IADC/SPE 27493

Pore Pressures, Fracture Gradients, and Drilling Economics

T.S. Proehl, ARCO E&P Technology
lADe and SPE Member
Copyright 1994, IADC/SPE Drilling Conference.
This paper was prepared for presentation at the 1994 IADC/SPE Drilling Conference held in Dallas, Texas, 15-18 February 1994.
This paper was selected for presentation by an IADC/SPE Program Com.mit1ee following revie:" of contai.ned in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents of the paper,
as presented, have not been reviewed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers or the International Association of Drilling Contractors and are sUbject to correctIOn by the author(s).
material, as presented, does not necessarily reflect any position of the IADC or SPE, their officers, or members. Papers presented at IADC/SPE meetings subject to publicatIOn
review by Editorial Committees of the IADC and SPE. Permission to copy is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 Illustrations may not be copIed. The abstract should
contain conspicuous acknowledgment of where and by whom the paper is presented. Write Librarian, SPE, P.O. Box 833836, Richardson, TX 75083-3836, U.S.A. Telex, 163245 SPEUT.
Introducmo
Risk sharing and alliance formation are central themes in the
E&P business environment of the 1990s. Acommon manifesta-
tion of these themes is the recruitment and use of partners and
contractors to perform drilling operations on specific projects
which formerly would have been 100% managed and operated
by large integrated oil companies. One consequence of risk-shar-
ing activity is that integrated companies have had the opportu-
nity to closely observe and assess the drilling practices of other
operators and incentive-oriented drilling contractors on wells in
real time, with funds at risk.
The debate over which kind of business organization and risk-
sharing philosophy produces the most cost-effective drilling
result often neglects the fact that for any given well, the in-situ
conditions would be identical for anyone undertaking the work.
There is no inherent logic in the notion that turnkey contractors
have an edge on oil companies in addressing subsurface condi-
tions. The economic outcome of a given well is more dependent
on objective subsurface factors and the way they are approached
than on the kind of risk-sharing philosophy selected for drilling.
Similarly, there is no inherent logic in the notion that hiring a
turnkey contractor absolves an oil company from risk on a
well. At a minimum, the risk of possible production delays
caused by acts of a turnkey contractor is always present.
Three wells (A, B, and C) drilled recently illustrate the point.
One well was drilled by an oil company and two were drilled by
turnkey contractors. All three wells penetrated geopressured
sections. The resulting geopressure-related problems with
fracture gradients and wellbore integrity caused large economic
impacts on turnkey drillers and operators alike. The wells were
selected to highlight the common-sense idea that the key to risk
management and achieving profit goals is good planning and
proper execution, not the form of risk-sharing selected for any
particular venture.
References, Tables, Figures at end or paper
This paper examines the boreholes, explores relationships
between planning and execution during drilling operations, and
explores the economic impacts of geopressure problems on
fmancial outcomes and decision choices on geopressured wells.
Conclusions are drawn from experiences on these wells and
recommendations are made on approaches to minimizing the
problems caused by pore pressures and fracture gradients.
Background and Methods
Figure 1 illustrates the drilling time required for each well to
reach particular depths. Clearly, Well A experienced the least
trouble of the three. Not Well A was maybe the least
physically challenging of the prospects to drill. Well Bfeatures
two hole sections that were re-drilled after fish were left on
bottom following well control incidents. The first was a kick
taken at 11,752'. The second was a problem with gas cutting
and flow at 16,932'. Well C presents the longest history of the
three and was the only well not to reach projected total depth.
This well experienced lost circulation below 11,525'. A drill
string failure at 14,177' resulted in a side-tracking operation. A
stuck pipe incident at 14,579' caused a second side track. Well
control problems at 16,269' and 15,953' caused third and fourth
side tracks. The well was finally abandoned after drilling the
fourth side track to 14,032'.
What went wrong with each of the three wells? Analysis of
information gathered during drilling operations provides
insights into the well planning process and also illustrates the
dominant impact of pore pressures, fracture gradients, and
effective stresses on the success or failure of drilling operations.
All pore pressures and fracture gradients were calculated from
wireline-log data using the Eaton Method.l Compaction trend
analysis generally follows the guidelines of Magara.
2
All
computed curves were checked for consistency with pore pres-
sures and fracture gradients actually measured in the wells
during drilling operations. Sonic and resistivity logs were used
and good agreement (generally within 0.2 ppg E.M.W.) between
pore pressures calculated from each log was obtained. Fracture
gradients computed from logs are probably less accurate than
pore pressures because of uncertainties associated with overbur-
den stresses and values of formation strength against which to
563
2 PORE PRESSURES, FRACfURE GRADIENTS
ANDDRILLINGECONOMICS
IADC/SPE 27493
calibrate a model. There is no way to determine the difference
between a "shoe test" and a "leakoff test" from the data.
Also, it is unclear precisely what is meant by the term "leak.aff
test." When two logs were used to compute pore pressures, the
highest pressure computed at each depth is presented. Finally,
all analyses were carried out with the aid of Windows-based PC
software
3
, and UNIX-based work station software' .
WeDA
The prognosed drilling time on Well A was 62 days and actual
operating time was 54 days, thus the timedepth performance
was very good. A single lost-circulation incident precluded
achieving even better time-depth performance. The incident took
8 days to remedy. Given that the actual productive time on the
well was 46 days, the slack time in the prognosis is 16 days, or
26% of the original time estimate.
The prognosed and calculated pore pressures and fracture
gradients are presented in Figure 2. Actual pore pressures,
fracture gradients, and mud weights appear in Figure 5.
Clearly, pre-drill estimates of pressure are greater than pres-
sures actually encountered during drilling. The well was a
discovery with actual sandstone pressures measured on produc-
tion tests, equivalent to +/-13.4 ppg E.M.W. at +/-14,900'. This
value confirms earlier RFT data, and is consistent with the
tendency of permeable rocks to have lower pressures than
surrounding shales used in the log-based calculations of pres-
sure. If anything, the log-computed pressures may be slightly
high, as the highest computed pressures were used in this analy-
sis.
Figure 3 illustrates the problem on this well. Partial losses
began to occur at 14,139', with 16.5 ppg mud. Circulation was
lost at 14,611' while drilling with 16.6 ppg mud. The hole was
filled with diesel oil. When standing full with diesel, the hydro-
static head at total depth was equivalent to a column of 15.74
ppg mud. This figure esta,blishes an upper bound on pore
pressure in the well between the casing shoe at 11,280' and
14,611'. Given that the shoe test at the previous casing shoe
(11,280') was +/-16.9 ppg, and the E.C.D. was about 17.0 ppg
E.M.W., circulation was lost because the fracture gradient
somewhere in the open hole was exceeded. The situation was
remedied by lowering the mud weight to 16.2 ppg, pumping
some LCM, and letting the hole heal. Interestingly, there was a
plan to squeeze the casing shoe at 11,280'. A packer was run
and set inside casing. Pressure equivalent to 17.3 ppg E.M.W.
was applied below the packer and held for 30 minutes, with no
loss of pressure. After this event, the oil-base mud in the hole
was replaced with water-base mud and the hole drilled to a total
depth of 15,271' without further incident
The economic consequence of this event would not be severe
relative to Wells Band C. Assuming $18/bbl oil,
$2.00/MMSCF/D gas, and $20,OOO/day drilling costs, actual
"excess" well costs would have been the $160,000 direct outlay,
plus about $75,000 in delayed production revenue. An addi-
tional cost of $30,000 was associated with swapping mud
systems. This was not a riskfree transaction. Possible wellbore
564
stability problems were risked and indeed, the reports note
"large shale" returns after displacement. The grand total cost
of problems on this well is about $265,000. The real issue is
this. Was the gamble of drilling with high mud weight worth
the potential cost, as it is reasonably clear that there was, in
fact, no benefit to be gained by using high mud weights? Wells
Band C will make the consequences of the high mud weight
more clear.
WeDB
The prognosed drilling time on Well B was 105 days and the
actual time required was 158 days. The lost-time incidents on
this well consumed 73 days. Given that actual productive
drilling operations time was 85 days, slack time allowed in the
prognosis was 20 days or 19% of the total allowed.
The prognosed and calculated pore pressures and fracture
gradients for this well are shown in Figure 3. Actual pore
pressures, fracture gradients, and mud weights appear in Figure
6. Unlike Well A, however, there is much less cushion between
actual pore pressures and actual fracture gradients. A mud
program based on the pre-drill pore pressure estimates would be
dangerously close to the actual fracture gradient curve from
about 12,500' to total depth. This discovery well had an actual
reservoir pressure equivalent to +/-17.5 ppg at +/-16,880' . A
kick equivalent to 13.2 ppg E.M.W. was taken at 11,752'. These
pressures match the log-calculated pressures very well. From the
log plot, it appears that the shales below the reservoir zone were
drilled with mud weights at, or slightly under balanced to,
formation pressures.
This well exhibits 3 major incidents associated with pore pres-
sures and fracture gradients. The kick taken at 11,752' was part
of an attempt to set a casing string close to 12,000', which
would have cased off most of the pressure transition zone and
maximized the formation fracture resistance at the shoe. The
flaw in this approach is the fact that the previous casing shoe at
4,000' had a fracture resistance of only 13.5 ppg E.M.W.
Drilling with 12.7 ppg mud at 11,752' means that the kick
tolerance with zero influx was only 0.28 ppg E.M.W., which is
zero for practical purposes. It was virtually impossible to safely
shut in on any influx. Given that the pre-drill pore pressure
prediction for 12,000' was 13.5 ppg, the potential upside value
of the plan to set casing at that depth is questionable and the
risk associated with the plan is very large.
The second pore pressure incident occurred at 12,987'. Returns
were lost while increasing mud weight from 17.1 ppg to 17.2
ppg. Clearly, the problem is identical to the problem experi-
enced on Well A, in which the E.C.D. of about 17.6 ppg
E.M.W. was greater than the formation strength somewhere in
the open hole. The hole healed with circulation and was drilled
to a liner point at 14,960'. There was no circulation during
precement pumping or the cement job itself.
The well was drilled to 16,932', where the third pore pressure
incident occurred. A well flow was observed and the well shut in
with zero drill pipe pressure. Mud weight was increased from
IADC/SPE 27493 TIIOMASSlRENGERPROEHL 3
16.9 ppg to 17.1 ppg and then to 17.6 ppg in 0.1 ppg incre-
ments. While circulating up to 17.6 ppg, the pipe stuck, despite
movement during the procedure. A long fishing job ensued, with
a resulting side-track from 14,535'. The reservoir is just above
the depth of flow and the pressure in it is equivalent to 17.5 ppg
E.M.W. In retrospect, it is clear that a 1,000' pressure transi-
tion zone begins at about 16,000' and ends at about 17,000'.
From the casing shoe at 14,960' to 16,932', pore pressure
increases about 1.5 ppg E.M.W., allowing the possibility of
differential sticking somewhere in the open hole section during
circulation operations. Pushing the shoe at 14,960' to about
16,500' might have been a reasonable bet and could have
avoided the stuck-pipe incident at 16,932' and the subsequent
expensive fishing attempL
The economic consequences of this well were very large. In
addition to the hypothetical lost-time cost of $1,460,000, this
well was a discovery with delayed production, the value of
which is on the order of $1,100,000, for a grand total of
$2,560,000. This total is 10 times the cost of the delays incurred
on Well A. The gap between pore pressure and fracture gradient
on this well is much narrower than on Well A, and is directly
responsible for magnifying small "misplacements" of casing
seats into a large dollar-volume of consequences. This well was
the most difficult undertaking of the three wells studied. As was
the case in Well A, was the gamble of unnecessarily-high mud
weights worth the risks?
WellC
This well is similar to Well B in that the prognosed drilling
time was much less than the time actually taken on operations.
The prognosis called for 100 drilling days. Actual time spent on
the well was 185 days and the objective was not reached. Lost
time on this well was 109 days. Assuming no trouble, time
required to reach total depth on this well would have been an
additional 7 days, for a grand total of about 86 expected
drilling operations days through logging point, so after-the-fact
analysis calculates about 14 slack days in the prognosis, or
14% of the total.
Figure 4 shows the prognosed and calculated pore pressures and
fracture gradients. Actual pore pressures, fracture gradients,
and mud weights appear in Figure 7. As was the case in Well B,
the prognosed pore pressure is essentially the actual fracture
gradient from about 12,500' to total depth. This well failed to
reach the objective, hence was not fUlly evaluated with either
wireline logs or other methods. For this reason, no pressures
from zones penetrated in the well are certain. No kicks indica-
tive of formation pressures were experienced either. A close
offset well encountered lost circulation just below 13,500',
which is the point of highest computed pore pressure in this
well. The hydrostatic head of fluid in the offset well after the
lost circulation incident was equivalent to 15.6 ppg E.M.W.
This number establishes a reasonable upper bound on the pore
pressure above that depth, hence, some evidence exists that the
log calibrations used in computing pore pressures on Wells A
and B wells are also valid in Well C.
565
The initial problem with this well was lost circulation below the
casing shoe at 11,300'. The fU'St losses happened at 11,525' and
had repercussions for the rest of the well. One of the main
unknowns is the fracture gradient at or near 11,300'. At least 7
open hole "leak-off tests" were conducted below the casing at
that depth. These are shown in Figure7. It is impossible to say
which one is correct, or even if one should be preferred over the
others. The losses at 11,525' associated with an E.C.D. of 15.3
ppg mud plus 0.4 ppg E.M.W. pressure losses, could simply be
associated with drilling a sandy section 6 ppg overbalanced. In
any event, numerous open hole squeezes were followed by
numerous open hole "leak-off tests", and the well was drilled to
13,162'. at which point, losses began with 16.7 ppg mud. The
well was drilled 100' deeper with 16.9 ppg mud weight at which
point it was decided to run a liner. The liner was stuck and
cemented at 12,600'. The liner leak-off test is reported to be
equivalent to 18.1 ppg. Below this point, the well experienced
more incidents of lost circulation and stuck pipe. It was ulti-
mately abandoned.
Physically, this well appears more akin to Well A than Well B,
in that there appears to be a fairly large gap between pore
pressures and fracture gradients. From the log-based evidence
available down to about 15,000', it appears that the problems in
the well were almost exclusively due to running mud weights
and E.C.D.s overbalanced and close to the fracture gradient. It
is also possible to speculate that radical remedial efforts such
as squeeze cementing, contributed to the troubles by creating
fractures and propping them open with cement and LCM.
Allowing the hole to heal, as on Well A, may have been a
prudent course to pursue on this well.
The economic consequences of this well are acute. If the hypo-
thetical day rate is applied, a cost of $3,700,000 is incurred.
Assuming a chance factor of 15%, with reserves and flowrates
similar to those on offset wells, the risk-weighted expected value
of reserves in the ground is on the order of $15,000.000.
Problem Analysis and Comments
The main technical and tactical problem common to these wells
is the use of mud weights and associated equivalent circulating
densities near or at the fracture gradients existing in the subsur-
face. The tactical use of excessive mud weights impeded achieve-
ment of the strategic goals on each well. Inadequate provision
for the realities present in the subsurface allows opportunity
costs to materialize, including production revenue delays,
failure to reach objectives, and covering liabilities that contrac-
tors may be unable to handle. Secondary, but important, techni-
cal issues are drilling rates and gas entrained in the drilling
mud. Should drilling rate be reduced to allow gas to be circu-
lated out? To what extent, if any. should gas cutting be used to
justify increasing mud weights? Finally, there are the economic
issues of drilling rate and slack time. Is maximizing rate of
penetration at each point in the well equivalent to minimizing
expected costs on the well overall? Is slack time a possible trap
for unwary drillers who might be tempted to make mistakes
with pore pressures and fracture gradients in the name of
maximizing penetration?
4 PORE PRESSURES, FRACfURE GRADIENTS
ANDDRll1..JNGECONOMICS
IADC/SPE 27493
Large discrepencies between actual pore pressures and mud
hydrostatic pressures hold two implications for drilling opera-
tions on any well. First, the effective stress principle governing
the relationship between pore pressures and fracture gradients
ensures that overestimation of pore pressure causes overestima-
tion of formation strength. This produces a false sense of
security about the magnitude of mud weight it is possible to
drill with. Second, the mud program design for a well is based
on pore pressure estimates plus an explicit or implicit trip
margin and safety factor. The reality of a drilling plan based
on overestimated pressures is that it puts unnecessarily inflated
mud weights close to the real fracture gradient which will be
encountered in the well. Paradoxically, such a conservative bias
produces a well plan which is actually more akin to a dangerous
gamble than good practice.
Why were excessive pore pressures and mud weights built into
these well plans, and why were excessive mud weights run in the
wells? An informal check revealed only anecdotal evidence
about pore pressure estimation. Several points were fairly clear,
however. It appears that offset-based log analysis of pore
pressures was performed using overlay methods, probably
calibrated with mud weights used, or flowing tubing pressures,
as opposed to actual measured pore pressures. No evidence was
found to indicate that actual pore pressures measured in offset
wells were known at the time well plans were written. Overlay
plots appear in several of the well planning documents. From
drilling histories, it also appears that in many instances, mud
weights were increased in response to "gas units" detected by
mud loggers and that these "gas units" were interpreted as a
surrogate pore pressure indicator in some manner. Goldsmiths
and Fert1
6
point out pitfalls asociated with mud log gas read-
ings. Goldsmith offers excellent practical suggestions for
handling and interpreting gas cut mud. Nine examples of
weighting up in response to "gas units" and gas cutting were
noted in the daily reports on these wells. The average mud
weight increase was 0.17 ppg. This indicates that a gas chro-
matograph is probably commonly assumed to be a sensitive
quantitative indicator of pressure, a development which is still
in its conceptual infancy.7
There seems to be considerable lead-following and perhaps
outright imitation of other-company practices. If Company X
used a certain mud weight on a direct offset well, apparently it
was believed that the same mud weight would be required on the
prospect in question. Campbell
8
and Brush and Marsden'
discuss bias and distortions and offer suggestions on how to
minimize them. Despite the discrepency between pre-drill and
actual pore pressures and despite evidence that pressures are
actually lower than anticipated, one group of well planners
expressed confidence in their original work by planning a
duplicate offset to one of the problem wells in this sample. The
only change in the offset program was upsizing the casing
program. The setting depths and proposed mud weights were
virtually identical. Perhaps, this is evidence of Savage'SI 0
observation on evidence and credibility. In this case, if pore
pressures are regarded as high, hence requiring very high
mud weights for prudent operation, no amount of evidence or
argument to the contrary will lend the case any credibility.
566
Overlays are area-specific calibrations. They are simply expres-
sions of some observed quantity versus a pore pressure or pore
pressure surrogate. From Figures 2,3, and 4, it is clearly
possible to overestimate pore pressures by using overlays,
particularly when using mud weight as a pore pressure surro-
gate for calibration purposes. The same is true for flowing
tubing pressures, which discount the complexities of multiphase
flow and ignore pressure transients within a reservoir zone.
There is a fair chance that the mud weights used are already
inflated themselves. A pervasive bias toward nominal conserva-
tism in planning mud weights and casing setting depths appears
to exist, based on uncertainty about the nature of the real pore
pressure regime on particular prospects. Curiously, the exist-
ence of uncertainty seems to be ignored. Two of the drilling
programs specifically state that if certain "shoe tests" are not
obtained, squeeze operations will be performed until they are
obtained. No discrimination is made between the possibility of
weak rock and a bad cement job. No mention is made of the
fact that squeeze cementing is incapable of making weak rock
strong, nor is there any indication of an understanding of the
effective stress principle which relates pore pressures and rock
strength. Finally, one program called for taking a "shoe test"
to leak off. This instruction was ignored and circulation later
lost in the well.
Capen,l 1 discusses the difficulties inherent in assessing uncer-
tainty and points out that it is probably best not to focus on
specifing "the answer", in this case, the precise mud weights to
use and fracture gradients to be achieved. It is probably better
to concentrate on uncertainties surrounding pore pressures and
fracture gradients, narrowing ranges of uncertainties, training
rig personnel in the interpretation of gas cutting phenomena,
reacting properly to gas cutting. and detecting evidence of pore
pressures in real time. Rodriguez and Carter
l1
, discuss the
phenomenon of believing that the act of making a decision has
resolved the uncertainty present prior to the decision. From
available evidence on these wells, it appears that there is a
tendency to believe that the act of finalizing a pore pressure,
fracture gradient, and casing depth program actually resolves
the uncertainty associated with pore pressures in a subject well.
Economic Choices
Are geopressured wells like Wells A, B, and C good turnkey
bets or even risk-sharing candidates? The combination of slack
time and downhole risks offers both opportunity and danger. A
very efficient driller could expect to exploit a profit opportunity
by making slack time productive. Relatively small mistakes
carry heavy penalties, however. One way to gain perspective on
drilling economics is to consider the risk-weighted probabilities
that various pore pressure related outcomes will occur. This is
done with computer-based probability or decision trees.
l1
For example, any driller has to decide how to handle gas cut
mud. One possibility is to drill close to balance with high gas
levels in the mud and risk incurring extra circulation time and
kicks. The second possibility is to supress gas in the mud with
high mud weights and risk wellbore integrity problems. Table 1
presents probabilities and time estimates for handling gas in the
IADC/SPE 27493 1HOMASSlRENGERPROEHL 5
mud. These probabilites and times are inputs for the decision
tree in Figure 8. The expected time required for drilling with a
heavy overbalance is an additional 13.5 days. The expected time
required for extra circulation associated with higher gas levels
in the mud is only 9.5 days. It may be a wise choice to drill
closer to balance on these wells. This is a choice which opera-
tors and turnkey contractors alike would have to make on a
geopressured well. If a turnkey driller took this bet and his
profit opportunity was limited to exploiting the slack time, The
profit margin in terms of days would be about 6 to 10%, not
particularly appealing, given the pore pressure risks involved.
Recasting the above delay numbers allows another perspective.
Assume a simple hypothetical situation in which a contractor
examines whether or not to accept a modified turnkey bid which
would propose to compensate the contractor at the dayrate for
the operator's expected duration of the well. In other words, the
operator wishes to present contractors with a profit opportunity
limited to successful exploitation of the slack time on the well.
Assuming the contractor's revenue will be $600,000 on a 100-
day well with 20 days of slack time, the maximum possible
profit on the slack time is $120,000. The expected value of this
turnkey, based on the cumulative probability distribution of
Figure 8, shown in Figure 9, is only $64,200 or just over half
of the possible amount. In other words, the expected total
drilling time for the well given the presence of geopressure-re-
lated gas cut mud is about 91 days and it is expected that half
of the possible profitable days will be lost combatting prob-
lems. Is a 10% margin worth the objective risks in geopressured
wells? Is it good long-term policy for operators to offer wells
like these to turnkey contractors for consideration? It would
appear that the upside for turnkey contractors on wells like
these is limited compared to the downside, if risks associated
with subsurface pressures are accounted for.
Conclusions
1. Approaches taken to overcoming downhole conditions are
more critical to the outcome of a well than the partnering
method selected for drilling the well.
2. "Conservative" approaches are not inherently risk-free.
3. "Shoe test" methodology should be standardized.
4. Pore pressures should be calibrated against known values
of subsurface pressures. Kicks, Drill stem tests, production
tests, and possibly wireline pressure tests are preferred to
mud weights and flowing tubing pressures.
5. Turnkey premiums for wells like these should probably be
substantial.
6. Engaging contractors to perform high-risk operations is
risk sharing, not risk shedding.
567
Rerommendations
1. Use pore pressure methods such as Eaton's to relate pore
pressures and fracture gradients with appropriate local
models. This work is facilitated by using modern computer
software.
2. Establish better criteria for increasing mud density than
"gas units." If gas cutting is a problem, the solution is not
necessarily increasing mud density.
3. Recognize that primary well control.is reliably achieved
only when the mud weight and E.C.D. are maintained
between the pore pressure and fracture gradient curves.
4. Employ incentive contracts judiciously on wells where
win-win outcomes are highly probable. Do everything
possible to avoid the outcomes on 2 of these wells.
AcknowJedgements
The author thanks ARCO Exploration and Production Technol-
ogy for permission to publish this paper. Thanks are also due to
Richard Leturno, Mark Patteson, Mark Herkommer, and Roy
Shilling. Interpretations/opinions herein are the author's and not
to be construed as those of any of the ARCO companies.
References
1. Mouchet, J.P. and Mitchell, A., Abnormal Pressures While
Drilling, Elf Aquitaine, Boussens, 1989.
2. Magara, K., Compaction and Fluid Migration, Elsevier,
Amsterdam, 1978.
3. Petrospec Computer Corporation, Geofressure
oftware, Richardson TX, 1993.
4. ARCO Exploration and Production Technology, PPFG,
Plano, TX, 1993.
5. Goldsmith, R.G., Why gas cut mud is not always a serious
problem, World Oil, Oct 1972, p. 51.
6. Fertl, W.H., What to remember when interpreting mud gas
cutting, World Oil, Sep 1973, p. 67.
7. Robinson, L.H., Determine Formation Pore Pressure at the
Surface while Drilling, Petroleum Engineer International,
Jan 1993, p. 38.
8. Campbell, J.M., Nontechnical Distortions in the Analysis
and Management of Petroleum Investments, Journal of
Petroleum Technology, Dec 1986, p. 1336.
9. Brush, R.M. and Marsden, S.S., Bias in Engineering
Estimation, Journal of Petroleum Technology, Feb 1982, p.
433.
6
PORE PRESSURES, FRACTURE GRADIENTS
ANDDRIll.lNGECONOMICS
IADC/SPE 27493
10. Savage, LJ., The Foundations of Statistics, Dover, New
York, 1972, p. 47.
11. Capen, E.C., The Difficulty of Assessing Uncertainty, SPE
5579,1975.
12. ARCa Exploration and Production Technology, dTree,
Plano TX, 1993.
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8 10 12 14 16 18 20
EQUIVALENT MUD WEIGHT (ppg)
FIGURE 2
WELL A, PRE-DRILL AND ACTUAL
PQRE PRESSURES AND FRACTURE GRADIENTS
a
5,000
15,000
20,000

I 10,000
t
LU
o
50 100 150 200
TIME (days)
o
20,000
FIGURE 1
TIME vs. DEPTH (3 WELLS)
a
5,000 -H---+---f----++lM..<;!=M""1 ....., ...
-
FIGURE 3
WELL B, PRE-DRILL AND ACTUAL
PORE PRESSURES AND FRACTURE GRADIENTS
o
FIGURE 4
WELL C, PRE-DRILL AND ACTUAL
PORE PRESSURES AND FRACTURE GRADIENTS
o
25,000 25,000
I
.......
5,000
I
t
15,000 -f----!----'-----eL---llI:
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20,000 -1--,...... 1 .......__
Pro-llrtI PonI-.e , Pre-OrtII F"'" o_
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PonI_, LoR-e-od Frac GfOdIIr1l
0:- i
8 10 12 14 18 18 20
EQUIVALENT MUD WEIGHT (ppg)
8 10 12 14 18 18 20
EQUIVALENT MUD WEIGHT (ppg)
568
IADC/SPE 27493
lliOMAS SlRENGERPROEHL 7
FIGURE 5. WELL A
PORE PRESSURE. FRAC GRADIENT. MUD WEIGHT
FIGURE 6. WELL B
PORE PRESSURE. FRAC GRADIENT. MUDWEIGHT
c_
w" :W"A
-,
c-..,: ... :
APt.: W.. lltwnLA
K.I./A,G.: 3110 Q.LAU.L: 0.00 w.o.: 0.00

I Pll!'
1M'....
Zl
Zl
c_
W.. :W".
-,
c..,: SIN:
API,: WlllltWnu
1l1.IA.G.: 2S.00 G..L.M.S.L.: 0.00 W.o.: 0.00

"""" .
Zl
Zl
Zl
--
I j ;

Ii' i :
1_ I:
----
; I
_.__i _.L._.... __ __ __:_
_.- .. _. -_.. _.. ...- - ..-.- __.- i..- ._--7---1---
f-r-- _;-.i... .,__ .. I
'1 ,.. --. --L-------r--+---H-
lIlllllI
. i ;; i
-- .. - ------ -- ---- ._- -
-. -rs-_ ----.__L. LI--_.:..._. ._J....-t--i........1---
---- t;;>.. ---:- :
_._-;-_' _:_- ! ;
i''- I--+It::::::'"I--'--'-----'---+-\--------If---:--;---j

i
1- ' .
r l.. c.....,.o.,.. 1:1 l. rT...
I: la 0CUIlIMz.-
I OnI,,-T_ ... :=:.r:.....
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CJ lA.-....T..
riI u.c::nu.e...l.-
_ ' T.,
,..,.L.....
" _.-
:,
-....-- ----; ,-f--t--'---...;....-+-+---...
11:.L =..:-
..- R '-....r...
o.tI T...
--
1,_
IlIlllllI
I
I
I
I
----.---.-,---'t--;-..,..--,---t--I---;----+--j
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;' '
_ --. __ ._-- ------- . --f-.-'-_:-
- -- --1----' -:. --' -- --:-:
FIGURE 7. WELL C
PORE PRESSURE. FRAC GRADIENT. MUD WEIGHT
-
w" :W"C
-,
c.....y: ... :
APt. : w.l1It WElle
K.BAo.:a.oo ClJ..M.s..L:o.oo W.D.:o.oo

Zl
Zl
Zll
-----.--'_:....._-1--. __:_, -_:_.:--
__ .__ - - : I !
. , !
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!! \ i I I
,lIlllllI
-- -- ---_._-_..__. Q'----.. -.--. -- .__...
ll.
I ::.:::-_.... T...
I. DtC$twwT..
,_
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_ '....... r.,
... IUt"""LeuIM
..........
569
8 PORE PRESSURES, FRACTIJRE GRADIENTS
ANDDRllllNGECONOMICS
IADC/SPE 27493
Ev-nt: MlftOt Lo.t elreul.don
ProMblllfy:UTS
-.,
IblMded Drr-: .."
E...nt: Molonl Clre"l.tkMI
'nablIItf.G.2S0
0..,.:0
Ibpected o.y.: 0."
....nt: Normal Circulation T......
Prot.blUtr: 0.100
0.",:0
EI,.et..t o.y.: 115
IEftnt:lluck ",.
Pntbrlblllty: 0.050
0.,.: to
&,.eIMi 0.,.: IUS
Evont: Ele...m ClrculaUon
Pr.bllhy. O.toO
0....:1
bpeclMD-p:1G.11
Altwn.lh: Drill N." Saltine-
0..,.:0
Elpect.clo..,.:I.U
FIGURE 8, DECISION TREE FOR
HOWTO HANDLE GAS-CUT MUD
FIGURE 9, CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY FOR
HOWTO HANDLE GAS-CUT MUD
20 15
I
10
x Days
5
75
25
50
Cumulative Risk Profile for "How to handle GCM" Decision
Chance 100
that
Payoff is
Less
Than or
Equal to
x(%)
570
IADC/SPE 27493 THOMAS S1RENGERPROEHL
TABLE 1
"How to handle GCM" dTree Inputs
9
Alternatives:
1. Drill Near Balance
2. Drill Over Balance (possibly close to frac gradient)
Event Hierarchy for 'Drill Over Balance' Alternative
1. Lost Circulation
a. Minor; p=0.375, cost=8 days
Stuck Pipe; p=0.05, cost=1 0 days
Kick; p=0.1, cost=2 days
Excessive Circulation; p=0.15, cost=3 days
No Trouble; p=0.75, cost=O days
No Stuck Pipe; p=0.95, cost=O days
Kick: p=0.1, cost=2 days
Excessive Circulation; p=0.15, cost=3 days
No Trouble; p=0.75, cost=O days
b. Major; p=0.375, cost=20 days
Stuck Pipe: p=0.60, cost=1 0 days
No Stuck Pipe; p=0.40, cost=O days
c. No Lost Circulation: p=0.25, cost=O days
Kick; p=0.25, cost=2 days
Excessive Circulation; p=0.15, cost=3 days
No Trouble; p=0.60, cost=O days
Event Hierarchy for 'Drill Near Balance' Alternative
1. Excessive Circulation; p=0.90, cost=7 days
a. Kick; p=0.50, cost=3 days
Stuck Pipe; p=0.25, cost=1 0 days
Lost Circulation; p=0.1 0, cost=8days
No Trouble; p=0.65, cost=O days
b. No Kick; p=0.50, cost=O days
2. Normal Circulation Time; p=0.1 0, cost=O days
a. Kick; p=0.50, cost=3 days
Stuck Pipe; p=0.25, cost=10 days
Lost Circulation; p=0.1 0, cost=8 days
No Trouble; p=0.65, cost=O days
b. No Kick; p=0.50, cost=O days
Note: Event Hierarchy, probabilities and costs can be changed to reflect latest information. This is an approach to
making better decisions and finding a better answer, not a search for a "correct" answer. Convert to cost by assuming a
dayrate of $6,000.
571