Book 3

EMV2000
Integrated Circuit Card

Specification for Payment Systems
Book 3
Application Specification
Version 4.0
December, 2000
© 2000 EMVCo, LLC (“EMVCo”). All rights reserved. Any and all uses of the EMV 2000 Specifications
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December, 2000 Table of Contents i
Table of Contents
1. Scope vii
2. Normative References viii
3. Definitions x
4. Abbreviations and Notations xii
Part I - Data Elements and Commands

1 Data Elements and Files 1
1.1 Data Elements Associated with Financial Transaction Interchange 1
1.2 Data Objects 1
1.2.1 Classes of Data Objects 2
1.3 Files 2
1.3.1 Application Elementary Files 2
1.3.2 File Referencing 2
1.4 Rules for Using a Data Object List (DOL) 3
2 Commands for Financial Transaction 5
2.1 Command APDU Format 5
2.2 Response APDU Format 5
2.3 Coding Conventions 5
2.3.1 Coding of the Class Byte 6
2.3.2 Coding of the Instruction Byte 6
2.3.3 Coding of Parameter Bytes 7
2.3.4 Coding of Data Field Bytes 7
2.3.5 Coding of the Status Bytes 7
2.3.6 Coding of RFU Data 10
2.4 Logical Channels 10
2.5 Commands 10
2.5.1 APPLICATION BLOCK Command-Response APDUs 10
2.5.2 APPLICATION UNBLOCK Command-Response APDUs 11
2.5.3 CARD BLOCK Command-Response APDUs 12
2.5.4 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command-Response APDUs 13
2.5.5 GENERATE APPLICATION CRYPTOGRAM Command-Response
APDUs 14
2.5.6 GET CHALLENGE Command-Response APDUs 17
2.5.7 GET DATA Command-Response APDUs 18
2.5.8 GET PROCESSING OPTIONS Command-Response APDUs 19
2.5.9 INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command-Response APDUs 21
2.5.10 PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK Command-Response APDUs 22
2.5.11 READ RECORD Command-Response APDUs 23
2.5.12 VERIFY Command-Response APDUs 25
Part II - Debit and Credit Application Specification

3 Files for Financial Transaction Interchange 29
3.1 Mandatory Data Objects 30
3.2 Data Retrievable by GET DATA Command 31
ii Table of Contents December, 2000
3.3 Data Retrievable by GET PROCESSING OPTIONS 32

3.4 Erroneous or Missing Data in the ICC 32
4 Transaction Flow 34
4.1 Exception Handling 34
4.2 Example Flowchart 34
4.3 Additional Functions 36
5 GENERATE AC Command Coding 37
5.1 Command Parameters 40
5.2 Command Data 40
5.2.1 Card Risk Management Data 40
5.2.2 Transaction Certificate Data 40
5.3 Command Use 41
5.3.1 GENERATE AC (First Issuance) 41
5.3.2 GENERATE AC (Second Issuance) 42
6 Functions Used in Transaction Processing 43
6.1 Initiate Application Processing 43
6.2 Read Application Data 44
6.3 Offline Data Authentication 45
6.4 Processing Restrictions 48
6.4.1 Application Version Number 48
6.4.2 Application Usage Control 48
6.4.3 Application Effective/Expiration Dates Checking 49
6.5 Cardholder Verification 50
6.5.1 Offline PIN Processing 51
6.5.2 Online PIN Processing 52
6.5.3 Signature Processing 53
6.5.4 Combination CVMs 53
6.6 Terminal Risk Management 53
6.6.1 Floor Limits 53
6.6.2 Random Transaction Selection 54
6.6.3 Velocity Checking 55
6.7 Terminal Action Analysis 56
6.8 Card Action Analysis 59
6.8.1 Terminal Messages for an AAC 60
6.8.2 Terminal Messages for a TC and ARQC 60
6.8.3 Advice Messages 61
6.9 Online Processing 61
6.10 Issuer-to-Card Script Processing 62
6.11 Completion 64
Annexes
Annex A - Data Elements Table 67
Annex B – Rules for BER-TLV Data Objects 85
B.1 Coding of BER-TLV Data Objects 85
B1.1 Coding of the Tag Field of BER-TLV Data Objects 85
B1.2 Coding of the Length Field of BER-TLV Data Objects 86
B1.3 Coding of the Value Field of Data Objects 87
Annex C - Coding of Data Elements used in the Transaction Processing 89
Annex C.1 - Application Interchange Profile 90
December, 2000 Table of Contents iii
Annex C.2 - Application Usage Control 91

Annex C.3 - Cardholder Verification Rule Format 92
Annex C.4 - Issuer Code Table Index 94
Annex C.5 - Terminal Verification Results 95
Annex C.6 - Transaction Status Information 98
Annex D Transaction Processing for Chip Electronic Commerce 99
D.1 System Architecture 101
D.1.1 EMV Debit/Credit Applications 102
D.1.2 Cardholder System 103
D.1.3 Merchant Server 108
D.1.4 Payment Gateway 109
D.2 Transaction Processing 110
D.2.1 Purchase Transaction Flow 110
D.2.2 IC Card—Cardholder System Functions 113
D.2.3 Cardholder System—Merchant Server Interface 120
D.2.4 Merchant Server—Payment Gateway Interface 126
Annex E - Issuer URL for Electronic Commerce 131
Annex F - Electronic Commerce Cardholder System Flow Diagram 133
Annex G - Electronic Commerce Cardholder System Implementations 135
G.1 Overview 135
G.2 Hosted Cardholder System 139
G.3 Thick Client Cardholder System 141
iv Table of Contents December, 2000
Table of Tables
Table I - 1- Structure of SFI 3
Table I - 2- Most Significant Nibble of the Class Byte 6
Table I - 3- Coding of the Instruction Byte 7
Table I - 4- Coding of Status Bytes SW1 SW2 8
Table I - 5- Allocation of Status Bytes 9
Table I - 6- APPLICATION BLOCK Command Message 11
Table I - 7- APPLICATION UNBLOCK Command Message 12
Table I - 8 - CARD BLOCK Command Message 13
Table I - 9- EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command Message 14
Table I - 10- GENERATE AC Cryptogram Types 15
Table I - 11- GENERATE AC Command Message 15
Table I - 12- GENERATE AC Reference Control Parameter 16
Table I - 13- Format 1 GENERATE AC Response Message Data Field 16
Table I - 14- Coding of Cryptogram Information Data 17
Table I - 15- GET CHALLENGE Command Message 18
Table I - 16- GET DATA Command Message 19
Table I - 17- GET PROCESSING OPTIONS Command Message 20
Table I - 18- Format 1 GET PROCESSING OPTIONS Response Message
Data Field 20
Table I - 19- INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command Message 21
Table I - 20- PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK Command Message 23
Table I - 21- READ RECORD Command Message 24
Table I - 22- READ RECORD Command Reference Control Parameter 24
Table I - 23- READ RECORD Response Message Data Field 24
Table I - 24- VERIFY Command Message 25
Table I - 25- VERIFY Command Qualifier of Reference Data (P2) 25
Table II - 1 - Data Objects Used by the Offline Data Authentication Algorithm 30
Table II - 2 - Mandatory Data Objects 30
Table II - 3 - Data Required for Offline Static Data Authentication 30
Table II - 4 - Data Required for Offline Dynamic Data Authentication 31
Table II - 5 - Data Objects Retrievable by GET DATA Command 31
Table II - 6 - Data Retrievable by GET PROCESSING OPTIONS 32
Table II - 7 - ICC Data Missing Indicator Setting 33
Table A - 1 - Data Elements Dictionary 80
Table A - 2 - Data Elements Tags 83
Table B - 1 - Tag Field Structure (First Byte) BER-TLV 85
Table B - 2 - Tag Field Structure (Subsequent Bytes) BER-TLV 86
Table B - 3 - Primitive BER-TLV Data Object (Data Element) 87
Table B - 4 - Constructed BER-TLV Data Object 87
Table C - 1 - Application Interchange Profile 90
Table C - 2 - Application Usage Control 91
Table C - 3 - CVM Codes 92
Table C - 4 - CVM Condition Codes 93
Table C - 5 - Issuer Code Table Index 94
Table C - 6 - Terminal Verification Results 97
Table C - 7 - Transaction Status Information 98
December, 2000 Table of Contents v
Table D - 1 - Issuer URL in FCI description 102

Table D - 2 - Location of Issuer URL in FCI Template 102
Table D - 3 - - Source of data requested in CDOL1 118
Table D - 4 - Converting CDOL1 Data for Terminal Action Analysis 119
Table D - 5 - IC Card Data inputs to PInitReq 122
Table D - 6 - Converting IC Card Data inputs to PInitReq 122
Table D - 7 - IC Card Data inputs to Payment Instructions 124
Table D - 8 - Converting IC Card Data to PI Inputs 125
Table D - 9 - commonChip extension data and its sources 126
Table E - 1 - Issuer URL data 131
vi Table of Contents December, 2000
Table of Figures
Figure I-1 - Command APDU Structure 5
Figure I-2 - Response APDU Structure 5
Figure I-3 - Structural Scheme of Status Bytes 8
Figure II- 1 - Transaction Flow Example 35
Figure II- 2 - Use of GENERATE AC Options 38
Figure II- 3 - Use of GENERATE AC with Referrals 39
Figure II- 4 - Random Transaction Selection Example 55
Figure II - 5- Issuer Script Format 63
Figure II - 6- Issuer Script Command Format (Shown with Three Commands) 63
Figure II- 7 - Chip Electronic Commerce System 100
Figure II- 8 - Diagram of Chip Electronic Commerce transaction flow 111
Figure E- 1 - Cardholder System Flow Diagram 133
Figure G - 1 - Cardholder System components 136
Figure G - 2 - Hosted Cardholder System example 140
Figure G - 3 - Thick Client example 142
December, 2000 Scope vii
1. Scope
The Integrated Circuit Card Application Specification for Payment Systems
(hereinafter referred to simply as ‘the Application Specification’) defines the
terminal and integrated circuit card (ICC) procedures necessary to effect a payment
system transaction in an international interchange environment.
In particular it covers:
• Mapping of data elements to files
• Transaction flow (the sequence of events and the commands issued to the card)
• Exception processing
• Coding of specific data objects (see Annexes C and D)
• Definition of data elements and commands as they apply to the exchange of

information between an ICC and a terminal. In particular,
¾Data elements for financial interchange and their mapping onto data objects.
¾Structure and referencing of files.
¾Structure and coding of messages between the ICC and the terminal to achieve
application level functions.
• Chip Electronic Commerce Specification
The functions described are those necessary to ensure that payment system cards
conforming to this specification can perform the set of common core functions in all
terminals conforming to this specification. Application functions unique to
individual payment systems and those functions not performed in interchange are
not described, but are not precluded.
This specification does not address clearing and settlement or any transactions
where the ICC is not present.
The Application Specification assumes familiarity with Book 1 (Application

Independent IC Card to Terminal Interface Requirements), that describes
functionality outside the application layer, including application selection. Both
specifications are intended for use by payment system members, ICC and terminal
manufacturers, and designers of applications using ICCs or interfacing to payment
system applications that use ICCs.
viii Normative References December, 2000
2. Normative References
The following standards contain provisions that are referenced in this specification.
EMV2000 Integrated Circuit Card Specification for Payment Systems

Version 4.0: Book 1 - Application Independent ICC to Terminal Interface
December 1, 2000 Requirements

Version 4.0: Book 2 - Security and Key Management
December 1, 2000

Version 4.0: Book 4 - Cardholder, Attendant and Acquirer Interface
December 1, 2000 Requirements
FIPS Pub 180-1:1995 Secure Hash Standard
IEC 512-2:1979 Specifications for electromechanical components for

electromechanical equipment - Part 2: Contact resistance
tests, insulation tests, and voltage stress tests
ISO 639:1988 Codes for the representation of names and languages
ISO 3166:1997 Codes for the representation of names of countries
ISO 4217:1995 Codes for the representation of currencies and funds
ISO/IEC 7811-1:1995 Identification cards – Recording technique - Part 1:

Embossing
ISO/IEC 7811-3:1995 Identification cards – Recording technique - Part 3: Location

of embossed characters on ID-1 cards
ISO/IEC 7813:1995 Identification cards – Financial transaction cards
ISO/IEC 7816-1:1998 Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts

- Part 1: Physical characteristics

- Part 2: Dimensions and location of contacts

- Part 3: Electronic signals and transmission protocols

- Part 4, Inter-industry commands for interchange
December, 2000 Normative References ix

- Part 5: Numbering system and registration procedure for
application identifiers

- Part 6: Inter-industry data elements (Draft International
Standard)
ISO 8731-1:1987 Banking - Approved algorithms for message authentication -

Part 1: DEA
ISO 8372:1987 Information processing - Modes of operation for a 64-bit block

cipher algorithm
ISO/IEC 8825:1990 Information technology - Open systems interconnection -

Specification of basic encoding rules for abstract syntax
notation one (ASN.1)
ISO 8583:1987 Bank card originated messages - Interchange message

specifications - Content for financial transactions
ISO 8583:1993 Financial transaction card originated messages - Interchange

message specifications
ISO 8859:1987 Information processing - 8-bit single-byte coded graphic

character sets
ISO/IEC 9796-2: 1997 Information technology - Security techniques - Digital

signature scheme giving message recovery - Part 2:
Mechanism using a hash function
ISO/IEC 9797:1994 Information technology - Security techniques - Data integrity

mechanism using a cryptographic check function employing a
block cipher algorithm
ISO/IEC 10116: 1997 Information technology - Modes of operation of an n-bit block

cipher algorithm
ISO/IEC 10118-3: Information technology - Security techniques - Hash functions

1998 – Part 3: Dedicated hash functions
ISO/IEC 10373:1993 Identification cards - Test methods

x Definitions December, 2000
3. Definitions
The following terms are used in this specification.
Application - The application protocol between the card and the terminal and its
related set of data.
Byte - 8 bits.
Card - A payment card as defined by a payment system.
Command - A message sent by the terminal to the ICC that initiates an action and
solicits a response from the ICC.
Cryptogram - Result of a cryptographic operation.
Cryptographic Algorithm - An algorithm that transforms data in order to hide or

reveal its information content.
Financial Transaction - The act between a cardholder and a merchant or acquirer

that results in the exchange of goods or services against payment.
Function - A process accomplished by one or more commands and resultant actions

that are used to perform all or part of a transaction.
Issuer Action Code - reflects the issuer’s selected action to be taken based upon
the content of the TVR.
Key - A sequence of symbols that controls the operation of a cryptographic

transformation.
Padding - Appending extra bits to either side of a data string.
Path - Concatenation of file identifiers without delimitation.
Payment System - For the purposes of this specification, Europay International

S.A., MasterCard International Incorporated, or Visa International Service
Association.
Payment Systems Environment - The set of logical conditions established within

the ICC when a payment system application conforming to this specification has
been selected, or when a directory definition file (DDF) used for payment system
application purposes has been selected.
Response - A message returned by the ICC to the terminal after the processing of a
command message received by the ICC.
December, 2000 Definitions xi
Script - A command or a string of commands transmitted by the issuer to the

terminal for the purpose of being sent serially to the ICC as commands.
Template - Value field of a constructed data object, defined to give a logical

grouping of data objects.
Terminal - The device used in conjunction with the ICC at the point of transaction
to perform a financial transaction. It incorporates the interface device and may also
include other components and interfaces such as host communications.
Terminal Action Code - Terminal Action Code(s) (Default, Denial, Online) reflects
the acquirer-selected action to be taken upon the content of the TVR.
xii Abbreviations and Notations December, 2000
4. Abbreviations and Notations

The following abbreviations and notations are used in this specification.
AAC Application Authentication Cryptogram
AAR Application Authorisation Referral
AC Application Cryptogram
ADF Application Definition File
AEF Application Elementary File
AFL Application File Locator
AID Application Identifier
an Alphanumeric
ans Alphanumeric Special
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
ARPC Authorisation Response Cryptogram
ARQC Authorisation Request Cryptogram
ASN Abstract Syntax Notation
ATC Application Transaction Counter
b Binary
BER Basic Encoding Rules
C Celsius or Centigrade
C-APDU Command APDU
CDOL Card Risk Management Data Object List
CLA Class Byte of the Command Message
cn Compressed Numeric
C-TPDU Command TPDU
CVM Cardholder Verification Method

December, 2000 Abbreviations and Notations xiii
DDF Directory Definition File
DDOL Dynamic Data Authentication Data Object List
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Dedicated File
DIR Directory
EF Elementary File
FCI File Control Information
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
hex. Hexadecimal
HHMM Hours, Minutes
HHMMSS Hours, Minutes, Seconds
IC Integrated Circuit
IAC Issuer Action Code (Denial, Default, Online)
ICC Integrated Circuit Card
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IFD Interface Device
INS Instruction Byte of Command Message
I/O Input/Output
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation
KM Master Key
KS Session Key
Lc Exact Length of Data Sent by the TAL in a Case 3 or 4 Command
lcm Least Common Multiple
LDD Length of the ICC Dynamic Data
Le Maximum Length of Data Expected by the TAL in Response to a Case

2 or 4 Command
xiv Abbreviations and Notations December, 2000
Licc Exact Length of Data Available (or Remaining) in the ICC to be

Returned in Response to the Case 2 or 4 Command Received by the
ICC
LEN Length
Lr Length of Response Data Field
LRC Longitudinal Redundancy Check
M Mandatory
MAC Message Authentication Code
max. Maximum
MF Master File
min. Minimum
n Numeric
NCA Length of the Certification Authority Public Key Modulus
NI Length of the Issuer Public Key Modulus
NIC Length of the ICC Public Key Modulus
NPE Length of the ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key Modulus
O Optional
P1 Parameter 1
P2 Parameter 2
P3 Parameter 3
PAN Primary Account Number
PCA Certification Authority Public Key
PCB Protocol Control Byte
PDOL Processing Options Data Object List
PI Issuer Public Key
PIC ICC Public Key

December, 2000 Abbreviations and Notations xv
PIN Personal Identification Number
PSA Payment System Application
PSE Payment System Environment
R-APDU Response APDU
RFU Reserved for Future Use
RID Registered Application Provider Identifier
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman Algorithm
R-TPDU Response TPDU
SCA Certification Authority Private Key
SI Issuer Private Key
SIC ICC Private Key
SFI Short File Identifier
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SW1 Status Word One
SW2 Status Word Two
TAC Terminal Action Code(s) (Default, Denial, Online)
TAL Terminal Application Layer
TC Transaction Certificate
TDOL Transaction Certificate Data Object List
TLV Tag Length Value
TPDU Transport Protocol Data Unit
TVR Terminal Verification Results
var. Variable
YYMMDD Year, Month, Day

xvi Abbreviations and Notations December, 2000
The following notations apply:
‘0’ to ‘9’ and ‘A’ to ‘F’ 16 hexadecimal digits
# Number
[...] Optional part
A := B A is assigned the value of B
A=B Value of A is equal to the value of B
A ≡ B mod n Integers A and B are congruent modulo the integer n, that is,
there exists an integer d such that
(A - B) = dn
A mod n The reduction of the integer A modulo the integer n, that is, the
unique integer 0 ≤ r < n for which there exists an integer d
such that
A = dn + r
abs(n) Absolute value of an integer n defined as n if n ≥ 0, and as −n if

n<0
Y := ALG(K)[X] Encipherment of a 64-bit data block X with a 64-bit block

cipher as specified in Annex E1 using a secret key K
X = ALG-1(K)[Y] Decipherment of a 64-bit data block Y with a 64-bit block

cipher as specified in Annex E1 using a secret key K
Y := Sign (SK)[X] The signing of a data block X with an asymmetric reversible

algorithm as specified in Annex E2, using the private key SK
X = Recover(PK)[Y] The recovery of the data block X with an asymmetric reversible

algorithm as specified in Annex E2, using the public key PK
C := (A || B) The concatenation of an n-bit number A and an m-bit number

B, which is defined as C = 2m A + B.
H := Hash[MSG] Hashing of a message MSG of arbitrary length using an 80-bit

hash function
lcm(a, b) Least common multiple of two integers a and b
|n| Length of an integer n in bits

December, 2000 Abbreviations and Notations xvii
(X | n) The Jacobi symbol of an integer X with respect to an integer

n = pq consisting of the product of two primes p and q, and
which is defined as follows. Define
J := (X(p-1)/2 mod p)(X(q-1)/2 mod q)
If J = 1 or J = (pq – p – q + 1), then (X  n) := 1.

Otherwise, (X  n) := -1.
Note that the Jacobi symbol can efficiently be computed

without the prime factors of n (for example, see Informative
Reference [5] in Annex G).
Xx Any value
The following terminology is used:
proprietary Not defined in and/or outside the scope of this specification
shall Denotes a mandatory requirement
should Denotes a recommendation

xviii Abbreviations and Notations December, 2000
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Part I
Data Elements and Commands
December, 2000 Data Elements and Files 1
1 Data Elements and Files

An application in the ICC includes a set of items of information. These items of
information may be accessible to the terminal after a successful application selection
(see Book 1, Part II of this specification).
An item of information is called a data element. A data element is the smallest piece
of information that may be identified by a name, a description of logical content, a
format, and a coding.
1.1 Data Elements Associated with Financial

Transaction Interchange
The data element directory defined in Annex A, Table A-1 includes those data
elements that may be used for financial transaction interchange. Data elements not
specified in Annex A, Table A-1, are outside the scope of these specifications.
Any additional data element transmitted in the response to the SELECT command
(e.g. O/S Manufacturer proprietary data) is placed in the field “FCI Issuer
Discretionary Data” (EMV tag ‘BF0C’).
1.2 Data Objects

A data object consists of a tag, a length, and a value. A tag uniquely identifies a
data object within the environment of an application. The length is the length of the
value field of the data object. The value of a data object may consist either of a data
element or of one or more data objects. When a data object encapsulates a data
element, it is called a primitive data object. When a data object encapsulates one or
more data objects, it is called a constructed data object. Specific tags are assigned to
the constructed data objects with a specific meaning in the environment of an
application according to this specification. The value field of such constructed data
objects is a context-specific template. Rules for the coding of context-specific data
objects and templates are given in Annex B.
Upon receipt, the terminal shall parse all the data elements following the rules
described in Annex B. The retrieved value fields of the data elements shall be stored
in the terminal buffer for possible later use in the application.
The terminals shall be capable of correctly interpreting TLV data objects with a
length field coded '00’ as defined in ISO/IEC 7816. This situation can occur, when a
data element is personalised on a card without an actual value field. A data element
with length ‘00’ shall be treated as not present. The data element length indicated
in Annex A, reflects the length of the data elements when actually present on the
card.
2 Data Elements and Files December, 2000
Table A-1 and Table A-2 in Annex A describes the mapping of data elements onto
data objects and the mapping of data objects into templates when applicable.
Records are templates containing one or more primitive and/or constructed data
objects.
The mapping of data objects into records is left to the discretion of the issuer and the
manner in which data elements are to be used is described in Part II of this book.
Annex B defines the tags that are reserved by this specification for EMV, the
payment systems, and issuers. All ICC applications conforming to this specification
shall comply with this coding and allocation scheme in accordance with ISO/IEC
7816-6.
1.2.1 Classes of Data Objects

Identification and coding of different classes of data objects are defined in Annex C.
The tag definitions specified in that annex are according to ISO/IEC 8825 and
ISO/IEC 7816 series and apply to applications conforming to this specification.
1.3 Files
The data objects contained in data files accessible from the ICC are stored in
records. The file structure and referencing method depend on the purpose of the file.
Structures and referencing methods are described in the following sections. The
layout of the data files accessible from the ICC is left to the discretion of the issuer
except for the directory files described in the following section.
1.3.1 Application Elementary Files

An AEF in the range 1-10, contains one or more primitive Basic Encoding Rules -
Tag Length Value (BER-TLV) data objects grouped into constructed BER-TLV data
objects (records) according to Annex C. After selecting the application, an AEF in
the range 1-10 is only referred to by its short file identifier (SFI) as described in
section I-1.3.2.
A data file referred to in this specification consists of a sequence of records

addressed by record number. The data files referred to by SFIs in the range 1-10
contain only data not interpreted by the card, that is, data that is not used by the
card in its internal processes. This file structure is defined as linear. It can be
either linear fixed or linear variable according to ISO/IEC 7816-4. The choice is left
to the issuer and does not affect the reading of the file according to this specification.
1.3.2 File Referencing

A file may be referred to by a name or a SFI depending on its type.
December, 2000 Data Elements and Files 3
1.3.2.1 Referencing by Name
Any ADF or DDF in the card is referenced by its DF name. A DF name for an ADF
corresponds to the AID or contains the AID as the beginning of the DF name. Each
DF name shall be unique within a given card.
1.3.2.2 Referencing by SFI
SFIs are used for the selection of AEFs. Any AEF within a given application is
referenced by a SFI coded on 5 bits in the range 1 to 30. The coding of the SFI is
described in every command that uses it.
The structure of a SFI is according to Table I - 1:
Value Meaning
1-10 Governed by this specification
11-20 Payment system specific
21-30 Issuer specific
Table I - 1- Structure of SFI
A SFI shall be unique within an application. The coding of SFIs within the range 1
to 10 is used to address AEFs governed by this specification.
1.4 Rules for Using a Data Object List (DOL)

In several instances, the terminal is asked to build a flexible list of data elements to
be passed to the card under the card’s direction. To minimise processing within the
ICC, such a list is not TLV encoded but is a single constructed field built by
concatenating several data elements together. Since the elements of the constructed
field are not TLV encoded, it is imperative that the ICC knows the format of this
field when the data is received. This is achieved by including a Data Object List
(DOL) in the ICC, specifying the format of the data to be included in the constructed
field. DOLs currently used in this specification include the PDOL used with the
GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command, CDOL1 and CDOL2 used with the
GENERATE AC command, the TDOL used to generate a TC Hash Value, and the
DDOL used with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command. This section
describes the rules for constructing a field using a DOL supplied by the card.
A DOL is a concatenated list of entries, with each entry representing a single data
element to be included in the constructed field. The format of each entry is a one- or
two-byte tag identifying the desired data object, followed by a one-byte length,
representing the number of bytes the field shall occupy in the command data. Only
tags representing primitive data objects defined in Annex B shall be used in DOLs.
The terminal shall complete the following steps to build the constructed field:
1. Read the DOL from the ICC.

4 Data Elements and Files December, 2000
2. Concatenate together all data elements listed in the DOL. The following
rules apply to the creation of this concatenation:
a) If the tag of any data object identified in the DOL is unknown to the
terminal or represents a constructed data object, the terminal shall
provide a data element with the length specified and a value of all
hexadecimal zeroes.
b) If a data object is in the list and is meaningful to the terminal but

represents optional static data that is absent from the ICC, the
portion of the command field representing the data object shall be
filled with hexadecimal zeroes.
c) If the length specified in the DOL entry is less than the length of the
actual data object, the leftmost bytes of the data element shall be
truncated if the data object has numeric (n) format, or the rightmost
bytes of the data shall be truncated for any other format. If the length
specified is greater than the actual data, the actual data shall be
padded:
• With leading hexadecimal zeroes if the data has numeric format
• With trailing hexadecimal FF’s if the data has compressed
numeric (cn) format,
• With trailing hexadecimal zeroes for any other format (an or ans).
d) If a data object is in the list and is meaningful to the terminal but

represents data that is not applicable to the current transaction, the
portion of the command field representing the data object shall be
filled with hexadecimal zeroes.
The completed list of data elements shall be concatenated in the sequence in which
the corresponding data objects appear in the DOL.
December, 2000 Commands for Financial Transaction 5
2 Commands for Financial Transaction
2.1 Command APDU Format

The command APDU consists of a mandatory header of four bytes followed by a
conditional body of variable length, as shown in Figure I-1:
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le

← Mandatory Header → ← Conditional Body
→
Figure I-1 - Command APDU Structure
The number of data bytes sent in the command APDU is denoted by Lc (length of
command data field).
The maximum number of data bytes expected in the response APDU is denoted by
length of expected data (Le) . When Le is present and contains the value zero, the
maximum number of available data bytes (up to 256) is expected . When required in
a command message, Le shall always be set to ‘00’.
2.2 Response APDU Format

The response APDU format consists of a conditional body of variable length followed
by a mandatory trailer of two bytes, as shown in Figure I-2:
Data SW1 SW2

← Body → ← Trailer →
Figure I-2 - Response APDU Structure
The data field of a response APDU is an object structured as defined in Annex B.

The detailed coding of the objects is provided with the commands described in
subsequent sub-clauses.
2.3 Coding Conventions

This section defines the coding of the header and the body of the messages
(command and response).
6 Commands for Financial Transaction December, 2000
2.3.1 Coding of the Class Byte

The most significant nibble of the class byte codes the type of command as shown in
Table I-2:
Hex. Meaning
‘0’ Inter-industry command
‘8’ Proprietary to this specification
Any other Outside the scope of this specification
value
Table I - 2- Most Significant Nibble of the Class Byte
A command proprietary to this specification is introduced by the most significant

nibble of the class byte set to ‘8’, in other words, the structure of the command and
response messages is according to ISO/IEC 7816-4, the coding of the messages is
defined within the context of the PSE.
The least significant nibble of the class byte codes secure messaging and logical
channel mechanisms, according to ISO/IEC 7816-4.
2.3.2 Coding of the Instruction Byte

The INS byte of a command is structured according to Book 1, Part I of this
specification. The coding of INS and its relationship to CLA as shown in Table I - 3
applies:
CLA INS Meaning

‘8x’ ‘1E’ APPLICATION BLOCK
‘8x’ ‘18’ APPLICATION UNBLOCK
‘8x’ ‘16’ CARD BLOCK
‘0x’ ‘82’ EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
‘8x’ ‘AE’ GENERATE APPLICATION CRYPTOGRAM
‘0x’ ‘84’ GET CHALLENGE
‘8x’ ‘CA’ GET DATA
‘8x’ ‘A8’ GET PROCESSING OPTIONS
‘0x’ ‘88’ INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
‘8x’ ‘24’ PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (PIN)
CHANGE/UNBLOCK
‘0x’ ‘B2’ READ RECORD
‘0x’ ‘A4’ SELECT
‘0x’ ‘20’ VERIFY
‘8x’ ‘Dx’ RFU for the payment systems
‘8x’ ‘Ex’ RFU for the payment systems
‘9x’ ‘xx’ RFU for manufacturers for proprietary INS coding
‘Ex’ ‘xx’ RFU for issuers for proprietary INS coding
Table I - 3- Coding of the Instruction Byte
Note: Additional INS codes may be assigned in the future in the PSE context using the class ‘8x’. It is
strongly recommended not to define proprietary commands in the class ‘8x’ when they are to be used in
the PSE context, so that collision is avoided.
2.3.3 Coding of Parameter Bytes

The parameter bytes P1 P2 may have any value. If not used, a parameter byte has
the value ‘00’.
2.3.4 Coding of Data Field Bytes

When present, an APDU command message data field consists of a string of data
elements.
When present, an APDU response data field consists of a data object or a string of
data objects encapsulated in a template according to Annex B.
2.3.5 Coding of the Status Bytes

The status bytes SW1 SW2 are returned by the transport layer to the application
layer in any response message and denote the processing state of the command. The
coding of the status words is structured according to Figure I-3:
SW1 SW2
Process Completed Process Aborted
Normal Warning Execution Checking
‘61xx’ ‘62xx’ ‘63xx’‘64xx’ ‘65xx’ ‘67xx’ to

‘9000’ ‘6Fxx’
Figure I-3 - Structural Scheme of Status Bytes
SW1 SW2 Meaning

Normal processing
‘90’ ‘00’ Process completed (any other value for SW2 is RFU)
Warning processing
‘62’ ‘83’ State of non-volatile memory unchanged; selected file invalidated
‘63’ ‘00’ State of non-volatile memory changed; authentication failed
‘63’ ‘Cx’ State of non-volatile memory changed; counter provided by ‘x’ (from 0-15)
Checking errors
‘69’ ‘83’ Command not allowed; authentication method blocked
‘69’ ‘84’ Command not allowed; referenced data invalidated
‘69’ ‘85’ Command not allowed; conditions of use not satisfied
‘6A’ ‘81’ Wrong parameter(s) P1 P2; function not supported
‘6A’ ‘82’ Wrong parameter(s) P1 P2; file not found
‘6A’ ‘83’ Wrong parameter(s) P1 P2; record not found
‘6A’ ‘88’ Referenced data (data objects) not found
Table I - 4- Coding of Status Bytes SW1 SW2
The following values of SW1 SW2 are described in Book 1, Part I of this specification
as they apply to the TPDU and are not returned to the APDU:
• ‘61xx’: SW2 indicates the number of response bytes still available.
• ‘6Cxx’: Wrong length Le, SW2 indicates the exact length.
SW1 = ‘6x’ or ‘90’ denotes a normal, warning, or error condition coded according to
ISO/IEC 7816-4.
Other values of SW1 returned by the ICC are not supported by Book1, Part I.
Table I-5 shows the coding of the SW1SW2 status bytes which this specification
requires to be returned in response to specific conditions. The card may generate
status bytes not listed in this table for error and warning conditions not specified in
the ICC Application Specification described in Part II of this book.
GENERATE APPLICATION CRYPTOGRM
GET PROCESSING OPTIONS

EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
PIN CHANGE/UNVBLOCK
APPLICATION UNBLOCK
APPLICATION BLOCK
GET CHALLENGE
READ RECORD
CARD BLOCK
GET DATA
SELECT
VERIFY
SW1 SW2
‘62’ ‘83’ X
‘63’ ‘00’ X
‘63’ ‘Cx’ X
‘69’ ‘83’ X
‘69’ ‘84’ X
‘69’ ‘85’ X X X
‘6A’ ‘81’ X X
‘6A’ ‘82’ X
‘6A’ ‘83’ X
‘6A’ ‘88’ X
Table I - 5- Allocation of Status Bytes
The following convention is used in the table:
X= Allowed response code, for which a dedicated action shall be taken or

which has a special meaning for an EMV compliant application. The
meaning of the action is explained in section 6.
2.3.6 Coding of RFU Data

The coding of data (bits and bytes) indicated as RFU and marked as ‘x’ in the tables
of the specifications shall be set to zero unless otherwise stated.
To allow for migration and support of new functionality, the IC Card and the
terminal shall not verify the data indicated as RFU.
2.4 Logical Channels

A logical channel establishes and maintains the link between an application in the
terminal and an application in the card.
A card may support more than one logical channel but only the basic logical channel
is supported by this specification. This limits to one the number of concurrent
applications according to this specification.
2.5 Commands
This section describes the following APDU command-response pairs:
• APPLICATION BLOCK (post-issuance command)

• APPLICATION UNBLOCK (post-issuance command)
• CARD BLOCK (post-issuance command)
• EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
• GENERATE APPLICATION CRYPTOGRAM
• GET CHALLENGE
• GET DATA
• GET PROCESSING OPTIONS
• INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
• PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK (post-issuance command)
• READ RECORD
• VERIFY
The post-issuance commands shall only be sent using script processing (see Part II,
Section 6.10) and secure messaging as specified in Book 2 of this specification.
2.5.1 APPLICATION BLOCK Command-Response APDUs

2.5.1.1 Definition and Scope
The APPLICATION BLOCK command is a post-issuance command that invalidates

the currently selected application.
Following the successful completion of an APPLICATION BLOCK command:

• An invalidated application shall return the status bytes ‘Selected file invalidated’
(SW1 SW2 = ‘6283’) in response to a SELECT command.
• An invalidated application shall return only an AAC as AC in response to a

GENERATE AC command.
2.5.1.2 Command Message
The APPLICATION BLOCK command message is coded according to Table I - 6:
Code Value
CLA ‘8C’ or ‘84’; coding according to the secure messaging
specified in Book 2 of this specification
INS ‘1E’
P1 ‘00’; all other values are RFU
Lc Number of data bytes
Data Message Authentication Code (MAC) data
component; coding according to the secure messaging
Le Not present
Table I - 6- APPLICATION BLOCK Command Message
2.5.1.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message
The data field of the command message contains the MAC data component coded
according to the secure messaging format specified in Book 2 of this specification.
2.5.1.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message
The data field of the response message is not present.
2.5.1.5 Processing State Returned in the Response Message
‘9000’ codes a successful execution of the command, independent whether the

application was already invalidated or not.
2.5.2 APPLICATION UNBLOCK Command-Response APDUs

The APPLICATION UNBLOCK command is a post-issuance command that

rehabilitates the currently selected application.
Following the successful completion of an APPLICATION UNBLOCK command, the

restrictions imposed by the APPLICATION BLOCK command are removed.
The APPLICATION UNBLOCK command message is coded according to Table I - 7.
Code Value
INS ‘18’
Data MAC data component; coding according to the secure
messaging specified in Book 2 of this specification
Le Not present
Table I - 7- APPLICATION UNBLOCK Command Message
‘9000’ codes a successful execution of the command, independent whether the

application was invalidated or not.
2.5.3 CARD BLOCK Command-Response APDUs

The CARD BLOCK command is a post-issuance command that permanently disables

all applications in the ICC.
The CARD BLOCK command shall disable all applications in the ICC, including
applications that may be selected implicitly.
Following the successful completion of a CARD BLOCK command, all subsequent

SELECT commands shall return the status bytes ‘Function not supported’ (SW1
SW2 = ‘6A81’) and perform no other action.
The CARD BLOCK command message is coded according to Table I - 8.

Code Value
INS ‘16’
Data MAC data component; coding according to the secure
messaging specified in Book 2 of this specification
Le Not present
Table I - 8 - CARD BLOCK Command Message
‘9000’ codes a successful execution of the command, independent of whether the card
was already blocked or not.
2.5.4 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command-Response APDUs

The EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command asks the application in the ICC to

verify a cryptogram.
The response from the ICC consists of returning the processing state of the
command.
The EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command message is coded according to Table I

- 9:
Code Value
CLA ‘00’
INS ‘82’
P1 ‘00’
P2 ‘00’
Lc 8-16
Data Issuer Authentication Data
Le Not present
Table I - 9 - EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command Message
The reference of the algorithm (P1) of the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command

is coded ‘00’, which means that no information is given. The reference of the
algorithm is known either before issuing the command or is provided in the data
field.
The data field of the command message contains the value field of tag ‘91’ coded as
follows:
• Mandatory first 8 bytes containing the cryptogram.
• Optional additional 1-8 bytes are proprietary.
‘9000’ codes a successful execution of the command.
2.5.5 GENERATE APPLICATION CRYPTOGRAM Command-

Response APDUs
The GENERATE AC command sends transaction-related data to the ICC, which

computes and returns a cryptogram. This cryptogram shall either be an Application
Cryptogram (AC) as specified in this specification or a proprietary cryptogram. In
both cases, the cryptogram shall be of a type specified in Table I - 10 (for more
details, see Part II).
Type Meaning
Application Authentication Transaction declined
Cryptogram (AAC)
Application Authorisation Referral Referral requested by the card
(AAR)
Authorisation Request Cryptogram Online authorisation requested
(ARQC)
Transaction Certificate Transaction approved
(TC)
Table I - 10- GENERATE AC Cryptogram Types
The cryptogram returned by the ICC may differ from that requested in the command
message according to an internal process in the ICC (as described in Part II ).
The GENERATE AC command message is coded according to Table I - 11:
Code Value
CLA ‘80’
INS ‘AE’
P1 Reference control parameter
(see Table I - 12)
P2 ‘00’
Lc Var.
Data Transaction-related data
Le ‘00’
Table I - 11- GENERATE AC Command Message
The reference control parameter of the GENERATE AC command is coded as shown

in Table I - 12:
b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Meaning
0 0 AAC
0 1 TC
1 0 ARQC
1 1 RFU
0 Combined
DDA/AC
generation not
explicitly
requested
1 Combined
DDA/AC
generation
requested
x x x x x RFU
Table I - 12- GENERATE AC Reference Control Parameter
The content of the data field of the command message is coded according to the rules
for the data object list as defined in section 1.4.
The data field of the response message consists of a BER-TLV coded data object.
The coding of the data object shall be according to one of the following two formats.
• Format 1: The data object returned in the response message is a primitive data
object with tag equal to ‘80’. The value field consists of the concatenation without
delimiters (tag and length) of the value fields of the data objects specified in Table
I - 13:
Value Presence
Cryptogram Information Data M
Application Transaction Counter (ATC) M
Application Cryptogram (AC) M
Issuer Application Data O
Table I - 13- Format 1 GENERATE AC Response Message Data Field
• Format 2: The data object returned in the response message is a constructed

data object with tag equal to ‘77’. The value field may contain several BER-TLV
coded objects, but shall always include the Cryptogram Information Data, the
Application Transaction Counter, and the cryptogram computed by the ICC
(either an AC or a proprietary cryptogram). The utilisation and interpretation of
proprietary data objects, which may be included in this response message, are
outside the scope of these specifications.
Format 2 shall be used if the response is being returned in an envelope as

specified for the Combined DDA/AC Generation feature described in Book 2
section 6.6. The required data elements for the response in an envelope are
shown in Table 16 of that section.
For both formats, the Cryptogram Information Data returned by the GENERATE
AC response message is coded according to Table I - 14:
b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 B1 Meaning
0 0 AAC
0 1 TC
1 0 ARQC
1 1 AAR
x x Payment System specific
cryptogram
0 No advice required
1 Advice required
x x x Reason/advice/referral code
0 0 0 No information given
0 0 1 Service not allowed
0 1 0 PIN Try Limit exceeded
0 1 1 Issuer authentication failed
x x x Other values RFU
Table I - 14- Coding of Cryptogram Information Data
2.5.6 GET CHALLENGE Command-Response APDUs

The GET CHALLENGE command is used to obtain an unpredictable number from

the ICC for use in a security-related procedure.
The challenge shall be valid only for the next issued command.
The GET CHALLENGE command message is coded according to Table I - 15:

Code Value
CLA ‘00’
INS ‘84’
P1 ‘00’
P2 ‘00’
Lc Not present
Data Not present
Le ’00’
Table I - 15- GET CHALLENGE Command Message
The data field of the command message is not present.
The data field of the response message contains an 8-byte unpredictable number
generated by the ICC.
2.5.7 GET DATA Command-Response APDUs

The GET DATA command is used to retrieve a primitive data object not
encapsulated in a record within the current application.
The usage of the GET DATA command in this specification is limited to the retrieval
of the primitive data objects ATC (tag ‘9F36’), Last Online ATC Register (tag ‘9F13’),
or PIN Try Counter (tag ‘9F17’) defined in Annex A, Table A-1 that are interpreted
by the application in the ICC.
The GET DATA command message is coded according to Table I - 16:

Code Value
CLA ‘80’
INS ‘CA’
P1 P2 ‘9F36’, ‘9F13’, or ‘9F17’
Lc Not present
Data Not present
Le ‘00’
Table I - 16- GET DATA Command Message
The data field of the response message contains the primitive data object referred to
in P1 P2 of the command message (in other words, including its tag and its length).
2.5.8 GET PROCESSING OPTIONS Command-Response APDUs

The GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command initiates the transaction within the
ICC.
The response from the ICC consists of returning the Application Interchange Profile
(AIP) and the Application File Locator (AFL).
The GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command message is coded according to Table I

- 17:
Code Value
CLA ‘80’
INS ‘A8’
Lc var.
Data Processing Options Data Object List
(PDOL) related data
Le ‘00’
Table I - 17- GET PROCESSING OPTIONS Command Message
The data field of the command message is a data object coded according to the
Processing Options Data Object List (PDOL) provided by the ICC, as defined in
section 1.4, and is introduced by the tag ‘83’. When the data object list is not
provided by the ICC, the length field of the template is set to zero. Otherwise, the
length field of the template is the total length of the value fields of the data objects
transmitted to the ICC.
object with tag equal to ‘80’. The value field consists of the concatenation without
delimiters (tag and length) of the value fields of the Application Interchange
Profile (AIP) and the Application File Locator (AFL). The coding of the data
object returned in the response message is shown in Table I - 18:
‘80’ Length Application Interchange Profile AFL
Table I - 18- Format 1 GET PROCESSING OPTIONS Response Message Data Field

coded objects, but shall always include the AIP and the AFL. The utilisation and
interpretation of proprietary data objects, which may be included in this response
message, are outside the scope of these specifications.
The AIP specifies the application functions that are supported by the application in
the ICC and is coded according to Part II of this book.
The AFL consists of the list without delimiters of files and related records that shall
be read according to the ICC Application Specification described in Part II of this
book for the currently selected application.
2.5.9 INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command-Response APDUs

The INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command initiates the computation of the

Signed Dynamic Application Data by the card using the challenge data sent from the
IFD and data and a relevant private key stored in the card.
The response from the ICC consists of returning the Signed Dynamic Application
Data to the terminal.
The INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command message is coded according to Table I -

19:
Code Value
CLA ‘00’
INS ‘88’
P1 ‘00’
P2 ‘00’
Lc Length of authentication-related data
Data Authentication-related data
Le ‘00’
Table I - 19- INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command Message
The reference of the algorithm (P1) of the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command

is coded ‘00’, which means that no information is given. The reference of the
algorithm is known either before issuing the command or is provided in the data
field.
The data field of the command message contains the authentication-related data
proprietary to an application. It is coded according to the Dynamic Data
Authentication Data Object List (DDOL) as defined in Book 2 of this specification.
object with tag equal to ‘80’. The value field consists of the value field of the
Signed Dynamic Application Data as specified in Book 2 of this specification.

coded objects, but shall always include the Signed Dynamic Application Data as
specified in Book 2 of this specification. The utilisation and interpretation of
proprietary data objects which may be included in this response message are
outside the scope of these specifications.
2.5.10 PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK Command-Response APDUs

The PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK command is a post-issuance command. Its purpose

is to provide the issuer the capability either to unblock the PIN or to simultaneously
change and unblock the reference PIN.
Upon successful completion of the PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK command, the card

shall perform the following functions:
• The value of the PIN Try Counter shall be reset to the value of the PIN Try
Limit.
• If requested, the value of the reference PIN shall be set to the new PIN value.
The PIN data transmitted in the command, if present, shall be enciphered for
confidentiality.
Note: The reference PIN, which is stored within the card, is the one that is associated with the
application and which the card uses to check the Transaction PIN Data transmitted within the
VERIFY command.
The PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK command message is coded according to Table I - 20.

Code Value
CLA ‘8C’ or ‘84’; coding according to the secure
messaging specified in Book 2 of this
specification
INS ‘24’
P1 ‘00’
P2 ‘00’, ‘01’, or ‘02’
Data Enciphered PIN data component, if present,
and MAC data component; coding according to
the secure messaging specified in Book 2 of this
specification
Le Not present
Table I - 20- PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK Command Message
P2: If P2 is equal to ‘00’, the reference PIN is unblocked and the PIN Try Counter
is reset to the PIN Try Limit. There is no PIN update, since the PIN
CHANGE/UNBLOCK command does not contain a new PIN value.
The usage of P2 equal to ‘01’ or ‘02’ is reserved for payment schemes.
Any other value of P2 allowing PIN unblocking and/or PIN changing is out of
the scope of this specification and shall be described for each payment system
individually.
The data field of the command message contains the PIN data component, if present,
followed by the MAC data component coded according to the secure messaging
format specified in Book 2 of this specification.
2.5.11 READ RECORD Command-Response APDUs

The READ RECORD command reads a file record in a linear file.
The response from the ICC consists of returning the record.

The READ RECORD command message is coded according to Table I - 21:
Code Value
CLA ‘00’
INS ‘B2’
P1 Record number
P2 Reference control parameter (see
Table I - 22)
Lc Not present
Data Not present
Le ‘00’
Table I - 21- READ RECORD Command Message
Table I - 22 defines the reference control parameter of the command message:
x x x x x SFI
1 0 0 P1 is a record number
Table I - 22- READ RECORD Command Reference Control Parameter
The data field of the response message of any successful READ RECORD command
contains the record read. For SFIs in the range 1-10, the record is a BER-TLV
constructed data object as defined in Annex B and coded as shown in Table I - 23:
‘70’ Length Record Template
Table I - 23- READ RECORD Response Message Data Field
The response message to READ RECORD for SFIs outside the range 1-10 is outside
the scope of this specification.

2.5.12 VERIFY Command-Response APDUs

The VERIFY command initiates in the ICC the comparison of the Transaction PIN
Data sent in the data field of the command with the reference PIN data associated
with the application. The manner in which the comparison is performed is
proprietary to the application in the ICC.
The VERIFY command applies when the Cardholder Verification Method (CVM)
chosen from the CVM List is an offline PIN, as described in Part II of this book.
The VERIFY command message is coded according to Table I - 24:
Code Value
CLA ‘00’
INS ‘20’
P1 ‘00’
P2 Qualifier of the reference data (see Table I-33)
Lc var.
Data Transaction PIN Data
Le Not present
Table I - 24- VERIFY Command Message
Table I-33 defines the qualifier of the reference data (P2):
b8 b7 B6 b5 b4 b3 B2 b1 Meaning
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 As defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Plaintext PIN, format as defined below
1 0 0 0 0 x x x RFU for this specification
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Enciphered PIN, format as defined in
Book 2
1 0 0 0 1 0 x x RFU for this specification
1 0 0 0 1 1 x x RFU for the individual payment
systems
1 0 0 1 x x x x RFU for the issuer
Table I - 25- VERIFY Command qualifier of reference data (P2)
The processing of the VERIFY command in the ICC will be defined in combination
with the CVM rules as specified in Part II of this book.
1 The value of P2 = ‘00’ is not used by this specification.

The plaintext offline PIN block shall be formatted as follows:
C N P P P P P/F P/F P/F P/F P/F P/F P/F P/F F F
where:
Name Value
C Control field Binary 2 (hex. 0010)
N PIN length 4-bit binary number with permissible values of hex.
0100 to hex. 1100
P PIN digit 4-bit field with permissible values of hex. 0000 to
hex. 1001
P/F PIN/filler Determined by PIN length
F Filler 4-bit binary number with value of hex. 1111
P2 = ‘00’ indicates that no particular qualifier is used. The processing of the

VERIFY command in the ICC should know how to find the PIN data
unambiguously.
The data field of the command message contains the value field of tag ‘99’.
When for the currently selected application the comparison between the Transaction
PIN Data and the reference PIN data performed by the VERIFY command fails, the
ICC shall return SW2 = ‘Cx’, where ‘x’ represents the number of retries still possible.
When the card returns ‘C0’, no more retries are left, and the CVM shall be blocked.
Any subsequent VERIFY command applied in the context of that application shall
then fail with SW1 SW2 = ‘6983’.
Part II
Debit and Credit Application
Specification
December, 2000 Files for Financial Transaction Interchange 29
3 Files for Financial Transaction Interchange

The description of the file structure and commands for accessing the files is found in
Book 1, Part II (for the Application Selection) and Part I of this book for the
application elementary files . The definition of each of the data objects is defined in
Annex A. The payment system or issuer will map the appropriate data objects to
files according to their needs, subject to the following restrictions:
• All files accessible using the READ RECORD command as defined in the Card
Specification containing data objects defined in the Card Specification shall use
short file identifiers (SFIs) in the range 1 to 10. These files:
− Shall be linear files readable using the READ RECORD command as described
in the Card Specification.
− May contain multiple records. Each record is limited to 254 bytes, including tag
and length.
− Each record shall be coded as a constructed data object. The tag of the
constructed data object shall be ‘70’ indicating a template proprietary to this
specification, and the length field shall contain the total length of the
encapsulated data objects.
− Shall contain only data objects defined in this specification and coded in
accordance with the Basic Encoding Rules - Tag Length Value (BER-TLV)
described in Annex B.
− May have access conditions to be satisfied for updates, but must be readable
unconditionally.
• Files with SFIs in the range 11 to 20 are reserved for proprietary data to be
specified by the individual payment systems.
• Files with SFIs in the range 21 to 30 are reserved for proprietary data to be
specified by the issuer.
• The Application File Locator (AFL) determines the files and records to be used
for processing a transaction. The use of the AFL is described in section 6.2. The
data objects listed in Table II - 1 are used by the offline data authentication
algorithm and, when present, should be located in the first record referenced by
the AFL.2
2This allows the terminal to optionally perform the hashing necessary for data
authentication in parallel with reading and parsing of data for other purposes.
30 Files for Financial Transaction Interchange December, 2000
Tag Value
‘8F’ Certification Authority Public Key Index
‘90’ Issuer Public Key Certificate
Table II - 1 - Data Objects Used by the Offline Data Authentication Algorithm
Additional information may be found in complementary payment system

documentation.
3.1 Mandatory Data Objects

Table II - 2 lists the data objects that must be present in the ICC in files read using
the READ RECORD command. All other data objects defined in this specification to
be resident in such files in the card are optional.
Tag Value Presence

‘5F24’ Application Expiration Date M
‘5A’ Application Primary Account Number M
(PAN)
‘8C’ Card Risk Management Data Object List 1 M
‘8D’ Card Risk Management Data Object List 2 M
Table II - 2 - Mandatory Data Objects
Table II - 3 lists the data objects that must be present if the ICC supports offline
static data authentication. Table II - 4 lists the data objects that must be present if
the ICC supports offline dynamic data authentication.3 Offline data authentication
is required to support offline transactions but is optional in cards that support only
online transactions.
Tag Value
‘93’ Signed Static Application Data
‘92’ Issuer Public Key Remainder
‘9F32’ Issuer Public Key Exponent
Table II - 3 - Data Required for Offline Static Data Authentication
3The exception may be that the Issuer Public Key Remainder or the ICC Public Key
Remainder could be absent. This is because if the public key modulus can be
recovered in its entirety from the public key certificate there is no need for a
remainder.
Tag Value
‘92’ Issuer Public Key Remainder
‘9F32’ Issuer Public Key Exponent
‘9F46’ ICC Public Key Certificate
‘9F47’ ICC Public Key Exponent
‘9F48’ ICC Public Key Remainder
‘9F49’ Dynamic Data Authentication Data Object
List (DDOL)4
Table II - 4 - Data Required for Offline Dynamic Data Authentication
3.2 Data Retrievable by GET DATA Command

Data objects listed in Table II - 5 are not retrievable by the READ RECORD
command but are retrieved by the terminal using the GET DATA command as
described in the Card Specification.
Of the objects listed here, only the Application Transaction Counter (ATC) is a
mandatory data object, and it can be retrieved by either the GET DATA command or
in the response to a GENERATE APPLICATION CRYPTOGRAM (AC) command.
The terminal retrieves the ATC via the GET DATA command only if the ICC
contains the Lower Consecutive Offline Limit and Upper Consecutive Offline Limit
data objects. If the issuer does not wish terminal velocity checking to be performed
and omits these data objects, the ICC does not need to support the GET DATA
command.
Tag Value Presence

‘9F36’ Application Transaction Counter (ATC) M
‘9F17’ PIN Try Counter O
‘9F13’ Last Online ATC Register O
Table II - 5 - Data Objects Retrievable by GET DATA Command
4In case the DDOL is not present in the card, the Default DDOL shall be used in
stead.
32 Files for Financial Transaction Interchange December, 2000
3.3 Data Retrievable by GET PROCESSING OPTIONS

Data objects listed in Table II - 6 are not retrievable by the READ RECORD
command but are retrieved by the terminal using the GET PROCESSING OPTIONS
command as described in Table II - 6 defines the data returned, not the format of
the response; Part I Data Field Returned in the Response Message describes the
format of the data when returned by the GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command.
Tag Value Presence

‘82’ Application Interchange Profile M
‘94’ Application File Locator M
Table II - 6 - Data Retrievable by GET PROCESSING OPTIONS
3.4 Erroneous or Missing Data in the ICC

Data objects in the card are classified in section 3.1 as either mandatory or optional.
However, some optional data objects must be present to support optional functions
selected by the issuer or must be present to avoid inconsistencies if other related
data objects are present.
When any mandatory data object is missing, the terminal terminates the
transaction. When an optional data object is required because of the existence of
other data objects or to support functions that must be performed due to the setting
of bits in the Application Interchange Profile, the terminal sets to ‘1’ the ‘ICC data
missing’ indicator in the TVR.
Table II - 7 summarises the conditions under which this bit should be set to ‘1’. If
none of the conditions in Table II- 7 apply, the bit shall be set to ‘0’. The setting of
this bit is in addition to any other actions specified in other sections of this
document.
Name Tag ‘ICC Data Missing’ Shall Be Set If ...

Application ‘9F36’ ATC is not returned by GET DATA command and
Transaction Counter both Lower and Upper Consecutive Offline Limit
(ATC) data objects are present
Cardholder ‘8E’ Not present and AIP indicates that cardholder
Verification Method verification is supported
(CVM) List
Certification Authority ‘8F’ Not present and AIP indicates offline static or
Public Key Index dynamic data authentication is supported
Issuer Public Key ‘90’ Not present and AIP indicates offline static or
Certificate dynamic data authentication is supported
Issuer Public Key ‘9F32’ Not present and AIP indicates offline static or
Exponent dynamic data authentication is supported
Issuer Public Key ‘92’ Not present and AIP indicates offline static or
Remainder dynamic data authentication is supported and the
‘length of the Issuer Public Key’, as recovered
from the Issuer Public Key Certificate, indicates
that there was insufficient space for the entire
Issuer’s Public Key in the certificate
Last Online ‘9F13’ Last Online ATC Register is not returned by GET
Application DATA command and both Lower and Upper
Transaction Counter Consecutive Offline Limits are present
(ATC) Register
Signed Static ‘93’ Not present and AIP indicates offline static data
Application Data authentication is supported
ICC Public Key ‘9F46’ Not present and AIP indicates offline dynamic
Certificate data authentication is supported
Exponent data authentication is supported
Remainder data authentication is supported and the ‘length
of the ICC Public Key’, as recovered from the ICC
Public Key Certificate, indicates that there was
insufficient space for the entire ICC’s Public Key
in the certificate
Table II - 7 - ICC Data Missing Indicator Setting
It is up to the issuer to ensure that data in the card is of the correct format, and no
format checking other than that specifically defined is mandated on the part of the
terminal. However, if in the course of normal processing the terminal recognises
that data is incorrectly formatted (for example, constructed data objects that do not
parse correctly), the terminal shall terminate processing. This rule includes (but is
not limited to):
I. Constructed data objects that do not parse correctly.

II. Dates that are out of range (for example, months that are not in the range 1
to 12).
III. Other data that must be in a specific range of values but are not.
IV. CVM Lists with no Cardholder Verification Rules.
V. Multiple occurrences of a data object that should only appear once.
VI. An AFL with no entries.
VII. An AFL entry with invalid syntax, that is, any one or more of the following:
1. An SFI of 0 or 31.
2. A starting record number of 0.
3. An ending record number less than the starting record number (byte 3
< byte 2).
4. Number of records participating in offline data authentication greater
than the number of records (byte 4 > byte 3 - byte 2 + 1).
34 Transaction Flow December, 2000
4 Transaction Flow
The Application Interchange Profile specifies the application functions that are
supported by the card. The terminal shall attempt to execute only those
functions that the ICC supports.
Book 1 describes all functionality outside the application layer, including the
selection of the application. The functions described here begin after application
selection has taken place.
The remainder of this book deals with the terminal-to-ICC dialogue on the level
of the application logical functions. Two transaction flows are described:
• Section 6 Functions used in Transaction Processing.
• Annex D Transaction Processing for Chip Electronic Commerce
4.1 Exception Handling

Exceptions to normal processing are described in the Application Specification for
specific status codes returned in the status bytes (SW1, SW2) or for missing data.
Unless otherwise specified in the Application Specification, any SW1 SW2
returned by the transport layer to the application layer other than ‘9000’, ‘63Cx’,
or ‘6283’ shall cause termination of the transaction.5 This requirement applies to
the Application Specification but does not apply to the application selection
process..
4.2 Example Flowchart

The flowchart in Figure II-8 gives an example of a transaction flow that may be
used by a terminal for a normal purchase transaction. This flowchart is only an
example, and the order of processing may differ from that given here. All
restrictions on the order of processing are provided in section 6 and Annex D.
5Other actions may be taken by prior agreement but are outside the scope of this
specification.
December, 2000 Transaction Flow 35
Initiate
Application
Read
Application
Data
In this example, Terminal

Data Risk Management is Terminal Risk
Authentication performed in parallel Management
with other functions.
Processing
Restrictions
Cardholder
Verification
Terminal
Action Analysis
Card Action
Analysis
Online
Online /
Offline Online
Processing &
Decision Issuer
Authentication
Offline
Script
Completion
Processing
Figure II- 1 - Transaction Flow Example

36 Transaction Flow December, 2000
4.3 Additional Functions

Provision has been made in this specification for additional functions beyond
those described here. Such additional functions may be:
• Future additions to this specification
• Proprietary functions implemented by local or national agreement or by the

individual payment systems
The Application Interchange Profile indicates the functions supported in the ICC
according to this specification. Most of the bits in this data object are reserved
for future use (RFU). When a new function is added, a bit in the Application
Interchange Profile will be allocated to indicate support for the new function, and
this specification will be updated to specify the new function and where it fits
into the transaction flow.
Proprietary functions may be added to the terminal and the ICC application as
long as they do not interfere with processing of terminals and ICCs not
implementing the function. For example, offline dynamic data authentication
based on symmetric keys may be added at local option. Such proprietary
functions, while not described in this specification, are not precluded, as long as
the functions specified herein continue to be supported for ICCs not
implementing the proprietary functions.
December, 2000 Generate AC Command Coding 37
5 GENERATE AC Command Coding

The GENERATE AC command format and response codes are described fully in
section 2.5.5. This section describes how the various options and data elements
are used in transaction processing. Figure II- 2 and Figure II- 3 depict the
interaction between the terminal decisions, ICC decisions, issuer approval, the
GENERATE AC command, and the possible ICC responses. Figure II- 2 describes
the overall flow; Figure II- 3 provides the additional logic for referral
transactions.
The complete transaction flow is not shown in these charts, only the GENERATE
AC commands, responses, and associated decisions.
38 Generate AC Command Coding December, 2000
Earlier
Processing
Reject Terminal Approve

Offline Decision Offline
Online
Terminal Terminal
Terminal
Requests Requests
Requests TC
AAC ARQC
Card
Card Card
responds Reject Refer Online Offline
decision decision
with AAC
Approve Reject
Online Refer
Card Card Card Card

responds responds responds responds
with ARQC with AAR with TC with AAC
Referral
Completed Processing
No
Online? (see Figure 6)
Authorization
TAC/IAC-
Approve Reject Response
Default
Code
Reject Approve
Terminal
Terminal
requests
requests TC
AAC
Card
Card
returns TC
returns AAC
or AAC
Figure II- 2 - Use of GENERATE AC Options

Card initiates
referral processing
External procedures
may take effect.
See payment systems
documentation.
Terminal Terminal
selects Offline supplies Auth.
option Response Code
Online
Using AAR Terminal

Auth Resp
as ARQC, go Reject Requests
Code
online AAC
Approve
Online Auth
Terminal
Response Approve
Requests TC
Code
Reject
Request Card Card

Reject
AAC Option returns AAC
Approve
Card Card
returns AAC returns TC
Figure II- 3 - Use of GENERATE AC with Referrals

5.1 Command Parameters

The GENERATE AC command parameters provide three different options to the
terminal:
• Request for the generation of a TC
• Request for the generation of an ARQC
• Request for the generation of an AAC
5.2 Command Data

The data field of the GENERATE AC command is not TLV encoded, so it is
imperative that the ICC know the format of this data when the command is
received. This is achieved by allowing the ICC to specify the format of the data to
be included in the command. This section describes how the ICC makes that
specification.
5.2.1 Card Risk Management Data

The Card Risk Management Data Object List (CDOL) is a data object in the ICC
that provides to the terminal a list of data objects that must be passed from the
terminal to the ICC in the GENERATE AC command. There shall be two CDOLs
in the ICC, referred to as CDOL1 (tag ‘8C’) and CDOL2 (tag ‘8D’). CDOL1 is
used with the first GENERATE AC command, and CDOL2 is used with the
second GENERATE AC command (if used). The terminal uses the appropriate
CDOL and the rules specified in section 1.4 (see ‘Rules for Processing Data
Object Lists (DOLs)’) to build the appropriate data field for the command. It is
the responsibility of the terminal to ensure that current data is used in building
the GENERATE AC command. To this end, the command data should be built
immediately prior to issuing the GENERATE AC command.
5.2.2 Transaction Certificate Data

A CDOL may request a TC Hash Value to be included in the command data of a
GENERATE AC command. The TDOL is a data object that provides to the
terminal a list of data objects to be used in generating the TC Hash Value. The
ICC may contain the TDOL, but there may be a default TDOL in the terminal,
specified by the payment system, for use in case the TDOL is not present in the
ICC. To create the hash value, the terminal shall use the TDOL (if present) or
the default TDOL to create the appropriate value for input to the hash algorithm,
applying the rules specified in section 1.4 (see ‘Rules for Processing Data Object
Lists (DOLs)’). If the default TDOL is used, the terminal shall set to ‘1’ the
‘Default TDOL used’ bit in the TVR. If a default TDOL is required but is not
present in the terminal, a default TDOL with no data objects in the list shall be
assumed.
If the terminal issues a second GENERATE AC command during the processing

of a transaction, the terminal shall ensure that the data provided in the TC Hash
Value is current at the time the command is issued.
5.3 Command Use

Either one or two GENERATE AC commands are issued during the processing of
a transaction according to this specification.
The ICC shall respond to the first GENERATE AC command with any of the
following:
• TC
• ARQC
• AAR
• AAC
The ICC shall respond to a second GENERATE AC command with either a TC or

an AAC.
The possible responses listed above are in hierarchical order, with a TC being the
highest and an AAC being the lowest. The terminal may request a TC, an
ARQC, or an AAC. If the ICC responds with a cryptogram at a higher level, this
indicates a logic error in the ICC. If this occurs after the first GENERATE AC
command in a transaction, the transaction shall be terminated. If it occurs after
the second GENERATE AC command, all processing for the transaction has been
completed, and the cryptogram returned shall be treated as an AAC.
5.3.1 GENERATE AC (First Issuance)

The terminal completes its online/offline decision process with a GENERATE AC
command (see section 2.5.5). The form of the command depends upon the
decision made by the terminal:
• If the terminal decides the transaction might be completed offline, it requests

a TC from the ICC. The ICC shall reply with a TC, an ARQC, an AAR, or an
AAC, depending upon its own analysis of the transaction.
• If the terminal decides the transaction should go online, it requests an ARQC

from the ICC. The ICC shall reply with an ARQC, an AAR, or an AAC.
• If the terminal decides to reject the transaction, it requests an AAC from the
ICC. The ICC shall reply with an AAC.
If the ICC responds with a TC or an AAC, the terminal completes the transaction
offline.
If the ICC responds with an AAR, the terminal either provides an Authorisation
Response Code and proceeds to the completion function or uses the AAR to go
online. See Figure II – 3 for referral processing logic.
If the ICC responds with an ARQC, the terminal attempts to go online, sending
an authorisation request message to the issuer. Included in the authorisation
request message is the ARQC for online card authentication.
5.3.2 GENERATE AC (Second Issuance)

Whether the terminal receives an authorisation response message as a result of
online processing or an approval or rejection by using the Issuer Action Code -
Default, it completes the transaction by requesting either a TC (in the case an
approval was obtained) or an AAC (in case the issuer’s instruction is to reject the
transaction) from the ICC. If a TC was requested, the ICC shall reply with either
a TC or an AAC. If an AAC was requested, the card shall reply with an AAC.
The ICC shall permit at most two GENERATE AC commands in a transaction.

If the terminal issues more than two, the third and all succeeding GENERATE
AC commands shall end with SW1 SW2 = ‘6985’, and no cryptogram shall be
returned.
December, 2000 Functions Used in Transaction Processing 43
6 Functions Used in Transaction Processing
6.1 Initiate Application Processing

Purpose:
Inform the ICC that the processing of a new transaction is beginning and provide
to the ICC the terminal information about the transaction. Obtain from the ICC
the Application Interchange Profile and a list of files that contain the ICC data to
be used in processing the transaction, and determine whether the transaction is
allowed.
Conditions of Execution:
The terminal shall always execute this function.
Sequence of Execution:
This is the first function performed after application selection.
Description:
The terminal sets all bits in the Transaction Status Information (TSI) and the
Terminal Verification Results (TVR) to ‘0’.6
The Processing Options Data Object List (PDOL) is a list of tags and lengths of
terminal-resident data elements needed by the ICC in processing the GET
PROCESSING OPTIONS command. Only data elements identified in the Card
Specification as having the terminal as the source of the data may be referenced
in the PDOL.
If the PDOL does not exist, the GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command uses a
command data field of ‘8300’, indicating that the length of the value field in the
command data is 0.
If the PDOL exists, the terminal extracts the PDOL from the FCI of the ADF and
uses it to create a concatenated list of data elements without tags or lengths.
The rules specified in section 1.4 (see ‘Rules for Processing a Data Object List
(DOL)’) apply to processing of the PDOL. If an amount field (either Amount,
Authorised or Amount, Other) is referenced in the PDOL and the terminal is
unable to provide the amount at this point in transaction processing, the amount
field in the data element list shall be filled with hexadecimal zeroes.
The terminal issues the GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command using either
the command data field of ‘8300’ (if there was no PDOL in the ICC) or a data
object constructed with a tag of ‘83’ and the appropriate length according to
6 There may be some exceptions in the timing for this. For example, these bits
could be set to ‘0’ at the completion of the previous transaction or prior to
application selection of this transaction. The intent here is that the processing
steps as described in the Application Specification presume the bits have been
initialised to ‘0’.
44 Functions Used in Transaction Processing December, 2000
BER-TLV encoding rules and a value field that is the concatenated list of data
elements resulting from processing the PDOL. The card returns either:
• The Application Interchange Profile, the Application File Locator (identifying

the files and records containing the data to be used for the transaction), and
status SW1 SW2 = ‘9000’, or
• Status SW1 SW2 = ‘6985’ (‘Conditions of use not satisfied’), indicating that
the transaction cannot be performed with this application.
The format of the response message is given in section 2.5.8.
If the status words ‘6985’ are returned, the terminal shall eliminate the current
application from consideration and return to the application selection function to
select another application.
6.2 Read Application Data

Purpose:
Data contained in files in the ICC are required by the terminal to perform the
various functions used in transaction processing as described in this section. The
terminal must read this data from the ICC.
The read application data function is performed immediately following the
initiate application function.
Description:
The terminal shall read the files and records indicated in the Application File
Locator using the READ RECORD command identifying the file by its SFI. If an
error prevents the terminal from reading data from the ICC, the transaction
shall be terminated (see section 4.1).
The AFL is a list identifying the files and records to be used in the processing of a
transaction. The terminal is to read only the records named in the AFL. Each
element of the list corresponds to a file to be read and is structured as follows:
• The first byte codes the SFI in the five most significant bits. The three least
significant bits of the first byte shall be set to zero.
• The second byte codes the first (or only) record number to be read for that SFI.
The second byte shall never be set to zero.
• The third byte codes the last record number to be read for that SFI. Its value
is either greater than or equal to the second byte. When the third byte is
greater than the second byte, all the records ranging from the record number
in the second byte to and including the record number in the third byte shall
be read for that SFI. When the third byte is equal to the second byte, only the
record number coded in the second byte shall be read for that SFI.
• The fourth byte codes the number of records involved in offline data
authentication starting with the record number coded in the second byte. The
fourth byte may range from zero to the value of the third byte less the value of
the second byte plus 1.
The terminal shall process each entry in the AFL from left to right. A READ
RECORD command as described in section 2.5.11 shall be issued for each record
between the starting record number and the ending record number, inclusively.
Any SW1 SW2 other than ‘9000’ passed to the application layer as a result of
reading any record shall cause the transaction to be terminated. Records
specified in the AFL to be included in offline data authentication shall be
processed as described in section 6.3.
The terminal shall store all recognised data objects read, whether mandatory or
optional, for later use in the transaction processing. Data objects that are not
recognised by the terminal (that is, their tags are unknown by the terminal) shall
not be stored, but records containing such data objects may still participate in
their entirety in offline data authentication, depending upon the coding of the
AFL.
All mandatory data objects shall be present in the card. If any mandatory data
objects are not present, the terminal shall terminate the transaction.
Redundant primitive data objects are not permitted. If the terminal encounters
more than one occurrence of a single primitive data object while reading data
from the ICC, the transaction shall be terminated.
Proprietary data files may or may not conform to this specification. Records in
proprietary files may be represented in the AFL and may participate in offline
data authentication if they are readable without conditions by the READ
RECORD command coded according to the Card Specification. Otherwise, the
reading and processing of proprietary files is beyond the scope of this
specification.
6.3 Offline Data Authentication

Purpose:
Offline data authentication is performed as specified in Book 2. This
specification describes how it is determined whether offline data authentication
will be performed, what kind of authentication will be performed, and how the
success or failure of authentication affects the transaction flow and data recorded
in the TVR and TSI.
Availability of data in the ICC to support offline data authentication is optional;
its presence is indicated in the Application Interchange Profile. If both the
terminal and the ICC support offline data authentication, the terminal shall
perform this function. Depending on the capabilities of the card and the
terminal, either offline static data authentication or dynamic data authentication

may be performed but not both.
If both of the following are true, the terminal shall perform the Combined
Dynamic Data Authentication/Application Cryptogram Generation as specified in
Book 2:
• The Application Interchange Profile indicates that the card supports the
Combined Dynamic Data Authentication/Application Cryptogram Generation.
• The terminal supports the Combined Dynamic Data

Authentication/Application Cryptogram Generation.
If all of the following are true, the terminal shall perform offline dynamic data
authentication as specified in Book 2:
• The Application Interchange Profile indicates that the card supports offline
dynamic data authentication.
• The terminal supports offline dynamic data authentication.
• Either the card or terminal (or both) does not support Combined Dynamic
Data Authentication/Application Cryptogram Generation.
If all of the following are true, the terminal shall perform offline static data
authentication as specified in the Card Specification:
• The Application Interchange Profile indicates that the card supports offline
static data authentication.
• The terminal supports offline static data authentication.
• Either the card or the terminal (or both) does not support offline dynamic
data authentication
• Either the card or terminal (or both) does not support Combined Dynamic
Data Authentication/Application Cryptogram Generation.
If neither offline static data authentication nor offline dynamic data

authentication is performed, the terminal shall set the ‘Offline data
authentication was not performed’ bit to ‘1’ in the TVR.
The terminal shall perform offline data authentication in any order after Read
Application Data but before completion of the terminal action analysis.
Description:
Offline static data authentication authenticates static data put into the card by
the issuer. Offline dynamic data authentication authenticates ICC-resident data,
data from the terminal, and the card itself.
Input to the authentication process is formed from the records identified by the
AFL, followed by the data elements identified by the optional Static Data
Authentication Tag List (tag ‘9F4A’).
Only those records identified in the AFL as participating in offline data

authentication are to be processed. Records are processed in the same sequence
in which they appear within AFL entries. The records identified by a single AFL
entry are to be processed in record number sequence. The first record begins the
input for the authentication process, and each succeeding record is concatenated
at the end of the previous record.
The data from each record to be included in the offline data authentication input
depends upon the SFI of the file from which the record was read.
• For files with SFI in the range 1 to 10, the record tag (‘70’) and the record
length are excluded from the offline data authentication process. All other
data in the data field of the response to the READ RECORD command
(excluding SW1 SW2) is included.
• For files with SFI 11-30, all data in the data field (excluding SW1 SW2) is
included.
The bytes of the record are included in the concatenation in the order in which
they appear in the command response.
After all records identified by the AFL have been processed, the Static Data
Authentication Tag List is processed, if it exists. If the Static Data
Authentication Tag List exists, it shall contain only the tag for the Application
Interchange Profile. The tag must represent the AIP available in the current
application. The value field of the AIP is to be concatenated to the current end of
the input string. The tag and length of the AIP are not included in the
concatenation.
Building of the input list for offline data authentication is considered the first
step in the offline data authentication process. If the input cannot be built
because of a violation of one of the above rules but offline data authentication
should be performed according to the ‘Conditions of Execution’ above, offline data
authentication shall be considered to have been performed and to have failed;
that is, the terminal shall set to ‘1’ the ‘Offline data authentication was
performed’ bit in the TSI and the appropriate ‘Offline static data authentication
failed’ or ‘Offline dynamic authentication failed’ bit shall be set in the TVR.
See Book 2 for additional steps to be performed for offline data authentication. If
offline static data authentication is performed but is unsuccessful, the ‘Offline
static data authentication failed’ bit shall be set to ‘1’ in the TVR, otherwise it
shall be set to ‘0’.
If offline dynamic data authentication is performed but is unsuccessful, the

‘Offline dynamic data authentication failed’ bit shall be set to ‘1’ in the TVR,
otherwise it shall be set to ‘0’.
If the Combined Dynamic Data Authentication/Application Cryptogram

Generation is performed but is unsuccessful, the ‘Combined Dynamic Data
Authentication/Application Cryptogram Generation‘ bit shall be set to ‘1’ in the
TVR, otherwise it shall be set to ‘0’.
Upon completion of the offline data authentication function, the terminal shall
set to ‘1’ the ‘Offline data authentication was performed’ bit in the TSI.
6.4 Processing Restrictions

Purpose:
The purpose of the processing restrictions function is to determine the degree of
compatibility of the application in the terminal with the application in the ICC
and to make any necessary adjustments, including possible rejection of the
transaction.
Functions described here may be performed at any time after Read Application
Data and prior to completion of the terminal action analysis.
Description:
The processing restrictions function is described as comprising the following
compatibility checks:
• Application Version Number
• Application Usage Control
• Application Effective/Expiration Dates Checking
6.4.1 Application Version Number

The application within both the terminal and the ICC shall maintain an
Application Version Number assigned by the payment system. The terminal
shall use the version number in the ICC to ensure compatibility. If the
Application Version Number is not present in the ICC, the terminal shall
presume the terminal and ICC application versions are compatible, and
transaction processing shall continue. If the Application Version Number is
present in the ICC, it shall be compared to the Application Version Number
maintained in the terminal. If they are different, the ‘ICC and terminal have
different application versions’ bit shall be set to ‘1’ in the TVR.
6.4.2 Application Usage Control

The Application Usage Control indicates restrictions limiting the application
geographically or to certain types of transactions. If this data object is present,
the terminal shall make the following checks:
• If the transaction is being conducted at an ATM, the ‘Valid at ATMs’ bit must
be on in Application Usage Control.
• If the transaction is not being conducted at an ATM, the ‘Valid at terminals

other than ATMs’ bit must be on in Application Usage Control.
If the Application Usage Control and Issuer Country Code are both present in the
ICC, the terminal shall make the following checks:
• If the Transaction Type indicates that this is a cash transaction and the
Issuer Country Code matches the Terminal Country Code, the ‘Valid for
domestic cash transactions’ bit must be on in Application Usage Control.
• If the Transaction Type indicates that this is a cash transaction and the
Issuer Country Code does not match the Terminal Country Code, the ‘Valid
for international cash transactions’ bit must be on in Application Usage
Control.
• If the Transaction Type indicates a purchase of goods and the Issuer Country
Code matches the Terminal Country Code, the ‘Valid for domestic goods’ bit
must be on in Application Usage Control.
• If the Transaction Type indicates a purchase of goods and the Issuer Country
Code does not match the Terminal Country Code, the ‘Valid for international
goods’ bit must be on in Application Usage Control.
• If the Transaction Type indicates a purchase of services and the Issuer

Country Code matches the Terminal Country Code, the ‘Valid for domestic
services’ bit must be on in Application Usage Control.
• If the Transaction Type indicates a purchase of services and the Issuer

Country Code does not match the Terminal Country Code, the ‘Valid for
international services’ bit must be on in Application Usage Control.
• If the transaction has a cashback amount and the Issuer Country Code
matches the Terminal Country Code, the ‘Domestic cashback allowed’ bit
must be on in Application Usage Control.
• If the transaction has a cashback amount and the Issuer Country Code does
not match the Terminal Country Code, the ‘International cashback allowed’
bit must be on in Application Usage Control.
If any of the above tests fail, the ‘Requested service not allowed for card product’
bit shall be set to ‘1’ in the TVR.
6.4.3 Application Effective/Expiration Dates Checking

If the Application Effective Date is present in the ICC, the terminal shall check
that the current date is greater than or equal to the Application Effective Date.
If it is not, the ‘Application not yet effective’ bit shall be set to ‘1’ in the TVR. The
terminal shall check that the current date is less than or equal to the Application
Expiration Date. If it is not, the ‘Expired application’ bit shall be set to ‘1’ in the
TVR.
6.5 Cardholder Verification

Purpose:
Cardholder verification is performed to ensure that the person presenting the
ICC is the person to whom the application in the card was issued.
Ability of the ICC to support at least one cardholder verification method is
indicated in the Application Interchange Profile. If this bit is set to ‘1’, the
terminal shall use the cardholder verification related data in the ICC to
determine whether one of the issuer-specified cardholder verification methods
(CVMs) shall be executed. This process is described below.
This function may be performed any time after Read Application Data and before
completion of the terminal action analysis.
Description:
The CVM List (tag ‘8E’) is a composite data object consisting of the following:
1. An amount field (4 bytes, binary format), referred to as ‘X’ in the CVM

Condition Codes (see Annex C.3 - Cardholder Verification Rule Format). ‘X’ is
expressed in the Application Currency Code with implicit decimal point. For
example, 123 (hexadecimal ‘7B’) represents £1.23 when the currency code is
‘826’.
2. A second amount field (4 bytes, binary format), referred to as ‘Y’ in the CVM
Condition Codes (see Annex C.3 - Cardholder Verification Rule Format). ‘Y’ is
expressed in Application Currency Code with implicit decimal point. For
example, 123 (hexadecimal ‘7B’) represents £1.23 when the currency code is
‘826’.
3. A variable-length list of two-byte data elements called Cardholder

Verification Rules (CVRs). Each CVR describes a CVM and the conditions
under which that CVM should be applied (see Annex C.3 - Cardholder
Verification Rule Format).
If the CVM List is not present in the ICC, the terminal shall terminate
cardholder verification without setting the ‘Cardholder verification was
performed’ bit in the TSI.
If the CVM List is present in the ICC, the terminal shall process each rule in the
order in which it appears in the list according to the following specifications.
Cardholder verification is completed when any one CVM is successfully
performed or when the list is exhausted.
If any of the following are true:
• The conditions expressed in the second byte of a CVR are not satisfied, or
• The ICC data required by the condition (for example, the Application
Currency Code) is not present, or
• The CVM Condition Code is outside the range of codes understood by the
terminal (which might occur if the terminal application program is at a
different version level than the ICC application),
the terminal shall bypass the rule and proceed to the next. If there are no more
CVRs in the list, cardholder verification has not been successful, and the
terminal shall set the ‘Cardholder verification was not successful’ bit to ‘1’ in the
TVR.
If the conditions expressed in the second byte of a CVR are satisfied, the terminal
shall attempt to perform the CVM if the CVM code is one of those listed in Annex
A or is otherwise understood by the terminal. If the conditions expressed in the
second byte of a CVR are satisfied, but the CVM is not among those listed and is
not understood by the terminal, the terminal shall set the ‘Unrecognised CVM’
bit to ‘1’ in the TVR.
If the CVM is performed successfully, cardholder verification is complete and

successful. Otherwise, the terminal shall then examine b7 of byte 1 of the CVM
field. If b7 is set to ‘1’, processing continues with the next CVR, if one is present.
If b7 is set to ‘0’, or there are no more CVRs in the list, the terminal shall set the
‘Cardholder verification was not successful’ bit to ‘1’ in the TVR and cardholder
verification is complete.
When cardholder verification is completed, the ‘Cardholder verification was

performed’ bit in TSI shall be set to ‘1’.
6.5.1 Offline PIN Processing

This section applies to the verification by the ICC of a plaintext or enciphered
PIN presented by the terminal.
If an offline PIN is the selected CVM as determined by the above process, offline
PIN processing may not be successfully performed for any one of the following
reasons:
• The terminal does not support offline PIN7. In this case, the terminal shall
set to ‘1’ the ‘PIN entry required and PIN pad not present or not working’ bit
in the TVR.
7 This means that the terminal does not support either offline plaintext PIN
verification or offline enciphered PIN verification. If the terminal supports at
least one of these functions, it is considered to support offline PIN for the
purposes of setting the TVR bits.
• The terminal supports offline PIN, but the PIN pad is malfunctioning. In this
case, the terminal shall set to ‘1’ the ‘PIN entry required and PIN pad not
present or not working’ bit in the TVR.
• The terminal bypassed PIN entry at the direction of either the merchant or
the cardholder8. In this case, the ‘PIN entry required, PIN pad present, but
PIN was not entered’ bit shall be set to ‘1’ in the TVR. The terminal shall
consider this CVM unsuccessful, shall not set the CVM Results, and shall
continue cardholder verification processing in accordance with the card’s
CVM List.
• The PIN is blocked upon initial use of the VERIFY command (the ICC returns
SW1 SW2 = ‘6983’ or ‘6984’ in response to the VERIFY command). In this
case, the ‘PIN Try Limit exceeded’ bit shall be set to ‘1’ in the TVR.
• The number of remaining PIN tries is reduced to zero (indicated by an SW1

SW2 of ‘63C0’ in the response to the VERIFY command). In this case, the
‘PIN Try Limit exceeded’ bit shall be set to ‘1’ in the TVR.
The only case in which offline PIN processing is considered successful is when
the ICC returns an SW1 SW2 of ‘9000’ in response to the VERIFY command.
6.5.2 Online PIN Processing

If online PIN processing is a required CVM as determined by the above process,
the processing may not be successfully performed for any one of the following
reasons:
• The terminal does not support online PIN. In this case, the terminal shall set
to ‘1’ the ‘PIN entry required and PIN pad not present or not working’ bit in
the TVR.
• The terminal supports online PIN, but the PIN pad is malfunctioning. In this
case, the terminal shall set to ‘1’ the ‘PIN entry required and PIN pad not
present or not working’ bit in the TVR.
• The terminal bypassed PIN entry at the direction of either the merchant or
the cardholder. In this case, the ‘PIN entry required, PIN pad present, but
PIN was not entered’ bit shall be set to ‘1’ in the TVR.
If the online PIN is successfully entered, the terminal shall set to ‘1’ the ‘Online
PIN entered’ bit in the TVR. In this case, cardholder verification is considered
successful and complete.
8 Especially for a new cardholder or during conversion to PINs, it is likely that a

cardholder will realize that he or she does not know the PIN. In this case, it is
better to bypass PIN processing with an indication to the issuer of the
circumstances than it is to either terminate the transaction or try numbers until
the PIN try count is exhausted. If the transaction goes online, the issuer can
decide whether to accept the transaction without the PIN.
6.5.3 Signature Processing

If a (paper) signature is a required CVM as determined by the above process, the
terminal shall determine success based upon the terminal’s capability to support
the signature process (see complementary payment systems documentation for
additional information). If the terminal is able to support signature, the process
is considered successful, and cardholder verification is complete.
6.5.4 Combination CVMs

Some CVMs require multiple verification methods (for example, offline PIN plus
signature). For these CVMs, all methods in the CVM must be successful for
cardholder verification to be considered successful.
6.6 Terminal Risk Management

Purpose:
Terminal risk management is that portion of risk management performed by the
terminal to protect the acquirer, issuer, and system from fraud. It provides
positive issuer authorisation for high-value transactions and ensures that
transactions initiated from ICCs go online periodically to protect against threats
that might be undetectable in an offline environment. The result of terminal risk
management is the setting of appropriate bits in the TVR.
Terminal risk management shall be performed if the ‘Terminal risk management
is supported’ bit is set to ‘1’ in the Application Interchange Profile. Random
transaction selection need not be performed by a terminal with no online
capability. If terminal risk management is not performed, sections 6.6.1 through
6.6.3 do not apply.
Terminal risk management may be performed at any time after Read Application
Data but before issuing the first GENERATE AC command.
Description:
Terminal risk management consists of:
• Floor limit checking
• Random transaction selection
• Velocity checking
6.6.1 Floor Limits

To prevent split sales, the terminal may have a transaction log of approved
transactions stored in the terminal consisting of at least the Application PAN
and transaction amount and possibly the Application PAN Sequence Number and
Transaction Date. The number of transactions to be stored and maintenance of
the log is outside the scope of this specification, although to prevent split sales
the number of transactions stored may be quite small.
During terminal risk management floor limit checking, the terminal checks the
transaction log (if available) to determine if there is a log entry with the same
Application PAN, and, optionally, the same Application PAN Sequence Number.
If there are several log entries with the same PAN, the terminal selects the most
recent entry. The terminal adds the Amount, Authorised for the current
transaction to the amount stored in the log for that PAN to determine if the sum
exceeds the Terminal Floor Limit. If the sum is greater than or equal to the
Terminal Floor Limit, the terminal sets the ‘Transaction exceeds floor limit’ bit to
‘1’ in the TVR.
If the terminal does not have a transaction log available or if there is no log entry
with the same PAN, the Amount, Authorised is compared to the appropriate floor
limit. If the amount authorised is equal to or greater than the floor limit, the
‘Transaction exceeds floor limit’ bit is set to ‘1’ in the TVR.
6.6.2 Random Transaction Selection

For each application the relevant payment system specifies, in addition to the
floor limit:
• Target Percentage to be Used for Random Selection (in the range of 0 to 99)
• Threshold Value for Biased Random Selection (which must be zero or a

positive number less than the floor limit)
• Maximum Target Percentage to be Used for Biased Random Selection (also in

the range of 0 to 99 but at least as high as the previous Target Percentage for
Random Selection). This is the desired percentage of transactions ‘just below’
the floor limit that will be selected by this algorithm.
Any transaction with a transaction amount less than the Threshold Value for
Biased Random Selection will be subject to selection at random without further
regard for the value of the transaction. The terminal shall generate a random
number in the range of 1 to 99. If this random number is less than or equal to
the Target Percentage to be Used for Random Selection, the transaction shall be
selected.
Any transaction with a transaction amount equal to or greater than the

Threshold Value for Biased Random Selection but less than the floor limit will be
subject to selection with bias toward sending higher value transactions online
more frequently (biased random selection). For these transactions, the terminal
shall compare its generated random number against a Transaction Target
Percent, which is a linear interpolation of the target percentages provided by the
payment system (Target Percentage to be Used for Random Selection, and
Maximum Target Percentage to be Used for Biased Random Selection).9 If the

random number is less than or equal to the Transaction Target Percent, the
transaction shall be selected.
The probability of selection as a function of the transaction amount may be

charted as shown in Figure II-4:
0
Biased Floor
Selection Limit
Threshold
Figure II- 4 - Random Transaction Selection Example
If the transaction is selected through the process described in this section, the
‘Transaction selected randomly for online processing’ bit shall be set to ‘1’ in the
TVR.
6.6.3 Velocity Checking10

If both the Lower Consecutive Offline Limit (tag ‘9F14’) and Upper Consecutive
Offline Limit (tag ‘9F23’) exist, the terminal shall perform velocity checking as
9 The Transaction Target Percent is calculated as follows:

Amount, Authorised − Threshold Value
Interpolation factor =
Floor Limit − Threshold Value
Transaction Target Percent = ((Maximum Target Percent - Target Percent ) × Interpolation factor )
+ Target Percent
10 The purpose of velocity checking is to allow an issuer to request that, after a

certain number of consecutive offline transactions (the Lower Consecutive Offline
Limit), transactions should be completed online. However, if the terminal is
incapable of going online, transactions may still be completed offline until a
second (Upper Consecutive Offline Limit) limit is reached. After the upper limit
is reached, the recommendation of the issuer might be to reject any transaction
that cannot be completed online. Once a transaction has been completed online
with successful issuer authentication, the count begins anew, so that
transactions may be processed offline until the lower limit is again reached.
described in this section. If either of these data objects is not present in the ICC
application, the terminal shall skip this section.
The ATC and Last Online ATC Register shall be read from the ICC using GET
DATA commands. If either of the required data objects are not returned by the
ICC in response to the GET DATA command, the terminal shall:
• Set both the ‘Lower consecutive offline limit exceeded’ and the ‘Upper
consecutive offline limit exceeded’ bits to ‘1’ in the TVR.
• Not set the ‘New card’ indicator in the TVR.
• End velocity checking for this transaction.
If the required data objects are available, the terminal shall compare the
difference between the ATC and the Last Online ATC Register with the Lower
Consecutive Offline Limit to see if the limit has been exceeded. If the difference
is equal to the Lower Consecutive Offline Limit, this means that the limit has not
yet been exceeded. If the limit has been exceeded, the terminal shall set the
‘Lower consecutive offline limit exceeded’ bit to ‘1’ in the TVR and also compare
the difference with the Upper Consecutive Offline Limit to see if the upper limit
has been exceeded. If it has, the terminal shall set the ‘Upper consecutive offline
limit exceeded’ bit to ‘1’ in the TVR.
The terminal shall also check the Last Online ATC Register for a zero value. If it
is zero, the terminal shall set the ‘New card’ bit to ‘1’ in the TVR.
Upon completion of terminal risk management, the terminal shall set to ‘1’ the
‘Terminal risk management was performed’ bit in the TSI.
6.7 Terminal Action Analysis

Purpose:
Once terminal risk management and application functions related to a normal
offline transaction have been completed, the terminal makes the first decision as
to whether the transaction should be approved offline, declined offline, or
transmitted online. If the outcome of this decision process is to proceed offline,
the terminal issues a GENERATE AC command to ask the ICC to return a TC.
If the outcome of the decision is to go online, the terminal will issue a
GENERATE AC command to ask the ICC for an Authorisation Request
Cryptogram (ARQC). If the decision is to reject the transaction, the terminal will
issue a GENERATE AC to ask for an Application Authentication Cryptogram
(AAC).
An offline decision made here is not final. If the terminal asks for a TC from the
ICC, the ICC, as a result of card risk management, may return an ARQC or AAC.
The terminal action analysis function is always performed.
The terminal action analysis function is performed after terminal risk
management and cardholder- and merchant-entered transaction data has been
completed. It shall be performed prior to the first use of the GENERATE AC
command.
The Issuer Action Code - Default and Terminal Action Code - Default processing
described below shall also be performed after online processing is attempted in
the case where the terminal was unable to process the transaction online.
The terminal action analysis function may be executed at several places during a
transaction to eliminate the need for unnecessary processing. If any processing
results in the setting of a bit in the TVR (for example, failure of cardholder
verification), it may be desirable to perform this function immediately to
determine whether the transaction should be rejected offline based upon the
issuer’s parameters in the ICC or the acquirer’s parameters in the terminal.
Recognition of such a decision early in processing may allow the terminal to
avoid prolonging a transaction that will ultimately be rejected. Multiple
executions of this decision process is optional on the part of the terminal.
Description:
The terminal shall make a preliminary decision to reject the transaction,
complete it online, or complete it offline based upon the TVR, issuer action
preferences, and acquirer action preferences according to the method described in
this section.
The ICC contains (optionally) three data elements to reflect the issuer’s selected
action to be taken based upon the content of the TVR. Each of the three data
elements has defaults specified here in case any of these data elements are
absent from the ICC. The three data elements are:
• Issuer Action Code – Denial
• Issuer Action Code - Online
• Issuer Action Code - Default
Collectively, these three data objects are termed the Issuer Action Codes. The
purpose of each is described in this section below. The format of each is identical
and mirrors the TVR. Each has one bit corresponding to each bit in the TVR, and
the Issuer Action Code bit specifies an action to be taken if the corresponding bit
in the TVR is set to ‘1’. Thus, the size and format of each of the Issuer Action
Codes is identical to the TVR.
Similarly, the terminal may contain three data elements to reflect the acquirer’s
selected action to be taken based upon the content of the TVR. These data
elements are:
• Terminal Action Code - Denial
• Terminal Action Code - Online

• Terminal Action Code - Default
Collectively, these three data objects are termed the Terminal Action Codes. The
purpose of each is described in this section below. The format of each is identical
and mirrors the TVR. Each has one bit corresponding to each bit in the TVR, and
the Terminal Action Code bit specifies an action to be taken if the corresponding
bit in the TVR is set to ‘1’. Thus, the size and format of each of the Terminal
Action Codes is identical to the TVR and to the Issuer Action Codes.
The existence of each of the Terminal Action Codes is optional. In the absence of
any Terminal Action Code, a default value consisting of all bits set to ‘0’ is to be
used in its place. However, it is strongly recommended that as a minimum, the
Terminal Action Code - Online and Terminal Action Code - Default should be
included with the bits corresponding to ‘Offline data authentication was not
performed’, ‘Offline static data authentication failed’, and ‘Offline dynamic data
authentication failed’ set to ‘1’.11
Processing of the action codes is done in pairs, that is, the Issuer Action Code -
Denial is processed together with the Terminal Action Code - Denial, the Issuer
Action Code - Online is processed together with the Terminal Action Code -
Online, and the Issuer Action Code - Default is processed together with the
Terminal Action Code - Default. Processing of the action codes shall be
performed in the order specified here.
If the Issuer Action Code - Denial does not exist, a default value with all bits set
to ‘0’ is to be used. Together, the Issuer Action Code - Denial and the Terminal
Action Code - Denial specify the conditions that cause denial of a transaction
without attempting to go online. If either data object exists, the terminal shall
inspect each bit in the TVR. For each bit in the TVR that has a value of ‘1’, the
terminal shall check the corresponding bits in the Issuer Action Code - Denial
and the Terminal Action Code - Denial. If the corresponding bit in either of the
action codes is set to ‘1’, it indicates that the issuer or the acquirer wishes the
transaction to be rejected offline. In this case, the terminal shall issue a
GENERATE AC command to request from the ICC an AAC. This AAC may be
presented to the issuer to prove card presence during this transaction, but details
of handling a rejected transaction are outside the scope of this specification.
If the Issuer Action Code - Online is not present, a default value with all bits set
to ‘1’ shall be used in its place. Together, the Issuer Action Code - Online and the
Terminal Action Code - Online specify the conditions that cause a transaction to
be completed online. These data objects are meaningful only for terminals
capable of online processing. Offline-only terminals may skip this test and
proceed to checking the Issuer Action Code - Default and Terminal Action Code -
Default, described below. For a terminal capable of online processing, if the
terminal has not already decided to reject the transaction as described above, the
11This protects against a fraudulent card with all the bits in the Issuer Action
Code set to ‘0’. Without this protection, such a card could be created with no
possibility of going online or declining transactions. All transactions would be
approved offline.
terminal shall inspect each bit in the TVR. For each bit in the TVR that has a
value of ‘1’, the terminal shall check the corresponding bits in both the Issuer
Action Code - Online and the Terminal Action Code - Online. If the bit in either
of the action codes is set to ‘1’, the terminal shall complete transaction processing
online and shall issue a GENERATE AC command requesting an ARQC from the
ICC.
If the Issuer Action Code - Default does not exist, a default value with all bits set
to ‘1’ shall be used in its place. Together, the Issuer Action Code - Default and
the Terminal Action Code - Default specify the conditions that cause the
transaction to be rejected if it might have been approved online but the terminal
is for any reason unable to process the transaction online. The Issuer Action
Code - Default and the Terminal Action Code - Default are used only if the Issuer
Action Code - Online and the Terminal Action Code - Online were not used (for
example, in case of an offline-only terminal) or indicated a desire on the part of
the issuer or the acquirer to process the transaction online but the terminal was
unable to go online. If the terminal has not already rejected the transaction and
the terminal is for any reason unable to process the transaction online, the
terminal shall use this code to determine whether to approve or reject the
transaction offline. If any bit in Issuer Action Code - Default or the Terminal
Action Code - Default and the corresponding bit in the TVR are both set to ‘1’, the
transaction shall be rejected and the terminal shall request an AAC to complete
processing. If no such condition appears, the transaction may be approved
offline, and a GENERATE AC command shall be issued to the ICC requesting a
TC.
If Combined DDA/AC Generation is to be performed and the ICC’s CDOL1 does

not include the tag for the Terminal Capability Profile, the terminal shall set the
bit for Combined DDA/AC Generation Requested in the GENERATE AC
command to ‘1’.
6.8 Card Action Analysis

Purpose:
An ICC may perform its own risk management to protect the issuer from fraud or
excessive credit risk. Details of card risk management algorithms within the
ICC are specific to the issuer and are outside the scope of this specification, but
as a result of the risk management process, an ICC may decide to complete a
transaction online or offline or request a referral or reject the transaction. The
ICC may also decide that an advice message should be sent to the issuer to
inform the issuer of an exceptional condition.
The card online/offline decision is specified by its response to the GENERATE AC
command. Therefore, this section applies to all transactions. Whether the ICC
performs any risk management tests is transparent to the terminal and outside
the scope of this specification.
The card action analysis process is performed when the terminal issues the
GENERATE AC command for a given transaction.
Description:
The result of risk management performed by the ICC is a decision for one of the
following actions to be taken by the terminal:
• Approve the transaction offline. This option is available to the ICC only if the
terminal has made a preliminary decision to complete the transaction offline,
as described in section 6.7.
• Complete the transaction online.
• Request a referral.
• Reject the transaction.
The decision by the ICC is made known to the terminal by returning a TC, an
ARQC, an AAR, or an AAC to the terminal in response to a GENERATE AC
command, as described in section 2.5.5.
Upon the completion of the card action analysis function, the terminal shall set to
‘1’ the ‘Card risk management was performed’ bit in the TSI.
6.8.1 Terminal Messages for an AAC

An AAC returned by the card indicates either a rejection of the specific
transaction or a restriction that disallows use of the card in the environment of
the transaction (for example, the card application may be restricted only to
specific merchant categories). In both cases, the card disapproves the
transaction, but the terminal may choose to display different messages in the two
cases. The card may optionally distinguish the cases by the use of the code
returned in the Cryptogram Information Data (see the GENERATE AC
command in section 2.5.5). If an AAC is returned with b3-b1 = ‘001’ in the
Cryptogram Information Data, the AAC was returned due to card restrictions.
6.8.2 Terminal Messages for a TC and ARQC

The ICC determines if the transaction is eligible for combined DDA/AC
generation using one of the following methods:
1. When the Terminal Capabilities Profile is included in the CDOL data, the
ICC considers the transaction eligible for combined DDA/AC generation if
the Combined Dynamic Data Authentication/Application Cryptogram
Generation bit in the Terminal Capabilities Profile is ‘1’ and Combined
DDA/Generate AC bit in the Application Interchange Profile is ‘1’.
2. When the Terminal Capabilities Profile is not included in the CDOL data,
the ICC considers the transaction eligible for combined DDA/AC
generation if Combined DDA/AC Generation Requested bit in the
GENERATE AC command is ‘1’.
If the transaction is eligible for combined DDA/AC generation and the ICC
response is an offline approval (TC) or an online request (ARQC), the ICC shall
return the GENERATE AC response in a public key envelope as specified in Book
2 Section 6.6.
6.8.3 Advice Messages

The issuer may wish for an advice message, separate from either an
authorisation request or a clearing message, to be sent in certain exception cases.
(Currently, the only identified such case is ‘PIN Try Limit exceeded’, but
allowance has been made for the addition of other cases later; see ‘Coding of
Cryptogram Information Data’ in the GENERATE AC command in the Card
Specification).
If b4 of the Cryptogram Information Data is ‘1’, the terminal shall format and
send an advice message. Further information may be found in complementary
payment system documentation and in Book 4.
6.9 Online Processing

Purpose:
Online processing is performed to ensure that the issuer can review and
authorise or reject transactions that are outside acceptable limits of risk defined
by the issuer, the payment system, or the acquirer.
Online processing shall be performed if the ICC returns an ARQC in response to
the first GENERATE AC command for the transaction.
The online processing function is performed when the terminal receives an ARQC
in response to the first GENERATE AC command.
Description:
In general, online processing is the same as today’s online processing of magnetic
stripe transactions and is not described here. This section is limited to the
additional online processing provided in an ICC environment that is not
available in a magnetic stripe environment.
The ARQC may be sent in the authorisation request message.12 The

authorisation response message from the issuer may contain the Issuer
12Actions performed by the acquirer or issuer systems are outside the scope of
this specification. However, an explanation of what is expected to take place at
the issuer may be useful for clarity. The ARQC is a cryptogram generated by the
card from transaction data using an issuer key stored in the card and known at
the issuer authorisation system. The issuer uses this key to authenticate the
ARQC and thereby authenticate the card. This process is termed ‘online card
authentication’ or simply ‘card authentication’.
Authentication Data (tag ‘91’). If the Issuer Authentication Data is received in

the authorisation response message and the Application Interchange Profile
indicates that the ICC supports issuer authentication, the Issuer Authentication
Data shall be sent to the ICC in the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command. If
the ICC responds with SW1 SW2 other than ‘9000’, the ‘Issuer authentication
was unsuccessful’ bit shall be set to ‘1’ in the TVR.
If the Issuer Authentication Data is received but the Application Interchange

Profile indicates that the ICC does not support issuer authentication, this
indicates that the ICC has combined the issuer authentication function with the
GENERATE AC command. In this case, or if no Issuer Authentication Data is
received, the terminal shall not execute the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
command.
The ICC shall permit at most one EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command in a

transaction. If the terminal issues more than one, the second and all succeeding
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE commands shall end with SW1 SW2 = ‘6985’.
Upon completion of online processing, if the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE

command was sent to the card by the terminal, the terminal shall set to ‘1’ the
‘Issuer authentication was performed’ bit in the TSI.
6.10 Issuer-to-Card Script Processing

Purpose:
An issuer may provide command scripts to be delivered to the ICC by the
terminal to perform functions that are not necessarily relevant to the current
transaction but are important for the continued functioning of the application in
the ICC. Multiple scripts may be provided with an authorisation response, and
each may contain any number of Issuer Script Commands. Script processing is
provided to allow for functions that are outside the scope of this specification but
are nonetheless necessary.13
A script may contain Issuer Script Commands not known to the terminal, but the
terminal shall deliver each command to the ICC individually according to this
specification.
None.
Subsequent to card authentication, the issuer may generate a cryptogram on

selected data included in the authorisation response or already known to the
card. This cryptogram is sent to the terminal in the authorisation response as
part of the Issuer Authentication Data. The terminal provides the Issuer
Authentication Data to the ICC in the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command
or the second GENERATE AC command, as described in the Card Specification.
The ICC may use the Issuer Authentication Data to authenticate that the
response message originated from the issuer.
13 An example might be unblocking of an offline PIN, which might be done
differently by various issuers or payment systems.

Two separate script tags are defined that are available for use by the issuer.
Issuer scripts with tag ‘71’ shall be processed prior to issuing the final
GENERATE AC command. Issuer scripts using tag ‘72’ shall be processed after
issuing the final GENERATE AC command.
Description:
An Issuer Script is a constructed data object (tag ‘71’ or ‘72’) containing
(optionally) a Script Identifier and a sequence of Issuer Script Command APDUs
to be delivered serially to the ICC. The Script Identifier is optional and is not
interpreted by the terminal; it is meaningful only to the issuer. Figure II – 5 and
Figure II - 6 illustrate an Issuer Script containing a Script Identifier and three
commands.
T L T L Script ID Commands
‘71’ or L(∑data, including Script ‘9F18’ ‘04’ Identifier (see Figure II –
‘72’ ID, tags, and lengths) (4 bytes) 6 – Issuer
Script
Command
Format (Shown
with Three
Commands))
Figure II - 5- Issuer Script Format
T1 L1 V1 T2 L2 V2 T3 L3 V3
‘86’ L(V1) Command ‘86’ L(V2) Command ‘86’ L(V3) Command
Figure II - 6- Issuer Script Command Format (Shown with Three Commands)
It is possible for multiple Issuer Scripts to be delivered with a single

authorisation response. The terminal shall process each Issuer Script in the
sequence in which it appears in the authorisation response according to the
following rules:
• Issuer Script Commands shall be separated using the BER-TLV coding of the
data objects defining the commands (tag ‘86’).
• Each command will be delivered to the ICC as a command APDU in the

sequence in which it appeared in the Issuer Script.
• The terminal shall examine only SW1 in the response APDU and perform one
of the following actions:
− If SW1 indicates either normal processing or a ‘warning’ according to the

conventions described in the Card Specification, the terminal shall
continue with the next command from the Issuer Script (if any).
− If SW1 indicates an ‘error’ condition, the processing of the Issuer Script

shall be terminated.
If an Issuer Script is processed, the terminal shall set the ‘Script processing was
performed’ bit in the TSI to ‘1’. If an error occurred in processing a script, the
terminal shall set to ‘1’ either the ‘Script processing failed before final
GENERATE AC’ in the TVR if the identifying tag of the failing script was ‘71’ or
the ‘Script processing failed after final GENERATE AC’ in the TVR if the tag was
‘72’.
6.11 Completion
Purpose:
The completion function closes processing of a transaction.
The terminal always performs this function unless the transaction is terminated
prematurely by error processing.
The completion function is always the last function in the transaction processing.
(Script processing may be performed after the completion function.)
Description:
The ICC indicates willingness to complete transaction processing by returning
either a TC or an AAC to either the first or second GENERATE AC command
issued by the terminal. If the terminal decides to go online, completion shall be
done when the second GENERATE AC command is issued.
See section 5 for additional information on the use of the GENERATE AC

command.
Annexes
December, 2000 Annex A – Data Elements Table 67
Annex A - Data Elements Table

Table A-1 defines those data elements that may be used for financial transaction interchange and their mapping onto data objects and
files.
Name Description Source Format Template Tag Length

Acquirer Uniquely identifies the acquirer within each payment Terminal n 6-11 - ‘9F01’ 6
Identifier system
Additional Indicates the data input and output capabilities of the Terminal b - ‘9F40’ 5
Terminal terminal
Capabilities
Amount, Authorised amount of the transaction (excluding Terminal b - ‘81’ 4
Authorised adjustments)
(Binary)
Amount, Authorised amount of the transaction (excluding Terminal n 12 - ‘9F02’ 6
Authorised adjustments)
(Numeric)
Amount, Other Secondary amount associated with the transaction Terminal b - ‘9F04’ 4
(Binary) representing a cashback amount
Amount, Other Secondary amount associated with the transaction Terminal n 12 - ‘9F03’ 6
(Numeric) representing a cashback amount
Amount, Authorised amount expressed in the reference currency Terminal b - ‘9F3A’ 4
Reference
Currency
Application Cryptogram returned by the ICC in response of the ICC b ‘77’ or ‘80’ ‘9F26’ 8
Cryptogram GENERATE AC command
Application Indicates the currency in which the account is managed ICC n3 ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F42’ 2
Currency Code according to ISO 4217
Application Indicates the implied position of the decimal point from the ICC n1 ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F44’ 1
Currency right of the account represented according to ISO 4217
Exponent
68 Annex A - Data Elements Table December, 2000

Application Issuer or payment system specified data relating to the ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F05’ 1-32
Discretionary application
Data
Application Date from which the application may be used ICC n6 ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5F25’ 3
Effective Date YYMMDD
Application Date after which application expires ICC n6 ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5F24’ 3
Expiration Date YYMMDD
Application File Indicates the location (SFI, range of records) of the AEFs ICC var. ‘77’ or ‘80’ ‘94’ var. up to
Locator (AFL) related to a given application 252
Application Identifies the application as described in ISO/IEC 7816-5 ICC b ‘61’ ‘4F’ 5-16
Identifier (AID)
Application Identifies the application as described in ISO/IEC 7816-5 Terminal b - ‘9F06’ 5-16
Identifier (AID)
Application Indicates the capabilities of the card to support specific ICC b ‘77’ or ‘80’ ‘82’ 2
Interchange functions in the application
Profile
Application Mnemonic associated with the AID according to ISO/IEC ICC an 1-16 ‘61’ or ‘A5’ ‘50’ 1-16
Label 7816-5
Application Preferred mnemonic associated with the AID ICC an 1-16 ‘61’ or ‘A5’ ‘9F12’ 1-16
Preferred Name
Application Valid cardholder account number ICC cn ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5A’ var. up to
Primary Account var. up to 19 10
Number (PAN)
Application Identifies and differentiates cards with the same PAN ICC n2 ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5F34’ 1
Primary Account
Number (PAN)
Sequence
Number
Application Indicates the priority of a given application or group of ICC b ‘61’ or ‘A5’ ‘87’ 1
Priority applications in a directory
Indicator

Application 1-4 currency codes used between the terminal and the ICC ICC n3 ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F3B’ 2-8
Reference when the Transaction Currency Code is different from the
Currency Application Currency Code; each code is 3 digits according
to ISO 4217
Application Indicates the implied position of the decimal point from the ICC N1 ‘70 or 77’ ‘9F43’ 1-4
Reference right of the amount, for each of the 1-4 reference currencies
Currency represented according to ISO 4217
Exponent
Application For an application in the ICC to be supported by an Terminal At the None None See
Selection application in the terminal, the Application Selection discretion of format
Indicator Indicator indicates whether the associated AID in the the terminal.
terminal must match the AID in the card exactly, including The data is
the length of the AID, or only up to the length of the AID in
not sent
the terminal
There is only one Application Selection Indicator per AID
across the
supported by the terminal interface
Application Contains one or more data objects relevant to an ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘61’ var. up to
Template application directory entry according to ISO/IEC 7816-5 252
Application Counter maintained by the application in the ICC ICC b ‘77’ or ‘80’ ‘9F36’ 2
Transaction (incrementing the ATC is managed by the ICC)
Counter (ATC)
Application Indicates issuer's specified restrictions on the geographic ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F07’ 2
Usage Control usage and services allowed for the application
Application Version number assigned by the payment system for the ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F08’ 2
Version Number application
Application Version number assigned by the payment system for the Terminal b - ‘9F09’ 2
Version Number application
Authorisation Value generated by the issuer for an approved transaction Issuer an 6 - ‘89’ 6
Code
Authorisation Code that defines the disposition of a message Issuer/ an 2 - ‘8A’ 2
Response Code Terminal

Card Risk List of data objects (tag and length) to be passed to the ICC ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘8C’ var. up to
Management in the first GENERATE AC command 252
Data Object List
1 (CDOL1)
Card Risk List of data objects (tag and length) to be passed to the ICC ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘8D’ var. up to
Management in the second GENERATE AC command 252
Data Object List
2 (CDOL2)
Cardholder Indicates cardholder name according to ISO 7813 ICC ans 2-26 ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5F20’ 2-26
Name
Cardholder Indicates the whole cardholder name when greater than 26 ICC ans 27-45 ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F0B’ 27-45
Name Extended characters using the same coding convention as in ISO
7813
Cardholder Identifies a method of verification of the cardholder ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘8E’ var. up to
Verification supported by the application 252
Method (CVM)
List
Cardholder Indicates the results of the last CVM performed Terminal b - ‘9F34’ 3
Verification
Method (CVM)
Results
Certification A check value calculated on the concatenation of all parts Terminal b -- 20
Authority Public of the Certification Authority Public Key (RID,
Key Check Sum Certification Authority Public Key Index, Certification
Authority Public Key Modulus, Certification Authority
Public Key Exponent) using SHA-1
Certification Value of the exponent part of the Certification Authority Terminal b -- 1 or 3
Authority Public Public Key
Key Exponent
Certification Identifies the certification authority's public key in ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘8F’ 1
Authority Public conjunction with the RID
Key Index

Certification Identifies the certification authority’s public key in Terminal b - ‘9F22’ 1
Authority Public conjunction with the RID
Key Index
Certification Value of the modulus part of the Certification Authority Terminal b -- NCA (up
Authority Public Public Key to 248)
Key Modulus
Command Identifies the data field of a command message Terminal b ‘83’ var.
Template
Cryptogram Indicates the type of cryptogram and the actions to be ICC b ‘77’ or ‘80’ ‘9F27’ 1
Information performed by the terminal
Data
Data An issuer assigned value that is retained by the terminal ICC b ‘9F45’ 2
Authentication during the verification process of the Signed Static
Code Application Data
Dedicated File Identifies the name of the DF as described in ISO/IEC ICC b ‘6F’ ‘84’ 5-16
(DF) Name 7816-4
Default Dynamic DDOL to be used for constructing the INTERNAL Terminal b -- var.
Data AUTHENTICATE command if the DDOL in the card is not
Authentication present
Data Object List
(DDOL)
Default TDOL to be used for generating the TC Hash Value if the Terminal b -- var.
Transaction TDOL in the card is not present
Certificate Data
Object List
(TDOL)
Directory Identifies the name of a DF associated with a directory ICC b ‘61’ ‘9D’ 5-16
Definition File
(DDF) Name
Directory Issuer discretionary part of the directory according to ICC var. ‘61’ ‘73’ var. up to
Discretionary ISO/IEC 7816-5 252
Template

Dynamic Data List of data objects (tag and length) to be passed to the ICC ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F49’ up to 252
Authentication in the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command
Data Object List
(DDOL)
Enciphered Transaction PIN enciphered at the PIN pad for online Terminal b -- 8
Personal verification or for offline verification if the PIN pad and
Identification IFD are not a single integrated device
Number (PIN)
Data
File Control Issuer discretionary part of the FCI ICC var. ‘A5’ ‘BF0C’ var. up to
Information 222
(FCI) Issuer
Discretionary
Data
File Control Identifies the data object proprietary to this specification in ICC var. ‘6F’ ‘A5’ var.
Information the FCI template according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
(FCI)
Proprietary
Template
File Control Identifies the FCI template according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 ICC var. - ‘6F’ var. up to
Information 252
(FCI) Template
ICC Dynamic Time-variant number generated by the ICC, to be captured ICC b ‘9F4C’ 2-8
Number by the terminal
Integrated ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key certified by the issuer ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F2D’ NI
Circuit Card
(ICC) PIN
Encipherment
Public Key
Certificate

Integrated ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key Exponent used for PIN ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F2E’ 1 or 3
Circuit Card encipherment
(ICC) PIN
Encipherment
Public Key
Exponent
Integrated Remaining digits of the ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F2F’ NPE − NI
Circuit Card Modulus + 42
(ICC) PIN
Encipherment
Public Key
Remainder
Integrated ICC Public Key certified by the issuer ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F46’ NI
Circuit Card
(ICC) Public Key
Certificate
Integrated ICC Public Key Exponent used for the verification of the ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F47’ 1 to 3
Circuit Card Signed Dynamic Application Data
(ICC) Public Key
Exponent
Integrated Remaining digits of the ICC Public Key Modulus ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F48’ NIC − NI +
Circuit Card 42
(ICC) Public Key
Remainder
Interface Device Unique and permanent serial number assigned to the IFD Terminal an 8 - ‘9F1E’ 8
(IFD) Serial by the manufacturer
Number
Issuer Action Specifies the issuer's conditions that cause a transaction to ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F0D’ 5
Code - Default be rejected if it might have been approved online, but the
terminal is unable to process the transaction online
Issuer Action Specifies the issuer's conditions that cause the denial of a ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F0E’ 5
Code - Denial transaction without attempt to go online

Issuer Action Specifies the issuer’s conditions that cause a transaction to ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F0F’ 5
Code - Online be transmitted online
Issuer Contains proprietary application data for transmission to ICC b ‘77’ or ‘80’ ‘9F10’ var. up to
Application Data the issuer in an online transaction 32
Issuer Data sent to the ICC for online issuer authentication Issuer b - ‘91’ 8-16
Authentication
Data
Issuer Code Indicates the code table according to ISO 8859 for ICC n2 ‘A5’ ‘9F11’ 1
Table Index displaying the Application Preferred Name
Issuer Country Indicates the country of the issuer according to ISO 3166 ICC n3 ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5F28’ 2
Code
Issuer Public Issuer public key certified by a certification authority ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘90’ NCA
Key Certificate
Issuer Public Issuer public key exponent used for the verification of the ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F32’ 1 to 3
Key Exponent Signed Static Application Data and the ICC Public Key
Certificate
Issuer Public Remaining digits of the Issuer Public Key Modulus ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘92’ NI − NCA
Key Remainder + 36
Issuer Script Contains a command for transmission to the ICC Issuer b ‘71’ or ‘72’ ‘86’ var. up to
Command 261
Issuer Script Identification of the Issuer Script Issuer b ‘71’ or ‘72’ ‘9F18’ 4
Identifier
Issuer Script Indicates the result of the terminal script processing Terminal b -- var.
Results
Issuer Script Contains proprietary issuer data for transmission to the Issuer b - ‘71’ var.
Template 1 ICC before the second GENERATE AC command
Issuer Script Contains proprietary issuer data for transmission to the Issuer b - ‘72’ var.
Template 2 ICC after the second GENERATE AC command
Issuer URL The URL provides the location of the Issuer’s Library ICC ans ‘A5’ ‘5F50’ var.
Server on the Internet.

Language 1-4 languages stored in order of preference, each ICC an 2 ‘A5’ ‘5F2D’ 2-8
Preference represented by 2 alphabetical characters according to ISO
639
Last Online ATC value of the last transaction that went online ICC b - ‘9F13’ 2
Application
Transaction
Counter (ATC)
Register
Lower Issuer-specified preference for the maximum number of ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F14’ 1
Consecutive consecutive offline transactions for this ICC application
Offline Limit allowed in a terminal with online capability
Maximum Value used in terminal risk management for random Terminal -- -- --
Target transaction selection
Percentage to be
used for Biased
Random
Selection
Merchant Classifies the type of business being done by the merchant, Terminal n4 - ‘9F15’ 2
Category Code represented according to ISO 8583:1993 for Card Acceptor
Business Code
Merchant When concatenated with the Acquirer Identifier, uniquely Terminal ans 15 - ‘9F16’ 15
Identifier identifies a given merchant
Merchant Name Indicates the name and location of the merchant Terminal ans -- var.
and Location
Message Type Indicates whether the batch data capture record is a Terminal n2 -- 1
financial record or advice
Personal Secret key of a symmetric algorithm used by the PIN pad Terminal -- -- --
Identification to encipher the PIN and by the card reader to decipher the
Number (PIN) PIN if the PIN pad and card reader are not integrated
Pad Secret Key

Personal Number of PIN tries remaining ICC b - ‘9F17’ 1
Identification
Number (PIN)
Try Counter
Point-of-Service Indicates the method by which the PAN was entered, Terminal n2 - ‘9F39’ 1
(POS) Entry according to the first two digits of the ISO 8583:1987 POS
Mode Entry Mode
Processing Contains a list of terminal resident data objects (tags and ICC b ‘A5’ ‘9F38’ var.
Options Data lengths) needed by the ICC in processing the GET
Object List PROCESSING OPTIONS command
(PDOL)
Response Contains the data objects (without tags and lengths) ICC var. ‘80’ var.
Message returned by the ICC in response to a command
Template
Format 1
Response Contains the data objects (with tags and lengths) returned ICC var. ‘77’ var.
Message by the ICC in response to a command
Template
Format 2
Service Code Service code as defined on tracks 1 and 2 ICC n3 ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5F30’ 2
Short File Identifies the SFI to be used in the commands related to a ICC b ‘A5’ ‘88’ 1
Identifier (SFI) given AEF or DDF. The SFI data object is a binary field
with the three high order bits set to zero.
Signed Dynamic Digital signature on critical application parameters for ICC b - ‘9F4B’ NIC
Application Data dynamic data authentication
Signed Static Digital signature on critical application parameters for ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘93’ NI
Application Data static data authentication
Static Data List of tags of primitive data objects defined in this ICC -- ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F4A’ var.
Authentication specification whose value fields are to be included in the
Tag List Signed Static or Dynamic Application Data

Target Value used in terminal risk management for random Terminal -- -- --
Percentage to be transaction selection
used for Random
Selection
Terminal Action Specifies the acquirer’s conditions that cause a transaction Terminal b -- 5
Code - Default to be rejected if it might have been approved online, but the
terminal is unable to process the transaction online
Terminal Action Specifies the acquirer’s conditions that cause the denial of a Terminal b -- 5
Code - Denial transaction without attempt to go online
Terminal Action Specifies the acquirer’s conditions that cause a transaction Terminal b -- 5
Code - Online to be transmitted online
Terminal Indicates the card data input, CVM, and security Terminal b - ‘9F33’ 3
Capabilities capabilities of the terminal
Terminal Indicates the country of the terminal, represented Terminal n3 - ‘9F1A’ 2
Country Code according to ISO 3166
Terminal Floor Indicates the floor limit in the terminal in conjunction with Terminal b ‘9F1B’ 4
Limit the AID
Terminal Designates the unique location of a terminal at a merchant Terminal an 8 - ‘9F1C’ 8
Identification
Terminal Risk Application-specific value used by the card for risk Terminal b - ‘9F1D’ 1-8
Management management purposes
Data
Terminal Type Indicates the environment of the terminal, its Terminal n2 - ‘9F35’ 1
communications capability, and its operational control
Terminal Status of the different functions as seen from the terminal Terminal b - ‘95’ 5
Verification
Results
Threshold Value Value used in terminal risk management for random Terminal -- -- --
for Biased transaction selection
Random
Selection

Track 1 Discretionary part of track 1 according to ISO/IEC 7813 ICC ans ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F1F’ var.
Discretionary
Data
Track 2 Discretionary part of track 2 according to ISO/IEC 7813 ICC cn ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F20’ var.
Discretionary
Data
Track 2 Contains the data elements of the track 2 according to ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘57’ var. up to
Equivalent Data ISO/IEC 7813, excluding start sentinel, end sentinel, and 19
LRC, as follows:
Primary Account Number n, var. up to 19
Field Separator (hex. ‘D’) b
Expiration Date (YYMM) n4
Service Code n3
Discretionary Data(define by individual payment systems) n, var.
Pad with hex. ‘FF’ if needed to ensure whole bytes b
Transaction Clearing amount of the transaction, including tips and Terminal n 12 -- 6

Amount other adjustments
Transaction List of data objects (tag and length) to be used by the ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘97’ var. up to
Certificate Data terminal in generating the TC Hash Value 252
Object List
(TDOL)
Transaction Result of a hash function specified in Annex F3 of this Terminal b - ‘98’ 20
Certificate (TC) specification
Hash Value

Transaction Indicates the currency code of the transaction according to Terminal n3 - ‘5F2A’ 2
Currency Code ISO 4217
Transaction Indicates the implied position of the decimal point from the Terminal n1 - ‘5F36’ 1
Currency right of the transaction amount represented according to
Exponent ISO 4217
Transaction Local date that the transaction was authorised Terminal n6 - ‘9A’ 3
Date YYMMDD
Transaction Data entered by the cardholder for the purpose of the PIN Terminal b - ‘99’ var.
Personal verification
Identification
Number (PIN)
Data
Transaction Code defining the common currency used by the terminal Terminal n3 - ‘9F3C’ 2
Reference in case the Transaction Currency Code is different from the
Currency Code Application Currency Code
Transaction Factor used in the conversion from the Transaction Terminal n8 -- 4
Reference Currency Code to the Transaction Reference Currency
Currency Code
Conversion
Transaction Indicates the implied position of the decimal point from the Terminal n1 - ‘9F3D’ 1
Reference right of the transaction amount, with the Transaction
Currency Reference Currency Code represented according to ISO
Exponent 4217
Transaction Counter maintained by the terminal that is incremented by Terminal n 4-8 - ‘9F41’ 2-4
Sequence one for each transaction
Counter
Transaction Indicates the functions performed in a transaction Terminal b - ‘9B’ 2
Status
Information
Transaction Local time that the transaction was authorised Terminal n6 - ‘9F21’ 3
Time HHMMSS

Transaction Indicates the type of financial transaction, represented by Terminal n2 - ‘9C’ 1
Type the first two digits of ISO 8583:1987 Processing Code
Unpredictable Value to provide variability and uniqueness to the Terminal b - ‘9F37’ 4
Number generation of a cryptogram
Upper Issuer-specified preference for the maximum number of ICC b ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F23’ 1
Consecutive consecutive offline transactions for this ICC application
Offline Limit allowed in a terminal without online capability
Table A - 1 - Data Elements Dictionary
When the length defined for the data object is greater than the length of the actual data, the following rules apply:
• A data element in format n is right justified and padded with leading hexadecimal zeroes
• A data element in format cn is left justified and padded with trailing hexadecimal ‘F’s
• A data element in format an is left justified and padded with trailing hexadecimal zeroes
• A data element in format ans is left justified and padded with trailing hexadecimal zeroes
When data is moved from one entity to another (for example, card to terminal), it shall always be passed in order from high order to low
order, regardless of how it is internally stored. The same rule applies when concatenating data.
Note: Data that can occur in template ‘70’ or ‘77’ can never occur in both.
December, 2000 Annex A - Data Elements Table 81
The tags allocated to the data elements are according to Table A-2:
Name Template Tag

Application Identifier (AID) ‘61’ ‘4F’
Application Label ‘61’ or ‘A5’ ‘50’
Track 2 Equivalent Data ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘57’
Application Primary Account Number (PAN) ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5A’
Cardholder Name ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5F20’
Application Expiration Date ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5F24’
Application Effective Date ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5F25’
Issuer Country Code ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5F28’
Transaction Currency Code − ‘5F2A’
Language Preference ‘A5’ ‘5F2D’
Service Code ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5F30’
Application Primary Account Number (PAN) Sequence ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘5F34’
Number
Transaction Currency Exponent − ‘5F36’
Application Template ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘61’
File Control Information (FCI) Template − ‘6F’
Application Elementary File (AEF) Data Template − ‘70’
Issuer Script Template 1 − ‘71’
Issuer Script Template 2 − ‘72’
Directory Discretionary Template ‘61’ ‘73’
Response Message Template Format 2 − ‘77’
Response Message Template Format 1 − ‘80’
Amount, Authorised (Binary) − ‘81’
Application Interchange Profile ‘77’ or ‘80’ ‘82’
Command Template − ‘83’
Dedicated File (DF) Name ‘6F’ ‘84’
Issuer Script Command ‘71’ or ‘72’ ‘86’
Application Priority Indicator ‘61’ or ‘A5’ ‘87’
Short File Identifier (SFI) ‘A5’ ‘88’
Authorisation Code − ‘89’
Authorisation Response Code − ‘8A’
Card Risk Management Data Object List 1 (CDOL1) ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘8C’
Card Risk Management Data Object List 2 (CDOL2) ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘8D’
Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) List ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘8E’
Certification Authority Public Key Index ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘8F’
Issuer Public Key Certificate ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘90’
Issuer Authentication Data − ‘91’
Issuer Public Key Remainder ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘92’
Signed Static Application Data ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘93’
Application File Locator (AFL) ‘77’ or ‘80’ ‘94’
Terminal Verification Results − ‘95’
Transaction Certificate Data Object List (TDOL) ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘97’
Transaction Certificate (TC) Hash Value − ‘98’
Transaction Personal Identification Number (PIN) Data − ‘99’
Transaction Date − ‘9A’
Transaction Status Information − ‘9B’
Transaction Type − ‘9C’
Name Template Tag

Directory Definition File (DDF) Name ‘61’ ‘9D’
Acquirer Identifier − ‘9F01’
Amount, Authorised (Numeric) − ‘9F02’
Amount, Other (Numeric) − ‘9F03’
Amount, Other (Binary) − ‘9F04’
Application Discretionary Data ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F05’
Application Identifier (AID) − ‘9F06’
Application Usage Control ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F07’
Application Version Number ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F08’
Application Version Number − ‘9F09’
Cardholder Name -Extended ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F0B’
Issuer Action Code - Default ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F0D’
Issuer Action Code - Denial ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F0E’
Issuer Action Code - Online ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F0F’
Issuer Application Data ‘77’ or ‘80’ ‘9F10’
Issuer Code Table Index ‘A5’ ‘9F11’
Application Preferred Name ‘61’ or ‘A5’ ‘9F12’
Last Online Application Transaction Counter (ATC) − ‘9F13’
Register
Lower Consecutive Offline Limit ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F14’
Merchant Category Code − ‘9F15’
Merchant Identifier − ‘9F16’
Personal Identification Number (PIN) Try Counter − ‘9F17’
Issuer Script Identifier ‘71’ or ‘72’ ‘9F18’
Issuer URL ‘A5’ ‘5F50’
Terminal Country Code − ‘9F1A’
Terminal Floor Limit − ‘9F1B’
Terminal Identification − ‘9F1C’
Terminal Risk Management Data − ‘9F1D’
Interface Device (IFD) Serial Number − ‘9F1E’
Track 1 Discretionary Data ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F1F’
Track 2 Discretionary Data ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F20’
Transaction Time − ‘9F21’
Certification Authority Public Key Index − ‘9F22’
Upper Consecutive Offline Limit ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F23’
Application Cryptogram ‘77’ or ‘80’ ‘9F26’
Cryptogram Information Data ‘77’ or ‘80’ ‘9F27’
ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key Certificate ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F2D’
ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key Exponent ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F2E’
ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key Remainder ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F2F’
Issuer Public Key Exponent ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F32’
Terminal Capabilities − ‘9F33’
Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) Results − ‘9F34’
Terminal Type − ‘9F35’
Application Transaction Counter (ATC) ‘77’ or ‘80’ ‘9F36’
Unpredictable Number − ‘9F37’
Processing Options Data Object List (PDOL) ‘A5’ ‘9F38’
Point-of-Service (POS) Entry Mode − ‘9F39’
Amount, Reference Currency − ‘9F3A’
December, 2000 Annex A - Data Elements Table 83
Name Template Tag

Application Reference Currency ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F3B’
Transaction Reference Currency − ‘9F3C’
Transaction Reference Currency Exponent − ‘9F3D’
Additional Terminal Capabilities − ‘9F40’
Transaction Sequence Counter − ‘9F41’
Application Currency Code ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F42’
Application Reference Currency Exponent ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F43’
Application Currency Exponent - ‘9F44’
Data Authentication Code - ‘9F45’
ICC Public Key Certificate ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F46’
ICC Public Key Exponent ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F47’
ICC Public Key Remainder ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F48’
Dynamic Data Object List (DDOL) ‘70’ or ‘77’ ‘9F49’
Static Data Authentication Tag List - ‘9F4A’
Signed Dynamic Application Data - ‘9F4B’
ICC Dynamic Number - ‘9F4C’
File Control Information (FCI) Proprietary Template ‘6F’ ‘A5’
File Control Information (FCI) Issuer Discretionary Data ‘A5’ ‘BF0C’
Table A - 2 - Data Elements Tags


December, 2000 Annex B – Rules for BER-TLV Data Objects 85
Annex B – Rules for BER-TLV Data Objects
B.1 Coding of BER-TLV Data Objects

As defined in ISO/IEC 8825, a BER-TLV data object consists of 2-3 consecutive
fields:
• The tag field (T) consists of one or more consecutive bytes. It codes a class, a type,
and a number (see Table C-1). The tag field of the data objects described in this
specification is coded on one or two bytes.
• The length field (L) consists of one or more consecutive bytes. It codes the length
of the following field. The length field of the data objects described in this
specification is coded on one, two, or three bytes.
• The value field (V) codes the value of the data object. If L = ‘00’, the value field is
not present.
A BER-TLV data object belongs to one of the following two categories:
• A primitive data object where the value field contains a data element for financial
transaction interchange.
• A constructed data object where the value field contains one or more primitive or
constructed data objects. The value field of a constructed data object is called a
template.
The coding of BER-TLV data objects is defined for as follows.
B1.1 Coding of the Tag Field of BER-TLV Data Objects

The first byte of the tag field of a BER-TLV data object is according to Table C-1:
0 0 Universal class
0 1 Application class
1 0 Context-specific class
1 1 Private class
0 Primitive data object
1 Constructed data object
1 1 1 1 1 See subsequent bytes
Any other value Tag number
Table B - 1 - Tag Field Structure (First Byte) BER-TLV

86 Annex B – Rules for BER-TLV Data Objects December, 2000
According to ISO/IEC 8825, Table C-2 defines the coding rules of the subsequent
bytes of a BER-TLV tag when tag numbers ≥ 31 are used (that is, bits b5 - b1 of the
first byte equal ‘11111’).
1 Another byte follows
0 Last tag byte
Any value > 0 (Part of) tag number
Table B - 2 - Tag Field Structure (Subsequent Bytes) BER-TLV
Before, between or after TLV-coded data objects, ‘00’ or ‘FF’ bytes without any
meaning may occur (e.g. due to erased or modified TLV-coded data objects).
The coding of the tag field of a BER-TLV data object is according to the following
rules:
• The following application class templates defined in ISO/IEC 7816 apply: ‘61’ and
‘6F.’
• The following range of application class templates is defined in Part I: ‘70’ to ‘7F’.
The meaning is then specific to the context of an application according to this
specification. Tags ‘78’, ‘79’, ‘7D’, and ‘7E’ are defined in ISO/IEC 7816-6 and are
not used in this specification.
• The application class data objects defined in ISO/IEC 7816 and described in Part
I are used according to the ISO/IEC 7816 definition.
• Context-specific class data objects are defined in the context of this specification
or in the context of the template in which they appear.
• The coding of primitive context-specific class data objects in the ranges ‘80’ to ‘9E’
and ‘9F00’ to ‘9F4F’ is reserved for this specification.
• The coding of primitive context-specific class data objects in the range ‘9F50’ to
‘9F7F’ is reserved for the payment systems.
• The coding of primitive and constructed private class data objects is left to the
discretion of the issuer.
B1.2 Coding of the Length Field of BER-TLV Data Objects

The coding of the length field is as follows.
When bit b8 of the most significant byte of the length field is set to 0, the length field
consists of only one byte. Bits b7 to b1 code the number of bytes of the value field.
The length field is within the range 1 to 127.
December, 2000 Annex B – Rules for BER-TLV Data Objects 87
When bit b8 of the most significant byte of the length field is set to 1, the subsequent
bits b7 to b1 of the most significant byte code the number of subsequent bytes in the
length field. The subsequent bytes code an integer representing the number of bytes
in the value field. Two bytes are necessary to express up to 255 bytes in the value
field.
B1.3 Coding of the Value Field of Data Objects

A data element is the value field (V) of a primitive BER-TLV data object. A data
element is the smallest data field that receives an identifier (a tag).
A primitive data object is structured according to Table B-3:
Tag (T) Length (L) Value (V)
Table B - 3 - Primitive BER-TLV Data Object (Data Element)
A constructed BER-TLV data object consists of a tag, a length, and a value field
composed of one or more BER-TLV data objects. A record in an AEF governed by
this specification is a constructed BER-TLV data object. A constructed data object is
structured according to Table B-4:
Tag Length Primitive or ... Primitive or constructed

(T) (L) constructed BER-TLV BER-TLV data object
data object number 1 number n
Table B - 4 - Constructed BER-TLV Data Object

88 Annex B – Rules for BER-TLV Data Objects December, 2000

December, 2000 Annex C – Coding of Data Elements 89
Annex C - Coding of Data Elements used in the

Transaction Processing
This annex provides the coding for specific data elements used to control the
transaction flow in the terminal or to record the status of processing for the
transaction. In the tables, a ‘1’ means that if that bit has the value ‘1’, the
corresponding ‘Meaning’ applies. An ‘x’ means that the bit does not apply.
Data (bytes or bits) indicated as RFU shall be set to ‘0’.
90 Annex C – Coding of Data Elements December, 2000
Annex C.1 - Application Interchange Profile
Byte 1 (Leftmost):
0 x x x x x x x RFU
x 1 x x x x x x Offline static data authentication is supported
x x 1 x x x x x Offline dynamic data authentication is
supported
x x x 1 x x x x Cardholder verification is supported
x x x x 1 x x x Terminal risk management is to be performed
x x x x x 1 x x Issuer authentication is supported14
x x x x x x 1 x Combined DDA – GENERATE AC supported
x x x x x x x 0 RFU
Byte 2 (Rightmost):
0 x x x x x x x RFU
x 0 x x x x x x RFU
x x 0 x x x x x RFU
x x x 0 x x x x RFU
x x x x 0 x x x RFU
x x x x x 0 x x RFU
x x x x x x 0 x RFU
x x x x x x x 0 RFU
Table C - 1 - Application Interchange Profile
When this bit is set to ‘1’, Issuer Authentication using the EXTERNAL
14
AUTHENTICATE command, is supported

Annex C.2 - Application Usage Control

Byte 1 (Leftmost):
b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 B3 b2 b1 Meaning
1 x x x x x x x Valid for domestic cash transactions
x 1 x x x x x x Valid for international cash transactions
x x 1 x x x x x Valid for domestic goods
x x x 1 x x x x Valid for international goods
x x x x 1 x x x Valid for domestic services
x x x x x 1 x x Valid for international services
x x x x x x 1 x Valid at ATMs
x x x x x x x 1 Valid at terminals other than ATMs
Byte 2 (Rightmost):
1 x x x x x x x Domestic cashback allowed
x 1 x x x x x x International cashback allowed
x x 0 x x x x x RFU
x x x 0 x x x x RFU
x x x x 0 x x x RFU
x x x x x 0 x x RFU
x x x x x x 0 x RFU
x x x x x x x 0 RFU
Table C - 2 - Application Usage Control

Annex C.3 - Cardholder Verification Rule Format

Byte 1 (Leftmost): Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) Codes
0 RFU
0 Fail cardholder verification if this
CVM is unsuccessful
1 Apply succeeding CVR if this CVM
is unsuccessful
0 0 0 0 0 0 Fail CVM processing
0 0 0 0 0 1 Plaintext PIN verification
performed by ICC
0 0 0 0 1 0 Enciphered PIN verified online
0 0 0 0 1 1 Plaintext PIN verification
performed by ICC and signature
(paper)
0 0 0 1 0 0 Enciphered PIN verification
performed by ICC
0 0 0 1 0 1 Enciphered PIN verification
performed by ICC and signature
(paper)
0 x x x x x Values in the range 000110-011101
reserved for future use by this
specification
0 1 1 1 1 0 Signature (paper)
0 1 1 1 1 1 No CVM required
1 0 x x x x Values in the range 100000-101111
reserved for use by the individual
payment systems
1 1 x x x x Values in the range 110000-111110
reserved for use by the issuer
1 1 1 1 1 1 This value is not available for use
Table C - 3 - CVM Codes

Value Meaning
‘00’ Always
‘01’ If cash or cashback
‘02’ If not cash or cashback
‘03’ If terminal supports the CVM15
‘04’ - ‘05’ RFU
‘06’ If transaction is in the application
currency16 and is under X value
currency and is over X value
currency and is under Y value
currency and is over Y value
‘0A’ - ‘7F’ RFU
‘80’ - ‘FF’ Reserved for use by individual payment
systems
Table C - 4 - CVM Condition Codes
15 In the case of offline PIN CVM, this means ‘If offline PIN pad present’. In the case
of online PIN CVM, this means ‘If online PIN pad present’.
16 That is, Transaction Currency Code = Application Currency Code.
Annex C.4 - Issuer Code Table Index
Value Refers to
‘01’ Part 1 of ISO 8859
‘02’ Part 2 of ISO 8859
‘03’ Part 3 of ISO 8859
‘04’ Part 4 of ISO 8859
‘05’ Part 5 of ISO 8859
‘06’ Part 6 of ISO 8859
‘07’ Part 7 of ISO 8859
‘08’ Part 8 of ISO 8859
‘09’ Part 9 of ISO 8859
‘10’ Part 10 of ISO 8859
Table C - 5 - Issuer Code Table Index

Annex C.5 - Terminal Verification Results

Byte 1: (Leftmost)
1 x x x x x x x Offline data authentication was not performed
x 1 x x x x x x Offline static data authentication failed
x x 1 x x x x x ICC data missing
x x x 1 x x x x Card appears on terminal exception file17
x x x x 1 x x x Offline dynamic data authentication failed
x x x x x 1 x x Combined DDA/AC Generation failed
x x x x x 0 x x RFU
x x x x x x 0 x RFU
x x x x x x x 0 RFU
Byte 2:
1 x x x x x x x ICC and terminal have different application
versions
x 1 x x x x x x Expired application
x x 1 x x x x x Application not yet effective
x x x 1 x x x x Requested service not allowed for card product
x x x x 1 x x x New card
x x x x x 0 x x RFU
x x x x x x 0 x RFU
x x x x x x x 0 RFU
17There is no requirement in this specification for an exception file, but it is

recognised that some terminals may have this capability.
Byte 3:
1 x x x x x x x Cardholder verification was not successful
x 1 x x x x x x Unrecognised CVM
x x 1 x x x x x PIN Try Limit exceeded
x x x 1 x x x x PIN entry required and PIN pad not present or
not working
x x x x 1 x x x PIN entry required, PIN pad present, but PIN
was not entered
x x x x x 1 x x Online PIN entered
x x x x x x 0 x RFU
x x x x x x x 0 RFU
Byte 4:
1 x x x x x x x Transaction exceeds floor limit
x 1 x x x x x x Lower consecutive offline limit exceeded
x x 1 x x x x x Upper consecutive offline limit exceeded
x x x 1 x x x x Transaction selected randomly for online
processing
x x x x 1 x x x Merchant forced transaction online
x x x x x 0 x x RFU
x x x x x x 0 x RFU
x x x x x x x 0 RFU
Byte 5 (Rightmost):
1 x x x x x x x Default TDOL used
x 1 x x x x x x Issuer authentication was unsuccessful
x x 1 x x x x x Script processing failed before final
GENERATE AC
x x x 1 x x x x Script processing failed after final GENERATE
AC
x x x x 0 x x x RFU
x x x x x 0 x x RFU
x x x x x x 0 x RFU
x x x x x x x 0 RFU
Table C - 6 - Terminal Verification Results

Annex C.6 - Transaction Status Information
Byte 1 (Leftmost):
1 x x x x x x x Offline data authentication was performed
x 1 x x x x x x Cardholder verification was performed
x x 1 x x x x x Card risk management was performed
x x x 1 x x x x Issuer authentication was performed
x x x x 1 x x x Terminal risk management was performed
x x x x x 1 x x Script processing was performed
x x x x x x 0 x RFU
x x x x x x x 0 RFU
Byte 2 (Rightmost):
0 x x x x x x x RFU
x 0 x x x x x x RFU
x x 0 x x x x x RFU
x x x 0 x x x x RFU
x x x x 0 x x x RFU
x x x x x 0 x x RFU
x x x x x x 0 x RFU
x x x x x x x 0 RFU
Table C - 7 - Transaction Status Information

December, 2000 Annex D – Transaction Processing for Chip E-Commerce 99
Annex D Transaction Processing for Chip

Electronic Commerce
This section defines a transaction flow that begins with the Cardholder System
checking for the presence of an IC Card while conducting a purchase, continues with
the transmission of the purchase and authorisation requests, and ends with the
transmission of the capture message from the Merchant Server or Payment
Gateway.
The Payment Gateway is responsible for reformatting the SET message (along with
additional IC Card related data) and transmitting an authorisation request to the
issuer. The manner in which the Payment Gateway reformats, transmits and
receives messages to and from the issuer is dependent on Payment Systems
requirements. These requirements are outside the scope of this document.
The Transaction Processing for Chip Electronic Commerce defines the use of an
integrated chip card (IC Card) application to conduct a credit or debit transaction in
an electronic commerce environment using SET 1.0 compliant software.
It leverages the EMV functions described in section 6 with the Secure Electronic
Transaction™ (SET) Specification (a secure protocol for which credit and debit
products may be used to conduct electronic commerce), to provide the foundation for
secure, portable, cost–effective, IC Card based transactions over the Internet
In addition, the Transaction Processing for Chip Electronic Commerce takes

advantage of two enhancements to the SET protocol:
• SET Common Chip Extension: Extends the SET protocol to support the
transport of IC Card related data.
• Online PIN extension Extends the SET protocol to support the
online transport of a cardholders’ PIN.
SET provides an electronic commerce infrastructure that delivers:
• Confidentiality of information
• Integrity of data
• Interoperability
• Certificate based authentication

100 Annex D –Transaction Processing for Chip E-Commerce December, 2000
The Transaction Processing for Chip Electronic Commerce extends the SET
Specification by supporting two key features native to EMV IC Card applications:
• Online card authentication, through the use of a cryptogram
• Cardholder verification, through the use of an optional Cardholder PIN
The Chip Electronic Commerce payment system consists of eight components:
Payment System
Issuer Acquirer
Internet SET Payment

and SET Gateway
software
IC Card
Cardholder
IC Card Interface Internet Access Device

Device SET Merchant
Server
Cardholder System
Figure II- 7 - Chip Electronic Commerce System
1. Issuer A financial institution that issues payment card

products to individuals;
2. Cardholder An authorised holder of a payment card issued by an
issuer.
3. EMV IC Card Stores the cardholder’s payment data and is capable of
generating a cryptogram to authenticate the card and
optionally verify a cardholder’s PIN.
4. Cardholder System Serves as the interface between the EMV IC Card and
the SET merchant server. It is responsible for
authenticating the merchant to the cardholder.
5. Merchant Server A system that interacts with the Cardholder System
for electronic payments. The Merchant Server also
interacts with the acquirer using the payment protocol
to receive authorisation and capture services for
electronic payment transactions
6. Payment Gateway A system that interacts with the Merchant Server and
an acquirer’s legacy system to support the
authorisation and capture of SET transactions.
7. Acquirer A financial institution that supports merchants by
providing a service for processing payment card
transactions;
8. Payment System A franchiser of payment system networks and branded
instruments.
The Chip Electronic Commerce Specification contains the following parts:
Section D.1 System Architecture: Defines the additional requirements

placed upon the components of the Chip Electronic
Commerce system by this specification
Section D.2 Transaction Processing: defines the manner in which a
purchase is processed in the Chip Electronic Commerce
system
Annex E to G Provides supplementary information.
D.1 System Architecture

The transaction processing capabilities of each component in the Chip Electronic
Commerce system are defined in the following sections:
D.1.1 EMV Debit/Credit Applications Describes the attributes of EMV debit

or credit card applications that
participate in EMV Chip Electronic
Commerce transactions.
D.1.2 Cardholder System Describes the pre–conditions the
Cardholder System shall meet prior to
transaction processing.
D.1.3 Merchant Server Describes the pre–conditions that
Merchant Servers shall meet prior to
D.1.4 Payment Gateway Describes the pre–conditions that
Payment Gateways shall meet prior to
D.1.1 EMV Debit/Credit Applications

The EMV Debit/Credit applications are IC Card applications that are capable of
generating for each transaction an application cryptogram that can decline or
approve off–line, or else, request the on–line referral or authorisation of a
transaction.
The Transaction Processing for Chip Electronic Commerce does not require any
modification to EMV–compliant IC Cards.
During application selection, an issuer may supplement the EMV defined branding
mechanisms, i.e. the display of an Application Label or Preferred Name, by showing
its cardholder a visual image of its brand. More information is provided in Annex E
Issuer URL for Electronic Commerce.
To do this, an issuer should store an additional data element, the Issuer URL, in the
File Control Information of its Application Definition File. If used, the format,
template, tag, and length to be applied to this data element are as follows:
Name Format Template Tag Length

Issuer URL ans ‘BF0C’ ‘5F50’ var.
Table D - 1 - Issuer URL in FCI description
Tag Value Presence

‘6F’ FCI Template M
‘84’ DF Name M
‘A5’ FCI Proprietary Template M
‘50’ Application Label O
‘87’ Application Priority Indicator O
‘9F38’ PDOL O
‘5F2D’ Language Preference O
‘9F11’ Issuer Code Table Index O
‘9F12’ Application Preferred Name O
‘BF0C’ FCI Issuer Discretionary Data O
‘5F50’ Issuer URL O
Table D - 2 - Location of Issuer URL in FCI Template

D.1.2 Cardholder System

The Cardholder System is the combination of hardware and software required
interacting with the cardholder, the cardholder’s IC Card, and a SET Merchant
Server in order to participate in the Transaction Processing for Chip Electronic
Commerce.
This section describes the additional requirements imposed upon the Cardholder
System by this specification. Since there are many possible ways in which a
Cardholder System can be configured, this description treats the component as if it
were a black box.
Appendix F offers a high level model describing the Cardholder System.
The physical requirements that the EMV capable Interface Device (IFD) must meet
are prescribed by Book 1.
The physical characteristics that the Cardholder System and the PIN entry device
must possess to process a cardholder’s PIN are defined by individual Payment
System rules.
The Cardholder System must be aware of its PIN processing and interface device
capabilities.
This section includes the following:
D.1.2.1 Cardholder System Functions Describes the functions through which

Cardholder Systems interact with IC
Cards
D.1.2.2 Commands Lists the commands that Cardholder
Systems shall support.
D.1.2.3 Data Elements Defines the coding and/or values to be
ascribed to data elements that
Cardholder Systems shall store or
create.
D.1.2.4 SET message extensions Lists the SET message extensions that
Cardholder Systems shall support.
D.1.2.1 Cardholder System Functions
Section D.1.2.1 describes the functions performed by the Cardholder System on

behalf of the IC Card.
The Cardholder System shall perform the following functions, which are detailed in
Section D.2, Transaction Processing:
D.2.2.1 Card Selection

D.2.2.2 Application Selection
D.2.2.3 Application Initiation
D.2.2.4 Read Application Data
D.2.2.5 Cardholder Verification
D.2.2.6 Terminal Action Analysis
D.2.2.7 Issuer Script Processing & Completion
Due to the special nature of the electronic commerce environment, the following
EMV defined functions are not executed:
6.3 Offline Data Authentication

6.4 Processing Restrictions
6.6 Terminal Risk Management
D.1.2.2 Commands
The Cardholder System communicates with the IC Card application by issuing

commands and interpreting the card’s response.
Part II of Book 1 and Part I of this book prescribe the coding conventions and
structuring of command and response APDUs.
The Cardholder System shall support the following commands:
• SELECT Selects an application definition file, directory

definition file or Payment System
Environment.
• GET PROCESSING OPTIONS Initiates the transaction within the IC Card.
• READ RECORD Retrieves the data in the records of linear files.
• GET DATA Retrieves a data object not encapsulated in a
record within the current application.
• VERIFY Initiates in the IC Card the comparison of the
Transaction PIN Data sent in the data field of
the command with the reference PIN data
associated with the application.
• GENERATE AC Initiates the generation of an application
cryptogram by the IC Card.
• EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Initiates the verification of the Issuer
Authentication Data generated by the issuer.
The Cardholder System shall be able to decode all responses generated by cards,
which respond to commands as prescribed by Part I of this book.
D.1.2.3 Data Elements
This section defines the Data Elements resident at the Cardholder System and their
values.
For more information regarding other EMV related Data Elements and their
sources, see Table D-9.
Resident Data Elements

The Cardholder System shall store values for the following Resident Data Elements:
• Amount Other
• BrandID—AID Mappings
• ISO 8859 Code Table
• Terminal Type
• Transaction Type
• Terminal Verification Results
Amount Other
Amount Other encodes a cashback amount. Since there is no cashback in the
purchase transaction, the Data Element shall be defined as:
Data Element EMV tag Format Length Value

Amount Other ‘9F04’ b 4 0000
–or– –or–
‘9F03’ n12 6 000000000000
BrandID—AID Table
The BrandID—AID Table contains a mapping from each SET brandID to its
corresponding Application Identifiers (AIDs).
The Cardholder System should have a mechanism to update its BrandID-AID Table.
The Cardholder System’s BrandID—AID table shall include the AIDs defined in the
Payment System Specifications.
ISO 8859 code table

The ISO 8859 Code Table enables the Cardholder System to decode card resident
data objects such as Application Preferred Name. For more information about coding
this table, see book 4.
Terminal Type
The Terminal Type specifies the terminal’s environment, its communications
capabilities and its operational control. To indicate that it is an “unattended, online,
controlled by cardholder” device, the Data Element shall be defined as:

Terminal Type ‘9F35’ n2 1 34
Transaction Type
The Transaction Type specifies the type of financial transactions the Cardholder
System performs. To indicate that the transaction is a purchase of goods or service,
the Data Element shall be defined as:

Transaction Type ‘9C’ n2 1 00
Terminal Verification Results

The Terminal Verification Results is a record of the outcome of the various
application functions performed by the Cardholder System. It shall be defined as:

Terminal ‘95’ b 5 static and
Verification Results dynamic
The values to be ascribed to bits that are static are indicated below. Bits whose
values are to be dynamically set, will be set by the Cardholder System during the
course of the transaction, as prescribed later in this specification. The coding of this
Data Element is as follows:
Byte Bit Meaning Value

1 8 Offline data authentication was not performed 1
7 Offline static data authentication failed 0
6 IC Card Data missing Dynamic
5 Card appears on terminal exception file 0
4 Offline dynamic data authentication failed 0
3 RFU 0
2 RFU 0
1 RFU 0

2 8 IC Card and terminal have different application 0
versions
7 Expired application 0
6 Application not yet effective 0
5 Requested service not allowed for card product 0
4 New Card 0
3 RFU 0
2 RFU 0
1 RFU 0

3 8 Cardholder verification was not successful Dynamic
7 Unrecognized CVM Dynamic
6 PIN Try Limit exceeded Dynamic
5 PIN entry required and PIN pad not present or not Dynamic
working
4 PIN entry required, PIN pad present but PIN was Dynamic
not entered
3 Online PIN entered Dynamic
2 RFU 0
1 RFU 0
Byt Bit Meaning Value

e
4 8 Transaction exceeds floor limit 1
7 Lower consecutive offline limit exceeded 0
6 Upper consecutive offline limit exceeded 0
5 Transaction selected randomly for online 0
processing
4 Merchant forced transaction online 0
3 RFU 0
2 RFU 0
1 RFU 0

5 8 Default TDOL used 0
7 Issuer authentication was unsuccessful Dynamic
6 Script processing failed before final GENERATE Dynamic
AC
5 Script processing failed after final GENERATE AC Dynamic
4 RFU 0
3 RFU 0
2 RFU 0
1 RFU 0
D.1.2.4 SET Message Extensions
This section describes the SET Message Extensions that the Cardholder System
shall support in order to conduct an EMV transaction.
The Cardholder System must be able to support the following message extensions as
prescribed by the SET Common Chip Extension and SET Online PIN Extension.
• commonChip Created by the Cardholder System and placed in the
PReq message; this extension carries the cryptogram
and related data required by the acquirer to format a
Payment System’s authorisation request.
• acqCardExtensions Created by the Payment Gateway and placed within
the AcqCardMsgData field of the PRes message; this
extension carries Issuer Authentication and Issuer
Script data.
• onlinePIN Created by the Cardholder System and placed in the
PReq message; this extension identifies the presence
in the RSA/OAEP block of PIN data entered by the
cardholder.
D.1.3 Merchant Server

The Merchant Server is the component that interacts with the Cardholder System in
support of electronic payments. The Merchant Server also interacts with the
acquirer’s Payment Gateway.
The Transaction Processing for Chip Electronic Commerce does not require any
modification to Merchant Servers.
D.1.4 Payment Gateway

The Payment Gateway is the system that interacts with the Merchant Server and an
acquirer’s legacy system to support the authorisation and capture of SET
transactions. This section defines the additional requirements imposed upon the
Payment Gateway by this specification.
The Payment Gateway must be able to process the following message extensions as
prescribed by the SET Common Chip Extension.
• commonChip Created by the Cardholder System and placed in the

PReq message; this extension carries the cryptogram
and related data required by the acquirer to format a
Payment System’s authorisation request.
• acqCardExtensions Created by the Payment Gateway and placed within the
AcqCardMsgData field of the PRes message; this
extension carries Issuer Authentication and Issuer
Script data back to the Cardholder System.
The Payment Gateway shall be able to process the following message extensions as
prescribed by the SET Online PIN Extension.
• onlinePIN Created by the Cardholder System and placed in the PReq

message; this extension identifies the presence in the
RSA/OAEP block of PIN data entered by the cardholder.
The SETExtension component of the Payment Gateway’s certificate shall indicate

that the Payment Gateway supports the commonChip extension.
The SETExtension component of the Payment Gateway’s certificate shall indicate

that the Payment Gateway supports the onlinePIN extension.
110 Annex D - Transaction Processing for Chip E-Commerce December, 2000
D.2 Transaction Processing

This section defines the manner in which purchase transactions are processed in the
EMV Chip Electronic Commerce system. It describes all EMV functions and SET
messages related to the authorisation and capture of a payment.
Organisation
The Transaction Processing includes the following:

D.2.1 Transaction Flow: provides an overview of the interactions required
completing a purchase.
D.2.2 IC Card to Cardholder System Interface: describes the functions between
the IC Card application and the Cardholder System.
D.2.3 Cardholder System to Merchant Server Interface: describes the interactions
between the Cardholder System and the Merchant Server.
D.2.4 Merchant Server to Payment Gateway Interface: describes the interaction
between the Merchant Server and the Payment Gateway.
Section D.2.1 provides a high–level overview of the transaction processing phases.
The remaining chapters describe the processing of each phase in detail.
D.2.1 Purchase Transaction Flow

This Section provides a high–level overview of the purchase transaction. It provides
an illustration of the transaction flow as well as a summary description of each
phase:
D.2.1.1 Diagram of Transaction Flow: Illustrates the transaction flow.

D.2.1.2 Explanation of Transaction Flow; Provides a brief description of the
transaction flow.
D.2.1.1 Diagram of Transaction Flow
This section illustrates the EMV functions and SET messages processed to conduct a
purchase transaction.
SET initiation message
Card Selection
Application Selection
Application Initiation
Read Application
Purchase Initialization Request
Purchase Initialization Response
Cardholder Verification
Terminal Action Analysis
Purchase Request Authorization Request
Purchase response Authorization response
Issuer Script Processing

and Completion
Capture Request
Capture Response
Figure II- 8 - Diagram of Chip Electronic Commerce transaction flow
D.2.1.2 Explanation of Transaction Flow
This section describes the phases of the purchase transaction in the order in which
they occur.
SET Payment Initiation
The Merchant Server invokes the Cardholder System and informs it of the payment
brands it accepts.
Card Selection
The cardholder presents to the Cardholder System the payment card to be
used for the purchase.
Application Selection
The Cardholder System selects an application from the card, with input from
the cardholder if necessary.
Application Initiation
The Cardholder System initiates the card application to determine whether it
and the card agree about how the transaction should be processed.
Read Application
The Cardholder System reads the application data.
Purchase Initialization Request

The Cardholder System initialises the purchase by informing the Merchant
Server how the cardholder intends to pay.
Purchase Initialization Response

The Merchant Server returns the information necessary to complete the
purchase.
Cardholder Verification
The Cardholder System retrieves information from the cardholder that may
verify their identity and either presents it to the card or transmits to the
issuer for verification
Terminal Action Analysis

The Cardholder System requests an online authorisation of the transaction.
The card determines whether to decline the transaction off–line or to request
an online authorisation or referral.
Purchase Request
The Cardholder System requests a purchase and provides the Merchant
Server with the data that it, the Payment Gateway and the issuer need to
respond to the request.
Authorisation Request
The Merchant Server sends the Payment Gateway the information that it
needs to verify the authenticity of the cardholder and to create a Payment
System’s authorisation request message.
Note: SET allows a merchant to return a PRes message to the Cardholder
System before authorisation processing.
Authorisation Response
The Payment Gateway sends the Merchant Server a message that indicates
whether the transaction has been authorised or declined by the issuer.
Purchase Response
The Merchant Server informs the Cardholder System of the status of the
transaction sometime after it has received the Cardholder System’s Purchase
Request.
Issuer Script Processing and Completion

The Cardholder System ends the involvement of the cardholder and IC Card.
Capture Request
The Merchant Server may request that the Payment Gateway capture the
transaction after it has received the Payment Gateway’s Authorisation
Response.
Capture Response
The Payment Gateway notifies that Merchant Server of the status of its
request for capture.
D.2.2 IC Card—Cardholder System Functions

This section defines the transaction processing phases that involve interaction
between the IC Card application and the Cardholder System.
Phases that do not involve interaction between the card and the Cardholder System
are detailed in following Sections:
D.2.2.1 Card Selection: Describes how the Cardholder indicates which payment
card to use for the purchase.
D.2.2.2 Application Selection: Describes how the Cardholder System, with
input from the cardholder, selects a card application to participate in the
transaction.
D.2.2.3 Application Initiation: Describes how the Cardholder System initiates
the card application.
D.2.2.4 Read Application Data: Describes how the Cardholder System reads the
card application’s records.
D.2.2.5 Cardholder Verification: Describes how the Cardholder System verifies
the identity of the cardholder.
D.2.2.6 Terminal Action Analysis: Describes how the IC Card application
generates an Application Cryptogram.
D.2.2.7 Issuer Script Processing and Completion: Describes how the
Cardholder System ends its involvement with the processing of the
transaction.
D.2.2.1 Card Selection
Purpose
Card selection is the phase of transaction processing in which the cardholder
indicates which payment card should be used for the purchase. This phase
supplements the SET defined account selection process.
Conditions of execution
The Cardholder System shall always perform Card Selection.
Process description
The Cardholder System shall integrate the execution of Card Selection with the
execution of account selection. In doing so, the following requirements shall be met:
• All brands accepted by the Merchant Server shall be displayed.
• The Cardholder shall be offered all available payment options.
• Once a chip card has been selected, the Cardholder System shall request that the
Cardholder not remove the card until prompted to do so.
D.2.2.2 Application Selection
Introduction
Application Selection is the transaction-processing phase in which the Cardholder
System selects the application from the IC Card.
This phase is mandatory.
Process description
The Cardholder System shall perform Application Selection as prescribed by Part II
of Book 1
To create the list of supported applications, the Cardholder System shall:

• Examine the SET Initiation Message to determine the brands supported by the
merchant. Use the BrandID—AID table to build the list of supported AIDs.
If no mutually supported applications are found, the Cardholder System shall either:
• Automatically update the Brand—AID table.
• Prompt the Cardholder to confirm the correct card has been inserted, and if so,
update the Brand—AID table. Otherwise request the Cardholder to remove the
card and return to the Card Selection phase. If after an update, a mutually
supported application cannot be found, the Cardholder System shall request that
the Cardholder remove the card and return to the Card Selection phase.
The Cardholder System shall display the application(s) as follows:

1 If an Application Preferred Name (tag ‘9F12’) was provided by the card

application in its response to the SELECT command, the Cardholder System
shall display it to the Cardholder.
Otherwise: the Cardholder System shall display the Application Label (tag
‘50’) that was provided by the card application in its response to the SELECT
command.
2 If an Issuer URL (tag ‘5F50’) was provided by the card application in its
response to the SELECT command, the Cardholder System may use the
Issuer URL to request an application logo and display that logo to the
Cardholder in addition to the Application Preferred Name or Application
Label. The Cardholder System shall decode the Issuer URL as prescribed by
Annex E Issuer URL for Electronic Commerce.
D.2.2.3 Application Initiation
Purpose
Application Initiation is the transaction-processing phase during which the IC Card
and the Cardholder System learn the details of the transaction and make an
informed decision as to whether they wish to participate.
Process description
The Cardholder System shall initiate the application as prescribed by Section 6.1..
It shall assume the role of the “terminal” described therein.
D.2.2.4 Read Application Data
Purpose
Read Application Data is the transaction processing phase in which the Cardholder
System reads the files and records of the card application.
Process description
The Cardholder System shall read the application data as prescribed section 6.2. It
shall assume the role of the “terminal” described therein.
D.2.2.5 Cardholder Verification
Purpose
Cardholder Verification is the transaction-processing phase in which the Cardholder
System retrieves information from the Cardholder that may verify their identity and
either presents it to the card or transmits it to the issuer for verification.
Annex F – Electronic Commerce System Flow Diagram provides a flow diagram to

assist the reading of this section.
The Cardholder System shall perform Cardholder Verification if bit 5 of byte 1 of the
Application Interchange Profile is set to ‘1’.
Process Description
The Cardholder System shall perform the Cardholder Verification process as
prescribed by section 6.5, assuming the role of the “terminal” described therein, with
the following exceptions:
1 Determining Whether to Prompt for Off–line PIN Entry. When the method
of Cardholder Verification requested by the card (as indicated by it’s CVRs)
requires that the Cardholder provide his/her PIN for off–line verification by
the card, the Cardholder System shall determine whether there is a
mechanism for transport of the cryptogram to the issuer for authentication.
If transport of the cryptogram is not available, the Cardholder System shall
not prompt for off–line PIN entry, but shall attempt to process the next
CVR. Cardholder applications shall support the following method and may
support others. The Cardholder System shall search for the presence of the
commonChip OID in the extension to Payment Gateway Certificate. If this
OID is present, transport of the cryptogram is available.
2 Determining Whether to Prompt for Online PIN Entry. When the method of
Cardholder Verification requested by the card (as indicated by it’s CVRs)
requires that the Cardholder provide his/her PIN for online verification by
the issuer, the Cardholder System shall determine whether the Payment
Gateway supports issuer verification of an online PIN. To do this, the
Cardholder System shall search for the presence of the id–set–PIN–Any–
Source OID in the extension to Payment Gateway Certificate. If this OID is
available, the Cardholder System shall prompt for PIN entry. If this OID is
not available, the Cardholder System shall not prompt for PIN entry, but
shall attempt to process the next CVR.
Transmitting PIN Online

The Cardholder System shall encipher and transmit the Cardholder’s PIN online as
prescribed by the SET Online PIN Extension.
D.2.2.6 Terminal Action Analysis
Purpose
Terminal Action Analysis is the phase of transaction processing in which the
Cardholder System requests an online authorisation of the transaction. In response,
the card determines whether to decline the transaction off–line or to request an
online authorisation.
This phase is mandatory if the Payment Gateway supports the commonChip
extension.
Process description
The Cardholder System shall perform Terminal Action Analysis as in section 6.7.
The Cardholder System shall assume the role of the “terminal” described therein
and behave just like that terminal with the following exceptions:
1. Changes to Issuer and Terminal Action Code Processing: the Cardholder

System shall not compare the Terminal Verification Results to the card’s
Issuer Action Codes or to Terminal Action Codes.
2. GENERATE AC Command: the Cardholder System shall tailor the
GENERATE AC command by limiting the values of its reference control
parameters to ARQC.
3. Source of data requested in CDOL1: the Data Elements the Cardholder System
transmits to the card in the data field of the GENERATE AC command shall
be obtained from the sources indicated in Table D-3.
4. Converting Cryptogram Data: some of the Data Elements the Cardholder
System obtains for transmission to the card in the data field of the
GENERATE AC command must be converted to formats the card understands
as prescribed in Part I of this book.
Source of data requested in CDOL1

The Cardholder System shall obtain the data elements requested by the EMV IC
Card in the CDOL1 from the following sources and transaction processing phases
indicated below:
Data Element Transaction Source

Processing Phase
Amount, SET Initiation PurchAmt
Authorised
Amount, Other ––––––––––––––––––– Cardholder System
–
Terminal Purchase Merchant certificate
Country Code Initialization [merchcert.merchantdata.mer
country]
Terminal ––––––––––––––––––– Cardholder System
Verification –
Results
Transaction SET Initiation PurchAmt
Currency Code
Transaction Purchase PreqDate
Date Initialisation
Transaction ––––––––––––––––––– Cardholder System
Type –
Unpredictable Terminal Action The Cardholder System shall
Number Analysis generate the Unpredictable
Number as follows:
1. Obtain the SET
defined Data Element,
XID (Transaction ID).
2. Divide the XID (from
left to right) into five
4-byte blocks.
3. Exclusive-or the first
block (leftmost) with
the second block.
4. Exclusive-or the result
from Step 3 with the
third block.
fourth block.
fifth block.
The 4–byte result of this
operation is the
Unpredictable Number.
Table D - 3 - Source of data requested in CDOL1

Converting CDOL1 data
Before transmitting it to the card in the data field of the GENERATE AC command,
the Cardholder System shall convert some of the source data referenced above as
follows:
Source Conversion Procedure Output

Data
PurchAmt Extract Currency Transaction
Currency Code
PurchAmt Extract Amount Amount, Authorised
PreqDate Extract YYYYMMDD from the Transaction Date
PinitRes message and strip the
first two digits to derive
YYMMDD.
Table D - 4 - Converting CDOL1 Data for Terminal Action Analysis
D.2.2.7 Issuer Script Processing and Completion
Purpose
Issuer Script Processing and Completion is the transaction-processing phase in
which the Cardholder System terminates the involvement of the Cardholder and the
IC Card with the transaction.
Conditions of executions
Process description
The Cardholder System shall perform Issuer Script Processing and Completion
according to the following conditions:
1. The card application declines the transaction.

The Cardholder System shall terminate the transaction, inform the Cardholder
that the purchase has been declined and that it is now permissible to remove
the card from the Interface Device (IFD).
2. The PInitRes indicates the Payment Gateway does not support the Common
Chip Extension or
The PRes message has been processed and the AuthCode indicates
orderReceived, noReply, piAuthMismatch or systemError, or
The Cardholder System does not receive a PRes message in a timely manner:
The Cardholder System shall:
• perform the processing prescribed by Section 7.11, with the following
exception: the Cardholder System shall request an AAC and will assign
the value ‘Z3’ to the Authorisation Response Code (tag ‘8A’) (Inform the
Cardholder that it is now permissible to remove the card from the IFD).
3. The PRes message has been processed and the AuthCode does not indicate
orderReceived, noReply, piAuthMismatch or systemError.
The Cardholder System shall:

• Examine the contents of the acqCardExtensions of the PRes to determine
whether Issuer Scripts (tag ‘71’ or ‘72’) are present. If scripts are present
they are to be processed as Section 6.10.
• Perform the processing prescribed by Section 6.11 (using any other EMV
data from the acqCardExtensions), with the following exceptions.
• The Cardholder System shall examine the AuthCode of PRes to determine
which type of cryptogram it should request. If the AuthCode indicates
declined, callIssuer, amountError, expiredCard, invalidTransaction, the
Cardholder System shall request an AAC and will assign the value ‘05’ to
the Authorisation Response Code (tag ‘8A’). If the AuthCode indicates
approved, the Cardholder System shall request a TC and will assign the
value ‘00’ to the Authorisation Response Code (tag ‘8A’).
After receiving the card’s response to the second GENERATE AC
command and after the execution of all Issuer Scripts present, inform the
Cardholder that it is permissible to remove the card. The results of the
second GENERATE AC are ignored.
D.2.3 Cardholder System—Merchant Server Interface

This section describes the transaction processing phases that involve interaction
between the Cardholder System and the Merchant Server.
Phases of transaction processing that do not involve interaction between the
Cardholder System and the Merchant Server are detailed in Section 2.6 and 2.8.
This section describes the following transaction processing phases:
D.2.7.1 SET Initiation: describes the SET Initiation Message used to invoke the
Cardholder System.
D.2.7.2 Purchase Initialization Request & Response: describes the PInitReq and
PInitRes messages, which support initialization of the SET protocol.
D.2.7.3 Purchase Request & Response: describes the PReq and PRes messages,
which constitute the purchase transaction between the Cardholder
System and Merchant.
D.2.3.1 SET Initiation
Purpose
SET Initiation is the phase of a purchase transaction during which the Merchant
Server invokes the Cardholder System and informs it of the transaction details and
accepted payment brands.
Conditions of use
The Merchant Server shall initiate every SET purchase transaction.
Creation of SET Payment Initiation message

Merchant Servers shall create SET Payment Initiation messages as prescribed by
External Interface Guide to SET Secure Electronic Commerce.
Note: In order to provide the complete functionality of this specification, the URL in
the SET–Brand header line in the SET Initiation message must reference a
directory that contains the brandDat.mim file. When the merchant manages this
directory, the Merchant Server shall retrieve the file from a directory managed by
the brand and copy the file to its local directory. See Appendix 1 for more details.
Processing of SET Initiation Message

The Cardholder System shall process SET initiation messages as prescribed by
External Interface Guide to SET Secure Electronic Commerce.
D.2.3.2 Purchase Initialisation
Purpose
Purchase Initialization is the phase of a purchase transaction during which:
1. The Merchant Server obtains the information that it needs to understand the
context of the transaction.
2. The Cardholder System obtains the information that it needs to create a
purchase request, as well as authenticate the Merchant Server and Payment
Gateway.
Conditions of use
The Cardholder System shall initialize every purchase transaction.
Rules
The mechanism that SET provides for purchase initialisation is the PInitReq and
PInitRes messages.
The Cardholder System shall create the PInitReq message as prescribed below.
The Merchant Server shall process PInitReq and create PInitRes as prescribed by
SET.
The Cardholder System shall process PInitRes as prescribed by SET.
D.2.3.2.1 Cardholder System Creates PInitReq
Completing PInitReq
The Cardholder System shall create PInitReq as prescribed by SET, with the
following exceptions:
Step Action
1 Obtain the IC Card specific data inputs to PInitReq from the
card application.
2 Convert the data objects obtained from the card to SET formats.
Obtaining Data Objects from IC Card

The Cardholder System shall obtain the following data objects from the card
application. The sources of these data objects and elements, i.e. the phase of
transaction processing during which they are retrieved, are indicated below. Once
converted, these data objects shall serve as inputs to the PInitReq message.
SET Data Corresponding Source Tag

Input Card Data Object
Language Language Preference Application Selection ‘5F2D’
phase
BrandID AID (of selected Application Selection ‘4F’
application) phase
BIN PAN Read Application data ‘5A’
phase
Table D - 5 - IC Card Data inputs to PInitReq
Note: Cardholder Systems designed for use in a private environment (a home PC for
example) may provide an option to use a Cardholder–selected language rather than
the IC Card’s language.
Converting Data Objects to Data Inputs

The Cardholder System shall convert the data objects obtained from the card as
follows:
Data Element Conversion Procedure

PAN Let the first six digits of the PAN constitute the BIN.
AID Obtain the brand corresponding to this AID from the
Brand—AID mapping table.
Table D - 6 - Converting IC Card Data inputs to PInitReq

D.2.3.2.2 Cardholder System Processes PInitRes
Processing PInitRes
The Cardholder System shall process the PInitRes as prescribed by SET with the
following addition.
The Cardholder System shall examine the Payment Gateway’s certificate to

ascertain whether it supports the commonChip and onlinePIN extensions.
D.2.3.3 Purchase Request & Response
Purpose
Purchase Request is the transaction-processing phase in which the Cardholder
System requests the actual purchase from the merchant. Purchase Response is the
transaction-processing phase in which the Merchant Server informs the Cardholder
System of the status of the Purchase Request.
Conditions of use
The Cardholder System shall transmit the Purchase Request (PReq) message after
initializing each purchase transaction. The Merchant Server may transmit the
Purchase Response (PRes) message anytime after it receives the Purchase Request
Message, even before it sends an Authorisation Request to the Payment Gateway.
Rules
The mechanism that SET provides for purchase request is the PReq and PRes
messages.
The Cardholder System shall create the PReq message as follows:
If a SET Cardholder certificate associated with the selected account is available

during the transaction, the Cardholder System shall create a PReqDualSigned
message, otherwise it shall create a PReqUnsigned message as prescribed by this
section.
If the Cardholder Verification Method selected was Online PIN, the Cardholder
System shall create and append the onlinePIN extension to the PReq message as
prescribed in the SET Online PIN Extension.
If the Terminal Action Analysis phase resulted in an ARQC or an AAR, the

Cardholder System shall create and append the commonChip extension to the PReq
message as prescribed below.
The Merchant Server shall process the PReq and create a PRes as prescribed by
SET.
The Cardholder System shall process the PRes as prescribed by SET.
D.2.3.3.1 Cardholder System’s Creation of PReq
Completing PReq
The Cardholder System shall create the PReq as prescribed by SET, making the
following changes to the manner in which the Payment Instructions are created:
Step Action
1 Obtain the IC Card specific data inputs to the Payment
Instructions (PI).
2 Convert the data objects obtained from card to SET required
formats.
Obtaining Data Elements from IC Card

The Cardholder System shall obtain the following data elements from the card
application to serve as inputs to the PI. The sources of these data elements, i.e. the
phase of transaction processing during which they are accessed, are indicated below.
PI Input Corresponding Source Tag

Card Data
Element
Language Language Application Selection phase ‘5F2D’
Preference
BrandID AID (of selected Application Selection phase ‘4F’
application)
PAN PAN Read Application data phase ‘5A’
BIN PAN Read Application data phase ‘5A’
CardExpiry Application Read Application data phase ‘5F24’
Expiration Date
Table D - 7 - IC Card Data inputs to Payment Instructions
Converting Data Elements to PI Inputs

The Cardholder System shall convert the Data Elements obtained from the card as
follows:
Data Object Conversion Procedure

PAN The first six digits of the PAN identify the BIN.
AID Obtain the brand corresponding to this AID from the
Brand—AID mapping table.
Application Annex defines the format for Application Expiration
Expiration Date Date to be YYMMDD. However, the SET Specification
defines the format for CardExpiry to be YYYYMM.
Therefore, the Cardholder System shall reformat
Application expiration Date as prescribed below:
Drop DD.
Use same MM.
1. Convert the YY value to a four–digit year as
prescribed by EMV.
Table D - 8 - Converting IC Card Data to PI Inputs
D.2.3.3.2 Cardholder System’s Creation of Common Chip Extension
When required, the Cardholder System shall append the commonChip extension to
the PIHead portion of the PReq message. It shall code this extension as prescribed
by SET Common Chip Extension. The EMVData field of the extension must include
the Data Elements listed in the table below, when available for the transaction.
The data that appears in the EMV data field can be in any order but must be TLV
encoded and bit–wise identical to the fields presented to the IC Card. The
Cardholder System shall obtain these Data Elements from the source identified in
the last column of the table.
Name Tag Format Length Sources

Amount, Authorised ‘9F02’ n 6 SET Initiation Phase
Amount, Other ‘9F03’ n12 6 Cardholder System
Application Cryptogram ‘9F26’ b 8 Terminal Action Analysis
Application Interchange ‘82’ b 2 Application Initiation Phase
Profile
Application PAN Sequence '5F34' n2 1 Read Application Data
Number
Application Transaction ‘9F36’ b 2 Read Application Data
Counter
Cryptogram Information ‘9F27’ b 1 Terminal Action Analysis
Data
Issuer Application Data ‘9F10’ b Var. up 32 Terminal Action Analysis
Terminal Country Code ‘9F1A’ n 2 Purchase Initialisation
Terminal Verification ‘95’ b 5 Terminal Action Analysis
Results
Track–2 Equivalent Data '57' b Var. up 19 Read Application Data
Phase (the Cardholder
System shall set the PAN
and Expiration Date in this
data object to zero before
transmitting it in the
extension)
Transaction Currency Code ‘5F2A’ n 2 SET Initiation Phase
Transaction Date ‘9A’ n 3 Purchase Initialisation Phase
Transaction Type ‘9C’ n 1 Cardholder System
Unpredictable Number ‘9F37’ b 4 Terminal Action Analysis
Table D - 9 - commonChip extension data and its sources
D.2.4 Merchant Server—Payment Gateway Interface

This section describes the transaction processing phases that involve interaction
between the Merchant Server and the Payment Gateway. It defines the messages
through which Merchant Servers and Payment Gateways communicate to complete
a phase of transaction processing. Phases of transaction processing that do not
involve interaction between the Merchant Server and the Payment Gateway are
detailed in section 2.6 and section 2.7.
This section describes the following phases of transaction processing:
D.2.4.1 Authorisation Request & Response: describes the AuthReq and AuthRes
messages, which support the authorisation stage of the payment
transaction.
D.2.4.2 Capture Request & Response: describes the CapReq and CapRes
messages, which support the capture stage of the purchase transaction.
D.2.4.1 Authorisation Request and Response
Purpose
Authorisation Request is the phase in which the Merchant Server requests an
authorisation for the Cardholder’s intended purchase.
Authorisation Response is the phase in which the Payment Gateway informs the
Merchant Server whether the purchase has been approved or declined by the issuer.
It also provides the merchant with the data necessary to request the capture of the
transaction.
The Merchant Server shall transmit the Authorisation Request (AuthReq) message
after it receives a valid purchase request from the Cardholder System. The
Payment Gateway shall transmit the Authorisation Response (AuthRes) message
after it has received an authorisation response.
Rules
The Merchant Server shall create the AuthReq as prescribed by SET.
The Payment Gateway shall process AuthReq and may create AuthRes as prescribed
below.
The Merchant Server shall process AuthRes as prescribed by SET.
D.2.4.1.1 Payment Gateway Processing of AuthReq
Payment Gateway processes AuthReq

The Payment Gateway shall process the AuthReq as follows:
1 Process AuthReq as prescribed by SET
2 If the PIHead contains the commonChip extension then:
• Re–calculate the Unpredictable Number and compare the fresh results
with the Unpredictable Number contained in the commonChip extension.
• If the recalculated and transmitted Unpredictable Numbers do not
match, then proceed to AuthRes, otherwise continue.
3 Request issuer authorisation.
Re–calculating Unpredictable Number

To ensure the cryptogram is fresh, the Payment Gateway shall recalculate the
Unpredictable Number transmitted in the extension as prescribed below. The 4–byte
result of this operation is the Unpredictable Number:
1 Divide the XID (from left to right) into five 4–byte blocks.
2 Exclusive–or the first block (leftmost) with the second block.
3 Exclusive–or the result from Step 2 with the third block.
4 Exclusive–or the result from Step 3 with the fourth block.
5 Exclusive–or the result from Step 4 with the fifth block.
D.2.4.1.2 Payment Gateway Creation of AuthRes
Completing AuthRes
The Payment Gateway shall create AuthRes as prescribed by SET with the following
exception:
1 If the recalculated and transmitted Unpredictable Numbers do not

match, the Payment Gateway shall return an Authorisation Response
with AuthCode set to piAuthMismatch.
2 If the issuer transmitted Issuer Authentication Data or Issuer
Script(s) in its response to the Payment Gateway’s earlier
authorisation request, the Payment Gateway shall transmit this
information to the Cardholder System through the acqCardExtensions
in the SET AcqCardMsg.
3 If the Merchant Server is to supply the Payment Gateway or the
acquirer with the data that is required to capture approved
transactions, the Payment Gateway must transmit to the merchant
the additional data required to capture transactions in which the
cryptogram is used to verify the authenticity of the card.
Modifications to SET Acquirer Card Message

The Payment Gateway must be able to transmit Issuer Authentication Data (tag
‘91’) and Issuer Script(s) (tag ‘71’ or ‘72’) to the Cardholder System by including the
acqCardExtensions as defined in the SET Common Chip Extension.
Transmitting capture data to the Merchant Server

Merchants who supply the Payment Gateway or the acquirer with the data required
to capture approved transactions must provide the EMV data used to verify the
authenticity of the card. This additional data is the emvData field of the
commonChip extension.
To be able to provide this additional data, the Merchant Server must have received
it from the Payment Gateway in one of two fields of the AuthRes message. If the
Payment Gateway wishes to enable the Merchant Server to decrypt the emvData, to
capture outside of SET for example, the Payment Gateway must transmit it as an
extension to the AuthResPayload field of AuthRes. If not, the Payment Gateway
may transmit it via the TokenOpaque field of the Capture Token.
Since TokenOpaque is an open type (containing DER-encoded data) meaningful only

to the Payment Gateway, to transport EMVData, ChipTokenOpaque may be used as
an alternative definition for TokenOpaque, where:
ChipTokenOpaque ::= SEQUENCE {

emvData EMVData,
tokenOpaque TokenOpaque
}.
D.2.4.2 Capture Request and Response
Purpose
Capture Request is the phase of transaction processing in which the merchant
requests clearing, i.e., financial payment, for one or more previously authorized
transactions. Capture response is the phase of transaction processing in which the
Payment Gateway notifies the Merchant Server of the status of its capture request.
The means by which the Merchant Server captures transactions and the times at
which it does so may vary. For example, a merchant may delay the clearing of a
transaction and when clearing the transaction, the merchant may clear it out–of–
band to SET.
Rules
The contents of the EMVData field of the commonChip extension should be included
in Payment System messages related to the original authorisation request (e.g.,
subsequent authorisation requests/reversals needed to process split and recurring
payments, and clearing messages in general.) Exactly how this data ultimately
reaches the clearing and settlement system depends upon the processing
relationships and capabilities of the Merchant Server, Payment Gateway, merchant
back office, and the acquirer’s system.

December, 2000 Annex E – Issuer URL for Electronic Commerce 131
Annex E - Issuer URL for Electronic Commerce

Introduction
The issuer Uniform Resource Locator (URL), located in the ADF, points to the
location of (a) brand or financial institution logo(s) that the Cardholder System may
retrieve for display to the Cardholder during the transaction.
Structure of Issuer URL
The structure of the Issuer URL is illustrated below. It consists of two parts, the
Issuer’s server, which is identified by its Scheme and Authority, and an
ApplicationID:
URL <Scheme>://<Authority><ApplicationID>
Scheme Example: http://
Authority Example: www.bankname.com/
ApplicationID Examples: Brand–xCreditClassic, or a reference number.
Table E - 1 - Issuer URL data
Example of processing an Issuer URL
In order to retrieve the logo to be displayed, the Cardholder System shall generate
the Issuer URL as follows:
1 Read the URL: e.g. http://www.bankname.com/Brand—xCreditClassic.

2 Append the filename for the desired logo prior to sending the request to create:
http://www.bankname.com/Brand—xCreditClassic/small.gif
For more information
The graphic formats for the logo are defined in Appendix F of the SET 1.0
Specification.
For more information regarding URL, see IETF RFC 1738 “Uniform Resource
Locator (URL).”
132 Annex E – Issuer URL for Electronic Commerce December, 2000
THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK.

December, 2000 Annex F - E-Commerce Cardholder System Flow Diagram 133
Annex F - Electronic Commerce Cardholder

System Flow Diagram
Introduction
This appendix illustrates the flow of the Cardholder System’s processing steps.
No
Is
Application
SET Initiation Message Card Selection Application Selection Selection
successful
Yes
Purchase Initialization Purchase Initialization Read Application Application Initiation
Response Request
Is
Is commonChip
No Online PIN No
extension
requested supported
Yes Yes
Is Is
Is Is onlinePIN
No onlinePIN No Yes Yes
Off-line PIN Online PIN extension Cardholder Verification
extension
requested requested supported
supported
Yes Yes
Generate onlinePIN
Cardholder Verification Cardholder Verification No No extension
Generate Online PIN Terminal Action Analysis

extension
Is the
Application
Cryptogram Yes
an AAC
No
Generate commonChip
extension
Is a
Cardholder No
Certificate
available
Yes
PReqDualSigned PReqUnSigned
Purchase Response
Issuer Script Processing

and Completion
Figure F- 1 - Cardholder System Flow Diagram

134 Annex F - E-Commerce Cardholder System Flow December, 2000

December, 2000 Annex G - Cardholder System Implementations 135
Annex G - Electronic Commerce Cardholder

System Implementations
G.1 Overview
Introduction
This specification defines the integration of EMV card technology and SET electronic
commerce technology. In it, the communication between the card and the merchant
is managed by a system called the Cardholder System. Before the development of
Chip Electronic Commerce, a SET Cardholder System was usually a software
application stored on a PC that acted as a helper to a Web browser. This application
is commonly referred to as a SET “wallet”.
The design of a Cardholder System however, is not limited to a single device or

implementation. A growing number of implementations experiment with client-
server architectures, thereby gaining advantages such as simplified distribution and
upgrades. Similarly, certain Chip Electronic Commerce implementations have also
been designed to provide an authentication migration path, whereby a SET
cardholder certificate is used should the merchant and their acquirer not support
the IC Card’s cryptogram.
This specification does not specify or recommend any particular implementation or

describe the merits of any implementation; rather, it aims to define a high level
model of the EMV Cardholder System which members and vendors can use as part
of their design process. The aim of this informational appendix is to encourage
members and vendors to experiment with different technical configurations based
upon this specification. This appendix also explores two sample implementations
that address the issue of authenticating an chip card initiated transactions to a
merchant and acquirer who are not chip capable.
It is offered by the EMVCo working group as an aid to the ongoing SET Technical
Advisory Group efforts to define the technical requirements for server based wallets.
Definition of Cardholder System
The EMV Cardholder System is any combination of hardware and software that
allows a cardholder to conduct an EMV compliant SET payment with a merchant’s
system. It is an abstract term covering any number of logical components that reside
on a single physical device, or are distributed across any number of connected
devices.
136 Annex G - Cardholder System Implementations December, 2000
Cardholder System components
The EMV Cardholder System can be divided into seven functional components and a
internal communication protocol defining the interaction of each component. The
components are:
• Cardholder interface
• Cardholder database
• SET message manager
• SET private key manager
• EMV message manager
• IC Card Interface device
• PIN entry device (optional)
• Internal communication protocol
Components
The relationship between components of the EMV Cardholder System is depicted

below:
Card- Card- SET

holder holder Private
Device interface Key
Manager
Cardholder
IFD EMV SET

EMV IC Device Manager Message
Card
EMV PIN Manager SET
Device
SET Merchant Server

or Certificate Authority
Figure G - 1 - Cardholder System components
Overall guideline
The Cardholder System, being the sum of the components, must minimize the risk of
limited or systemic compromise. The specific security requirements must be
appropriate for the implementation of the system as a whole. For example, the risks
and therefore the security requirements for a classic SET application on a personal
computer will be less than those for a server based Cardholder System designed to
serve hundreds of cardholders.
Cardholder interface and device
The Cardholder interface and device is responsible for the system’s input/output
(such as keyboard, screen, and graphic user interface) allowing the Cardholder to
interact with the system.
The Cardholder interface and device must protect the Cardholder’s input, as well as
the display or output of system information in accordance with industry best
practice.
Cardholder database
The Cardholder database is responsible for the management of all Cardholder data,
both payment data and non–payment data, such as a telephone number. Some
configurations may store this data; others might hold it only for the duration of a
transaction
Cardholder data must be processed and stored in a manner that secures the
confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data (both personal and payment related,
such as PAN, PANSecret and Expiry) from external and internal attacks.
SET message manager

The SET message manager is responsible for the SET message interaction between
a Merchant Server and Cardholder Certificate Authority.
The SET Message Manager shall be capable of interfacing with a SET Merchant
Server or Certificate Authority as defined by the SET Specification.
SET private key manager

The SET private key manager is responsible for the use and security of the SET
Cardholder private key.
The SET Private Key Manager, in conjunction with the SET Message Manager,
must process certificate request and purchase request signing operations in a
manner that assures the security of the private key.
EMV manager
The EMV manager is responsible for the EMV message interaction between an EMV
Device and Card.
The EMV Manager must, at a minimum, support the EMV Commands, and ChipEC
protocols defined in the Chip Electronic Commerce Specification.
IC Card interface device (IFD)

The IC Card Interface device (IFD) is a physical card–reading device that is
responsible for allowing the EMV manager to communicate with an EMV card.
The IC Card Interface device must, at a minimum, be an EMV level 1 compliant

card reader capable of interfacing with the EMV manager.
PIN entry device (optional)

The PIN entry device, which is optional, is a physical Cardholder input device
capable of accepting the entry of a PIN.
The PIN entry device must comply with applicable Payment System requirements
and industry best practices.
Internal communication protocol

The Internal Communication Protocol is responsible for the communication between
the Cardholder System components. A Cardholder System may posses one or both
types of the communication protocols described below.
Internal communications between interconnected devices.

Components that reside in different devices must communicate in a manner that
ensures that the information is passed in a timely, reliable and secure manner. It
must also ensure the integrity of the individual components and their host device. At
a minimum, sensitive payment data, such as PAN, Expiry and Track 2 equivalent
data, should be protected to the same degree as they are in a SET message.
Internal communications within a device.

Components within a device must communicate in a manner that ensures the
security of both the information passed, and the integrity of the components
themselves. The implementation should follow established best practices for
financial applications running on that device/Operating System.
Organisation
Annex G includes the following sample implementations:
Annex G.2 Hosted Cardholder System:

A sample implementation of a client–server based Cardholder System where the
majority of the Cardholder System components reside on the server.
It is designed to provide Cardholder authentication either using a cryptogram, or for
those acquirers who have yet to migrate to EMV, a SET Cardholder certificate.
Annex G.3 Thick Client Cardholder System:

A sample implementation of a client–server based Cardholder System where the
majority of the Cardholder System components reside on the client.
It is designed to provide Cardholder authentication using a cryptogram, and/or a
SET Cardholder certificate.
G.2 Hosted Cardholder System

Client–server based Cardholder System
This implementation explores hosting the majority of the SET Cardholder System
components on a centralized server. This can facilitate the update and management
of a large number of Cardholder Systems as most of their functionality has been
concentrated on the server. Furthermore, as the installation of a “thin” Cardholder
Client application is less complex, it is expected that the deployment and Cardholder
usage will increase.
Component allocation
This implementation allocates the Cardholder System components as follows:
Component Location
Cardholder interface Client
Cardholder database Server
SET message manager Server
SET private key manager Server
EMV manager Client
EMV device Client
PIN entry device (optional) Client
Internal communication protocol Shared
Description of Hosted Cardholder System example

The components interact as follows:
Step Description
1 The SET Merchant Server sends a standard SET Initiation message.
2 The Chip enabled Cardholder Client forwards the wake–up message to the
Cardholder Server requesting that it complete a standard SET transaction. The
Cardholder uses a cryptogram as a key to access the server.
3 The Cardholder Server having received the Client request message, validates the
& cryptogram by contacting the issuer through an out of band mechanism, and if
4 successful, uses the information in the wakeup message to conduct a SET
transaction on the Cardholder’s behalf.
Depending on the server’s capabilities, a certificate and/or a cryptogram may be
used in the Purchase Request.
5 Upon the completion of the transaction, the Cardholder Server sends a purchase
response message to the Cardholder Client informing it of the transaction
results.
Cardholder Server
Purchase
Request
+cryptogram
Purchase
Response
SET
Cardholder SET Initiation (Wake-up) Merchant
Client Server
EMV
Figure G - 2 - Hosted Cardholder System example

G.3 Thick Client Cardholder System

Client–server based Cardholder System (thick client)
This example implementation explores hosting the majority of the SET Cardholder
System functions on the Cardholder Client, while the server provides a specialized
service to the client. The example below describes a server that manages the
certificate request and signing processes for a PReqDualsigned transaction. Note, in
this example the certificate and private key are not stored on the Cardholder Client.
This implementation might suit markets where some SET merchant/acquirers do

not support EMV transactions and where a hosted wallet is not considered
appropriate. This configuration may also allow the server to be phased out once
EMV is universally accepted.
Component allocation
This implementation allocates the Cardholder System components as follows:
Component Location
Cardholder interface Client
Cardholder database Client
SET message manager Client
SET private key manager Server
EMV manager Client
EMV device Client
PIN entry device (optional) Client
Internal communication protocol Shared
Description of Thick Client example

The components interact as follows:
Step Description
1 The SET Merchant Server sends a standard SET Initiation
message.
2 The Cardholder Client sends a standard SET Purchase
Initialization Request message indicating which payment brand
is being used and receives a standard response from the
merchant.
3 The Chip enabled Cardholder System determines from the

Initialization Response if the merchant/acquirer supports EMV.
If they do, the transaction will continue as a ChipEC
transaction and the server is not required.
If they do not, the Cardholder Client generates the Payment
Information (Payment information to be signed Data Element,
PITBS) for the SET Purchase Request and the sends it to the
server as part of a signing request to the server using a
cryptogram as the authentication data.
4 The server receives the request for authentication, and once the
cryptogram has been verified by the issuer using an out of band
mechanism, signs the PITBS data and returns it along with a
Cardholder certificate (containing the Cardholder’s public key.)
5 The Cardholder System continues the transaction as a standard
SET transaction signed with a Cardholder certificate.
Cardholder Server
Signing
Request
+cryptogram Signing
Response
+Certificate
SET Initiation (Wake-up)
Cardholder SET
ChipSET
SET PInitReq/Res Mercant
Merchant
Client
PReq/Res (DualSigned) Server
EMV
Figure G - 3 - Thick Client example

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EMV2000

Integrated Circuit Card

Part I - Data Elements and Commands

Part II - Debit and Credit Application Specification

3.3 Data Retrievable by GET PROCESSING OPTIONS 32

Annex C.2 - Application Usage Control 91

Table D - 1 - Issuer URL in FCI description 102

• Mapping of data elements to files

• Coding of specific data objects (see Annexes C and D)

• Definition of data elements and commands as they apply to the exchange of

¾Structure and referencing of files.

• Chip Electronic Commerce Specification

The Application Specification assumes familiarity with Book 1 (Application

EMV2000 Integrated Circuit Card Specification for Payment Systems

EMV2000 Integrated Circuit Card Specification for Payment Systems

EMV2000 Integrated Circuit Card Specification for Payment Systems

FIPS Pub 180-1:1995 Secure Hash Standard

IEC 512-2:1979 Specifications for electromechanical components for

ISO 639:1988 Codes for the representation of names and languages

ISO 3166:1997 Codes for the representation of names of countries

ISO 4217:1995 Codes for the representation of currencies and funds

ISO/IEC 7811-1:1995 Identification cards – Recording technique - Part 1:

ISO/IEC 7811-3:1995 Identification cards – Recording technique - Part 3: Location

ISO/IEC 7813:1995 Identification cards – Financial transaction cards

ISO/IEC 7816-1:1998 Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts

ISO/IEC 7816-2:1998 Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts

ISO/IEC 7816-3:1997 Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts

ISO/IEC 7816-4:1995 Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts

ISO/IEC 7816-5:1994 Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts

ISO/IEC 7816-6:1996 Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts

ISO 8731-1:1987 Banking - Approved algorithms for message authentication -

ISO 8372:1987 Information processing - Modes of operation for a 64-bit block

ISO/IEC 8825:1990 Information technology - Open systems interconnection -

ISO 8583:1987 Bank card originated messages - Interchange message

ISO 8583:1993 Financial transaction card originated messages - Interchange

ISO 8859:1987 Information processing - 8-bit single-byte coded graphic

ISO/IEC 9796-2: 1997 Information technology - Security techniques - Digital

ISO/IEC 9797:1994 Information technology - Security techniques - Data integrity

ISO/IEC 10116: 1997 Information technology - Modes of operation of an n-bit block

ISO/IEC 10118-3: Information technology - Security techniques - Hash functions

ISO/IEC 10373:1993 Identification cards - Test methods

Card - A payment card as defined by a payment system.

Cryptogram - Result of a cryptographic operation.

Cryptographic Algorithm - An algorithm that transforms data in order to hide or

Financial Transaction - The act between a cardholder and a merchant or acquirer

Function - A process accomplished by one or more commands and resultant actions

Key - A sequence of symbols that controls the operation of a cryptographic

Padding - Appending extra bits to either side of a data string.

Path - Concatenation of file identifiers without delimitation.

Payment System - For the purposes of this specification, Europay International

Payment Systems Environment - The set of logical conditions established within

Script - A command or a string of commands transmitted by the issuer to the

Template - Value field of a constructed data object, defined to give a logical

4. Abbreviations and Notations

AAC Application Authentication Cryptogram

AAR Application Authorisation Referral

ADF Application Definition File

AEF Application Elementary File

AFL Application File Locator

AID Application Identifier

ans Alphanumeric Special

APDU Application Protocol Data Unit

ARPC Authorisation Response Cryptogram