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DOI: 10.1177/030981680207700104
2002 26: 89 Capital & Class
Srhan Cam
Turkey economy
Neo-liberalism and labour within the context of an 'emerging market'

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89 Neo-liberalism and labour in Turkey
It has been long argued by marketeers that neo-liberal
reforms benet the working class. This study suggests,
however, that since the outset of the neo-liberal era in
Turkey, temporary employment has risen, unioni-
sation has declined, employment prospects have
deteriorated and employees earnings have diminished
in real terms. Such developments made Turkey a
better place for capital. Yet they also caused a growing
inequality in overall income distribution, and political
unrest across the country.
Introduction: the promises of neo-liberalism
I
n recent decades, free marketeers have conducted a
worldwide campaign against state interventions in
economic aairs. In this process, commentators such as
Beckler (18z) and Piatier (18(), depicted protectionist
trade policies as the basic problem of developing countries.
Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1z) and Meyer (18) also conten-
ded that a structural convergence between the Third World
and industrialised economies would inevitably require the
liberalisation of international trade and investments. In addi-
tion, according to Heller (18() and Vickers & Yarrow (188),
for example, transferring the ownership of public enterprises
Neo-liberalism and labour
within the context of an
emerging market
economy Turkey
Srhan Cam
Capital & Class #77 90
to the wider stratum of society by privatisation, was the
universal imperative of common sense in order to invigorate
the entrepreneurial spirit.
For pro-market scholars, exible employment relations
were crucial for a viable employment structure in the age of
globalisation. Despite the lack of convincing evidence, it
has been argued that growing interaction among dierent
cultures began to change consumers consumption patterns
almost on a day-to-day basis. Mahon (18;) stressed that in
order to cope with the volatile demands of consumers,
companies frequently needed to alter their products, but not
all workers had sucient skills to cope with changing produc-
tion systems. Therefore, Blyton & Morris (11) asserted
that promoting temporary employment was the only way
forward, if unsustainable levels of labour costs were to be
avoided.
The excessive power of trade unions became a specic
subject of the critique, combined with an ambiguous ideology
of conict of interest between workers and consumers. Sarfati
& Kobrin (188) and Saunders & Harris (1() argued that
the reluctance of trade unions to relinquish job security
policies, and their pervasive obsession with vested interests,
were not only pushing up labour costs for employers but
commodity prices for consumers as well. Accordingly, pro-
market commentators vilied trade unions, particularly those
operating in the public sector, as opportunists taking advan-
tage of the statutory regulations and collective bargaining
position. Referring to the political compromises of state
managers, Pierson (11) contended that the privatisation
of public sector organisations would produce signicant
contributions to a well-balanced union power.
In spite of the challenges to job security and organised
solidarity, however, the proponents of the neo-liberal project
posited that the working class in developing countries would
derive the most notable gains from market solutions. As
far as Rojas (1) was concerned, the internationalisation
of poor economies in general would improve employment
prospects in the Third World. From this point of view, foreign
investment, in particular, was seen as an eective remedy for
unemployment in less auent nations. Markusen & Venables
(1;) suggested that international capital inow to such
countries would culminate in job opportunities by sparking
o new economic activities in industrial sectors. Neo-liberal
literature was also embellished with promises regarding
91 Neo-liberalism and labour in Turkey
employees earnings in emerging market economies. Slau-
ghter & Swagel (1;) and Williamson (18) endorsed the
idea that the integration of less auent nations within the
world economy would boost production technology and make
for increases in wages and salaries as a result of growing
labour productivity.
Furthermore, it was argued that market solutions would
undermine conicts between the interests of the bourgeoisie
and the proletariat. In this account, privatisation would not
only invigorate the entrepreneurial spirit by dispersing the
ownership of public enterprises to the wider stratum of
society (Vickers & Yarrow 188), but would also deliver
mutual benets for employers and employees in particular,
by distributing company shares to employees (Heller 18().
Pertinently, as Meiskins (186) noted, such promises of
liberalism to labour appealed even to some political Left
groups. In time, left-leaning parties have associated them-
selves with neo-liberal rhetoric in many countries (Sivanan-
dan 1).
In reality, the consequences of liberal reforms on labour
can only be fully explained in a specic and institutional
context. Bearing this in mind, the present paper examines
the case of Turkey, a country which shifted from a state policy
of import substitution in the 18os and has received as much
free market advice as possible from international agencies
and private consultancy rms. In order to develop a systematic
analysis of liberalism and to provide the reader with some
general information, rstly, an overall review of liberal
reforms will be given within the context of Turkeys macro-
economic structure. Second, addressing the inadequacy of
explanations based on the so-called dierentiations in con-
sumption and production patterns (Mahon 18;), a rapidly
spreading phenomenon of temporary employment will be
seen to have come into existence. Third, the article will focus
on the growth of a capital-biased oensive against trade
unions. Fourth, it will be argued that market solutions have
entailed a massive exclusion of people from working life
instead of enhancing employment prospects. Fifth, a deteri-
oration in wages and salaries will be considered since the
initiation of neo-liberal reforms. The conclusion places the
emphasis on the contradiction between the positive impli-
cations of neo-liberal labour policies for capital and their
negative implications for overall income distribution and
democracy in Turkey.
Capital & Class #77 92
1. Neo-liberal reforms and the economic structure
The adherents of neo-liberalism like Beckler (18z) and
Piatier (18() lavishly celebrated free trade and the
elimination of taris as the pivotal components of globali-
sation. In keeping with this logic, and pressurised by an
i:r stand-by and stabilisation package, the military regime
which seized power in Turkey in 18o replaced the policy of
import substitution with an export substitution policy in
order to give the economy an outward orientation. The ratio
of imports to cbi had increased to z1.;% by 1 from a
;% annual average between 16o and 1; (Table i). When
Turkey joined the European customs union in 1, the
growth of imports gained additional momentum, and the
ratio to cbi had reached z;.;% by 1;.
However, so-called free trade is not applied even-
handedly when it jeopardises the interests of powerful
countries. Since the initiation of the export substitution policy,
Western occb countries
1
(hereafter called woccb) have, as
the biggest trade partners of Turkey, been persistently inic-
ting protectionist quotas on the exports of Turkish service
sector industries such as fashion, advertising and entertain-
ment. Turkeys appeals to woccb countries to exempt its
service sector exports from taris are constantly turned down
(Buchan 18). These sorts of restrictions have limited
exports in relation to imports and, accordingly, led to trade
decits. Most notably, the average annual ratio of trade decit
to cbi increased to (.% between 1o and 1; from a
z% annual average between 16o and 1; (Table i). In
particular, a .;% ratio of trade decits to cbi in 1; was
even higher than the (.;% level of 1; which was sparked
by rising oil prices in the mid-1;os (sio, 18).
The Ricardian prediction that international trade would
induce a diversied specialisation in certain products has
been used to show that developing countries would become
cheap raw material suppliers (Wallerstein 1;). To fend o
such criticism, contemporary marketeers shifted the emphasis
from the divergence-based liberalism of Ricardo to a
convergence-based liberalism. In this new genre, Hayek
(11) for example, stressed that international competition
would bring about a structural convergence, instead of
divergence, amongst trade partners by forcing local
companies to opt for the most protable economic activities.
Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1z) also postulated that the
93 Neo-liberalism and labour in Turkey
convergence process would boost the service sector and
industry in emerging market economies while reducing
their reliance upon agriculture. In particular, it was conten-
ded that in addition to international trade, the liberalisation
of foreign investment would boost industry by tackling the
problem of capital shortage in less auent economies
(Meyer 18; Markusen & Venables 18).
The claim that the internationalisation of developing
economies triggers a structural convergence with developed
countries (Hayek 11; Barro & Sala-i-Martin 1z) should
be treated with caution. Although the share of the service
sector in cbi had risen from (o% in 16o to z% when the
liberal reforms were initiated in 18o, no change had been
observed in this proportion by 1; (Table ii). The stagnation
of the Turkish service sectors share in cbi should be
compared with the increase in the service sectors share in
cbi in woccb countries which went up from an average of
;% in 18o to 6;% in 1; (occb 1b).
2
Yet there was a shift in the economy from agriculture to
industry which does not conrm the contention that the
periphery countries could not accomplish industrialisation
(Frank 16;). In Turkey, whilst cbi grew from $bn in
1; to $zobn in 1;, the industrys share in cbi increased
from z6% to z%. Meanwhile that of agriculture declined
from z% in 1; to 16% in 1; (Table ii). Foreign capital
played an important role in the industrialisation of the
economy, but it also applied pressure on short-term external
debts. Following the liberalisation of foreign investments
in the early 18os, annual capital inow increased from $;
million in 18o to $(,ooo million in 1; (Table i). The
rise in capital inow mostly came from foreign investments
in government debt securities rather than foreign direct
investment in industry (rbi). In 1;, for example, a $8o
million rbi was accompanied by $z,oo million foreign
investments in government debt securities. International
investors were inclined to benet from the foreign currency
requirements of the country during the phase of soaring
external debts; the ratio of external debt to cbi had risen
from z% in 18o to (6% annual average between 1o and
1; (Table iii). In order to raise foreign currency for debt
re-payments, the government issued debt securities with high
interest rates to international investors for short terms.
Accordingly, the ratio of short-term debts to total external
debts increased from 1% in 18o to z% in 1; (Table iii).
3
Capital & Class #77 94
In line with the neo-liberal reform project, a privatisation
programme was also mapped out in the mid-18os. Resolving
the problem of the low eciency of public enterprises was
regarded by Vickers & Yarrow (188) as an inherent merit of
privatisation, but priority of privatisation in Turkey was
accorded to the most ecient state companies (Karatas 1o:
1). Initially, the government sold some large public enter-
prises, such as the ci1osaN cement industry, and the Eregli
Demir-Celik steel and iron industry. Later, many other
important companies, such as i11, the postal-telecom-
munications industry, and :kk, the arms industry, were also
added to the privatisation plan. As noted in the introduction,
pro-market scholars argued that privatisation would disperse
the ownership to all citizens including employees (Heller
18(; Vickers & Yarrow 188). In Turkey, however, transfers
to individual shareholders were not greater than % of total
privatisation. No company was sold to its employees (iir
18).
4
It is a fact that a limited proportion of public com-
panies has been privatised. Between 186 and 18, $1obn
in revenue was obtained from sales operations, but this was
still much less than the total revenues expected from all
sales, $6obn (Barham 1;; iir 18; occb 1a). Even
so, the implications of privatisation for labour, along with
the other reforms undertaken, became serious, as evidenced
in what follows.
2. Temporary employment
In accordance with the prescriptions of the New Right
(Mahon 18;; Blyton & Morris 11), the number of
temporary employees in Turkey has considerably increased
in recent years. Yet, in contrast to their contention, the issue
cannot simply be analysed through the so-called changes in
consumption and production patterns without examining the
impacts of temporary employment on the working class.
Not only in Turkey but also in many countries, the employ-
ment structure has shifted from secure jobs towards temporary
ones. Amongst the cc countries, for example, temporary
employment grew from % to 8% in the ck, from (% to
1z% in Italy and from 6% to 1% in France between 18
and 1; (Eurostat, 18). As for Turkey, temporary employ-
ment has risen from % in 18 to 1(% in 1; (sis 18;,
18; occb 18b). This proportion may be even higher,
95 Neo-liberalism and labour in Turkey
since the short spells of employment for women engaged in
the home-based jobs in the textile industry are not always
declared in labour surveys (Ozbay 1o).
Pro-market policies exacerbated temporary employment
in two basic forms: contract work and the tacheron system.
After the mid-18os, the contract work system as a temporary
employment model became an overriding recruitment
strategy in the public sector companies that were scheduled
to be privatised. On the eve of privatisation, white-collar
workers were initially employed by the government through
the contract work model. Later, the system was swiftly
extended to blue-collar workers (bisk, 1), and the total
number of employees working under this system climbed
from zo,ooo to oo,ooo between 18 and 16 (Ekonomik
Trend 16).
Market solutions extended the coverage of another
temporary employment model, the tacheron system. To
illustrate how severely pro-market policies can wreck
employees work-lives, a glance at the tacheron system is
useful. Under the tacheron system, workers are hired via
mediating job organisers (tacheron) without any ocially
recognised contract, while these organisers may sign a
contract with the big bosses to x their prerogatives and
responsibilities, but only vis--vis each other. The system
does not give any chance for workers to describe themselves
as employees in legal terms. In this sense, it distinctively
lacks legality when compared with many other classical types
of non-contracted employment models (see Bromley & Gerry
1;).
Owing to the absence of ocial recognition, tacheron
workers are deprived of their social and economic rights.
Virtually no tacheron worker can benet from the social
security programme, despite the fact that employment
without social security is ostensibly ruled out by the Social
Security Code. They are also paid lower wages than the
mandatory national minimum wage (ci:sc-is 16). 1cnk-
is, the biggest trade union confederation, reported that the
tacheron system breached the provisions of the iLo which
were ratied by Turkey in 16o (1cnk-is 1).
As noted in the introduction, marketeers sought to justify
temporary employment by claiming that required skills for
companies began to change very frequently as a result of
growing variations in consumption and hence production
patterns (Mahon 18;; Blyton & Morris 11). However,
Capital & Class #77 96
the scope of the tacheron employment model goes well
beyond changing consumption and production patterns. By
the mid-1os, all zz plants of ci1osaN, the public cement
industry, had been privatised. It is estimated that one-third
of the workers in cement factories were then employed under
the tacheron system (Ekonomik Trend 16: 6z; Boratav et
al., 18: 11;). Given that the standard character of cement
production did not change, it is rather dicult to explain
the increase in temporary employment simply by growing
variations in consumption patterns as the New Right has
posited.
5
The tacheron model was introduced to other privatised
companies as well. Nearly z% of the work force is now
supplied by tacheron rms for privatised companies
(Ekonomik Trend 16: 6z; Boratav et al. 18: 11;). Over
the past several years, the system has also grown in the
construction industry where workers were conventionally
employed through this model. Since the mid-18os, the
residential building sector has thrived; its share in cbi leapt
from (% to ;% between 18( and 16 (occb 1b). The
expansion of the industry was accompanied by construction
rms keeping down the cost of production by any means.
This corruption was responsible for the poor quality of
buildings which was much blamed for the death toll of more
than z,ooo in the 1 earthquakes (Colasan 1). Similar
money saving motives lay behind the sectors failure to
improve its employment policies. The number of tacheron
workers in the construction industry had increased from
o,ooo in 18 to 1.z million in 1; (sis 18;, 18).
Employees in general strongly oppose the tacheron
model (Nichols et al. 18). Trade unions often draw the
governments attention to the grim working conditions of
these workers. To reduce political tension and to enable the
Labour Placement Oce to send tacheron workers to the
Turkic speaking republics of the former cssn, the govern-
ment, for the rst time, decreed some ad-hoc legal arrange-
ments in 1 (Cam, 1). Yet such regulations only
encompass those who want to go abroad to work. Instead of
producing proper legislation to secure the fundamental rights
of tacheron workers, the government itself hires an
increasing number of employees via tacherons; by 16,
the proportion of tacheron workers in state economic
enterprises, had risen to 1%, from (% in 186 (Ekonomik
Trend 16: 6z; Boratav et al. 18: 11;).
97 Neo-liberalism and labour in Turkey
Eventually, because of a strike led by ozccLik-is, the trade
union of the Steel Industry, the state gave tacheron workers
permanent status in the Karabuk Plant. However, such an
outcome is exceptional. Whilst facilitating the adoption of
this model by employers, legislative vagueness about the
issue subverts the eectiveness of union resistance. The growth
of the tacheron system together with the contract work
model has undermined organised labour solidarity.
3. Trade unions
Sarfati & Kobrin (188) and Saunders & Harris (1()
claimed that trade unions were once extremely powerful. As
Isikli (1) noted, neo-liberal circles in Turkey also
embraced the same argument. However, this was by no means
the case, even before liberal reforms were initiated. Whilst
union density was at its highest-ever level in 1;, it was
still no more than z;% of all employees (Table iv)the
corresponding gure for 16o was z%. Moreover, in 1;,
the yearly average of workers who signed for collective
bargaining remained less than (% of total employment.
However, not only in Turkey, but in many other countries in
the world, pro-market policies diminished unionisation.
Between 18 and 1, for example, union density amongst
wage and salary earners declined from 8% to z% in the
ck, from 1% to 1% in Malaysia and from % to 1(% in
the csa (iLo 18b). In Turkey, too, union density tumbled
to .% by 18.
The military regime of 18o banned bisk, the Revolu-
tionary Workers Trade Union Confederation, and restricted
union activities with the Unionisation Act of 18z, which
arbitrarily excluded certain sectors from unionisation. The
law was so stringent that it precluded white-collar workers
from joining a union in the public and private sectors.
Furthermore, during the rst half of the 18os, wage
settlements were imposed by anti-democratic regulations.
In this period, employees earnings were xed through the
Supreme Arbitration Board which based its decisions on the
governments targets (occb 1).
In 18, an Islamic trade union confederation, nak-is,
was set up under the supervision of the government in order
to generate an ideological ambivalence within the working
class. As has often been pointed out, the Islamic confederation
Capital & Class #77 98
seeks to foster a philosophy of Islamic brotherhood with
employers as against conict-oriented unionism (Sen 1).
nak-is represents about 1z% of total unionisation. The fast
growth of some cheap labour-based export companies has
also played an important part in its expansion. Most pro-
Islamic owners of such companies do not tolerate their
employees gathering under the umbrella of secular trade
unions (Kose & Oncu 18, Boulton 18).
After the mid-18os, the military regime began to relent
and, in addition to bisk being again permitted to operate,
more than 1% of white collar workers were organized into
trade unions, despite government opposition (occb 1;b).
However, the replacement of unionised workers by temporary
employees has now become a major challenge to labour
solidarity (Cam 1). In 1;, union density was still half
the z;% level of 1;. Between 18 and 1;, the yearly
average of those covered by collective bargaining did not
exceed 3% of total employment. In what follows, we will
show that market solutions have also been accompanied by
a substantial exclusion from working life.
4. Growing exclusion from working life
The assumption that neo-liberalism improves employment
prospects in developing countries is not borne out by Turkeys
experience. On the contrary, pro-market reforms adversely
aected peoples job opportunities. In order to undertake a
systematic analysis of neo-liberal policies regarding employ-
ment prospects, let us start by reviewing the acceleration of
internal migration which rendered millions of peasants
unemployed after the initiation of neo-liberalism. Between
16o and 18o, the proportion of those living in rural areas
declined from 68% to 8% of the total population, while
the total population itself grew from z;.; million to ((.(
million.
6
By 1;, however, rural population fell to 1% of
total population which was then recorded as 6.; million
(Table v). The acceleration of migration was enhanced by
neo-liberal economic policies. A huge mechanisation
programme was introduced in order to increase agricultural
output and exports. The number of tractors used rose from
;o,ooo in 18o to almost 1 million in 1; (sis 18z: z1,
18: 1). Meanwhile, the exports of agriculture approached
zo% of total agricultural output by 1;, compared to a
99 Neo-liberalism and labour in Turkey
1o% annual average between 16o and 18o (sio zooo:
1z).
Here it is necessary to make specic reference to the
uprooting of the Kurdish people in the South East during
the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies. No
doubt, the centuries-long history of the Kurdish struggle
for independence cannot simply be analysed within the
context of neo-liberalism.
7
Yet the eects of neo-liberal
economic policies on the Kurdish people were an inextri-
cable part of the migration dilemma. Until the early 18os,
the smuggling of goods from the Middle East was one of
the two main economic activities of the mostly Kurdish
population in the region partly because of the terrains
unsuitability for agriculture and partly because of the failure
of the government to improve the economic conditions of
these people (Ciment 16). Later, however, trade liberali-
sation substantially reduced the smuggling of goods.
Unfortunately, no data is available about the extent of smugg-
ling because of its illegal nature. Yet, according to an eminent
author on the Kurdish problem, Ismail Besikci (1o), the
decline of smuggling adversely aected most families in the
South East. The other main occupation of these people,
animal husbandry, was also much aected; rstly by the
privatisation of the meat and animal food industries and
later by the freeing of meat imports. Between 18o and 1997,
the sheep population, the dominant livestock in the South
East as well as in Turkey, fell from ( million to z million
(sis 18: z8;, 18: o8). Over time, growing economic
deprivation in the region buttressed sympathy for the
insurrections of the Kurdish Workers Party. In response,
the government forced up to million dissidents to migrate
to the cities (Chomsky 1).
The Turkish media has heralded an irrigation project in
South East Anatolia as likely to substantially increase
agricultural employment in Turkey. However, environmental
concerns in relation to the project cast doubts over its
sustainability. The British funding consortium, led by Balfour
Beatty, faces mounting protests by environmentalist groups
which argue that the project risks, for example, ooding
HasanKeyf, an ancient Kurdish town, and igniting water-
wars in the Middle East whilst serving for the ethnic clean-
sing of Kurds in the region (Brown 1). Apart from this
controversy, even if the whole project is completed, the extent
to which it might help alleviate agricultural unemployment
Capital & Class #77 100
is still disputable. Since 18o, over four million acres of
newly opened farmland, double the acreage the project could
irrigate,
8
has still failed to impede migration in Turkey. No
less signicantly, the (% share of agriculture in total
employment
9
(Table vi) is depicted by the State Planning
Organisation (sio 18: 1) as grounds for stepping up
mechanisation in order to bring this proportion down to the
level of developed countriesit was ;% among woccb
countries in 1; (occb 18b).
The deteriorating employment performance of non-
agricultural sectors (industry and the service sector), on the
other hand, is treated with complacency in policy making
circles. In fact, the initiation of massive redundancies was a
deliberate objective of the rehabilitation and privatisation
programmes (Hale 181: ;z). Between 186 and 16, nearly
oo,ooo workers were dismissed from state economic
enterprises (iir 18: 1). In addition to privatisation, a
relative increase in the automation of production (Celebi
1: 1z6), and the introduction of new management
techniques designed to cut labour costs and to increase labour
productivity (Cam 1;: 6;), also hampered employment
growth in non-agricultural sectors. Even though the yearly
growth rate of industrial employment averaged .% from
16o to 18o, it was no more than 6.6% between 18o and
1; (occb 181, 18b). Since the beginning of the neo-
liberal era, therefore, the share of industr y in total
employment has stagnated at z1%, albeit its contribution to
cbi has gone up from z6% to z% (Table ii and v). Likewise,
while failing to increase the service sectors z% share in
cbi, neo-liberal reforms slowed down the annual average
of employment growth in this sector by % between 18o
and 1; from ;.6% annual average between 16o and 18o
(occb 181, 18b).
Having noted that employment prospects have lagged
behind labour supply both in agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, we can now look at the problem from a
wider perspective. In general, pro-market policies limited
total employment growth to a z% yearly average between
18o and 1; compared with a z.6% annual average between
1;o and 1; (occb 181, 18b). Taking into account 6
million unpaid family workers and ; million self-employed
(occb 18b), total employment was roughly z1 million in
1; (Table vi). According to ocial statistics, this
employment level implies no more than a ;% unemployment
101 Neo-liberalism and labour in Turkey
rate, since it is dened by the number of those seeking a job
via the Labour Placement Oce (sis 18). However, as in
many other developing countries (Walter 1z), lack of
unemployment benet and scarcity of job opportunities often
discourage people from applying to job centres. Considering
such factors, the iLo estimated the unemployment rate to be
around 11% for 1; (iLo 18a). Even so, the unemployment
gures alone are not sucient to highlight the consequences
of neo-liberal employment policies.
In the course of liberal reforms, people have confronted
a growing exclusion from working life which does not match
the over optimism of Markusen & Venables (1;) and Rojas
(1) regarding the creation of job opportunities in develo-
ping countries. The exclusion of women has been especially
discernible. Available data indicate a substantial plunge in
the ratio of the female labour force to the female population
aged from 1 to 6( years old (working age population, wai).
It declined from % in 18o to 1% in 1;. Females
comprised only one-quarter of the total labour force in this
year (Table vii). Given that female participation as a source
of cheap labour in comparison to their male counterparts
has had a worldwide upward trend over the past several
decades (Bensman & Vidich 18;), the sharp decline in
Turkey cannot simply be attributed to the direct eect of
neo-liberal policies.
Yet, following the huge waves of migration amidst the
liberal reforms, an increasing proportion of females in the
cities became ineligible for work. As a cultural phenomenon,
the traditional priority of males for outdoor work played an
important part in this (Erman 18). Another reason was
the high level of illiteracy among women, which was as high
as (8% in 18o. Although it declined to z;% in 1;, eective
reading and writing levels did not change so fundamentally,
since the decline in female illiteracy was mostly due to a
short-term education campaign (occb 18a). Furthermore,
even the z;% female illiteracy in 1; was three times higher
than the % male illiteracy (occb 1;b). In addition to
these special disadvantages, the trajectory of female partici-
pation was nurtured by an overall exclusion.
The neo-liberal reforms triggered an unprecedented
exclusion from jobs not only of women but also men. In
general, while the working age population (wai) had grown
from 1.( million in 16o to z(. million by 18o, the ratio
of total labour force to wai had already decreased from
Capital & Class #77 102
8% to ;z% (Table vii). After the initiation of liberal reforms,
such a trend was not averted or stopped. The ratio of total
labour force to wai slumped further to % while the wai
had grown to . million by 1;. It is a fact that the decline
of the participation rate was partly inuenced by the
acceleration of the wais growth rate to a .(% yearly average
between 18o and 1;, from a z.8% annual average between
16o and 1; (Table vii). Moreover, an increase in the
schooling ratio of wai from .8% in 18o to 8.6% in 1;
also contributed to the decline in participation rate (sis, 18).
However, even if the overall growth rate and schooling ratio
of wai had not increased in the liberal era, the participation
rate would not have become more than 8% for 1;.
10
At
this point, an international comparison may help us to
understand the signicance of the neo-liberal exclusion more
clearly. The % participation rate of wai in 1; was zo%
lower than the ;% woccb average, whereas it had been (%
higher in 18o (occb 1b).
It is also important to note that, in the face of failure to
enhance non-agricultural employment in relation to wai,
pro-market nostrums barely substantiate future hopes to
overcome the exclusion in a sustainable way. In 1;, the
ratio of non-agricultural jobs to wai in general, was no more
than z8%, though it had gone up from 1% in 16o to o%
by 18o (Table vii). Broadly speaking, one can argue that
the neo-liberal project became a regressive initiative in terms
of employment prospects. Creating job opportunities, on the
other hand, appears to be increasingly important, given that
the size of wai is going to grow for many years to come
(Table vii). In the next section, it will be proposed that the
adverse impact of market solutions on working-life was
also evident in the case of employees earnings.
5. Employees earnings
Prior to the initiation of the export substitution policy in
Turkey, there was a surge in the real earnings of employees.
In general, from 168 to 1;8, the real incomes of civil
servants and sii workers
11
increased by z% (Table iv). This
was propelled by strengthening labour solidarity and the
increased need for domestic demand to sell industrial
products (Keyder 18;). After 1;8, however, when the export
substitution policy was initially agreed with the i:r,
103 Neo-liberalism and labour in Turkey
employees earnings began to decrease. During the suc-
ceeding years, the deterioration was perpetuated by, rstly,
the union hostility of the 18o military regime and, later, by
that of liberal employment strategies. Between 1;8 and 188,
the real incomes of civil servants shrank by two-thirds, and
those of sii workers halved between 1; and 188.
Noticeably, before the 18 elections, the ruling Mother
Land Party introduced some pay-rises for public sector
employees in order to increase its votes (iso 18: ;). These
were reected in relative increases in income levels of both
civil servants and sii workers in 1o (Table iv). Yet the
upward trend did not last long, and employees earnings
continued to decline later. In 1;, the salaries of civil
servants in real terms were ;o% less than they were in 1;8.
Likewise, in 1;, the wages of sii workers were % lower
than 1; levels. Such ndings are obviously at odds with
the assertions of Slaughter & Swagel (1;) and Williamson
(18) that the internationalisation of developing economies
would lever up wages.
In particular, the role of investment nancing policies in
the decline of earnings has been immense. Since the outset
of the neo-liberal reform project, both the government and
private sector have borrowed money from domestic savers
as well as from international creditors. The ratio of domestic
debt to cbi jumped from (% to 6% between 18o and
1;.
12
In order to subdue the real value of domestic debt
payments, the state pursued an inationary policy, and
between 18o and 1;, ination increased from o% to
8;% (c:cn 1;). Meanwhile ination functioned as a
governmental mechanism to oset labour cost in the public
and private sectors.
The general impoverishment of earnings is also regarded
as a means to attract foreign investment to the country. As
Cassel (1;) indicates, recent years have witnessed emer-
ging market economies adopting competitive models to
charm international capital through cheap labour. Indeed,
according to the purchasing power parity-based comparison
of wages in the manufacturing sector, from 1; to 1;,
the ratio of the earnings of Turkish workers declined, for
example, from z;% to 18% of Canadian workers, from z%
to zo% of German workers and from 8% to z;% of French
workers (iLo, 18, 18a).
Capital & Class #77 104
Conclusions
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that market
solutions have severely undermined the interests of labour.
Such developments made Turkey a better place for capital
especially in the case of export-oriented companies. The
largest oo industrial companies which constituted (8% of
total exports in 1;, increased the ratio of output to
employees from 8.1 in 18o to 1(.6 by 1; (Ozmucur &
Bayazitoglu 1;, Tunca 1;). In the manufacturing sector,
which accounted for 8% of total exports in 1;, the annual
growth rate of output per employee went up to a .8% annual
average between 18o and 1; from a z.8% annual average
between 16o and 1; (occb 18(, 188a).
However, the deterioration in employment prospects and
employees earnings is reected in a growth in overall income
disparity across the country. The share of the bottom fth in
national income decreased from .6% in 18 to (.z% in
1;, contrasting a hitherto experienced increase from %
in 16o (World Bank 18, sis 181, 11, 18). In 1;,
Turkey was ranked as the second most unequal society after
Mexico amongst occb countries (occb 1;b). The
economic deprivation of people became most visible in a
massive housing problem intensied by the acceleration of
migration to the cities in the course of liberal reforms; the
proportion of gecekondushanty towndwellers is probably
now more than half of the urban population, whereas it was
z% in 18o (Keles 1, Milliyet 1).
The growth in overall income disparity resulted in an
escalation of political conict that is in contrast to Hellers
(18() position that market solutions would reduce class
conicts between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. While
suppressing trade unions, pro-market policies gave rise to
wider reactions. Demonstrations against privatisation, wage
levels and the employment policies of the government and
employers became almost a daily routine in the main squares
of the big cities. Following the relaxation of military control
in the mid-18os, the number of days lost in industrial
disputes had risen to million in 1; (Table iv).
Yet, military pressure continued to be an important reason
for the failure of centre-left parties to adopt egalitarian
political agendas when they came to oce as well as in
opposition (Inonu, 1). Moreover, there was a noticeable
shift in these parties towards liberalism. In the name of
105 Neo-liberalism and labour in Turkey
national interests, they opposed, for example, the right of
civil servants to become unionised (Elekdag 1).
Accordingly, electoral support for centre-left parties slumped.
A similar trajectory was also the case for centre-right parties
due to their pro-market orthodoxy. In general, the total share
of central parties declined from an 8z% average in the 1;os
to ;% by 18 election.
13
Meanwhile, the share of the Islamic Welfare Party in
elections increased from a % average in the Seventies to
z1% in the 1 election and it came to power as a coalition
partner. The success of the Welfare Party has often been
attributed to its fair society rhetoric as well as Islamic
propaganda (Sen 1; Ayata 16). In return, the army
the instigator inside Turkey of free market principlesbegan
to ex its muscles publicly with the z8 February intervention
in 1;. The intervention was not a classical military
overthrow, but was popularly called a post-modern coup.
The army named and shamed the pro-Islamic policies of
the government and threatened a military takeover, unless
the Islamist partner of the coalition stepped down from oce.
In the face of such pressures, the Islamic party resigned, but
later, the extremist Nationalist Movement Party joined the
coalition government, since its share in elections rose from
;% average in the Seventies to 18% in the 18 election.
Nevertheless, the nationalists are also declared by the army
as one of the biggest threats to the interests of the country
(Dogan 1;).
The heavy presence of the army in daily politics casts
Turkey as another example of emerging market economies
like Latin American or South Asian countries where neo-
liberal programmes are implemented through authoritarian
policies (Macewan 1). Since the beginning of the neo-
liberal era in Turkey, non-egalitarian distribution policies
have been secured by anti-democratic means. Pro-market
orthodoxy does not hesitate to sacrice democratic principles
for the sake of its own economic agendas. The proliferation
of critical studies appears to be essential in order to advance
democratic alternatives to neo-liberalism both in economic
and political terms.
Capital & Class #77 106
Acknowledgments:
The author would like to thank the editorial board of Capital
& Class, the anonymous referees of the paper, Theo Nichols,
Gregor McLennan, Tony Alderton, Erol Demir, Wen-Chi
Chou, Nik Winchester, Fatih Gungor and Pinar Enneli for
their very useful comments on the earlier drafts of this paper.
Table I: International Trade and Capital Inow
International Trade Capital Inow ($m.)
Years Exports Imports Total Trade
as % of as % of Trade Decit Total
$bn GDP $bn GDP $bn (as % FDI(1) GDSs(2) Inow (3)
of GDP)
1960 1.6 4.8 2.3 6.7 11.5 1.9 n.a n.a 1
1965 2.1 4.8 2.7 6.2 11.0 1.4 n.a n.a 10
1970 3.1 5.1 4.6 7.6 12.3 2.5 58 12 88
1975 4.4 5.8 8.5 10.5 16.4 4.7 114 13 90
1980 4.7 5.0 6.1 6.5 11.5 1.5 75 47 97
1985 13.7 12.0 16.4 14.3 26.3 2.3 99 (1986) 146 235
1990 20.1 13.2 26.4 17.5 30.8 4.3 668 (1992) 2,815 1,861
1995 30.8 17.4 38.2 21.7 39.1 4.3 608 (1993) 3,910 2,063
1997 44.8 22.0 56.4 27.7 49.8 5.7 805 2,336 4,100
Turkey -: Economic and labour market indicators
* All values are based on the price levels and exchange rates of 1o.
1: Foreign Direct Investment in industry.
2: Foreign Investment in Government Debt Securities.
3: In addition to foreign investment in industry and cbss, it covers investment in equity
markets and unfullled commitments. In some years, the nal aggregation of capital
inow was less than total rbi and cbss due to capital outows (State Planning Organisation,
sio, 18).
Sources: SPO (I); OECD (I8c, I8d, Ia); World Bank (Iy); IMF (II, I).
107 Neo-liberalism and labour in Turkey
Table II: Composition of GDP
Years GDP GDP Industry Agriculture Service Sector
($bn)* Growth Rates** As % of GDP*** As % of GDP*** As % of GDP***
1960 35.0 19 40 41
1965 44.2 5.2 22 35 43
1970 60.8 7.5 23 30 47
1975 80.6 6.5 24 27 49
1979 92.9 3.8 26 23 52
1985 114.4 3.9 27 21 52
1990 150.6 6.3 32 18 50
1997 203.0 5.0 32 16 52
* 1o Constant Prices and Exchange Rates.
** Annual average of growth rates for each interval. To nd average growth rate per year
from 16o to 16, for example, $bn cbi in 16o is rst subtracted from $((.zbn in
16. Second, the result is taken as percentage of former, and later, it is divided by the
total ve years of this period.
*** Total ratios to cbi may not add to 1oo due to rounding.
Sources: OECD (I8:, Ia, Ib).
Table III: External Debts
Years External Debts Short-Term External Debts
$(bn)* As % of GDP ($bn)* As % of GDP
1960 2.8 8 5.3 0.3
1965 3.9 9 5.5 0.4
1970 6.1 10 6.4 0.6
1975 10.4 13 8.3 0.9
1979 21.2 23 13.0 2.9
1985 51.7 45 18.3 8.2
1993 73.7 49 27.5 13.4
1997 83.2 41 25.3 12.3
* 1o Constant Prices and Exchange Rates.
Sources: SPO (I); OECD (I8c, I8d, Ia); World Bank (Iy); IMF (II, I).
Capital & Class #77 108
Table IV: Industrial Relations Indicators
Years Salaries of Civil Wages of SII Collective Union Density Industrial
Servants (1) Workers (1) Bargaining (2) (3) Disputes (4)
1960 81.46 - 2.2 -
1965 83.96 172 2.7 242
1970 125.00 106.89 550 16.4 263
1975 127.00 111.57 601 20.8 1,102
1980 (1978)126.00 (1979)128.25 590 27.2 5,408
1985 47.16 68.28 (1984)245 9.5
1988 43.21 65.21 9.7 2,977
1990 63.24 111.42 483 10.3 4,654
1997 38.36 85.53 815 14.1 (1996)5,046
1 The index of real salaries and wagesdaily per employee, 168=1oo (Also, see Endnote 11)
2 Number of workers covered by collective bargaining (Thousands).
3 Number of unionised workers as a percentage of all employees.
4 Number of Lost Days (Thousands).
Sources: OECD (I); World Bank (Iy); SIS (I66, I;I, I;;, I8:, I8;, I6, I8); ILO (I8y,
I8b).
Table V: Population (Rural and Urban)
Years Population (000) Rural Population Urban Population Rural population as
(000) (000) % of total
1960 27,755 18,874 8,881 68
1965 31,921 21,068 10,853 66
1970 35,630 22,091 13,539 62
1975 40,350 24,614 15,736 60
1980 44,439 25,775 18,664 58
1985 50,306 24,650 25,656 49
1990 56,203 21,920 34,283 39
1997 63,700 19,747 43,953 31
Sources: OECD(I8I, I8b); SIS (I66, I;I, I;;, I8:, I8;, II, I8).
109 Neo-liberalism and labour in Turkey
Table VI: Employment Breakdowns by Sectors (As Percentage of Total Employment)
Total Employment In Agriculture In Industry In Service Urban
Years (000) (%) (%) Sector (%) Employment (%)*
1960 12,417 76 11 13 19
1965 12,800 73 12 15 22
1970 12,550 68 14 18 24
1975 13,780 59 19 22 26
1980 15,820 54 22 25 30
1985 16,500 51 21 28 28
1990 18,222 47 22 31 29
1997 20,076 45 22 33 28
* The ratio of non-agricultural employment to the population aged from 1 to 6( years old.
Sources: OECD (I8I, I8b); SIS (I66, I;I, I;;, I8:, I8;, II, I8).
Table VII: Working Age Population (WAP) and Labour Force (LBF) by Gender
Yearly Growth Rate LBF as % Female LBF as Female LBF as
Years WAP (000) of WAP (%)* of WAP % of Female WAP % of total LBF
1960 15,450 83 71 40
1965 16,800 1.74 80 63 38
1970 18,500 2.02 80 59 37
1975 21,600 3.35 75 57 36
1980 24,350 2.54 72 55 35
1985 28,300 3.24 65 49 33
1990 32,800 3.18 61 38 29
1997 39,500 3.13 53 31 25
*Yearly average for each period.
Sources: OECD (I8I, I8b); SIS(I66, I;I, I;;, I8:, I8;, II, I8).
Notes
1. 1 cc countries, Switzerland, Norway, csa and Canada. They are the main trade partners
of Turkey. Between 1o and 1;, woccb countries accounted for 6% of Turkeys
average annual international trade. When trade with other occb countries is also taken
into account, this proportion increases to 68% (sis 18; occb zoooa).
2. See Rowthorn & Kozul-Wright (18) for a critical analysis of structural convergence
supposition in the case of occb countries.
Capital & Class #77 110
3. See Richards (1;) for a discussion over debt contractions in Latin
American case.
4. For a critical appraisal of shareholding policies see, Baddon et al., 18.
5. See Sugur 1;, for a discussion of exible employment in Turkey.
6. A regular set of data specically for migration rate is not available,
instead the distribution of population between cities and rural areas
is given.
7. For some discussions on the issue see, Bruinessen 1;8, Enneli 16.
8. The total size of cultivated farmland in Turkey increased from (1.
million to (. million acres between 18o and 1; (sis, 18:
o(). The irrigation project, on the other hand, covers z million
acres of farmland (Ciment 16: 11z).
9. The labour market gures are internationally standardised by occb,
and include employment both in the formal and informal sectors.
10. This result is based on the recalculation of labour force and wai
gures given in Table vii according to a hypothetical assumption
that there was no increase in the schooling ratio and overall growth
rate of wai from 18o to 1;.
11. In 1;, around z. million civil servants were working for the
public sector. sii workers are those insured by the Social Security
Institution (sii). The gures for 1; indicate that approximately
(. million sii workers were employed by state economic enterprises
and other industrial sectors (sis 18).
12. Domestic debt calculations are based on the balance sheets of the
Central Bank, Money Deposit Banks, and Investment and Develop-
ment Banks (sis 186: o-, 18: 6o-6;).
13. Central parties on the left are the Democratic Left Party (bLi) and
Republican Populist Party (nii). The central right is represented
by the Mother Land Party (:Li) and the True Path Party (1ii).
See, Shmuelevitz 16, for the main ideological orientations of the
political parties in Turkey.
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