Formal

Epistemology

Gregory Wheeler New Draft University of July

of 31, Lisbon 2011

Dedicated

in

memory of

Horacio

Arl--Costa

Narrowly construed, logical approach to traditional view, the epistemology methods philosophical analytic aim of is to to bring

formal epistemology epistemology. formal harness rigor and

is

a to of to

methodo this formal

According the power clarity

analysis.

Yet, in merely a tool its view, h work sts, for own

broader terms, formal epistemology methodological epistemologists, right. On but this

is

not in researc scienti who

a discipline programmatic interdisciplinary computer and economists representations belief,

formal epistemology program that by philosophers, statisticians, operations give and with for and

is an covers mathematicians, researchers,

psychologists, aim to mathematical of, along strategies judgment

sometimes sound reasoning decision

computational

about, knowledge, making.

This essay presents formal epistemology. The first why

two--pronged general formal

argument question historical

for of example

part addresses the anyone should bother with illustrating, role that

methods by , the

through a formal models

can two within nding

play in specific

inquiry. examples one

The of that what

second part recent work addresses to of make

describes a of longsta coheren reasoni

formal epistemology, issue within

traditional epistemologynamely, tist justificationand another addressing ng which has across a making a wide case a fallacy implications range for Finally, for that one of a

probabilistic and with thereby a

disciplines, broader, we close formal,

programmatic view. logical proposal epistemology, one and traditional approaches into

methodo

incorporates program.

experimental,

Why

be

formal?

When r by how or you

you to

fiddle with select a

the controls color, either of blue point a

of

your

compute specify wheel, a

typing a much red, by are

triplet green, and a of It that

numbers to to include, within a model that year, color in involves

selecting making use 1802. hall,

dates back to London lecture first three the tz, speculated different eye, that

was that Thomas Young color in

that human receptors

perception Hermann

and a nineteenth

half--century later century

Helmhol was sensiti of mathema be

colossus, ve to light, red, 1860). tical

reckoned that three distinct

each receptor frequencies of our proposed spectrum mixture

corresponding green, and model

roughly to blue (Helmholtz Helmholtz a good

perceptions a can of

What's more, whereby the by

portion of represented

visible color an additive

those three century physiological vision, time the development

basic to

frequencies. confirm the span

Although the

it

took

another color

claims of in that RBG of

Young--Helmholtz's of model color spurred

theory of the among

additive color color photography, printing, and

halftone color other things.

television,

The y

story for

of how

the to

RBG think For can it a ask There

color about the have

model story

offers an illustrates how analogy informed it and a

allegor the to

formal epistemology. impact a formal model on inquiry, and assess the merits of one holds all, by may for reasonable epistemology.

also highlights formal model. But whether is, after that is plenty of to keeping the not

plenty of epistemology formal methods, and committed made their than Why,

epistemologists seem way. Giants have mark n ask, with of

that smidgeo

little more logic. formal?

commonsense one might

bother being

The given

best years

short ago

answer to by Rich

this

question on

is philosophers

one who observe

Thomason.1 Thomason, view formal methods a d distraction that the that past to only we are at

commenting as real real have the our The

philosophical over new

advancement,

advantage of the that

the great methods

philosophers logic. without much

we have Calculus.

disposal. number zero. on were

First--order It is Aristotle just this

hard to resorting simply about

imagine improving to methods that to a him. Knowing better question

unavailable history,

is

this:

why

limit

your

options?

To mholtz three there with in

begin a theory and

longer answer, notice its that rely a

return to development. people on great a so At sensitive color the had three model the that to primary and went run to nowhere

the

Young--Hel First,

important stages in was Young's idea normal color their eyes. perception This was

receptors nor idea time much common

idea, but empirical languished wisdom held receptors and blue, wheel and mixed But

there was evidence for that would since 50 those

neither for it, years. three

surely be Newton's those for

red, yellow, colors, blue. until in Helmhol

designated painters

three as centuries red, yellow, tradition idea

their paints from intuition and

notwithstanding, Young's tz came along. His ingenious contribution which subjects were match their three that match . the color choice, of which

was to instructed a they

experiments a by also a basic

swatch to selected He make three

color of mixing observed light for sources the green

wavelengths of the subjects with only Helmholtz's

light. could not those

two of experiments

contributed trichromatic offering in his introduction visible

important account, grounds account, of color a as

empirical mainly by for but

evidence

replacing it was

yellow with his to

mathematical model an additive

represent

1 Krister Segerberg recounts Thomason's remarks in (Segerberg 2005, p. 166).

2 mixture of motion. mathematical stage of spurred a ced the three basic Helmholtz's model the colors that really set of Maxwell Helmholtz's and things in the second introdu work. color

marked the theory,

beginning which James

number of innovations. first trichromatic

color photograph within a decade of Halftone printing presses came along soon motion pictures decades later. occurred well when mholz theory physiological trichromatic of color after. followed And yet, before the mechanism vision was

Color television several all last that finally of these stage, underpins

developments the Young--Hel

confirmed.

What of of of theory the

is the color the

striking about Young--Helmholz vision is RGB color not model

this schematic theory merely the had on

history impact but of on those

outsized the

and on timing and turn and

other developments sequence of to drawing consider their

far afield, events. out two bearing

Let us features epistemology. from

Experimental sufficient.

evidence

is

important

but

far

Some philosophers have traditional analytic epistemology of to intuitiona

attacked

a normative and Stich

practice claims by have dubbed critics,

within appeals

justifying methodology

that Weinberg, Nichols, `Intuition Driven Romanticism (Weinberg the first history will et. part al. of

2001). For these the Young--Hemlhotz for Young's insight

resonant,

was

stalled

because were basic mislead `colors'

people at

that

time intuitions for color about the that the three set theory

by their necessary was on set

vision. It the program the on. correct

Helmholtz's track by of

experiments identifying base

colors to

Even ates

so, the matters

second half of for friends For for although set was

this of

history Helmholtz's

complic experim

experimental ents were

philosophy. crucial

pointing to the experimental conclusive thesis about in ents from RGB down be for the

the right evidence

of far central these focus to to other

basic from

colors, physiological

establishing the photoreceptors eye. to The shift role the

the human played was

initial a nail progress

experim plausible could

an unworkable additive color the made. RGB model

RYB model model, not before any

But look Stich's oddly sm

closely attack.

at

Weinberg, What they a

Nichols, are up longstanding 1971, Sears

and to, critici 1986, The

enough, is of experimental

refashioning psychology

over convenience Henrich et. attack on problem sampling lar is

sampling al. 2010)

(Carlson into an

traditional analytic with convenience in the social psychological problem of human of

epistemology. research basing results are of in

particu garnere

general conclusions about d from studies undergraduate psychology WEIRD people (Henrich Educated,

nature on who

students,

overwhelmingly Western,

et. al. 2010): members Industrialized, Rich, and

Democratic societies. In the literature, Henrich, Norenzayan found that representative populations in tion, 3 categorization reasoning concepts, remark that studies spatial WEIRD

a comparative Heine, and people are often

review of the least coopera

of visual perception, reasoning,

fairness,

and inferential induction, styles, self-- and the heritability of

moral IQ.

reasoning, They

there are claiming behavioral g from subpopulation. that we

no that

obvious a a particular

priori grounds based patterns of on

for samplin suggest human

phenomenon is a single Overall, need to in basis these be

universal empirical

less cavalier nature on the drawn slice (Henrich c from of

addressing of data thin, p.

questions and 61).

this particularly humanity et. al. the is 2010, knock that

rather unusual,

So, while epistemology

against there is suggest intuitions

traditional that there

analyti are

experimental differences

evidence to in epistemic

in different groups and these claims that epistemic intuitions are universal (Weinberg et. against experimental psychology that used there for are the differences lion's share between of

differences al. is

undermine knock

2001), the the and

subpopulation these differe

studies and the nces undermine generalizations (Henrich

general population, `species--level' et. al. 2010).

Weinberg, Nichols and that different epistemic

Stich

would

have

us

believe

intuitions about have observed from one on (NB: `dual ogy,2 East hand, the It Asian and

Gettier cases among students or WEIRD

(Gettier

1963)

they on the

the Indian sub--continent, students epistemic what they intuitions. make of and and

other, undermines is unclear

process' theories which distinguish and an

within cognitive deliberative analogous judgments et. al. within explaining is a

social psychol are

between intuitive susceptible to WEIRD of

critique of Henrich the dual--process theories not the involve dispute provide judgments 2011).)

Criticism away intuiti explana

psychology does ve judgments; instead over tion for (Kruglanski

how to intuitive and

psychological

Gigerenzer

But the epistemic a

problem intuition

with is

this that

line it

of attack on cloaks shares with general program are shared

weakness that traditional analytic namely how is a for of

experimental to warrant necessary

philosophy a a would

epistemology, claimwhich condition . None

carrying out the critics epistemic about human

positive deny there deny is there the samples

are universal general facts Rather, what practice claims of of the each of

norms or nature.

critique challenges making cavalier from In

generality population. is high of In Even its

non--representative of are is

philosophy, it highly trained, status professors question. college sophomores. a point in critique of

the intuitions socioeconomic philosophy psychology that it

self--selected, called into US has

though experimental epistemology,

philosophy the

traditional

disappointing

fact

remains

that is the susceptible general adopt instead. to the very

experimental philosophy same criticism for claims it would

prefer we

2 For overview of dual process theories, see Kruglanski and Orehek (2007), Evans (2008) and Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011). 4 The introduction of front, but before considering of the formal models can turn to history. help another on this feature

how, let us Young--Helmholtz

Counterexamples

are

not

always decisive.

Traditional ent to

epistemology, epistemic

in to which is not the color

addition rely as have

to solely on good to as be

its

commitm

intuitions, also tends to assess theories, means that But Look RGB a it miss does

counterexamples a this history, mile. way. for

the

again at additive no means cannot be within the seriously to has be it

Young--Helmhotz model are

is by colors which represented never been considered model, nor threat model serve. were to was weighed

comprehensive: there model. Yet a been this

visible has the the theory RGB

limitation to

`counterexample' viewed as a

the physiological theory of originally designed to Rather, against the exceptions the power

vision that to of the the

model, of

and the

a recognition that theorywhich remained through and the the first last half

the half of

empirical of the the 20th of

basis 19th the standin

unconfirmed century

was likely to be truth. A successful make g it sensible closer to the

in the formal model to truth view than

neighborhood can

one theory as another.

If experimental intuition boils to ons a about

philosophers' down

complaint putting the a

about

epistemic their intuiti and so, constru other considerations.

beef about empirical

philosophers claims above to an

any experimental having the nerve argument then the

evidence to offer

contrary, priori to against all do

to justify complaint about down to

continuing unchecked beef

counterexamples boils cting theories objectionsno

to a resist contrivedabove

matter how

The problem with philosophy without taking ints into is account that the

aspiring

to

counterexample--proof empirical wits the constra

either formal or exercise can battle of What's more, pseudo--formal this

quickly devolve a battle of

into a ideas. by

rather than philosophythe unfortu

problem is compounded nate practice of using phers

formal logic informallybecause to describe define the fundamental Memories are the on right one's

encourages of

philoso their

rather than theories.

operations

`accessed in are `based' beliefs `hang in a of e a on

way'; `evidence'; But, pushed from to to

justified beliefs coherent like one a bump corner this and relianc

together'. rug carefully crowded room pseudo--formalisms

another, avoid any

all d

counterexamples often philosophical problems

means are

that

the

hard, head

unsolve on.

artfully At its

avoided rather than worst, rampant threatens a

addressed to turn

counterexample avoidance into little more than performance art.

philosophy

But, ining by For terms by a of 5

one way to epistemological empirical if you with a empirical theory is cases, that

arrest this theories

slide

is

by

constra

considerations and replace those formal model, and constraints, then successful hard won

formal models. fudged hem if in imagination a be range

in handling success will

weighed against if we set epistemology open more

the theory's aspirations for conceptual judge than the the had

failings. analysis,

In that

other will

words,

higher than room to

success and failure counterexample avoidance. That its vague not is one introduction, idea of recognized

all--or--nothing RGB a model. Prior colors and color

stakes of to it model, color was

lesson of people only how that to there

`combine' was a a and for

crucial difference which models how to create new model, which is color the the not perception. limitations

between paints mix colors, appropriate of That the

subtractive an additive modeling far it the

insight model, and to

outweighed is theory did

main reason that undermine it. What

exceptions do.

formal models can

So far we formal methods

have by

been discussing drawing

the

merits of

analogies purely for making c

to a illustrative

historical purposes, comparisons take piece on of

example, and by with

selected analyti

some critical epistemology and philosophy's one last which at

traditional

experimental There is stage we

epistemic to a beginning as a

intuitions. distinction methodological as terms an that and

setting, introduced

returns the very

between viewing formal epistemology approach within analytic epistemology and interdisciplinary program, may lead a Pereira simply from type which to viewing research

formal epistemology elsewherein (Wheeler to

I've discussed confusionas

of methodological naturalism 2005). Here I want the this advantages broader, you would to

point out embracing

epistemologists call it.

programmatic

viewwhatever

prefer to

Sometimes fields to problems, opportunity

a model and for

formal technique a family of in a these cases formal

is there

used is

in often of how

several an similar to 2011). a vary of problem assumpt

epistemologist to ly structured with work an But a with

build a problems

rich repertoire together techniques methods (Haenni fixing the may also appear in for are

library of them. Probabilistic

excellent example in addition to one can

et. al. method and focus on and lens the

varying the problem, single problem, which different guises in the methods. An viewing the different begin are of

various advantage

disciplines, of the often

same problem models is that which which methods

through we can

to identify enduring and our particular

features of are artifacts or

background

ions. license for several problem can nt to

Because us to approaches give keep you and

abstraction

is

a looking a what to is of at importa a

ignore information, to modeling insight what is into noise

ignore. Moreover, problem, when reshape your can be philosophical tool for prior to

discovering robust features it happens, can In train this way

intuitions. used to intuitions rigorous

formal epistemology as a reply intuiti on

rather than exposition then that

simply serve of

intuitions. Here the problem with its experimental with WEIRD similar people.

is a partial besets traditional on limits from The not rest claims if model and to epistemic relying entire

epistemology, ons, and philosophy, too many load the

reliance

of a grounds a to will

theory need for its reasonable predict be put

entirely on the theory us new A

includes abilities good model

that gives explain. use.

6 While ology, that place this it this for essay presents should be clear is hardly a experimental work is a place formal methods precision, the most a case for formal epistem is too. only be that hampere precisi a

manifesto. There in philosophy, for are intuitions, not the may human well

and there Moreover, route to understanding

and it important

undertakingslove, d rather than helped on. that by not

friendship,

political

compromiseis

placing Live long everything

too high enough and yields to

a stock in you'll discover hard thought.

Coherence

and

Dilation

So a view. phy's

far we bird's--eye

have point

discussed of

formal epistemology experimental

from philoso

We agreed with critique of philosophy, likely to also found Throughout we how methods used one

the spirit of traditional namely that take us experimental this a might and

analytic is not but we short. discussion illustrate experimental together.

unaided very far, philosophy example

intuition falling to fitting

historical think of formal methods

In two

this section, recent examples

we of The first figuring

shift work

focus to within reports

consider a coherence,

formal epistemology. breakthrough in of which the is

example out some a open

fundamentals for a longstanding

theory of

problem for is a

the coherence theory of classic example of bear on examines

justification. Here formal a problem principles assumptions alone discipl

methods being brought to within traditional analytic epistemology. of sound reasoning play. This formal ine, The second example probabilistic and is the an

role that example as from

independence of a stand of

epistemology for the

pursued ramifications

this example affect the methods within philosophy afield.

application and far

Bayesian

Toward

theory of

coherence

In re of tism

1985, to

Laurence BonJour provided the coherence theory his postulates describe a of C. self-- then have this

some for role I. several explored basic

structu coheren Lewis's

justification,3 and (1985, pp. 95--9) along of

for probability probabilistic model justifying authors

the lines `congruent',

memories working

(Lewis 1946). Since within the Bayesian epistemology of developing a of coherence along

framework of the prospects probabilistic model Jour outline.4

Lewis--Bon

Much s of of

of the coherence propositions coherence

work among and can

in a

Bayesian set

epistemology probabilistic

concern measure

whether a be adduced

3 He later despaired of meeting those demands and quit the theory altogether, bu t that is another story. 4 See, for example, Huemer 1997, Cross 1999, Shogenji 1999, Bovens & Hartmann 20 03a, 2003b, 2005, Olsson 2002, 2005, Fitelson 2003, Meijs, 2004, Glass 2006. 7 which of set are is `truth--conducive'that coherence among a of more propositions likely to is, whether those among fully a propositions Bayesian succeeds on results show

higher degr

ensures that be true, ceteris consensus no coherence and this largely

paribus. The epistemologists probabilistic in being pessimistic by Luc Hartmann

general is that

measure of truth--conducive, consensus Bovens and (2003a)

is based Stephan and Erik

Olsson (2005) that

in

effect how

any

probabilistic will their fail to likelihood ensure a corresp

measure of coherence onding `boost' in of truth.

The question is whether between probabilistically correlated evidence (thought and incremental confirmation (thought ology has to model investigated terms 2002,

there to

are model and witness of of with of

relationships `coherence') Bayesian testimo a a witness message to model of in a epistem

`justification'), this of 2005, models for Bovens Think sets

relationship in ny (Olsson and model

Hartmann 2003a, 2003b). as composed of two of and

things, a group to deliver, those form

messengers, each the contents we set. may

messages, which an information from but

gather together Olsson's Hartmann's

model differs important ways, two key Bayesian

Bovens and both share

assumptions witness

about the structure model: namely

(bw1) A that

is is,

a true Pr(A that that

messenger i is positive | each is, Report i(A)) messenger whether whether A and all

who reports evidence for > is A Pr(A), and an or

that A,

(bw2) reporter, A A other .

independent i reports reports

screens off 5 or reports contingent facts

messenger from all other

messenger

The ring

idea is whether is or

to to only its

ensure that report A influenced negation

a or by are

messenger its whether true, and

conside in not

negation fact A

what might

other be

facts might saying.

be

or

what

other

messengers

According pillars

to of

Olsson, Bayesian not to hope of only see

these the if

two most

assumptionsthe favorable that some circums probabi

twin

witness modelsoffer tance in which there listic is any measure be

of showing coherence can but

possibly as well:

truth--conducive,

necessary

conditions

coherence tive sense absence of p. 3).

cannot be in the independence

truth and

conducive individual

in

the

compara (2005,

credibility

While these assumptions formal perspective, they te what even shouldin fact circumstances[and

may be

seem seen

restrictive as

from

a fortuna that not

describing says is measure the

Olsson's impossibility] theorem under fortunate there or be truth 135). any

circumstances can of coherence agreement tive sense

interesting in

that is (2005, p.

conducive

compara

5 See (Pearl 2000) and (Spirtes et. al. 2000) for a thorough treatment. 8 And both yet, while favorable (bw1) and and (bw2) necessary, is the may the least seem case. intuitively The witness

it turns testimony

out neither models are among

favorable coherence of truth propositions problem is general coherence

models for exploring and likelihood (Wheeler 3 and and 4). Scheines

the

relationship 2011

between

forthcoming, the

The witness measures model, not of

the Bayesian features of and confirmation.

Indeed, if on that Bayesian is a association, Wheeler robustly Scheines

you is witness measure

drop built

the into

conditional

independence (bw2)

conditi

modelsassumption of correlation confirmation 2011, Wheeler

abovethere 1995, and and Scheine

called focused 2009), which tracks incremental 2011, Wheeler

(Myrvold (Wheeler

Schlosshauer and s, forthcoming).

Briefly, focused two quantities, the association among the degree of

correlation degree of given in

is a the is the here and

the

ratio

of over in

evidence association

hypothesis, clearest for a two

evidence alone. This relationship the rightmost expansion of measure, For, which is e statements, E 1 single hypothesis, H. defined and E 2,

evidenc

Pr( E 1, E 2 | H) Pr( H | E Pr( E For 1, E 2 ) 1 | H ) Pr( E 2 | H ) H ( E 1, E 2 ) = df

= . Pr( H | E Pr( E 1) Pr( H | E 2 ) 1, E 2 ) Pr( E 1) Pr( E 2)

Given one

some provisos,6 evidence set

it turns out (e.g., { E 1, E 2})

that to

comparing

another (e.g., tion { E 1, E 3}) by (with respect their to degree of a more (Wheeler focused and focused correla correlation Scheines weaker assumpt respect 1, given that

designated entails

hypothesis H), more incremental

confirmation, ceteris paribus forthcoming, Schlosshauer and Wheeler, ions, when correlation to a then the evidence 2009, Wheeler 2011). focused

What's more,

making even (with than H

of an evidence set hypothesis, H) is greater incremental confirmation of is positive (Wheeler and Scheines,

forthcoming).

Our point results

is fail

not to

that be

the Bayesian theorems, only What

impossibility a for works

but rather that narrow class of see is focused

they are models.

representative of we condition within paribusit the to witness which

that while correlation

the tracking doesn't hold not by down

witness modelsbecause ceteris is fine in many cases outside of the models. an insight constraints Why? The from imposed reason boils focused

correlation,

is

that

there

is

parameter to For give it

missing a is

from probabilistic theory not enough to (e.g., the similar the any is reason regard

previous attempts of coherence. look event at of

the association messengers all rather we association. might truth agree of must to the

of evidence telling a account After all, for

story), but for that witnesses to the

agree without matter. This

6 Conditions (A1, A2) in (Wheeler and Scheines forthcoming) which is generalized in (Schlosshauer and Wheeler 2011) 9 the . possibility But, that in (bw2) so was designed to doing, the witness the of possibility prevent of is

models also connecting

inadvertently scupper a higher measure higher likelihood and important impossibility

association to the surprising from the Bayesian

of truth. That insight results.

Given the

this cause

observation of the Scheines model which

that one association and takes

must

account proposed of relationships and you

for a between hypothe

(`coherence'), general the the

I have account the

causal structure evidence (or reports, truth of

regulating if the

messenger sis (the

you prefer) reports, if

prefer). This requires rethinking the to Lewis--BonJour witness models, and terms moving away from of information seems defining sets, but to have coherence already

commitment solely in done this:

BonJour himself

The fact rather than a

that some

a other

belief was can play a idea

caused in special is that or of the

this kind the

way of beliefs

crucial role in coherentist justification. The

justification of , rather than appealing contents of other belief was justificationally a general caused ing are in this further generally to with

these perceptual merely the the coherence contents (so would irrelevant), belief that special conditions true that be appeals beliefs way as

observational their way instead

propositional that the to satisfy

beliefs produced

(and well)

perhaps

(2002, p.

206--7).

In what

summary, causes the

we think coherence

that is on and

taking into a we've formal, by are

account probabi introducing no to The the indepen help model impossi version think that

crucial to making progress listic theory of coherence, followed a model through on which combines cases to in foul

this idea focused which up there the

correlation, for dence conditions probabilistic identify

machinery, and how associated

causal structure confirmation.

evidence will affect incremental is hardly comprehensive, and bility there are results intriguing allude to. present impossibility

irregularities which a more result in general we

(Indeed, we of Olsson's Wheeler and it is direction

Scheines a step for solving

forthcoming).) But, in the right the

riddle of

coherence.

Dilating

sets

of

probabilities

Open an within the you tic

introductory first few

textbook pages find a Defined

on

probability of

and stochas Pr, joint

will invariably independence. a that

definition with

respect to we say independent probability is equal distribution distribution

classical event E F of

probability function, is stochastically just both in E case and the F marginal

of event distribution to for for the E F,

product and the that is:

of the marginal

(IND) 10

Pr( E, F)

Pr( E)

Pr( F).

For example, suppose of a fairly flipped `tails' and F American tosses are of is Those ion, is the quarter

that 1 event of landing

E Euro

is coin

the event landing

a fairly flipped `tails'. The the probability

two

stochastically independent both coins landing

just when `tails'

.
textbooks too. So often long will as may of to = give an Pr( F) also F the Pr( E), irrelevant between say just alternative that when E F of definit is is E:

is non--zero, we stochastically independent epistemically (IR) 0. Event there F is is no of of irrelevant Pr( E| F)

probability when to the F to

Pr( F) > E and our when the

epistemically difference E E

probability probability coins, the quarter

conditional on alone. Returning that a `tails'

probability landing

fairly tossed American given that

a ,

fairly tossed 1 which is the a

Euro same

coin as

has the

landed `tails' quarter Euro turns out

is

probability that lands `tails'. knowing how the is irrelevant outcome of Finally, of F a we and

fairly tossed American In other words, the the

experiment with to estimating fairly tossed quarter. may Eso just long as as

well we avoid

switch the make conditioning

places on

the appropriate zero--probability Let's of say F then just to | Pr( F

accommodations to events. that when the F) | E each is is

epistemically epistemically is:

independent

irrelevant (EI) 0 > Pr( E and 0.

other, that = E)

Pr( E), when = Pr( F),

Pr( F) > when Pr( E)

When Pr,

working with these notions when is,

a are

single probability 0 (IR) and iff for since

distribution,

equivalent that you

Pr( F) > (IND) iff to your

Pr( E) > 0: (EI). Indeed, each they of are of these one

are unlikely notions in generally and the independence.7

see names textbook,

thought to same concept:

be expressions probabilistic

However, these three given nt a an

there are notions. behavioral agent's

differences If Pr

between is

each viewed to two event

of represe events is

interpretation and degrees of that agent

belief, then arguably are stochastically independent epistemically (IND) by irrelevant In Pr,

learns that that one a an

observing to the other the

other (IR). interpretation of

words, on way for

behavioral agent

to dent event more,

justify is from is since

that two observing

events are that one to

stochastically indepen the other. Further epistemic that a

epistemically we know only seems if an

irrelevant that (IR) (EI), the unnecessary,

if and independence

notion of knowing licenses

intermediary step. joint distribution

Finally, satisfies (IND)

7 Or if there is a distinction draw, it is simply between conditional independen ce (IR) and independence (IND). 11 us to marginal probability since the determined lity of The into and ge factorize that distributions, which some semblance probability of by E taking the and the joint gives of ( E distribution acting like and F) of of by a is the F. the logic probabi

product probability

ability to a product

factorize a of marginal

joint distribution probabilities tremendous advanta

conditional probabilities is a to computing probabilities.

So, one (IND), (IR), licenses observing

way and

to look (IND), is about event

at that

the it

equivalence independence estimate leverage conditions

of through of to

learning when one to then

stochastic

is irrelevant another, and what yield we learn tractable

the probability allows us to independence for The strategy Spirtes et. to probabilistic

about those methods

probabilistic reasoning. nets illustrates this perfectly Our own (Pearl 2000, approach

theory of al. logic

causal Bayes 2000).

is

another

example

(Haenni

et.

al.

2011).

Yet, there foundation turns s out, are

is this

a question strategy rests that these all. ways

of on. three

how It

sound

a concept appear

surprisingly, distinct

independence They only

mathematical to be expressing the lens measure, is that reasoning assumptions glide out a les

notions after three equivalent the of Pr. sound from which same a

of viewed through

concept when single probability this and

What probabilistic independence

means, philosophically, conditional and with So, (EI), those independence will turn

freely between to depend on single probability of probabilistic

(IND), (IR), reasoning distribution.

sounds princip you have

reasoning depend on for assuming a probability nate Assuming degrees distribution. that of

the grounds that numerically precise

agents always have belief,

numerically several

determi authors

however, is have argued that should Take your that of it of

a stretch, and probability models or coin an a interval in

accommodate approximate for example that pocket: it the probability that coin Instead, is more `tails' Yet even a go is of

values.8 to fair assume toss .

idealization single,

landing `tails' the argument for reasonable is opening just a number of to the to plus the crack

is precisely imprecision goes, the some chance

assume that or minus door to issues,

small e. probabilities introductions of which probabilistic there is

interval--valued some of whether

difficult heart of The of question

reasoning. one concept

probabilistic s is

independence or an example.

several

independence

concept

Suppose that the l [ l, u], be and the u lower is that to

probability where l bound the E. flesh of upper this

of is the bound There idea

E is understood probability of the are out,9

the to that

interva E, distinc

probability t ways

several but a

8 Pioneers of imprecise probability theory includes B.O. Koopman (1940), Alfred Horn and Alfred Tarski (1948), Paul Halmos (1950), I. J. Good (1952), C.A.B. Smith (1961) , Daniel Ellsberg (1961), clude Isaac Levi ce (2010), Fabio See also Haenni and Henry Kyburg, Jr. (1961). Notable contemporary advocates in (1980), Peter Walley (1991), Teddy Seidenfeld (2010), James Joy Cozman (2000), Gert de Cooman and Enrique Miranda (2007, 2009). et. al. (2011).

9 Recent textbook treatments include Paris 1994, Halpern 2003, Haenni et. al. 20 11. 12 common lity a one is assignment of the to interpret [ l, u] to an an interval event E = E {Pr1, the of probabi by Pr2,, upper Pr( E). to

set Pr n}, where

probability functions, Pr lower probability of of is

is the probability Define a lower set

infimum of E and of

Pr( E), and the supremum with as: respect

upper probability, probabilities Pr,

Pr( E) = l = infPrPr Pr( E) (lower probability) Pr( E) = u = supPrPr Pr( E) (upper probability)

As it stands, the set Pr could represent

set

of

classical

Bayes

agents who

express

different eted as sensitivity statistical be lities

judgments a model

about for

E; Pr could studying in Pr

also

be Bayesian

interpr

and robustness inference; and

classical can also imprecise is the from

viewed as for a which is the to

a model of single agent. This has worth drawn fire pointing

credal probabi

interpretation but it out we're to that about this

epistemologists, of tied the example

underlying consider

mechanics is not

interpretation.

Although described

imprecise probability as `exotic', in Bayesianism the set drops Pr From a different one end

theory is out as contains

sometimes a special the or classic marks as

reality classical case: when just set two al one Pr

measure. may contain

what we've said, single measure measures. If of set-- (Levi 1980)

or several Bayesianism marks

based Bayesianism, then another important endpoint. For a closure

convex Bayesianism think on of the

we can condition

convexity set Pr:

(Cx) two

Pr is probability for Pr*

a closed convex set measures Pr1, Pr2 all = (Cx) the 0 r Pr1+

when, in

for 1, is

any the also measure by also set and

Pr, then measure in Pr. s the convex in mixture Pr.

r (1- r)Pr2 for Pr*

Condition in Pr,

says that, measure two we

any two defined is a

of those Informally, (Cx) as is a

measures say that

satisfying adding (Cx)

closed under condition

convex mixtures, is

common to In With turn

when a represent what these to

set of imprecise we in

probabilities credences.

is

interpreted holds.

follows, preliminaries dilation.

will assume (Cx) place, let's

We E

say just

that in

an case

event

dilates

the

event

Pr( E | F) < Pr( E) Pr( E) < Pr( E | F).

In case

words, outcome the range of to E

F dilates E unconditional probability is the range of

just

in

assignments a assignments given ble the E

proper subset of to E

probability a Then, measura dilates

F. Now partition partition just in

suppose that of possible of case: outcomes

B is outcomes. B strictly

Pr( E | F) < Pr( E) Pr( E) < Pr( E | F), for all F B.

13 The remarkable specter of estimate of e, no matter the thing about turning E into outcome. strict dilation is a more precise a less precise the estimat

To illustrate strict dilation, we Walley's canonical coin tossing example.

recount

Peter

Example. twice. The

Suppose first toss

that of

a the

fair coin

coin is

is

tossed

a in

fair such

toss, a

but way the known

the that

second toss is the outcome of type the

performed first Let We toss. H 1, T know (PrA) but second. second toss estimat

may depend on Nothing is

outcome about the possible possible pair and toss, toss the the of that so is

or degree of the 1, H 2, T 2 denote the outcomes the coin toss e is for for is a the between extreme the puts the fair fair first

dependence. tosses. the first

the Agent's precise. The unknown, the the

interaction in the may This

tosses is first toss

determine likewise on the

outcome of a precise

constraint prior to

A's estimate of experiment. Hence,

1 ( a) Pr A ( H 1) = Pr A ( H 1) = Pr A ( H 1) = = Pr 2 A ( H 2 ) = Pr A ( H 2 ) = Pr A ( H 2 ). or between the ce by pair of tosses. Model A's ignoran However, degree of little is dependence known about the direction

1 ( b) Pr

A ( H 1, H 2 ) = 0, and Pr A ( H 1, H 2 ) = Pr A ( H 1) = 2

Suppose now the first

that toss

A is

learns that heads. The

the

outcome

of

extremal points from be conditioned by

(b), namely 0 Bayes' rule

and

can

yielding

( c) ( i) Pr A ( H 2 | H 1) = Pr A ( H 2, H 1) / Pr A ( H 1) = 0 and ( ii) Pr A ( H 2 | H 1) = Pr A ( H 2, H 1) / Pr A ( H 1) = 1 So, learning dilates A's estimate of value within the interval An analogous learns that the toss the are A's second unit the argument outcome the second toss [0,1]. holds of two there first about if the outcomes toss the to way can the 1991, instead first to any A partition turn vacuous pp. 298--9). out, although that the initially first toss PrA( H 2) lands heads = ,

is tails. Since these outcome space, i.e., no other precise ways the probability

toss strictly interval, no first coin toss

dilates matter which lands (Walley

One is

way that

to they

interpret stand for

the two

two extreme opposing controlling case to the ( i)

points second says case to heads. So, may provide

hypotheses toss. Each specifies that the be ( ii) be on tails says heads this

about the hypothesis

mechanism

a deterministic second coin is if that the the

mechanism: certain

first is second coin coin the

heads, whereas is certain toss agent first is knows toss

if the first interpretation, outcome information,

that the relevant 14

of the possibly

definitive information, is insufficient to determine in t. Arguably, the first signals toss a what then,

but way the

merely observing the information outcome of agent informationor, important

that is

outcome relevan better,

gives the potentially

gap in

in her belief.

informationwhich This is by but the it next the first

warrants no means is a example, same toss

the more

change plausib assumin second

universally accepted, le position than which g seems that to there between

reproduce is no the

result while and the

connection toss.

Suppose that twice and the we coins, other

instead hiding from which flip

of the the two known bias.

tossing agent second toss different to

a is

single coin performed, the for this

manner in instead one of

which is unknown coin the of the

be normal and Whereas in methods the used

the first performing constitution example

example the tosses varied but the coin mechanism

remained fixed, in for tossing the of coin are above

the coins is independentbut the coins replacing are (a)

normalthat is, the consitution different.10 in the

tosses are doing by is

What we example

1 (

a ) Pr ( H A 2 ) = Pr A ( H 2 ) = Pr A ( H 2 ) = 2 Pr A ( H 1) = 0, Pr ( H A 1) = 1, well. which But appears to the explanation dilate the second toss we provided for as

the this

first example second example, that two it can

is since

not we

available have independent. the

to Yet,

explain even of event.

stipulated though the independent, one event probability How

the tosses are events are appears dilate the of be?! that sharp another,

imprecision independent

estimate can this

What this

is interesting setting is of

is that ambiguous stochastic which are necessary

`independent

event' in

between analogues independence, and

independence, epistemic defined for E and (Seidenfeld which is sets F a et.

epistemic irrelevance of probabilities. A condition to not et. al. bulwark for be

dilation is for stochastically independent 2.1--2.3), paradoxical drawn. What is that there the is flips after

1992, Theorems against the have us

conclusions critics al.'s theorems tell where So, second could there it coin this is would toss be?

Seindenfeld dependence. in the all.

dilation, appear, are

dependent

How

The ion

answer returns of independence:

us there

to are

our

earlier a single,

discuss

several independence concepts rather than unified independence concept (Kyburg and Within the probability independence Pittarelli, imprecise setting, entails Cozman 2012, Wheeler,

forthcoming). (Cx), entails entails stochastic epistem

and assuming epistemic independence is

independence, and ic irrelevance, not the epistemic

epistemic but it

case that independence

epistemic nor,

irrelevance

shockingly, independence!

does

epistemic The

independence

entail stochastic

10 A version of this is discussed by Walley (1991), White (2010), Sturgeon (2010 ), and Joyce (2010). 15 reasons for be dealt the ions this with are in technical, another point (if which and will essay.11 is that have to But

larger, philosophical about dilation have a real reasoning

recent discuss fallacy indepen

foundered on in probabilistic hinge dence that which on is the hold

understandable) probabilistic and

assuming, falsely, that a unitary notion, principles for a settings

of sound probabilistic single measure in which there are

reasoning sets of

extend to measures.

This n that ty points x based

observation is a

suggests the side issue, and is that concepts. for horn, other:

controversy there This are

over a

dilatio plurali orthodo

really the issue of independence to a Bayesians Bayesians

dilemma on one on the

Bayesianism, with and set--

For orthodox reveals a (IND), (EI), properties collapsed distribution, Bayesianism if you and which when Pr.

Bayesians: fact about (IR), are working Orthodox

Imprecise they a view.

probability are distinct

theory

namely that with from

single probability However, even

hides this fact reject set--based

approaches, procedure determining warrants distinctions?

are for

you

confident precise these

that degrees

your

elicitation of belief

numerically collapsing

For rely your a

set--based on a convex set behavioral

Bayesians: behavior of

In so far interpretation of do

as you

you provide

distributions, how two not

justification for treating stochastically independent given that (IND) does

events as (EI)?

completely

follow from

In dence

short, the concepts

discovery rather than an that

that a

there

are of have the of

many

indepen

single concept is within formal epistemology

example has far we

research illustrated recent literat sound probabi

reaching consequences. Although this discovery through diagnosing ure on point listic

a common missteps in dilation, the underlying the very foundations

concerns reasoning.

The are C.P. made

FIE--model Snow up

of

inquiry long broad and of ago types hard each all, 1959 that of universities yet

observed of two intellectuals individual

people, literary a typical is with

scientists, type to lecture 1993), goes to

barely able, if his counterpart. popularized and the (reissued explaining

able at Snows in his Scientific by the one `the

communicate Two some as

observation, Cultures Revolution way to

Cambridge two hears referred sciences'.

distinct cultures `the humanities' and

Certainly there c subjects

is the

some way

basis we

for do.

grouping Physics,

academi

11 However, if you drop (Cx), then Stochastic independence does not entail Epist emic independence. See Wheeler forthcoming for an example. 16 chemistry, experimental and le part e. and biology are science. Although the the pillars skills aim to the by experimental of an evidence The quarrel of reconci evidenc the data; literat indicat

methods differ from theory purporting to of the However,

each, all govern some against studied to

natural world the subjects yield no to

humanities there are branches ure. It importance ion of is. front The and

typically dont no experimental of is history, tempting

laboratories view the data as subject experimental the cannot. and

placed on experimental how scientific a hard sciences put center, whereas either do experimental some often not or philosophy,

humanities s over to are a very

extent, viewed as

debate over pitched

formal epistemology, of another the

battles about humanities Heaped about placed

whether or part

philosophy of the

is part sciences.

on top whether in one

of that philosophy or the

quarrel is even should be other.

Although this is misleading.

is a Mathematics

familiar has no

picture, more to

it do

with experimental cooking is experimentation as cooking is academic we as subject, In closing, should instead

data as

than poetry, concerned with the a less want of

and

professional But

any of clearly much I think

social sciences. trade, not an a science.

to suggest that academic disciplines rather than two. There This Reason there thoselik this

dividing into three are formal disciplines, experimental three--way proposed (1990, 16) activities is much disciplines, distinction by to that to

categories and was

interpretive Science the

disciplines. and but

Henry Kyburg in better represent make up recommend a this

university, way of

thinking about academic e philosophywhich are

disciplines, nature.

particular Call

restlessly interdisciplinary in the FIE--model of inquiry.

Mathematics empirical

is essentially sciences are and the

a formal discipline, largely the traditional leading disciplines. literature sometimes at the an a various observed fine But are

the arts nearly often

empirical disciplines, and letters are exemplars of all fields draw each category. concerned with the upon

interpretive skills from

Biology and formal structures, are are about

mathematics and psychology with interpretation, and psychology interested society or r, or series of and in literature the facts

concerned times behavio

groups that produced whose members wrote plays.

It help

is in

unclear organizing

whether this a university,

FIE--model as

would

Kyburg idea

suggested would need to a

when an

he proposed administrative question But, the scholar a topic

it. out. categories to like

The Or,

Helmholtz perhaps, are mind

sort that Clausewitz. a on

helpful for when working not from so the

have in epistemology. calls upon

It is results

much that cognitive,

epistemology and

computational, and from philosophy, psychology, ly does. point of

decision mathematics, and the

sciences,

insights it full and certain range interpr

statistics, Rather,

linguisticsalthough central calls truly upon the

is that inquiry,

epistemology even if formal, readily have our is on

harnessing together etive skills do not match our That that 17 the way departments Snow he was must we and right go

experimental, happened universities. to

organize believe

surely no reason to being right.

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