Why passwords have never been weakerand crackers have never been stronger

Thanks to real-world data, the keys to your digital kingdom are under assault.
by Dan Goodin - Aug 20 2012, 8:00pm H !

HA"#$%&

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Auri(h )awson * Thinksto(k

$n late 2010, !ean +rooks re(ei,ed three e-mails o,er a span o- .0 hours warning that his a((ounts on )inked$n, +attle.net, and other popular websites were at risk. He was tempted to dismiss them as hoa/es0until he noti(ed they in(luded spe(i-i(s that weren1t typi(al o- mass-produ(ed phishing s(ams. The e-mails said that his login (redentials -or ,arious &awker websites had been e/posed by ha(kers who rooted the sites1 ser,ers, then bragged about it online2 i- +rooks used the same e-mail and password -or other a((ounts, they would be (ompromised too. The warnings +rooks and millions o- other people re(ei,ed that 3e(ember weren1t -abri(ations. 4ithin hours o- anonymous ha(kers penetrating &awker ser,ers and e/posing (ryptographi(ally prote(ted passwords -or 1.. million o- its users, botnets were (ra(king the

passwords and using them to (ommandeer Twitter a((ounts and send spam. 5,er the ne/t -ew days, the sites ad,ising or re6uiring their users to (hange passwords e/panded to in(lude Twitter, Ama7on, and 8ahoo. 9The danger o- weak password habits is be(oming in(reasingly wellre(ogni7ed,9 said +rooks, who at the time blogged about the warnings as the rogram Asso(iate -or the "enter -or 3emo(ra(y and Te(hnology. The warnings, he told me, 9show :that; these (ompanies understand how a se(urity brea(h outside their systems (an (reate a ,ulnerability within their networks.9 The an(ient art o- password (ra(king has ad,an(ed -urther in the past -i,e years than it did in the pre,ious se,eral de(ades (ombined. At the same time, the dangerous pra(ti(e o- password reuse has surged. The result: se(urity pro,ided by the a,erage password in 2012 has ne,er been weaker.

A new world
The a,erage 4eb user maintains 2' separate a((ounts but uses <ust =.' passwords to prote(t them, a((ording to a landmark study > 3?@ -rom 200A. As the &awker brea(h demonstrated, su(h password reuse, (ombined with the -re6uent use o- e-mail addresses as user names, means that on(e ha(kers ha,e plu(ked login (redentials -rom one site, they o-ten ha,e the means to (ompromise do7ens o- other a((ounts, too. %ewer hardware and modern te(hni6ues ha,e also helped to (ontribute to the rise in password (ra(king. %ow used in(reasingly -or (omputing, graphi(s pro(essors allow password-(ra(king programs to work thousands o- times -aster than they did <ust a de(ade ago on similarly pri(ed "s that used traditional " Bs alone. A " running a single AC3 Dadeon H3AEA0 & B, -or instan(e, (an try on a,erage an astounding 8.2 billion password (ombinations ea(h se(ond, depending on the algorithm used to s(ramble them. 5nly a de(ade ago, su(h speeds were possible only when using pri(ey super(omputers. The ad,an(es don1t stop there. "s e6uipped with two or more F'00 & Bs (an a(hie,e speeds two, three, or more times -aster, and -ree password (ra(king programs su(h as o(lHash(at-plus will run on many othem with little or no tinkering. Ha(kers running su(h gear also work in tandem in online -orums, whi(h allow them to pool resour(es and knowhow to (ra(k lists o- 100,000 or more passwords in <ust hours.

Cost importantly, a series o- leaks o,er the past -ew years (ontaining more than 100 million real-world passwords ha,e pro,ided (ra(kers with important new insights about how people in di--erent walks o- li-e (hoose passwords on di--erent sites or in di--erent settings. The e,er-growing list o- leaked passwords allows programmers to write rules that make (ra(king algorithms -aster and more a((urate2 password atta(ks ha,e be(ome (ut-and-paste e/er(ises that e,en s(ript kiddies (an per-orm with ease. 9$t has been night and day, the amount o- impro,ement,9 said Di(k Dedman, a penetration tester -or se(urity (onsultants #ore)ogi( and organi7er o- the "ra(k Ce $- 8ou "an password (ontest at the past three 3e-(on ha(ker (on-eren(es. 9$t1s been an e/(iting year -or password (ra(kers be(ause o- the amount o- data. "ra(king 1=-(hara(ter passwords is something $ (ould not do -our or -i,e years ago, and it1s not be(ause $ ha,e more (omputers now.9

Gnlarge * This F12,000 (omputer, dubbed ro<e(t Grebus ,2.' by (reator d.ad0ne, (ontains eight AC3 Dadeon H3AEA0 & B (ards. Dunning

,ersion 0.10 o- o(lHash(at-lite, it re6uires <ust 12 hours to brute -or(e the entire keyspa(e -or any eight-(hara(ter password (ontaining upperor lower-(ase letters, digits or symbols. $t aided Team Hash(at in winning this year1s "ra(k Ce $- 8ou "an (ontest.
d.ad0ne

At any gi,en time, Dedman is likely to be running thousands o(ryptographi(ally hashed passwords though a " (ontaining -our o%,idia1s &e?or(e &TH I80 graphi(s (ards. $t1s an 9older ma(hine,9 he (on(eded, but it still gi,es him the ability to (y(le through as many as =.2 billion (ombinations e,ery se(ond. He typi(ally uses a di(tionary -ile (ontaining about 2= million words, (ombined with programming rules that greatly e/tend its e--e(ti,eness by adding numbers, pun(tuation, and other (hara(ters to ea(h list entry. 3epending on the <ob, he sometimes uses a =0 million-strong word list and something known as 9rainbow tables,9 whi(h are des(ribed later in this arti(le. As a penetration tester who gets paid to pier(e the de-enses o- ?ortune '00 (ompanies, Dedman tries to spot weaknesses be-ore (riminal ha(kers e/ploit them on his (ustomers1 networks. 5ne o- the key ways he stays ahead is by downloading hash lists that are dumped almost e,ery day on pastebin.(om and other sites to see i- any belong to the organi7ations he is (ontra(ted to prote(t. De(ently, he re(o,ered a 1.-(hara(ter password that he had spent se,eral months trying to (ra(k. To prote(t the a((ount holder, he de(lined to re,eal the pre(ise (ombination o- (hara(ters and instead made up the imaginary passphrase 9!up.rThinkers9 >minus the 6uotation marks@ to illustrate his breakthrough. 9!up.rThinkers9 -ollows a number o- patterns that ha,e be(ome (ommon: it opens with a (ommon, -i,e-letter word that begins with a (apitali7ed letter and substitutes a . -or an G, -ollowed by a (ommon, se,en-letter word that also begins with a (apital letter. 4hile the speed o- his system didn1t hurt, (ra(king the password was largely the result o- the (olle(ti,e (odebreaking e/pertise de,eloped online o,er the past -ew years. The most important single (ontribution to (ra(king knowledge (ame in late 200E, when an !J) in<e(tion atta(k against online games ser,i(e Do(k8ou.(om e/posed .2 million plainte/t passwordsused by its members to log in to their a((ounts. The pass(odes, whi(h (ame to 1I.. million on(e dupli(ates were remo,ed, were posted online2 almost o,ernight, the unpre(edented (orpus o- real-world (redentials (hanged the way whitehat and bla(khat ha(kers alike (ra(ked passwords.

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Hashing it out
)ike many password brea(hes, almost none o- the 1.. million &awker (redentials e/posed in 3e(ember 2010 (ontained human-readable pass(odes. $nstead, they had been (on,erted into what are known as 9hash ,alues9 by passing them through a one-way (ryptographi( -un(tion that (reates a uni6ue se6uen(e o- (hara(ters -or ea(h plainte/t input. 4hen passed through the C3' algorithm, -or instan(e, the string 9password9 >minus the 6uotes@ translates into 9'-Id((.b'aaA='d=1d8.2Adeb882(-EE9. G,en minor (hanges to the plainte/t input0say, 9password19 or 9 assword90result in ,astly di--erent hash ,alues >9A(=a180b.=8E=a0a8(02A8Aeea-b0eI(9 and 9d(=IAeb='e=A11e1''.A'218212b.E=I9 respe(ti,ely@. 4hen pro(essed by the !HA1 algorithm, the inputs 9password9, 9password19, and 9 assword9 result in 9'baa=1eI(EbE.-.-0=822'0b=(-8..1bAee=8-d89, 9e.8ad21IEI.daad1d=I(102-ae(2EdeIa-eEda.d9, and 98be.(EI.b1=0E---b-('1aad===d0a0Iad-8.(Ed9 respe(ti,ely. $n theory, on(e a string has been (on,erted into a hash ,alue, it1s impossible to re,ert it to plainte/t using (ryptographi( means. assword (ra(king, then, is the pra(ti(e o- running plainte/t guesses through the same (ryptographi( -un(tion used to generate a (ompromised hash. 4hen the two hash ,alues mat(h, the password has been identi-ied. The Do(k8ou dump was a watershed moment, but it turned out to be only the start o- what1s be(ome a mu(h larger (ra(king phenomenon. +y putting 1I million o- the most (ommon passwords into the publi( domain, it allowed people atta(king (ryptographi(ally prote(ted password leaks to almost instantaneously (ra(k the weakest passwords. That made it possible to de,ote more resour(es to (ra(king the stronger ones. 4ithin days o- the &awker brea(h, -or instan(e, a large per(entage othe password hashes had been (on,erted to plainte/t, a -eat that ga,e

(ra(kers an e,en larger (orpus o- real-world passwords to in-orm -uture atta(ks. That (olle(ti,e body o- passwords has only snowballed sin(e then, and it grows e,er larger with ea(h passing brea(h. Kust si/ days a-ter the leak o- =.' million )inked$n password hashes in Kune, more than E0 per(ent o- them were (ra(ked. $n the past year alone, Dedman said, more than 100 million passwords ha,e been published online, either in plainte/t or in (ipherte/t that (an be readily (ra(ked. 9%ow, it1s like on(e a 6uarter you get another Do(k8ou,9 Dedman said.

Gnlarge * A s(reenshot -rom o(l-Hash(at as it (ra(ks a list o- password hashes leaked online.

3an &oodin

We will RockYou
$n the Do(k8ou a-termath, e,erything (hanged. &one were word lists (ompiled -rom 4ebster1s and other di(tionaries that were then modi-ied in hopes o- mimi(king the words people a(tually used to a((ess their email and other online ser,i(es. $n their pla(e went a single (olle(tion oletters, numbers, and symbols0in(luding e,erything -rom pet names to (artoon (hara(ters0that would seed -uture password atta(ks. 9!o it1s no longer this theoreti(al word list o- #lingon planets and stu-like that,9 Dedman said o- the Do(k8ou list. 9$t1s literally 1dragon1 and 1prin(ess1 and stu-- like that, and :the list; may (ra(k =0 per(ent o- a newly (ompromised website. %ow you ha,e =0 per(ent o- the work done and you ha,en1t done any thinking at all. 8ou1,e <ust used your pre,ious knowledge.9 Almost as important as the pre(ise words used to a((ess millions oonline a((ounts, the Do(k8ou brea(h re,ealed the strategi( thinking people o-ten employed when they (hose a pass(ode. ?or most people, the goal was to make the password both easy to remember and hard -or others to guess. %ot surprisingly, the Do(k8ou list (on-irmed that nearly all (apital letters (ome at the beginning o- a password2 almost all numbers and pun(tuation show up at the end. $t also re,ealed a strong tenden(y to use -irst names -ollowed by years, su(h as Kulia1E8I or "hristopher1E='.

A!!45D3 A!!AB)T ?$&BDG!

6! A,erage number o- passwords -or a 4eb user >despite maintaining an a,erage o- 2' separate a((ounts@. "## $illion%plus %umber o- passwords published online in the past year. &' 8ears sin(e the -irst belie,ed password-database leak in 1E='. ( ) billion A,erage passwords (ombinations per se(ond able to be tried by a " running a single AC3 Dadeon H3AEA0 & B.

*+"#( terabytes 3isk spa(e needed to store a table o- e,ery possible 10-(hara(ter password with lower(ase letters, along with its (orresponding C3' hash. "6' gigabytes !pa(e needed to store a rainbow table e/pressing EE.E per(ent o- the (ombinations abo,e. 9!up.rThinkers9 wasn1t in(luded in the list o- Do(k8ou passwords, making it part o- the I0 per(ent o- hashes that re6uire Dedman to apply (ra(king te(hni6ues that go beyond a simple word-list atta(k. ?ortunately -or him, the Do(k8ou (orpus in(luded both 9sup.r9 and 9thinkers9 as separate passwords. That allowed him to re(o,er the password in 6uestion by appending ea(h word in his list to e,ery other word in the list. The te(hni6ue is simple enough to do, although it in(reases the number o- re6uired guesses dramati(ally0-rom about 2= million, assuming the di(tionary Dedman uses most o-ten, to about =A= trillion. 5ther (omple/ passwords re6uire similar manipulations to be (ra(ked. The Do(k8ou list, and the hundred-millions-plus passwords that ha,e (olle(ti,ely been e/posed in its a-termath, brought to light a plethora oother te(hni6ues people employ to prote(t simple pass(odes -rom traditional di(tionary atta(ks. 5ne is adding numbers or nonalphanumeri( (hara(ters su(h as 9LLL9 to them, usually at the end, but sometimes at the beginning. Another, known as 9mangling,9 trans-orms words su(h as 9super9 or 9prin(ess9 into 9sup.I9 and 9prin(eFF.9 !till others append a mirror image o- the (hosen word, so 9book9 be(omes 9bookkoob9 and 9password9 be(omes 9passworddrowssap.9 asswords su(h as 9musta(heeh(atsum9 >that1s 9musta(he9 spelled -orward and then ba(kward@ may gi,e the appearan(e o- strong se(urity, but they1re easily (ra(ked by isolating their patterns, then writing rules that augment the words (ontained in the Do(k8ou dump and similar lists. ?or Dedman to (ra(k 9!up.rThinkers9, he employed rules that dire(ted his so-tware to try not <ust 9super9 but also 9!uper9, 9sup.r9, 9!up.r9, 9superLLL9 and similar modi-i(ations. $t then tried ea(h o- those words in (ombination with 9thinkers9, 9Thinkers9, 9think.rs9, and 9Think.rs9. !u(h (ra(king te(hni6ues ha,e e/isted -or a de(ade, but they work -ar better now that the (ra(kers possess a more intimate understanding othe ways people (hoose passwords.

9$t1s ,astly di--erent than it was :be-ore; be(ause o- these massi,e password lists,9 said Dob &raham, "G5 o- penetration testing -irm Grrata !e(urity. 94e ne,er had a really large password list to work -rom. %ow that we do, we1re learning how to remo,e the entropy -rom them. The state o- the art o- (ra(king is mu(h more subtle in that be-ore we were guessing in the dark.9

A little ,inesse
That subtlety takes all sorts o- -orms. 5ne promising te(hni6ue is to use programs su(h as the open-sour(e asspal to redu(e (ra(king time by identi-ying patterns e/hibited in a statisti(ally signi-i(ant per(entage ointer(epted passwords. ?or e/ample, as noted abo,e, many website users ha,e a propensity to append years to proper names, words, or other strings o- te/t that (ontain a single (apital letter at the beginning. Bsing brute--or(e te(hni6ues to (ra(k the password Kulia1E8I would re6uire =2E possible (ombinations, a 9keyspa(e9 that1s (al(ulated by the number o- possible letters >'2@ plus the number o- numbers >10@ and raising the sum to the power o- nine >whi(h in this e/ample is the ma/imum number o- password (hara(ters a (ra(ker is targeting@. Bsing an AC3 Dadeon H3AEA0, it would still take about 1E days to (y(le through all the possibilities. Bsing -eatures built into password-(ra(king apps su(h as Hash(at and G/treme & B +rute-or(er, the same password (an be re(o,ered in about E0 se(onds by per-orming what1s known as a mask atta(k. $t works by intelligently redu(ing the keyspa(e to only those guesses likely to mat(h a gi,en pattern. Dather than trying aaaaa0000, MMMMMEEEE, and e,ery possible (ombination in between, it tries a lower- or upper(ase letter only -or the -irst (hara(ter, and tries only lower-(ase (hara(ters -or the ne/t -our (hara(ters. $t then appends all possible -ourdigit numbers to the end. The result is a drasti(ally redu(ed keyspa(e oabout 2.A.= billion, or '2 N 2= N 2= N 2= N 2= N 10 N 10 N 10 N 10. An e,en more power-ul te(hni6ue is a hybrid atta(k. $t (ombines a word list, like the one used by Dedman, with rules to greatly e/pand the number o- passwords those lists (an (ra(k. Dather than brute--or(ing the -i,e letters in Kulia1E8I, ha(kers simply (ompile a list o- -irst names -or e,ery single ?a(ebook user and add them to a medium-si7ed di(tionary o-, say, 100 million words. 4hile the atta(k re6uires more (ombinations than the mask atta(k abo,e0spe(i-i(ally about 1 trillion >100 million N 10I@ possible strings0it1s still a manageable number that takes only about two minutes using the same AC3 AEA0 (ard. The payo--, howe,er,

is more than worth the additional e--ort, sin(e it will 6ui(kly (ra(k "hristopher2000, thomas1E=I, and s(ores o- others. 9The hybrid is my -a,orite atta(k,9 said Atom, the pseudonymous de,eloper o- Hash(at, whose teamwon this year1s "ra(k Ce i- 8ou "an (ontest at 3e-(on. 9$t1s the most e--i(ient. $- $ get a new hash list, let1s say '00,000 hashes, $ (an (ra(k '0 per(ent <ust with hybrid.9 4ith hal- the passwords in a gi,en brea(h re(o,ered, (ra(king e/perts like Atom (an use asspal and other programs to isolate patterns that are uni6ue to the website -rom whi(h they (ame. They then write new rules to (ra(k the remaining unknown passwords. Core o-ten than not, howe,er, no amount o- sophisti(ation and high-end hardware is enough to 6ui(kly (ra(k some hashes e/posed in a ser,er brea(h. To ensure they keep up with (hanging password (hoi(es, (ra(kers will regularly brute--or(e (ra(k some per(entage o- the unknown passwords, e,en when they (ontain as many as nine or more (hara(ters. 9$t1s ,ery e/pensi,e, but you do it to impro,e your model and keep up with passwords people are (hoosing,9 said Co/ie Carlinspike, another (ra(king e/pert. 9Then, gi,en that knowledge, you (an go ba(k and build rules and word lists to e--e(ti,ely (ra(k lists without ha,ing to brute -or(e all o- them. 4hen you -eed your su((esses ba(k into your pro(ess, you <ust keep learning more and more and more and it does snowball.9

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Attack o, the dictionaries

This sort o- password (ra(king entered the publi( (ons(iousness thanks largely to the 1E80s ha(king thriller The Cuckoo's Egg, in whi(h author "li-- !toll (hroni(les his real-li-e pursuit o- a ha(ker who breaks into B! (omputer systems and steals sensiti,e military and se(urity do(uments on behal- o- the !o,iet #&+.

THG )5%& H$!T5D8 5? A!!45D3!

The -irst re(orded use o- se(ret words to authenti(ate a human being dates at least as -ar ba(k as an(ient Dome, a((ording to Koseph +onneau, a Bni,ersity o- "ambridge student who re(ently (ompleted a

h3 thesis on passwords and personal identi-i(ation numbers, titled 9&uessing human-(hosen se(rets.9 The Doman military de,eloped a (are-ul pro(edure -or (ir(ulating daily wat(hwords known as signa to pre,ent in-iltration by enemy soldiers. !e(ret authenti(ation words also appear in the tale o- 9Ali +aba and the ?orty Thie,es,9 in(luded in some ,ersions o- the One Thousand and One Nights(olle(tion o- -olk tales, when the protagonist uses the -amous phrase 9open sesame9 to unseal a magi(al (a,e. +ernardo in !hakespeare1s Hamlet may also be in,oking a pass(ode when, at the opening o- the play, he identi-ies himsel- to (astle guards with the words 9)ong )i,e the #ingL9 The -irst use o- passwords -or a (omputer system is belie,ed to ha,e taken pla(e in the 1E=0s with the "ompatible Time-!haring !ystem at the Cassa(husetts $nstitute o- Te(hnology, a((ording to +onneau >with additional (olor -rom Wired reporter Dobert C(Cillan here@. A password -or ea(h user a((ount was stored in an unen(rypted master -ile and was used to ration s(ar(e (omputing time. A((ording to both a((ounts, a do(toral student at the (ollege admitted to what1s likely to be the -irste,er password (ompromise so he (ould in(rease the time a,ailable -or his own pro<e(ts. The system saw what may be the -irst-e,er password database leak in 1E=' when a bug sent the -ile to a publi( printer, re6uiring administrators to manually reset e,ery password. The book is pa(ked with people in high pla(es who undermine national se(urity with poor password hygiene0an a((ount on the network ode-ense (ontra(tor !D$ $n(. with a user name and password o- 9!A"9, -or e/ample, or a super-user a((ount -or )awren(e +erkeley )abs that hadn1t been (hanged in years. 94hen money was stored in ,aults, sa-e-(ra(kers atta(ked the (ombination lo(ks,9 writes !toll, who as a displa(ed astronomer be(omes the book1s unlikely ha(ker-hunting protagonist. 9%ow that se(urities are <ust bits in a (omputer1s memory, thie,es go a-ter the passwords.9 !toll1s a((ount was one o- the -irst to show how a ha(ker armed with little more than a di(tionary and a Bni/ (omputer (ould (ra(k any password in the Gnglish language, e,en when the pass(ode was stored as only hash on a ha(ked ma(hine. At one point, !toll (ompares the (rypto -un(tion0whi(h was then based on the now-anti6uated 3ata

Gn(ryption !tandard >3G!@0to a one-way meat grinder that (on,erts ea(h human-readable word into uni6ue (ipherte/t. 93id this ha(ker ha,e a magi( de(ryption -ormulaO9 !toll asks. 9$- you turn the (rank o- a sausage ma(hine ba(kwards, pigs won1t (ome out the other end.9 5nly later would !toll learn that the ha(ker was -eeding ea(h word o- the di(tionary0starting with aard,ark and ending with 7ymurgy0into the same 3G! hash -un(tion the ha(ked Bni/ systems used. The intruder then (ompared the output to the (ipherte/t (ontained in the inter(epted password -iles. 9This was serious stu--,9 !toll wrote. 9$t meant that e,ery time $1d seen him (opy a password -ile, he (ould now -igure out legitimate users1 passwords. +ad news.9 !toll didn1t know it at the time, but e,en as the intruder was using a di(tionary to guess his users1 passwords, (ryptographers were -ashioning a new type o- atta(k that would ultimately be able to (ra(k orders omagnitude more hashes in a -a(tion o- the time.

-he rainbow connection

The germ o- this new approa(h originated with Cartin G. Hellman. $n 1E80, Hellman published a paper titled 9A "ryptanalyti( Time-Cemory Trade-o--9 that proposed what (ame to be (alled Hellman tables. These tables were (ompiled ahead o- a password atta(k and worked by using pre(al(ulated data stored on disk. Hellman tables redu(ed the (omputing resour(es re6uired to (ra(k a 3G! hash -rom about F',000 to <ust F10. $n 200., -ellow (ryptographer hillippe 5e(hslin proposed re-inements to Hellman1s te(hni6ue that ,astly impro,ed the e--e(ti,eness. The result is now what1s known as rainbow tables. Almost o,ernight, they (hanged the way people went about (ra(king large numbers opassword hashes. )ike earlier time-memory tradeo--s proposed by Hellman, the (on(ept was simple. Dather than asking a (omputer to enumerate ea(h possible password in real-time and (ompare it against a targeted hash, pre(al(ulated data was stored in memory or on disk in a highly (ompressed -orm to speed up the pro(ess and lower the (omputing re6uirements needed to brute -or(e huge numbers o- hashes. 4hile earlier te(hni6ues had also tried this approa(h, they produ(ed tables that were unne(essarily large and there-ore unwieldy -or (ra(king

passwords. The genius o- rainbow tables is a (omple/ mathemati(al -ormula that e/presses ,irtually e,ery possible password (ombination without re6uiring ea(h one to be stored in memory or on disk. Ga(h table targets a spe(i-i( algorithm and keyspa(e, and it (ontains a (olle(tion o(hains. Ga(h (hain starts with an arbitrary password on one side and ends with a single hash ,alue on the other end. The beginning password is put through the algorithm to generate its hash, and that ,alue is then passed through one o- many di--erent 9redu(tion -un(tions9 to generate a new password guess. The new password is then hashed.

?rom (ryptographer #estas #uliukas: A rainbow table (hain starts with an arbitrary plainte/t, hashes it, redu(es the hash to another plainte/t, hashes the new plainte/t, and so on. The table stores only the starting plainte/t and the -inal hash, and so a (hain 9(ontaining9 millions ohashes (an be represented with only a single starting plainte/t, and a single -inishing hash.
#estas #uliukas

The pro(ess (ontinues until the hash at the end o- the (hain is rea(hed.

Gnlarge * An o,er,iew o- rainbow table generation demonstrating -our (hains.

"ryptoha7e.(om

The breakthrough wasn1t <ust the speed with whi(h the tables (ould (ra(k passwords2 it was also their ability to (ra(k almost every possible password as long as it didn1t -all outside the targeted keyspa(e. Dainbow tables are belie,ed to get their name be(ause ea(h (hain link uses a di--erent redu(tion -un(tion, but all (hains -ollow the same pattern0

mu(h as ea(h (olor in a rainbow is di--erent but all rainbows -ollow the D58&+$P pattern. The spa(e sa,ings alone are huge. !toring a table o- e,ery possible 10(hara(ter password with only lower(ase letters, along with its (orresponding C3' hash, would re6uire about .,108 terabytes o- disk spa(e. A rainbow table e/pressing EE.E per(ent o- those (ombinations, by (ontrast, re6uires <ust 1=A gigabytes. $n the era o- 4indows H , when Ci(roso-t1s underlying )A% Canager restri(ted password lengths to no more than 1I (hara(ters that at ma/imum were (on,erted into two se,en-(hara(ter passwords and that (on,erted all letters into upper(ase, the results were de,astating. $n 200., ha(kers released5ph(ra(k, an open-sour(e program that used rainbow tables to (ra(k most 4indows passwords in <ust minutes. G,en more power-ul (ra(king appli(ations 6ui(kly -ollowed. 9The -a(t that you (an ha,e this thing that anyone (an download that will (ra(k literally any 4indows H password hash was really (ool,9 said Carlinspike, who has designed "loud"ra(ker, a ser,i(e that takes about 20 minutes to (he(k a 4i?i password against .00 million possible words. 9$t1s not like $ got 20 per(ent, or '0 per(ent, or e,en 80 per(ent. 8ou got all o- them. That was a ma<or thing.9 The huge ad,an(es in & B-assisted password (ra(king ha,e diminished mu(h o- the ad,antages o- rainbow tables, howe,er. asswords with si/ or -ewer (hara(ters (an be brute--or(e (ra(ked with less -uss using & Bpowered (omputers, while passwords longer than nine or 10 (hara(ters re6uire rainbow tables with unwieldy -ile si7es. That lea,es only a small sweet spot o- se,en or eight (hara(ters where rainbow tables are espe(ially use-ul these days. !till, the tables maintain their status as a use-ul, i- ni(he, tool -or some ha(kers. 4itness ?ree Dainbow Tables, a pro<e(t that allows ,olunteers to donate spare (omputer (y(les to generate publi(ly a,ailable tables that (ra(k hashes returned by algorithms in(luding !HA1, C3', and %T)C. $ts organi7ers ha,e already amassed si/ terabytes worth o- data. And with the parti(ipation o- more than .,E00 ,olunteer (omputers, ?ree Dainbow Tables adds an estimated .= megabits o- table data e,ery se(ond, a((ording to Kames %obis, one o- the de,elopers behind the pro<e(t.

.eeds $ore salt

An updated ,ersion o- )A% Canager known as %T)C was introdu(ed with 4indows %T ..1. $t lowered the sus(eptibility o- 4indows passwords to rainbow table atta(ks, but didn1t eliminate the risk. To this day, the authenti(ation system still doesn1t apply (ryptographi( 9salt9 to passwords to render su(h atta(ks in-easible. !alting appends se,eral uni6ue (hara(ters to ea(h a((ount password be-ore running it though a (ryptographi( -un(tion, a pro(ess that blunts the ,alue o- rainbow tables and other types o- pre(omputed atta(ks. A 1=-bit salt, -or e/ample, re6uires =','.'0or 21=0separate tables to be de-eated. A random salt o- .2 bits makes rainbow table atta(ks e,en more impra(ti(al by pushing the number o- tables re6uired to more than -our billion. >The salt must be sa,ed -or ea(h user and is usually stored beside the user name and password hash, so the in-ormation is a,ailable during ea(h user login. !alt is rarely kept apart -rom the hash. G,en when known, its ,irtue lies in its uni6ueness, whi(h de-eats pre(omputation o- results.@ To illustrate what this looks like in pra(ti(e, we (reated a new )inu/ a((ount -or 9testuser.9 The operating system stored the login data in a single long line o- te/t >kept in *et(*shadow, where )inu/ stores passwords@:
testuser: F=F2l,Ghpi'F#nPnE01"I82.7sPM#1*B$)bTk#$B=hA=P*opHM.yJB.GhP/J!=*#<a52bHAP M55r*3T&koE)<645iA"rB.&gy0:1''=E:0:EEEEE:A:::

The line is broken up by (olons0-irst (omes the username, then the lengthy password se(tion, then data about when the password was last (hanged, how old it is, when the a((ount e/pires, and more. The important bit -or our purposes is the password se(tion, whi(h is internally di,ided by F symbols. ?irst (omes the number that identi-ies the hashing algorithm used0in this (ase, = (orresponds to the !HA-'12 algorithm. %e/t is the salt, 2l,Ghpi'. ?inally, there1s the hash itsel-, a long string o- letters and symbols. $n addition to making rainbow-table atta(ks in-easible, salting (an also signi-i(antly add to the resour(es re6uired to (arry out more traditional (ra(king atta(ks, sin(e it ensures that ea(h stored hash is uni6ue e,en itwo users (hoose the same pass(ode. That, in turn, re6uires ea(h hash in a (ompromised table to be (ra(ked separately, e,en i- they mask one or more identi(al plainte/t passwords.

3espite the bene-it o- the te(hni6ue, and the relati,e ease oimplementing it, a surprising number o- websites0in(luding )inked$n, 8ahoo, and eHarmony0didn1t use it when they were re(ently brea(hed. Hashes deri,ed -rom %T)C, be(ause they ne,er use salting, are among the easiest to (ra(k. To the detriment o- millions o- $nternet users, going without salt is only one o- the many sins that popular websites routinely (ommit against password se(urity.

related searches:
age break by Auto ager. age> I )oad ages @.

.o+ /HA" is not a secure hashing algorith$

A large per(entage o- the sites that -all prey to password brea(hes (ommit another error that -urther diminishes the prote(tion o- hashes: they use algorithms that were ne,er designed to prote(t passwords. That1s be(ause !HA1, 3G!, and C3' were designed to (on,ert plainte/t into hashes e/tremely 6ui(kly using minimal (omputing resour(es, and this is e/a(tly what people running password (ra(king programs want most. >%T)C, whi(h still uses C3I, is also highly sus(eptible to (ra(king.@

&553 A!!45D3 H8&$G%G:

Bse a program su(h as assword !a-e or)ast ass to generate and store all your passwords, and make sure they are prote(ted by a master password that1s truly strong, uni6ue, and memorable. Bse this password management app to randomly generate pass(odes that are a minimum o- 1. (hara(ters. $- you won1t be typing the password into a smartphone or other de,i(e with a limited keyboard, make sure ea(h password has symbols. 5therwise, a mi/ o- lower-(ase letters, (apital letters, and numbers will su--i(e. &enerate a uni6ue password -or e,ery a((ount that (ontains any personally identi-ying in-ormation about you. "hange your password at least on(e e,ery si/ months, and more o-ten -or your most sensiti,e a((ounts or a-ter you1,e used a network you

don1t trust. "hange your password immediately i- you learn the site it1s used to a((ess has been brea(hed. 4hen signing in to websites, try to use a login BD) that begins with 9https.9 To appre(iate <ust how poor a password hashing (hoi(e these unsalted algorithms are, (onsider this: $t took independent se(urity resear(her Keremi &osney about si/ days to (ra(k more than E0 per(ent o- the =.' million !HA1 hashes e/posed in the )inked$n brea(h. He re(o,ered a -i-th o- the plainte/t passwords in <ust .0 se(onds. $n the -ollowing two hours, he (ra(ked another one-third o- them. 5ne day into the e/er(ise, he had re(o,ered a total o- =I per(ent, and in the -i,e days that -ollowed he (ra(ked another 2= per(ent. A key part o- his su((ess0besides his '00-million-strong word list and a (omputer e6uipped with -our AC3 Dadeon H3=EE0 graphi(s (ards0was the de(ision by )inked$n engineers to hash passwords using !HA1. The algorithm uses a single (ryptographi( iteration to (on,ert plainte/t, allowing &osney1s system to (y(le through more than 1'.' billion guesses per se(ond. +y (ontrast, algorithms spe(i-i(ally designed to prote(t passwords are engineered to re6uire signi-i(antly more time and (omputation to (on,ert plainte/t into hashes. ?or instan(e, !HA'12(rypt, whi(h is in(luded in Ca( 5! H and most Bni/-based operating systems, passes te/t through ',000 iterations, a hurdle that would ha,e limited &osney to slightly less than 2,=00 guesses per se(ond. The +(rypt algorithm is e,en more (omputationally e/pensi,e, in large part be(ause it sub<e(ts te/t to multiple iterations o- the +low-ish (ipher that was deliberately modi-ied to in(rease the time re6uired to generate a hash. +#3?2, a -un(tion built into Ci(roso-t1s .%et so-tware de,eloper -ramework, o--ers similar bene-its. These (omputationally e/pensi,e -un(tions re6uire in(reased ser,er pro(essing, o- (ourse. This (an in(rease the strain on 4eb ser,ers and (ould e,en open them up to new types o- 3o! atta(ks, said Catt 4eir, a ?lorida !tate Bni,ersity post-do(toral student whose h3 -o(used on pass(odes. +ut the bene-it in impro,ed se(urity largely outweighs the in,estment, many se(urity e/perts argue. Had )inked$n engineers used +(rypt, -or e/ample, &osney would ha,e been able to make -ewer than 1,A'0 guesses per se(ond. 9$- the )inked$n passwords had been hashed using b(rypt, $ ne,er would ha,e been able to (ra(k E0 per(ent o- them,9 he told Ars in an e-mail.

9The number o- atta(ks $ had to run, (ombined with the sophisti(ation othe atta(ks $ had to run to get many o- the passwords :more than; 1' (hara(ters, would ha,e taken literally (enturies to -inish. $ would ha,e gi,en up a-ter about a week.9

Hitting the wall

G,en power-ul (omputation engines ha,e trouble (ra(king longer passwords using brute -or(e. Assuming su(h an atta(k (he(ks -or all (ombinations o- all E' letters, numbers, and symbols a,ailable on a standard Gnglish-language keyboard, it takes a matter o- hours -or a desktop (omputer with an$ntel "ore iA E80/ pro(essor to brute--or(e (ra(k any -i,e (hara(ter password. $n(reasing the password length by <ust one (hara(ter re6uires about a day2 bumping the length by one more (hara(ter, though, dramati(ally in(reases the (ra(king time to more than 10 days. Dob &raham, the Grrata !e(urity "G5 who (al(ulated the re6uirements, re-ers to this limitation as the 9e/ponential wall obrute--or(e (ra(king.9

Gnlarge * +rute--or(e (ra(ks work well against shorter passwords. The te(hni6ue (an take days or months -or longer pass(odes, e,en when using Ama7on1s (loud-based G"2 ser,i(e.
Dob &raham, Grrata !e(urity

Adding a & B (ard to a system undoubtedly helps, but not as mu(h as many might imagine. An AC3 Dadeon =EA0 still needs more than 10 days to brute -or(e a se,en-(hara(ter pass(ode. And the wall barely budges e,en when signi-i(antly more power-ul resour(es are brought to bear. Bsing an Ama7on G"2 (loud system that (ombines the horsepower o- more than 1,000 indi,idual & Bs, it still takes about 10 days to brute-or(e an eight (hara(ter password. +ut with -ew e/(eptions, the e/ponential wall rarely impedes most password (ra(kers. As demonstrated by the Do(k8ou dump, the typi(al person is notoriously sloppy when (hoosing a pass(ode. A -ull A0 per(ent o- them (ontained eight (hara(ters or less. 5nly 1I million o- the .2 million total were uni6ue, showing that a large per(entage o- passwords are dupli(ates. Atom, the Hash(at de,eloper and password-(ra(king e/pert, estimates that == per(ent o- entries -rom the typi(al unsalted hash list (an be (ra(ked by a single person in less than two days. !o what (an the a,erage person do to pi(k a pass(ode that won1t be toppled in a matter o- hoursO er Thorsheim, a se(urity ad,isor who spe(iali7es in passwords -or a large (ompany head6uartered in %orway, said the most important attribute o- any pass(ode is that it be uni6ue to ea(h site. 9?or most sites, you ha,e no idea how they store your password,9 he e/plained. 9$- they get brea(hed, you get brea(hed. $- your password at that site is uni6ue, you ha,e mu(h less to worry about.9 $t1s also important that a password not already be a part o- the (orpus othe hundreds o- millions o- (odes already (ompiled in (ra(kers1 word lists, that it be randomly generated by a (omputer, and that it ha,e a minimum o- nine (hara(ters to make brute--or(e (ra(ks in-easible. !in(e it1s not un(ommon -or people to ha,e do7ens o- a((ounts these days, the easiest way to put this ad,i(e into pra(ti(e is to use program su(h as 1 assword or assword!a-e. +oth apps allow users to (reate long, randomly generated passwords and to store them se(urely in a (ryptographi(ally prote(ted -ile that1s unlo(ked with a single master password. Bsing a password manager to (hange pass(odes regularly is also essential. &i,en the sophisti(ation o- the (ra(kers, anything less simply means your password is tri,ial to break. 9The whole password-(ra(king s(ene has (hanged drasti(ally in the last (ouple years,9 said 4eir, the ?lorida !tate Bni,ersity post-do(toral

student. 98ou (an look online and you (an generally -ind passwords -or <ust about e,eryone at some point. $1,e -ound my own username and passwords on se,eral di--erent sites. $- you think e,ery single website you ha,e an a((ount on is se(ure and has ne,er been ha(ked, you1re a mu(h more optimisti( person than $ am.9