PEOPLE VS.

CAYAT
Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their i nstant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians. ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are; (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

Facts/Issue: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power. Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage, as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This

distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
Facts: Cayat was a native from Baguio, Benguet, Mt. Province who was found guilty of violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Act 1639: It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a nonChristian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe. SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court. Issues: 1. 2. If said law is discriminatory and denies EP of laws; If said law is an improper exercise of the police power of the state. Held: 1. Said statute does not deny EP of laws; the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable: a. b. c. d. must rest on substantial distinctions; must be germane to the purposes of the law; must not be limited to existing conditions only; and must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act 1639 meets all such requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a

recognition of their inherent right to equality in that enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established. 2. Said statute is not an improper exercise of the PPS. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity is legitimate exercise of police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual. Act 1639 is designed to promote peace and order to non-Christian tribes and to eventually hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Facts: Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind. The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so -called native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take. Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law. Held: No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions. The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

Facts/Issue: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power. Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be

germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage, as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese busines smen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling with in a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

FACTS: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.

a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term. Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act. provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry. provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons: it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title the Act violates international and treaty obligations the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws. HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted. RATIO: The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act. The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency. While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State. The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents. G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957 FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident,s corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws and due process? HELD: The Court cited the following reason in upholding the constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 1180 which does not violate the equal protection of laws and due process. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. DUE PROCESS The due process of law clause is not violated because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not

only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable?; Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 10801081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.