Somatics and Social Criticism

Tom S. Tabaczynski

I’ve been reading G. H. Mead and then also Herbert Marcuse and I find somatics to
fit in with these sorts of approaches. Mead seems to be a natural place to look for a
philosophical framework for thinking about somatics. While sympathetic to certain
aspects of Shusterman’s approach but I’m not really well versed in his style of
pragmatism which connects Dewey with Rorty, Wittgenstein, and constructivism (I
guess??) so have no clear critical view of its effectiveness but the idea of
’somaesthetics’ seems worth exploring. But Shusterman’s pragmatism seems quite
different from Mead’s, and I am interested in reviving Mead’s naturalism.

The other literature that I find interesting is critical theory’s interest in sexuality,
aestheics, and embodiment in thinking about mass culture, consumerism, monopoly
capitalism, etc. I like Marcuse’s style of analysis and share his interest in a ‘concrete
philosophy’. Unless we’re talking psychology it seems that the interest of somatics is
in relation to issues of modernity, liberation, social transformation, etc. So I think that
intellectually speaking it has this dual background, in pragmatism, esp. the ‘motor’
psychology of dewey and mead, and in Marxist social criticism.

Somatics and psychotherapy

Somatic education is connected to psychoanalysis through practices such as body

psychotherapy. Nonetheless, it is much more grounded in pragmatist psychology than
psychoanalysis. This seems to limit how far it can draw on European critical social
theory for wider philosophical and critical (ie., political) implications. It is through
the concept of sexuality or Eros that psychoanalysis acquires its political and
philosophical edge through its concepts of repression and of culture-as-sublimation.
The psychoanalytic model seems to rely heavily on the hydraulic model of libidinal
psychic energy. Feldenkrais however rejects this model on theoretical grounds, and
insists that the system does not allow for a conception in terms of energy, but only in
terms of action and tension. There is no energy to be expelled but only tension and the
release from tension.

This generates a problem in so far as Feldenkrais and somatic education in general

seeks to acquire political and philosophical significance, in that it moves towards the
pragmatist conception of action that has not generates the critical edge of Marxism
and psychoanalysis. Marxist and social theoretical analysis of capitalism draw heavily
on the notions of economic oppression and sexual repression in the production of the
historical forms of capitalism and repressive forms of bourgeois liberation and
individualism. Marcuse fundamental contention is that Western art provides the main
means of reconciling the bourgeois concepts of individual liberation with the
unfreedom and repression that is the reality of the capitalist system of production and
distribution.
The Marxist credentials of critical theory are much stronger than those of
pragmatism, it seems. So the question is then how can somatic education draw on the
psychoanalytic model for its critical edge when it rejects what apparently is its critical
tenet, namely, the conception of sexuality in terms of psychic energy, and its
insistence on the centrality of sexuality. Somatic education does not seem to focus on
sexuality over and above other forms of expertise. Yet the Reichian model of sex
economy at least claims to offer the possibility of a historical analysis of patriarchy,
repression, and therefore a historical analysis of the sources of capitalism and its
forms of sexual repression, in the history of patriarchy in general, as the history of
sexual repression within the family. Alternatively, it offers, in Marcuse, the possibility
of an analysis of the contradictions and psychological basis of the maintenance of
capitalist forms of domination in Western forms of art that enable the reconciliation of
the bourgeois values of liberation and the repressive realities of capitalist modes of
production.

The question then is whether these putative gains can be retained or reconstructed
within a psychological model that dispenses with the energy metaphor in favour of a
tension-reduction model of the psychosomatic system. Certainly Feldenkrais as well
as the other somatic educators seek to cover the ground that has been traditionally
claimed by psychoanalysis, including neurosis and sexuality. But it seems at least on
the surface that neither pragmatism nor somatic education necessitate the viewing of
sexuality and sexual repression as a central function. Nonetheless, it does seem that
the Reichian move from the orthodox Freudian model of the psychic system towards
one in terms of the body or soma does move in the direction of the somatic education
model, the question then being whether it is necessary to retain the hydraulic/energy
metaphor in order to retain the insights and in particular the critical edge of
psychoanalysis.

Well, one response that does seem to invite itself is that in fact critical theory does
need to broaden its concept of psychic energy such that it generalizes being genital
sexuality, as is clear in the case of Marcuse, so as to account for the significance of art
in the maintenance of the capitalist forms of repression and domination. Here it is the
desexualisation, or desensualisation, of the body, that is, removing bodily or sensual
pleasure as a precondition of happiness, and its replacement with a disembodied or
non-embodied forms of happiness that are found in the cognitive-aesthetic relation to
art, providing the individual with momentary and transient bouts of liberation and
happiness within an unhappy reality, that forms the central historical mechanism for
reconciling the ideals of liberation with a repressive reality. The question then is
whether the hydraulic model with its energy metaphor does not become redundant
and unnecessary, that is, whether it is possible to make that argument without the
conceptual baggage of psychoanalysism, that is, whether the tension-release model
might not do just as well.

There are really two connected claims being made by critical theory, namely, the
insistence on the quantitative model of sexuality, and the insistence on the centrality
of sexuality in social repression. These seem to be connected in some way. But
fundamentally sexual energy becomes generalized as being psychic energy in general.
Culture provides for the sublimated means of releasing this sexual energy, but in the
end it is simple genital sexuality that provides the ultimate means of sexual
gratification and release of the dammed up psychic energy. Pragmatism, and even
somatic education, accepts the centrality of sexuality in a certain sense which at least
superficially seems weaker, in the sense that sexual differentiation is quite
fundamental to the human species and a basic instinct.

There are a couple of issues that arise for psychoanalysis: the question of accounting
for the neuroses; and the attempt to explain neuroses in terms of the need to repress
sexuality in civilized society. In this respect somatic education, and Feldenkrais in
particular, seek to provide a developmental model, suggesting that failure of
development, which we may view in terms of the failure to acquire competence or
expertise in some critical domain of life, leads to regression or immaturity. On the
other hand, there is the question whether the quantitative model of sexuality really
makes that much difference, or whether in fact the two models are incommensurate.
Both seek to account for sexual dysfunction within the current social context. What
the psychoanalytic model seems to offer is a broader philosophical framework which
places sexuality at the centre as an explanatory construct. Somatic education on the
other hand tends to emphasise movement in general, rather than specifically sexuality,
as the domain of inquiry and improvement. Still, Feldenkrais seeks to draw
conceptual connections between somatic education and psychoanalysis, so lets look at
that.

Reconciling somatic education and psychoanalysis

A good amount of Feldenkrais’s writing seems to be concerned as much about

somatic practice as with reconciliation with psychoanalytic and critical thought.
Wilhelm Reich and the body psychotherapy paradigm would be figure in this respect.
Somatic education points to the idea that the body psychotherapy model can be
adopted with all of its critical substance but without the dubious science (esp., the
psychic energy metaphor). The strategy seems to be to take the pragmatist
psychological model and to develop it (esp. the tension-release metaphor) as an
alternative basis for the somatic reconception of psychoanalysis. What psychoanalysis
and critical social theory gains is a more scientifically respectable basis in pragmatist
behaviourism, and what somatic education and pragmatism gains is the resources of
critical theory. The question is whether this can succeeds, that is, whether
Feldenkrais’ attempt at downplaying the differences are in fact convincing.

There seems to be at least two critical elements that need addressing. The first is the
practice side of psychoanalysis that deals with neuroses. On this side somatic
education needs to show how it deals with the problem of neurosis, and the proposal
is to look at this in terms of development and regression. The second is the theoretical
side of psychoanalysis, which gives it its critical edge. On this side psychoanalysis
posits civilization as emerging out of the repression of natural impulses, in particular,
the repression of sexuality. Now, here we need to look at the theoretical side of
orthodox psychoanalytic theory against the background of interpretive social
psychology or Volkerpsychologie of Wilhelm Wundt. Freud sees psychoanalysis as
essentially social psychology, that is, as interpretive. His emphasis on sexuality is
drawn from his psychoanalytic practice and generalized in terms of an interpretation
of art and literature. In this he moves in the direction of anthropology.

On the other side of the divide we have people like the anthropologist Bronislaw
Malinowski who sees social structures in essentially functional terms. Dewey’s paper
on anthropology reflects this and draws further implications for the processes of
education. The tone of these writings is that the survival of the group demands the
reproduction of certain predispositions and in particular certain forms of expertise
that ensure the preservation and survival of the group. Malinowski makes a strong
distinction between the religious or sacred and the non-religious or profane social
function. In matters of expertise the native is pragmatic and exercises quasi-scientific
modes of reasoning. It is possible to clearly distinguish the spiritual domain and the
pragmatic domain. In the latter the native needs to exercise practical reasoning and
ensure the reproduction of expertise, something that would not presumably be
compatible with the sacred domain which demands unquestioning commitment to the
group.

Feldenkrais perhaps is equivocal in his approbation of social criticism on the sort of

grounds that we might find in say Marcuse. If we for example take Marcuse’s strategy
for explaining the psychological basis of capitalism in terms of bourgeois aesthetics,
the theme is that the psychological basis of capitalism is illusory inner liberation
without real outer freedom. Marcuse develops the Marxist interpretation of Hegel in
terms of the idea that outer freedom demands that the inner impulse is reflected in
social institutions, whereas liberalism provides for inner liberation through bourgeois
forms of cultural production within the context of the chaos of the marketplace which
destroys the human ecology and the possibility of guarantees of outward bodily
satisfaction. Real bodily consummations are vitiated by the tyranny of the
marketplace that opposes the interests of the individual to those of the market place
and of the requirements of mass consumption, that is, to the need of the market to
sustain overconsumption. The market has no interest in the attainment of bodily
satisfaction and the destruction of striving, but rather the opposite, its interest is in
sustaining social mobility and the creation of artificial needs. It is only in the sphere
of high art that the individual achieves immediate yet momentary satisfaction, or at
least its promise.

The conception of freedom in Feldenkrais is primarly based in the notion of the soma,
movement, and the anti-gravity righting mechanisms. It is articulated in terms of
spontaneity and choice of action. It is based around the notions of posture and motion
or movement. Spontaneous movement is defined in terms of freedom from
compulsion, and compulsion is associated with the notions of culture and society. So
Feldenkrais seems to imply a kind of foundationalism in that he invokes the notion
that there is a basic system that provides from free action and free choice, and that
freedom here implies freedom from social compulsion. Social compulsion is
associated with anxiety, and hence with the fear of falling. Freedom and spontaneity
are further associated with achievement, which is exemplified in the arts.

The question then is whether there is any relation between the two frameworks for
thinking about art and cultural mediation in relation to freedom and spontaneity.
There are parallels, points of contact, and some overlapping areas of concern, but
there remains the question as to the motivation behind Feldenkrais’s interest in
psychoanalysis and issues of freedom. On the surface at least he seems to be
grounded firmly within the framework of pragmatist empiricism. So the question is
whether there is any interest in Marxist social criticism, or whether there are other
reasons for reconstructing the relation with psychoanalysis. Certainly the concern
with the issues of freedom form a significant point of contact. But the critical theory’s
concern with freedom concerns primarily the historical analysis of the processes
whereby a society built around the overt ideals of freedom and happiness leads to an
actual unfreedom and unhappiness due to the enslavement by market forces, and the
concern here is the role that art and cultural production plays in the creation of the
contradictions of capitalist society. There is the question therefore whether somatic
education is critical and therefore revolutionary or not, and whet this is Feldenkrais’s
concern at all.

Whatever the case may be, it is clear that Feldenkrais wants to see somatic education
as continuous with psychoanalysis, as providing a further elaboration of that, rather
than viewing it as a competing alternative paradigm. This may help its Marxist and
critical credentials as a revolutionary technique. Viewed in this way somatic
education provides a further elaboration of the psychoanalysis rather than a complete
paradigm shift. If that is the case then, in so far as psychoanalysis is viewed at the
level of theory as revolutionary and critical, then presumably somatic education must
also accept this burden. The means of achieving this reconciliation is in terms of the
notions of growth, development, and of regression due to failure of development.
Neurosis is identified in terms of anxiety, growth and development are idenfied with
art and spontaneity. The question then is whether this succeeds in connecting the two
traditions. At least we can say that in so far as the Reichian body armouring and
repression are critical concepts, the somatic education in terms of tension and anxiety
ought to be able to inherit this theoretical function, so that tension can be associated
with repression and oppression. I would further suggest that this can be elaborated in
terms of the concept of a ‘politics of uncertainty’.