Julian Paul S. Cacho, LLB4103 Cases under Civil Service Commision: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Mathay v.

CSC, 312 SCRA 91 Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau v. CA, 299 SCRA 373 CSC and PAGCOR vs. Salas, 274 SCRA 414 Eugenio vs. CSC, 243 SCRA 196 Hilario v. CSC, 243 SCRA 206 Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. CSC, 241 SCRA 184 Debulgado v. CSC, 237 SCRA 184

Mathay v. CSC, 312 SCRA 91

FACTS: Petitioner Ismael A. Mathay, Jr., Mayor of Quezon City, seeks the nullification of the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) recalling his appointment of Olegario S. Tabernilla as Electrical Engineer V in the city government; and consequently, the reversal of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals of (1) 16 July 1997 denying due course and dismissing the petition for certiorari, and (2) 12 August 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC had jurisdiction or authority to revoke or cancel a complete appointment to a civil service position through its issued Resolutions against the motions for reconsideration. HELD: The Resolutions of 10 January and 9 March 1995 had already attained finality. This Court, therefore, finds no necessity to pass upon the timeliness or propriety of the petition for certiorari filed by MATHAY before the Court of Appeals on 17 June 1997, or after more than two years from the date the said resolutions became final. The petitioner asseverates, however, that the said resolutions were void and were issued in violation of due process; hence, they could never become final, and they could be attacked directly or collaterally even after the time of appeal or review has lapsed. According to him, the CSC had no jurisdiction or authority to revoke or cancel an appointment to a civil service position after its Regional Office had approved the same and the appointee had assumed the new position. The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners theory. Under Section 12 (11) of Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC has the power to [h]ear and decide administrative cases instituted before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its agencies and of the agencies attached to it. Moreover, Section 20, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws provides that notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled for [v]iolation of other existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations. As held in Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission, the CSC is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel actions and that such power includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations. Anent petitioners imputation to the CSC of violation of due process, the same does not hold water. What was lodged before the Commission was not a disciplinary case wherein petitioner or TABERNILLA should have been afforded an opportunity to be heard. As ruled in Debulgado, the CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, only examines the conformity of the appointment with applicable provisions of law and whether the appointee possesses the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualifications. At any rate, petitioner was requested to comment on the protest; and he did file comment and, later, a motion for reconsideration of the revocation of the initially approved appointment.

Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau v. CA, 299 SCRA 373

FACTS: On Oct. 13, 1988, CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas required the Secretary of Finance to submit to the CSC all appointments in the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB). Commissioner of EIIB Jose T. Almonte replied with a request for confirmation of EIIBs exemption from CSC rules and regulations with respect to appointments and other personnel actions. Basis for exemption: PD 1458 & LOI 71. CSC denied Almontes request & reiterated its order in Resolution 89-400. CSC cited Almonte guilty of indirect contempt. CA affirmed CSC and denied Almontes Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not EIIB is embraced by the Civil Service? HELD: Yes. EIIB is a government agency under the Department of Finance as provided by The 1987 Administrative Code, Book IV. The Executive Branch, Title II. Finance, Chapter IV. BUREAUS Section 17. Therefore EIIB is within the ambit of the Civil Service Law. Petition DENIED. CA AFFIRMED. The Civil Service is comprehensive in score. It embraces all officers and employees of the government, its branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities. Even employees in GOCCs with original charters are covered thereby. The Exemptions are only relative to appointments and other personnel actions, but not from the Civil Service Law or Civil Service Rules & Regulations relative to any other matter. Almonte claims that being a member of the intelligence community and the personnel are occupying jobs highly confidential in nature that EIIB should not be required to submit the names of its personnel to the CSC. The NBI is also a member of the intelligence community but submits to the CSC in the appointments of all NBI personnel.

CSC and PAGCOR vs. Salas, 274 SCRA 414 FACTS: Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff (ISS) member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. His employment was terminated by the PAGCOR Board for loss of confidence, after a covert investigation yielded an alleged involvement of Salas in proxy betting. Salas requested reinvestigation from the PACGOR Board, which was denied. Appeals to the MPSB and CSC were denied saying that being a confidential employee by operation of law (PD1869) his term only in fact expired upon loss of confidence by the appointing power. The CA however reversed the mentioned rulings and adjudged Salas to not be a confidential employee after applying the proximity rule. Petitioners raise 4 grounds: (1) Sec 16. PD. 1869 creating the PACGOR expressly provides that all employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as confidential appointees; (2) PAGCOR vs. Court of Appeals, et al. which classified PAGCOR employees as confidential appointees; (3) CSC Resolution No. 91-830 declared employees in casinos and related service as confidential appointees by operation of law; and (4) His functions as a member of the ISS ISSUE: WON Salas, a member of the PACGORs Internal Security Staff is a confidential employee HELD: No. "Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service Law and Rules has been modified by the 1987 Constitution and EO 292. However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section 16, which provides that "all employees of the casino and related services shall be classified as 'confidential' appointees." There were two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: First, when the President, upon recommendation of the CSC Commissioner has declared the position to be primarily confidential; and, second, when by the nature of the functions of the office there exists "close intimacy" between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. At first glance, it would seem that the instant case falls under the first category by virtue of the express mandate under Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869. In Nature The Court explicitly decreed that executive pronouncements, such as Presidential Decree No. 1869, can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. According to the transcripts in the passage of the bill, it is the nature of the position that determines whether it is policy-determining or primarily confidential." The matter should be left to the "proper implementation of the laws, depending upon the nature of the position to be filled", and if the position is "highly confidential" then the President and the CSC Commissioner must implement the law. The words in nature is

used in Section 2, Article XII- of the old Constitutions, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260 and Section 1 of the General Rules in the implementing rules of P.D. 807. Despite the deletion of the phrase in nature in the 1987 Constitution and the RAC, the Pinero doctrine still applies, as can be gleaned from the deliberations by the Constitutional Commission. The CSC itself ascribes to this view as may be gleaned from its resolution which stated that "the declaration of a position as primarily confidential if at all, merely exempts the position from the civil service eligibility requirement. Proximity Rule Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. The functions of Salas: to prevent irregularities, misbehavior, illegal transactions and other anomalous activities; report unusual incidents and related observations in accordance with established procedures; prevention, documentation or suppression of any unwanted incidents at the gaming and non-gaming areas etc do not involve "such close intimacy" between him and the appointing authority the Chairman of PAGCOR, as would insure "freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust, albeit requiring honesty and integrity in their exercise. The fact that, sometimes, private respondent may handle ordinarily "confidential matters" or papers which are somewhat confidential in nature does not suffice to characterize his position as primarily confidential. The case of PAGCOR vs. CA upheld the dismissal of PAGCOR employees declared to be confidential simply because the validity of the PD 1869 was not questioned therein. Although appointed by the Chairman, ISS members do not directly report to the Office of the Chairman in the performance of their official duties. An ISS member is subject to the control and supervision of an Area Supervisor who, in turn, only implements the directives of the Branch Chief Security Officer. The latter is himself answerable to the Chairman and the Board of Directors. The position of an ISS member belongs to the bottom level of the salary scale of the corporation, being in Pay Class 2 level only, whereas the highest level is Pay Class 12. VITUG, J., concurring: I agree with the thorough and exhaustive ponencia of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado supporting the theory of the appellate court that Salas, not being a confidential employee, may not dismissed for mere lack of trust or confidence; nevertheless, I should like to bring into focus the phrase, "without prejudice to the filing of administrative charges against Salas if warranted."

Eugenio vs. CSC, 243 SCRA 196

FACTS: Eugenio, the Deputy Director of Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. But before she got the rank, the CSC passed Resolution No. 93-459, reorganizing itself and changing the CES Board (CESB) to Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission (OCES). ISSUE: W/N CSC usurped legislative function of Congress by abolishing the CESB and transferring its budget to OCES HELD: CESB was created by PD 1. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. While CSC has the power to reorganize under Sec. 17, Chap. 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V. of the Administrative Code of 1987, this must be read with sec. 16, which enumerates the offices under the control of the CSC. CESB is not one of such offices. CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to CSC. This essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain policy and program coordination.

Hilario v. CSC, 243 SCRA 206

FACTS: On August 18, 1986, Nescito Hilario, petitioner, was appointed as City Attorney by Brigido Simon, Jr., the OIC of the Office of the Mayor of Quezon City under the Freedom Constitution of 1986. Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., the newly-elected mayor who took over from Mayor Simon, issued a letter dated July 24, 1992 to petitioner which declares the formers official termination of his present position as City Attorney pursuant to Sec. 481, Article II of the LGC of 1991 stating that the position is coterminous with the appointing authority. Then, on July 1, 1993, respondent Vice Mayor Planas of QC filed a complaint with the CSC against petitioner and a certain Jose L. Pecson. The complaint charges them to be found administratively liable for usurpation, grave misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, gross insubordination, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The CSC subsequently issued a resolution dated September 21, 1993 stating that the CSC resolves to hold in abeyance any administrative disciplinary action against the Petitioner, however, they expressed that the Petitioner should not be allowed to continue to be the City Attorney of Quezon City. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by the Petitioner but was denied by the CSC through a resolution, which also orders the Cashier of QC to cease the payment of salaries to the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and Preliminary Injunction, as he also seeks to declare CSC Resolutions issued to him as null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent CSC has the authority to remove or terminate the services of petitioner. HELD: Yes. Petitoner argues that the CSC usurped the power, functions, and prerogatives of Mayor Mathay to exclusively discipline and decide on matters affecting the conduct and employment of Quezon City employees and officials who are under his control and supervision. Petitioner maintains that the Mayor is the only one who may remove him from office directly and not the CSC, which only has appellate powers to review the decision of the Mayor. The Court finds the Petitioners argument untenable as nothing in the Administrative Code precludes the CSC from deciding a disciplinary case before it. Furthermore, in regards to the respondent Planas who is a public official and not a private citizen, there is nothing under the law to prevent her from filing a complaint directly with the CSC against petitioner. It was therefore only right for the CSC to determine that the petitioner can no longer hold the position, and was acting within its authority under the Administrative Code to hear and decide complaints filed before it. Lastly, petitioner alleges that although Mayor Mathay in his letter dated July 24, 1992 considered him resigned as of June 30, 1992, he still continued to perform his duties as Legal Officer indicating that Mayor Mathay still trusts him, which implicates that there is no reason for him to vacate his office. However, there is really no evidence that Mayor Mathay intended to retain the Petitioners services as he did not issue a formal appointment, he did not have the desire to rescind his letter during the proceedings, and he did not object the CSCs order to the petitioner to vacate the position.

Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. CSC, 241 SCRA 184 FACTS: This petition stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice filed with public respondent Civil Service Commission ("CSC") by private respondents, through Pamantasan Ng Lungsod Ng Maynila Faculty Organization ("PLMFO"), against petitioner Pamantasan Ng Lungsod Ng Maynila ("PLM") and its officers. The sixteen (16) individual private respondents were full-time instructors of PLM under "temporary contracts" of employment renewable on a yearly basis. They, among other instructors, joined the PLMFO. On 29 May 1990, private respondents, through PLMFO, filed with the CSC a verified complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against petitioner and its officers. In a letter-comment, dated 13 July 1990, petitioner denied having committed any unfair labor practice or having illegally dismissed private respondents. In its defense, PLM interposed (1) the temporary nature of private respondents' contracts of employment and (2) reasons that could justify the nonrenewal of the contracts. Public respondent CSC referred the case to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council ("PSLMC"). The latter, through its deputized hearing officer, Med-Arbiter Hope Ruiz-Valenzuela of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor and Employment, after due notice, heard the case (PSLMC Case No. 00-06-91). During the proceedings, petitioner relied in main on the temporary nature of private respondents' employment contracts. ISSUES: Whether or not: 1. The Civil Service Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and denial of due process when it adopted entirely, without according the petitioner the opportunity to be heard, the findings of facts and resolutions of the Public Sector Labor and Management Council, a body separate and distinct and with different jurisdiction from that of the Commission. 2. The Civil Service Commission acted with grave abuse discretion in effectively denying the petitioner the opportunity to present evidence to substantiate its allegations in its defense against the charge of illegal dismissal, to the prejudice of civil service and public interest. HELD: The Court expressed that the Petitioner stresses that the CSC and the PSLMC both exercise quasi-judicial functions but not on identical issues and subject matter; that the PSLMC possesses jurisdiction only over the unfair labor practice aspect of private respondents' complaint but that it is the CSC which alone can take cognizance over the question of illegal dismissal; and that, therefore, when the CSC has simply adopted the recommendations of the PSLMC in the unfair labor practice case in resolving the issue of illegal dismissal and ordering the reinstatement of private respondents without conducting further proceedings of its own, it has effectively denied petitioner of its right to due process. Petitioner insists that when CSC has ruled on the matter of illegal dismissal without conducting any further hearing of its own, relying, instead, on PSLMC's finding of unfair

labor practice on the part of petitioner, the latter has thereby been denied due process. Unfortunately for petitioner, however, the two supposed independent issues, i.e., the unfair labor practice charge and the complaint for illegal dismissal both filed by private respondents, are, in fact, here unavoidably interlinked. The non-renewal of an employment contract with a term, it is true, is ordinarily a valid mode of removal at the end of each period. This rule, however, must yield to the superior constitutional right of employees, permanent or temporary, to self-organization. While, a temporary employment may be ended with or without cause, it certainly may not, however, be terminated for an illegal cause. Petitioner claims that it was denied "due process." It itself admitted, however, that "it manifested (before the PSLMC) its intention to submit evidence (that it had other valid grounds for not renewing private respondents' temporary contracts of employment) which, inadvertently or otherwise, it failed to present . . . This supposed evidence, if true and being material to substantiate its defense against the unfair labor charge, should have been duly presented, but it did not. Petitioner should not now be heard to complain that it was denied due process. We ruled, time and again, that "due process" was designed to afford an opportunity to be heard, not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held. The finding of the PSLMC that the non-renewal by petitioner of the questioned contracts of employment had been motivated by private respondents' union activities is conclusive on the parties. Indeed, this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 105157 (PLM vs. PSLMC et al.) which has long become final and executory should now render that matter a fait accompli. When the case was thus referred to the CSC by the PSLMC to take "appropriate action" it understandably meant that the CSC should take the necessary steps of reinstating the illegally dismissed employees. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the appealed resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 18 May 1993, is LIFTED. No costs.

Debulgado v. CSC, 237 SCRA 184 FACTS: Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. On October 1, 1992, petitioner Mayor appointed his wife, Victoria T. Debulgado, as General Services Officer, that is, as head of the Office of General Services of the City Government of San Carlos. Victoria was one of three (3) employees of the City Government who were considered for the position of General Services Officer. Before her promotion in 1992, she had been in the service of the City Government for about thirty-two (32) years. She joined the City Government on January 3, 1961 as Assistant License Clerk. Through the years, she rose from the ranks from being Asst. Chief of the Licenses & Fees Division until being a Cashier IV. On October 1, 1992, petitioner Victoria assumed the new post, and commenced discharging the functions, of General Services Officer of San Carlos City and receiving the regular salary attached to that position. On December 16, 1992, the Civil Service Commission received a letter from Congressman Tranquilino B. Carmona of the First District of Negros Occidental, calling attention to the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife. During the investigation, the CSC found that the appointee was the lawful wife of the Mayor. Acting on the investigation report, the CSC disapproved the promotion of Victoria to the position of General Services Officer of San Carlos City upon the ground that that promotion violated the statutory prohibition against nepotic appointments. The Debulgados moved for reconsideration, contending that the statutory prohibition against nepotism was not applicable to the appointment of Victoria as General Services Officer. They also asserted that the Commission had deprived Victoria of her right to due process by unilaterally revoking her appointment. MR denied. ISSUES: 1. Whether the prohibition against nepotic appointments is applicable only to original appointments and not to promotional appointments. 2. Whether the CSC exercised due process in recalling/disapproving the appoint of Victoria. HELD: 1. The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public service is set out in Section 59, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. A textual examination of Section 59 at once reveals that the prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms. Firstly, it explicitly covers "all appointments", without seeking to make any distinction between differing kinds or types of appointments. Secondly, Section 59 covers all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal government, as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all government owned or controlled corporations. Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set out in Section 59 itself, but it is a short list which includes (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (b) teachers; (c) physicians; and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The list has not been added to or

subtracted from for the past thirty (30) years. The list does not contain words like "and other similar positions." Thus, the list appears to us to be a closed one, at least closed until lengthened or shortened by Congress. Under Sec. 1, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of the Admin Code, both an original appointment and a promotion are particular species of personnel action. The original appointment of a civil service employee and all subsequent personnel actions undertaken by or in respect of that employee such as promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, etc., must comply with the Implementing Rules including, of course, the prohibition against nepotism in Rule XVIII. To the extent that all personnel actions occurring after an original appointment, require the issuance of a new appointment to another position (or to the original position in case of reinstatement), we believe that such appointment must comply with all applicable rules and prohibitions, including the statutory and regulatory prohibition against nepotism. To limit the thrust of the prohibition against nepotism to the appointment issued at the time of initial entry into the government service, and to insulate from that prohibition appointments subsequently issued when personnel actions are thereafter taken in respect of the same employee, would be basically to render that prohibition meaningless and toothless. The purpose of the rule is to ensure that all appointments and other personnel actions in the civil service should be based on merit and fitness and should never depend on how close or intimate an appointee is to the appointing power. 2. No. The action was not the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure upon petitioner Victoria, nor upon petitioner Mayor. There were no administrative charges in respect of which petitioner Victoria would have been entitled to notice and hearing. The Commission, in approving or disapproving an appointment, only examines the conformity of the appointment with applicable provisions of law and whether the appointee possesses all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualifications. In any case, Victoria was afforded an opportunity to be heard when she filed a motion for reconsideration with the Commission and there challenged the disapproval by the Commission.