G.R. No. 173520 January 30, 2013 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.

SPOUSES RODOLFO ZABALA and LILIA BAYLON, Respondents. FACTS: On October 27, 1994, plaintiff-appellant National Power Corporation ("Napocor") filed a complaint for Eminent Domain against defendants-appellees Sps. R. Zabala & L. Baylon, Tomas Aguirre, Generosa de Leon and Leonor Calub before the Regional Trial Court, Balanga City, Bataan alleging that: defendants-appellees Spouses Zabala and Baylon, Aguirre, de Leon, and Calub own parcels of land located in Balanga City, Bataan; ; it urgently needed an easement of right of way over the affected areas for its 230 KV Limay-Hermosa Transmission Line[s]; the said parcels of land have neither been applied nor expropriated for any public use, and were selected in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury; it repeatedly negotiated with the defendants-appellees for the acquisition of right of way easement over the said parcels of land but failed to reach an agreement with the latter; it has the right to take or enter upon the possession of the subject properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 42, which repealed Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court upon the filing of the expropriation complaint before the proper court or at anytime thereafter, after due notice to defendants-appellees, and upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank of the amount equal to the assessed value of the subject properties for taxation purposes which is to be held by said bank subject to the orders and final disposition of the court; and it is willing to deposit the provisional value representing the said assessed value of the affected portions of the subject property x x x. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to enter and take possession of the subject property, to demolish all the improvements x x x thereon, and to commence with the construction of the transmission lines project on the subject properties, and to appoint not more than three (3) commissioners to ascertain and report the just compensation for the said easement of right of way. On January 11, 1995, defendant-appellee Spouses Zabala moved to dismiss the complaint averring that: the Balanga City proper is already crowded and x x x needs additional space to meet the housing requirements of the growing population; the only direction the city proper could expand is the side where their subject property is located; they incurred a considerable expense in the preparatory development of the subject property into a subdivision to serve the interest and well being of the growing population of Balanga; the said growing need for housing and said preparatory development would necessarily increase the value of the said property; the just compensation would be higher if the proposed transmission lins of plaintiff-appellant Napocor is installed or made to pass or traverse through their property rather than through the parcels of land. On December 4, 1997, the Commissioners submitted their Report/Recommendation fixing the just compensation for the use of defendants-appellees Spouses Zabalas property as easement of right of way at P150.00 per square meter without considering the consequential damages. Plaintiff-appellant Napocor prayed in its Comment to the commissioners report, that the report be recommitted to the commissioners for the modification of the report and the substantiation of the same with reliable and competent documentary evidence based on the value of the property at the time of its taking. On their part, defendants-appellees Spouses Zabala prayed, in the Comments, for the fixing of the just compensation at P250.00 per square meter. On August 20, 2003, the Commissioners submitted their Final Report fixing the just compensation at P500.00 per square meter.

Since the Commissioners had already submitted their Final Report8 on the valuation of the subject property, spouses Zabala moved for the resolution of the case insofar as their property was concerned. Thus, on June 28, 2004, the RTC rendered its Partial Decision,9 ruling that Napocor has the lawful authority to take for public purpose and upon payment of just compensation a portion of spouses Zabalas property. The RTC likewise ruled that since the spouses Zabala were deprived of the beneficial use of their property, they are entitled to the actual or basic value of their property. Thus, it fixed the just compensation at P150.00 per square meter. Napocor appealed to the CA. It argued that the Commissioners reports upon which the RTC based the just compensation are not supported by documentary evidence. Necessarily, therefore, the just compensation pegged by the RTC at P150.00 per square meter also lacked basis. Napocor likewise imputed error on the part of the RTC in not applying Section 3A of Republic Act (RA) No. 639511 which limits its liability to easement fee of not more than 10% of the market value of the property traversed by its transmission lines. On July 10, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the RTCs Partial Decision. ISSUE: Whether or Not Section 3A of Republic Act No. 6395 can restrict the constitutional power of the courts to determine just compensation. HELD: No, Section 3A of Republic Act No. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional power of the courts to determine just compensation. In insisting that the just compensation cannot exceed 10% of the market value of the affected property, Napocor relies heavily on Section 3A of RA No. 6395. Just compensation has been defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The word just is used to qualify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample." The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property owners to just compensation has been violated. Thus, we have consistently ruled that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof. Since the high-tension electric current passing through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to require Napocor to recompense them for the full market value of their property.

G.R. No. 182249 March 5, 2013 TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent. FACTS: On August 30, 2001, De Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as Financial Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080. His appointment was included in TIDCORPs Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) for August 2001, which was submitted to the CSC Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Field Office. On September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De Guzmans appointment because the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was not included in the DBMs Index of Occupational Service. TIDCORPs Executive Vice President Jane U. Tambanillo appealed the invalidation of De Guzmans appointment to Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC-National Capital Region (NCR). According to Tambanillo, Republic Act No. (RA) 8494, which amended TIDCORPs charter, empowers its Board of Directors to create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and to approve its own compensation and position classification system and qualification standards. On the basis of Section 7 of RA 8494, Tambanillo argued that TIDCORP is authorized to adopt an organizational structure different from that set and prescribed by the CSC. Section 7 exempts TIDCORP from existing laws on compensation, position classification and qualification standards, and is thus not bound by the DBMs Index of Occupational Service. Pursuant to this authority, TIDCORPs Board of Directors issued Resolution No. 1185, s. 1998 approving the corporations re-organizational plan, under which De Guzman was appointed Financial Management Specialist IV. De Guzmans appointment was valid because the plan providing for his position followed the letter of the law. The CSC-NCRs Ruling Director Padilla denied Tambanillos appeal because De Guzmans appointment failed to comply with Section 1, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, which requires that the position title of an appointment submitted to the CSC must conform with the approved Position Allocation List and must be found in the Index of Occupational Service. Since the position of Financial Management Specialist IV is not included in the Index of Occupational Service, then De Guzmans appointment to this position must be invalid TIDCORP appealed to the CSC-Central Office (CO) and affirmed the CSC-NCRs decision that De Guzmans appointment should have complied with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999. Rule III, Section 1(c) is explicit in requiring that the position title indicated in the appointment should conform with the Position Allocation List and found in the Index of Occupational Service. Otherwise, the appointment shall be disapproved. In disallowing De Guzmans appointment, the CSC-CO held that Director Bugtong was simply following the letter of the law. According to the CSC-CO, TIDCORP misconstrued the provisions of Section 7 of RA 8494 in its attempt to bypass the requirements of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998. While RA 8494 gave TIDCORP staffing prerogatives, it would still have to comply with civil service rules because Section 7 did not expressly exempt TIDCORP from civil service laws.

TIDCORP moved to reconsider the CSC-COs decision, but this motion was denied,16 prompting TIDCORP to file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA. The petition asserted that the CSC-CO committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 030144 and Resolution No. 031037. However, The CA denied TIDCORPs petition and upheld the ruling of the CSC-CO. In its present petition for review on certiorari,23 TIDCORP argued that the CSCs interpretation of the last sentence of Section 7 of RA 8494 (which mandates it to endeavor to make the system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided in RA 6758) is misplaced. This provision does not bar TIDCORP from adopting a position classification system and qualification standards different from those prescribed by the CSC. TIDCORP asserts that it is not also duty bound to comply with civil service rules on compensation and position classification, as it is exempt from all these rules. Instead, TIDCORP is only required to furnish the CSC with its compensation and position classification system and qualification standards so that the CSC can be properly guided in processing TIDCORPs appointments, promotion and personnel action. Insisting on its exemption from RA 6758 and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, TIDCORP emphasizes that the provisions of RA 6758, which the CSC applied to TIDCORP, is a general law, while TIDCORPs charter, RA 8494, is a special law. In interpreting conflicting provisions of a general law and a special law, the provisions of the two laws should be harmonized to give effect to both. But if these provisions cannot be reconciled, then the special law should prevail because it is a qualification to the general rule. The CSC maintained that Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution includes government and controlled corporations as part of the civil service. TIDCORP, a GOCC, is therefore covered by the civil service rules and by the CSC. It should submit its Position Allocation List to the DBM, regardless of its exemption under RA 6758. Lastly, the CSC argued that RA 8494 should not prevail over RA 6758 because the latter also applies to GOCCs like TIDCORP; RA 8494 even makes a reference to RA 6758. ISSUE: Whether the Constitution empowers the CSC to prescribe and enforce civil service rules and regulations contrary to laws passed by Congress; Whether De Guzmans appointment as Financial Management Specialist IV in TIDCORP is valid?

HELD: Directly at issue is the application of Section 1(c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, to appointments in TIDCORP. TIDCORP claims that its exemption, embodied in Section 7 of its charter, precludes the application of this requirement. The CSC, on the other hand, maintains its stance that appointments in a GOCC should follow the civil service laws on appointments, regardless of its exemption from the civil service rules on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. While the CSC has authority over personnel actions in GOCCs, the rules it formulates pursuant to this mandate should not contradict or amend the civil service laws it implements. At the outset, we clarify that the CSCs authority over personnel actions in TIDCORP is uncontested. Both parties acknowledge this relationship in the pleadings they filed before the Supreme Court.25 But while TIDCORP asserts that its charter exempts it from rules on compensation, position classification and qualification standards, the CSC argues that this exemption is irrelevant to the denial of De Guzmans

appointment because the CSCs authority over TIDCORPs personnel actions requires it to comply with the CSCs rules on appointments. The parties arguments reveal an apparent clash between TIDCORPs charter, enacted by Congress, and the CSC rules, issued pursuant to the CSCs rule-making power. Does the CSCs constitutional authority over the civil service divest the Legislature of the power to enact laws providing exemptions to civil service rules? The CSCs rule-making power, albeit constitutionally granted, is still limited to the implementation and interpretation of the laws it is tasked to enforce. The 1987 Constitution created the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government mandated to establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service.26 It is a constitutionally created administrative agency that possesses executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. With TIDCORP exempt from Section 1(c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, there remains the issue of whether De Guzmans appointment as Financial Management Specialist IV is valid. Since Section 1(c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998,is the only requirement that De Guzman failed to follow, his appointment actually complied with all the requisites for a valid appointment. The CSC, therefore, should have given due course to De Guzman's appointment. WHEREFORE, all premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE

3G.R. No. 195540 March 13, 2013 GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, Respondent. FACTS: On November 29, 1985, Goldenway Merchandising Corporation (petitioner) executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank (respondent) over its real properties situated in Valenzuela, Bulacan (now Valenzuela City) and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T152630, T-151655 and T-214528 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan. The mortgage secured the Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) loan granted by respondent to petitioner and was duly registered. As petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation, respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on December 13, 2000. During the public auction, the mortgaged properties were sold for P3,500,000.00 to respondent. Accordingly, a Certificate of Sale was issued to respondent on January 26, 2001. On February 16, 2001, the Certificate of Sale was registered and inscribed on TCT Nos. T-152630, T-151655 and T-214528. In a letter dated March 8, 2001, petitioners counsel offered to redeem the foreclosed properties by tendering a check in the amount of P3,500,000.00. On March 12, 2001, petitioners counsel met with respondents counsel reiterating petitioners intention to exercise the right of redemption.6 However, petitioner was told that such redemption is no longer possible because the certificate of sale had already been registered. Petitioner also verified with the Registry of Deeds that title to the foreclosed properties had already been consolidated in favor of respondent and that new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondent on March 9, 2001. On December 7, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint7 for specific performance and damages against the respondent, asserting that it is the one-year period of redemption under Act No. 3135 which should apply and not the shorter redemption period provided in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791. Petitioner argued that applying Section 47 of R.A. 8791 to the real estate mortgage executed in 1985 would result in the impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection clause under the Constitution. Additionally, petitioner faulted the respondent for allegedly failing to furnish it and the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC of Valenzuela City with a Statement of Account as directed in the Certificate of Sale, due to which petitioner was not apprised of the assessment and fees incurred by respondent, thus depriving petitioner of the opportunity to exercise its right of redemption prior to the registration of the certificate of sale. On January 8, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. It noted that the issue of constitutionality of Sec. 47 of R.A. No. 8791 was never raised by the petitioner during the pretrial and the trial. Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial courts decision. According to the CA, petitioner failed to justify why Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 should be declared unconstitutional. Furthermore, the appellate court concluded that a reading of Section 47 plainly reveals the intention to shorten the period of redemption for juridical persons and that the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties in this case when R.A. No. 8791 was already in effect clearly falls within the purview of the said provision. In the present petition, it is contended that Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 is inapplicable considering that the contracting parties expressly and categorically agreed that the foreclosure of the real estate

mortgage shall be in accordance with Act No. 3135. Citing Co v. Philippine National Bank11 petitioner contended that the right of redemption is part and parcel of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage itself and attaches thereto upon its execution, a vested right flowing out of and made dependent upon the law governing the contract of mortgage and not on the mortgagees act of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged properties. ISSUE: Whether or not the Section 47 of R.A. 8791 to the real estate mortgage executed in 1985 would result in the impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection clause under the Constitution? HELD: The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, contracts should not be tampered with by subsequent laws that would change or modify the rights and obligations of the parties. Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. There is an impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135 Petitioners claim that Section 47 infringes the equal protection clause as it discriminates mortgagors/property owners who are juridical persons is equally bereft of merit. The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal protection permits of reasonable classification.24We have ruled that one class may be treated differently from another where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee. The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 202202 March 19, 2013 SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO, Petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ, Respondents. FACTS: On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution granting Buenaventura Juntillas petition, one of the opposing candidates seeking for the position of Congressional Office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of, to disqualify Richard Gomez for lack of qualification to meet the one year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The moved for consideration was subsequently denied by COMELEC En Banc on May 4, 2010. On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez filed her COC together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the partys official substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. The COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 8890 on May 8, 2010 to allow the substitution of private respondent. Pending the petition filed by Juntilla on May 9, 2010 for an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution 8890, the national and local elections were conducted as scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the election Richard, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered 101,250 votes which was credited in favor of private respondent as a substitute and as a result she was proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte. On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust private respondent claiming that she failed to comply the one year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution and that she did not validly substitute Richard as his COC was void ab intio. The HRET dismissed the quo warranto petition and declared that private respondent was a qualified candidate. The resolution denying Richards candidacy spoke of disqualification and not Coc cancellation. Thus, substitution of private respondent was legal and valid. Hence, this instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that Richard was validly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative in view of the formers failure to meet the one year residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. HELD: Yes. Under the Omnibus Election Code Section 68 and 78, it provides for certain remedies to assail a candidates bid for public office. While a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose COC had been denied due course to and/ or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. A cancelled COC is considered void ab intio and thus cannot give rise to a valid candidacy as a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution provided in Section 77 and necessarily, to valid votes. In the case at bar, it is clear and unequivocal that the basis for Richards disqualification is his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the denial for the due course to and/ or cancellation on COC under Section 78 of the OEC. Misrepresentation contemplated under Section 78 refers to statements affecting ones qualifications for elective office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino Status. The COMELE En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution finding Richard was only disqualified. It overlooked that fact that the latters ruling encompasses the cancellation of Richards COC and in consequence, disallowed the substitution of the private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved the private respondents substitution. Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Bancs error, the HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion, warranting the grant of the instant petition. Private respondent was therefore not a bona fide candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of

Leyte which means that she could not have been elected. Petition is granted, HRET decision hereby reversed and set aside.

G.R. No. 188179 January 22, 2013 HENRY R. GIRON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent, ALMARIO E. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and RICARDO L. BAES JR., Petitioners-in-Intervention. FACTS: This case is a special civil action assailing the constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. Petitioner Henry R. Giron (Giron) asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires: "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Petitioner avers that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity. ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the "one subject-one title" rule. HELD: It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law. Because of this strong presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the petition must fail. The proscription under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution is aimed against the evils of the socalled omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. After a careful analysis of the foregoing, we find that the assailed Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) are indeed germane to the subject expressed in the title of R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. The title was worded broadly enough to include the measures embodied in the assailed sections. The court observed that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention raise various arguments that we deem are matters of policy. Whether or not those ratiocinations are valid, we reiterate that the power of this Court is limited to the interpretation of the law. Judicial power does not include the determination of the wisdom, fairness, soundness, or expediency of a statute. Otherwise, the Court may be accused of engaging in judicial legislation. As it is Congress that is empowered by the Constitution to determine state policies and to enact laws, we feel that petitioner's reasoning would be best addressed by the legislature. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.