Matthew Ullery 12-14-12 Professor Wilson The Effect of the Government of India and the Central Tibetan Administration

on the Tibetan Exile Identity

Ullery 1 In March of 1959 His Holiness Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama and supreme head of Tibetan Buddhism, left his homeland in search of better opportunities for his people, his religion, and the Tibetan culture. His arrival on Indian soil marked the beginning of one of the largest cultural diasporas of modern times, as tens of thousands of Tibetans left their country in search of safety from violence and cultural suppression from the invading Peoples Republic of China. Today the exodus continues, with an average of nearly 1,000 Tibetan refugees arriving into India from Bhutan, Bangladesh, and especially Nepal (Routray 2007: 80), causing the number of refugees within the borders of India to be conservatively estimated at just over 100,000 (Hess 2009: 137). The Indian government was tasked with finding land in which to allow these quickly growing numbers of refugees to live, and to write legislation that allowed them certain rights during what they hoped would be a temporary stay. However, after fifty years, the Tibetans have become well established in India and have no way of returning to their country that technically does not exist anymore. These stateless people are now stranded without a place that they are truly welcome or at home. Their welfare, while being dictated largely by the Indian government, has been handed off to the Central Tibetan Administration, a democratic governmental organization that oversees the education, religious affairs, and cultural preservation of the Tibetan refugee population while also managing their birth records, Registration Certificates, and Identification Certificates (Falcone & Wangchuk 2008: 173-174). However with the increasing numbers of refugees coming into India, with already high unemployment rates and low levels of education, it is becoming increasingly more taxing on the Central Tibetan Administration to adequately provide for the refugee population and to maintain a sense of identity and purpose within the community (Adams 2005: 18). Also, many Tibetans consider becoming Indian

Ullery 2 citizens to increase their personal freedoms, however many worry that this will surely weaken the Tibetan exile community (Bentz 2012: 106). The process that these refugees undergo to come to India, the policies governing them by the Indian government, and the emphasis on religion and education by the Central Tibetan Administration have a collective impact on the Tibetan exile identity. This identity, however, is being brought into question by the refugees and is undergoing a state of radical change from that of a settled refugee community towards a globalized diaspora culture due to the modern awareness of the Tibetan exile community at large. With the Tibetan exile community well past its fiftieth year in India, the new arrivals from the Tibetan Autonomous Region must assimilate into a culture that has upwards of four generations of well established exiles. These generations have lived their entire lives in India with the escape from Tibet a distant memory long since passed (Routray 2007: 88). However, for the new arrivals, the escape from the harsh and unforgiving Himalayan wilderness is a feat unto itself, making the prospect of settling into a quasi-foreign exile community a daunting task. These people took on extreme danger in order to leave their homeland behind them in the hopes of bettering their lives and the lives of their family. They probably braved the harsh winters of the Himalayas, due to the relaxed patrols of the Sino-Nepal border at this time, and would have been guided by local Nepalese guides who guide the would-be-refugees across the border, who often charge upwards of eight hundred dollars per person (Routray 2007: 81). This treacherous and uncertain journey can take multiple weeks or months to complete, depending on the weather and abilities of the travelers, and often involve dangerously close encounters with Chinese patrols (Oberoi 2006: 77-78).

Ullery 3 Once across the border and inside Nepal the refugees must register with the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) so that they can be processed and transported out of the country as soon as possible. While Nepal has an official policy of getting the Tibetan refugees onto buses to Delhi or Dharamsala within two weeks of their UNHCR registration, in reality it can take months for enough refugees to make it into the country in order to fill a bus, forcing the refugees to wait even longer to receive their group exit permit that authorizes their immigration into India (Routray 2007: 81). Finally, upon arriving in India the newcomers move to the Tibetan Reception Center at Mcleodganj, Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh. They must go through the arduous process of registering for residence permits, often having to falsify their birth records or bribe government officials to be issued their permits quickly (Routray 2007: 81). It is fortunate that India allows refugees to take asylum within the country in the first place, as India is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and has no formal legislation regarding refugees (Routray 2007: 80). Although the UNHCR is present in India, the Indian government only grants it access to refugees living in urban centers and does not recognize the UNHCRs grants of refugee status. India, however, is a member of the UNHCR Executive Committee and only responds to refugee groups on a case-by-case basis, largely depending on the nationality of the group (Routray 2007: 80). This being so the nationality of the Tibetan refugees, and their having fled Chinese persecution, made for an intricate foreign policy dilemma for Nehrus developing government. One the one hand, there was much public support for the Tibetan refugees and the cause for which they were fighting, as well as the humanitarian obligation that the Indian government felt by means of granting asylum to the exiles. On the other hand, however, if the Government of

Ullery 4 India were to open its borders to the Tibetans, then there was the definite potential to antagonize the Peoples Republic of China, a growing ally and economic rival for Nehru (2006: 77-78). This awkward foreign policy situation increased on April 3rd, 1959 when Indian newspapers announced the arrival of the Dalai Lama and his followers. Nehru was already trying to minimize the damage to Sino-Indian relations due to a debate that took place the previous day, when members of Parliament across the country openly criticized Chinas treatment of, and public policy towards, the Tibetans (Oberoi 2006: 83). The Dalai Lama having forced his hand, Nehru formally announced that he would grant asylum to the Dalai Lama and, by extension, any Tibetan fleeing their homeland (Oberoi 2006: 83). Nehru announced, according to Oberoi (2006: 84), that Indias policy in regard to the Tibetan refugees was to be governed, in order of priority, by considerations of its own security, by its friendship with China, and the desire to preserve Tibetan autonomy. The admission of the Tibetans onto India territory was not undertaken with expressed purpose of embarrassing or aggravating China, but the presence of these refugees, among other things, led to the marked deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, eventually leading to the Sino-Indian War in 1962 (Oberoi 2006: 84). However, at the conclusion of the war, with the humiliating defeat of the Indian Army, the Government of India somewhat altered its position and policies towards the Tibetan issue. India joined 42 other states in its support of the 1965 General Assembly resolution regarding Tibet thereby indicating its shifting policies on China (Oberoi 2006: 88). The government gradually became more willing to countenance expression of Tibetan demands, and was coming to the realization, albeit reluctantly, that the Tibetan situation was proving to be more permanent than had previously been anticipated (Oberoi 2006: 88-90). The refugees were moved from their original transit camps in Misarami in Assam and Buxa in West Bengal and allotted land

Ullery 5 throughout the country, so that they could build settlements for themselves to preserve their culture and maintain their way of life well outside of Indian society (Bharihoke 2009: 34). Many of these settlements were agricultural, with individual families originally granted leases for farmland, with most settling in Dharamsala where the Central Tibetan Administration, as well as the home of the Dalai Lama, is located (Routray 2007: 82). Along with agricultural settlements and the virtual take over of the town of Dharamsala, the Indian government provided land and housing to establish monasteries and nunneries to accommodate the Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns, who are by far the most heavily persecuted and prevalent Tibetan refugee demographic (Routray 2007: 79). Nearly half of all new refugees over the past several decades have been Tibetan monks and nuns fleeing religious persecution, which has more than doubled the size of the Tibetan monastic community in India since 1980 (Routray 2007: 87). While these monasteries and nunneries have been, and continue to be, willing to rehabilitate the newly arrived monks and nuns to life in India, it has become increasingly difficult to adequately accommodate these refugees into the already overcrowded monastic community (Adams 2005: 218). With the support of the Indian government, the Central Tibetan Administration has been able to absorb newcomers into the fold of the Tibetan exile community, with the encouragement to promote a Tibetan nationalist identity amongst the refugees. The Central Tibetan Administration oversees much of the Tibetan livelihood in India. It independently runs schools, issues birth certificates, runs cultural programs, and meets with delegates of foreign nations (Falcone & Wanchuk 2008: 173). In fact, for all practical purposes, the Central Tibetan Administration is a fully functioning government, despite the fact that Tibetans are not legal citizens of any state, claiming citizenship of a non-existent country, and that it remains an

Ullery 6 unrecognized government body (Falcone & Wangchuk 2008: 173-174). Within India, however, the Central Tibetan Administration has some limited power; it is a wholly democratic institution, with elected officials serving five year terms in the Assembly of Tibetan Peoples Deputies, where they make laws that are upheld and enforced by the Indian government, as long as they do not contradict any national or international laws (Falcone & Wangchuk 2008: 174). The Central Tibetan Administration maintains itself through substantial donations from various international sources, but mainly through requiring the annual payment of taxes by all Tibetan refugees above the age of six (Falcone & Wangchuk 2008: 174). The payment of these taxes, according to Falcone & Wangchuk, earns the refugees the right to possess a Green Book, also called a Freedom Book, which serves as the primary marker of an exiles connection with the Central Tibetan Administration. Tibetans that pay their taxes on an annual basis are entitled to certain benefits, such as pensions for the elderly, free enrollment in Tibetan-medium schools, eligibility for employment in the Central Tibetan Administration and Tibetan military posts in the Indian Army, as well as collegiate scholarships (2008: 174). While the Green Book establishes the legal identity of a Tibetan refugee, the Central Tibetan Administration works to preserve the cultural Tibetan identity within the exile community. This, however, is an intimidatingly difficult prospect with the ever-growing number of escapees arriving in Dharamsala, the fading dream of a return to a free Tibet, and the growing numbers of refugees that are no longer as content to remain in their settlement communities. The Central Tibetan Administration, in response to this, facilitates the promotion of complete religious freedom and the right to a Tibetan-medium education, with the thought that if their traditions and customs are maintained, then the community as a whole can maintain their Tibetan refugee identity and focus on the fight towards independence (Bentz 2012: 92).

Ullery 7

In May of 1961, the Government of India created the autonomous Tibetan Schools Society, now called the Central Tibetan Schools Administration, under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Education (Hess 2009: 54). Currently there are three different types of Tibetanmedium schools: those funded and overseen by the Central Tibetan Schools Administration, schools directly managed and funded by the Central Tibetan Administration, and private autonomous schools affiliated with the Indian Central Board of Secondary Education. These autonomous schools do not receive funding from either the Indian or Tibetan governments, but also have more leeway in the curriculums and policies that they can create (Hess 2009: 54). All of these schools, however, must adhere to basic Indian educational requirements and the teachers must have Indian certifications, which severely limits the amount of people qualified to teach in Tibetan-medium schools, even if they had previously been teachers in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (Hess 2009: 137). The Tibetan-medium schools, while teaching standard subjects such as arithmetic and history, teaches about the culture and religion of Tibet in a very romanticized fashion so as to convey a sense of nationalistic pride within the over 27,000 students that attend the 80 schools across India (Routray 2007: 83). Of these students, nearly 11,000 of them are students that have fled Tibet (Routray 2007: 83), and must learn in an environment that emphasizes the traditional Tibetan culture, which they have had ironically little exposure to, due to the cultural repression policies of the Chinese government (Falcone & Wangchuk 2008: 179). If the Central Tibetan Administration is attempting to preserve the national identity of a region that no longer maintains or even possesses that identity, one must ask what identity is truly being formed in these Tibetan-medium schools? Falcone and Wangchuk hint at this identity when they write, There is unwillingness to concede publicly that the Tibet of old is gone

Ullery 8 forever, but the wrangling between the early waves of refugees and the more recent waves of exiles in Dharamsala and elsewhere demonstrate that the Tibetans in exile here and Tibetans there are now quite fragmented by such disjointed historical experiences. The newcomers from Chinese-occupied Tibet today are taught that their version of Tibet is less authentic and less real than the version(s) preserved by the Tibetan exile community writ large (2008: 179). These disjointed historical experiences are the problem underlying the idea of the Tibetan identity formed in the exile schools, the refugee community in India having been physically and emotionally removed from the happenings in Tibet over the past fifty years, causing there to be a significant deviation in what identity the newly escaped Tibetans have and what the Central Tibetan Administration defines as traditional Tibetanness. The idea of Tibetannes, or the identification with the culture of Tibet circa 1959 (Bentz 2012: 106), stems from the fact that the central goal of the Tibetan government-in-exile is the eventual return to Tibet under conditions of autonomy, a dream that has no hope of being fulfilled in the near future. This idea is in conflict with the obvious reality that the identity that the Government-in-exile is attempting to preserve has long since passed away with its people, who are often third or fourth generation refugees that have no true memory of Tibet and any knowledge or experience of Tibetan culture that they might have is purely anecdotal (Routray 2007: 88). This lack of memory for the suffering of their compatriots and their forefathers has led to radical changes in the identities, specifically the feelings of patriotism and belonging, in the Tibetan exile communities. Unsurprisingly, many of the newer generations of Tibetan refugees that were born and lived their entire lives in India do not have as strong of a connection with their homeland as they do with their host country. These people often desire to become Indian

Ullery 9 citizens, for a variety of reasons, but are pressured from within the exile community to remain stateless. The desire for Indian citizenship lies in the benefits that the exiles stand to gain from relinquishing their status as refugees. Tibetan refugees do not possess the same rights as Indian citizens. They cannot formally participate in Indian politics, do not qualify for academic scholarships that are afforded to other ethnic communities, cannot possess an Indian passport, and are not eligible to work in civil service jobs in the government (Routray 2007: 80). Most Tibetan refugees born in India are not eligible for native-born citizenship because of the status of their community as a refugee settlement, unless they are children of refugees and were born in India before July 1, 1987 (Bentz 2012: 86). However, most of the refugee population, even those born before the required date, is impeded from taking advantage of their right to citizenship or does not wish to become Indian citizens in the first place. Instead of having Indian citizenship, with the subsequent identification papers and passport, Tibetan refugees are registered by their local Union Ministry of Home Affairs Office and possess Registration Certificates as their primary form of identification as refugees, and are eligible for Identity Certificates should they desire to travel throughout the country or internationally (Routray 2007: 82). The application for an Identification Certificate, however, can take several months as it requires a letter of approval from the Central Tibetan Administration, a valid Registration Certificate, and proof of a date of birth (something that is not commonly recorded) just so that the Government of India will begin processing the paperwork (Falcone & Wangchuk 2008: 176). Even when the individual manages to leave the country, once it is time to return they must apply for a visa to re-enter India, as they are not Indian citizens and do not carry a legal passport (Falcone & Wangchuk 2008: 169).

Ullery 10 For some their identity as a Tibetan refugee supersedes all else and makes the bureaucracy of their status worth the trouble. They believe that their communitys strength lies in their collective refugee status and that if this were to be abandoned, then the Tibetan struggle for independence would collapse unto itself because the former refugees would assimilate into their new country and forget about their Tibetan heritage (Bentz 2012: 102). Not all refugees express their Tibetan patriotism in the same way however. Many believe that obtaining an Indian citizenship is a great benefit to the Tibetan community as a whole, as they can become involved in Indian government and are able to influence domestic policy regarding Tibetan refugee rights and foreign policy directed against China (Falcone & Wangchuk 2008: 171). In fact, they view the act of becoming an Indian citizen to be rife with Tibetan patriotism (Bentz 2012: 106). Religion is the most visible connector of the Tibetan community, with Buddhism ordering the daily life of most Tibetan exiles. Prayers are constantly on the lips of monks, nuns, and lay people alike; prayer wheels turn to no end; and all of nature bears witness to the universal presence of the gods whose divine will regulates the lives of the people and therefore must be unceasingly petitioned, pleased, and thanked (Routray 2007: 82). The Dalai Lama stands as the supreme head of Tibetan Buddhism, as the interpreter of the divine will of the Gods, and as the figurehead towards whom all worship is directed and all teachings derived (Hess 2007: 84). That the Indian government allows the Tibetan people such high degrees of religious freedom is not surprising as this is a sign of the affinity that Hinduism has for Buddhism, as a derivative from Hinduism, and that the Buddha is an incarnation of the Hindu God Vishnu (Routray 2007: 84). The importance of Tibetan Buddhism, then, for the identity of its practitioners-in-exile is paramount. Hess writes that, The Dalai Lama has said that what is most important about

Ullery 11 Tibetan culture is not the national cuisine or the mode of dress; these are superficial and transitory. What is most enduring about Tibet is BuddhismBy Buddhism, however, the Dalai Lama meant something else, foremost the practice of compassion, something not of Tibetan origin, but transmitted to Tibet by the great Indian masters of Mahayana (2009: 61). That the most visible tenets of the romanticized Tibetan culture, the dress and cuisine, are seen as relatively unimportant is highly significant. The Dalai Lama is conveying the Buddhist idea of impermanence, which states that all things in this world are in a constant state of change and can never be expected or relied upon. What is truly important for the continuation of the Tibetan culture, then, is not the citizenship of the individual exile or their global location, but the idea that these Tibetans still uphold their religious values in their daily life, and still practice the fundamental doctrine spelled out by the great teachers of their religion. After over fifty years of settlement in India, the Tibetan community is beginning to come to terms with the fact that it is transitioning from a refugee population to that of a diaspora community. The Government of India has allowed the Tibetan exile community great freedom in governing itself freely in a way that keeps it separated from Indian society, so as to promote a Tibetan education and freedom to practice their religion that is so vital to their identity. The Central Tibetan Administration implements these programs in place of the Indian government, giving the Tibetans much greater control over their future in India. However, with the constant influx of new refugees that do not relate to the romanticized view of Tibetan culture, and the fact that there are four generations of Indian born refugees in these Tibetan settlements, many hope to acquire an Indian citizenship so that they can increase their personal freedoms and potentially better the situation of the Tibetan exile community. However, many see this desire as detrimental to the Tibetan community because if these Tibetans give up their status as refugees, they fear that

Ullery 12 the Tibetan cause for independence will never be attained. But, the Dalai Lama firmly believes that if the Tibetan Buddhist tradition is upheld and Tibetans remain a compassionate people, then the Tibetan identity could never fade away, even if the appearance and nationality of the Tibetan people were to change.

Ullery 13 References: Adams, W.F. "Tibetan Refugees In India: Integration Opportunities through Development of Social, Cultural and Spiritual Traditions." Community Development Journal 40.2 (2005): 216-19. Oxfordjournals.org. Web. 30 Oct. 2012. Bentz, Annie-Sophie. "Being a Tibetan Refugee in India." Refugee Survey Quarterly 31.1 (2012): 80-107. Oxfordjournals.org. Oxford University Press, Mar. 2012. Web. 8 Oct. 2012. Bharihoke, Neera. Human Rights and the Law. New Delhi: Serials Publications, 2009. Print. Falcone, Jessica, and Wangchuk, Tsering. "We're Not Home: Tibetan Refugees In India In The Twenty-First Century." India Review 7.3 (2008): 164-199. Academic Search Complete. Web. 30 Oct. 2012. Hess, J. M. (2009). Immigrant Ambassadors: Citizenship and Belonging in the Tibetan Diaspora. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Print. Oberoi, P. A. (2006). Exile and belonging: Refugees and state policy in South Asia. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Print. Routray, Bibhu Prasad. "Tibetan Refugees in India: Religious Identity and the Forces of Modernity." Refugee Survey Quarterly 26.2 (2007): 79-90. Oxfordjournals.org. Web. 30 Oct. 2012.

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