HIJO PLANTATION VS CENTRAL BANK, 164 SCRA 192

FACTS:
Because of the difficulty in determining the peso-dollar exchange rate, Congress
passed RA 6125 which imposed a stabilization tax on exports, which gradually
decreases over four years. The law enumerated covered products such as logs,
copra, centrifugal sugar and copper.
Under Section 1, as a last provision, Any export product the aggregate annual
F.O.B. value of which shall exceed five million United States dollars in any one
calendar year during the effectivity of this Act shall likewise be subject to the rates
of tax in force during the fiscal years following its reaching the said
aggregate value.
During the first 9 months of 1971, the total banana export exceeded the USD5m
limit in RA 6125. Thus, the Central Bank issued a Monetary Board Resolution
imposing a stabilization tax on exports of bananas. The resolution provided a rate of
6% for the first half of 1971 and 4% from July 1971 to last until June 1972.
The petitioner corporations were all engaged in production and exportation of
bananas who paid the stabilization taxes in protest and now assail the said
resolution. Central Bank contends that the stabilization tax should be imposed
starting July 1971, the fiscal year following the calendar yea rwhere the industry
reached USD 5m limit.
ISSUE: WON the Central Bank exceeded its powers in issuing the said Resolution
HELD:YES.
There is no question that the export of bananas already reached the limit, bringing
it under the coverage of RA 6125, and thus making the petitioners liable. However,
the Central Bank, in issuing the resolution, acted in overzealous desire to carry out
the provisions of RA 6125. It acted beyond its authority under the said law. Thus,
where there is a discrepancy between the basic law and the regulation issued to
implement the said law, the basic law prevails and the regulation cannot go beyond
the terms and provisions of the basic law.
CHAVEZ VS NHA, 530 SCRA 235
FACTS:
Former Solicitor General Frank Chavez files a case against BHA for prohibition to
enjoin the NHA from implementing the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) entered into
by NHA with R-II Builders for the reclamation and development of the Smokey
Mountain area in Tondo. Chavez imputes certain constitutional infirmities against

the JVA, for instance that the NHA had no authority to order reclamation, the DENRs
approval was not secured, etc.
ISSUE: Whether NHA has the power and authority to reclaim lands(as this power is
vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner)
RULING: YES.
While EO 525 (DESIGNATING THE PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AS THE AGENCY
PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL RECLAMATION PROJECTS) provides;
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for
and on behalf of the National Government. All reclamation projects
shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the
PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that,
reclamation projects of any national government agency or entity
authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with
the PEA upon approval of the President.
And without a doubt, PEA was designated as the agency primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects. But it doesnt
mention that PEA has the exclusive and sole power to reclaim lands. even EO 525
reveals and exception reclamation projects by a national government agency or
entity authorized by its charter to reclaim land.
And the authority of the NHA to reclaim lands being challenged by the petitioner,
the court found it had more than enough authority to do so under existing laws.
While the NHA Charter doesnt explicitly mention reclamation in any of the listed
powers of the agency, the court ruled that the NHA has the implied power to reclaim
land as it is vital or incidental to effectively or logically and successfully implement
and urban land reform and housing program enunciated in Sec9 of Art13 of the
Constitution.
Basic in AdminLaw; A government agency has express or implied powers based on
its charter and other pertinent statutes.
MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE VS SEC 16 SCRA 623
FACTS:
The SEC in its resolution, denied the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc (MSE) permission
to operate stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading its board securities
already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange.

Objecting to the requirement, MSE contends that the commission has no power to
impose it and that anyway it is illegal, discriminatory and unjust. The commissions
order or resolution would make impossible, for all practical purposes, for the MSE to
operate, such that its permission amounted a prohibition.
ISSUE: Does the Commission have the authority to promulgate the rule in question?
RULING: NO.
1. The test for determining the existence of Authority
The Commission cites no provision of law expressly supporting its rule
against double listing. It suggests that the power is necessary for the
execution of the functions vested in it. It argues that said rule was approved
by the DepartmentHead before the war and it is not in conflict with the
provisions of the Securities Act. The approval of the Department, by itself,
adds no weight in judicial litigation.

The test is not whether the Act forbids Commission from imposing a
prohibition but whether it empowers the Commission to prohibit.
2. Commission without power to impose prohibition
The Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the rule
which results in discrimination and violation of constitutional rights. It is
fundamental that an administrative officer has such powers as expressly
granted to him by statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof. Accordingly, the license of MSE is approved without such condition
against double listing.

MASANGKAY VS COMELEC 6 SCRA 27

FACTS:
Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the COMELEC in its
resolution to among others, take charge of the receipt and custody of the official
ballots,
election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the different
municipalities of the province. He and several others were charged before the
COMELEC with contempt for having opened three boxes containing official and
sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan without the
presence of
the division
superintendent
of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the

Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens' Party, in violation of the instru
ctions of said Commission and which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised
Election Codeand Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. He was subsequently convicted by
the COMELEC as guilty and sentenced to suffer three months imprisonment and pay
a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to
be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. Masangkay contended that, even if he
can be held guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision is null and void for
lack of valid power on the part of the Commission to impose such disciplinary
penalty under the principle of separation of powers.
Issue: Whether or Not COMELEC can exercise the power to punish contempt.
Held: NO.
The COMELEC, although it cannot be classified a court of justice within the meaning
of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body,
may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by
express provision law come under its jurisdiction. However, when the Commission
exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish contempt
because such power is inherently judicial in nature. In the instant case,
the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the
charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the
exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely
concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election
paraphernalia among the different municipalities. Thus, the COMELEC cannot exerci
se its power to punish contempt.
PHILIPPINE TODAY VS NLRC 267 SCRA 202
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippines Today, Inc (PTI) is the owner of the Philippine Star, a daily
newspaper of national and international circulation, while the individual petitioners
are officers and members of the board of directors of PTI. On the other hand, Private
Respondent
Felix
R.
Alegre,
Jr
was
employed
by
PTI
as
a
senior investigative reporter of the
Philippine Star and later on became the
chief investigative writer and to the publisher. Respondent Alegre filed a request for
a 30 day leave of absence effective on the same date, citing the advice of his
personal physician for him to under go further medical consultations abroad. Four
days later, he wrote a Memorandum for File, which the chairman of the board
construed as Alegres resignation.
Respondent Alegre received a reply from Petitioner Belmonte, the chairman of the
board stating therein that the Board decided to accept the formers resignation.
Alegre thereafter wrote Belmonte expressing surprise over the acceptance of his

resignation because according to him no such move, however implicit it may be,
and no such letter has ever been made by him.
Alegre filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners, the labor arbiter
dismissed said complaint and held that while it be said that nothing therein
mentions about resigning from his position as Assistant to the Publisher, a perusal
of the letter as a whole shows that the intention of the complainant was to resign
from his post.
On appeal by Alegre, the above decision was set aside by the NLRC; adopting the
definition of Blacks Law Dictionary of Resignation, as a Formal Renoucement or
Relinquishment of Office. It held that the Respondent did not resign as there was no
actual act of relinquishment to constitute complete and operative resignation. The
NLRC further held that the Respondent was constructively dismissed without
just cause because Alegre did not intend to resign but the board interpreted it
as tantamount to resignation.
ISSUE: WON the NLRC properly exercised its adjudicatory power when it rendered
the decision that Respondent was constructively dismissed without just cause.
RULING: NO.
In the exercise of their functions and in making decisions, quasi judicial bodies must
not be too dogmatic as to restrict themselves to literal interpretations of words,
phrases and sentences. A complete and wholistic view must be taken in order to
render a just and equitable judgment.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION 322 SCRA 160
FACTS:
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez
for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal
law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 Prescribing the Procedure for
Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country and the
established Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America, the department proceeded with
proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical
evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the
treaty. The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as
well as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the
request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is
premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary
investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the
accused are not yet available.
ISSUE: WON the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings have
characteristics of an investigatory or inquisitorial nature.

HELD:
Yes. The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs
to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also
erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. Hence, said
process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast
to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial
power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation
of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon,
Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United
States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or
investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body
which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to
inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or
entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of
information by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses,
production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing
evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of
its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.

PHARMACEAUTICAL AND HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS DUQUE III 535 SCRA 265
Facts:
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the
DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the
questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive
Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law
seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly
(WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the
effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it
should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should
take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that
all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed
RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issue: WON the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the
Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.
Held:
Yes. As the issuing department of the RIRR which was noted to have some parts not
in consonance with the Milk Code and thus the provisions were considered null and
void, including the following:
1. such as Sec. 4(f) ->advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited,
2. Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants
and young children uo to 24 months
3. And Sec 46 -> With regard to Section 46 of the RIRR providing for administrative
sanctions that are not found in the Milk Code, the Court upholds petitioner's
objection thereto. - In the present case, neither the Milk Code nor the Revised
Administrative Code grants the DOH the authority to fix or impose administrative
fines. Thus, without any express grant of power to fix or impose such fines, the DOH
cannot provide for those fines in the RIRR. In this regard, the DOH again exceeded
its authority by providing for such fines or sanctions in Section 46 of the RIRR. Said
provision is, therefore, null and void.
Note: As between an IRR and the provisions of the law, the latter prevails as in this
case where inconsistencies between the Milk Code and the IRRs of the Code were
noted, the Milk Code prevailed and the IRRs were stricken down and declared null
and void.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY VS CA 457 SCRA 32

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:
An administrative officer such as the BIR Commissioner, may revoke, repeal or
abrogate the acts or previous rulings of his predecessor in office-- the construction
of a statute by those administering it is not binding on their successors if,
thereafter, the latter becomes satisfied that a different construction should be
given.

PHILIPPINE TRADING INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION VS SANDINO 233 SCRA 665

REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP. V SENDINO (233 scra 665)
FACTS
Respondent Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with petitioner Realty
Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a lotlocated in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat
for P307,800. Sendino paid a total of P5000 as reservation fee.Six months thereafter
Sendino paid 16K as downpayment. She was however advised by REVI to change
her co-maker.Sendino agreed, to which she asked for an extension of one month or
so. For alleged non-compliance with the appropriatedocumentary requirements,
REVI unilaterally rescinded the contract.Sendino sued for Specific Performance
against REVI with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA)
ofthe HLURB.REVI argued that OAALA-HLURB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case because EO 90 which created the HLURBdid not grant such powers to it.
Although such quasi-judicial function was exercised by the Human Settlements
RegulatoryCommission (HSRC), HLURBs predecessor.
ISSUES
1. Whether the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions notwithstanding the absence of
such grant of power by EO 90.
2. Whether a decision can be rendered by OAALA- a subordinate office of the Board
of Commissioners.
RULING
1. YES. The HLURB has quasi-judicial functions. Although such power was not
granted by the law creating the HLURB, it can be implied from the fact that HLURB
is thesole regulatory board for housing and land development. HLURB would have
been reduced to a functionally sterile entityif it lacked the powers exercised by its
predecessor, the HSRC, which included the power to settle disputes concerning land
use.
2. YES. The Board of Commissioners may delegate such function to the OAALA. The
power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations
necessary to carry out its functions has been held to be an adequate source of
authority to delegate a particular function. The board may adopt rules ofprocedure
for the conduct of its business for the effective accomplishment of its mandated
functions.

CARINO VS CHR 204 SCRA 483

FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the
alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions
consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with
an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the
return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were
administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41,
P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently

formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating
Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the
entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of
Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the
meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the
striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC.
Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in
peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers,
allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the
cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-towork orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking
teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced
without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation
of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to
investigate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific
cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law.