EQUAL PROTECTION

People of the Philippines vs Cayat Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native nonChristians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians. ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are; (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

January 22, 1980

Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution which provides that .Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. He likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously against him, and is based on purely arbitrary grounds, therefore, class legislation. Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid. Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class. WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC 95 SCRA 392 L-52245

Ramon Ceniza et al vs COMELEC, COA & National Treasurer Equal Protection Gerrymandering

**Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. ** Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection. HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969. The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and

development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right of suffrage. Rufino Nuez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of the Philippines Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned. HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial

distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

PASEI vs DRILON 163 SCRA 380 Facts:Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers. Issue:Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1. Decision:SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that: 1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions 2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law 3. They are not confined to existing conditions 4. They apply equally to al members of the same class In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

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Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting) Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts first, to the CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people. Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial courts judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial. Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). PASEI vs DRILON Edit 0 1

Philippine Judges Association et al vs DOTC Secretary Pete Prado et al on November 6, 2010 Equal Protection Franking Privilege of the Judiciary A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00, of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The postmasters conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. Acting from this, Prado implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the said law complaining that the law would adversely impair the communication within the judiciary as it may impair the sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of others such as the executive, former executives and their widows among others. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law. HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Ormoc City et al on November 15, 2010 Equal Protection In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries. Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection. HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy on November 15, 2010 Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law

Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional. HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream. RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter. EN BANC [G.R. NO. 148208, DECEMBER 15, 2004]

CENTRAL BANK (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides: Section 15, Exercise of Authority -In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall: (c) Establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentrals human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, that compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. The thrust of petitioners challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rankand-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is a classic case of class legislation, allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnels position.

Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most

important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP. Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments: a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law of establishing professionalism and excellence eat all levels in the BSP; c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP; d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon; and e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers. In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved. Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP, and the mandate of the Monetary Board to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management. The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish

professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.

ISSUE: Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws." RULING: A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID. Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities. It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislatures power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso. The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions. The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal

qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice. Furthermore, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed. Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the rational basis test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment. But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Courts solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor. Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justifiable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it.

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all. Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster. To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Courts duty to save them from reasonless discrimination. IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional. Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez on November 22, 2010 Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the

ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant G.R. No. 121777 (350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001 KAPUNAN, J.

initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money. Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken . Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a biodata form in hand. Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed. Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment. Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime. First, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. The provision in question reads:

FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down. They listened to the recruiter who was then talking about the breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore. Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up biodata forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the

ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x. (b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in

recruitment placement.

and

an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth. A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause. (2) Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be exculpated

HELD: (1) For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court criticized the definition of recruitment and placement. The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

(2)

Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equal protection clause in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, she concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City. The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination. In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a clear and intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials. Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes,

Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth since by merely referring a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment. That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral (referring

was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.

PLACER VS. JUDGE VILLANUEVA [126 SCRA 463; G.R. NOS. L-60349-62; 29 DEC 1983]
Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

SEARCHES & SEIZURES Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956) F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangales land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was premature because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested. Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view of his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused commited the crime charged. HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.

Facts:

Petitioners filed informations in the city court and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found. Upon receipt of said informations, respondent judge set the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscals certification in the informations of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest.

Issue:

Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

Soliven vs Makasiar
on October 29, 2011

Constitutional Law Presidents Immunity From Suit Must Be Invoked by the President
Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his

Held:

Judge may rely upon the fiscals certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and require submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to existence of probable cause. Petition dismissed.

contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president. HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the officeholders time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the

presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders the intention of the prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted

Enrile vs Salazar
on October 30, 2011

Constitutional Law Political Question Restriction to the exercise of judicial power

In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder which allegedly occurred during their failed coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging that the crime being charged against him is non existent. That he was charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. ISSUE: Whether or Enriles arrest is valid.

for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus. The SC further notes that there is a need to restructure the law on rebellion as it is being used apparently by others as a tool to disrupt the peace and espouse violence. The SC can only act w/in the bounds of the law. Thus SC said There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.

HO vs PEOPLE (1997) Panganiban, J. FACTS On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, represented by its chief prosecutor Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 106632 and 106678, respectively), Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos and Leonardo Odoo. The complaint was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019 prohibiting a public officer from entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the government if it is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. According to the information, Rolando Narciso, being then the Vice-President of the National Steel Corporation (NSC), a government-owned or controlled corporation organized and operating under the Philippine laws, and Doris Ho, the President of National Marine Corporation (NMC), a private corporation organized and operating under our Corporation law, was said to have entered without legal justification into a negotiated contract of affreightment disadvantageous to the NSC for the haulage of its products at the rate of P129.50/MT, from Iligan City to Manila. Such contract was entered into despite their full knowledge that the rate they have agreed upon was much higher than those offered by the Loadstar Shipping Company, Inc. (LSCI) and Premier Shipping Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the amounts of P109.56 and P123.00 per Metric Ton, respectively, in the public bidding, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the National Marine Corporation. Ho and Narciso alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant for their arrest, merely relied on the information and the resolution attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without other supporting evidence, in violation of the requirements of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled jurisprudence. They contend that a judge, in personally determining the existence of probable cause, must have before him sufficient evidence submitted by the parties, other than the information filed by the investigating prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the issuance of an arrest warrant. Such evidence should not be merely described in a prosecutors resolution. Sandiganbayans Denial: Considering, therefore, that this Court did not rely solely on the certification appearing in the information in this case in the determination of whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest but also on the basis predominantly shown by the facts and evidence appearing in the resolution/memorandum of responsible investigators/ prosecutors, then the recall of the warrant of arrest, or the reconsideration sought for, cannot be granted. More so, when the information, as filed, clearly shows that it is sufficient in form and substance based on the facts and evidence adduced by both parties during the

preliminary investigation. To require this Court to have the entire record of the preliminary investigation to be produced before it, including the evidence submitted by the complainant and the accused-respondents, would appear to be an exercise in futility. ISSUE May a judge determine probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the resolution of the prosecutor (in the instant case, the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) who conducted the preliminary investigation, without having before him any of the evidence (such as complainants affidavit, respondents counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been submitted at the preliminary investigation? DECISION & RATIO NO. Art III Section 2, 1987 Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Art III Section 2, 1987 Constitution) The word personally does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present Constitutions intent to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under the previous Charters. Soliven vs. Makasiar: In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. People vs. Inting: There is a difference between the judges goal from that of the prosecutors. First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor or for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause.

Third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The Court, in this case, reiterated and elaborated on the doctrine laid down in People vs. Inting and ruled that: First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives. Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutors report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutors bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have

sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer. IN THE INSTANT CASE, the public respondent relied fully and completely upon the resolution of the graft investigation officer and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor, attached to the information filed before it, and its conjecture that the Ombudsman would not have approved their recommendation without supporting evidence. It had no other documents from either the complainant (the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines) or the People from which to sustain its own conclusion that probable cause exists. Respondent Court palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and recommendation.

Salazar Vs. Achacoso Case Digest

Salazar Vs. Achacoso 183 SCRA 145 G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990 Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner

has (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation. Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code Held: Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be seized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

ALVAREZ VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS

G.R. No. L-45358, January 29 1937 FACTS: The chief of the secret service of the AntiUsury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a moneylender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock on the night, and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book belonging

to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. The search for and a seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of the petitioner who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, the petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion, praying that the agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure. HELD: No. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the warrant was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear positively in the affidavit that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated, neither could the search and seizure be made at night.

Mata vs Bayona G.R. No. L-50720, 26 March 1984 ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned. Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, it is with the court. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. Matas motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter. ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and

take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him? HELD:YES. Under the Constitution no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties. Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items. Held: The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff G.R. No L-64261 December 26, 1984 Facts: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements

of the witnesses having been mere generalizations. Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

PRUDENTE VS. JUDGE DAYRIT

G.R. No. 82870, December 14 1989 FACTS: P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, filed with the (RTC) an application for the issuance of a search warrant. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw alleged, among others, as follows: 1) That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that Nemesio Prudente has in his control or possession firearms, explosives handgrenades and ammunition which are illegally possessed or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense which the said Nemesio Prudente is keeping and concealing at the following premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines; 2) That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact, and therefore, believes that a Search Warrant should be issued Respondent Judge issued Search Warrant which was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives. Petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the

examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. Respondent Judge issued an order, denying the petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 10 was likewise denied ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause to satisfy the issuance of a search warrant. HELD: No. For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be PROBABLE CAUSE, which is to be determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. "Probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." This probable cause

must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons. Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers." On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant."

October 27-28, 1965 Armed with the search warrant, Zoleta and other agents entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two carloads of documents, papers and receipt. October 27-28, 1965 The Asian Surety & Insurance Company Inc. filed a petition assailing the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it was issued in contravention of the explicit provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, particularly Section 3, of Art. IV of the New Constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. End of Issue The criminal charges filed by the NBI have all been dismissed and/or dropped by the court or by the office of the City Fiscal of Manila in 1968, as manifested in the petition filed by the petitioner The search warrant reads in part: x x x property should be seized and brought to the undersigned. The judge made no attempt to determine whether the property he authorized to be searched and seized pertains specifically to any one of the three classes of personal property that may be searched and seized under a search warrant. It appears that the respondent judge intended the search to apply to all the three classes of property. The petitioner also manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the general public. Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. contests the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it authorized the search and seizure of personal properties so vaguely described and not particularized. It clearly violates the Constitutional Law: the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures stating that the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others, is an important factor to peace and happiness. It also assails the non-compliance with the Sec 2 of Rule 126 which provides that a search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the enumerated personal properties including the property subject of the offense.

Ratio Decidendi
A. Lower Court Judge Herrera approved the respondents application and commanded them to make an immediate search at any time to Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. for there are good & sufficient reasons to believe that Mr. Yao or his employees committed offenses using their properties. B. Supreme Court The petition was granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and the respondents were ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized or taken therunder. Without costs.

Asian Surety & Insurance Co ., Inc. vs. Herrera

Facts of the case: 1961 1964 Believed that the four offenses alleged to Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc estafa, falsification, tax evasion & insurance fraud took place. October 27, 1965 Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant against the corporation.

Salazar Vs. Achacoso Case Digest

Salazar Vs. Achacoso 183 SCRA 145 G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990 Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation. Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code Held: Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of

seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be seized. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 84873, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 11, 2011

(Constitutional Law Search Warrant, Probable Cause) Facts: Based on the application and joint deposition, a search warrant was issued against Siao and the same complaint was filed against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioner contends that the application for the search warrant and the joint deposition of witnesses failed to fulfill the requirements prescribed by the Constitution on the ground that probable cause was not personally determined. Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the said warrant is valid. Held: No, Probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce before the issuance of a search warrant.

Bache & Co. Inc. et al vs BIR Commissioner Vivencio Ruiz et al

on November 16, 2010

1.

J Ruiz failed to personally examine the

complainant and his witness. Personal examination by the judge of the

complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or nonexistence of a probable cause. 2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. 3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.

Search and Seizure Personal Examination of the Judge

On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. J Ruiz had After was the been session that taken. had the The adjourned, depositions informed

already

stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. The search was subsequently conducted. ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

warrant void for vagueness. HELD: SC held that the appellants contention, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could issue.

PEOPLE VS TEE
FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana. Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of marijuana. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the serach warrant which says an undetermined amount of marijuana, was too general and hence makes the

Frank Uy & Unifish Packing Corp. vs Bureau of Internal Revenue et al

on November 15, 2010

Search and Seizure Requisites of a Valid Search Warrant

In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. Judge

Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued which contains the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are: (1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

20th Century Fox Film v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76649-51, August 19, 1988

DECISION
(3rd Division) GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

I.

THE FACTS

Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting searches and seizures in connection with the NBIs anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law). The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private respondents. The lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants. Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized properties, which was granted by the lower court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court. II. THE ISSUE

The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the application for search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony, which was the alleged commission of the offense of piracy by the private respondents. Only the petitioners counsel who was also a witness during the application stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testimony of petitioners counsel did not have much credence because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application. The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns. The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with

Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier? III. THE RULING [The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of the CA.] YES, the judge properly lifted search warrants he issued earlier. the

the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid. HELD: Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accusedappellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the

PEOPLE VS. SALANGUIT

G.R. No. 133254-55, April 19, 2001 FACTS: Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the RTC to search the residence of accusedappellant Robert Salanguit y Ko. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued. The police operatives knocked on accusedappellants door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.

second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not. Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was seized within the "plain view" of the searching party. This is contested by accusedappellant. Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police. The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in

the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for admitting the other items subsequently found. A search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control. The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it. The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-appellant's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. People vs Court of Appeals (291 SCRA 400) FACTS A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed search warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant. >An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at

Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of different explosives and firearms. ISSUE: WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant. HELD: The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to

be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

Yousef Al Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals

Posted on June 26, 2013 by winnieclaire

tandard GR No.126859, September 4, 2001 Facts: Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-953 and 55-954 for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. On April 1, 1995, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were firearms, ammunitions and explosives. Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866.6 Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained. Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity. They argue that the two-witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126 was ignored when only one witness signed the receipt for the properties seized during the search, and said witness was not presented at the trial.

ISSUE: W/N the items described in the warrant were sufficiently described with particularity. HELD: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners. Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the warrants. That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant appears to be beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specifity in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice. The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz , 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed out that one of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. A careful examination of the Search Warrants shows that they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated items to be seized could

bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of Presidential Decree No.1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives.

UMIL VS. RAMOS (GR 81567, SEPT. 8, 1990) Digest

FACTS: -The are separate motions filed by 8 different petitions seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part: "WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs." - These petitions were consolidated because of the similarity of the issues being raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and explain why they should not be set off to liberty without delay. - Respondents assert that the privilege of habeas corpus is not available to petitioners as they have been legally arrested and detained by virtue of valid information file in court against them. - Petitioners are members of NPA ISSUE: WON the petitioners are illegally arrested and detained.HELD:Arrest and detention is valid. RATIO: There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyone without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests without warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted. In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said

Rule 113, which read: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; The record of the cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed has freshly committed, or were actually committing an offense when apprehended so that their arrest without warrant is clearly justified , and that they are detained by virtue of valid information filed against them.

People vs. dela Cruz [GR 83260, 18 April 1990] Second Division, Regalado (J): 4 concur Facts: After receiving a confidential report from Arnel, their informant, a "buy-bust" operation was conducted by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit through a team composed of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas as Team Leader, S/Sgt. Rodelito Oblice, Sgt. Dante Yang, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy as poseur-buyer and Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila at around 2:30 p.m. of 4 May 1987 to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the poseur-buyer with Arnel as his companion to buy marijuana worth P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran. At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first negotiated with on the purchase and when Arcoy told De la Cruz that he was buying P10.00

worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran to give one aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got from his pants' pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After ascertaining that the foil of suspected marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to his teammates by scratching his head and his teammates who were strategically positioned in the vicinity, converged at the place, identified themselves as NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill used by Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de la Cruz together with two aluminum foils and containing marijuana. Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were charged in Criminal Case 87-54417 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with violation of Section 4, Art. II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended. The court, on 15 March 1988, found Dela Cruz and Beltran guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law; to pay a fine of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half of the costs. From this decision, de la Cruz and Beltran appealed. In a letter of the Warden, Manila City Jail, dated 3 March 1989, the Court was informed of the death of de la Cruz on 21 February 1989. Thus, the criminal case against de la Cruz was dismissed in the Supreme Court resolution of 25 September 1989. The present appellate proceeding is limited only to Beltran. Issue: Whether the warrantless seizure incidental to the buy-bust operation violates Beltrans constitutional

rights against unreasonable search and seizure. Held: A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment since the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime. Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense. While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one's person without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not necessary, the search being incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably caught redhanded. There being no violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in evidence.

PEOPLE VS. AMMINUDIN [163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul 1988]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Idel Aminnudin, accusedappellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking

from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was

arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.

the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged.

PEOPLE VS. SUCRO [195 SCRA 388; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar 1991]
Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Issue:

Whether or not search of defendants bag is legal.

Held:

The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against

Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalados house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team intercepted and

arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.

of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful. (2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.

PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA [205 SCRA 791; G.R. No. 95902; 4 Feb 1992]
Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Held: Search

and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission

NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and a certain object wrapped in a plastic later identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to headquarters and made a report, based on which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the house of the father of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no authorization by any search warrant.

The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court, considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:

Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment.

under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant: CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against the appellant were the following items: One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following: Exh. "A"Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a transparent plastic bag. Exh. "B" Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson". Exh. "C" Four (4) aluminum foils

Held:

The NARCOM agents procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a person posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said raid also violated accused right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put

each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil. Exh. "D" Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seventeen grams. Exh. "E" One plastic syringe. Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the house of Rodriguezas father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed and set aside and accused is acquitted.

Facts:

PEOPLE V. MENGOTE [210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the

weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.

while being transferred from one confinement to another. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion. Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

Issue:

Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.

Held:

An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped

GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [206 SCRA 138; G.R. NO. 101837; 11 FEB 1992]
Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioners plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and

commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation. Issues: (1) WON warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful. (2) WON petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted continuing crimes, i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply. Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is

suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond.

People v. Manlulu

FACTS:

Alfaro, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot in a drinking spree. His drinking companions, Manlulu and Samson were arrested nineteen hours after the incident. Patrolman Perez arrested Manlulu on the information given by Manlapaz, who was also drinking with the accused and the victim. Patrolman Perez seized from Manlulu the .45 cal. Pistol and Casio wristwatch said to belong to Alfaro, without a warrant and without informing Manlulu of his right to counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest and seizure of the gun and the watch was valid.

HELD:

The warrantless arrest was invalid. The killing took place at one oclock in the morning. The arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven oclock that evening, some nineteen hours later. This instance cannot come within the purview of a valid warrantless arrest. Paragraph (b) Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the arresting officer must have personal knowledge nor was the offense in fact just been committed. While Pat. Perez may have personally gathered the information which led

to the arrest of Manlulu, that is not enough. The law requires personal knowledge. Obviously, personal gathering of information is different from personal knowledge. The rule requires that the arrest immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some nineteen hours later.

regarding the conduct of the arrest and search making his testimony a hearsay. Issue: Whether or not the arrest and seizure were valid Ruling:

However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness account of Manlapaz which the Court found credible. In spite of the nullification of the arrest of accused Manlulu, and the exclusion of real evidence, as well as his extra-judicial confession which was taken in violation of the Constitution, still the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

No. The Supreme Court held that the arrest was invalid because the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accusedapellants had just committed, were committing or about to commit a crime. The arresting officers also have no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor have a reasonable ground to believe that the accused committed the crime. And accused appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment. With respect to the seizure of the tea bags,the court held that it is also invalid because the objects were not seized in plain view. There was no valid intrusion and the evidence was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped through the window to ascertain the activities of appellants inside the room. In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless arrest, a customs search, or a stop and frisk situations. The court stated that the arresting officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identities and addressed of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, they should have secured a warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was also illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against the accused-appellants. The Court held that the State cannot in a cavalier fashioni ntrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.

People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Bolasa Facts: An informer told the police that an illegal transaction of prohibited drugs were being conducted at a certain house in Sta. Brigida St. Karuhatan Valenzuela Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceed to the said house. Upon reaching the house, they peeped through a small window and saw a man and woman repacking suspected marijuana. They enter the house and introduce themselves as police officers and confiscated the tea bag and other drug paraphernalia.Afterwhich, the police officers arrested the two,Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto de los Reyes. Upon examination by the NBI, the tea bags were confirmed as marijuana. Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto de los Reyes were charged with violation of Sec.8 of Article II of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The RTC convicted them of the crime charged. Accused Bolasa asserts that the search and her arrest was illegal. She insists that the trial court should not regard the testimony of PO3 cCarizon credible because he does not have personal knowledge

The Court held that the State cannot in a cavalier fashioni ntrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint

The Court enumerated the exceptions as follows: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements of

(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement toanother. (A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense

the plain view doctrine are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the policeare legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who havethe right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

Pp. vs. Salvatierra

Facts:

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable causethat the occupant committed a criminal activity ;4. Consented warrantless search ;5. Customs search ;6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

While Charlie Fernandez was walking towards Quiapo, appellant and the 2 accused lunged a pointed instrument at Charlie, hitting the latter at the left breast. This resulted to his death. On Nov. 15, 1990 the police received a complaint that appellant was creating a commotion. He was thereafter taken in custody. Appellant put up the defense of alibi alleging that he was having merienda with his wife and children when the incident occurred. He also alleged that he had an altercation with a woman on that day who caused his arrest for the crime of malicious mischief, wherein he was detained after. Then, when police arrived, they brought him to the Homicide Section where he was investigated for the stabbing of Fernandez. Appellant claimed that the arrest was made almost 3 months after the commission of the crime and no warrant had been obtained during the 3month intervening period between the commission of the crime and his apprehension, thus making the arrest illegal.

Citing the Rules of Criminal Procedure on lawful warrantless arrest, the Court stated that an arrest is lawful even in theabsence of a warrant

:(a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;( b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested hascommitted it; and,

Issue: W/N the arrest is violative of his constitutional rights?

Held:

No. Appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never raised it before entering his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. One of the box s flaps was open, and inside it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier sold to him by Jun. His suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from Neneth and they arrested her. The bricks were examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves. Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21 [Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them. ISSUE AND HOLDING WON RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. NO RATIO Re: warrantless arrest Gaddao s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. Plain view issue Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are

People v. Doria
Tags: criminal procedure, dangerous drugs act, doria, people v. doria, plain view, plain view doctrine,warrantless arrest, warrantless search

People v. Florencio Doria [ Jun ] and Violeta Gaddao [ Neneth ] 22 Jan 1999 / Puno / Appeal from a Pasig RTC decision Search and seizure > Nature, scope and definition > Types > Warrantless search and seizure > Plain view doctrine FACTS Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one Jun [Doria] was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the house of his associate Neneth [Gaddao], so he led the police team to her house. The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. Jun identified her as Neneth, and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked money as PO3 Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside the house].

subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. Requisites a. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area b. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." Each of the ten bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit

of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court. The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao s house Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged. In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller and the presentation of the drug as evidence in court. Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the P1,600.00 he received, Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug DORIA SENTENCED TO SUFFER RECLUSION PERPETUA + 500K FINE GADDAO ACQUITTED

People of the Philippines vs Rosa Aruta y Menguin

on November 16, 2010

Search and Seizure Informers Tip

In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello

about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation. ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accusedappellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of Arutas bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the

subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accusedappellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

PEOPLE VS. SALANGUIT

G.R. No. 133254-55, April 19, 2001 FACTS: Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the RTC to search the residence of accusedappellant Robert Salanguit y Ko. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued. The police operatives knocked on accusedappellants door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.

After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid. HELD: Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accusedappellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the

second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not. Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was seized within the "plain view" of the searching party. This is contested by accusedappellant. Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police. The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in

the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for admitting the other items subsequently found. A search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control. The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it. The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-appellant's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure.

The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and

PEOPLE VS. MUSA [217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa.

found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.

Issue:

Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.

police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said object. Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
Caballes vs Court of Appeals (January 15, 2002)

Held: Yes.

It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the object. In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the

Ponente: Puno Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: While on a routine patrol in Brgy Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, Sgt. Victorino Nocejo and Pat. Alex de Castro spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with kakawati leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two officers flagged down the vehicle. Being the driver of the jeep, Caballes was asked by the officers as to what was loaded in the jeep, to which he did not respond, appearing pale and nervous. The officers checked the cargo and discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation. Caballes and the vehicle with the highvoltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station, where he was imprisoned for 7 days. The trial court found Caballes guilty of the crime of Theft of property. Upon appeal, the Court fo Aooeaksm affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction.

Issue: WON the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against Caballes Held: No; the evidence are not admissible in evidence. Ratio: The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute, but admits of certain exceptions. The situation in the case at bar does not fall under any of the accepted exceptions.
1. Search of a moving vehicle (ito yung sense ng case talaga) 2.

suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered in kakawati leaves does not constitute probable cause to justify a search without a warrant. In addition, there was no tip or confidential information that could have backed up their search, as jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become sufficient to constitute probable cause.
Plain view doctrine It is clear from the records that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks and covered with leaves. They had no clue as to what was underneath the leaves. Object was not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure without further search. Consented search At most, there was only implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.

The rules governing searches and seizures of moving vehicles have been liberalized for the purposes of practicality. Obtaining a warrant for a moving vehicle is particularly difficult for want of a specific description of the place, things, and persons to be searches. Also, it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Still, however, there must be probable cause to conduct such warrantless search. One form of search of moving vehicles is the stop-and-search without warrant at checkpoints, which has been declared as not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search. Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. The circumstances in this case, however, do not constitute a routine inspection. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers have probable cause to believe that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In this case, the officers flagged down the jeep because they became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves, which, to them, was unusual and uncommon. The Court believes that the fact that the vehicle looked

3.

PEOPLE VS. BARROS (GR 90640, MARCH 29, 1994 ) Digest

FACTS: - Bonifacio Barros was charged and convicted of violating Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Barros was coming from Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, to Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province to Baguio City where he carried four (4) kilos of dried marijuana which the accused intended for distribution and sale. - M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus. - Barros carrying a carton, board the bus and seated himself and put the carton under his seat. - After alighting at their station, Sgt. Ayan ordered C2C Bongyao to inspect the carton and found out it contained marijuana. - As both P.C. officers Yag-as and Ayan Bonifacio Barros carrying that same carton when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan, Bonifacio was arrested and subsequently convicted. - Barros now appeals from the judgment of conviction and claims that his right to due process was violated when he was searched without the mandatory warrant.

ISSUE: WON Bonifacios non-objection to the search made in the moving vehicle, resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver. WON Bonifacio was denied due process when he was searched and arrested without warrant. HELD: Judgment reversed RATIO: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The fruits of the search and seizure will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Exception: 1) Peace officers may conduct searches of moving vehicles, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought, however only visual inspection. The accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.