Estrada v.

Escritor, 408 SCRA 1 (2003)

Facts:
In a sworn letter-complaint Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branc !"#, $egional %rial Court of &as 'i(as Cit).

Estrada confirmed that he filed the letter-complaint for immorality against Escritor because in his frequent visits to the Hall of Justice of Las Pias City, he learned from conversations therein that Escritor as living ith a man not her husband and that she had an eighteen to t enty-year old son by this man! % is prompted im
to write to Judge Caoibes as e belie*ed t at emplo)ees of t e judiciar) s ould be respectable and Escritor+s li*e-in arrangement did not command respect.

$espondent Escritor testified t at w en s e entered t e judiciar) in ,---, . s e was alread) a widow, er usband a*ing died in ,--.. - / e admitted t at s e as been li*ing wit &uciano 0uilapio, Jr. wit out t e benefit of marriage for twent) )ears and t at t e) a*e a son.

"ut as a member of the religious sect #no n as the Jehovah$s %itnesses and the %atch &o er and "ible &ract 'ociety, their con(ugal arrangement is in conformity ith their religious beliefs! )n fact, after ten years of living together, she e*ecuted on July +,, -..- a /0eclaration of Pledging 1aithfulness,/
Escritor+s partner, 0uilapio, e1ecuted a similar pledge on t e same da). ,, Bot pledges were e1ecuted in Atimonan, 0ue2on and signed b) t ree witnesses. 2t the time Escritor e*ecuted

her pledge, her husband as still alive but living ith another oman! 3uilapio as li#e ise married at that time, but had been separated in fact from his ife
3 en t e in*estigation is ongoing, 4regorio 'ala5ar, a member of the Jehovah$s

%itnesses since -.,6, also testified! He had been a presiding minister since -..and in such capacity is a are of the rules and regulations of their congregation!
0: 4o )ou mean to sa), 5inister, b) e1ecuting t is document t e contracting parties a*e t e rig t to co abit6 A: Can I sir, cite, w at t e Bible sa)s, t e basis of t at 'ledge of Fait fulness as we C ristians follow. % e basis is erein stated in t e Boo7 of 5att ew, C apter Fi*e, 8erse %went)-two. /o, in t at *erse of t e Bible, Jesus said 9t at e*er)one di*orcing is wife, e1cept on account of fornication, ma7es er a subject for adulter), and w oe*er marries a di*orced woman commits adulter). % us, e*en assuming arguendo t at t e declaration is *alid and binding in er congregation, it is binding onl) to er co-members in t e congregation and ser*es onl) t e internal purpose of displa)ing to t e rest of t e congregation t at s e and er mate are a respectable and morall) uprig t couple. % eir religious belief and practice, owe*er, cannot o*erride t e norms of conduct re:uired b) law for go*ernment emplo)ees. %o rule ot erwise would create a dangerous precedent as t ose w o cannot legali2e t eir li*e-in relations ip can simpl) join t e Je o*a +s 3itnesses congregation and use t eir religion as a defense against legal liabilit).

Issue: 3;< respondent s ould be found guilt) of t e administrati*e c arge of 9gross and immoral

conduct.9 %78 respondent$s right to religious freedom should carve out an e*ception from the prevailing (urisprudence on illicit relations for hich government employees are held administratively liable!

$uling:
% e case at bar being one of first impression, we now subject t e respondent+s claim of religious freedom to t e 9compelling state interest9 test from a bene*olent neutralit) stance = i.e. entertaining t e possibilit) t at respondent+s claim to religious freedom +would warrant car*ing out an e1ception

from t e Ci*il /er*ice &aw> necessaril), her defense of religious freedom

ill be unavailing should the government succeed in demonstrating a more compelling state interest! &he present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief! &he /compelling state interest/ test is proper here conduct is involved for the hole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state$s interests9 some effects may be immediate and short-term hile others delayed and far-reaching! 2 test that ould protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, hether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary! &he burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government hich is the 7ffice of the 'olicitor 4eneral! %o properl) settle t e issue in t e case at bar, the government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it see#s to uphold in opposing the respondent$s stance that her con(ugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes ithin the scope of free e*ercise protection! / ould t e Court pro ibit and punis er conduct
w ere it is protected b) t e Free E1ercise Clause, t e Court+s action would be an unconstitutional encroac ment of er rig t to religious freedom. %e cannot therefore simply ta#e a passing

loo# at respondent$s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the /compelling state interest/ test!

)n applying the test, the first inquiry is hether respondent$s right to religious freedom has been burdened! % ere is no doubt t at choosing bet een #eeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and #eeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free e*ercise of religion! &he second step is to ascertain respondent$s sincerity in her religious belief! :espondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the /0eclaration of Pledging 1aithfulness/ to avoid punishment for immorality! &he government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state$s compelling interest hich can override respondent$s religious belief and practice! %o repeat, t is
is a case of first impression w ere we are appl)ing t e 9compelling state interest9 test in a case in*ol*ing purel) religious conduct. % e careful application of t e test is indispensable as ow we will decide t e case will ma7e a decisi*e difference in t e life of t e respondent w o stands not onl) before t e Court but before er Je o*a ?od.

)8 ;)E% %HE:E71, the case is :E<280E0 to the 7ffice of the Court 2dministrator! &he 'olicitor 4eneral is ordered to intervene in the case here it ill be given the opportunity @aA to e*amine the sincerity and centrality of respondent$s
claimed religious belief and practice= @bA to present evidence on the state$s /compelling interest/ to override respondent$s religious belief and practice= and @cA to sho that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent$s religious freedom! % e re earing s ould be concluded t irt) @#BA da)s from t e ;ffice of t e Court Administrator+s receipt of t is 4ecision.

It identified t e Ci*il /er*ice &aw and t e laws on adulter) and concubinage as laws w ic respondent+s conduct as offended and cited a string of precedents w ere a go*ernment emplo)ee was found guilt) of committing a 9disgraceful and immoral conduct9 for maintaining illicit relations and was t ereb) penali2ed. As stated abo*e, t ere is no dispute t at under settled jurisprudence,

respondent+s conduct constitutes 9disgraceful and immoral conduct.9 Cowe*er, t e cases cited b) t e dissent do not in*ol*e t e defense of religious freedom w ic respondent in t e case at bar in*o7es.

5ore concretel), s ould t e Court declare respondent+s conduct as immoral and old er administrati*el) liable, t e Court will be olding t at in t e realm of public moralit), er conduct is repre ensible or t ere are state interests o*erriding er religious freedom. But w ile t e state, including t e Court, accords suc deference to religious belief and e1ercise w ic enjo) protection under t e religious clauses, t e social contract and t e constitutional order are designed in suc a wa) t at w en religious belief flows into speec and conduct t at step out of t e religious sp ere and o*erlap wit t e secular and public realm, t e state as t e power to regulate, pro ibit and penali2e t ese e1pressions and embodiments of belief insofar as t e) affect t e interests of t e state.

% e case at bar does not in*ol*e speec as in American Bible /ociet), Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo w ere t e 9clear and present danger9 and 9gra*e and immediate danger9 tests were appropriate as speec as easil) discernible or immediate effects. % e ?erona and ?erman doctrine, aside from a*ing been o*erruled, is not congruent wit t e bene*olent neutralit) approac , t us not appropriate in t is jurisdiction. /imilar to 8ictoriano. In a catena of cases, t e Court as ruled t at go*ernment emplo)ees engaged in illicit relations are guilt) of disgraceful and immoral conduct9 for w ic eDs e ma) be eld administrati*el) liable. E,B In t ese cases, t ere was not one dissent to t e majorit)+s ruling t at t eir conduct was immoral. % e respondents t emsel*es did not foist t e defense t at t eir conduct was not immoral, but instead soug t to pro*e t at t e) did not commit t e alleged act or a*e abated from committing t e act.