Hasan Karayam U.

S & Middle East Nov 22, 2011

Review book

Peter L. Hahn, Caught in the Middle East: U.S Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961, the University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, NC, 2004. 398p. The book is divided into acknowledgements, abbreviation, introduction, four parts, conclusion, notes, Bibliography, and index. This work is analysis of U.S policy toward the ArabIsraeli conflict from 1945-1961. Hahn argues that American policymakers wanted to stabilize the region before conflict could harm American interests, but the privileged war policy over ArabIsraeli relations. The structure of the book is chronologically and thematically as well. Hahn uses strong primary sources in different places; United States, Britain, Israel. Misses important for the audience of Hahns book is specialists in diplomatic history, graduate students, and educated people as well. This work will take its place among monographs as important study about U.SMiddle Eastern relationships.

This book analyzes the evolution of U.S policy towered the Arab- Israeli dispute during the first two presidential administrations after World War II. The book assesses how U.S officials approached the regional conflict and why they implemented certain policies toward it and explains the making of U.S policy in its global, regional and binational dimensions. While focused mainly on diplomatic and security issues, this work also addresses the domestic political and cultural dimensions of U.S policy, explaining why the united states failed to resolve the Arab- Israeli conflict and assessing this failures impact on American interests in the middle east

and elsewhere the book deals with five main themes in its four parts; presidential leadership styles, Israeli policies, Arab views, U.S domestic relations, and U.S- Anglo relations.

The first Part summarizes the pre-1945 origins of the Arab-Zionist controversy and U.S. involvement in it (chapter 1) and examines the Truman administrations approach to Palestine through 1949 in the context of U.S. global concerns during the early Cold War (chapters 2-4) these chapters aim for brevity since much of the literature on U.S. policy toward Palestine has concentrated on the years preceding Israeli independence in 1948. Part II examines Trumans policy in 1949-53, when the president made several momentous decisions regarding the ArabIsraeli conflict (and a period that has received much less scholarly attention than the preceding four years). Chapter 5 assesses regional and global concerns that shaped Trumans thinking about the Arab- Israeli conflict, and chapters6-9 study the development of the presidents policy regarding such points of controversy as borders, refugees, and Jerusalem, among others. Chapter 10 evaluates the impact of the conflict on U.S. relations with Israel and the Arab states. Part III analyzes Eisenhowers policy during his first administration. Chapter eleven examines the regional context of U.S policy in the mid-1950s, and chapters twelfth through fourteenth evaluate Eisenhowers efforts to resolve specific Arab-Israeli disputes and to negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement. U.S policy during and after the 1956-1957 SuezSinai War forms the subject of chapters fifteenth and sixteenth.

Part IV analyzes the late Eisenhower period. Chapters seventeenth through nineteenth establish the regional context of U.S policy and evaluate the presidents policy toward specific Arab-Israeli disputes and crises. Chapter twentieth evaluates the evolution of U.S relations with Israel and the Arab states during the Eisenhower years.

One of the strengths of this work is its use of Israeli, British, and U.S. sources to reconstruct the story of U.S. involvement; despite he misses the records of Arab states that lead to absence an important aspect of this study, which would give the book distinctive breadth and depth. Hahn recognizes to this point and mentioned to it in his introduction. Hahn moves quickly from the immediate post-World War II period1945 to the heart of the book, the 1949-1961 period. He really begins his work in 1949, and does not address the numerous issues before that time.

Hahn explores American relations with the key players in the region, beginning with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Truman administration, despite internal disagreements between the State Department and the Pentagon, on the one hand, and the White House staff as (I will explain in below), on the other, is presented as partial to the needs of the emerging Israeli state. A number of attempts were made to reign in Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, but Harry S. Truman and his advisers, more often than not, seemed to give in to Israeli concerns.1

Martijn Lak mentioned to a point about the fluctuation of U.S position. When Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945, Truman inherited a messy situation in Palestine. Focusing on how to bring a swift conclusion to the war, Truman had little time to study or understand the complexities of the Middle East. Moreover, his advisers differed profoundly in their perceptions of the region. Officials at the State Department and the Pentagon took an Anti-Zionist posture. Whereas Truman, the White House staff, and U.S. public opinion were largely pro-Zionist. This difference prevented Truman and the United States from stipulating a clear policy at a time when Western strategists were assigning increasing importance to the region, especially to its vast
1

Steven Z. Freiberg, Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 19451961 (review),The Journal of American History, Vol. 91, No 4 (Mar., 2005),1523-24

petroleum resources, which U.S. and British officials considered vital for the economic reconstruction of Western Europe and wanted to keep out of Soviet control. U.S. leaders defined vital interests in the region and took action to protect those interests in the light of the waning of British power in the region and growing Soviet power. The strategic and economic importance of the region also prompted U.S. officials to try to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, which threatened Middle Eastern stability.2

When Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948 and five Arab countries invaded the newly formed Jewish state the next day, the U.S. response was ambivalent. President Harry S. Truman had refused to promise recognition of Israel before the state was actually established. Afterward, Truman decided to extend de facto recognition to Israel, but he delayed de jure recognition and did not go along with territorial gains made by the Israelis in the 19481949War of Independence. His recognition of the nascent Jewish state enraged the Arabs. In short, Trumans policy toward Palestine satisfied neither side. As Peter L. Hahn writes in his book, this was characteristic of U.S. policy. Truman and his advisers pursued an Arab-Israeli peace but failed to find terms acceptable to the belligerent powers.

After the Second World War, the United States became increasingly involved in the Middle East. Before 1945, however, U.S. policymakers had shown little interest in the region, in particular toward Palestine. This changed during the war years, when U.S. officials decided, on grounds of national security, to endorse the anti-Zionist policy of Great Britain, which had exercised a mandate in the Middle East since the end of the First World War. Hahn is right, however, when he writes that U.S. presidents occasionally endorsed Zionism to serve their
2

Martijn Lak, Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 19451961 (review) Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 13, No 1 (Winter 2011), 236-38

domestic political interests, but never seriously challenged Britains policy, especially after the start of World War Two.3

Martijn Lak, 236-38.