CJCS 2 (2) pp.

231251 Intellect Limited 2010

Catalan Journal of Communication & Cultural Studies Volume 2 Number 2

2010 Intellect Ltd Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/cjcs.2.2.231_1

JOSEP ESPLUGA Universitat Autnoma de Barcelona ANA PRADES CIEMAT, Sociotechnical Research Centre JAN GONZALO Universitat Rovira i Virgili

Communicating at the edge: Risk communication processes and structural conflicts in highly industrialized petrochemical areas
ABSTRACT
This article, grounded in an empirical study carried out in the Tarragona petrochemical complex (Spain), explores how key actors operating in this specific social and organizational context perceive petrochemical communication activities. Data compiled from a set of interviews with stakeholders and focus group discussions with citizens were analysed from an interpretative perspective in an effort to capture underlying situationally specific logics. The results enabled us to discuss the advantages and limitations of different theoretical models of petrochemical communication, providing elements for a critique of overly simplistic normative models of risk communication. We

KEYWORDS
risk communication risk perception risk governance petrochemical industries interpretative approach social accounting practices

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highlight the potential contribution of interpretative research to the social perception of petrochemical risk and its implication in petrochemical communication processes.

INTRODUCTION
The area of Tarragona (Catalonia, northeastern Spain) is a densely populated region in which chemical and petrochemical industries play an important economic role. Twenty-seven chemical and petrochemical companies, including leading international companies such as Bayer, Basf, Dow Chemical and Repsol (Spains largest petrochemical company), occupy a total of 1,200 hectares. The plants are distributed between two distinct industrial estates (the southern and northern estates), 10 kilometres apart (Figure 1). The 27 companies occupying the northern and southern industrial estates belong to the Association of Chemical Companies of Tarragona (AEQT), an organization that oversees the sector. The companies annually process some 20,000 tonnes of various products fundamentally petroleum products and byproducts such as fuel, plastics and plastic derivatives, water treatment products, dissolvents, detergents, asphalt, adhesives, gases for domestic use, lubricants and textile fibres. Around 44 per cent of all plastics produced in Spain are manufactured in Tarragona (AEQT 2005). The chemical companies are organized spatially in three different zones: processing, packaging and pipe racks. These chemical plants provided 30,000 jobs in 2002, 6,000 of which represented direct employment (AEQT 2005; for more details see Farr and Fernndez (2007)).

Source: Departament dInte dInterior, Relacions Institucionals i Participaci de la Generalitat de Catalunya & Ajuntament de Tarragona (2007).

Figure 1: Map of the Tarragona region showing the northern and southern industrial estates (encircled) and major cities and towns.

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The manufacture, handling, transport and storage of chemical substances imply the possible occurrence of serious accidents that can have an immediate adverse effect on human and environmental health (acute petrochemical risk) and cause contamination over time via water, air and soil (chronic petrochemical risk) (Horlick-Jones 1998). European public authorities have made major efforts to regulate these risks over the last two decades; the Seveso II Directive 96/82/EC (on acute risk) and Directive 96/61/EC (on chronic risk) have both been adapted to the legislation of member states. In Spain the regulations have been adapted at both the national and regional level. The European directives and voluntary programmes of the chemical industry itself (for example, the Responsible Care programme1) establish two main lines of action for companies in relation to petrochemical risk, namely management and communication. Management refers to the development of processes and measures to prevent, minimize and control both acute and chronic chemical risk. Communication refers to the establishment of mechanisms for communicating with the different stakeholders affected by chemical risk (Heath 1997; Renn and Kastenholz 2000). By reinforcing consultation with stakeholders (operators, elected representatives, public authorities, associations and the local population), the Seveso directive, as revised in 1996, democratizes territorial chemical management to a greater extent than before and forces business organizations to open up to their social environment. This directive also obliges petrochemical companies to draw up an external emergency plan jointly with the public authorities. This plan obliges them to actively inform the population as to the procedure to follow in the event of an accident, and to run emergency simulations involving local people. Furthermore, legislation deriving from the Aarhus Convention enhances the right of citizens to obtain quality environmental information, and has direct implications for both companies and public authorities. In general, therefore, there is a worldwide tendency towards improving public information and communication regarding highly industrialized petrochemical management. Our aim in this article is to explore, with a view to highlighting mutual interdependence relationships and power relations, how risk communication actions and processes implemented by companies and state agencies in the Tarragona area (Spain) are experienced and perceived by the companies and state agencies themselves and by the local population.

1. This is defined as the global chemical industrys own unique initiative which helps the worldwide chemical industry to drive continual improvement in all aspects of health, safety and environmental performance and to be open in communication about its activities and achievements (CEFIC, European Chemical Industry Council 2005: 3).

THE STUDY OF RISK COMMUNICATION

Research into risk communication in the strictest sense began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when studies of perception regarding risk issues provided sufficient evidence that perceptions are complex phenomena that depend on many more factors than a mere passive reception of information by individuals. Risk communication can be defined in two main ways. One places the emphasis on the way the information is provided to the public, and the other considers information to be a more general and interactive interchange between all the parties involved. In the former model, experts considered the main actors assume the role of transmitting and elaborating information for a passive public. In the latter model, the public and other actors and experts play important (if different) roles in an interdependent interchange of information and opinions, while strengthening appropriate channels for consultation, response and dialogue (OECD 2002, 2003). In the former model, communication occurs in a single top-to-bottom direction; whereas the latter model emphasizes greater

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participation by the general public and contributions from non-experts, that is, lay people (Bennet and Calman 1999). In practice, both perspectives coexist, although one or the other may dominate in certain situations depending on decision-making traditions, the resources available, and political and social conditions. We could say that the adoption of one perspective or the other depends largely on the objectives of whoever is communicating. Risk communication objectives may involve several types and levels of action: To inform the public in order to educate people and improve knowledge of risks, circulate information, put peoples minds at ease and warn them about possible risks To change or reinforce peoples behaviour with respect to risks, either to reduce risky behaviour or to promote appropriate behaviour in emergencies To obtain a consensus or undertaking regarding controversial technologies, implying the use of many different kinds of actions, ranging from consulting to effectively including the general public in the decision-making process (Gray et al. 1998)

Communication underlies the risk management process and varies over time depending on changes in interest groups and problems as processes develop. The risk communication process involves all individual and collective actors with an interest in evaluating the risk. Broadly speaking, a general typology that distinguishes between risk promoters, the potentially affected population and regulators is useful for classifying the many actors involved in any risk management and communication process, namely, companies, workers, trade unions, public authorities at different levels, scientific experts, the media, local people, ecological associations and the general public. According to a large part of risk literature, it is clear that there is a need for government and businesses to gain a much better understanding of lay audiences, how they make sense of risk issues and what they value (HorlickJones et al. 2003; Otway 1992; Petts 2001; Renn 2003, etc.). This implies a need for a design-based and user-centred approach to risk communication (Murdock et al. 2003). In recent years there have been some theoretical and practical models that try to classify and manage operations to ensure effective communication of risk. For example, the model of Multiple Stages of Risk Communication Process (ERIK), developed by the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment in Germany (Hertel and Hensel 2007), emphasizes the opportunities afforded by participation in decisions about risk, and it understands risk communication as the whole exchange of information between political institutions, private companies, civil society representatives, experts and media. This model assumes that risk communication occurs in a context where multiple players offering pluralistic values come into conflict when defining the risk at different levels. This is a theoretical and practical model structured in different communication scenarios and with the involvement of public institutions. It distinguishes between horizontal communication (between the actors traditionally involved in the regulatory process of the risk) and vertical communication (which allows the integration of arguments of people and institutions outside the traditional regulatory processes), two aspects that help to bring concerns and values to ensure the plurality of process and improve

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its legitimacy. On the other hand, the ERIK model identifies four main stages: communication within and between public agencies; communication with experts; communicating with stakeholders; and communication with the general public. This design should enable a process of risk communication to integrate the different points of view, values and interests, and has an important participatory dimension. Another model of this kind is called Stakeholders in Risk Communication (STARC) (Wright 2006); this proposes a framework in which stakeholders, the media and the public can advance and participate in the development of a more dynamic management and governance to ensure dialogue among all the stakeholders. For this purpose, a corporate strategy of risk communication that goes beyond the simple transmission of information is deployed, since it is considered that risk communication is not effective without an effort to integrate, assimilate and understand the point of view of the other. The ultimate goal is to generate a culture of understanding, integration and involvement of different actors. From this point of view, a good risk communication process involves a series of structured stages in a loop (from analysis to improvement, through design, implementation or monitoring) that can be learned within spiral management, in which new experiences are added in order to improve the whole process. Perhaps the most well-known theoretical model in risk communication is the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) (Kasperson et al. 1988), a model based on the idea that risk events interact with a wide range of psychological processes and social, institutional and cultural factors that transform and determine the behaviour of the public in terms of amplification or attenuation. Thus, the experience of risk not only refers to physical risk, but also represents a process of interpretation through various social and individual filters. The signs of risk, defined as messages about a hazard or a dangerous event and its severity affecting the public perception (Pidgeon et al. 2003), including images, signs or symbols of real or hypothetical accidents, can be attenuated, remaining unnoticed as irrelevant or, conversely, receiving a substantial enlargement that leads to unexpected social alarm. The intensification or attenuation of the risk occurs when risk signals are socially processed and filtered through different stations amplifiers, which can include actors such as scientists, risk management institutions, the media, activists from social organizations, opinion leaders and public agencies (Kasperson et al. 1988: 1056). Therefore, the social amplification of risk refers to the interpretations and transformations that the images of the risk experience within the dynamic and interactive social processes. Each group or station can filter different aspects of risk or its related events. The importance of this model is that each of its segments can be studied through a part of the tradition on risk communication. Individual stations, for example, are related to the psychometric tradition and risk perception heuristics, but, in turn, are embedded in social groups with different cultural world views that ultimately influence the processes of social perception of risk. In this way, it is also stated that the institutional characteristics of the stations are not only influenced by the characteristics and values of its components, but also because of the cultural biases of their own organizations. Moreover, beyond an integration of psychological and cultural perspectives on risk, the SARF model also begins to integrate the constituent elements of communication processes to explain their influence, by incorporating the sources, channels and information flows, as well as culture

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and social institutions, as factors influencing the increase or attenuation of concrete risk signals (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2005: 16). We are aware that these are not the only existing models, but rather that they are probably representative of the main trends in risk communication.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

Our theoretical and methodological approach is based on what is called interpretative perception research (Horlick-Jones and Prades 2009), which accords a central role to meaning and interpretation when structuring social being and social interacting. This is an approach founded in perspectives that recognize the central roles of meaning and interpretation in structuring social interactions and being (Gadamer 1976; Schutz 1970), with some tradition in risk research (Molotch and Boden 1985; Perin 1995; Vaughan 1996; HorlickJones et al. 2001). According to this approach, it might be anticipated that the risk concept could assume complex roles and multiple and symbolic meanings in lay and expert discourse and action. From this point of view, the response to risk issues by people is not simply instrumentally calculative, but, rather, reflects the specificity of the risk issue in question and of the settings in which the risk issue is encountered. These settings include the matrix of social expectations, commitments and understandings in which people find themselves. The interpretative approach draws attention to the evidence of situationally specific logics in risk reasoning and practice across a range of organizational and social contexts. Research from the interpretative perspective has provided important insights into the nature of practical reasoning about risk issues, namely: 1. A recognition of the importance of social accounting practices in shaping the production of risk-related accounts (the need, in socially problematic situations, for people to present themselves as reasonable and the related politics of blame and responsibility) 2. A recognition of the need to understand that risk reasoning typically takes place in situations characterized by imperfect knowledge and that modes of reasoning may shift as levels of understanding change (low information rationality) 3. A recognition of the signature of technologies or specific ways in which the material features of technologies are articulated in practical reasoning. (Horlick-Jones and Prades 2009: 420) A qualitative approach was implemented in order to obtain what Geertz (1973) called a thick description of the circumstances in which given risk issues come to be identified and understood. A thick description provides situationally specific insights into the underlying social significance of given actions (Horlick-Jones and Prades 2009). In this way, in terms of making sense of petrochemical communication activities and practices, we attempt to understand the interpretative processes deployed, on the one hand, by experts representing the companies and state agencies, and, on the other hand, by the lay public. The in-depth interviewing technique was used to compile information from stakeholders, mainly representatives of companies and of state agencies responsible for ensuring safety in the Tarragona area, whereas the focus group technique was used to generate public discourse.

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In-depth interviews
Regarding the present data, we conducted a total of eight in-depth interviews. Four of these stakeholders were chemical and petrochemical plant managers specifically responsible for petrochemical communication on the Tarragona industrial estates (Bayer, Dow Chemical, Repsol-YPF and AEQT). The interviews were conducted face-to-face between November 2005 and February 2006 at the interviewees workplace. All interviews were audio recorded and then transcribed for analysis. The interviewees were asked about the following: (1) how they defined petrochemical risks; (2) what role they attributed to communication in petrochemical risk management; (3) what communicative strategies they used and the advantages and limitations of each; and (4) what role they attributed to the other social actors (public authorities, civil society and the media) involved in petrochemical processes. We conducted another four interviews with selected managers of public authorities responsible for chemical safety and emergencies in the region. These interviewees included an emergency expert working in the Generalitats Department of the Interior (regional government); an expert from the Catalan Emergencies Centre in Tarragona; a manager from the Generalitats General Subdirectorate for Industry (regional government); and a manager from the regional Government Delegation in Tarragona. These interviews were conducted face-to-face between November 2005 and February 2006 at the interviewees workplace. All interviews were audio recorded and then transcribed for analysis. The interviews were semi-structured with a short thematic list with no definite order. Interviewees were asked the following questions: (1) what risks are generated by the chemical and petrochemical companies in Tarragona; (2) how do you evaluate the role of risk communication within the field of risk management; (3) what mutual relationships exist between companies and public authorities in terms of risk management and communication; (4) what is the medias role in risk management and communication; and (5) what relationship do you have with the general public (individuals and organizations) in terms of risk management and communication? Such types of interviews allow for the development of long conversations with members of the study population, which expose signs of thematic elements. The interview is seen as a communicative process through which one can extract information from a person information that is in his or her biography, that is, the vivid set of representations associated with events (Alonso 1998). This generates a discourse much less fragmented than those generated with questionnaires, which allows people to describe experiences and opinions and talk about their own lives using their own words. It should be assumed that the information has been experienced in some way by the interviewee. This situation provides a specific bias consistent with the experience and the cognitive and emotional knowledge of that person. This interpretive bias of the information, far from being an obstacle, is significant because it allows for the reconstruction of the various social discourses on the theme of the research object. It should be noted, however, that the speeches are problematic because they are not independent of the structures of social interaction: the result of the interviews themselves are considered as communicative constructs and not mere records of speeches. The speeches are not an existing data collection, but appear as a forced response to a question by the researcher in a conversational situation, where each participant (researcher and interviewee) co-constructed

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that discourse moment by moment. It is important to consider all these virtues and limitations of the technique in order to be able to make as consistent an analysis as possible. In the results section, to ensure anonymity, the fragments corresponding to these interviewees are coded.

Focus group discussions

A total of eight focus groups were organized, composed of individuals recruited on the basis of the proximity of their home to the petrochemical complex. More distant neighbourhoods were Tarragona Centre I and II, Reus and Vilaseca, and closer neighbourhoods were Bonavista, La Canonja, Constant and La Pobla de Mafumet. Socio-economic activities with a direct bearing on the industrial sector predominate in the areas closest to the complex, whereas activities associated with the services sector tend to predominate in Tarragona city and Reus. Meanwhile, although Vila-seca has an important industrial sector, it also has a growing tourist sector. Recruitment was based on random telephone calls to the selected municipalities, combined with the snowball technique. A total of 50 people with a mean age of 51 years (range 1692 years) participated (thirty women and twenty men). In terms of education, four of the participants had no education, eighteen had primary education, 21 had secondary education and seven had attended university. Employment status varied greatly. The sample was, as far as possible, structurally representative of the population under study, and we ensured that each focus group would have men and women and would reflect different ages, education and occupations. An effort was also made to achieve relative internal homogeneity within each group by dividing the sample using a territorial variable (presence of people living near to or far from the petrochemical plants), which, a priori, could provide more similar experiences with regard to these petrochemical issues. In order to minimize bias during recruitment (avoiding people too worried about risk) the participants in the focus groups were told that they were going to talk, in a broad sense, about the quality of life in the territory. In the same sense, the focus group moderator did not introduce the main objective of the research (to discuss the petrochemical risk perception) instead the moderator waited until the issue was raised spontaneously. Discussions started with an initial question, From your point of view, what are the things you like the most and the least about living in your city/neighbourhood? In fact, in all of the groups a similar spontaneous process took place: during the first 30 minutes the participants discussed the things they liked most (sea, sun, people, etc.) and then least (traffic, garbage collection, local politicians, etc.); after this they began to discuss the presence of the petrochemical plants and their implications, and they did not stop until the end of the session (discussions lasted approximately two hours). The moderator then had a brief list of relevant issues to talk about (only to be used if they were not addressed by the participants), namely perceptions, experiences and expectations about: (1) the petrochemical industries of the area; (2) the risks linked to these industries; (3) the risk control; (4) the social actions of the population (behaviours, strategies and tactics); and (5) the interactions among actors (companies, public authorities, social movements, media and scientific experts). Later we search for communication issues through all these topics.

Data analysis
The interviews and the discussions of the focus groups were transcribed and analysed using procedures based on grounded theory, a qualitative analysis

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methodology based on constant comparisons and the use of coding paradigms to ensure conceptual development and density (Glaser 1978; Strauss 1987). In this approach the important link between data and theory is based on conceptual codes that make it easier to search for patterns that give the empirical indicators meaning. The process brings confirmation, correction and saturation (eventually the data saturate all the categories and all data seem to fit). All data were coded for analysis, which avoids or at least attenuates the problem of only selecting data that fit the hypotheses. The data collection phase resulted in 157 pages of interviews and 188 pages of focus group transcriptions (345 pages of text in total). Linking the codes and categories developed in each interview and in each focus group discussion, we tried to re-elaborate the central issues that could help us to explain the discourses and ground hypotheses from the whole set of data. For these purposes we read every text, carefully taking sentences one by one, in order to subdivide the contents into classes. We discussed and compared our suggestions. Systematic comparisons made it possible to subdivide the classes further, and new classes were created and others integrated into existing ones. As the process advanced, fewer and fewer revisions were made. The next step in our work was to search for verbal expressions (quotations) that indicated possible logical contradictions and modes of reasoning in the participants discourses. We used this analysis strategy because we felt that the participants (especially those of the focus groups) would not like to talk too much about the petrochemical risks they were exposed to, but, at the same time, that they would want to express their fears and worries. During this process we added codes and categories, trying to re-elaborate the central issues that could help us to explain the participants discourses, grounding hypotheses from the whole set of data (both the interviews and the focus groups).

HOW IS RISK COMMU COMMUNICATED? Risk communication by companies

According to the research carried out in this area (Farr and Fernndez 2007), the most popular communication channels used by the companies in the petrochemical area of Tarragona are websites, information bulletins, press releases, advertisements in local press and radio, and regular talks with citizen associations (mainly neighbourhood associations) and in primary and secondary schools. The companies use these instruments to channel all information that will transmit a favourable image to the public. With regard to this information, the companies tend to focus on aspects such as investments in preventative measures, the technical resources at their disposal, and the social and economic value of their production, but avoid making explicit mention of risks. The AEQT, in representing its member companies, implements a number of regular communication activities regarding aspects of risk, as follows: Presentations to political parties Presentations to neighbourhood associations (especially those in the vicinity of industrial estates) An agreement with the Department of Education to train primary and secondary teachers An agreement with the Government Delegation to train journalists regarding the external emergency plan (called PLASEQTA, External Chemical Security Plan of Tarragona)

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Open days School visits to companies The issue of an annual report with a section devoted to safety The organization of a public advisory panel

In accordance with the data collected in our interviews, risk communication, as conceived by the companies, can be characterized as proactive, in the sense that companies prefer to take the initiative rather than wait for an incident or accident to occur before distributing information. This implies permanent and planned communications and also the provision of financial and human resources for this purpose. This proactive approach obliges companies to be present in many public forums and to forge relationships with other actors, such as public authorities, citizen associations, etc. Concern for the companys public image was a common thread in the interviews held with communication heads. Risk communication was viewed mainly as an instrument for both transmitting an image of transparency and for winning the public trust. For this reason, communication is mainly one-way, because, despite recognizing the need to involve the public in risk management and communication, the interviews reveal that the communicative priority was to transmit messages with as few impediments as possible. By far the most important thing was for the message to be transmitted and understood (Company A interview). However, communication activities other than the typical one-way instruments (public presentations, conferences, annual reports, etc.) and training (educating teachers and journalists) are implemented. The main example of a communicative activity that aspires to greater public participation is the public advisory panel implemented by the AEQT and some of the larger companies (Basf, Bayer and Dow). Such public advisory panels are composed of non-experts who are relatively representative of the population of an industrialized area. The panel meets regularly to learn about the functioning of the local industries and to give to the members an opportunity to express opinions. In the case of the AEQT panel, it has been reported that the public authorities complained about being excluded, but the AEQT maintains that public authorities already have other channels through which to voice their opinions. The interviewees confirm the two primordial aims of these panels: to project an image of wanting to draw closer to the people (Company D interview) and to obtain insights into the true concerns of the population regarding petrochemical risk while the company and the population learn in tandem (Company A interview). Although the interviewees defend the usefulness of these people panels, from their statements it would seem that the companies do not always know how to integrate participant feedback. Even some people within the company itself have to be convinced of the usefulness of these initiatives: The panels are complementary. [] Im a bit of a romantic about this, I think that you have to keep [] you have convince people in the company to keep the game going. (Company A) Or as another interviewee argued: To the question whether the panels work well, the answer is yes. Where do we need to improve? I think we need to ensure that panel member opinions are shared by more people. I mean to say, in the meetings we

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share things [] but we should write these opinions down and share them with our managers, our bosses. (Company B) In other words, despite the fact that the interviewees responsible for communication in their companies insist that the panels work well, they concede the difficulty of integrating them into routine company management. The main obstacle, it seems, is persuading senior company managers, which demonstrates that organizational inertia leads to few changes in decision making. One of the communication obligations imposed on companies by public authorities is the communications protocol for minor incidents, by means of which companies must inform the public authorities of any unexpected event that affects normal production operations. In the interviews, the companies representatives generally try to transmit a positive view of the protocol, which has the aim of improving preventative management. However, interviewees also expressed concern that, if made public, the information could be misinterpreted. The concept of minor incident We need to rethink this, the minor incident ... it could be a positive thing as information or it could be negative. [] Because the report on the minor incident doesnt go to the media, but goes immediately to neighbouring local authorities, etc. If anyone lets something slip to a journalist, the fats in the fire, because theyre on to you like a ton of bricks, all for reporting a minor incident [] because a minor incident, depending on how its read or interpreted, can be alarmist and a catastrophe, depending on who reads it. (Company B) The above interviewee, of the opinion that the current definition is overly broad and includes events that only make sense for internal company management, would be in favour of modifying the definition of a minor incident. Companies are reluctant to notify the public authorities about minor incidents, and especially for these to be made public, because they could cause what they would consider to be unnecessary panic. Despite initiating a discourse consisting of a positive evaluation, in the end the interviewees showed themselves to be in favour of restriction. It should be noted that although the interviewees did not like the notion of publicly explaining incidents, they did not dare to disparage the protocol directly before the interviewer, possibly because they did not wish to transmit a poor image of their company. In this regard, the importance attached to a companys public image, or, at least, the priority granted to battling against public stigmatization of the chemical industry in general, is noteworthy. This dynamic affects the entire discourse of the interviewees.

Risk communication by the public authorities

Public authorities have the function of guaranteeing minimum safety levels and controlling risk for the population, and thus they need to communicate regarding risk and risk prevention. Communications of this nature have been organized to date by authorities responsible for the Tarragona industrial area. They have mainly been based on one-off or periodic information campaigns designed jointly with the petrochemical plants. Occasionally campaigns are implemented typically annually through the local press or using printed

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materials (leaflets, calendars, etc.) distributed to associations and in neighbourhoods close to the industries. Another important communication channel is through schools, where experts hold regular workshops and talks on risk, and emergency measures. Finally, there are several websites with information on risk and describing what to do in the event of an emergency. The interviewees expressed their frustration at peoples lack of interest in attending events specifically aimed at neighbourhood associations. Associations are offered the opportunity to organize talks, conferences and workshops on risk prevention, but very few take up the offer and the few events that are held are poorly attended, according to the opinions of the interviewees: At first they responded, but increasingly less, and lately very few people have been coming to the information sessions. The attendees were outnumbered by the talkers. (Public Authority B) One interviewee was shocked at the populations lack of interest in the risks they are living with, assuming that this was due to the perception of a high level of safety, which, in fact, contradicts the general idea that the public is increasingly demanding regarding risk. The neighbourhood associations, for example [] this year only one has requested an information session, whats more, to make it a bit more interesting, weve told them they can come and visit the place and we will hold the information session there. We fit in with whatever they want, if they want well go there [] only one has responded [] But nobody is asking, there are hardly any requests. Either its that [] things are very safe, a sensation that things are very safe, or people simply trust in God []. (Public Authority B) As we can see, the interviewee has the initial expectation that people would like information on risks and emergencies, but then their own experience tells him otherwise, from which it follows that people are not sufficiently concerned (feeling safe or believing in God too much). The interviewees consider that communication strategies often do not achieve the expected success because people have a poor image of the authorities and this affects credibility. In other words, public authorities think that they are perceived by the people to be aligned with the companies, and (they suppose) this is reflected in the image that the public has of the authorities and of their acts. People have the idea that the public authorities, in certain situations, defend the companies because they generate wealth [] they dont want them to get annoyed and leave and so they are handled with care. Because of this, the people draw their own conclusions and say to themselves: In these conditions, the likelihood of the authorities telling the truth is quite a bit lower than the likelihood of them telling a lie, if a risk-producing event does take place. Naturally, bit by bit, I think that the public authorities have been learning [] are learning, that saying that we dont want to alarm people actually has catastrophic effects. [] There is inertia in the public authorities in terms of correct management, but the tendency is to improve. (Public authority C)

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Reiterated here and even acknowledged by insiders is the idea of stigma associated with chemical risk management, which not only affects the industrial sector, but also the authorities in charge of regulating and controlling risk, possibly by association with the stigma of the companies. Even though the companies may comply with safety and risk prevention standards, the comments of the interviewees tend to confirm that they are not sufficiently transparent regarding inspections or investigations by the authorities, and tend to conceal incidents and other risk data. The public authorities play a major role, its the public authorities that have to look out for the general good, thats our main function and thats what the people want us to do. But if we cant convince companies that they have to have a more open attitude, to be more willing to be audited, to be controlled and not to fear inspections and [] well, if this attitude is missing then things just get complicated. (Public Authority D) Note that this interviewee uses the conditional verbal form (if we cant convince and if this attitude is missing ), which denotes a normative discourse that is not met. In the background this can be a way of acknowledging a difficult responsibility to fulfil in practice. Essentially, the idea is that risk communication requires greater involvement by both the public authorities and the private sector in cooperation. In a way, this is recognition of the mutual interdependence between both (even if this is not entirely symmetrical given that they do not have the same effective power).

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF RISK COMMUNICATION

To begin with, people tend to say they do not receive sufficient information on risk, risk prevention and emergency plans. Not only is more information called for with accusations of secretiveness in passing but also more intelligible and more accessible information. As can be seen in the extract below, participants 2 and 3 call for clearer and more accessible information, participant 6 comments that the petrochemical industries generate much employment in the area and participant 3 responds that there is too much secrecy. Significantly, the (perceived) lack of information is linked with the possibility of losing jobs. This conceptual association is typical of contexts where people see themselves as very dependent on risk promoters. 3.: If there was a[n official] report that was easily [] that could be understood by everybody, I mean. M. Would that be of interest to those of you here? 2.: Yes, absolutely 3.: Of course. There are lots of people like us who dont have access. 6.: You know what though? A lot of people are employed by the petrochemical plants. 7.: Sure. 6.: What would they do?

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3.: All those people [] If they cover up, its for a reason, because if everything was clean and working right, theyd tell us and theyd be informing us continually about how great everything is and how little pollution they are creating [] Theyre saying nothing, thats a bad sign. 7.: Us? All the people in the petrochemical plants in Tarragona. 3.: That means that they are keeping quiet because they are hiding something. (Excerpt 1, Tarragona Centre II Group) We have found here a thinking model based on the idea that absence of information means bad news (no news equals bad news model). In this way, people seem to want to be seen by others as exposed at constant risk until proven otherwise. At least, this seems to be the social accounting practice they refer to when speaking of their risk exposure. People suspect that the official institutions and councils have information on petrochemical risk, but it is assumed to be unintelligible for the public in general. In fact, in the next extract participant 5 suggests that the official institutions should distribute some kind of newsletter or regular publication to provide information on risk (in this case, pollution). Nevertheless, other participants were of the opinion that nobody would read them. In other words, it is claimed that there is a lack of information and that people need to be informed (and ways of informing people are proposed), but it is also acknowledged that the effort would be wasted in the current context and circumstances (there will be people who wont read it and most people wont read it). M.: Do the people want it? [Information on petrochemical risks.] 5.: I think so, yes. 3.: Id say they do, dont they? 5.: If they sent me a newsletter or delivered a newsletter to each house [] knowing the pollution levels, whats being contaminated, whats not being contaminated, what Repsol is doing, what another company is doing [] You may not be more at ease, but you know. This doesnt mean that they dont know, they have some kind of control, thats for sure, I suppose. After what happened with ETA [terrorists], I doubt that a town council would fail to deal with these things and more so with the responsibilities they face now. But sure, not getting to the people [] or perhaps we dont want information, but of course the easiest thing would be an information bulletin, every year, like they do [] just like they send you a propaganda bulletin for the town festival [] well, another one for pollution. 4.: Obviously, there will be people who wont read it. 5.: There will be people who wont read it. There would be [] most people wouldnt read it, but of course, it would have to be a clear bulletin, so people could understand it, because once they start using technical words [] (Excerpt 2, Constant Group) These people see that having information will mean that they will have to behave in a certain way, and this is a responsibility that not all are willing to

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assume. Notable is the comment by participant 3 (next extract) in a conversation on the lack of information, who says that although they inform you [] you wont do what they tell you: M.: [] Do you consider yourselves well informed about the risks or potential risks? 4.: You know, to tell the truth, truly well informed, no. When that [explosion] happened, people got worried, you know, but we are not informed. 3.: And the truth is, although they inform you [] you wont do what they tell you. (Excerpt 3, Constant Group) This position contributes to explaining the calculated ambiguity among the public regarding information on risks. Although the participants admit they are aware that the companies hold regular talks with neighbourhood associations, their opinions regarding these talks reveal a calculated ambiguity. They can say that they are informed, but at the same time they claim that almost no information on risk is provided. As can be observed in the following extract, participant 3 states that the annual talks are very informative but do not cover topics that could create a sensation of panic or fear. Another participant also commented that many facts are not revealed (again there is a suspicion of secrecy, again the no news equals bad news model). M.: Do you think you should be better informed? 3.: We already are. M.: Because you say they hold talks and [] 2.: Yes. 3.: Yes. 5.: Dow holds a talk every year. 3.: The thing is, they cant alarm people over a triviality. 8.: Right, and there are a lot of trivialities you dont hear anything about. (Excerpt 4, La Pobla de Mamufet Group) On the other hand, all participants in the focus groups are aware of the existence of a communication channel called open days, although only those living near the industrial zones appear to have access to it. Those living further away criticize the fact that the open days only admit people linked directly to the companies, that is, employees and their families and people living in the immediate vicinity (it appears that one must be registered as a resident with the local authority). The open days generally consist of a guided visit to a company; people are shown around, attend a talk and are invited to a drink or meal. From the comments of the focus group participants, it can be deduced that the communication is very much one-way it being difficult to ask what might be awkward questions about risk. The context of the open day the fact that it takes place on the companys premises the courtesy extended

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to the visitors, the meal, etc. undoubtedly has an impact on the behaviour of visitors (as revealed in the extract below). It seems, furthermore, that risk is never discussed. M.: Have you recently attended an open day? 5.: Every year 9.: Every year theres one or two. M.: And can anyone go who wants to? 8.: The whole town, people from the town. 2.: People registered as resident in the town. 9.: They show you the section here, the section in La Canonja and theres a reception as if you were the king of Spain. [] I think [] well, they talk to you, making you feel at home. We go to the assembly hall and they tell us how many workers they took on that year, their earnings, their current situation, the founding spirit of the firm [] I mean, you can go anywhere you want there 8.: You can talk if you want to [] 9.: No, no [] They ask you to, they do, but since we are all very shy, we say nothing. We dont say about that smoke [] 2.: And you cant very well complain [] because afterwards they give you lunch [] and you complaining? 8.: If we sell out for as little as a lunch, what do we amount to, eh? (Excerpt 5, La Pobla de Mafumet Group) In their discourses these people show a lot of indications of the distribution of power relationships, of how power is distributed in this society, which probably refers to a context of high social dependence on institutions and companies within this population. Other communication possibilities mentioned by the participants in the focus groups are the local media (press, radio and television). However, some of these participants voice the suspicion that even though there is a wealth of media available to transmit information, economic interests interfere. The participants discussed at length whether information on risk did not appear in the local media because the companies were trying to conceal information (as claimed by participant 3) or because people are not asking for it (as suggested by participant 1). Note that the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. M.: And how can this information be transmitted to the people? Through the press? Or will it be given out to whoever phones? Because maybe there are people who dont want to know [] 1.: Everyone wants to know. 2.: Yes, I think that the press is the most convenient and the easiest for everyone. 3.: But they wont allow that, theyll cover up.

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8.: Whats happening here in Tarragona, and this is a strong point, is that theres a strong cultural movement. Three or four cultural bulletins are published, there are activities, short films, documentaries, cinema [] So, ways of including education regarding the petrochemical industry exist. These channels can be used for [] All the culture that there is in Tarragona, its amazing, every day theres something to do or a film to see. They could show documentaries or news bulletins [] They could [] 3.: So why dont they? Because theyre hiding something [] When things dont come out in the light of day, its because theres a cover-up. 2.: But then [] maybe a citizen platform or something similar will be started. 1.: And thats the issue, are people interested? 3.: If there was a report that was easy [] that could be understood by everybody, if you know what I mean [] (Excerpt 6, Tarragona Centre II Group) Once again people talk about the absence of information (no news equals bad news model), and about the possible public reluctance to admit information just after saying that everyone wants to know.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Risk communication by the petrochemical companies analysed for the purposes of our research is mainly centred around and planned in accordance with two interrelated factors: legal requirements, and the desire of companies to develop and maintain a good public image (in the framework of battling the stigma attached to the chemical industry by public opinion). In the interviews we held with people in charge of communications in these companies, although the interviewees were at pains to show that their companies assumed their legal obligations positively, indirectly these obligations were disparaged. Communications are basically one-way, that is, aimed at transmitting information to the people with as few obstacles as possible. Two-way communication mechanisms seem to be rarely used, and the few that are (for example, the public advisory panels) tend to be integrated, with great difficulty, into routine risk management. This also points to how risk communication roles are subordinate to other company roles. In the case of the public authorities, many of their communications are designed in cooperation with the chemicals sector. Indeed, the authorities attribute their problems of credibility to this perceived closeness to the chemicals sector. The public authorities are thus trapped in an interdependency relationship: they need to control companies that often do not cooperate, but cannot always publicly reveal the obstacles posed by companies as this could further deteriorate their public image and negatively affect their role as the guarantors of the safety of the population. As for the public in general, several contradictions can be observed that could be explained by the social, economic and political contexts in which the local people live out their lives. On the one hand, the population points to a dearth of information on risk and on preventative measures, while insisting on the need for clear information, and even proposing means for providing it.

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On the other hand, however, they claim that the information is not very useful, and that the public are not interested in seeking information. As indicated by the public authorities, the talks given to neighbourhood associations tend not to be well attended, and company representatives say that even activities like open days tend to leave the public quite indifferent, with the people seemingly unconcerned about risks. This unwillingness to obtain information can be interpreted as social accounting practice in shaping the production of risk-related accounts, in the sense that people need to present themselves as reasonable persons in order to avoid blame (by other people and/or institutions). This is congruent with the statement of the risk scholar Marc Poumadere, who suggests that local populations in the neighbourhood of industries form a minority, both in quantitative terms (only a fraction of the general population lives in the neighbourhood of industries), and in terms of cognitions (they find themselves doing what the overall population declare they would refuse to do), which leads to a complex social order where people need to present themselves in public strategically. (Poumadere 2008: 5) On the other hand, this reluctance to obtain information can be linked to the great dependence of the people on the other actors in this risk context. This dependence may be economic or employment related, or may be linked to a lack of alternatives in terms of action, in the sense that acquiring information on risks may require the assumption of certain responsibilities regarding areas where a person does not have decision-making powers. These results allow us to judge the communication models pointed out above (STARC, ERIK or SARF). On the one hand, both STARC and ERIK are based on the idea that public institutions are in charge of implementing a risk communication process that is plural and inclusive, where all participants can speak and be heard, so as to collect and integrate a wide range of values, interests and viewpoints. In fact, these are two strong normative models that establish what should be done (to achieve good risk communication). It is certainly a valuable proposal to achieve fairer and better risk management. However, the case study discussed here illustrates some of the practical difficulties for the implementation of such models as the STARC or ERIK. Perhaps the most difficult obstacles are those related to the context in which actors relate to each other, which are normally very marked power relations spaces that prevent actors expressing their preferences directly (attending to circumlocutions, metaphors, models of discursive thought or conditional formulas that indicate dissatisfaction with the present). As we pointed out in our theoretical framework, it is important to recognize the (often tacit) political role of all accounts when seeking to interpret risk perception data. In this sense, interpretative research indicates that active work is required to make sense of risk issues, and that this work is collective, and draws on stocks of shared interpretative resources. This is a point often neglected in the theoretical models of risk communication: not just in STARC or ERIK, but also in the more theoretical and integrative approach of SARF (Kasperson et al. 1988), where the reception and interpretation of information by the communication agencies or amplification stations is usually conceived as a kind of mechanical arrival and processing of a packet of knowledge by individuals (Horlick-Jones et al. 2003: 284).

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In conclusion, the analysis of risk communication can be a crucial element when designing governance risk models, as communication plays a central role in accounting for the interaction between actors. In this text we have noted the existence of several descriptive (such as SARF) or normative (such as STARC or ERIK) theoretical models that are very useful to take into account the communicative dimension of risk processes. But we have also observed how certain crucial aspects of these processes can remain hidden if they do not address the interpretive dimensions of human behaviour, such as the social accounting practices, the risk reasoning in contexts of low information rationality, and the presence of some kind of stigma related to technologies. In any case, the research shows that the practice of risk communication in the petrochemical area of Tarragona is still far from the normative models mentioned above.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This article is based on two research projects funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. References: SEJ2004-00892 and SEJ2007-63095/ SOCI. We would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their very useful comments and suggestions.

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SUGGESTED CITATION
Espluga, J., Prades, A. and Gonzalo, J. (2010), Communicating at the edge: Risk communication processes and structural conflicts in highly industrialized petrochemical areas, Catalan Journal of Communication & Cultural Studies 2: 2, pp. 231251, doi: 10.1386/cjcs.2.2.231_1

CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
Josep Espluga teaches environmental and health sociology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He is senior researcher of the Public Policies and Government Institute (IGOP), and his research work is particularly concerned with social aspects of risk perception. Contact: Facultat de CCPP i Sociologia. Edifici B, Campus de la UAB; 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona-Spain). E-mail: joseplluis.espluga@uab.cat Ana Prades is Head of the Socio-Technical Research Unit (Centro de Investigacin Sociotcnica) of the Spanish Government Agency CIEMAT, based in Barcelona. Her research is mainly concerned with risk perception, risk communication and public engagement, as they relate to energy technologies. Contact: Centro de Investigacin Sociotcnica. CIEMAT Barcelona; Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes 604. 4 -2; 08007 Barcelona. E-mail: ana.prades@ciemat.es Jan Gonzalo has degrees in both Geography and History and in Journalism. He is a member of the research group Asterisc and his main topics of interest are risk communication issues. He is currently finishing his Ph.D. on Communication Studies at the Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Contact: Department of Communication Studies; Avd. Catalunya, 35; 43002 Tarragona (Spain). E-mail: juanluis.gonzalo@urv.cat

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