Candidate Selection: The Choice Before the Choice

Rahat, Gideon.

Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, Number 1, January 2007, pp. 157-170 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/jod.2007.0014

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CANDIDATE SELECTION: THE CHOICE BEFORE THE CHOICE

Gideon Rahat

Gideon Rahat is a lecturer in political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He studies democratic institutions, political parties, and the politics of electoral reform. He has coauthored articles on candidate selection for Party Politics and the Journal of Legislative Studies.

crucial but neglected topic that should concern all students of democracy is how political parties choose the candidates who will run on their behalf. If democracy can be compared to a restaurant where customers (voters) order from a menu of parties and candidates, the process of choosing which candidates will be on the ballot is like that of devising the menu itselfand it all happens before even a single vote is cast in a general election. In other words, the topic is hugely important, though one would never guess this from looking at the relative paucity of writings by scholars and pundits on this theme. In most established democracies, there are no laws telling parties how to choose their candidates, and each party is free to make its own rules. The few that do have such legislation include the United States, Germany, New Zealand, Norway (until 2002), and Finland. In the United States, each state determines in detail the way that the parties are to select their candidates. In Germany (and also in New Zealand since the 1990s), the law lays out a general framework for candidate selection, but leaves it to each party to decide whether its members, or delegates whom the members select (or both, in the case of New Zealand), will choose candidates. In Norway from 1920 until 2002, parties selected their candidates through regional conventions comprising selected delegates, in voluntary compliance with a nonbinding law that promised to pay for this process if a party followed the laws guidelines. In neighboring Finland, the law still obliges parties to grant their members the right to choose candidates (in cases where the number of would-be candidates is higher than the number of positions on the party list).
Journal of Democracy Volume 18, Number 1 January 2007 2007 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press

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The laws concerning candidate selection in democracies run the gamut from detailed to general and from mandatory to voluntary-butaided-by-incentives. The varying shape of such legislation from country to countryand before that, its presence or absencereveals the different approaches toward political parties that democratic polities can take. In the United States, for instance, the laws governing parties are mandatory and detailed, which reflects the U.S. view of parties as public utilities. By contrast, the lack of legislation in most established democracies reflects a view of parties as private and autonomous voluntary associations.1 Those cases in between, of general and nonobligatory legislation, can be seen as an attempt to find a middle path between these perspectives. Over the last decade and a half, laws that oblige parties to guarantee a minimal share of their candidate slots to women or members of certain ethnic groups (or perhaps both) have become increasingly common. Argentina was the first to take this leap in 1991, when it passed a law mandating that each sex had to receive at least 30 percent of the positions on each partys candidate lists at both the national and local levels. Since then, about ten Latin American countries have followed suit, as have West European democracies such as Belgium and France. 2 Although such laws apparently look only to the outcomes of candidate selection and not its methods, the reality is that selection procedures can hardly escape being affected, since they must be made to meet the legally prescribed thresholds of female or minority representation. The nature of the electoral system defines the final products that are expected from the candidate-selection process. In countries such as Britain and the United States, where first-past-the-post systems are used in the election of the national legislature, a person is selected to stand as the partys candidate in a single-member electoral district. In countries such as the many in Western Europe that use proportional-representation systems based on lists of candidates sorted by party (list PR), the candidates usually appear in ranked order on each partys list. In both majoritarian and proportional systems, parties function as gatekeepers that decide who will run under the party banner and who is set to run for a safe seat (in majoritarian races) or gets a safe place on the candidate list (in list-PR elections).

Why Methods Matter

Candidate-selection methods hold significance for at least four reasons: 1) They have large political consequences for the composition of parliaments and the behavior of their members; 2) they play a major role in the delegation process within modern representative democracy; 3) they show how power is distributed within parties; and 4) their importance is rising with the increase of candidate-centered, or personalized, politics.

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First, because there are safe seats in virtually every legislature, in many cases it is the candidate-selection procedureand not the general electionthat determines who will become a member of parliament. Representation is largely determined at this stage. For example, if all parties were to appoint women as their candidates in half their safe seats (or positions), this would go a long way toward assuring parity in the sexes representation in parliament before any general election even took place. Candidate selection can also affect the turnover of legislators through the continuation or deselection of incumbents. The methods by which the candidates are selected influence their behavior as parliamentarians. In cases when candidates are selected by the party leader or by a small party elite, those legislators who want to be reselected are likely to demonstrate high levels of party cohesion and discipline. When selection is decentralized and conducted by wider publics (all party members or party supporters, for example), legislators are more likely to be responsive to various interests and may thus demonstrate lower levels of party cohesion. Second, candidate selection is a link in the chain of democratic delegation: If voters make legislators their agents through elections, then selectors make candidates their agents through selection. Third, the analysis of candidate selection reveals the power balance within parties. The degree to which individuals or groups can influence contests over candidacy says much about who wields clout inside the party. Parties may have slipped as providers in areas that once defined them (interest representation and aggregation, political communication, and identity), yet nearly everywhere parties still hold the keys to elective office, for in most legislatures less than a handful of members are independents. Finally, the last few decades have seen a growing personalization of politics across much of the democratic world, with the significance of individual actors rising as that of groups (and especially parties) declines. The rise of candidate-centered politics further boosts the importance of candidate-selection methods, since these so greatly influence the career prospects and hence the behavior of politicians. In other words, we should be increasingly interested in the methods used for the selection of individual politicians within parties, and should avoid restricting our interest to the competition between parties that marks general elections. Candidate-selection methods can range from those in which the choice is highly institutionalized and formalized to those in which it is made informally, or even ad hoc. Methods can also be classed by selection system: Are candidates appointed or does the aggregation of selectors votes decide who is nominated? If the latter, is the aggregating done by plurality vote, a runoff, or some form of proportional or semiproportional representation? Or one might ask who is eligible to be nominated? In

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some parties, only long-active members may present themselves as candidates for a party nomination. Other parties set the bar lower but still require their candidates to show minimal terms as members before submitting themselves as candidates. Still others set no conditions and allow any voter to try his luck. The focus here, however, will be on two additional parameters that are usually considered to be the most important. The first is who the selectors are (in other words, how inclusive is the selectorate that picks the partys candidates?). The second is where the selection takes place (in other words, is it centrally controlled or not?). In its territorial sense, the second parameter has to do with whether candidates are chosen at the national level or else at the regional or local levels. A major question is who selects the candidates: A single leader? A small party elite? Delegates whom party members choose? Party members themselves? Any voter who registers under the partys name? The above possibilities are presented by the Figure on a continuum that stretches from a highly exclusive pole to a highly inclusive one. The most exclusive selectorate is a single party leader. Until 2000, Mexicos long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party allowed its leader, who was always its candidate for the countrys one-term presidency, to handpick all Senate candidates.3 In several populist parties on Europes extreme rightincluding parties in Denmark, Italy, and Norwaythe party leader plays a central role in candidate selection even today. 4 A small group of leaders is the next-most exclusive selectorate. It may be an informal assembly of those who head important intraparty factions, a group founding a new party, or a set of figures with extrapolitical (often religious) claims to authority. In Israel, intraparty councils of religious leaders select the candidate lists of the ultraOrthodox Jewish parties, as well as the representatives of the Islamic movement. In many parties across the world, slightly more inclusive selectorates comprising small nominating committees play central roles in candidate selection. Such bodies are likelier to receive input from wider party agencies and hence to be more inclusive and transparent than small, informal groups of party grandees. Moreover, nominating committees often submit the proposed nominees for broader intraparty ratification. In Norway, for example, party committees submit lists of nominees for the seats in each of the countrys multimember parliamentary districts to conventions chosen by party members at large. The members of these conventions may vote to change as well as approve nominees.5 German parties use a similar committee-to-convention system when they assemble their candidate lists at the level of the Lnder, as the 13 constituent units (along with three free states) that make up the German Federal Republic are called.6

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FIGUREPARTY SELECTORATES
General Electorate Inclusive Party Members Selected Party Agency Non-Selected Party Agency Single Leader Exclusive

Source: Based on Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat, Candidate Selection, in Richard Katz and William Crotty, eds., Handbook of Party Politics (London: Sage, 2006), 109121.

Somewhat in the middle of the continuum we find selection by the members of selected party agencies and selection by delegates specially chosen to pick nominees for legislative seats. In many parties around the democratic world, central committees, conventions, and other relatively broad party agencies play central roles in candidate selection. In Germany, in most cases, delegates picked specially for the purpose by party members select candidates for the single-member districts of the Bundestag.7 This practice was also once common in Irelandand is still used by some parties therethough the last decade has seen several parties switch to direct nomination of candidates by party members.8 The next stop in our journey toward the inclusive pole is party primaries. Under the primary system, party members select nominees. Members usually means all those who have registered under the partys name and paid a modest fee to the party. Sometimes a minimum term of membership is required before one may vote in a party primary. In Canada, party members vote in those cases where a nomination is contested, which happens on average about a third of the time in the various parties.9 There is a growing trend in many democracies to involve party members at large in the selection process, sometimes as the sole selectors and sometimes as one of several selectorates.10 In the British Conservative and Labour parties, for example, selection committees and certain party agencies screen prospective nominees, but the members often have the last word in selecting among several short-listed candidates.11 In Belgium, different variations of polls of party members have been and continue to be conducted. In some of them, party members decide the composition and rank-ordering of the party lists for the multimember districts; in others, party members are asked to ratify lists prepared by other, more exclusive party agencies. In the latter case, only rarely, when a majority refuses to ratify and expresses different preferences, do party members influence the composition and rank-ordering of a partys list.12 The last and most inclusive stop on the itinerary involves candidateselection methods that allow all voters to take part. There may still be some thresholds for participation, such as registration as a party supporter in advance of the primaries (known as closed primaries in the United States). Participation in the most inclusive method of allthe open primaryrequires no more than the effort to reach the polling station, or even just to complete and mail a postal ballot, or perhaps even to vote via a telephone or the Internet. In the United States, Hawaii, Wis-

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consin, and Michigan are among the states that hold open primaries. Beyond U.S. borders, such highly open methods remain in limited use. As is already evident from the examples above, in many cases more than one selectorate, at differing levels of inclusiveness, is involved in candidate selection. This may reflect historical developments, in which selection was not transferred from one selectorate to another but rather new selectorates were added. This has usually been done to satisfy pressures for democratizationthat is, to increase inclusiveness. In addition to asking about overall inclusiveness, one may ask at what level of centrality candidate selection takes place. Does the partywhether that means a single leader, a party agency, or all members or backersrank candidates on its list or assign districts among them at the national level? Or are these decisions dispersed among regional, local, or other noncentral dimensions of the party? (Noncentral need not mean inclusiveletting a local notable singlehandedly pick nominees, for instance, would represent a noncentralized but highly exclusive method of candidate selection.) Certain parties in Israel fully centralize candidate selection at the national level, while the U.S. system represents full decentralization: When Democratic Party primary voters in the state of Connecticut rejected long-serving senator Joseph Lieberman as their nominee in 2006, for instance, the national Democratic Party had no choice but to accept this verdict and embrace the primary winner (who later lost the general election to Lieberman) as its nominee. In other democracies, selectorates from different levels become involved in choosing candidates. In Britain, for example, the Conservative Party national agency does the initial screening of potential candidates, while local party selectorates continue the screening process and make the final selection.13 The term decentralization is usually used in a territorial sense, yet candidate selection may be decentralized in ways that are not geographic. Israels Labor Party accords certain minorities (Arab and Druze) the right to fill several fairly safe slots on the candidate list. In other cases, candidate-selection rights may be granted to certain interest groups affiliated with a party, such as unions or employers associations. Even the widespread use of quotas to ensure minimal representation for women can be seen as a form of partial, nonterritorial decentralization, in the sense that it distinguishes among candidates according to the specific criterion of gender.

Candidate Selection the World Over: A Brief Survey

North American partiesin the United States, Canada, and more recently Mexicofavor relatively decentralized and inclusive systems. Many West European parties have adopted more inclusive candidate selection methods in recent decades, giving the ranks of ordinary party

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members a significant role in candidate selection. Yet most of those parties have also been careful to ensure that party agencies retain some control over the process. At the same time, more than a few European parties have made their candidate-selection procedures more centralized, mainly in order to ensure that, within the framework of wider inclusion, demands for greater representation of women and other social groups can also be met. In some cases, pursuit of this latter goal has led parties to adopt obligatory rules for ensuring representation even though such rules restrict the choices of the parties more inclusive selectorates.14 In U.S. primary elections, voters may select congressional nominees without reference to what any higher party organization might prefer. This is candidate selection at its most purely inclusive and decentralized, and it has helped to create and preserve parties that are less cohesive than most of their counterparts in other established democracies. Parties in the United States are largely platforms for candidates who are responsive, first and foremost, to their selectorates and electorates at the level of single-member districts, including the 435 (currently fixed at that number by a 1929 law) that choose one member each of the House of Representatives (each U.S. congressional district contains about 600,000 people, and any state with a population smaller than that gets a single, at-large representative). Critics claim that U.S. primaries promote the unhealthy personalization of politics, while supporters present them as a tool that has shortened the distance between the people and their representatives and smashed the old, corrupt political machines.15 Canadian parties use a highly decentralized candidate-selection method which is also very inclusive (albeit slightly less so than the method that U.S. parties use). In Canada, it is not all party supporters but only dues-paying party members who select nominees for parliamentary seats. Federal-level party organizations retain a modest say concerning candidacies, though the basic fact of local dominance over the process is hardly disputed. Interestingly, while candidate selection is highly inclusive and decentralized, Canadian MPs show high levels of party discipline.16 While space will not permit exploration of this counterintuitive phenomenon, it is worth noting as a reminder that the relationship between candidate-selection methods and party cohesion is not as simple as the comparison between the U.S. and West European cases might seem to imply. Since the 1990s, Mexico has been in the midst of a democratization process that has most famously been about increasing democratic competition between parties, but which has also seen experiments regarding democratization within parties. The general trend in candidate selection has been toward less centralism and more inclusiveness. In many cases, candidates for the single-member congressional districts are selected by party members or even supporters at the level of those districtsa highly decentralized and inclusive system. Yet candidacies

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for proportional seats (Mexico mixes plurality with list-based proportional elections) continue to be doled out by party elites at the center, chiefly as a means of rewarding loyalists.17 British parties have gradually developed more inclusive ways of choosing candidates. In the past, party members had no role (beyond perhaps rubber-stamping) in a selection process dominated by party agencies. Increasingly, party members now choose from short lists of candidates produced by the screening efforts of various party agencies. Selection became a little more centralized recently when the national offices of the two main parties enhanced their control over the process, the Conservatives through preselection screening and Labour via the assertion of a right to veto locally selected candidates.18 In Germany, the parties select candidates according to rules outlined by law. In a fashion somewhat parallel to Mexicos, candidate selection is affected by the presence of an electoral system that in each Lnd mixes single-member constituencies with a candidate list. The law allows candidate selection by either party members or their selected delegates. Committees meeting at the Lnd level compile lists for their respective parties, subject to ratification by delegates who represent the party membership and who are empowered to add and drop candidates from the list. Special meetings of delegates chosen by party members make nominations for the single-memberdistrict races, though there are also cases in which party members choose candidates directly. The Christian Democrats and Social Democrats (Germanys two largest parties) thus follow candidate-selection procedures that can be defined as moderately inclusivesometimes more so at the local than at the Lnd level. The German system is also quite decentralized: The federal level has almost no say, while the local level dominates candidate selection in the single-member districts and the Lnd level dominates the filling of the party lists. Across the Nordic lands, candidate selection is highly decentralized and under local dominance, yet the degree of inclusiveness varies significantly from country to country. In Iceland, party supporters are gaining ever more control over who is nominated. In Finland, duespaying party members select the candidates as the law ordains, but local party organizations have the right to make limited changes in the candidate list. In Denmark, most parties give their members a central role in candidate selection, though other party agencies do take part and influence the process. In Norway, nominations are the province of selected party-member delegates who ratify or change a candidate list filled and ranked by a nominating committee.19 The more exclusive procedures in Norway allow the parties to ensure various kinds of representation (territorial, group, gender), while the Icelandic parties that use highly inclusive methods find it more difficult to ensure such representation. An interesting case is the approach that the Labour Party of New Zealand uses to choose candidates in the countrys single-member dis-

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tricts. The selectorate is composed of three delegates who are appointed by the central party organization, a more or less equal number of delegates selected by the local organization (the more Labour Party members live in the district, the higher the number of local representatives), and of party members whose choice in a special meeting is counted as a single vote.20 This arrangement mixes both territorial levels and various levels of inclusiveness: appointed selectors, selectors chosen by party members, and members themselves. Argentinean parties choose nominees for Congress at the provincial level. The process may be maximally exclusive (with a single local leader doing the picking) or may involve elite arrangements, selection by an assembly of delegates, or, at the most inclusive end of the spectrum, primary elections in which most participants are party members.21 Israel also displays levels of inclusiveness that differ sharply from party to party, with some parties running lists put together by a single leader or a small nonselected elite while other parties field candidacies chosen by broadly selected party agencies or even party members themselves. The wide range of selectorates found within a small country such as Israel is interesting in itself. It is far more common to find all the parties within a given country using fairly similar candidate-selection methods, in part perhaps due to authoritative norms and traditions of the national political culture, and in part perhaps simply because parties tend to imitate one another. The incomplete picture that we have indicates that some parties in new democracies experiment with highly inclusive (and sometimes also decentralized) candidate-selection methods, while others stick to the use of highly exclusive (and centralized) methods. In Taiwan as in Mexico, democratization expressed itself in part as a process of internally democratizing the governing party, which in Taiwans case meant the long-ruling Nationalists (or Kuomintang). Experiments with several kinds of relatively inclusive methods that gave rank-and-file Kuomintang members an unprecedented role in candidate selection marked significant milestones along Taiwans path toward fuller democracy.22 In Croatia, on the other hand, the parties adopted very exclusive and centralized procedures that gave the party leader and nonselected party agencies a dominant, sometimes even exclusive, role in candidate selection.23 It would be interesting to attempt an explanation of why some parties in some new democracies experiment with intraparty democratization and why some do not, but that is beyond the scope of this article.

Methods and Consequences

Comparative research on the consequences of candidate-selection methods is still in its early stages. Yet it is already apparent that simple cases of more democracy in candidate selection breeding more democ-

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racy in the larger polity will be found rarely, if at all. Highly inclusive methods enable wider realization of a core democratic valuepopular participation. Yet research casts doubts on the quality of this participation, which candidates and other powerful actors manipulate shamelessly. 24 Research also points to the large advanInclusive methods seem to encourage the tage that incumbents enjoy in primaries (especially in the United States), thanks politics of personality to their ability to make news and to their and may thus lead to advantage in raising the huge sums of low levels of party money that are needed to win a typical cohesion. U.S. primary (cash would not be at such a premium if aspiring nominees were not competing before such large selectorates).25 Inclusive methods also seem to encourage the politics of personality and may thus lead to low levels of party cohesion (but not necessarily, as the Canadian case demonstrates). Finally, highly inclusive methods make it hard to present balanced candidate slates that include representation of women, ethnic minorities, or other social groups. Ensuring that the aggregation of thousands of votes produces balanced representation is impossible unless the party adopts mechanisms that somewhat limit the selectors choices or interfere (as gender quotas do) with the translation of votes into candidacies. In short, there is a tension between the fullest participation and the most comprehensive representation, since maximizing the former may impinge upon the latter. Although we can argue that primaries do not equal democracy, and may even impair attempts to achieve some democratic goals, it is also clear that using moderately or highly exclusive selectorates causes problems of its own. Small nominating committees may ensure a highly representative array of candidates, but do not foster popular participation. Such bodies lack the aura of democratic legitimacy, which is not only a problem in itself, but is also likely to lead them to stick too close to the status quo and thus produce inadequate turnover of officeholders. Party discipline and cohesion may run too strong if candidates depend on the favor of a small party elite for their reselection, and leave too little room for a legislators personal responsiveness to constituents. The middle way, selecting candidates through selected party agencies or special conventions, also has flaws. While such selectorates are likely to be the most competitive, they do less than committees when it comes to ensuring comprehensive representation, and less than primaries when it comes to broadening participation. Moreover, certain pathologiessuch as patron-client tiescan breed as a result of the bond that forms between selectors and the selected. It is common to see decentralization as an opportunity for more

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grassroots involvement and hence as a sign of democratization. This impression, however, is simplistic. First, candidate selection may be highly decentralized and yet highly exclusive at the same time. You cannot get more decentralized, after all, than by having a set of individual local strongmen each handpick the candidate or candidates in his district. Yet such a situation would hardly be democratic. Second, decentralization often enhances a certain kind of representation and makes it more difficult to ensure other kinds. For example, it is harder to ensure minimal representation for women and minorities in cases when the autonomous local organization selects a single candidate than in those cases where a more centralized selectorate allocates plural candidacies.26 Third, decentralization may be less an expression of grassroots power than a sign ofand an incentive forthe politics of patrons and clients. 27 A major point that arises from both our survey of candidate-selection methods and our brief discussion of their political ramifications is that there is no single method that optimally serves all democratic goals at the same time. In short, each method has its pros and cons, and the adoption of any one of them cannot be a mere technical affair, but rather implies a political decision to accept a certain tradeoff regarding a set of democratic goals that cannot all be maximally pursued at once. A more participatory method, for example, is likely to produce narrower representation, while a less participatory method increases the opportunity to design balanced candidacies but at a possible cost in democratic legitimacy. No single method can fulfill at the same time the full set of democratic goals, including participation, representation, competition, responsiveness, and popular legitimacy. We know the minimal requirements that we need to see in order to answer the question of whether a national polity is democratic. When it comes to democracy within a party, however, the picture is less clear. One possible solution may be to apply the polity-wide tests to the way in which each party conducts its own internal affairs. This would imply the adoption of highly inclusive candidate-selection methods as an answer to the requirement for universal participation. A country may gain from this in terms of widening political participation, but pay in other ways ranging from poor-quality participation to inadequate representation. Another way to look at the issue of intraparty democracy is to see it as complementary to national-level democracy, rather than as a lowerlevel parallel system. In this view, the intraparty arena may be exempted from the requirement of universal participation. While we forbid democracies from strongly limiting participation in national elections, we do allow parties to limit participation in candidate selection. A main justification for these different approaches to the national and intraparty levels is that states or polities as a wholeas distinguished from parts (the origin of the word party) within those politiesare responsible

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for allowing universal participation. Parties are voluntary associations, and any citizen unhappy with a party may leave it and join or even establish another party (and the democratic state is responsible for ensuring that all citizens are free to do so). In contrast, at the national level such an exit option is irrelevant. A state is not a voluntary association and a democratic state is obliged to give voice to all its citizens that is, to assure the possibility of universal participation. If we were free to engineer a candidate-selection method, what design would we choose in order best to promote the overall quality of democracy? A possible optimal solution from a liberal-democratic point of view is to involve several selectorates in the process. For example, a small screening committee might design a short list; then a wider party agency would ratify or reject the reselection of incumbents and would be able to change the short list using procedures such as special-majority requirements. Finally, all party members who cared to vote would select their candidates from the short list designed by the former two selectorates. Such a mixture would allow democracies to strike an optimal balance from the standpoint of several democratic goals. First, it would open the gates wide to meaningful participation while still allowing each party to reward its activists by granting them special influence over the second stage of candidate selection. Second, it would enable a reasonable level of representation, at least in the designation of the short list (the use of quotas for ensuring representation of women and minorities is likely to be needed). Third, it would permit some competition by putting the fate of incumbents in the hands of the selected party agency. Fourth, it would make those selected (and those who are interested in reselection) responsive to various selectorates, with different interests and outlooks. Candidates who would like to be reselected would need to balance the need to be team players with the need to be responsive to constituencies both within and beyond the party. Finally and this advantage may weigh more heavily than all the others combinedthe diffusion of authority among several selectorates would prevent the concentration of power and the growth of the pathologies that characterize the use of a single selectorate. The existence of several selectorates, in other words, would foster checks and balances of the sort whose worth to democracy is well established. NOTES
1. Alan Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 2. Mala Htun, Is Gender Like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity Groups, Perspectives on Politics 2 (September 2004): 43958. 3. Steven T. Wuhs, Democratization and the Dynamics of Candidate Selection

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Rule Change in Mexico, 19912003, Mexican Studies 22 (Winter 2006): 3355. 4. On Italy, see Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, 3 rd ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2001). On Norway and Denmark, see Hanne Marthe Narud, Party Nominations and Patterns of Representation: The Scandinavian Countries, paper presented at the IPSA World Congress, Fukuoka, Japan, 913 July 2006. 5. Henry Valen, Hanne Marthe Narud, and Audun Skare, Norway: Party Dominance and Decentralized Decision-Making, in Hanne Marthe Narud, Mogens N. Pedersen, and Henry Valen, eds., Party Sovereignty and Citizen Control: Selecting Candidates for Parliamentary Elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway (Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2002), 169215. 6. Geoffrey Roberts, The German Federal Republic: The Two-Lane Route to Bonn, in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh, eds., Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics (London: Sage, 1988), 94119. 7. Roberts, The German Federal Republic. 8. Yvonne Galligan, Candidate Selection: More Democratic or More Centrally Controlled? in Michael Gallagher, Michael Marsh, and Paul Mitchell, eds., How Ireland Voted 2002 (Houndmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 3756. 9. William Cross, Candidate Nomination in Canadas Political Parties, paper presented at the IPSA World Congress, Fukuoka, Japan, 913 July 2006. 10. Lars Bille, Democratizing a Democratic Procedure: Myth or Reality? Candidate Selection in Western European Parties, 196090, Party Politics 7 (May 2001): 36380; Miki Caul-Kittilson and Susan E. Scarrow, Political Parties and the Rhetoric and Realities of Democratization, in Bruce E. Cain, Russell J. Dalton, and Susan E. Scarrow, eds., Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 5980; Susan E. Scarrow, Paul Webb, and David M. Farrell, From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation: The Changing Distribution of Power within Political Parties, in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 12953. 11. Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Thomas Quinn, Modernizing the Labour Party (Houndmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 12. Lieven De Winter, Belgium: Democracy or Oligarchy? in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh, eds., Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics (London: Sage, 1988), 2046. 13. Norris and Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament . 14. Pippa Norris, Recruitment, in Richard S. Katz and William J. Crotty, eds., Handbook of Party Politics (London: Sage, 2006), 89108. 15. Alan Ware, The American Direct Primary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 16. Kenneth R. Carty, Parties as Franchise Systems: The Stratarchical Organizational Imperative, Party Politics 10 (January 2004): 524; Jonathan Malloy,

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High Discipline, Low Cohesion? The Uncertain Patterns of Canadian Parliamentary Party Groups, in Reuven Y. Hazan, ed., Cohesion and Discipline in Legislatures (London: Routledge, 2006), 11629. 17. Wuhs, Democratization and the Dynamics of Candidate Selection Rule Change in Mexico. 18. Norris and Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament . 19. Hanne Marthe Narud, Mogens N. Pedersen, and Henry Valen, eds., Party Sovereignty and Citizen Control: Selecting Candidates for Parliamentary Elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway (Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2002). 20. Richard Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 3 rd ed. (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2004). 21. Miguel De Luca, Mark P. Jones, and Maria I. Tula, Back Rooms or Ballot Boxes? Candidate Nomination in Argentina, Comparative Political Studies 35 (May 2002): 41336. 22. Chung-Li Wu, The Transformation of the Kuomintangs Candidate Selection System, Party Politics 7 (January 2001): 10318. 23. Mirjana Kasapovi, Nominating Procedures in Democratic Polities, Politika Misao 38 (May 2001): 317. 24. Gideon Rahat and Reuven Hazan, Participation in Party Primaries: Increase in Quantity, Decrease in Quality, in Thomas Zittel and Dieter Fuchs, eds., Participatory Democracy and Political Participation. Can Democratic Reform Bring Citizens Back In? (London: Routledge, forthcoming). 25. John S. Jackson, Incumbency in the United States, in Albert Somit, Rudolph Wildenmann, Bernard Boll, and Andrea Rmmele, eds., The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy? (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 1994), 2970; Sandy L. Maisel and Walter J. Stone, Primary Elections as a Deterrence to Candidacy for the U.S. House of Representatives, in Peter F. Galderisi, Marni Ezra, and Michael Lyons, eds., Congressional Primaries and the Politics of Representation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 2947. 26. Richard E. Matland and Donley T. Studlar, The Contagion of Women Candidates in Single-Member and Multi-Member Districts, Journal of Politics 58 (August 1996): 70733. 27. Magnus Ohman, The Heart and Soul of the Party: Candidate Selection in Ghana and Africa (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 2004).