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The Problem of Polity: Political Participation and Aristotle's Best Regime Author(s): Kevin M. Cherry Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), pp. 1406-1421 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20622366 . Accessed: 29/11/2013 11:56
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The
Problem
of
Polity:
Political
Participation
and
Aristotle's
Best
Regime
Kevin M. Cherry
SaintAnselm College
Aristotle uses the same word?politeia?to describe both thegenus of "regimes" and a particular species within a common I is that genus. argue that this usage practice inAristotle's practical works and identifies themost developed species within its genus. Aristotle thus sees the regime of polity as more appropriate for developed communities than the regimes often taken to represent his ideals, i.e., kingship and aristocracy. Aristotle's
understanding of the capacities, and limitations, of themultitude leads him topropose themixed regime ofpolity as the best regimegenerally possible. While polity differs from the best regime simply discussed inBook VII, it still rich both and theoretical offers possibilities for political activity.
features of Aristotle's
they pursue the common good and of rulers: one, few, or many. He by to refers the regime inwhich "the multitude famously as politeia governs for the common advantage" the number it is usually translated, polity as Aristotle himself notes, However, (1279a37-39).1 name to all regimes" "common this word is also the [iTO\LT La] or, as
through the use of two different names is problematic because the term he uses for proper popular govern ment "is also the general word for constitutions"
(1977, 76). Despite, or perhaps because of, this dif like Bates have empha ficulty,many commentators, sized the necessity of grappling with Aristotle's dual here as
usage
(2003, 105).4
key
to understanding some
his
argument to his
careful attention
That is, he calls, and calls 1293a40).2 to calling, one particular species of regime by the name of the genus to which that species and five others belong. (1279a38, attention
linguistic use elsewhere in the Ethics and Politics, the confusion can be clarified and Aristotle's argument better understood. Robinson notes that Aristotle's dual usage of politeia is an example of "what may be called a 'genus-species' ambiguity, where the same word is used to mean now a genus and now one of the species of that genus" of translations to remove But Robinson Aristotle's use and laments the tendency this ambiguity (1995, 24). also notes, "There are other examples of of the same term to denote both
Aristotle's terminology here has long raised all sorts of questions among commentators. Sidgwick contends that Aristotle's dual use of the term politeia impediment clear and consistent conception has clature" (1892, 144).3 More recently, Mulgan that Aristotle's attempt to distinguish complained is "a serious in the way
proper
government
lrrhe "genus"
usage
of politeia
is generally
translated
as
"regime"
or "constitution."
Aristotle (2002); I have occasionally modified Aristotle (1984) and of the Nicomachean Ethics from translations of thePolitics are from both in lightof theOxford Classical Texts,Aristotle (1986) and (1988), respectively.
to avoid the problem, 3Sidgwick, attempting senses" and (1892, 143). special general concludes that politeia is "more naturally used in a sense intermediate between Aristotle's
4Bates (2003), highlightingseveraldifficultiesinAristotle's use of the termpoliteia, concludes that there is no specificregime called and justify politeia, only the generalphenomenon ofpoliteia as regime. I hope to provide an alternativeexplanation for thedifficulties
the consensus of scholarship that there is, in fact, a specific regime called polity.
The Journal ofPolitics, Vol. 71,No. 4, October 2009, Pp. 1406-1421 ISSN 0022-3816 ? 2009 Southern Political Science Association 1406
doi:10.1017/S002238160999003X
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THE
PROBLEM
OF POLITY
1407 unprecedented he does so, we nor can genus and its various members.6 More importantly, Aristotle uses the genus-term to name the most fully species within the genus, thus indicating developed how the various species can be ordered according to the genus. In the particular case cited by Aquinas, Aristotle or comprehensive argues that justice-as-genus, jus tice, serves to "produce and preserve happiness
species
of
regime
is neither
insignificant. By realizing why a better understanding of his linguistic achieve practice and, more specifically, a better understand
the various
kinds of regimes.
or its is
as the opposite good, it is not properly understood of democracy. Just as he refines his initial definitions of democracy and oligarchy, Aristotle also expands
few such that neither is in complete control. Aristotle that the multitude concedes should have authority
many, Aristotle's polity is a kind of mixed regime in which laws tend to be made and administered in a way that benefits both Johnson, often note classes. Commentators, like that polity "combines distinct
equitable, or fair, for a person, particularly in regard to "honor or money" (1130b2, 31). And because such questions always involve a community and may, if resolved poorly, destroy that community, this species of justice shares in the name of the genus. It has "the same name because its definition is in the same general class. For both have their power in relation to another person" Insofar as human (1130a33-bl).
of bearing the name common (192). This is true, so far as it to the genus.
tice, however, is the virtue concerned with honor and wealth and so most directly concerned with living in community with others. For this reason name of the genus. Perhaps the most famous it bears the
beings are political animals, living in community with others, justice is the general virtue concerned with preserving communities. The particular virtue of jus
in
example
of genus
the great student of Aristotle, in Aquinas, whether determining equity is a part of justice, treatment of the issue in NE alludes to Aristotle's (see observes Summa 120.2). What Theologiae is that Aristotle uses the same term, II-II
6What theme
I discuss
bears
some
resemblance
V.10 Aquinas
justice, to denote both a genus and a species within it. Unlike modern usage, which distinguishes between a terms, Aristotle tends to use his language in such a
as discussed, of "focal meaning," (1995). Barnes defines it as a word "used way containing the account
to the philosophical for instance, by Barnes in several ways, one of of the primary way"
which refers firstand (1995, 76). The usual example is "healthy," foremost to the condition of bodily health but is also used to describe complexions and foodswhich, respectively, and signify
produce between health. my account In focal meaning, species differences are, however, significant of hierarchical focal and language meaning. all of the derivative usages bear the same name There
5Davis
diction" found in all regimes, namely theirlackof self-knowledge about the ends theypursue (1996, 74).
argues
polity
has
its name
for it "exemplifies
the contra
in a particular focal meaning genus. More importantly, to a while the primary generally applies variety of accidents, is a substance hierarchical (77). By contrast, because meaning the genus-species all the terms distinction, language parallels involved refer to substances?in this case, regimes.
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1408
KEVIN
M.
CHERRY
discusses
Practical
suggests part of Aristotle's Cooper is to clarify "what itwas discussion inclined the Greeks to group
them together under this common name" (1980, 302). Though Aristotle does not deny that associations of pleasure or utility are in fact kinds of friendship, he is quite clear that, on accidental qualities, are imperfect being based they friendship goodness; friendships are fullest and best, if also the most only one is based on virtue and such
judgment, phronesis, is the capacity to delib erate well about acting, not making (1112a30 ff.). The genus of practical thought, unlike the genus of speculative thought, includes the species of both
acting and making. However, Aristotle uses the same term to describe the (broader) genus of practical thought, as opposed to speculative, and a (narrower)
of the genus, is more is never an end in truly practical activity. Making a means to something else; action, by itself, only contrast, is an end in itself (1139M ff.).8 Aristotle acting, which bears
species, that of acting, within that genus. He makes clear not only that acting is not making but also that the name
deserving
linguistic
In other words, the discussion of friendship, like that of justice, illuminates a critical aspect of Aristotle's linguistic practice, as Cherry and Goerner argue: Aristotle's tendency is to see a genus as hierarchically arranged so that themost fully realized formwithin it (the highest species) is simultaneously the form in terms of which the other, lower, forms are to be understood by disciplined analogy rather thanmere metaphor. This is linguistically reflected in his simultaneous use of the term for the highest species as the term for the genus as a whole, the less complete forms pointing toward the completed form. (2006, 566) Although examples unpacking regular practice of genus-species ambiguity require more than friendship or justice. For example, in contrasts what we might call practical a of Aristotle's, some
in a city (Pol. 1281a40-42). Though none an man of them is "individually excellent [spoudaios
judgment at least as good as that of a single excellent man or a few excellent men The (1281a42-b3).9 life, that is, may judgment necessary for political not be the province of a select few. One reason why is able to extend to the multitude
Aristotle
some
capacity for making judgments about political life is his broad understanding of the virtue of practical judgment and his awareness of the connections among the various forms of knowledge that have to do with human activity. Practical judgment, phronesis, helps us determine both the appropriate ends of our actions and themeans to attain those ends. While this knowl edge takes various forms, according to Aristotle, forms are not distinct but rather related.
of thought are falsity, but the former is concerned about the truth "that pertains to actions," while the latter is concerned with the truth about being. the?retike). Both (dianoia concerned with truth and faculties Shortly thereafter,however, Aristotle distinguishes prac
such
In his treatment of phronesis in Book VI of the that Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle acknowledges as having practical most of us "speak of people some particular thing when judgment concerning a some to with view well particular serious they calculate
is not a form ofmaking, nor making a form of are governed by doing." Being distinct activities, they different intellectual capacities. The rational capacity "Doing for art is "concerned with making," not "with doing."
made kinds: (1) things intotwodifferent ticalthinking 1140al and (2) actionsdone (praktike, ff.). (poietike)
Yet it is not immediately clear end" (1140a28-30). whether Aristotle agrees with this common way of speak a contrast between wisdom ing. However, by drawing common (sophia) and phronesis, Aristotle sides with one is virtue The of possessed by opinion: phronesis 8This priorityof acting to making is reiteratedin the Politics,
Aristotle, in the course of discussing natural slavery,
where
which is 7Irwincontends "there is one definitionof friendship, fully satisfiedonly by complete friendship,and is only partly forpleasure and utility" (1999, 277). satisfied by friendships
in soul" (1286b3).
the many
may
be "excellent
[spoudaioi]
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1409 of terms is frustrated by organization common for respect opinion.11 Genus-species ambiguity, however, is also present within the term phronesis: if the practical judgment of hierarchical
anyone?not only statesmen or philosophers?capable of reasoning about "what is good or bad for a human
being" (1140b4-6).
While phronesis deals with what can and should be done, wisdom is concerned with what is eternal and and Thales (1141b3?4)?seek Anaxagoras most kind of "the wisdom, precise knowledge," which practical judgment" (1141al6,
what
depends upon a conception of the good (1141M2-14), but this does not require investigation into the Platonic
20-21).10 To be sure, "the exercising phronesis, seeking things that are just
is most appropriately called phronesis7.12 knowledge Aristotle notices thatmost people believe phronesis to be particularly concerned with one's individual wel fare, for "someone who knows and devotes his time to concern himself seems to be possessed of things that seem to be busybodies" (1142al-2). Yet Aristotle not
is good
and one's
while politicalpeople practical judgment(phronimos), from endorsing this opinion (he only only refrains but also gives quotes Euripides' lostplay Philoctetes),
reason to doubt one's own wellbeing without or the political art" (1142a9-10).13 As Irwin points out, Aristotle is emphasizing here thatphronesis should not be concerned with one's own it: "presumably it is impossible to seek household management
or Socratic form of the Good, which Aristotle suggests does not improve our actions (1096a 10 ff.). Indeed
Aristotle's
man
beings," and this capacity belongs to "those who as well as those who "handle households" manage
example of someone who has phronesis is the statesman Pericles. People like Pericles, Aristotle says, can "see what is good for themselves and for hu
Phronesis is possessed by political affairs" (1140b7-ll). those who manage well cities, households, and indi vidual lives, even if they are not philosophic. However, Aristotle refines his initial suggestion that the virtue of phronesis is common to individuals,
245^16). Properly understood, prudence is concerned not only with one's own good but also with the good of one's household and community. It is difficult to pursue one's own good through the exercise of
household
and political leaders, and the managers, genus-species ambiguity again rears its head. He says that phronesis is a "genus" within which there is "much difference" encompasses as one person," Phronesis, that is, (1141b33-42a2). the knowledge "concerned with oneself as well as that concerned with ruling
individual phronesis in the absence of related capacities for phronesis with respect to the family and city The connection between the good of (1142a9-10). the Nicomachean
the name, but common is opinion and he, though indicating his disagree ment, defers to it. This is also an instance of genus if one where Aristotle's usual species ambiguity, otherwise
common of appellation matters deals with that particular "politics" (politike) Aristotle laments this: he believes that (1141b23?26). the act of lawgiving ismore truly political action and othetike), so deserves
a hierarchical also accepts dis reading of Aristotle's of phronesis, but unlike me, he asserts that legislative "is far more than household important management prudence in the specific sense of the term" because and prudence "every cussion
... and a city and is part every household, despite its autonomy, of a city" (1993, 65). See also Vander Waerdt, who argues that the apparent elevation of political it cannot despite prudence,
truly be
architectonic
because
of the tension
between
the good
413);
he omits Aristotle's
VI, did not preclude his possession of phronesis, as Aristotle recounts inBook I of thePolitics (1259a5 ft).However, Aristotle,
in this passage, does call attention to Thales' not only knowledge of universals but also of particulars, which ismore characteristic of practical than wisdom. judgment
10Thales's
possession
of theoretical
wisdom,
as adduced
in Book
the relationship between thevarious formsof phronesis 14Might Aristotle's remarkthattheend of thecity is help us tounderstand the same as that of individuals?Phronesis has as its end the
identification of what
as well
sumpheronta]for the sake of "living well" (NE 1140a26-28); the capacityfordetermining well the activities of a city therefore,
as a person or household must have that end. something to do with
is "good
and
advantageous"
[agatha
kai
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MIO
KE VIN M.
CHE RR Y
the same time, however, Aristotle does not to object using phronesis to refer to the species of practical judgment concerned primarily with oneself At provided the good that concern iswide of the community he indicates his disagreement enough to encompass to which one belongs. with the com
adequate experience. It is not a lack of study but a lack of experience that hinders their pursuit of the to the knowledge of universals to achieve and
While mon
about
to deliberating about one's own ends. While of political phronesis?namely, the good city?may sive, as is suggested the character (1094a26-bll), be themost authoritative of
use of politike, he shows no such reservations the common use of phronesis to refer primarily of
it, expe required rience with particulars is something which the (adult) in the citymight multitude expe have?particularly rience with matters that affect them and their lives. that reason, phronesis is a virtue they may ac quire, particularly to the extent necessary to take part For assemblies people
that direct
character and practical knowledge of those who make them; bad people will not make good laws. Because human beings
citizens toward that end will depend upon the will reflect what citizensbelieve is good for regimes
the good for human beings, understanding to is prior either what is good understanding over that of individuals. This
experience and reflection necessary to acquire polit ical phronesis (i.e., politike), let alone that phronesis necessary for lawgiving (nomothetike). It is only those
fewwho do develop those kinds of phronesis who to as in hold offices the rather individuals ought city
regime, they are never adequate situation, and so it is necessary than as part of a group. While laws are a necessary part of any good for judging every that they are sup
precedence with individual associated phronesis species which is deserving of, and so bears, the name of the genus.
zens. Following many commentators, I believe that Aristotle ultimately, though not without hesitation, concludes that it is better for the many, rather than only the one or judgments.15 Aristotle the few, to participate in such the virtue of understands
multitude allowing
judgment to be one susceptible of relatively not every multi distribution. However, widespread tude is capable of judging well and so warrants this practical that responsibility; only "a certain kind ofmultitude" judges better than the one or the few (1281M5-17). must the virtue of developed their and experiences through have
The multitude
authority. Though they belong to the same genus, the distinction between individual phronesis and politike will be critical in understanding Aristotle's argument
here.
both
the universal
practical judgment bring those experiences to bear on the decisions they make. One of the explicit conditions is that the not be overly slavish, but we might also multitude in question must have suspect that the multitude and undermine Aristotle some level of ethical virtue lest they disregard the laws the regime itself (1282al5-16).
insofar as
action,
an [phronesis ouk episteme], for it is directed at For this ultimate particular" reason, (1142a23-24). are unlikely to that young people Aristotle warns possess phronesis, as they have not yet acquired
universals, which may be why it can exist without the or wisdom theoretical knowledge characteristic of he will go so far as Later, (1141b21?22). philosophers to say that "practical is not science judgment
people who have experience adept at action than others who do have knowledge Indeed, Aristotle says, prac [eidot?n]" (1141bl4?18). tical judgment relies "more so" on particulars than
first intimates that the multitude, when combined with the few,may be no worse at judging than the few alone (1281a34-38, but he 1282al6-17), later suggests that having themultitude participate in making certain such judgments. "There having only are some [arts] concerning which the maker might the art also have some knowledge judgments the few make is in fact better than
15See,e.g., Bluhm (1962), Nichols (1992), Kraut (2002), and Bates (2003).
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THE
PROBLEM
OF POLITY
1411
For this reason, Aristotle (1282al7-19). to serve as individ the unable multitude, though says, uals, should collectively have authority over electing and auditing officials and should serve as members of of itswork" may, in fact, be a of of species capable acquiring phronesis which is to in for them take the mixed regime part adequate that governs the city. He is quite clear that phronesis can possess. Rather, he empha to experience, sizes the relationship of phronesis can have. Again, this is not to which the multitude denies the multitude which would enable them to serve in the city's highest as offices less that they could ac individuals, much the assembly and juries. Aristotle believes the multitude
various
III of the Politics, Aristotle discusses the forms of kingship, one of which he calls "heroic" and was characteristic of the earliest cities In Book they "had been benefactors of the multitude in connection with the arts or with war or by bringing
because
Their
them together [in a city], or providing them land." in war and those duties included "leadership sacrifices that did not require priests" (1285b9-10),
as
the people were grateful for these benefits, such kings and even allowed their they accepted to succeed them.17 descendents The rule of heroic their virtues helped kings was them procure justified because a greater level of better for defense
quire nomothetike, the species of phronesis necessary to legislate well in a manner akin to Solon. It is, rather, to make a more limited claim that the multi tude may acquire the species of phronesis that enables
evaluation of cases in the law courts, and the selection and auditing of office holders.16
involving the particular matters over suggests giving them authority, i.e., the assessment of specific policies in the assembly, the
heroic kings. Once in the polis, citizens continue the search formore efficientmeans of securing the goods life as well as the good life necessary for mere and achieved ies. Aristotle
ff.). The attempt to secure these life, is what led goods, particularly those of mere citizens of the earliest poleis to accept the rule of ent villages (1285b4
self-sufficiency through providing against enemies, necessary sacrifices, and a means of resolving disagreements among inhabitants of differ
Polity as Genus
With
and Species
To understand
this as background, let us return to the ques tions surrounding the usage of politeia in the Politics.
for political life are shared so each person is responsible for among many people, one task (1273b9?11). But, on Aristotle's account, a multitude of capable contributing to what is neces securing what is necessary share in ruling in exchange for their contributions
still possible, but it required the sufficiency was development of different parts in the regime. A city is more self-sufficient when the responsibilities of
Aristotle's
in doing so because they but also justified helpmake good life (1281a4-10).
Aristotle drive unite
the
equal citizens of a sufficient level of virtue to share in ruling in turn with a view toward the common end of living well.
argues that the origin of the polis is the for self-sufficiency (autarkeia). The desire to secure the goods of daily life leads men and women to in the household. The desire to secure the of nondaily life?for instance, better security
goods lican theory" (2002, 253) and identifies him as a "progenitorof the liberal-cum-republican tradition in political thought" (242), discovering "a marked kinship between the principles and (256). (See also Waldron 1995.) Collins (2002) critiques this view, focusingon the way inwhich Aristotle is concerned about
warning prescriptions of Aristotle and those of the American Founders" 16Taylor places Aristotle "in the mainstream of modern repub
limited
absolute
would
deserve
in rule,
which he calls pambasileia. While we may infer that the pambasileus benefits those he rules in a way similar to that of theheroic king,which iswhy Aristotle says thatpeople ought to will not "obey such a person gladly" (1284b32-34), such a ruler be bound by laws. It is the possibility of absolute kingship without law that leads to Aristotle's dialectical treatmentof
whether the rule of law is better than the rule of one man.
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1412
KEVIN
M.
CHERRY
to the union of against foreign invasion?leads several households in a village. Although the polis comes about as a result of the desire to secure the it also goods of mere life in a more effective manner, exists for?and is defined by its pursuit indeed was for a variety of
to suggest it does not accord for a developed political community to have a part superior to the whole. A polis in which the multitude?or at least a Aristotle certain kind of multitude?takes ruled in turn is, on being part in ruling and this reading, a more
one man
common
their communities, they satisfied with kingly rule and "sought and established a polity"
of heroic necessary
a polis in which the multitude is sufficiently advanced to share in the activity of ruling is one inwhich the
goods providing more opportunity for the pursuit of good life. Second, as the number of people capable of more participating in political life increases, people in
necessary
for mere
more
The development of a citizen body able to contribute toward what is necessary for self-sufficiency seems to of a citizen go hand-in-hand with the development
body
capable,
on
the basis
of their experience
and
their political
the city are sharing in the end forwhich the city exists: livingthe good lifevia logosabout the good,
Finally, insofar as the heroic for achieving a great variety for the city, their leisure time to
capacities
which a
of necessary goods pursue the good life, transcending the mere neces sities, for themselves was restricted.19 A regime in citizens rule, but also are ruled in turn, the provides more good life. Aristotle's communities opportunities for each to pursue
(1253al4-18).
political community contains capable of a regime ought to provide for such participation, their participation: "it is evident that among similar nor just and equal persons it is neither advantageous for one person to have authority over all [matters]" (1287b41-88a2). Aristotle often treats the nature of things as what they are in their developed form (1252a31 ff.), and he suggests that a polis in which virtue and political the among equally dispersed is of the natural community development political life: "It does not accord with nature for the part to be Given (1288a26-27).18 preeminent over the whole" authority the connections of nature with Greek word physis [<ptkris],we may growth even understand in the are more
terms. The polis is the culmination of the growth of the various other forms of human com munities, and, I have argued, polity is similarly the historical culmination of
many have not and will polis communities?indeed, not?he knows that polity is both rare (1293a39-42) and susceptible to decline. Books IV-VI teach that the development requires no of political communities is fragile and small amount of phronesis, hard work,
the development of the kind of as the polis. Just as Aristotle is community known aware that not all communities have developed into
and perhaps fortune. Aristotle turns to history to show that a multitude capable of political rule can exist,
a time when
be widespread and not restricted(cf. 1286bl2). This superiority, I have argued, belongs most properly to earlier times,although
it may also exist
Waerdt argues that the heroic king lacks philosophic 19Vander virtue (1985, 264, 267); rather, he provides the opportunityfor other citizens to engage in philosophy (252). Such a kingship is,
therefore, Aristotle's best best
in less developed
communities
of later times
imum opportunityfor the good lifeof philosophy; the second in the absence of a heroic king (255, 257).
regime occurs when philosophers rule and are ruled
regime
because
it provides
the max
in turn,
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THE
PROBLEM
OF POLITY
1413
suspect most
(1286b20-22).20 Aristotle praises the polis not because it is the last but because stage of historical human development of what number
that is a polis (1279al7-21, equal persons In such a com cf. 1284a3-15). 1328a35, 1332M6-29, munity, rule should be shared among citizens in turn, and not held by one person or group (1279a8-10). To be sure, Aristotle does not believe rule should
or proportion of its citizens. In the same not because of when it arises in he way, praises polity course life?it of political the of the development on my interpretation, be similarly praised would, even if it predated heroic kingship?but because of theway inwhich it represents the fullest development the actual historical circumstances of its existence.21 contributions
that makes
possible
multitude
be shared among all citizens in every regime. How ever, he does suggest that a city that not only is self sufficient and promotes the good life but also has a
in politics and capable of participating more developed, more in sharing in that good life is accord with nature, than other cities. Polity, more
than other regimes, is comprised of free and equal citizens who seek, and deserve, to rule and be ruled in turn.Moreover, it allows a greater number of people
As a mixed
regime combining to rule, rather than a simple regime that or claim, polity is recognizes only one contribution to in the arisen earliest cities. In have unlikely and claims the arrangement of a some experience with different regime requires forms of rule before being able to combine them into the multitude, form. Aristotle believes the multitude this experience, which both capable of possessing and their efforts to secure partic explains justifies a ipation in mixed regime.
one, mixed
is
and being ruled. There is a certain requirement that such activity be both 'virtuous' and carried on by 'the (1988, 204). many'" A regime, however, is not just any arrangement of offices in a city. The
Having examined the origins and development of I believe it is clear that the political communities,
alone of regimes?supplies both of polity?perhaps are the conditions Aristotle says necessary for a city to
arrangement
should be with
officesin a polis (1278b8-10). As a polis, the regime should be self-sufficient (1252b28-30) and directed toward the good life, rather than simply seeking profitor defense (1280a30ff). Moreover, it should
allow citizens to participate in deliberations and good (1253a9-18), just, advantageous, fying political inappropriate about the exempli rule rather than mastery, which is for the community of free persons
military virtue is also the characteristic first identified virtue help a city to be finely governed, and how does
which describes a politymore than a kingship,but byAristotleas belonging topolity. Why doesmilitary it justify multitude in ruling? includingthe
justice characteristic of a community of relatively free and equal persons ruled by laws (NE 1134a24-30),
this although he questions whether Aristotle believes 20Simpson, now to suggest that "kingship also reads the passages argument, now is no longer good or correct because the number of the virtuous, or those capable of exercising rule, are much greater, and thus there will be no one man who the rest" stands out above
(1998, 185).While not all cities are sufficiently developed to supportpolitical rule, I disagreewith Simpson, for reasons stated
below,
that pambasileia
represents
Aristotle's
preferred
regime.
change
in the manuscripts. Newman refers to supported are said to be where excellence 1291a24-27, justice and military for the city goods of soul that transcend what ismerely necessary
(1902, III.232).
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14H
KEVIN
M.
CHERRY
the necessary virtue (VII.5, 6). Bad laws bad habits, such as the excessive valuation of develop leads to tyranny, oligarchy, and de wealth, which mocracy rather than polity. acquiring these obstacles, some cities did develop populations capable of ruling and being ruled in turn. reason for this seems to be the expansion of One Despite the city's military, development particularly citizens among
the necessary spirit or deliberative faculty to engage in self-rule (VII.7); other peoples, by virtue of a city's vices that preclude them from location, develop
military would do perhaps even more to guarantee as that citizens become courageous, if not moderate
must have some ethical a virtue, and the laws of polity foster the development of habits that give rise to these virtues. Serving in the
The
lawful multitude
Military virtue is said by Aristotle to form thebasis for the regime called politeia (1279M-2), and the
capacity indicates virtues of as well. the many a capacity on This to acquire military virtue their part to acquire other recommends
(1998, 155). But parts of virtue" military virtue, like the other kinds of ethical virtue, is connected to phronesis in two ways. While "there is many also impossible "to have phronesis without life also helps ethical
well. Military discipline, after all, gives rise tomilitary virtue. As Simpson acknowledges, "the military life contains
is what Aristotle
middle
Politics: The young of the city will serve as soldiers, and practical the necessary acquiring experience once to that rule enables them judgment they reach
another way
in
age. In other words, serving in the military provides young citizens with the time and opportu nity to acquire the necessary experience in order that they might develop the virtue of phronesis. emphasizes this connection in discussing and ruling being ruled in turn. In a community of "those who are similar in stock and free," the ability Aristotle
not only to rule but also to be ruled is required of But "a citizen" as well as "the good man" (1277b7-17). the ability to rule is such that it can be learned only "by being ruled," for "it is not possible to rulewell with out having been ruled" (1277b7-13). In other words, the multitude
phronesis. Second, it develops the habits of obedience to the laws as well as those of ethical virtue, without which well
Military virtue thus contributes in three ways to the development of phronesis necessary for themulti in ruling. First, it provides the tude to participate essential for necessary experience with particulars
can acquire the phronesis necessary for in rule sharing only through firsthaving been ruled.
possibility of improving the capacity for judging others.This would be more likelyifthose giving the
who already have phronesis?explained their decisions, but even in the absence of that, it is likely that some soldiers will perceive the reasoning what they are told to do. The experience with the development of military virtue the development of phronesis and this iswhat makes possible through the observation of the judgments of
orders?those
behind
23Salkever
suggests
between
military
virtue
and
possible themultitude,
of dikaiosune (justice) and epiekeia (equity or decency ... )" (2007, 35). Although Aristotledoes not offeran explicit explan
to show, the connection is defensible. ation, I believe, and hope Salkever argues that Aristotle is concerned about the consequen ces of the common for political of "manliness" understanding
of andreia
guarantees
for a
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1415 "required by the higher end of the city because of as well as "its their collective virtue and prudence" of the threat to the city stemming from their exclusion" (68).26 By bringing together the few and many, Nichols continues, "polity allows lower end because
between polity and the best regime the relationship in discussed Book VII of the Politics7.In Book IV,
Aristotle distinguishes the best regime simply, the re ex gime for which "one would pray above all, with
regime, what of Aristotle's statement that "it is edu cation and virtue above all" that have a "just claim" to rule with a view to the highest end of the city, i.e., In other words, what is the good life (1283a24-26)?
all"
from the best regime generally possible, the regime "most fitting for all cities" and "more attainable for (1288b34, 38). While take polity to be Aristotle's there is much almost all commentators best regime in some way, disagreement about what way. Some to prefer kingship and aristocracy to polity only because
some parts of Nichols's argu ment, particularly regarding the various contributions and claims within the city, I disagree that Aristotle While I agree with describes
human beings to fulfill their natures as political beings, in the continuous sharing in rule and participating debate over benefits and justice" (88).27
read Aristotle
still of oligarchy and democracy. And prevalence others maintain Aristotle's polity is in fact his best regime simply.
of instituting these. Others treatitas of thedifficulty the best regime possible formost cities given the
"what quality it should have to be what one would pray for above all, with external things providing no far too closely (1288b23-24)?mirrors impediment" regime simply as "the city that is to be constituted on
de
the languageused in Book VII, describing the best the basis of what one would pray for" (1325b36).
Moreover, while Aristotle is emphatic that while this regime must not be impossible, he also acknowledges that the conditions required for its realization are
the Ethics
life
middle class (202 n9), she, too, depictspolityas "the best regime simply" (1992, 88).25As themixed re
gime, polity combines the various contributions?and various claims to rule?of the different parts of in rule is the city. The multitude's participation
simply, whose material requirements prevent most, if not all, existing regimes from achieving it.29 These material conditions, in fact, are outside the control of statesmen, which is why it is necessary to investigate how statesmen should legislate for other kinds of regimes and not only the best simply. For would to prayer instance, the regime according lack the economic classes found in a polity,
on
unlikely. Nichols, by contrast, argues that polity serves not only as a paradigm but also a potential regime for all other cities. This is not the case for the best regime
Book
conditions (1962, 744); thuspolity, as it generallyoccurs, is not thebest regime simply (749). Bluhm is rightthat the regimeof
VII cannot
24Bluhm
argues
VII
is a polity under
optimal
26Her emphasis
statesmanship,
which
distinguishes
her argu
tional senseof the ruleby the few, much lessa kingship (751), but the differences between polity and the city of Book VII are
that they warrant different names, as I
be understood
as an aristocracy
in any
tradi
with 27Nicholsargues thatpolities begin bymixing poor and rich a modicum ofmilitary virtue, such that the lawswill in factbe will over timedevelop obeyed.However, if properlyordered, they a middle classwith a higher levelof virtue thatallows thepolity
to become degree words, while of virtue the a an aristocracy, "those with some regime in which rule and are ruled in turn" (1992, 99). In other institutions the political of polity remain a "mixture," citizens move toward a "middle" status in and ethical character.
based best
the regimeaccording to prayerof Book VII of thePolitics is not, of the limitsof politics. See also Salkever (2007, 34-35). Simply accepting theirclaim that the regimeof Book VII is not, in fact,
best would make my argument easier; however, I in fact, Aristotle's regime simply but rather an illustration
largely
on
the presence
of slavery, that
their
economic
Aristotle's
a of natural may not be as great as it first appears; population slaves is no more unlikely than some of the other conditions he Aristotle slaves as he does, could recommend, if they are capable of independent that masters reasoning
believe Aristotle does portray it as best. The problem of slavery enumerates.And perhaps it is only in the best regime that
free their choice: and to and
Bluhm (1962, 748) and Nichols (1992, 88) emphasize the 28Both most reflective which polity is the regime of political rule, way in
allowing citizens to rule and be ruled in turn.
who believes that the regime 29Hence I also disagreewith Frank, of Book VII exists as "an actualizable future" (2005, 140) for Athens if it can firstbe transformedinto a combination of
and democracy that she calls "a democracy of dis aristocracy tinction" the extensive material (142). Samaras, acknowledging for this regime, argues that it is "a blueprint for the preconditions prospective colonist of Asia Minor" and not Athens (2007, 89).
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H1^
KEVIN
M.
CHERRY
middle
Aristotle argues in Book IV that the regime that is best [ariste]and theway of lifethat is best [aristos]
"for most cities and most human emphasizes "the middling beings" is one that sort of life." The best
develop more
a well-arranged a large polity that promotes class. Moreover, itwould provide the basis for a more leisurely life that would allow the citizens to fully the ethical and intellectual virtues.
even
quite
to the city of prayer and so as the best regime generally possible ignation similar
regime generally possible, that is, requires only the virtue appropriate to "private persons" and does not require a high level of education or circumstances that would
ample benefitsof fortune;thebest regime simplyof Book VII is not thebest regimegenerally possible. considers polity to be the best regime generally
possible and not than is often acknowledged because he sees a closer it and the city of prayer in between Book VII than is commonly of recognized. Most connection those commentators who believe that polity are no is the Following most commentators, I believe Aristotle
trast, "anyone might act in the best [arista] manner and live blessedly" In other words, all (1324a23-25). citizens would have a high level of education and
be "dependent
on chance"
(1295a25-34,
of wealthy and free-born are not the use of the term "virtue" insignificant. Moreover, here is presumably broad enough to include the contributions justice and military excellence associated with a
do not have the only just claim to rule; the that they
simply. However,
Indeed, Aristotle suggests that in a community where there exists a variety of just claims to rule, that of the multitude?taken collectively and provided it a is of certain sort?is more persuasive than that of thewealthy few or even the virtuous few (1283b27 ff.). It is not, in the case of polity, a question ofwhether the a certain multitude taken collectively is judgment of a to that few of excellent individuals; rather, superior
is, in the words of one critic, "a strength because, unlike the city of prayer, the constitutional polity is actualizable" (Frank 2005, 164). Polity, as the only correct regime, is the best regime gen actualizable
polity mixes both parts: a multitude possessing mil in itary virtue and justice and the few outstanding
that ostracism may sometimes be necessary for cer tain cities, he does not seem to expect it in cities in some level of vir which themultitude has developed tue and political capacity (1284a3 ff.). Polity, there fore, not only incorporates but also benefits from the presence of individuals whose virtue exceeds, though not excessively, that of the multitude. Aristotle calls the rule of either part?the and imperfect, incomplete few or ateles the many? The (1281b38).
a "so-called argues that while aristocracy might have 30Mulgan to polity, Aristotle claim to be superior it as a does not accept It candidate for the best constitution for most cities and men.
mixed regimeof polity is perfectedand completed both the fewand the many. by including
To be sure, many have argued that Aristotle's pre ferred regimes are kingship and aristocracy. A close is a reading, however, questions whether kingship
either liesbeyond the reach ofmost statesor else isvery close in nature to polity" (1977, 102-03). He therefore suggestspolity is thebest regimegenerally possible only because the realizationof kingship or aristocracy is unlikely if not impossible. Simpson similarlyargues thatwhile Aristotle believes "the simply best regime is a kind of kingshipor aristocracy" (1998, 290), polity is most citiesbecause it is thekind the regimehe recommends for ofmost people and cities" (327). And althoughKraut argues that Aristotle's best regime,as depicted in Book VII, is one inwhich maintains there is a wide degree of political participation,he still we should wish we had such extraordinaryindividuals in our midst" (2002, 416).
that Aristotle believes that "when there are no kingly persons ... of regime "most people and most cities can share in," emphasiz are not "within the reach ing that aristocracies aiming at virtue
31Yack
acknowledges
Aristotle's involves of
"clear
and
explicit
statement"
like tyranny,
"the monopolization
of political
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1417 ... and under What, then, are we tomake of the regime accord in best regime simply?discussed ing to prayer?the outset that Book VII? It is important to note at the Aristotle never refers explicitly to this regime as an common with existing aristocracy.35 It has little in aristocracies either those "so-called" aristocracies, that include claims to rule other than virtue or those "true" aristocracies citizens
certain circumstances just" form of rule, "he still refuses to call it a 7toAitlk?s kind of Davis 75 n5, emphasis Likewise, added).32 reduces the the the rule of argues pambasileius a with rule household, replacing political city to economic (1996, 121).33 Aristotle himself asserts it rule" (1999,
does not in accord with nature?or, perhaps, devel so superior to his man one to be opment?for community that he deserves unlimited personal rule (1288a26-8).34 of What aristocracy aristocracy? is much like kingship: Aristotle indicates "each that
of them
both regimes justify widespread political participa tionon thepossession of a kind of virtue (ifdifferent
kinds a true aristoc in the different regimes). While racy includes the "best simply on the basis of virtue"
that exclude the vast majority of in political life. Rather, from participating I suggest, it has more in common with polity in that
wishes to be establishedon thebasis of virtue that is with equipment" (1289a30-33). But like furnished
aristocracy kingship, basis of virtue?assuming most equipment?excludes tion and an established solely on the that it has the necessary citizens moves from participa away from
according to prayer an aristocracy to highlight the way it differs from the aristocracies with which we
so, again like kingship, a political regime. To the extent, however, that being a polity by incorporating aristocracies approximate Aristotle explicitly says those other elements?which aristocracies which are possible for cities to sustain
mind
to it have experience(1293b7 ff). Rather,by referring as to calls the best he repeatedly politeia, frequently
its connection with polity. In particular, Aristotle emphasizes the way that the regime according to prayer will be run not by one It is a city that has a
What I suggest kingshipor aristocracy(1287b38 ff.). time will?if not frustrated bymany of thepotential
in a direction to is that the development of political communities over
Aristotle does not deny that, in certain places and times, a community may have a nature suitable for
will be political; words, rule in thebest regimesimply In both kinds of regimes,themultitude will select and audit the highest offices of the city.36The
is that, in the best regime simply, more citizens will possess the levels of virtue necessary to rule by turn. For this reason, the connection
dangers Aristotle discusses?be make rule increasingly political, as was historically the case in some, though far from all, cities. In other words, the conventional view has it backward: The
difference
capable of par difficulty of developing a multitude in it necessary for life often makes political ticipating to if wish be cities, they governed well, to accept the rule of kings and aristocrats.
without
32Itis elsewherelikenedto householdmanagement,which differs from political rule (1285b29-33). Thus Davis: "There seems tobe a king to rule no form of kingship as political rule_For not political justice.For him to rule with consent may be political rule,but it is not kingship" (1996, 58). 33Davis concludes pambasileia isAristotle's preferred option but acknowledges that such a regime lacks justice (1996, 58) and so "the best city is not a city" (66).
34Aristotle greater virtue required for kingly rule is says the excessive nature than what accords with human (1286b26-7). into "nature" the connotations of development inherent for one person to have the kind of monopoly of consent may be good household management, but it is
35Somepassages inBook III are read to referto the cityof Book VII as an aristocracy (1289a30-33, 1290al, 1293M-3). Such an the textof thePolitics as we interpretation requires rearranging
have has some, but not it, which I is that Aristotle think, suggestive, it. aristocracy while discussing unanimous, support. More refrains from calling it an
Reading
where
36Because it involves rule by themultitude, the city according to prayer is closer toAristotle'sdefinitionof polity as the regime
"the multitude toward governs for the common advantage" than "the common
development
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M1^ that the regime of polity "has substantial similarities the city of prayer" (2005, 163), and Samaras the emphatically political character of acknowledges
KEVIN M. CHERRY
with
the political
virtue. The
political institutions"of the regime of Book VII (Kahn 1990, 370; cf. Kraut 2002, 225). While the
differ substan governance of these regimes would tially because of their physical location and material status, and more importantly due to the higher levels of virtue present in the regime according to prayer, the political institutions themselves?particularly de liberative assemblies and juries?would not, I suggest, However, while both the best regime simply and
concerning
gives the
city according to prayer will have citizens of ethical virtue capable of a more robust phronesis and suited to hold office as individuals. In a polity, the most
guarantee that all people will be able to hold political office, so that the virtuous will always be in office. In a polity, class divisions, though moderated, will still exist, such that not all citizens will have the lei sure necessary for ruling let alone for the pursuit of
multitude
the lower level of leisure afforded Moreover, citizens in a polity prevents them from achieving the highest level of virtue possible. The excellence of simply, and so polity does, at the end of the day, differ from the regime according to prayer. While "it is possible for one or a few to be out excellence standing in virtue," Aristotle but argues that it is "diffi
that can be guaranteed is the presence of a possessing military virtue and capable of
of different kinds. multitude, they are multitudes Aristotle contends that the "middling sort" of vir tue appropriate to polity, found among the middle class, serves as a guarantee that the city will be ruled i.e., in turn, and not like "the rule of a politically, master." Insofar as the middle class consists largely of "equal and similar persons," a true "political community" "affection" (1295M2-24).
"It
particularly To be sure, he is far from certain that (1279a39-b2). the one or few will be outstanding in virtue; he is more certain that the kind of excellence possessed by the many is of a more limited scope: They have only "a part of virtue and prudence" (1281b4-5), specif phronesis based on experience that enables one to live one's own life and participate in politics only as a member of an assembly. Having a more robust eth ical virtue and a broader capacity for prudence?the as ability to choose rightly for cities and households well as individuals?requires the leisure for study and resources to facilitate so, in turn, greater economic such study. These resources are found, and broadly distributed, in the best regime simply, not existing regimes, and only there does the whole citizenry have
(1295b34-37). ing element is numerous" Polity re a even to middle class succeed, quires large though are not suited to hold the its members highest offices themselves, only to serve in assemblies
and
and
juries. In the city according to prayer, by contrast, all citizens will have the wealth and leisure necessary to engage not only in politics but also in the pursuit of Book VII has the necessary material preconditions to
middle class. This is no doubt problematic for Aristotle,but it is under the control somethingthat is,asNichols shows,potentially
of prudent according statesmen statesmen. The preconditions for the regime necessary to prayer, however, are not under the control of but are rather the material with which they must work
because
no more (or less) possible than the cityof prayer" (2005, 164)
of the difficulty of generating a strong and virtuous
37However,
Frank
also
contends
that "the
constitutional
polity
is
thedifference Aristotle identifies between the simply best regime and the best regime generallypossible (1288b21-34). A fullunderstandingof the best regime simply
requires a consideration of what Aristotle believes is
to live the best human the opportunity life. These differences in virtue and political capacities are trace able to a difference in material conditions, which is
Aristotle
(1325b35 ff.). Frank eventuallyconcludes thatnot only is polity like the cityof prayer, it is also like thedemocracy of distinction she champions (170).
is philosophic contemplation and so neither nor other any polity regime can secure the end of the politics, i.e., good life (1994, 151-52). Incorpo rating "the one most outstanding human being," the philosopher, within a community of "free and equal
the best human life.Looking largelyto the Ethics (148), Bartlett argues that the highest activityfor
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THE
PROBLEM
OF
POLITY
1419
as it is regime of Book VII, Bartlett argues, is flawed, devoted not to contemplation but to "leisure," which he presents as no more than "the closest imitation of
into justice (cf.Politics itself througha investigation 1279b13). Even ifthepolitical lifeiswholly subordi nate to thephilosophical,polityprovidesnot only for
a robust and inclusive political community but also one open to philosophy. An Aristotle who emphasizes how participation
the philosophic life that is possible within the con finesof thepolitical community" (148). Because the political life, it is achieved outside of politics, and
thus "even the best law or the best contemplative life is fundamentally different from the regime"?for
human
life clearly supports the enterprise of political an Aristotle who justifies the theory. Moreover,
However, others, like Zuckert, deny Bartlett's of politics to philosophy" claim of a "subordination
necessarily devoted exclusively to contemplation, and regimes that allow citizens to engage in true political development of our rational capacities (1333a6-ll). As Rorty argues, "nothing about the practical life ...
and even en prevents its also being contemplative hanced by being contemplative" (1980,377). Phronesis
but Aristotle such education, unavoidability?of seems to insist that more should be done in regimes where the multitude is to share in ruling.40 but I want ruling,
the impor virtues, particularly phronesis?highlights tance he places on political, or civic, education. Lib the the necessity?perhaps eralism has recognized
can be mutually reinforcing; the and contemplation include both. best human lifewould While outside complete our scope at this time, there is at least one communities a treatment of this issue is
A full treatment of this issue is beyond my scope, to raise one issue directly related to my in Aristotle believes that to participate argument. the multitude must have certain virtues. this
of such about thenecessity Assuming thathe is right virtue military service? might be acquired is through
civic education traits, is he also right that one way in which
context. Political
basis of shared reasoning about the just and unjust, as well as the good and bad and advantageous and the dis (1253al4-18).39 Resolving disadvantageous pute about what is just, Aristotle
free birth, variety of different claims to rule?wealth, the door for polit excellence?polity actually opens various
forpolitical philosophy (1282b23). By includingthe icalphilosophy to play a greaterrole in thecityas the ingpoliticalphilosophy;thereisprecedent in classical
that emphasizes military service its has certainly dangers; Aristotle, given his discus sion of Sparta, is aware of this (1271M-6). However, Aristotle's about is neither the complaint Sparta extent of her civic education nent, but rather its exclusive nor itsmilitary compo focus on courage and,
moreover, looks
claimants argue about justice. The attempt to resolve questions about justice goes beyond introduc
telian
the inappropriate ends to which Sparta in preparing its citizens for military service 1333b38 ff.). A contemporary Aristo (1324b8-25a5, approach to this service issue might ask whether can help citizens acquire the possible hazards. Per for national
modern
political philosophy?Plato's Republic being themost notable example?for leading people to philosophy
more once
service of a
"distorted" for political purposes, of the philosopher-king in Plato's Republic (1994, 148) and intimatesthatkingship is thus Aristotle's preferredregime (153-54 nl2). In lightof Aristotle's developed distinctionbetween practical and theoretical carefully knowledge, I find unconvincing Bartlett's suggestion that there is less to this distinction thanmeets the eye, thatAristotle's
"invention actions" of phronesis" appear "simply to make is designed rational" (154 nl3). "morally virtuous
38Bartlett presents
the pambasileus
as Aristotle's
adoption,
albeit
peaceful kind playing the role military service did. In any case, Aristotle's emphasis on the importance of civic education for a regime in which shares in ruling both poses a challenge
the multitude
40Collins
focuses
emphasis a resource
reasoning and speech allows theories of politics; indeed, is a better resource for such notion of the human good
concern is theconflict between thepolitical and philosophicways of life,and she claimsAristotleultimatelyprefersthe latter: "the contemplativeor theoreticallife,and not the political or moral life,is thebest one fora human being" (2006, 93). Like Bartlett, Aristotle "reject[s] thepolitical life"because it Collins argues that is an obstacle to the fullest human life (146) and so even thebest
civic education is incomplete and must point beyond itself.
of an Aristotelian conception see, in partic contemporary understandings; 1 and her conclusion. Collins's ultimate However, over
on the advantages
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H20
KEVIN
M.
CHERRY
Polity, I have argued, is the best regime generally it is the regime that represents the possible because fullest development of political life that statesmen can
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Boston
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