from the Office of the Civil Register.

Respondent stated in his Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to Felicitas Valderia. In respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1998, he declared his civil status as separated. Respondent has represented to all that he is married to Marilyn dela Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where respondent holds the position of Chairman of the Board of the Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said newspaper as husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina. The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as his direct testimony, is practically identical to that of witness Melgar. Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting of photocopies which were admitted by respondents counsel to be faithful reproductions of the originals or certified true copies thereof, to wit: a letter of one Luis Bermudez informing Nelson Melgar of respondents immoral acts, the Certification of the Local Civil Registrar of San Rafael, Bulacan, attesting to the celebration of the marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia, the Birth Certificate of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza, the Birth Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza,7 the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 9, 1995, the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 25, 1998, Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated October 27, 1998, attesting to the marriage celebrated between Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos, and the editorial page of the Naujanews (February-March 1999 issue), wherein it was stated that respondent has two daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente. Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence and merely submitted a memorandum expounding on his arguments that the testimonies of complainants witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their documentary evidence have no probative weight. On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2004123, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondents violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he is no longer cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has abandoned such immoral course of conduct. Issue: 1. Whether or not respondent is guilty of Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2. Whether or not the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza are admissible as evidence.

Held: 1. The Court finds such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully supported by the pleadings and evidence on record, and, hence, approve and adopt the same. The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings which is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conviction. By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo, and corroborated by the documentary exhibits will show that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a certain Marilyn de la Fuente who is not his wife and that out of said cohabitation respondent sired two children. Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good moral character is a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law [Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586 (1956); Cordova vs. Cordova 179 SCRA 680 (1989); People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA 682 (1990)]. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage" [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1 (1997)]. The evidence presented shows that respondent no longer possess (sic) that good moral character necessary as a condition for him to remain a member of the Bar in good standing. He is therefore not entitled to continue to engage in the practice of law. 2. The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and the Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records of an entry of a marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980, are public documents and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, as provided for under Article 410 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, are admissible. Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993. Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a

person from interference by the government or the state. Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.

G.R. No. L-36824 September 11, 1979 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARISTON GUILLERMO, CARLITO ABORDE, RONITO CULLO and JESUS CULLO, defendants-appellants. Facts: The Lower Court found accused Ariston Guillermo, Carlito Aborde, Ronito Cullo and Jesus Cullo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery in band with homicide defined and penalized in Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Articles 293 and 296 of the same Code. Accused-appellants Jesus and Ronito Cullo filed a separate brief from that filed by accusedappellants Ariston Guillermo and Carlito Aborde, all accused-appellants raising almost Identical issues as alleged errors of the trial court, namely: (1) the trial court's admitting in evidence Exhibits "A" and "B", alleged extrajudicial confessions of Ariston Guillermo and Carlito Aborde; (2) in relying on the evidence of the prosecution both oral and documentary which have disturbing inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities; (3) in not believing the testimonies of the witnesses and documentary evidence for accused-appellants; (4) in convicting the accused-appellants. Accused-appellants Ariston Guillermo and Carlito Aborde also raised the issue that the lower court allegedly erred in holding that the suspects were sufficiently Identified and in relying thereon as basis of conviction when in truth and in fact they were allegedly victims of a frame-up. It is firmly established by evidence that at about 5:30 A.M. of May 10, 1972, at Barrio Lamonan, Passi Iloilo, near the residence of Vicente Gardoce and his wife Demetria Castor, there occurred an incident where Billardo Gardoce was shot and killed with a homemade shotgun during a robbery wherein Vicente Gardoce was compelled to give the malefactors P500 cash, one 22 caliber paltik revolver, and one 12-ga. homemade shotgun. The prosecution's version of the crime, established principally by the testimony of witnesses Vicente Gardoce and Benedicto. Accused-appellants Ariston Guillermo and Carlito Aborde denied participation in the crime. They testified that when they denied participation in the crime, he was maltreated and that because of continued maltreatment by policemen, Carlito Aborde and Ariston Guillermo signed confessions. Accused-appellants Ronito Cullo and Jesus Cullo testified that they did not know of the death of Billardo Gardoce until they were jailed in Passi; that both Ronito and Jesus Cullo were arrested May 19, 1972 in their house at sitio Dumalagamba, Cuartero, Capiz; and that they were severely maltreated by policemen but they refused to sign confessions before the Municipal Judge of Passi. Focus is made on the crucial issue of admissibility of Exhibits "A" and "B", the alleged extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants Carlito Aborde and Ariston Guillermo.

An examination of Exhibits "A" and "B", written in English, will readily show that they were prepared by another person, both Ariston Guillermo and Carlito Aborde, affiants therein being without knowledge of the English language. The Chief of Police Alfonso Palmares of Passi Iloilo, admitted that he prepared the affidavits of Ariston Guillermo and Carlito Aborde. Both Ariston Guillermo and Carlito Aborde stated that at first they refused to sign Exhibits "A" and "B" but later they signed because they were threatened with further maltreatment if they would not sign the confessions. Accused Ronito and Jesus Cullo also stated that they were maltreated and threatened to sign confessions but they refused. Municipal Judge Mariano Basa, Jr., of Passi Iloilo, before whom Exhibits "A" and "B" were supposed to have been voluntarily subscribed and sworn to, admitted in his testimony that before the signing of Exhibits "A" and "B", Judge Basa, Jr. asked the affiants if they would sign the declaration and "they said no". 9 Judge Basa, Jr. also admitted that he did not remember how many times the accused Ariston Guillermo and Carlito Aborde were brought to his office to sign Exhibits "A" and "B. Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of Guillermo and Aborde are admissible. Held: There being reasonably sufficient doubts on the voluntariness of Exhibits "A" and "B", Court cannot sustain the lower court's stand on their admissibility as evidence for prosecution. There is no alternative but to rule that the lingering reasonable doubt on voluntariness of the extrajudicial confessions Exhibits "A" and "B" should be in favor of accused and against their admissibility as evidence. the the the the

Regarding the accused-appellants Cullo brothers, the extrajudicial confessions Exhibits "A" and "B", assuming arguendo that they are admissible as evidence, cannot be used as evidence against the Cullo brothers because of the "res inter alios acta" rule, since the declarations against interest or confessions of Ariston Guillermo and Carlito Aborde are admissible and effective against themselves alone, in the absence of independent evidence of conspiracy among Ariston Guillermo, Carlito Aborde and the Cullo brothers. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Under the circumstances, the direct testimony of Vicente and Benedicto Gardoce as to the participation of the Cullo brothers in the crime remains in serious doubt. Without the extrajudicial confessions Exhibits "A" and "B" of Guillermo and Aborde implicating the Cullo brothers, and there being serious doubts on the direct testimony of Vicente and Benedicto Gardoce regarding the participation of the Cullo brothers in the crime, there remains a reasonable doubt in their favor which materially strengthens the alibi they established. There is truth to the trial court's stand that even without exhibits "A" and "B", the direct evidence presented by the testimonies of Vicente and Benedicto Gardoce supported by other

evidence, sufficiently established the guilt of Ariston Guillermo and Carlito Aborde beyond doubt, as the said evidence from the very beginning pointed unerringly at Guillermo and Aborde, together with two others, who committed the crime, Guillermo as the one who shot Billardo Gardoce and who received the P500 and the guns, and Carlito Aborde who allegedly fired a shot in the air to threaten Vicente Gardoce to give in to their demand The trial court's decision is affirmed and sustained with respect to the conviction of and penalty imposed on accused- appellants Ariston Guillermo and Carlito Aborde who committed the crime with two others who have not been Identified; and reversed and set aside with respect to accused-appellants Ronito Cullo and Jesus Cullo who are acquitted, on the ground of reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. 121422

February 23, 1999

NOEL CRUZ y DIGMA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH VI, MANILA, respondents. Facts: On June 19, 1990, police officers arrested petitioner without warrant for illegal possession of a .38 caliber revolver with six (6) rounds of ammunition while waiting outside the Manila Pavilion Hotel along U.N. Ave., Manila. The trial court proceeded to try the case. After the prosecution presented and formally offered its evidence, the trial court issued an order dated January 18, 1993, admitting in evidence the gun and ammunition seized from the accused, over his objections. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner, on motion and upon leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence. On December 20, 1993, the trial court denied the demurrer, and ordered the accused to present his evidence. Instead, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in an order dated July 8, 1994. On October 27, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the three (3) orders, namely: the order admitting the prosecution's formal offer of evidence; the order denying his demurrer to evidence; and the order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, for being issued capriciously, arbitrarily and whimsically, in utter disregard of controlling law and jurisprudence, and with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On November 7, 1994, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and ordered the trial court to temporarily refrain from further proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 9085059. On August 8, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision denying the petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals ruled that the assailed orders were interlocutory in nature and not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioner should wait until the trial court has decided the case on its merits and if aggrieved, appeal from his conviction. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's order admitting the allegedly inadmissible evidence involved questions of facts, which are not reviewable in petitions for certiorari. There being no error in jurisdiction, whatever error in judgment committed by the trial court can not be corrected by certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's order admitting in evidence the gun and ammunition, which are allegedly inadmissible for being the fruits of an illegal warrantless arrest and search.

Held: Petition is denied. The Court finds no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari. The rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari, but may be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case. When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the accused, any error in the application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court after it has acquired jurisdiction over a case, may be corrected only by appeal. The trial court, in resolving petitioner's motion for reconsideration, squarely addressed the above contentions. The trial court ruled that the seized evidence was admissible, and that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction, if the accused presented no contrary evidence. The Court finds neither error nor patent abuse of discretion in the rulings of the trial court on these issues. Thus, upon the denial of petitioner's demurrer to evidence, he may present his evidence. After trial on the merits, and the court issues a verdict of conviction, petitioner may seasonably appeal such decision, raising once again his defenses and objections.

G.R. No. 123546 July 2, 1998 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOERAL GALLENO, accused-appellant.

Facts: Accused-appellant Joeral Galleno seeks reversal of the judgment of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Roxas City, relying on the defense of denial. Since the case involves the death penalty, the matter has been elevated to this Court for automatic review. Accused-appellant was charged in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. C-4629 for the crime of Statutory Rape. That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 16, 1994, at Brgy. Balighot, Maayon, Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused did, then and there, wilfully and feloniously, and without the permission of anyone, enter the house of EVELYN OBLIGAR, a five-year old child, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her thereby inflicting upon the latter a vaginal laceration which caused continuous bleeding and her admission of five (5) days at the Roxas Memorial Hospital. At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant was on his way to his Lola Esing to have his pants tailored. Since it was drizzling, he passed by the Obligars' residence. The prosecution's version of what took place at the Obligars' residence is based on the testimony of Evelyn herself, her uncle Emeterio, and the doctors who examined and treated her. According to Dr. Laada, the vaginal laceration may be caused (1) by trauma to the area, when a girl falls and hits her genital area on a blunt instrument; (2) by medical instrumentation, like the insertion of a speculum into the vagina; or (3) by the insertion of a blunt foreign object into the vagina, like a finger of a penis of a man in full erection. Upon examination of Evelyn on August 19, 1994, Dr. Toledo disclosed that the child suffered severe compound laceration which could have been caused by a normal and fully developed penis of a man in a state of erection that was forcibly inserted into her vagina and that the insertion caused her vagina to hemorrhage which thus required the transfusion of 255 cc of blood. Denial is presented as the defense. Accused-appellant testified that when he arrived at the Obligar residence that afternoon of August 16, 1994, he found the two children, Evelyn and Eleazar. He cajoled Evelyn and upon lifting up the child the first time, his left ring finger was

accidentally inserted into the vagina of the child since his fingernail was long and the child was not wearing any underwear. Consequently, Evelyn began to cry because her vagina started to bleed. Upon seeing this, he immediately went down the house and got some bark or leaves of a madre de cacao tree and applied the sap on the child's wound. The bleeding ceased and Evelyn stopped crying. Thereafter, accused-appellant went home. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of Statutory Rape. Held: Yes, the accused is guilty of Statutory Rape. The Court affirms the decision of the lower court. In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean that the trial court's inference is wrong. The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina. In rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's testimony is just a concocted story of what really happened, the Court applies the rule that the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence. The Court likewise considers the fact that her uncle and aunt, virtually her foster parents, themselves support her story of rape. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma.

G.R. No. 112176

February 6, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SANTOS CAADA, defendantappellant. Facts: Santos Caada was found guilty by the trial court of raping 12-year old Loberiza Palaming, i.e., having carnal knowledge of her against her will, with lewd designs, by force and intimidation, to her damage and prejudice. The evidence for the prosecution established that on 26 December 1990 Loberiza Palaming went to watch a public dance in La Union, Castilla, Sorsogon, together with Emma Valenzuela, Mary Villanueva and Daisy Laurio. The dance lasted until midnight. Loberiza sat near the entrance of the dance hall while her companions "went to a place." 2 Suddenly Loberiza was grabbed from behind and dragged towards a sampaloc tree ten (10) meters away. It was Santos Caada. Loberiza struggled hard but to no avail. Her hands were held then tied at her back, her mouth covered with a handkerchief. Santos Caada, armed with a gun, threatened to shoot her if she made any sound. But she continued to free herself despite the threat on her life. She firmly closed her legs but was overpowered and eventually overcome by the accused. He removed her maong pants and then her panty. His fingers felt her legs and then tiptoed to stroke her vagina. But this was not enough. He craved for more. He placed himself on top of her, intruded into her virginity and then unleashed the venom of his desire. He then got off from his quarry, released her hands and uncovered her mouth. Now freed, complainant boxed her despoiler before he could run away. The complainant was brought by her aunt Norma Lasarte to the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital where she was examined by Dr. Medy G. Auxillos. The medical examination revealed hymenal lacerations although there were no signs of spermatozoa or of physical injuries. The accused, a member of the 8th Sorsogon CAFGU Active Auxiliary Company stationed in La Union, Castilla, Sorsogon, testified that on the night of the alleged incident he was sleeping at their house in Milagrosa, Castilla, Sorsogon, approximately two (2) kilometers away from La Union. He was off duty. He however could not ascribe any ill motive on Loberiza to incriminate him as her rapist. His father Rogelio Caada nevertheless corroborated the alibi of the accused. Issue: Whether of not the accused is guilty of the crime charged. Held: The Court affirms the conviction of Santos Caada. Complainant was only 12 years 5 months and 4 days old when raped; yet, her narration of her misfortune was so detailed that it could only have come from one who experienced such ordeal. She withstood the probing,

penetrating, even misleading, questions of the defense. Full credence is accorded the testimony of a rape victim who has shown no ill motive to testify against the accused. The complainant clearly recognized the accused as her despoiler. The crime scene was not totally in darkness as there were lighted lamps about 30 meters away. Significantly, the accused was positively identified in court by the complainant. A woman will not expose herself to the humiliation of a rape trial, with its attendant publicity and the morbid curiosity it will arouse, unless she has been truly wronged and seeks atonement for her abuse. When a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. No unmarried woman would tell a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and therefore permit herself to be the subject of a public trial unless she was truly ravished and wants justice to be done. The absence of spermatozoa does not negate conclusively the existence of rape. The absence can be explained in several ways. Firstly, the sperm may have been washed away. Secondly, the rapist may have failed to ejaculate. Thirdly, the maximum lifespan of spermatozoa is only 72 hours. The complainant here was only examined five (5) days after the rape. Courts have always looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have always received it with caution not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated. For alibi to serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established with clear and convincing evidence. The requisites of time and place must be strictly met. Appellant must convincingly demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Material to establishing alibi as a valid defense, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for accused-appellant to have been present at the place of the crime at the time it was committed. As it is oft-repeated, alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. Where accused was positively identified by the victim of the rape herself who harbored no ill motive against the accused, the defense of alibi must fail.

G.R. No. 154183

August 7, 2003

SPOUSES VICKY TAN TOH and LUIS TOH, petitioners, vs. SOLID BANK CORPORATION, FIRST BUSINESS PAPER CORPORATION, KENNETH NG LI and MA. VICTORIA NG LI, respondents. Facts: RESPONDENT SOLID BANK CORPORATION AGREED TO EXTEND an "omnibus line" credit facility worth P10 million in favor of respondent First Business Paper Corporation (FBPC). The terms and conditions of the agreement as well as the checklist of documents necessary to open the credit line were stipulated in a "letter-advise" of the Bank dated 16 May 1993 addressed to FBPC and to its President, respondent Kenneth Ng Li. The "letter-advise" was effective upon "compliance with the documentary requirements." The documents essential for the credit facility and submitted for this purpose were the (a) Board Resolution or excerpts of the Board of Directors Meeting, duly ratified by a Notary Public, authorizing the loan and security arrangement as well as designating the officers to negotiate and sign for FBPC specifically stating authority to mortgage, pledge and/or assign the properties of the corporation; (b) agreement to purchase Domestic Bills; and, (c) Continuing Guaranty for any and all amounts signed by petitioner-spouses Luis Toh and Vicky Tan Toh, and respondent-spouses Kenneth and Ma. Victoria Ng Li. The spouses Luis Toh and Vicky Tan Toh were then Chairman of the Board and Vice-President, respectively, of FBPC, while respondent-spouses Kenneth Ng Li and Ma. Victoria Ng Li were President and General Manager, respectively, of the same corporation. On 10 May 1993, more than thirty (30) days from date of the "letter-advise," petitioner-spouses Luis Toh and Vicky Tan Toh and respondent-spouses Kenneth Ng Li and Ma. Victoria Ng Li signed the required Continuing Guaranty, which was embodied in a public document prepared solely by respondent Bank. The terms of the instrument defined the contract arising therefrom as a surety agreement and provided for the solidary liability of the signatories thereto for and in consideration of "loans or advances" and "credit in any other manner to, or at the request or for the account" of FBPC. The Continuing Guaranty set forth no maximum limit on the indebtedness that respondent FBPC may incur and for which the sureties may be liable, stating that the credit facility "covers any and all existing indebtedness of, and such other loans and credit facilities which may hereafter be granted to FIRST BUSINESS PAPER CORPORATION." The effectivity of the Continuing Guaranty was not contingent upon any event or cause other than the written revocation thereof with notice to the Bank that may be executed by the sureties. On 16 June 1993 respondent FBPC started to avail of the credit facility and procure letters of credit. On 17 November 1993 FBPC opened thirteen (13) letters of credit and obtained loans totaling P15,227,510.00. As the letters of credit were secured, FBPC through its officers

Kenneth Ng Li, Ma. Victoria Ng Li and Redentor Padilla as signatories executed a series of trust receipts over the goods allegedly purchased from the proceeds of the loans. On 13 January 1994 respondent Bank received information that respondent-spouses Kenneth Ng Li and Ma. Victoria Ng Li had fraudulently departed from their conjugal home. On 14 January 1994 the Bank served a demand letter upon FBPC and petitioner Luis Toh invoking the acceleration clause in the trust receipts of FBPC and claimed payment for P10,539,758.68 as unpaid overdue accounts on the letters of credit plus interests and penalties within twentyfour (24) hours from receipt thereof. The Bank also invoked the Continuing Guaranty executed by petitioner-spouses Luis Toh and Vicky Tan Toh who were the only parties known to be within national jurisdiction to answer as sureties for the credit facility of FBPC. On 17 January 1994 respondent Bank filed a complaint for sum of money with ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment against FBPC, spouses Kenneth Ng Li and Ma. Victoria Ng Li, and spouses Luis Toh and Vicky Tan Toh Petitioner-spouses however could not be certain whether to deny or admit the due execution and authenticity of the Continuing Guaranty. They could only allege that they were made to sign papers in blank and the Continuing Guaranty could have been one of them. Petitioners also contended that through FBPC Board Resolution dated 12 May 1993 petitioner Luis Toh was removed as an authorized signatory for FBPC and replaced by respondentspouses Kenneth Ng Li and Ma. Victoria Ng Li and Redentor Padilla for all the transactions of FBPC with respondent Bank. Finally, petitioners averred that sometime in June 1993 they obtained from respondent Kenneth Ng Li their exclusion from the several surety agreements they had entered into with different banks, i.e., Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, China Banking Corporation, Far East Bank and Trust Company, and herein respondent Bank. As a matter of record, these other banks executed written surety agreements that showed respondent Kenneth Ng Li as the only surety of FBPC's indebtedness. On 16 May 1996 the trial court promulgated its Decision in Civil Case No. 64047 finding respondent FBPC liable to pay respondent Solid Bank Corporation the principal of P10,539,758.68 plus twelve percent (12%) interest per annum from finality of the Decision until fully paid, but absolving petitioner-spouses Luis Toh and Vicky Tan Toh of any liability to respondent Bank. The trial court described the Continuing Guaranty as effective only while petitioner-spouses were stockholders and officers of FBPC since respondent Bank compelled petitioners to underwrite FBPC's indebtedness as sureties without the requisite investigation of their personal solvency and capability to undertake such risk. The appellate court modified the Decision of the trial court and held that by signing the Continuing Guaranty, petitioner-spouses became solidarily liable with FBPC to pay respondent Bank the amount of P10,539,758.68 as principal with twelve percent (12%) interest per annum from finality of the judgment until completely paid.

Issue: Whether or not the Continuing Guaranty is valid and will held the petitioner-spouses liable. Held: The Court holds that the Continuing Guaranty is a valid and binding contract of petitionerspouses as it is a public document that enjoys the presumption of authenticity and due execution. Although petitioners as appellees may raise issues that have not been assigned as errors by respondent Bank as party-appellant, i.e., unenforceability of the surety contract, we are bound by the consistent finding of the courts a quo that petitioner-spouses Luis Toh and Vicky Tan Toh "voluntarily affixed their signature[s]" on the surety agreement and were thus "at some given point in time willing to be liable under those forms." 46 In the absence of clear, convincing and more than preponderant evidence to the contrary, our ruling cannot be otherwise. Similarly, there is no basis for petitioners to limit their responsibility thereon so long as they were corporate officers and stockholders of FBPC. Nothing in the Continuing Guaranty restricts their contractual undertaking to such condition or eventuality. In fact the obligations assumed by them therein subsist "upon the undersigned, the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns of the undersigned, and shall inure to the benefit of, and be enforceable by you, your successors, transferees and assigns," and that their commitment "shall remain in full force and effect until written notice shall have been received by [the Bank] that it has been revoked by the undersigned." Verily, if petitioners intended not to be charged as sureties after their withdrawal from FBPC, they could have simply terminated the agreement by serving the required notice of revocation upon the Bank as expressly allowed therein.

G.R. No. 115304 July 3, 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLAND L. MELOSANTOS, accused-appellant. Facts: The theory of the People is to the effect that accused-appellant's apprehension was preceded by a buy-bust operation on October 10, 1992 during which occasion, accused-appellant was caught in the process of transacting the sale of 1 kilogram of "shabu" with the arresting team. To buttress this general proposition, SPO1 Jeremias Manlatao of the Narcotics Command was offered as the first witness of the prosecution. His essential testimony is to the effect that he was the poseur-buyer; that he was at the Shell Gas Station infront of Unimart, Greenhills around 9:30 o'clock in the morning together with Supt. Elenzano, SPO4 Velasco, including the Carlos, the confidential informer, waiting for accused-appellant who had previously agreed, through the confidential informer, to sell 1 kilogram of shabu at P450.00 per gram; that when accused-appellant arrived on the designated time and place on board a red Mitsubishi Lancer, he disembarked from the car and asked for the payment to which request the witness acceded. The members of the arresting team were presented as witnesses, but not the said confidential informer, Carlos. Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented is sufficient to prove that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Held: This Court cannot permit the incarceration of an individual based on insufficient factual nexus of that person's participation in the commission of the offense. The defense of accusedappellant appears to be shallow, yet the absence of depth would not warrant his conviction if, in the first place, the evidence of the People is anchored on a shaky foundation. This is but the necessary consequence of the adjective norm that the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused. At any rate, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed cannot by itself, prevail against the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded the accused. In default of a satisfactory premise for the non-presentation of a crucial witness like Carlos, it ineluctably follows that the disputable presumption that evidence deliberately withheld would be adverse if produced ( Section 3(e), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence) remains undisturbed. Moreover, the import of Carlos' "cooperation" specified under the third paragraph of the Joint Affidavit of Arrest is antithetical to the corollary axiom in remedial law of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, in the absence of independent proof for the application of the exceptions to the established principle that a transaction between two persons ought not to operate to the prejudice of another. If, in People vs. Guillermo, the confessions of the coaccused may not be accepted against the rest of the accused due to the res inter alios acta rule then, a fortiori, the alleged "cooperation" of Carlos who was never presented as a witness

in pointing to Melosantos as source of shabu must equally be repudiated. Indeed, any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by nature if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand. By virtue of this legal aphorism, no probative value can attach to the alleged confession of Carlos albeit no objection thereto was interposed by the defense. Verily, in criminal cases the admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision that the accused shall enjoy the right of being confronted with the witnesses testifying against him and to cross-examine them. Moreover, the court is without opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements by observing the demeanor of the person who supposedly made them. The prosecution evidence must at all times be competent and admissible to sustain its stand. Surely, the prosecution can not rely for conviction on an imaginary person charging a serious offense without extending to the accused the benefit of confronting his accuser. (People vs. Salcedo, 195 SCRA 345; 353 [1993]).

G.R. No. 132671

November 15, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISANTO BAULA, RUBEN BAULA, ROBERT BAULA and DANILO DACUCOS, accused-appellants. Facts: On 13 December 1995, at around eight oclock in the evening, Jupiter Caburao, decided to follow his mother, Patrocinia Caburao, who had earlier left their house at Barangay Siwasiw West, Sual, Pangasinan, to settle her due obligations at a store, about one-and-a-half kilometers away, owned by a certain Brigida Tumamang. While traversing the road towards the store, Jupiter noticed a commotion near the creek about ten meters away from him. He focused his flashlight towards the direction where he heard the commotion and saw accusedappellants Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos in the act of hacking a person who was lying on the ground, while accused-appellants Robert Baula and Ruben Baula stood as lookouts. The assault lasted for about four minutes. Accused-appellants fled but not before they had threatened Jupiter with death if he were to divulge the incident to anyone. Jupiter went near the lifeless body of the victim who turned out to be his own mother. Her head and face sustained four hacking wounds, two of which damaged her brain tissues. Jupiter rushed home and brought his niece and nephew to the house of a neighbor for their safety. For fear of reprisal from accused-appellants and believing that the police would be able to solve the gory killing on their own, Jupiter did not reveal the carnage to either his relatives or the police. The investigation revealed that before the victim was killed, she had been to Brigida Tumamang's store; that accused-appellants were also at the store having a drinking spree; that the victim left the store between seven o'clock and eight o'clock in the evening, and that, fifteen minutes later, accused-appellants also left. The policemen asked Ruben Baula and Crisanto Baula for the clothing they wore on the night of the murder. Ruben Baula gave his bloodstained pair of short pants, and Crisanto Baula turned over his bloodstained polo shirt. The policemen next went to the hut of Danilo Dacucos. Inside the hut, the group found hanging on the wall a bloodstained bolo. The bloodstained pair of short pants, polo shirt and bolo, together with the victim's dried blood samples, were sent on the same day to the National Bureau of Investigation, Dagupan City Branch Office, for forensic examination. The results of the examination disclosed that the bloodstains found in the bolo, the bloodstains on the polo shirt9 and the bloodstains10 on the pair of short pants had the same type "O" blood as that of the victim. Issues: Whether or not the trial court has erred (1) in giving full credence to the belated eyewitness account of Jupiter Caburao ascribing to herein accused-appellants authorship of the crime, and (2) in admitting in evidence the bolo, polo shirt, and short pants taken by the policemen from accused-appellants in violation of their constitutional rights.

Held: The Court cannot help but doubt as being highly suspect, the belated revelation of Jupiter on the identity of the assailants. His claim that he did not immediately report the matter to the police relying on a supposition that the crime could anyway be solved even without his own disclosure appears to be a bit flimsy. Unlike previous cases ruled otherwise, Jupiter is not just an innocent bystander but the son of the victim. The raging passion and anger of a son who has just lost a mother in such a brutal manner would have impelled him to immediately report the crime to the authorities even with an alleged threat upon his life. The Court finds that Jupiter's response to the events is far from the natural reaction of a son who has just witnessed the grisly murder of his own mother. What he has said to have done is simply not in accord with human nature. With all the bitterness and indignation expected of a person similarly situated, it is quite odd that he would keep the matter to himself and fail to disclose his knowledge of the crime to the police authorities, or even to any of his relatives, despite his presence during their investigation of the case. His belated declaration of the identity of his mother's assailants, some two months after the killing, can but accentuate the difficulty that the Court would have to face if it were to rely almost completely on his testimony. Testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself which, by common experience and observation, could lead to the inference of at least its probability under the circumstances. In a criminal prosecution the accused is confronted with the full might of state authority. The evidence of the prosecution must thus be strong to pierce the shield of presumptive innocence. Accused-appellants also take exception to the admissibility of the evidence consisting of the bloodstained bolo, polo shirt and short pants arguing that, even on the assumption that these articles did belong to accused-appellants, their seizure without a valid warrant has violated their constitutional rights. Admittedly, the bloodstained bolo, polo shirt and short pants were taken, sans any search warrant, from accused-appellants Danilo Dacucos, Crisanto Baula and Ruben Baula, respectively, at a time when the police started to question them about the killing of Patrocinia Caburao. Section 2, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution provides: "Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." The above constitutional mandate is complemented by Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution providing that -

"Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" Clearly, the police officers acted on a mere suspicion that accused-appellants could be responsible for the commission of the crime and only because of their being at the store where the victim was last seen. Mere suspicion cannot satisfy the requirement of probable cause which signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he can be charged.32 An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by that search. The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution that the polo shirt and short pants have been voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This presumption, by itself, cannot prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors.