1 Article 8 The Judicial Department Cases on Sections 1-3 SEC.1 1. JUDICIA !"#E$ %. CASES Santia&o '.

. (autista Firstly, how the fuck does this deserve an En Banc ruling? This is not even sensational. Its just a whim of a father a!!arently a lawyer" who wanted to make good on his threat that he will file charges if his son doesnt get highest honors. #hy cant he acce!t the fact that, may$e, some students are fucking $etter than his son? #hat a faggot. Teodoro %antiago, &r. was a 'rade ( !u!il at %ero Elementary %chool in )ota$ato )ity. *e is herein re!resented $y his mother, +ngelita %antiago, with his father acting as legal counsel. &uanita Bautista was a teacher at the same school, acting as a mem$er of the )ommittee on the ,ating of %tudents for *onor of the same. Section 1 o) $ule *+ pro'ides, Petition for certiorari When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. -acts, s the school year !"#$%!"#& was then about to end, the '(ommittee on the )ating of *tudents for +onor' was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the 'honor students' of its graduating class. fter deliberations, the committee finally adjudged *ocorro ,edina, Patricia -i.gat and Teodoro *antiago, /r. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The graduation exercises would be on ,ay 0!. +owever, *antiago1s parents wasn1t contended with the 2rd honors that their son would receive, and so 2 days before the graduation exercises, the parents filed a complaint see3ing the invalidation of the 'ran3ing of honor students' thus made. This complaint was dismissed and the graduation exercises pushed through as planned. 4n ,ay 0$, the defendants motioned to dismiss the case, alleging that the action for certiorari was improper and the issue is already academic. )econsideration was filed but this was again dismissed on the following grounds5 That the petition does not comply with the 0nd paragraph of *ec. ! of )ule #& because it has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto6 That administrative remedies were not first exhausted6 and That there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the teachers who constituted the committee referred to. 4f course, on the other hand, defendants argue that, in addition to the abovementioned grounds, the 'committee on the ratings of students for honor' whose actions are here condemned by appellant is not the 'tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions' against which an action for certiorari may lie under *ection ! of )ule #&. Issue, Whether or not the committee of teachers whose decision is herein assailed falls within the category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by )ule #&. .eld, 7n this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers6 the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. 7n order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invo3ed in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist5 That there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and the said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations. That the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end. That the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. The so%called committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned tas3. 8efore tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or

property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. There is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Therefore, since the committee did not perform judicial or quasi%judicial functions, the petition for certiorari cannot prosper and is improper. (onsequently, the petitioner is hereby held to have no cause of action. /arcos '. /an&lapus Ferdinand -arcos was the dictator who fled after the original .eo!le .ower ,evolution of /01(. ,aul -angla!us was then the %ecretary of Foreign +ffairs. -acts, 9erdinand ,arcos was 3ic3ed out of the presidency via the :;* )evolution and was forced into exile. *ubsequently, (ory quino was declared President under a revolutionary government. +owever, the country was far from being stabili<ed as continued threats emerged from various sectors ranging from the rebels to the ,arcos loyalists. The economy had its own challenges as it fights to relieve itself of the devastating effect of the accumulated foreign debt as a result of the ill%mannered accumulation of wealth. When ,arcos was dying, he wished to return to the country along with his family but then President quino stood in his way and contended that ,arcos cannot return to the country considering that his

return would be a threat to the stability of the government and the country1s economy. Issue, Whether or not the President, in the exercise of powers granted by the (onstitution, can prohibit the ,arcoses from returning to the Philippines. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac3 or excess of jurisdiction, when she determined that the return of the ,arcoses to the Philippines posed a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return. .eld, The President has residual and discretionary powers not stated in the (onstitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. *he is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest as provided in *ections $ and & of rticle 0 of the (onstitution. )esidual powers, according to Theodore )oosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the (onstitution. Therefore, as part of her residual power, the President can ban the return of ,arcos and his family to the country considering the consequences which could pose a serious threat to national interest and welfare of the country. The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in barring ,arcoses from returning to the country. Their return, considering present time = circumstances, would pose a serious threat to national interest and welfare.

2 abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be answerable by the President. The state cannot sacrifice public peace, order, safety and our political and economic gains to give in to ,arcos1 wish to die in the country. (ompassion must give way to the other state interests. Cru10 dissentin&, s a citi<en of this country, it is ,arcos1 right to return, live = die in his own country. 7t is a right guaranteed by the (onstitution to all individuals. 9urther, the military has failed to show that ,arcos1 return would pose a threat to national security. 9ears were mere conjectures. !aras0 dissentin&, The rmed 9orces has failed to prove danger which would allow *tate to impair ,arcos1 right to return to the Philippines. Therefore, there is no substantial proof that ,arcos1 return would endanger national security or public safety. 9ears are speculative and, more importantly, the military admits that it1s under control. (ut 2here is the 3udicial part o) this4 7n the process of the litigation for this case, the (ourt was tas3ed to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac3 or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the President when she made that decision to bar the ,arcoses. Prior to this case and perhaps in less sensational cases, the (ourt could have decided to forego loo3ing into the President1s prerogative precisely because of the separation of powers doctrine. +owever, in this case, the (ourt made it a priority and a critical point that they establish the extents of the exercise of judicial review. 7n this case, the (ourt carefully examined the concept of judicial review and, subsequently, applied it. 7n the end, the (ourt found that judicial review extends, as applied in this case, to

-ernan0 concurrin&, The President1s power is not fixed. -imits would depend on the imperatives of events and not on

the factual basis of then President quino1s decision. This is because of the fact that if indeed quino had no factual or substantive basis for such decision, she has therefore committed grave abuse of discretion with respect to her powers and jurisdiction, which in turn can be loo3ed at and chec3ed by the powers granted to the *upreme (ourt. Eche&ara5 '. Secretar5 o) Justice 2eo Echegaray was a sick man who ra!ed his own daughter ,odessa Echegaray. The %ecretary of &ustice at the time of this case was %erafin )uevas. -acts, 4n $ /anuary !""", the *upreme (ourt issued a Temporary )estraining 4rder staying the execution of petitioner -eo :chegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent /ustice *ecretary assailed the issuance of the T)4 arguing that the action of the *upreme (ourt not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve. Issue, Whether or not the *upreme (ourt lost its jurisdiction over the case when the decision became final and executory. Whether or not the *upreme (ourt, by granting the T)4, has in effect granted reprieve, thereby encroaching upon the functions of the executive. .eld, 9irst of all, the *upreme (ourt is not modifying or amending anything in the original decision. The finality of a judgment does not mean that the (ourt has lost all its powers over the case. 8y the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. :ven after the judgment has become final the court retains its

jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment6 the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 9or after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible. The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. 7t cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our (onstitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one *upreme (ourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. 7t is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the same the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. 7n the same vein, it cannot be denied that (ongress can at any time amend ) >#&" ?;eath Penalty -aw@ by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is li3e that of commutation of sentence. 8ut by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by (ongress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the :xecutive, the -egislative and the /udiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. 7ndeed, in various *tates in the Anited *tates, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. 9or the public

3 respondents therefore to contend that only the :xecutive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co%equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government. United States '. 6i7on The 3nited %tates of +merica is a !owerful country north of -e4ico, east of the .acific, west of the +tlantic and south of )anada. 5i4on was a former !resident of the 3nited %tates. This case is a$out the sensational #atergate scandal. -acts, 7n /une !">0, five men armed with cameras and bugging equipment were arrested inside the ;emocratic Bational (ommitteeCs offices in the Watergate complex in Washington, ;.(. Police soon discovered that the burglars wor3ed, directly or indirectly, for the (ommittee to )e%:lect the President. Then President Bixon and leaders of his campaign denied any connection with the incident. The five men were convicted of burglary, along with +oward +unt, /r., a former Bixon aide, and Dordon -iddy, a lawyer for the (ommittee to )e%elect the President. *hortly afterward, the presiding judge received a letter from one of the convicted men. 7t spo3e of payoffs to the burglars in return for their silencethe men had perjured themselves to protect others involved in the brea3%in. 7n !">2, a *enate select committee began an investigation, and it became clear that top members of the Bixon administration were involved in a cover% up of the brea3%in and several other illegal actions. 7t was also discovered that Bixon had installed a taping system that automatically recorded all of his conversations with his advisors. special prosecutor appointed to probe the Watergate scandal

subpoenaed the tapes. Bixon refused to release them, claiming they were protected under executive privilege. Bixon eventually released some of the tapes, but portions of them had been erased. 9inally, another special prosecutor as3ed the Anited *tates *upreme (ourt to compel Bixon to release all of the tapes in their entirety. Issue, Whether or not the separation of powers doctrine created by the (onstitution provide the President with an absolute power to withhold information from other branches of government. 7f the power is not absolute, whether or not President Bixon is able to claim executive privilege under the aforementioned circumstances. Whether or not the separation of powers allow for the settlement of this dispute to reside in the executive branch or it should be settled in the judiciary. .eld, Bixon must surrender the tapes. The impediment that an absolute, unqualified executive privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the /udicial 8ranch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under rticle 777 ?8ill of )ights@. The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions. The *ixth mendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. ,oreover, the 9ifth mendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process. 7t is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced. The (ourt made it

clear that the President could not withhold evidence from an ongoing criminal prosecution of another person simply because he was the President. 6ote, 4n " ugust !">$, Bixon became the first President in Anited *tates history to resign from the presidency. +e did so in order to avoid going through the li3ely prospect of being impeached by the full +ouse of )epresentatives and convicted by the *enate. In)otech -oundation '. C"/E EC Infotech is an organi6ation. )7-E2E) is the constitutional commission which is, 8uite fairly, in need of an overhaul at least with res!ect to its mem$ers. %eriously, look at all the cases and !ertinent juris!rudence in !olitical law. )7-E2E) is the favorite defendant. Its either our election laws are inherently flawed or the minds of the commissioners almost all of which incidentally $ecame wealthier after their terms" are so s!ent. -acts, 4n 00 ;ecember !"">, (ongress enacted ) E$2# authori<ing (4,:-:( to use an automated election system ? :*@ for the !""E national and local elections. 7t also mandated the poll body to acquire automated counting machines ? (,s@, computer equipment, devices and materials6 and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. This failed in the !""E elections but was revived in the preparations for the 0FF$ elections. 4n 0$ /anuary 0FF2, then President Dloria ,acapagal% rroyo issued :4 !>0, which allocated P0.& billion to fund the :* for the 0FF$ elections. *ubsequently, the (4,:-:( issued an invitation to apply for eligibility and to bid. 4ut of the &> bidders, the 8ids and wards (ommittee found ,ega Pacific (onsortium ?,P(@ and the Total 7nformation ,anagement (orporation ?T7,(@ eligible. 9or technical evaluation, they were referred

4 to the 8 (1s Technical Wor3ing Droup ?TWD@ and the ;epartment of *cience and Technology ?;4*T@. fter evaluation, ;4*T said that both ,P( and T7,( had failed in the technical evaluation. Botwithstanding these failures, (4,:-:( awarded the project to ,P(. 4n 0" ,ay 0FF2, five individuals and entities ?including 7nfotech 9oundation, represented by its president, lfredo Torres@ wrote a letter to (4,:-:( (hairman 8enjamin balos. They protested the award of the (ontract to ,P( due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted. (iting therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements, they sought a re% bidding. Issue, Whether or not the (4,:-:(, the agency vested with the exclusive constitutional mandate to oversee elections, gravely abused its discretion when, in the exercise of its administrative functions, it awarded to ,P( the contract. Whether or not the petitioners1 legal standing should be recogni<ed and upheld despite the fact that they don1t meet the rule on legal standing. .eld, (4,:-:(1s awarding of the subject contract is not only in clear violation of law and jurisprudence, but also in rec3less disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure. 9or the automation of the counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 0FF$ elections, (4,:-:( awarded the contract to G,ega Pacific (onsortiumH an entity that had not participated in the bidding. 4n the other hand, petitioners %% suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citi<ens %% respond that the issues central to this case are 'of transcendental importance and of

national interest.' llegedly, (4,:-:(1s flawed bidding and questionable award of the contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government. SEC.% 1. C"68$ESS A6D JUDICIA !"#E$ %. CASES /ala&a '. !enachos0 Jr. I wasnt a$le to find the original te4t of the case. -acts, 7n !"E!, during ,artial -aw, then President 9erdinand ,arcos issued P; !E!E which provided that no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy in'ol'in& an in)rastructure pro3ect, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or governmental official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation. pparently because ,alaga was somehow affected by this, it was assailed in this petition. As held in Datiles '. Sucaldito, The injunctions see3 to restrain the administrative agencies and its officials would in effect amount to

interference by the court or the substitution of its judgment for that of the said administrative agency in the discharge of its functions in pursuing infrastructure projects in question. The issuance of an injunction is clearly covered by the peremptory language of P; !E!E. While the prohibition is by no means absolute, as the courts are not prevented from exercising jurisdiction where questions of law are involved. As held in the case o) 9amora '. Ca:allero, 7n ,alaga, the (ourt declared that although P; !E!E prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. 4n issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this (ourt declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. SEC.3 1. -ISCA AUT"6"/; %. CASES $adio2ealth0 Inc. '. A&re&ado ,adiowealth was the vendor of the e8ui!ment and accessories which the government $ought for the offices of the %u!reme )ourt. -anuel +gregado was then the +uditor 'eneral of the .hili!!ines. -acts, The government bought equipment ?! Webster Teletal3 ,odel 0F# , and # Webster Telephone *pea3ers@ and other supplies from )adiowealth. +owever the (hairman of the Property )equisition (ommittee appointed by the President disapproved the purchase and installation as contrary to the

5 provisions of :F 20, and the policy adopted by the (abinet last year, discontinuing open mar3et purchases, and also a violation of the requirements of :4 0"E. Botwithstanding this, )adiowealth wanted to be paid their due, but the uditor Deneral did not budge and refused to pay them. Issue, Whether or not the uditor Deneral, as part of the :xecutive ;epartment, was correct in his decision to withhold payment of the equipment that the *upreme (ourt bought from )adiowealth. .eld, Bo one denies the power of the uditor Deneral to audit, in accordance with law and administrative regulations, expenditures of funds or property pertaining to or held in trust by the government or the provinces or municipalities thereof. This flows from *ection 0, rticle I7 of the (onstitution. Beither does the court claim exemption from the authority vested in the uditor Deneral to examine, audit and settle all accounts of the government or to bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant ?*ection 2, rticle I7 of the (onstitution@. 4n the other hand, this authority is absolute. The (onstitution defines the limits of the uditor DeneralCs powers, and it provides a remedy against his actions when he transcends those bounds. The uditor DeneralCs decisions in cases affecting an executive department, bureau, office or officer are appealable to the President, and in those affecting the rights of private citi<ens to the *upreme (ourt. The uditor DeneralCs authority to audit disapprove this courtCs expenditures has to limited to the conditions prescribed by the (onstitution, or statute, if there be one, which did not invade the courtCs independence. :xecutive and administrative orders and regulations

6 promulgated by officers who have no jurisdiction under the law or the (onstitution over the court, can give no justification or validity to the uditor DeneralCs decision. 7n the absence of express and valid legislation, the uditor Deneral may not question the courtCs expenditures except when they are irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant. 4utside of these exceptions his duty to approve the payments is mandatory6 and even when the objection is that the expenditures are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant, his decisions are not final. The uditor DeneralCs ruling under review does not critici<e the expenditure in question on any of the above purchase and installation of a teletal3 and telehome spea3ers in the offices of the (hief /ustice and of the cler3 of court has been explained in the cler3Cs statement6 the cost of the equipment and labor has been certified to be the lowest obtainable on the mar3et, and there is appropriation from which the items may lawfully be paid for. (en&1on '. Drilon )esar Beng6on was the )hief &ustice of the .hili!!ines from /0(/ until /0((. In 5ovem$er /0((, a few months after his retirement, he $ecame the first Fili!ino to $e a!!ointed to the International )ourt of &ustice. The !etitioners herein are retired &ustices of the %u!reme )ourt and )ourt of +!!eals who are currently receiving monthly !ensions under ,e!u$lic +ct 5o. 0/9 as amended $y ,e!u$lic +ct 5o. /:0:. Franklin ;rilon, at the time of this case, was acting as the E4ecutive %ecretary. -acts, 4n 0F /une !"&2, ) "!F was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of /ustices of the *upreme (ourt and of the (ourt of ppeals who have rendered at least 0F years service either in the /udiciary or in any other branch of the Dovernment or in both, having attained the age of >F years or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The retired /ustice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. This ) was amended by ) !>"> which provided that in case the salary of /ustices of the *upreme (ourt or of the (ourt of ppeals is increased or decreased, such increased or decreased salary shall, for purposes of this ct, be deemed to be the salary or the retirement pension which a /ustice who as of !0 /une !"&$ had ceased to be such to accept another position in the Dovernment or who retired was receiving at the time of his cessation in office. Provided, that any benefits that have already accrued prior to such increase or decrease shall not be affected thereby. Two months later, however, then President ,arcos issued P; #$$ repealing *ection 2% of ) !>"> which authori<ed the adjustment of the pension of the retired /ustices of the *upreme (ourt, (ourt of ppeals, (hairman and members of the (onstitutional (ommissions and the officers and enlisted members of the rmed 9orces to the prevailing rates of salaries. P; !#2E was eventually issued by ,arcos which provided that the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. ) !>"> was restored through +ouse 8ill !#0"> in !""F. When her advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in !""0 Deneral ppropriations ct were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in !""F, President quino issued the veto now challenged in this petition. 7t turns out that P; #$$ which repealed ) !>"> never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law. 7t follows that ) !>"> was still in effect and +8 !#0"> was useless because it tried to restore benefits which were never ta3en away validly. The veto of +8 !#0"> did not also produce any effect. Issue, Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the D of !""0 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired /ustices is constitutional or valid. .eld, The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of !""0 D are declared valid and subsisting. The veto of these specific provisions in the D is tantamount to dictating to the /udiciary of its funds should be utili<ed, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the /udiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. ny argument which see3s to remove special privileges given by law to former /ustices on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or Gpreferential treatmentH to retired /ustices ignores these provisions of the (onstitution and in effect as3s that these (onstitutional provisions on special protections for the /udiciary be repealed. 6ote )rom the :oo<, The provisions which were vetoed by then President were in effect for so long. *he vetoed those items, apparently, because she was misinformed. SEC.= 1. CASES -ortich '. Corona )arlos Fortich was then !rovincial governor or Bukidnon and ,enato )orona was the E4ecutive %ecretary of then .resident -aca!agal<+rroyo. 'arilao was then +grarian ,eform %ecretary.

-acts, 4n Bovember !""$, then grarian )eform *ecretary Darilao denied the application for conversation of hectares of land from agricultural to agro%industrial use and ordered its distribution to qualified landless farmers. 8 7; ?8u3idnon gro%7ndustrial ;evelopment ssociation@ and BJ*) ,anagement and ;evelopment (orporation filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. Thereafter, then 8u3idnon Dovernor (arlos 9ortich sent a letter to then President )amos requesting him to suspend the Darilao 4rder and to confirm the ordinance enacted by the *angguniang 8ayan of *umilao converting the subject land from agricultural to industrialKinstitutional land. cting on the letter, then :xecutive *ecretary Torres reversed the Darilao 4rder and upheld the power of local government units to convert portions of their agricultural lands into industrial areas. *ubsequently, Darilao filed a motion for reconsideration. dmittedly tardy, which was denied by then :xecutive *ecretary Torres on the ground that the decision had already become final and executory ?in view of the lapse of the fifteen%day period for filing a motion for reconsideration@L second motion for reconsideration was filed during the pendency of which President )amos constituted the Presidential 9act%9inding Tas3 9orce. 4n Bovember !"">, then ;eputy :xecutive *ecretary (orona issued the herein%assailed 'win%win' resolution which, pursuant to the recommendations of the tas3 force, substantially modified the Torres decision by awarding one hundred ?!FF@ hectares of the *umilao property to the qualified farmer beneficiaries and allocating only forty four ?$$@ hectares for the establishment of an industrial and commercial <one. ,otions for reconsideration were filed and a resolution was promulgated regarding this case on pril !""E affirming the assailed (orona decision. 7n a Bovember !""E resolution, the *upreme (ourt

voted two%two which affirmed the pril !""E resolution, again on separate motions for reconsideration filed by the respondents. Bow, respondents argue that the Bovember !""E resolution did not effectively resolve the matter inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the *upreme (ourt sitting en banc, pursuant to *ection $?2@, rticle E of the (onstitution. Issue, Whether or not the matter should have been brought to the *upreme (ourt, sitting en banc. .eld, careful reading of *ection $?2@, rticle E of the (onstitution reveals the intention to draw a distinction between cases and matters such that cases are GdecidedH while matters, which include motions, are GresolvedH. 4therwise put, the word GdecidedH must refer to GcasesH6 while the word GresolvedH must refer to GmattersH, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the concerned provision but also of the other provisions of the (onstitution where these words appear. With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the (ourt en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. (onversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. +ence, the second sentence of the provision spea3s only of GcaseH and not GmatterH. The reason is simple. The above%quoted *ection $?2@, rticle E pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. 7f there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the (ourt en $anc. 4n the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the

7 failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Juite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. *uch was the ruling of this (ourt in the )esolution of Bovember !>, !""E. !eople '. D5 Bryan Ferdinand ;y was a convicted ra!ist. -acts, +ntecedent facts are as follows= 7n or a$out /> &anuary /00?, in Baguio, and within the jurisdiction of the ,T), the a$ove<named accused, cons!iring and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully and taking advantage of the unconscious state of the com!lainant who was then under the influence of drugs, have carnal knowledge of 'ina -arie -o$ley against her will and consent. ccused%appellants 8ryan 9erdinand ;y and Diovan 8ernardino filed separate motions for reconsideration of the *upreme (ourt1s decision which affirmed the judgment of 8aguio )T(, 8ranch &, finding them guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. 7n his motion, ;y argues that the *upreme (ourt1s decision should have been merely recommendatory, in view of the provision of *ection &?0@ ?d@, rticle E of the (onstitution which provides that the *upreme (ourt sitting en banc has jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. +e contends that *upreme (ourt (ircular Bo. 0%E" which provides that death penalty cases shall be within the jurisdiction of the (ourt en

banc is incongruous and incompatible with the aforementioned constitutional provision. Issue, Whether or not the *upreme (ourt1s decision was only recommendatory. .eld, Ander *ection $?!@, rticle E of the (onstitution, the *upreme (ourt may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. t present, it is made up of three divisions. +owever, the divisions of the *upreme (ourt are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts. ctions considered in any of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. The divisions are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts, but as divisions of one and the same court. !eople '. E:io 'erry E$io was a convicted ra!ist who a$used his own daughter, ;ory E$io. Facts: +ntecedent facts are as follows= 7n +!ril >999, ;ory was !re!aring to slee! in the sala. Then, 'erry, a!!arently drunk, a!!roached the her and told her to transfer to the $edroom $ecause they were already crowded in the sala. +rmed with a si4<inch long $laded instrument, 'erry ordered her to undress and threatened to kill her if she would not com!ly. +fraid of the threat, she took off her shorts and !anty. 'erry also took off his shorts, mounted her and had carnal knowledge of her. %he felt !ain and cried. The !rivate com!lainant was silent during the se4ual assault $ecause he threatened to kill her if she would talk or shout. +fter the assault, she !ut on her shorts and !anty and again lay down. %he remained inside the room, crying.

4n !$ 4ctober 0FF0, Derry :bio was convicted by the *upreme (ourt of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. The Public ttorney1s 4ffice moved for reconsideration on the ground that the (ourt lac3ed a quorum when the case was deliberated as it appears that the decision was signed only by seven justices. 7n a )esolution dated > *eptember 0FF$, the *upreme (ourt granted the ,otion for )econsideration, ruling that there is no question that the (ourt1s decision in the case was concurred in by majority of the members of the (ourt who actually too3 part in the deliberations. 7t was in fact unanimously signed by the seven justices who were present during the deliberations. Issue, Whether or not the > concurring justices constituted a quorum of the !$%member court. .eld, The term 'quorum' has been defined as 'that number of members of the body which, when legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business, or, in other words, that number that ma3es a lawful body and gives it power to pass a law or ordinance or do any other valid corporate act.H The question of the number of judges necessary to authori<e the transaction of business by a court is as a general rule to be determined from the (onstitution or statutory provisions creating and regulating the courts, and as a general rule a majority of the members of a court is a 'quorum' for the transaction of business and the decision of cases. The (onstitution is clear on the quorum when the (ourt meets by ;ivision. There should be at least three members present for the ;ivision to conduct its business. This may be deduced from paragraph 2 of *ection $ rticle E. There is no similar pronouncement, however, when the (ourt meets en

8 banc. The 0nd paragraph of *ection $, rticle E of the (onstitution does not expressly state the number of justices required to be present to constitute a quorum of the (ourt en banc. The deliberations of the !"E> (onstitution are also silent on what constitutes a quorum when the (ourt is composed of only fourteen members. 7n case of doubt in a criminal case, especially where the death penalty is imposed, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. The case should be readmitted for deliberation of the (ourt, en banc. SEC.+ 1. !"#E$S "- T.E S.C. C ASSI-IED %. JUDICIA $E>IE# 3. JUDICIA $E>IE#, CASE?C"6T$">E$S; /ar:ur5 '. /adison -ar$ury was then the a!!ointed )olum$ia &ustice. -adison was then %ecretary of the %tate. Section %@%A0 Article 3 o) the Constitution 7n all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a *tate shall be a party, the *upreme (ourt shall have original jurisdiction. 7n all the other cases before mentioned the *upreme (ourt shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the (ongress shall ma3e. Judiciar5 Act o) 1B8C The *upreme (ourt shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after provided for6 and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts and writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the Anited *tates.

-acts, The case began on ,arch 0, !EF!, when an obscure 9ederalist, William ,arbury, was designated as a justice of the peace in the ;istrict of (olumbia. ,arbury and several others were appointed to government posts created by (ongress in the last days of /ohn damsCs presidency, but these last% minute appointments were never fully finali<ed. The disgruntled appointees invo3ed an act of (ongress and sued for their jobs in the *upreme (ourt. :ssentially, then outgoing President /ohn dams had appointed William ,arbury as justice of the peace in (olumbia, but the new *ecretary of *tate, /ames ,adison, refused to deliver it. ,arbury then sued to obtain it. Issue, Whether or not the *upreme (ourt was the correct place for ,arbury to see3 his desired relief. .eld, The justices held, through forceful arguments, that the (onstitution was 'the fundamental and paramount law of the nation' and that 'an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.' 7n other words, when the (onstitution%%the nationCs highest law%% conflicts with an act of the legislature, that act is invalid. This case establishes the *upreme (ourtCs power of judicial review. 6ote, This conflict raised the important question of what happens when an act of (ongress conflicts with the (onstitution. ,arshall answered that acts of (ongress that conflict with the (onstitution are not law and the (ourts are bound instead to follow the (onstitution, affirming the principle of judicial review. 7n support of this position ,arshall loo3ed to the nature of the written (onstitutionthere would be no point of having a written (onstitution if the courts

could just ignore it. 'To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrainedL' ,arshall also argued that the very nature of the judicial function requires courts to ma3e this determination. *ince it is a courtCs duty to decide cases, courts have to be able to decide what law applies to each case. Therefore, if two laws conflict with each other, a court must decide which law applies. 9inally, ,arshall pointed to the judgeCs oath requiring them to uphold the (onstitution, and to the *upremacy (lause of the (onstitution, which lists the '(onstitution' before the 'laws of the Anited *tates.' -urther note, The landmar3 decision inspired the current engraving on the *upreme (ourt1s wall, which reads as follows5 It is em!hatically the !rovince and duty of the &udicial ;e!artment to say what the law is. An&ara '. Electoral Commission In the elections of /0@A, &ose +ngara and .edro Bnsua were candidates voted for the !osition of mem$ers of the 5ational +ssem$ly for the first district of Taya$as. -acts, 4n 4ctober !"2&, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed ngara as member%elect of the Bational ssembly and on Bovember !"2&, he too3 his oath of office. 4n ;ecember !"2&, the Bational ssembly passed )esolution Bo. E, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. 4n E ;ecember !"2&, Mnsua filed before the :lectoral (ommission a protest against ngara and praying that Mnsua be declared elected ,ember of the Bational ssembly or that the election of said position be nullified. This motion was

9 dismissed. 4n " ;ecember !"2&, the :lectoral (ommission adopted a resolution stating that last day for filing of protests is on ;ec. ". ngara contended that the (onstitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the :lectoral (ommission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the Bational ssembly and the *upreme (ourt therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. Issue, Whether or not the *upreme (ourt has jurisdiction over the :lectoral (ommission and the subject matter of the controversy. .eld, The :lectoral (ommission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to ta3e cogni<ance of the protest filed by the Mnsua against the election of ngara, and that the resolution of the Bational ssembly on 2 ;ecember !"2&, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the Bational ssembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the :lectoral (ommission might prescribe. 6ote, 7n the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the Bational ssembly on the one hand and the :lectoral (ommission on the other. lthough the :lectoral (ommission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The :lectoral (ommission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and

agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. Tolentino '. Secretar5 o) -inance +rturo Tolentino was the creator of the Family )ode, and was the 0th Cice<.resident of the .hili!!ines. The %ecretary of Finance at the time of this case was ,o$erto ;e 7cam!o. -acts, The value%added tax ?N T@ is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. ) >>!# was issued, see3ing to widen the tax base of the existing N T system and enhance its administration by amending the Bational 7nternal )evenue (ode. Ansurprisingly, a barrage of suits challenging the constitutionality of ) >>!# on various grounds was filed. 4ne contention is that ) >>!# did not originate exclusively in the +ouse of )epresentatives as required by *ection 0$, rticle # of the (onstitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 0 distinct bills, +ouse !!!"> and *enate !#2F. There is also a contention that *enate !#2F did not pass 2 readings as required by the (onstitution. .eld, Whether or not ) >>!# violates *ections 0$ and 0#?0@ or rticle # of the (onstitution. .eld, The argument that ) >>!# did not originate exclusively in the +ouse of )epresentatives as required by *ection 0$, rticle # of the (onstitution is wrong. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the (onstitution to originate exclusively in the +ouse of )epresentatives. To insist

that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the +ouse bill would be to deny the *enate1s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. 7ndeed, what the (onstitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authori<ing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the +ouse of )epresentatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the +ouse can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Bor does the (onstitution prohibit the filing in the *enate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the +ouse, so long as action by the *enate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the +ouse bill. The fact that *enate !#2F did not pass 2 readings on separate days as required by the (onstitution was because the second and third readings were done on the same day. 8ut this was because the President had certified such as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 2 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. (ut 2here is the 3udicial part in this4 *ome petitioners were complaining that their constitutionally protected rights under the 8ill of )ights are being impaired. The (ourt said that when cases present these controversies, the (ourt must exercise its (onstitutional duty. +owever, the (ourt cannot invo3e this duty to justify this (ourtCs intervention in what is essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy, as *ection &?0@, rticle E clearly defines

10 our jurisdiction in terms of 'cases,' and nothing but 'cases.' That the other departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an independent ground for exercising our power. ;isregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only result in undermining the *upreme (ourt1s authority as a court of law. 9or, as judges, what the *upreme (ourt is called upon to render is judgment according to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of the day. (ut 2h5 did the Court sa5 that the issues raised :5 the petitioners are not 5et ripe )or ad3udication @prematureA4 s the words of the original case states, G7ndeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm ma3es the need for judicial intervention less evident and underscores the essential nature of petitionersC attac3 on the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of due process and equal protection and impairment of contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits of the law. 9or the fact is that there have even been no notices of assessments issued to petitioners and no determinations at the administrative levels of their claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of the law and enable us to reach sound judgment regarding so fundamental questions as those raised in these suits.H Tan '. /acapa&al Eugene Tan was re!resenting the !eo!le of the .hili!!ines. ;iosdado -aca!agal was acting on $ehalf of the other delegates to the /0:/ )onstitutional )onvention. -acts, Petitioners are assailing the validity of the -aurel% -eido )esolution, dealing with the range of the authority of the !">! (onstitutional (onvention, and

wants the (ourt to declare that it is 'without power, under *ection !, rticle !& of the (onstitution and ) #!20, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which see3 to revise the present (onstitution through the adoption of a form of government other than the form now outlined in the present (onstitution Othe (onvention beingP merely empowered to propose improvements to the present (onstitution without altering the general plan laid down therein.' This was dismissed. The petitioners then filed another petition, this time longer, hinging on merican /urisprudence, and this is the case at bar. 4ctober #, !">! Q Tan, cejas, and 9ernande< ?as taxpayers@ assailed the validity of the -aurel%-eido )esolution. -aurel%-eido )esolution deals with the range of the authority of the !">! (onstitutional (onvention. 7t see3s to replace the present ?!"2&@ (onstitution by adopting a form of government other than the form outlined in the present (onstitution. ccording to the petitioners, the (onstitution (onvention is merely empowered to propose amendments and must not alter the general plan. Issues, !. ;o petitioners have legal standing in assailing the validity of the -aurel%-eido )esolutionL 0. 7s the matter ripe for adjudicationL .eld?$atio, !. Petitioners do not have legal standing. 0. The matter is not ripe for adjudication. Therefore, petitioners1 motion for reconsideration cannot be sustained. !. B4 -:D - *T B;7BD

7t does not mean that in each and every instance where such ground ?locus standi as taxpayers@ is invo3ed, the (ourt is left with no alternative but to hear the parties. o G s far as taxpayer1s suit is concerned, this (ourt is not devoid of discretion as to WKB it should be entertained.H 0. B4T )7P: 94) ;/A;7( T74B o 7n Don<ales v. (4,:-:(, Don<ales waited before filing his suit until after the enactment of the statutes. +e acted in accordance with the controllin& doctrine, which requires something to be accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture. o *uch doctrine also applies when the inquiry concerns the scope of the competence lodged in the (onstitutional (onvention. s long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. The judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its responsibility according to its lights. !acu '. Secretar5 o) Education =. JUDICIA $E>IE#D "CUS STA6DI Jo5a ' !C88 -acts, Petitioner, ;ean /ose /oya, a Bational rtist, is joined by several other prominent 9ilipino artists

11 ?(armen Duerrero Ba3pil, Nirgilio lmario, -ucrecia Rasilag, Rerima Polotan, etc.@. Petitioners see3 to prevent the auction sale by the P(DD in (hristie1s of Bew Mor3 of E0 4ld ,asters paintings and silverware sei<ed from ,alaca.ang and the ,etropolitan ,useum of ,anila after the ,arcoses fled. Paintings and silverware were allegedly ill%gotten by the ,arcoses. Petitioners contend that the items for auction are Gcultural treasures of the nationH which rt. I7N, *ec. !$%!E of the !"E> (onstitution protects. Issues5 !. W4B petitioners have legal standing to file the case 0. W4B said paintings and silverware are Gcultural treasures of the nationH 2. W4B said paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion $. W4B P(DD has jurisdiction and authority to enter in agreement with (hristie1s of Bew Mor3 &. W4B P(DD has complied with due process #. W4B the petition has become moot and academic .eld, !. 6", petitioners have no legal standing ?locus standi@ e&al standin& Q personal and substantial ?material@ interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. Paintings were donated by private persons to the ,etropolitan ,useum of ,anila 9oundation, a non%stoc3, non% profit organi<ation. *ilverware were donated to the ,arcos couple by friends on the occasion of their 0&th wedding anniversary.

Therefore, paintings and silverware are 6"T public property. Petitioners won1t sustain direct injury if they are sold. lso can1t be tried as a taxpayer suit. Taxpayer suit can only prosper if the governmental acts involve dis:ursement of public funds. uction of the items are dispositions, not disbursements.

;efinition5 !. -ocus *tandi% legal standing before the court 0. -is ,ota% The cause of the suit or action. 8y this term is understood the commencement of the controversy, and the beginning of the suit. 3. 7n Nacuo% In isolationD 2ithout re)erence to related e'idence -acts, Petitioner see3s to have this (ourt declare as unconstitutional *ections 0E and $$ of )epublic ct Bo. >0>", otherwise 3nown as the Arban ;evelopment and +ousing ct of !""0. +e predicates his locust standi on5 !. +is being a consultant of the ;epartment of Public Wor3s and +ighways ?;PW+@ pursuant to a (ontract of (onsultancy on 4peration for )emoval of 4bstructions and :ncroachments on Properties of Public ;omain ?executed immediately after his retirement on 0 /anuary !""0 from the Philippine Bational Police@ 0. +is being a taxpayer. s to the first, he alleges that said *ections 0E and $$ 'contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as drawbac3' to his 'tas3s and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures'6 because of the said sections, he 'is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past.' s a taxpayer, he alleges that 'he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed.' 4n !$ ,ay !""2, the *olicitor Deneral filed his (omment to the petition. +e maintains that, the instant petition is devoid of merit for non%compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law.

%. 6" The ;irector of the ,useum issued a certification that said items are not Gcultural treasures of the nationH 2. ?answered in S!@ $. not discussed &. not discussed *. ;ES (ase is moot because the items were already auctioned off. The (ourt has the discretion to ta3e cogni<ance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. Bo such justification in the case at bar. !ETITI"6 DIS/ISSED

12 +e contends that there is no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely as3s for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the ct as he does not state that he has property 'being squatted upon' and that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. +e argues that *ections 0E and $$ of the ct are not constitutionality infirm. Issue, Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing .eld, 7t is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented. To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are5 ?a@ The existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination ?b@ The constitutional question must be raised by a proper property ?c@ The constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity ?d@ The resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. T proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. 7t is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two ?0@ fundamental requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. ,oreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually

/ACASIA6" '. 6ational .ousin& Authorit5 !" ICE 8E6E$A E>; /ACASIA6" @$et.A0 in his capacit5 as the consultant o) the Department o) !u:lic #or<s and .i&h2a5s @D!#.A Tas< -orce on Demolition and?or in his personal capacit5 as ta7pa5er0 petitioner, vs. 6ATI"6A ."USI68 AUT."$IT;0 ."USI68 A6D A6D USE $E8U AT"$; ("A$D and 6ATI"6A /A!!I68 $ES"U$CES I6-"$/ATI"6 AUT."$IT;0 respondents.

prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said ct. /udicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. /udicial power is the 'right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants.' The petition also anchored his locus standi on the fact that he is a tax payer. 8ut in Tan vs. ,acapagal, it was decided that Gas far as tax payer1s suit is concerned, this (ourt is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained.H Wherefore, for lac3 of merit, the instant petition is ;7*,7**:; with costs against the petitioner. :xtra 7nfo5 )epublic ct Bo >0>" section 0E Eviction and ;emolition. D Eviction or demolition as a !ractice shall $e discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may $e allowed under the following situations= a" #hen !ersons or entities occu!y danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, gar$age dum!s, river$anks, shorelines, waterways, and other !u$lic !laces such as sidewalks, roads, !arks, and !laygroundsE $" #hen government infrastructure !rojects with availa$le funding are a$out to $e im!lementedE or c" #hen there is a court order for eviction and demolition. In the e4ecution of eviction or demolition orders involving under!rivileged and homeless citi6ens, the following shall $e mandatory=

/" 5otice u!on the effected !ersons or entities at least thirty @9" days !rior to the date of eviction or demolitionE >" +de8uate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated re!resentatives of the families to $e resettled and the affected communities in the areas where they are to $e relocatedE @" .resence of local government officials or their re!resentatives during eviction or demolitionE ?" .ro!er identification of all !ersons taking !art in the demolitionE A" E4ecution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from -ondays to Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwiseE (" 5o use of heavy e8ui!ment for demolition e4ce!t for structures that are !ermanent and of concrete materialsE :" .ro!er uniforms for mem$ers of the .hili!!ine 5ational .olice who shall occu!y the first line of law enforcement and o$serve !ro!er distur$ance control !roceduresE and 1" +de8uate relocation, whether tem!orary or !ermanent= .rovided, however, That in cases of eviction and demolition !ursuant to a court order involving under!rivileged and homeless citi6ens, relocation shall $e undertaken $y the local government unit concerned and the 5ational *ousing +uthority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty<five ?A" days from service of notice of final judgment $y the court, after which !eriod the said order shall $e e4ecuted= .rovided, further, That should relocation not $e !ossi$le within the said !eriod, financial assistance in the amount e8uivalent to the !revailing

13 minimum daily wage multi!lied $y si4ty (9" days shall $e e4tended to the affected families $y the local government unit concerned. This ;e!artment of the Interior and 2ocal 'overnment and the *ousing and 3r$an ;evelo!ment )oordinating )ouncil shall jointly !romulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the a$ove !rovision. )epublic ct Bo >0>" section $$ Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition. There shall be a moratorium on the eviction of all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of their houses or dwelling units for a period of three (3 !ears from the effectivit! of this "ct: #rovided$ That the moratorium shall not appl! to those persons who have constructed their structures after the effectivit! of this "ct and for cases enumerated in %ection &' hereof. /ariano Jr. '. Commision on Elections -acts, 7. )epublic ct Bo. >E&$ entitled G n ct (onverting the ,unicipality of ,a3ati into a +ighly Arbani<ed (ity to be 3nown as the (ity of ,a3atiH was passed. petitioned was filed by individuals, suing as taxpayers. 4nly one was a resident of ,a3ati, while the others were residents of 7bayo Asusan, Taguig and ,etro ,anila. They assailed certain sections of the act unconstitutional on the following grounds5 77. *ec. &!5 GPresent 4fficials of the ,unicipality of ,a3ati shall continue as the officials of the (ity of ,a3ati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is heldH 1. *ection 0 did not properly identify the land area of territorial jurisdiction of ,a3ati by

14 metes and bounds, with technical description. 2. *ection &! attempts to alter or restart the Gthree consecutive termH limit for local effective officials. 3. *ection &2 a@ increases the legislative district of ,a3ati only by special law, b@ increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill and c@ the addition of another legislative district in ,a3ati is not in accord with the (onstitution because the population of ,a3ati stands at only $&F,FFF. Bote5 D.). Bo. !!E#0> was filed by petitioner /ohn +. 4smena as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citi<en. +e assails *ection &0 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated. Issue, Whether or not )epublic ct Bo. >E&$ sections 0, &!, and &0 are unconstitutional .eld?$atio !. The delineation of the land area did not change even an inch previously covered by ,a3ati as a municipality. *ection 0 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of ,a3ati. *ection 0 stated that, the city1s land area Gshall comprise the present territory of the municipality.H lso, the reason why the land area was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions was because there was a territorial dispute between the municipalities of ,a3ati and Taguig over 9ort 8onifacio under court litigation. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by ma3ing a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. 4ut of respect, legislators felt that they should leave it up to the courts to decide. "posa '. -actoran Jr. 0. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events li3e ,ayor 8inay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections6 that he would be re%elected in said elections6 and that he would see3 re%election for the same position in the !""E elections. Petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. 2. *ame as with the Tobias vs. balos case, the (onstitution did not preclude (ongress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is exactly what was done by (ongress in enacting ) Bo. >E&$ and providing for an increase in ,a3ati1s legislative district Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in ,a3ati is not in accord with section &?2@, rticle # of the (onstitution because as of the latest survey in ,a3ati ?!""F@, census stood at $&F,FFF. *aid section provides that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand shall have at least one representative. 7n petitioner1s contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in ,a3ati should have been expressly stated in the bill, the court ruled that Git should be sufficient compliance if the title expressed the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject. Eilos:a5an '. 8uin&ona0 Jr. !onente, ;avide, /r !etitioner, non%stoc3 domestic corporation composed of civic%spirited citi<ens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice and national renewal represented by its 84T6 *en Webb and Tanada6 and )ep. / rroyo in their capacities as taxpayers, and concerned citi<ensKmembers of congress. $espondent, Duingona /r. -acts, This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which see3s to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the G(ontract of -easeH executed by the P(*4 and the Philippine Daming ,anagement (orporation in connection with the on%line lottery system, also 3now as Glotto.H Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on% line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. 7t submitted that said contract of lease violated *ection ! of ). . Bo. !!#", as amended by 8. P. 8lg. $0. )espondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the 9oreign 7nvestment ct of !""!6 that the issues of Gwisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews6H and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit. Issues,

15 !. #hether or not petitioners ha'e the le&al standin& to )ile the instant petition. 0. #hether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid. .eld, s to the preliminary issue, the (ourt resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The (ourt adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of (ongress, and even association of planters, and non%profit civic organi<ations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities. #hen the su:3ect in issue is transcendental interest to the pu:lic0 te court entertains the suit e'en i) those suin& do not ha'e a personal and direct interest sucha that the5 are stand to su))er harm. +s to the su$stantive issue, the )ourt agrees with the !etitioners whether the contract in 8uestion is one of lease or whether the .'-) is merely an inde!endent contractor should not $e decided on the $asis of the title or designation of the contract $ut $y the intent of the !arties, which may $e gathered from the !rovisions of the contract itself. +nimus homini est anima scri!ti. The intention of the !arty is the soul of the instrument. Therefore the instant !etition is granted and the challenged )ontract of 2ease is here$y declared contrary to law and invalid. 6"TE, The Dreen 8oo3 says that $ months later, a second Filos$ayan case was heard and the decision to the former was reversed. Please read page "># of green boo3. Tatad '. 8arcia0 Jr .etitioners 9rancisco Tatad, /ohn 4smena, )odolfo 8ia<on suing in their capacities as Senators and ta7pa5ers ,es!ondents /esus Darcia, /r.incumbent *ecretary of the ;ept. of Transportation and (ommunication ?;4T(@ :;* -)T (orporation -td.private respondent6 Private (orporation organi<ed under +ong Rong laws Facts 7n !"E" ;4T( planned to construct :;* -)T 777, traversing Pasay, Jue<on, ,andaluyong, and ,a3ati (ity The G)evised and )estated greement to 8uild, -ease and Transfer a -ight )ailway Transit *ystem for :;* H ? pril !""0@ and the G*upplemental greement to the 00 pril !""0 )evised and )estated greement to 8uild, -ease and Transfer a -ight )ailway Transit *ystem for :;* H ?,ay !""2@ granted :;* -)T (orp. -td., a foreign corporation, ownership of :;* -)T 777 unconstitutionalU Taxpayers are disallowed to do this when only municipal contracts are involved ?8ugnay (onstruction and ;ev1t. (orp. v. -aron@ -:D - *T B;7BD AP+:-;U

(ssue(s The only issue discussed as far as the case boo3 is concerned is W4B petitioners are real parties%in%interest and have legal standing to institute this petition )eld Taxpayers may question contracts entered into by the government or government% owned or controlled corporations when allegedly in contravention of law ?Rilosayan, 7nc. v. Duingona@

*oncurring (+. Mendo,a (oncurs with the rest of the decision except the legal standing issue B4 -egal standing as member of (ongress o Bo allegation of infringement of prerogatives as legislators B4 -egal standing as taxpayers o Bo allegation of unconstitutional exercise of taxing or spending powers of the (ongress ? rt. N7, *ec. 0$,0&,0"@ or illegal disbursement of public money o taxpayer must prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract ?8ugnay (onst. and ;ev. (orp. v. -aron@ B4 -egal standing as citi<ens o The (ourt found standing because the claims for unconstitutionality were of transcendental importance amounting to public interest o 8AT a party1s standing is preliminarily affected to an extent by the substantive merits of his case ?-awyer1s -eague for a 8etter Philippines v. quino@ and the (ourt found the petitioners1 case to be without merit o citi<en must show that he has personally suffered some actual or

threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government This (ourt1s recognition of the standing in this case turns the *( into an office of the ombudsman for ventilation of generali<ed grievances P:T7T74B:)* + N: B4 *T B;7BDU

-acts, /an !""& parties signed an :quipment -ease greement ?:- @ whereby the Philippine Daming ,anagement (orp ?PD,(@ leased on%line lottery equipment and accessories to the P(*4 in consideration of a rental equivalent of $.2W of the gross amount of tic3et sale derived from the P(*4 from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental computed at P2&,FFF per terminal in (ommercial 4peration Issue, !. WKB the petitioners have substantial interest in the :- as would entitle them to bring this suitL $ulin&, Petition for Prohibition, )eview andKor 7njunction see3ing to declare the :- between the P(*4 and PD,( is invalid %%% ;7*,7**:;. $atio, The traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invo3e the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this (ourt, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the 'case and controversy' requirement of rt. N777, *ec &. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. 7t is what differentiates decision% ma3ing in the courts from decision%ma3ing in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party. ;enying them the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of government contracts. Juestion as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made can be raised in an appropriate case before the 4mbudsman or (ommission on udit. 7n addition, the *olicitor Deneral is authori<ed to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be thought that a government corporation, li3e the P(*4, has

16 offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchise. .rimer5 J5 :xplain further the concept of *tanding 5 person has GstandingH to challenge the validity of governmental act only if he has Ga personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. .eo!le Cs. Cera6 -acaisano Cs. 5ational *ousing +uthority. Thus &oya Cs. .)'' art lovers see3ing to enjoin the auction sale of :uropean artwor3s and silverware, part of the objects recovered by the government after the ouster of president ,arcos, on the ground that these formed part of the 9ilipino cultural heritage were deemed without standing to sue because they neither owned the properties involved nor had they been purchased with public funds. What appears in jurisprudence on GstandingH is that it is not only a rule that assures concrete adverseness which can sharpen the presentation of the issue but it also involves considerations of policy related to judicial self restraint /ilosba!an 0s. Morato 1223 TE E(A! '. C"/E EC Petitioners5 ?!@ Telecommunications and 8roadcast ttorneys of the Philippines ?T:-:8 P@ Q org. of lawyers of radio and TN broadcast companies and ?0@ D, Betwor3, 7nc. )espondent5 (4,:-:( -acts, *ection "0 of 8P 8lg. EE! requires the radioKTN companies to give radioKTN airtime for free for political ads ?sale of airtime for political ads is prohibited in a previous case, but was later repealed@. Petitioners

-ecit.read! version 7n this case, petitioners question the constitutionality of the decision of the ;4T( to grant the ownership of :;* -)T 777 to :;* -)T (orp. -td., which is a foreign corporation. Diven emphasis in this case is the legal standing of the petitioners, who sued in their capacities as senators and taxpayers. The (ourt upheld their legal standing, following the ruling in Filos$ayan and Bugnay that taxpayers may question the contracts that the government enters into when they are allegedly against the law and that taxpayers are disallowed from doing this only when municipal contracts are concerned. ?7f he as3s about the opinionV@ /. ,endo<a disagrees that petitioners have legal standing. s *enators they don1t have standing because they do not allege any infringement of their prerogatives as senators. s taxpayers, they do not allege unconstitutional taxing or spending or disbursement of public funds. They have to also show that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the contract. s citi<ens they don1t have it either, because they failed to show a direct injury or threat of injury as a result of the illegal conduct of the government. lso, since the (ourt found their case to be bereft of merit, their legal standing is also wea3 as in 2awyers 2eague. Eilos:a5an '. /orato

contend that the said section is invalid on the grounds ?!@ that it ta3es property without due process of law and without just compensation6 ?0@ that it denies radio and TN broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws6 and ?2@ that it is in excess of the power given to the (4,:-:( to supervise or regulation the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. Issue, WKB the petitioners have standing in the case ?given that the members Ghave interestH as lawyers of radioKTN companies and as citi<ens, taxpayers and registered voters@ .eld, The petitioner T:-:8 P have no merit nor standing in the case. A citi1en can onl5 raise a constitutional Fuestion, @1A 2hen he can sho2 that he has personall5 su))ered some actual or threatened in3ur5 as a result o) the alle&edl5 llle&al conduct o) the &o'ernment @%A 2hen the in3ur5 is )airl5 tracea:le to the challen&ed action0 and @3A 2hen the in3ur5 is li<el5 to :e redressed :5 a )a'ora:le action. Petitioners of T:-:8 P have failed to show that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of *ection "0 of 8P 8lg. EE!. +owever, the other petitioner, D, Betwor3 7nc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge, which is why the court has decided to ta3e or consider the case. Bote5 *tanding jus tertii ?third party standing@ is a term of the law of civil procedure that describes when one party may file a lawsuit on behalf of another party. 8asically, T:-:8 P is asserting that it has third party standing, when it doesn1t. *tanding jus tertii will be recogni<ed only if

?!@ it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party ?0@ that the third party cannot assert his constitutional right, or ?2@ that the right of the third party will be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third party1s constitutional claim. 8on1ales '. 6ar'asa 6otes, in this case, hindi na nagfocus masyado sa issues brought up by the petitioner since wala syang locus standi to begin with. *o the issues that he raised, though answered, are not comprehensively tac3led in the decision since wala nga siyang locus standi. nd since locus standi yung topic, yung doctrine on legal standing nalang yung ginawa 3ong issue hehe 5@ -acts, %This is a petition for Prohibition and ,andamus filed on ;ec ", !""". %The P(() ?Preparatory (ommission on (onstitutional )eform@ was created by President :) P on Bov. 0#, !""E through :4 $2 in order to study and recommend proposed ammendments andKor revisions to the !"E> (onstitution and the manner of implementing it. %Petitioner Don<ales, 7B +7* ( P (7TM * T IP M:), assailed the constitutionality of the creation of the P(() and of the positions of consultants, advisers, and assistants. %The following contentions were made by petitioner5 !. 7t is a public office, hence, only congress can create it by way of law. 0. 8y creating such a body, the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the (onstituton % the ammendment of the fundamental charter. %+e as3ed the court to enjoin presidential consultants, advisers, and assistants from acting as such, and to

17 enjoin :xecutive *ecretary )onaldo Xamora from enforcing their recommendations. +e also wanted to enjoin (4 from passing in audit expenditures from P(() and its members. +e also as3ed to be furnished with documents containing information on this matter. Issue, Whether or not petitioner has sufficient legal standing to file the case as a citi<en and taxpayer. .eld, 9irst of all, the action must be considereed moot or dead. The P(() submitted its recommendations to President :) P on ;ec 0F, !""" ?!! days after the case was filed@ and was dissolved on the same day. -i3ewise, it had already spent the funds alotted to it. +ence, P(() has ceased to exist. Those said events have overta3en the petition and has left the court with nothing to resolve. +ow can the *( enjoin a body which no longer existsLL 7n the final analysis regarding the main issue above, it must be stressed that the (ourt retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayerCs suit. 7n this case, since (ongress did not exercise taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the P(() * T IP M:). citi<en acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government6 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action6 and the injury is li3ely to be addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the P(() and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Beither does he claim that his rights or privileges

have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised. s somewhat of a consolation pri<e, his request for a copy of the documents containing information was granted. J. Del /ar0 et al. '. !A8C"$ -acts, 8elle /ai lai?8:--:@ agreed to provide all the required infrastructure facilities and all the needed funding, while P D(4), with no financial outlay, will handle the actual management and operation of jai% alai. Issues, WKB the franchise granted to Philippine musement and Daming (orporation ?P D(4)@ includes right to manage and operate jai%alai!. 5o decision regarding this issue was given in the $ook" Petition was granted by the supreme court, P D(4) not allowed to manage and operate jai%alai /AI6 ISSUE -"$ C ASS, WKB (ongressmen )aul 8. ;el ,ar ?!st district of (ebu@, 9ederico *. *andoval 77 ?,alabon%Bavotas@, ,ichael ;efensor ?2rd congressional district of J(@ and /uan ,iguel Xubiri ?2rd congressional district of 8u3idnon@ has locus standi. a@ s a tax payer b@ 7n their capacity as members of the +ouse of )epresentatives .eld, Bo, Mes a@ B4 locus standi as a taxpayer since, according to the agreement no money ?public funds@ will be spent by P D(4)
1

Taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of ille&al dis:ursement o) pu:lic )unds, or that pu:lic mone5 is being deflected to an5 improper purpose, or where petitioner see3 to restrain respondent )rom 2astin& pu:lic )unds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law b@ M:* they have locus standi as members of the house of representative since they complain that there is an infringement by P D(4) of the legislature1s exclusive power to grant franchise. To the extent the powers of congress are impaired so is the power of each member thereof since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution #hite i&ht Corporation '. Cit5 o) /anila -acts, 4n 2 ;ec !""0, then ,ayor -im signed into law 4rd >>>$ entitled G n 4rdinanceH prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the (ity of ,anila. White -ight (orp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the 4rdinance be nullified as the said 4rdinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The )T( ruled in favor of W-(. 7t ruled that the 4rdinance stri3es at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the (onstitution. The (ity maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Ander the -D(, the (ity is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar

18 establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The ( ruled in favor of the (ity. Issue, Whether or not 4rd >>>$ is valid. .eld, The *( ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. 7t also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or sei<ure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Bote that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. *ome are tourists who needed rest or to Gwash upH or to freshen up. +ence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The *( reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. +. !" ITICA GUESTI"6S *. !" ITICA GUESTI"6S, CASES B. E--ECT "- DEC. "- U6C"6STITUTI"6A IT; 8. $U E-/AEI68 !"#E$ (ustos '. ucero Petitioner5 ;ominador 8ustos )espondent5 ntonio -ucero, judge of the (ourt of 9irst 7nstance of Pampanga -acts, The petitioner was accused of a criminal case and filed a motion with the (ourt of 9irst 7nstance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial. The petition was a request praying that the record of the case be returned to the custody

a form of sport or game played for bets (Del Mar, et al. V PAGCOR)

of the justice of the peace court o) /asantol0 the court o) ori&in, in order that the petitioner might cross%examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. 7t was contended that SEC. 110 $ule 1H8 o) the $ules o) Court @$i&hts o) the De)endant a)ter the ArrestA 2as unconstitutional because it contradicts SEC. 13 Article >II @no2 Section + !ar. +A which states that the *( in promulgating rules regarding pleadings, procedure and practice in all courts should not diminish0 increase or modi)5 su:stanti'e ri&hts. The former is said to deal with su:stanti'e matters that impair su:stanti'e ri&hts.

Ad3ecti'e a2 prescribes methods of En)orcin& ri&hts or ":tain $edress for their invasion.

.eld, /otion 2as denied. );5 (iting a case, ;e Guito and %aling$uhay C% +rellano5 Preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional rights of the accused. *ection !!, rule !FE of )ules of (ourt is not a substantive law nor a substantive right but an adjective law. o Su:stanti'e $i&hts includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. o Su:stanti'e a2 that part of the law which Creates0 De)ines0 and $e&ulates rights or which gives rise to a cause of action

*ec !!, )ule !FE is also !$"CEDU$A 0 since :vidence is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress is obtained. 7t was also said that the right of the accused to cross%examine the witnesses who have given evidence against him during a preliminary investigation is not an offense against constitutional inhibition. Preliminary investigation is not an essential process of due process of law. It is a limited and unsu:stantial matter. *ec. !! )ule !FE still has 3ept the provisions of the accused1s rights to 3now the charges being filed against him and at the latter part of the trial, he can still enjoy his right to cross%examine the witnesses. 8ecause of the degree of difficulty in demarcating the difference between GremedyH and Gsubstantive rightH, *( should ma3e sure that in ma3ing rules should step on substantive rights and the (onstitution must be presumed to tolerate such intrusion to affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense. 7t shall operate only to a limited and unsubstantial matter to the accused1s disadvantage. In $e Cunanan 7n the ,atter of the Petitions for dmission to the 8ar of Ansuccessful (andidates of !"$# to !"&26 A (I6" CU6A6A6 )esolution ,arch !E, !"&$ 9acts5 (ongress passed $epu:lic Act 6um:er CB%, commonly 3nown as the G(ar -lun<ersI Act o) 1C+3.H

19 7n accordance with the said law, the *upreme (ourt then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of >0 per cent by raising it to >& percent. fter its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invo3ing its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invo3ed the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invo3ing the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invo3ed )epublic ct Bo. ">0. 7ssue5 W4B ) Bo. ">0 is constitutional and validL B4 +eld5 ) Bo. ">0 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the 8ar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. 7n the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputa:l5 a 3udicial )unction and responsi:ilit5. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, dis:arment or reinstatement o) attorne5s at la2 in the practice o) the pro)ession is concededl5 3udicial. The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the -egislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensin& o) an attorne5 is and al2a5s has :een a

purel5 3udicial )unction, no matter 2here the po2er to determine the Fuali)ications ma5 reside. ;istinction between the two5 (ongress may repeal, alter, and supplement the rules promulgated by the (ourt, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the *upreme (ourt ?as stated in *ec &@. (ongressC power is limited to repeal, modify, or supplement the e7istin& rules on the matter0 i) accordin& to its 3ud&ment the need )or a :etter ser'ice o) the le&al pro)ession reFuires it. :xercised properly, they should not be repugnant to each other but rather complementary. 4n this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. 7t is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate po2er to grant license for the practice of law :elon&s e7clusi'el5 to this Court, and the law passed by (ongress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license. Ja'ellana '. DI 8 -acts, tty. :rwin /avellana was an elected (ity (ouncil of 8ago (ity, Begros 4ccidental. (ity :ngineer :rnesto ;ivinagracia filed dministrative (ase Bo.(%!F%"F against /avellana as he continuosly engaged in the practice of law without securing the authority of the )egional ;irector, ;-D. /avellana filed a petition for certiorari saying that ;-D memorandum circulars Bo.s EF%2E and "F%E! as unconstitutional and null and void because it violates rt.N777 sec.& of the (onstitution. .eld, Petition dismissed.

)atio5 The -ocal Dovernment (ode and ;-D memorandum circular Bo."F%E! simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharges of their public duties and the private practice of their profession. H;e!artment of 2ocal 'overnment ;2'" 6ote, Amendment o) rules :5 statute Section = o) $.A. 8CB= C. $E>IE# "- DEA T. !E6A T; !eople '. /ateo -acts5 4n 4ctober 2F, !""# !F counts o) rape 2ere )iled a&ainst E)ren /ateo. The lower court finds ,ateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt, imposing reclusion !er!etua. *olicitor Deneral assails factual findings and recommends acquittal of defendant. Issue, W4B case should be forwarded directly to *upreme (ourt by virtue of rticle N777 *ection & par 0 ?d@, provides for review of all criminal cases in which penalty imposed is reclusion !er!etua or higher. ?0@ )eview, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the )ules of (ourt may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in5 ?d@ ll criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion !er!etua or higher. .eld, While the (onstitution requires a mandatory review by the *upreme (ourt for cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion !er!etua, life imprisonment, or

20 death, nowhere has it proscribed or forbidden an intermediate or appellate review. The (ourt now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the (ourt of ppeals before the case is elevated to *upreme (ourt. prior determination of the ( would minimi<e the possibility of error of judgment. 7f the ( should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion !er!etua, or life imprisonment, it could refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the *upreme (ourt for final disposition. 8etween !""2 until /une 0FF$, >!.>>W of cases where death penalty was imposed, the penalty was modified or vacated by the *upreme (ourt. That is #&! out of "F> appellants saved from lethal injection. Ander rticle N777 *ection & of the (onstitution, the *upreme (ourt is vested the power to amend rules of procedure. The rule additionally allowing an intermediate review by the ( before the case is elevated to the *upreme (ourt is a procedural matter. 4nly in cases where death penalty is imposed should the trial court automatically forward the records of the case to the *upreme (ourt ?now ( @ for review, and this right cannot be waived. The right to appeal reclusion !er!etua may be waived. 7f the petitioner does not file a notice of appeal or does not indicate a desire to appeal, the decision becomes final and unappealable. 'arcia v. .eo!le, '.,. 5o. /9(A@/, 5ovem$er /1, /000. 1H. (A$ I6TE8$ATI"6 In re, !etition to DisFuali)5 Att5. De >era !onente,

21 Justice Tin&a !etitioners, Att5s. "li'er 8arcia ?NP of 8u3idnon 78P (hapter@ Emmanuel $a'anera ?former President of ,isamis 4riental 78P (hapter@ Ton5 >ele1 ?current President of ,isamis 4riental 78P (hapter@ $espondent5 tty. -eonard ;e Nera -acts5 o The petitioners are see3ing the disqualification of the respondent from being elected Dovernor of :astern ,indanao in the !#th 7ntegrated 8ar of the Philippines )egional Dovernors1 elections. o ;e Nera filed a respectful comment on the petition. 7n his defense, he stated that this (ourt has no jurisdiction over the present controversy. The election of the officers of 78P, including those who want to serve the organi<ation, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the 78P 8y%-aws and exclusively regulated and administered by the 78P. Issue, WK4 this (ourt has jurisdiction on the matter .eld, The contention is untenable. *ection & of rticle N777 of the (onstitution confers on the *upreme (ourt the power to promulgate rules affecting the 78P. 7mplicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the 78P, including the election of its officers. HIn addition, IB. By<2aws even vests in the %) the !ower to amend, re!eal or modify the IB. By<laws %ec. ::" and to have the final decision in the removal of the mem$ers of the Board of 'overnors %ec. ??"