!

The Constitution of the Philippines

De Leon vs. Esguerra 153 SCRA 602 No. L-78059, August 31, 1987

FACTS: In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government. Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. LacanientaTeodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality ISSUE: Whether the memoranda of Feb 8, 1987 is null and void, thus prohibiting respondents from taking over the appointed positions HELD: No, the memoranda have no legal effect. 1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So, February 8, 1987 and not December 1, 1986. 2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer in efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec. 27 states that all previous constitution were suspended. 3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in effect. Petitioners now acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay officials has been fixed. Barangay election act is not inconsistent with constitution. Considering Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution which states that All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986, it would seem that the appointment was valid on Feb 8, 1987 since the term of the elective officials would end in Feb 25, 1987. However, since the new constitution was ratified on Feb 2, 1987 and section 27 states that effectivity is immediate, thereby superseding the Provisional Constitution. Furthermore, the 1987Constitution under ensures the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development and the Presidents power is for general supervision only which is in line with the barangay election act of 1982.

Relevantly, on Section 8 states that terms of local officials is 3 years, except of barangay officials, which means that the 6-year terms as stated in the Barangay Election Act of 1982is still in effect unless otherwise stated by law

FRANCISCO v. HOR FACTS: NOTE: Read Article XI of the 1987 Constitution *Following Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution1, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. *On July 22, 2002: the HOR adopted a resolution to conduct an investigation on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the SC Chief Justice of the Judiciary Development Fund. *On June 22, 2003: former President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (1st impeachment complaint) against CJ Davide and 7 Assoc. Justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes which was endorsed by Rep. Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on Aug. 5, 2003 in accordance with Sec 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. * October 13, 2003: the House Committee on Justice ruled on that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form but voted to dismiss the same on Oct 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary. *October 23, 2003 (four months and three weeks since the filing of the 1st impeachment complaint: 2nd impeachment complaint was filed with the Sec. Gen of the House by Representative Gilberto Teodoro and William Fuentabella against CJ Davide founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry. The 2nd impeachment complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least 1/3 of all members of the HOR. Thus, arose 18 instant petitions against the HOR, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"

!#$%!&'()*%++!+$,--!.*'/0-),1%!21+!*0-%+!'(!2/.%,3$/%(1!!"#$%%$&!'($)*#&+,,*#"-!#!.$#/-,/"0$#"%#!.'0#0$&!'"12!

provision of Sec 5 of Art XI of the Constitutions that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. ISSUES: I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution. II. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution. III. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. HELD:
45

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court

has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

!
445 The

provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state

that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
4445

The second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred

under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. Commissioner Regalado, who eventually became Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, agreed that the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The Court then held that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition

against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

Gonzales vs Commission on Elections (BAGTAS) **I included issue #1kase nakalagay sya sa case itself, and just to be sure and just in case Miss asks about it, but ang pinaka relevant lang talaga is Issue #2) FACTS: On 16 March 1967, the Congress passed the following Resolutions: Resolution of Both Houses (hereafter called RBH) 1:proposing that Sec 5 Art VI of the Constitution be amended to increase the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 RBH 2: to call a Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 elective delegates from each representative district, to be elected on the general elections on the 2nd Tuesday of November 1971. RBH 3: proposing to amend Sec 16 Art VI of the Consti to authorize senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the Constitutional Convention without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Consequently, the Congress passed a bill, which became RA 4913 upon approval of the President, providing that RBH Nos 1 and 3 be submitted for approval by the people at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967, the same day as the general elections. The petitioner, Ramon Gonzales, instituted this class suit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers and voters alike. He assailed the constitutionality of RA 4913 and the power of the Congress to propose amendments, being de facto officers because they have not yet completed the Constitutional requirement of reapportionment, therefore, rendering its acts null and void. He also added that constitutional amendments should not be submitted for ratification the same day as the general elections for this would not provide sufficient opportunity to cast intelligent votes and the voters therein would only be interested in the personalities in the general elections. ISSUE: 1.) WON the constitutional amendments had been validly proposed by the Congress. 2.) WON constitutional amendments can be submitted for ratification the same day the general elections as

HELD: 1.) Yes, there has been a valid proposal by the Congress. There is no law that states that failure to comply with a mandatory duty would result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to that effect. Neither may the validity of the acts of the Congress be questioned on the ground that they are merely de facto officers because it would be an indirect inquiry into the title of the office and the acts of a de facto officer are valid, in so far as the public is concerned. 2.) Yes, the constitutional amendments can be submitted for ratification the same day as the general elections. Sec 1 Art XV of the Constitution does not indicate that the election referred to is special and not a general election. -The contested Resolutions proposing the constitutional amendments were approved on March 16, 1967, and by November 14, 1967 or the date of the general elections, the citizenry shall have practically 8 months to be informed of the amendments in question.

Imbong vs. Comelec G.R. No. L-32432 September 11,1970

Facts: Petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, both interested in running as candidates in the 1971 Constitutional convention, filed separate petitions for declaratory relief, impugning the constitutionality of RA 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as candidates. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 2 which called for the Constitutional Convention to propose Constitutional amendments. After its adoption, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted RA 4914 implementing said resolution, restating entirely the provisions of said resolution. Thereafter, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly , passed Resolution No. 4 amending the Resolution No. 2 by providing that xxx any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation xxx. Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted RA 6132, implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing RA 4914. Issue: May Congress in acting as a legislative body enact RA 6132 to implement the resolution passed by it in its capacity as a Constituent Assembly? Ruling: Yes. The Court declared that while the authority to call a Constitutional Convention is vested by the Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constitutional Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details or specifics of the general law does not exclusively pertain to the congress, the congress in exercising its comprehensive legislative power( not as a Constitutional Assembly) may pass the necessary implementing law providing for the details of the Constitutional Conventions, such as the number, qualification, and compensation of its members. The reasons cited by the Court in upholding the constitutionality of the enactment of RA 6132 are as follows:

1. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution, has authority to propose constitutional amendments or call a convention for the purpose by ! votes each house in joint session assembled but voting separately. 2. Such grant includes all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power by necessary implication. 3. Implementing details are within the authority of the Congress not only as a Constituent Assembly but also in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power which encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action so long as it does not contravene any provision of the Constitution; and 4. Congress as a legislative body may thus enact necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps which Congress as a Constituent Assembly has omitted.

Occena vs Comelec G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981 Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions. Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Petitioners urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly. The Petitioners also urge what was done was to revise and not to amend. Issue: Whether the legislature can only amend and not to revise the constitution. Held: No, the choice of method of proposal is discretionary upon the legislature. It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections to dispose of this contention. Thus: "3. And whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. 4. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed.

Tolentino v. Comelec (G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 171) Facts: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which amends Section 1 of the Constitution lowering the voting age from 21 to 18. The amendment lowering the voting age to 18 is only the first amendment in a series of amendments to be submitted for ratification to the people in a plebiscite. In other words, the proposed amendment will be presented to the people separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. A petition for prohibition was thereafter filed at the Supreme Court which seeks to prevent the Comelec from conducting a plebiscite because Organic Resolution No. 1 is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution.2 Issue: Whether Organic Resolution No 1. is unconstitutional for violating Section 1, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. Held: Yes. 1. The language of the constitutional provision is clear, which unequivocally says "an election" which means only one. (2) When a whole Constitution is submitted to the voters for approval, more or less they can assume its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their votes and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to the people that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability. This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. The voter in the proposed plebiscite cannot intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6

! The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.

Sanidad vs. Comelec Facts: Sept 2, 1976: President Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum on Oct 16 1976 for the citizens assemblies (brgys) to resolve the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, powers of such replacement, period of existence, length of period for the exercise by the President of his powers. Sept22: the president issued PD 1031 amending PD 991 by declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in brgys applicable to the national referendum- plebiscite of Oct16. Relevantly, PD1031 repealed Sec4 of PD991. President issued PD1033 stating questions to be submitted to the people in the referendumplebiscite on Oct16. The COMELEC was vested with exclusive supervision and control of the Oct 1976 plebiscite. Sept 27 1976: Pablo and Pablito Sanidad commenced l-44640 for prohibition and preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the Comelec from holding and conducting the plebiscite on oct16, to declare pd991 and 1033 insofar as they propose amendments to the constitution as well as PD1031 insofar as it directs the comelec to supervise, control, hold and conduct the referendumplebiscite on Oct. 16. It was alleged that the 1935 and 1973 Constitution did not grant the incumbent President the power to exercise constituent power to propose amendments to the new constitution and that the plebiscite has no constitutional basis. Issue: w/n the president may call a referendum-plebiscite for the amendment of the constitution. Held: The petitions dismissed for not obtaining enough votes * Accdg to the 1973 consti, any amendment to or revision of may be proposed by a national assembly upon a vote of 3/4 of all its members call a constitl. convention or by majority vote of all its members submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate. there are two periods contemplated, period of normalcy and transituon period. In the period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with the amending power. The power may be exercised upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The prerogative of the Pres to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation and not with the proposition or adoption of amendments. It was opined further that since the President did not call the interim national assembly, he has the power to exercise the power conferred to the National Assembly.

THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997) Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that it is not initiatory party cognizable by the COMELEC. After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their Memoranda and/or Oppositions/Memoranda. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition raising the several arguments, among others: (1) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and (2) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution. R.A 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the Constitution; the Act covers only laws and not Constitutional amendments. (3) The Peoples Initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the peoples initiative. Issues: (1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. (2) Whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient statutory implementation of the said constitutional provision? (3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution. Held: (1) No. Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.

(2) No. R.A 6735 is insufficient and incomplete to fully comply with the power and duty of the Congress to enact the statutory implementation of Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. (3) The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative.

Lambino vs COMELEC FACTS: 1. On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado "Lambino Group", with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)and Section 7of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735"). 2. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. 3. The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification: DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER? 4. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

ISSUE: 1. WON the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative; 2. WON this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and 3. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition. 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void. 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore it constitutes a revision. 3.For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commission on Elections. Petition is Dismissed

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE Police Power G.R. No. 81958. June 30, 1988 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents. FACTS: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS." It is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. Further, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in some states. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. ISSUE: Whether or not Department Order No. 1 is valid under the Constitution. HELD: The petition is dismissed.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that: (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on substantial distinctions. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for unconstitutionality. In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary. Department Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." The right to travel is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. The Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.

Ichong v. Hernandez G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957 (Police Power) FACTS: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life. a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade Aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term. Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act. provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry. provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons: 1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process 2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title 3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations 4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession

Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. Held: YES. The Supreme Court held that the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost allembracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the

needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause. Summary: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state. Other Issue: Whether or not the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws. Held: No. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act. The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency. While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State. The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

Association of Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform GR. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

Facts: This case constitutes four consolidated cases involving the question of constitutionality of several measures passed by the government with regard to Comprehensive Agrarian Reform. Herein petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the following for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection: 1) P.D. No. 27, promulgated along with Martial Law, which provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners; 2) E.O. No. 228 promulgated by Pres. Corazon Aquino, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment; 3) E.O. No. 229, which provides for the mechanics of the implementation of P.D. no. 131, instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program; and 4) R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The first case questions the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. Petitioners contend that President Corazon Aquino usurped the legislative power in promulgating E.O. No. 228 before the Congress convenes. They also argued that such measure is invalid as it fails to provide for retention limits of small landowners and fails to comply with the requisites of a valid appropriation. In the second case, the petitioners seek to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They argued that there is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated. Petitioners further argue that the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50 billion under Sec. 2 of Proclamation No. 131 is invalid and President Aquino had no authority to fund the agrarian reform program. Thereafter, two separate motions for intervention were filed arguing that the government failed to provide by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain. The petitioner on the third case also raised the same arguments as above stated after the Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. The Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the

private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to the petitioner. He further alleged that the legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power. He prayed for the recall and cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer in favor of private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents. And lastly, the petitioners in the fourth case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. They argued that since they cannot eject their tenants, they are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under P.D. No. 316 stating that: No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27. On the other hand, public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table, Memorandum Circular No. 11 or the Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474, Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 or Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners, and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27. For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right. Issue: Whether or not the laws promulgated for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform are valid? Held:

Yes, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform measures are valid. The Supreme Court held that R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 in question are sustained against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions. The Supreme Court further ruled that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners; there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. In other words, the power of eminent domain could also be used as an implement of the police power. Since the objective of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is to promote the welfare of the farmers, which is clearly under the ambit of police power, the law has provided for the expropriation of agricultural lands, subject to maximum retention limits of landowners, to be distributed among landless farmers. Therefore, promulgation of CARP law is a valid exercise of police power and eminent domain.

Lozano vs. Martinez G.R. No. L-63419 Facts: The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision. The petitions in the case at bar arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved to quash the charge against them on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case (G. R. No. 75789) wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General commented that it was premature to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash. BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. The language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of value. BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, such checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice is proscribed by the state because of the injury it causes to t public interests. Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and (5) its enactment is flawed in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on Third Reading. Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction. Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.

Held: BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment and not the non-payment of an obligation. Thus, the law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Moreover, the law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. In addition, there is also no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. Neither there is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary. The allegation that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee has also no merit. If the payee does not present the check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws. he power to define the offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed, no

matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is farfetched. An objection has also been raised that Section 9 (2) of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution was violated by the legislative body when it enacted BP 22 into law. A careful review of the record of the proceedings of the Interim Batasan on this matter shows that, indeed, there was some confusion among Batasan Members on what was the exact text of the paragraph in question which the body approved on Second Reading. However, it is clear from the records that the text of the second paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was actually approved by the body on Second Reading on February 7, 1979, as reflected in the approved Minutes for that day. There was an authorized amendment of the bill and the printed copy thereof reflects accurately the provision in question as approved on Second Reading.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents.

FACTS:

1. The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East (UE) with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NATIONAL MEDICAL ADMISSIONS TEST (NMAT) three times (3) and flunked it as many times. 2. He applied to take it again; the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule THREE-FLUNK RULE. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. 3. He first appealed his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT. 4. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. 5. After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 6. All in all, the private respondent failed the test five times (5). a. The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. ISSUE:

Whether or not the admission rule implemented by petitioner an arbitrary exercise of police power.

HELD: Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably

necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

It is the right and indeed the obligation of the State to insure that incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health do not infiltrate the medical profession. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. The State needs to implement decisive steps to regulate system of education by directing students to the course where he is best suited through initial tests and evaluation. The decision of the respondent judge was reversed.

Ynot vs IAC G.R. No. 74457 20 March 1987 Facts: The Petitioners had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Illolo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for violation of E.O No. 626-A, an amended measure of E.O 626 it doesnt only prohibit the slaughtering of carabaos but it also bans the movemet of carabaos from inter provinces and the transport of carabeef. Ynot was charged with violation of such measure. The carabaos were arbitrarilt confiscated by the police station commander. The measure struck at once and rounded upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot holding that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote the welfare of farmers so as to are down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. Issue: WON E.O 626-A is constitutional Held: No. The measure is not a valid exercise of police power and therefore unconstitutional. To determine the validity of a police measure there shold be a lawful subject and lawful means reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose that is not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power because the method employed to converse the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law, and were unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in defense and is immediately condemned and punished.

City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta and Himlayang Pilipino, Inc., G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983. Facts: Quezon City council passed Ordinance no. 6118, S-64, entitled Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery or Burial Ground within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Provided for the Violation thereof. Section 9 of the aforementioned Ordinance states, among others, that each private memorial park cemetery shall set aside a total of 6% of its total area for charity burials of deceased paupers who were residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. The said section of the Ordinance was, however, not enforced after several years. Seven years after the enactment of the Ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. The Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. (HPI) in writing that the aforementioned Section of the Ordinance would be enforced. Respondent HPI filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question, alleging that the same is contrary to law. The respondent court, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, declared Section 9 of the Ordinance in question null and void. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitoner and was likewise denied. Hence, the petition for review.

Issue(s): Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power. Held: No. The Supreme Court held that there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. " As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Petition for review was DISMISSES and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the respondent court.

Power of Eminent Domain

#18 City of Manila (plaintiff-appellant) vs. Chinese Community of Manila (defendantsappellees) Facts: The case is an appeal of the decision in the court of First Instance of Manila. On December 11, 1916 the plaintiff-appellant city of Manila sent a petition to the Court of First Instance or CFI praying that certain lots within Block 83 in the Chinese Cemetery in Binondo be expropriated for the extension project of the Rizal Avenue. The Defendant- Chinese Community of Manila answered the plaintiffs petition by stating that the expropriation of the lots affected by the Rizal Avenue project was neither necessary nor expedient. The defendant also stated that the lots affected hold the remains of their deceased family members and should not be disturbed. The defendants offered plots of land adjacent to the Chinese Cemetery to the plaintiff for free. The defendants also added that there would be difficulty if the proposed project is to succeed since most of the Chinese family own plots of land in the cemetery for generations and that removal and transfer of the deceased would entail irreparable loss and injury. A defendant Idelfonso Tambunting answered the petition alleging that the expropriation is not a public improvement and his plot affected has become quasi-public property. Other defendants like Feliza Concepcion de Delagado, Jose Maria Delgado also gave the same defense as presented by the Chinese Community of Manila and Idelfonso Tambunting. The Plaintiff City of Manila maintained that expropriation was necessary. However the defendants alleged the following: a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchers and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes. The CFI Judge Honorable Simplicio del Rosario decided in favor of the defendants stating that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question. The CFI absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint without any finding as to costs. The plaintiff then elevated for a case for appeal.

Issue: 1) Whether or not the plaintiff can exercise the right to eminent domain in the case given?

2) Whether or not the parcels of land owned by the Defendant Chinese Community of Manila can be expropriated for the extension of Rizal Avenue?

Held: 1) No, the court has the power to inquire whether or not the authority conferred upon such delegate (plaintiff) has been correct or properly exercised. In determining whether or not the plaintiff has the authority following requisites must be met: a) there a law or higher authority exists for the exercise of the eminent domain, and b) the right or authority is exercised according to law. The plaintiff lacked the requisites. The plaintiff can only exercise expropriation as stated in its charter if: a) the land is private and b) the purpose for expropriation must be for the public use. However the land in question is public land as stated by the defendants. Legislature has given Philippine courts the power to ascertain upon trial whether the right of eminent domain exists in a case. Section 159 of volume 10 of Ruling Case Law or RCL states that courts have the power to prevent an abuse of discretion delegated by the legislative which in this case is expropriation via the power of eminent domain. The taking of private property for any use not required by necessity or convenience of the people is unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain and is beyond the legislature to delegate. Article 349 of the Civil Code also states that no one is to be deprived of his/her public property unless by competent authority for some proven public utility. 2) No because the cemetery is proven to be public property. The Spanish Governor General granted the land for the use of the Chinese community as gift for their service to the nation. Also the plaintiff did not mention to the court the plan to disturb the resting place of the deceased. The Chinese cemetery was specifically a public cemetery. There was no substantial proof for the need of converting the cemetery.

The petition of the plaintiff was denied and the higher court affirmed the decision of the CFI with cost against the plaintiff-appellant.

Republic vs PLDT GR NO. L- 18841 FACTS : In 1933, the defendant PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc. (RCA), entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the US and received by RCAs domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Phil to the US. The arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone messages to and from European and Asiatic Countries. Their contract contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it on a 24-month notice to the other. On February 2, 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on Feb 2, 1958. In 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications (BOT) set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the government offices to call private parties. The condition of BOTs application is that it shall abide with the rules and regulations of PLDT which are on file with the Public Service Commission. One of its rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private use. In 1948, the Bureau extended its services to general public using the same trunk line rented from PLDT. On March 5 1958, the plaintiff (BOT), through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCAs station to and from local residents. On April 7 1958, PLDT complained to BOT that said bureau was violating the conditions under which the Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDTs facilities, referring to the rented trunk-lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT. It warned BOT that if will not stop they will sever the tel. connections. The trunk lines were later disconnected. The result was the isolation of the Phil, on tel. services, from the rest of the world, except US. The Bureau had proposed to the PLDT on Jan 8 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement but neither party accepted the proposal. On April 12 1958, plaintiff RP commenced suit against PLDT in the CFI of Manila seeking for judgement commanding PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendants telephone system throughout the Phil. Under such terms and conditions as the court may consider reasonable. CFI rendered that it cannot compel PLDT to enter into an agreement with BOT because the parties cannot agree on the terms and conditions of the interconnection. Both parties appealed. ISSUE : Whether or not the court can compel PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff. HELD : Yes, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain require a the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation for the use of PLDTs line and services which is to be determined

by the court. If under Sec 6, Article XIII of the Constitution, the State may in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided that just compensation is provided therefor. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use. *NOTES : PLDT - a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise, to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other countries. RCA Communications, Inc.- is an American corporation authorized to transact business in the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative franchise to operate a domestic station for the reception and transmission of long distance wireless messages (Act 2178) and to operate broadcasting and radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic communications services (Act 3180).

Amigable vs Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360, GR NO L 26400 Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.

Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensationprice or value of the lot at the time of the taking.

REPUBLIC VS. CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL. CASE DIGEST (G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974) FACTS: This is a case between Republic of the Philippines and Carmen M. Vda. Castellvi over a parcel of land occupied by the AFP. On June 26, 1959, Republic filed a complaint for eminent domain against Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, the judicial administrator of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi located in barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga, alleging that fair market value of the disputed land has a total market value of P259,669.10, the republic also prayed in their complaint that (a) that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, (b) court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit, (c) court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation, (d) the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation. Trial court=> On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of the lands at P259,669.10. the defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that (a) the land under her administration, being a residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market value of P11,389,485.00, (b) the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, , illegally occupying her property preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of unrealized profits, the defendant also prayed that Republic be ordered to pay her P15.00 per square meter, or a total of P11,389,485.00, plus interest thereon at 6% per annum. On October 22, 1959, Toledo-Gozun, who was also allowed by the court to intervene as a party defendant, in her motion to dismiss allege that her two parcels of land were residential lands, that the fair market value of said lands was P15.00 per square meter, so they had a total market value of P8,085,675.00; and she prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that she be paid the amount of P8,085,675.00, plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum. On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as provisional value of her lands. On May 16, 1960 the trial Court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Castellvi the amount of P151,859.80 as provisional value of the land under her administration Trial Court appointed three commissioners and these an Commissioners submitted their report and recommendation and had determined that the lands sought to be expropriated were residential lands, they recommended unanimously that the lowest price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun and an additional P5,000.00 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for

improvements found on her land but these reports were objected by all parties in the case. On May 26, 1961, the trial court render its decision: court finds that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square meter for the three lots of the defendants subject of this action is fair and just. With respect to the defendant Castellvi, interest at 6% per annum will also be paid by the plaintiff to defendant when plaintiff commenced its illegal possession of the Castellvi land On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. On July 26, 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating that "in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court," ISSUE: whether or not the taking of the property in dispute commence from the time the plaintiff enter into contract of lease with the defendant. HELD: No, the Supreme Court held that the property would only be considered taken when the proceedings for expropriation or for the just compensation commence. In the case at bar the republic alleged that the lower court erred in holding that the taking of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of an action over the disputed land which takes place in 1947 through a lease agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, where the former argues that through the agreement, they were granted by a right and privileged to buy the property should the lessor, the latter, wish to terminate the lease. The defendant argues that the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property in which did not exist in the case at bar. It is undisputed that the Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by virtue of the contract under the terms and conditions therein stated. Before the expiration of the contract of lease, the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the general public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter, and premises be returned in substantially the same condition as before occupancy ). A follow-up letter was sent on January 12, 1957, demanding the delivery and return of the property within one month from said date. On January 30, 1957, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and

already established on the property, the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to the President. As the plaintiff insist in their argument that taking should commence in 1947, it is right to define the term taking in eminent domain, in American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section 157, on the subject of "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of "taking" (in eminent domain) as follows: entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain: 1. The expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is present in the instant case. 2. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. The word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to mean "a limited period", the fact that the Republic constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory but It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this "intention" cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. It might really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate the lands in question at some future time. 3. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. This circumstance is present in the instant case. 4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. This circumstance is present in the instant case. 5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In this case, the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals. Therefore, it is clear that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the

property as lessee. We also find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947. We also hold that the "taking" of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error in its decision because under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the "just compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

Philippine press institute vs. Comelec G.R no.119694 May 22, 1995 Facts: Respondent COMELEC promolgated Resolution No. 2271 directing newspapers to provide free Comelc space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non- profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resoulution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (Police Power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional. Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate "Comelec Space" amounts to taking of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

LORENZO SUMULONG vs. HON. BUENAVENTURA AUTHORITY, respondents. FACTS:

and

EMILIA

VIDANES-BALAOING, petitioners, and NATIONAL HOUSING

GUERRERO

(G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987) On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees, covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank, representing the total market value of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which defines the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation. On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of possession of the subject parcels of land. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration contending that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law but were denied. Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224, as amended. The petitioners further raised the following contentions: 1) Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion by issuing the Order of January 17, 1978 without notice and without hearing and in issuing the Order dated June 28, 1978 denying the motion for reconsideration. 2) Pres. Decree l224, as amended, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause, specifically: a) The Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of size and no matter how small the area to be expropriated; b) "Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation proceeding, as defined in said Decree, is not really for a public purpose; c) The Decree violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court;

d) The Decree would allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors; e) The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to determine what would be the "just compensation" in each and every raise of expropriation. the Court then categorized the petitioners contentions into (1) public use; (2) just compensation; and (3) due process for purposes of answering the same. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is for public use; (2) Whether or not the National Housing Authority (NHA) has the discretion to determine the size of the property/properties to be expropriated; (3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors; (4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land were immediately possessed by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by the respondent judge. HELD: The Supreme Court held that "socialized housing" defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 1259 and 1313, constitutes "public use" for purposes of expropriation; that the provisions of such decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional; and that in the instant case the Court finds that the Orders issued by the respondent judge authorizing immediate taking without notice and hearing are violative of due process. RATIO: The Supreme Court then ruled the following: 1. Public use a) Socialized Housing Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful of people, bereft of public character." "Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities" (Pres. Decree No. 1224, par. 1). This definition was later expanded to include among others: a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for the middle and lower income groups of the society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities; b) Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers as well as the provision of related facilities and services;

c) Slum improvement which consists basically of allocating homelots to the dwellers in the area or property involved, rearrangemeant and re-alignment of existing houses and other dwelling structures and the construction and provision of basic community facilities and services, where there are none, such as roads, footpaths, drainage, sewerage, water and power system schools, barangay centers, community centers, clinics, open spaces, parks, playgrounds and other recreational facilities; d) The provision of economic opportunities, including the development of commercial and industrial estates and such other facilities to enhance the total community growth; and e) Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of the objective to provide and maintain housing for the greatest number of people under Presidential Decree No, 757, (Pres. Decree No. 1259, sec. 1) The Court further ruled that the requirement of public use for the power of eminent domain to be valid is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. It likewise stressed that housing problem, due to or coupled with the migration of people to urban areas, is a public knowledge which must be addressed. Ultimately, the Supreme Court was satisfied that socialized housing fans within the confines of public use. It is, particularly important to draw attention to paragraph (d) of Pres. Dec. No. 1224 which opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the project contending that the lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees. Hence, such expropriation is for public use. b) Size of Property The petitioners contend that P.D. 1224, as amended, allows the taking of "any private land" regardless of the size and no matter how small the area of the land to be expropriated, hence would authorize NHA to determine the area or size of the land to be expropriated. The petitioners then suggested the vast areas of lands in Mayamot, Cupang, and San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal hundred of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. However, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the NHA, reiterating previous jurisprudence on the matter, and contending that NHA is the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. 2. Just Compensation Petitioners maintain that Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, would allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. In addition, they assert that the Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to determine what would be "just compensation." Reiterating previous rulings on the same issue, the Supreme Court declared that the provisions of P.D. 1224 unconstitutional because they constitute encroachments on prerogatives. The Court further stated that just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. ALL the facts as to the

condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. 3. Due Process Petitioners assert that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing. The Supreme Court reiterated the ruling in Export Processing Zone Authority case which declared that such is violative of due process. With regard to the issuance of the writ of possession by the respondent judge, the Supreme Court reiterated the ruling in the Ignacio case: [I]t is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in expropriation proceedings, the following requisites must be met: (1) There must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance; (2) A provisional determination of just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive) discretion; and (3) The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with. (p. 14)

Manosca vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996 Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: The expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born, valid and constitutional? Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a public use becauseof the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines.

EPZA VS DULAY Facts: On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). The proclamation included, among others, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the private respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding sale of the property. EPZA filed a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession in the Court of 1st instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, stating that P.D. 66 empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property in relation to Proclamation 1811. On October 21, 1980, a writ of possession was issued and on December 23, 1980, the private respondent filed its answer. On February 13, 1981, in the Pre-trial conference the respondent judge issued that the parties have agreed and the only thing to be resolved is the just compensation and he appointed creation persons as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated. On June 19, 1981, the three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties. On July 29, 1981, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of February 17, 1981 and Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533. But on November 14, 1981 the court denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. This present petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order was filed by EPZA on February 9, 1982. It was also raised that section 5 to 8 of the Revised Rules of Court had been amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of commissioners by the court to determine just compensation is concern. The petitioner argued that the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared by the owner or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Prior to the promulgation of P.D. Nos. 76, 464, 794 and 1533, the Supreme Court has interpreted the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. It laid down doctrines on just compensation and reiterated for many times the 'well-settled rule that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less, than just compensation.

Issue:

Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned. Stated in another way, is the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid and constitutional? Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be considered. In this case, the tax declarations used as basis for the just compensation were made long before the declaration of martial law when the land was much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of those documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory The method of ascertaining just compensation under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.

July 20,1998 J. Panganiban Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation N.B. There are two digests here for the same case.. The first one is a 3 page digest and the other is a 5 page digest.. Kung tamad na tamad ka na.. Yung sa held sulit ka na dun sa first paragraph in each issue.. Enjoy.. : ) the Municipality of Paraaque (MP) filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation 7 against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation (RC) over two parcels of land with a combined area of about 10,000 square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for the purpose of providing homes for the homeless." 8 Parenthetically, it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner (MP), pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, 9 previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent (RC), which the latter (RC) did not accept. 10 Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an Order dated February 4, 1994 (special date), 12 authorizing petitioner (MP) to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. On February 21, 1994, (RC) private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim, 13alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance(very important) as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 (special date) Resolution 16 nullifying its February 4, 1994 Order and dismissing the case. Court of Appeals agreed in the decision of RTC in toto on January 22, 1996 (special date) Supreme Court petition for review on certiorari N. B. The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain is not disputed. Issues: 1) Whether or not a resolution has the same force and effect of an ordinance, as required by Sec 19 (Eminent Domain) of RA 7160 (the Local Government Code) 2) Whether or not Eminent Domain is barred by the principle of Res Judicata. Held: 1) A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A

resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 27 In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. 32 An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. N.B. Strict Construction should apply 2) the principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals 43 and the trial court, 44 all the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it. Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, 45 cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a

prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every form of property which the State might need for public use." N.B. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with. The story of the prior case On September 29, 1987, the plaintiff filed a complaint for expropriation involving the same parcels of land which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17939 of this Court (page 26, record). Said case was dismissed with prejudice on May 18, 1988 (page 39, record). The order of dismissal was not appealed, hence, the same became final. While defendant in Civil Case No. 17939 was Limpan Investment Corporation, the doctrine of res judicata still applies because the judgment in said case (C.C. No. 17939) is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest (Vda. de Buncio vs. Estate of the late Anita de Leon). The herein defendant (RC) is the successor-in-interest of Limpan Investment Corporation as shown by the "Deed of Assignment Exchange" executed on June 13, 1990. 5page digest

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993 , 6 the Municipality of Paraaque (MP) filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation 7 against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation (RC) over two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a combined area of about 10,000 square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila, and covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project." 8 Parenthetically, it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner (MP), pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, 9 previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent (RC), which the latter (RC) did not accept. 10 Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, issued an Order dated January 10, 1994, 11 giving it due course. Acting on petitioner's (MP) motion, said court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994 (special date), 12 authorizing petitioner (MP) to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. On February 21, 1994, (RC) private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim, 13alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance(very important) as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondent's (RC)

motion, its Answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. 14 On March 24, 1991, 15 petitioner (MP) filed its opposition, stressing that the trial court's Order dated February 4, 1994 was in accord with Section 19 of RA 7160, and that the principle of res judicata was not applicable. Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 (special date) Resolution 16 nullifying its February 4, 1994 Order and dismissing the case. Petitioner's (MP) motions for reconsideration and transfer of venue were denied by the trial court in a Resolution dated December 2, 1994. 17 Court of Appeals agreed in the decision of RTC in toto on January 22, 1996 (special date) denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Supreme Court petition for review on certiorari N. B. The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain is not disputed.

Issues: 3) Whether or not a resolution has the same force and effect of an ordinance, as required by Sec 19 (Eminent Domain) of RA 7160 (the Local Government Code) Note: Sec 19 - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain 4) Whether or not Eminent Domain is barred by the principle of Res Judicata.

Held: 1) A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. Petitioner (MP) contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case "substantially complies with the requirements of the law" 22 because the terms "ordinance" and "resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain."23 Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides. "If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of theSanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate

expropriation proceedings." 24 (Emphasis supplied.) (do not be confused this is under the old law) The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. 25 An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." 26 In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 27 In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. 32 An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code -- that a mere resolution is allowed. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is

applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." 34 In the instant case, there is no reason to depart from this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust. Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people. 35 Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language from "resolution" under BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 demands a strict construction. "No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation." 3) the principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals 43 and the trial court, 44 all the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it. Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, 45 cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every form of property which the State might need for public use." 46 "All separate interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it." 47 Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement. While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. 48 By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others

are properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also true of the principle of "law of the case." In Republic vs. De Knecht, 49 the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice. The story of the prior case On September 29, 1987, the plaintiff filed a complaint for expropriation involving the same parcels of land which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17939 of this Court (page 26, record). Said case was dismissed with prejudice on May 18, 1988 (page 39, record). The order of dismissal was not appealed, hence, the same became final. While defendant in Civil Case No. 17939 was Limpan Investment Corporation, the doctrine of res judicata still applies because the judgment in said case (C.C. No. 17939) is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest (Vda. de Buncio vs. Estate of the late Anita de Leon). The herein defendant (RC) is the successor-in-interest of Limpan Investment Corporation as shown by the "Deed of Assignment Exchange" executed on June 13, 1990.