De Castro vs De Castro FACTS: Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991.

They planned to get married, thus they applied or a marriage license with the ! ice o the Ci"il #egistrar o Pasig City in September 199$. They had their irst se%ual relation sometime in !ctober 199$, and had regularly engaged in se% therea ter. &hen the couple went bac' to the ! ice o the Ci"il #egistrar, the marriage license had already e%pired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu o a marriage license, they e%ecuted an a ida"it dated 1( )arch 199* stating that they had been li"ing together as husband and wi e or at least i"e years. The couple got married on the same date, with +udge +ose C. ,ernabe, presiding -udge o the )etropolitan Trial Court o Pasig City, administering the ci"il rites. .e"ertheless, a ter the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went bac' to their respecti"e homes and did not li"e together as husband and wi e. /SS01: &hether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is "alid. 2134: 0nder the Family Code, the absence o any o the essential or ormal re5uisites shall render the marriage "oid ab initio, whereas a de ect in any o the essential re5uisites shall render the marriage "oidable. /n the instant case, it is clear rom the e"idence presented that petitioner and respondent did not ha"e a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. /nstead, they presented an a ida"it stating that they had been li"ing together or more than i"e years.

2owe"er, respondent hersel in e ect admitted the alsity o the a ida"it when she was as'ed during cross6e%amination. The alsity o the a ida"it cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the ormal re5uisites o marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license re5uirement or a man and a woman who ha"e li"ed together and e%clusi"ely with each other as husband and wi e or a continuous and unbro'en period o at least i"e years be ore the marriage. The aim o this pro"ision is to a"oid e%posing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation o persons outside a "alid marriage due to the publication o e"ery applicant7s name or a marriage license. /n the instant case, there was no 8scandalous cohabitation8 to protect9 in act, there was no cohabitation at all. The alse a ida"it which petitioner and respondent e%ecuted so they could push through with the marriage has no "alue whatsoe"er9 it is a mere scrap o paper. They were not e%empt rom the marriage license re5uirement. Their ailure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage "oid ab initio. Republic vs Dayot +ose was introduced to Felisa in 19:;. 2e later came to li"e as a boarder in Felisa7s house, the latter being his landlady. 3ater, Felisa re5uested him to accompany her to the Pasay City 2all, so she could claim a pac'age sent to her by her brother rom Saudi. At the PC2, upon a pre6arranged signal rom Felisa, a man bearing three olded pieces o paper approached them. They were told that +ose needed to sign the papers so that the pac'age could be released to Felisa.

2e initially re used to do so. 2owe"er, Felisa ca-oled him, and told him that his re usal could get both o them 'illed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. #eluctantly, he signed the pieces o paper, and ga"e them to the man who immediately le t. /t was in February 19:< when he disco"ered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. 2e alleged that he saw a piece o paper lying on top o the table at the sala o Felisa7s house. &hen he perused the same, he disco"ered that it was a copy o his marriage contract with Felisa. &hen he con ronted Felisa, she said she does not 'now o such. Felisa denied +ose7s allegations and de ended the "alidity o their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wi e absent the legality o marriage in the early part o 19:=, but that she had de erred contracting marriage with him on account o their age di erence. /n her pre6trial brie , Felisa e%pounded that while her marriage to +ose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain #u ina Pascual >#u ina? on (1 August 199=. !n ( +une 199(, Felisa iled an action or bigamy against +ose. Subse5uently, she iled an administrati"e complaint against +ose with the ! ice o the !mbudsman, since +ose and #u ina were both employees o the .ational Statistics and Coordinating ,oard. The !mbudsman ound +ose administrati"ely liable or disgrace ul and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty o suspension rom ser"ice or one year without emolument. The #TC ruled against +ose claiming that his story is impossible and that his action o raud has already prescribed. /t cited Article :< o the .ew Ci"il Code which re5uires that the action or annulment o marriage must be commenced by the in-ured party within our years a ter the disco"ery o the raud.

/SS01: &hether or not the action to ile an action to nulli y a marriage due to raud is sub-ect to prescription. 2134: The !S@ a"ers that +ose is deemed estopped rom assailing the legality o his marriage or lac' o a marriage license. /t is claimed that +ose and Felisa had li"ed together rom 19:; to 199=, notwithstanding +ose7s subse5uent marriage to #u ina Pascual on (1 August 199=, and that it too' +ose se"en years be ore he sought the declaration o nullity9 hence, estoppel had set in.This is erroneous. An action or nullity o marriage is imprescriptible. +ose and Felisa7s marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. .o other conclusion can be reached e%cept that it is "oid ab initio. /n this case, the right to impugn a "oid marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time. Mercado vs Tan FACTS: 4r. Aicent )ercado was pre"iously married with Thelma !li"a in 19<; be ore he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not 'now. Tan iled bigamy against )ercado and a ter a month the latter iled an action or declaration o nullity o marriage against !li"a. The decision in 199( declared marriage between )ercado and !li"a null and "oid. /SS01: &hether )ercado committed bigamy in spite o iling the declaration o nullity o the ormer marriage.

2134: A -udicial declaration o nullity o a pre"ious marriage is necessary be ore a subse5uent one can be legally contracted. !ne who enters into a subse5uent marriage without irst obtaining such -udicial declaration is guilty o bigamy. This principle applies e"en i the earlier union is characteriBed by statute as C"oid.D /n the case at bar, )ercado only iled the declaration o nullity o his marriage with !li"a right a ter Tan iled bigamy case. 2ence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. 2e contracted second marriage without the -udicial declaration o the nullity. The act that the irst marriage is "oid rom the beginning is not a de ense in a bigamy charge. Ty vs Court of Appeals /n 19<<, #eyes married Anna )aria Aillanue"a in a ci"il ceremony. They had a church wedding in the same year as well. /n 19:=, the +u"enile and 4omestic #elations Court o EC declared their marriage as null and "oid9 the ci"il one or lac' o marriage license and the subse5uent church wedding due to the lac' o consent o the parties. /n 19<9, prior to the +4#C decision, #eyes married ! elia. Then in 1991, #eyes iled or an action or declaration o nullity o his marriage with ! elia. 2e a"erred that they lac' a marriage license at the time o the celebration and that there was no -udicial declaration yet as to the nullity o his pre"ious marriage with Anna. ! elia presented e"idence pro"ing the e%istence o a "alid marriage license including the speci ic license number

designated. The lower court howe"er ruled that ! elia7s marriage with #eyes is null and "oid. The same was a irmed by the CA applying the pro"isions o the Art $= o the FC. /SS01: &hether or not the absolute nullity o the pre"ious o marriage o #eyes can be in"o'ed in the case at bar. 2134: Art. $= o the FC pro"ides that, CThe absolute nullity o a pre"ious marriage may be in"o'ed or purposes o remarriage on the basis solely o a inal -udgment declaring such pre"ious marriage "oid.D This means that be ore one can enter into a second marriage he must irst re5uire a -udicial declaration o the nullity o the pre"ious marriage and such declaration may be in"o'ed on the basis solely o a inal -udgment declaring the pre"ious marriage as "oid. For purposes other than remarriage, other e"idences may be presented and the declaration can be passed upon by the courts. /n the case at bar, the lower court and the CA cannot apply the pro"ision o the FC. ,oth marriages entered by #eyes were solemniBed prior to the FC. The old CC did not ha"e any pro"ision that states that there must be such a declaration be ore remarriage can be done hence ! elia7s marriage with #eyes is "alid. The pro"isions o the FC >too' e ect in 7:<? cannot be applied retroacti"ely especially because they would impair the "ested rights o ! elia under the CC which was operational during her marriage with #eyes. Morigo vs People FACTS:

Tenebro vs CA 3ucio )origo and 3ucia ,arrete were boardmates in ,ohol. They lost contacts or a while but a ter recei"ing a card rom ,arrete and "arious e%changes o letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 199=. ,arrete went bac' to Canada or wor' and in 1991 she iled petition or di"orce in !ntario Canada, which was granted. /n 199F, )origo married 3umbago. 2e subse5uently iled a complaint or -udicial declaration o nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. )origo was then charged with bigamy and mo"ed or a suspension o arraignment since the ci"il case pending posed a pre-udicial 5uestion in the bigamy case. )origo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with ,arrete was "oid ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good aith. /SS01: &hether )origo must ha"e iled declaration or the nullity o his marriage with ,arrete be ore his second marriage in order to be ree rom the bigamy case. 2134: )origo7s marriage with ,arrete is "oid ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony per ormed between them by a solemniBing o icer instead they -ust merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to ile declaration o the nullity o his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with 3umbago. 2ence, he did not commit bigamy and is ac5uitted in the case iled. Tenebro contracted marriage with Anca-as in 199=. The two li"ed together continuously and without interruption until the latter part o 1991, when Tenebro in ormed Anca-as that he had been pre"iously married to a certain 2ilda Aillareyes in 19:;. Petitioner therea ter le t the con-ugal dwelling which he shared with Anca-as, stating that he was going to cohabit with Aillareyes. /n 199(, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain .ilda Aillegas. Anca-as therea ter iled a complaint or bigamy against petitioner. Aillegas countered that his marriage with Aillareyes cannot be pro"en as a act there being no record o such. 2e urther argued that his second marriage, with Anca-as, has been declared "oid ab initio due to psychological incapacity. 2ence he cannot be charged or bigamy. /SS01: &hether or not Tenebro is guilty o bigamy. 2134: The prosecution was able to establish the "alidity o the irst marriage. As a second or subse5uent marriage contracted during the subsistence o petitioner7s "alid marriage to Aillareyes, petitioner7s marriage to Anca-as would be null and "oid ab initio completely regardless o petitioner7s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence o a "alid marriage is automatically "oid, the nullity o this second marriage is not per se an argument or the a"oidance o criminal liability or bigamy. Pertinently, Article ($9 o the #e"ised Penal Code criminaliBes Cany person who shall contract a second or subse5uent marriage be ore the ormer marriage has been legally dissol"ed, or be ore the absent spouse has been declared

presumpti"ely dead by means o a -udgment rendered in the proper proceedingsD. A plain reading o the law, there ore, would indicate that the pro"ision penaliBes the mere act o contracting a second or a subse5uent marriage during the subsistence o a "alid marriage. Republic vs Nolasco !n * August 19::, respondent @regorio .olasco iled be ore the #egional Trial Court o Anti5ue, ,ranch 1=, a petition or the declaration o presumpti"e death o his wi e +anet )onica Par'er, in"o'ing Article $1 o the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent7s wi e be declared presumpti"ely dead or, in the alternati"e, that the marriage be declared null and "oid. #espondent .olasco testi ied that he was a seaman and that he had irst met +anet )onica Par'er, a in a bar in 1ngland. !n 1* +anuary 19:F, respondent married +anet )onica Par'er in San +ose, Anti5ue. A ter the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a seaman and le t his wi e with his parents in San +ose, Anti5ue. Sometime in +anuary 19:(, while wor'ing o"erseas, respondent recei"ed a letter rom his mother in orming him that +anet )onica had gi"en birth to his son. The same letter in ormed him that +anet )onica had le t Anti5ue. 2is e orts to loo' or her himsel whene"er his ship doc'ed in 1ngland pro"ed ruitless. 2e also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at .o. (: #a"ena #oad, Allerton, 3i"erpool, 1ngland, the address o the bar where he and +anet )onica irst

met, were all returned to him. 2e also claimed that he in5uired rom among riends but they too had no news o +anet )onica. !n cross6e%amination, respondent stated that he had li"ed with and later married +anet )onica Par'er despite his lac' o 'nowledge as to her amily bac'ground. 2e insisted that his wi e continued to re use to gi"e him such in ormation e"en a ter they were married. 2e also testi ied that he did not report the matter o +anet )onica7s disappearance to the Philippine go"ernment authorities. The trial court granted .olasco7s +udgment dated 1F !ctober 19::. petition in a

The #epublic o the Philippines opposed the petition through the Pro"incial Prosecutor o Anti5ue who had been deputiBed to assist the Solicitor6@eneral in the instant case. The #epublic argued, irst, that .olasco did not possess a Cwell6 ounded belie that the absent spouse was already dead,D F and second, .olasco7s attempt to ha"e his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a Ccunning attemptD to circum"ent the law on marriage. /SS01: &hether or not .olasco has a well6 ounded belie that his wi e is already dead. 2134: /n ine, respondent ailed to establish that he had the well6 ounded belie re5uired by law that his absent wi e was already dead that would sustain the issuance o a court order declaring +anet )onica Par'er presumpti"ely dead.

The 4ecision o the Court o Appeals a irming the trial court7s decidion declaring that Par'er7a presumpti"e death is re"ersed, both decisions were nulli ied and set aside with costs against the respondent. ,AS/S: Article 1 o the Family Code )arriage is a special contract o permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law or the establishment o con-ugal and amily li e. /t is the oundation o the amily and an in"iolable social institution whose nature, conse5uences, and incidents are go"erned by law and not sub-ect to stipulation, e%cept that marriage settlements may i% the property relations during the marriage within the limits pro"ided by this Code. .ote: &hile the Court understands the need o respondent7s young son, @erry .olasco, or maternal care, still the re5uirements o the law must pre"ail. Since respondent ailed to satis y the clear re5uirements o the law, his petition or a -udicial declaration o presumpti"e death must be denied. Article //, Section 1F o the Constitution The State recogniBes the sanctity o amily li e and shall protect and strengthen the amily as a basic autonomous social institution Article 1$9 o the Family Code The amily, being the oundation o the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Conse5uently, amily relations are

go"erned by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructi"e o the amily shall be recogniBed or gi"en e ect.

Bienvenido vs Court of Appeals /. Facts: >/ncludes petitioner G respondent7s contention? Aurelio P. Camacho married Conse-o Aelasco in )anila on !ctober (,19$F. !n February ;, 19;F, without his marriage to Conse-o Aelasco being dissol"ed, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another marriage with respondent 3uisita C. Camacho >3uisita? with whom he had been li"ing since 19*( and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio 3uis Faustino C. Camacho >Chito? born on )ay FF, 19;1. The marriage was solemniBed in To'yo, +apan where Aurelio and 3uisita had been li"ing since 19*:. There were instances during 3uisita and Aurelio7s marriage when, because o their 5uarrels, one or the other le t the dwelling place or long periods o time. /n her case 3uisita stayed on those occasions at "arious times in 4a"ao City, 2ong'ong or +apan. /n 19;< Aurelio met petitioner .enita T. ,ien"enido, who had been estranged rom her husband, 3uis #i"era. 2e li"ed with her rom +une 19;: until Aurelio7s death on )ay F:, 19::, he li"ed with her, the last time in a duple% apartment in EueBon City. Petitioner7s daughter, .anette, stayed with them as did Aurelio7s son, Chito, who li"ed with them or about a year in 19<;. !n April (=, 19:F, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on 4elgado

Street in which they were staying rom the owners, PaB 3orenBo /n ante and SuBette /n ante6)oHoBca. /n the deed o sale and Trans er Certi icate o Title .o. F::(*= o the #egistry o 4eeds o EueBon City, issued in his name, Aurelio was described as single. !n .o"ember F;, 19:$, Aurelio e%ecuted a deed o sale o the property in a"or o petitioner .enita in consideration o the sum o PF*=,===.==, by "irtue o which Trans er Certi icate o Title .o. (F;;:1 was issued in petitioner7s name on +anuary 11, 19:*. !n September <, 19::, 3uisita and her son Chito brought this case in the #egional Trial Court o EueBon City, see'ing the annulment o the sale o the property to petitioner and the payment to them o damages. 3uisita alleged that the deed o sale was a orgery and that in any e"ent it was e%ecuted in raud o her as the legitimate wi e o Aurelio. /n answer petitioner .enita claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased the property in 5uestion using their -oint unds which they had accumulated a ter li"ing together or ourteen years, that the sale o the property by the late Aurelio to her was with respondent 3uisita7s consent9 and that she was a purchaser in good aith. //. /ssueIs: &hether the marriage o Aurelio and 3uisita is "alid. &hether the deed o sale between Aurelio and .enita is "alid. ///. #uling: J #TC: >&hat is the #TC7s basis or grant or denial o the appealK? !n August F9, 19:9, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale o the property to petitioner and dismissing the complaint o 3uisita. /t ound the deed

o sale in a"or o petitioner to be genuine and respondents 3uisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property until 19:: despite 'nowledge o the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented himsel to be single. #espondents mo"ed or a reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion. J Court o Appeals: >&hat is the CA7s basis or grant or denial o the appealK? !n appeal the respondents pre"ailed. !n +une $, 199(, the Court o Appeals re"ersed the decision o the trial court and declared respondents to be the owners o the house and lot in dispute. Although 3uisita had admitted that as early as 19:* she 'new that .enita had been staying in the premises, the appellate court held that respondents7 action was not barred by laches because 3uisita allegedly did not 'now that .enita had obtained title to the property. !n the merit, the Court o Appeals ruled that in the absence o proo to the contrary, Aurelio7s irst wi e must be presumed to ha"e been absent or se"en years without Aurelio ha"ing news o her being ali"e when Aurelio contracted a second marriage. !n this premise, it held >1? that the property in dispute belonged to the con-ugal partnership o Aurelio and 3uisita and >F? that the sale o the property to .enita was "oid or the same reason that donations between persons who are guilty o concubinage or adultery are declared "oid under Art. <(9 o the Ci"il Code. J Supreme Court: >&hat is the SC7s basis or grant or denial o the appealK? The decision appealed rom is #1A1#S14 and another one is entered, 4/S)/SS/.@ the complaint against petitioner and 41C3A#/.@ the deed o sale e%ecuted in her a"or and Trans er Certi icate o Title .o.

(F;;:1 o the #egister o 4eeds o EueBon City issued in her name to be AA3/4. /n the case at bar, the burden o proo was on respondents to show that 3uisita and Aurelio7s marriage alls under any o these e%ceptions in order to be considered "alid. They ailed to discharge this burden. /nstead the contrary appears. /t has been held that the irst e%ception re ers to the subse5uent marriage o the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage o the deserting spouse, a ter the period o se"en years had lapsed. ; This e%ception cannot be in"o'ed in this case in order to sustain the "alidity o Aurelio7s marriage to 3uisita because apparently it was Aurelio who had le t his irst wi e. At the time o his second marriage to 3uisita, he and 3uisita had already been li"ing together as husband and wi e or i"e years. /n act the couple begot a child, in 19;1, e"en be ore their marriage in 19;F. Conse5uently, there is no basis or holding that the property in 5uestion was property o the con-ugal partnership o 3uisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the irst place. The sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner7s ownership is e"idenced by a deed o absolute sale < e%ecuted with all the solemnity o a public document and by Trans er Certi icate o Title .o. (F;;:1 issued in due course in her name. /ndeed, the property in 5uestion was ac5uired by Aurelio during a long period o cohabitation with petitioner which lasted or twenty years >19;:619::?. &hile petitioner 'new respondent Chito to be Aurelio7s son way bac' in 19<;, there is nothing to show that she 'new Aurelio to be married to 3uisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himsel to be single. As ar as petitioner was concerned, Chito could ha"e been Aurelio7s child by a woman not his wi e. There was, there ore, no basis or the Court o Appeals7 ruling that

.enita was not a buyer in good aith o the property because she ought to ha"e 'nown that Aurelio was married to 3uisita. Republic vs Bermudez orino FACTS: @loria ,ermudeB and Francisco 3orino were married in +une 19:<. The wi e was unaware that her husband was a habitual drin'er with "iolent attitude and character and had the propensity to go out with his riends to the point o being unable to wor'. /n 1991 she le t him and returned to her parents together with her three children. She went abroad to wor' or her support her children. From the time she le t him, she had no communication with him or his relati"es. /n F===, nine years a ter lea"ing her husband, @loria iled a "eri ied petition with the #TC under the rules on Summary +udicial Proceedings in the Family 3aw. The lower court issued an order or the publication o the petition in a newspaper o general circulation. /n .o"ember <, F==1, the #TC granted the summary petition. Although the -udgment was inal and e%ecutors under the pro"isions o Act. F$< o the Family Code, the !S@ or the #epublic o the Philippines iled a notice o appeal. /SS01: &hether or not the actual and legal bases or a -udicial declaration o presumpti"e death under Art $1 o the Family Code were duly established. 2134: Art. F(: o the Family Code under Title L/ Summary +udicial Proceeding in the Family 3aw, sets the tenor or cases scoured by these rules, to wit:

ArtF(:. 0ntil modi ied by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases pro"ided or in this Code re5uiring summary court proceeding. Such cases shall be decided in an e%pedition7s manner with out regards technical rules. The -udge o the #TC ully complied with the abo"e6 cited pro"ision by e%peditiously rending -udgment within ninety >9=? days a ter the ormal o er o e"idence by the petitioner. !antos vs CA Facts: 3eouel irst met +ulia in /loilo City. The meeting later pro"ed to be an e"ent ul day or both o them or they got married on September F=, 19:;. 3eouel and +ulia li"ed with the latter7s parents. The ecstasy, howe"er, did not last long. /t was bound to happen, 3eouel a"erred, because o the re5uent inter erence by +ulia7s parents into the young spouses7 amily a airs. !ccasionally, the couple would also start a C5uarrelD o"er a number o things li'e when and where the couple should start li"ing independently rom +ulia7s parents or whene"er +ulia would e%press resentment on 3eouel7s spending a ew days with his own parents. !n )ay 1:, 19::, +ulia inally le t or the 0.S. to wor' as a nurse despite his husband7s pleas to so dissuade her. Se"en months a ter her departure, +ulia called 3eouel or the irst time. She promised to return home upon the e%piration o her contract but she ne"er did. &hen 3eouel got a chance to "isit the 0.S., where he underwent a training program under the auspices o the Armed Forces o the Philippines he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with +ulia,

but all his e orts were o no a"ail. 3eouel argues that the ailure o +ulia to return home, or at the "ery least to communicate with him, or more than i"e years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married li e. /ssue: &hether or not +ulia is psychologically incapacitated under Article (; o the FC. #uling: The use o the phrase Cpsychological incapacityD under Article (; o the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases o psychoses as, li'ewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, e%tremely low intelligence, immaturity and li'e circumstances. Article (; o the Family Code cannot be construed independently o but must stand in con-unction with e%isting precepts in our law on marriage. Thus, correlated, psychological incapacity should re er to no less than a mental >not physical? incapacity that causes a party to be truly incogniti"e o the basic marital co"enants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so e%pressed by Article ;: o the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to li"e together, obser"e lo"e, respect and idelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment o the law has been to con ine the meaning o psychological incapacity to the most serious cases o personality disorders clearly demonstrati"e o an utter insensiti"ity or inability to gi"e meaning and signi icance to the marriage. This psychological condition must e%ist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

C"i Ming Tsoi vs CA Facts: Chi )ing Tsoi and @ina 3ao were married on )ay FF, 19::. 0ntil their separation on )arch 1*, 19:9, there was no se%ual contact between them. 2ence, @ina >wi e? iled a petition or the declaration o nullity o their marriage. )edical e%aminations showed that the wi e was healthy, normal and still a "irgin, while the husband was ound to be capable o ha"ing se%ual intercourse since he was not impotent. The wi e claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closet homose%ual as he did not show his penis and since he was using his mother7s eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. She also claimed that her husband married her, a Filipino citiBen, in order to ac5uire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance o a normal man. !n the other hand, the husband claimed that it was his wi e who was psychologically incapacitated to per orm basic marital obligations. 2e asserts that his wi e a"oided him whene"er he wants to ha"e se%ual intercourse with her. 2e urther claimed that his wi e iled the case because she was a raid that she would be orced to return the pieces o -ewelry o his mother, and that he might consummate their marriage. 2e also insisted that their marriage would remain "alid because they are still "ery young and there is still a chance to o"ercome their di erences. The trial court declared their marriage "oid on account o psychological incapacity o the husband. The Court o Appeals a irmed the decision o the trial court. /ssue:

&hether or not the prolonged re usal o the husband to ha"e se%ual cooperation or the procreation o children with his wi e is e5ui"alent to psychological incapacity. #uling: Mes. The prolonged re usal o the husband to ha"e se%ual cooperation or the procreation o children with his wi e is e5ui"alent to psychological incapacity. / a spouse, although physically capable but simply re uses to per orm his or her essential marriage obligations, and the re usal is senseless and constant, the Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn re usal. The husband7s senseless and protracted re usal to ul ill his marital obligations is e5ui"alent to psychological incapacity. !ne o the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to Cprocreate children based on the uni"ersal principle that procreation o children through se%ual cooperation is the basic end o marriage. Constant non6 ul illment o this obligation will inally destroy the integrity or wholeness o the marriage. 4ecision a irmed and petition denied or lac' o merit. Marcos vs Marcos FACTS: ,renda ,. )arcos married &ilson )arcos in 19:F and they had i"e children. Alleging that the husband ailed to pro"ide material support to the amily and ha"e resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, ,renda iled a case or the nullity o the marriage on the ground that &ilson )arcos has psychological incapacity. The #TC declared the

marriage null and "oid under Article (; which was howe"er re"ersed by the Court o Appeals /SS01S: 1. &hether personal medical or psychological e%amination o the respondent by a physician is a re5uirement or a declaration o psychological incapacity. F. &hether or not the totality o e"idence presented in this case show psychological incapacity. 2134: Psychological incapacity, as a ground or declaring the nullity o a marriage, may be established by the totality o e"idencepresented. There is no re5uirement, howe"er that the respondent should be e%amined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditionsince 5ua non or such declaration.Although this Court is su iciently con"inced that respondent ailed to pro"ide material support to the amily and may ha"eresorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality o his acts does not lead to a conclusion o psychological incapacity on hispart. There is absolutely no showing that his Cde ectsD were already present at the inception o the marriage or that they areincurable.Aerily, the beha"ior o respondent can be attributed to the act that he had lost his -ob and was not gain ully employed or aperiod o more than si% years. /t was during this period that he became intermittently drun', ailed to gi"e material and moral support,and e"en le t the amily home.Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception o the marriage. 15uallyimportant, there is no e"idence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gain ully employed as a ta%i dri"er./n sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution o the marriage or ailure o petitioner to show that the alleged

psychologicalincapacity is characteriBed by gra"ity, -uridical antecedence and incurability9 and or her ailure to obser"e the guidelines outlined in)olina. Republic vs #uintero $amano FACTS: 3olita Euintero62amano iled a complaint in 199; or declaration o nullity o her marriage with Toshio 2amano, a +apanese national, on the ground o psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common6law relationship in +apan and li"ed in the Philippines or a month. Therea ter, Toshio went bac' to +apan and stayed there or hal o 19:<. 3olita then ga"e birth on .o"ember 1;, 19:<. /n 19::, 3olita and Toshio got married in )TC6,acoor, Ca"ite. A ter a month o their marriage, Toshio returned to +apan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his amily. Toshio sent money or two months and a ter that he stopped gi"ing inancial support. She wrote him se"eral times but ne"er respondent. /n 1991, she learned rom her riend that Toshio "isited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child. Toshio was no longer residing at his gi"en address thus summons issued to him remained unser"ed. Conse5uently, in 199;, 3olita iled an e% parte motion or lea"e to e ect ser"ice o summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy o the petition, was published in a newspaper o general circulation gi"ing Toshio 1* days to ile his answer. Toshio iled to respond a ter the lapse o ;= days rom publication, thus, 3olita iled

a motion to re er the case to the prosecutor in"estigation.

or

/SS01: &hether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to per orm his marital obligation. 2134: The Court is mind ul o the 19:< Constitution to protect and strengthen the amily as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the oundation o the amily. Thus, any doubt should be resol"ed in a"or o the "alidity o the marriage. Toshio7s act o abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was ne"er alleged nor pro"en to be due to some 'ind o psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical e%aminations are not needed, it would ha"e greatly helped 3olita had she presented e"idence that medically or clinically identi ied Toshio7s illness. This could ha"e been done through an e%pert witness. /t is essential that a person show incapability o doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. 2ence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated. Antonio vs Reyes /n 199=, 3eo married )arie, the latter being ten years his senior. /n 199(, 3eo iled to annul the marriage due to )arie7s P/. 3eo claimed that )arie persistently lied about hersel , the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other e"ents or things. She would claim that she is a psychologist but she is not. She7d claim she is a singer with the company ,lac'gold and that she is the latter7s number

1 money ma'er but she7s not. She7d also spend la"ishly as opposed to her monthly income. She abricates things and people only to ser"e her ma'e belie"e world. 3eo presented an e%pert that pro"ed )arie7s P/. )arie denied all 3eo7s allegations and also presented an e%pert to pro"e her case. The #TC ruled against )arie and annulled the marriage. The )atrimonial Tribunal o the church also annulled the marriage and was a irmed by the Aatican7s #oman #ata. The CA re"ersed the decision hence the appeal. /SS01: &hether or not P/ is attendant to the case. 2134: Mes, P/ is attendant. The guidelines established in the )olina case is properly established in the case at bar. The SC also emphasiBed what raud means as contemplated in Art $* >(? o the FC "is a "is Art $; o the FC. /n P/, the misrepresentation done by )arie points to her inade5uacy to cope with her marital obligations, 'indred to psychological incapacity. /n Art $* >(?, marriage may be annulled i the consent o either party was obtained by raud, and Article $; which enumerates the circumstances constituting raud under the pre"ious article, clari ies that Cno other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, ran', ortune or chastity shall constitute such raud as will gi"e grounds or action or the annulment o marriage.D These pro"isions o Art $* >(? and Art $; cannot be applied in the case at bar because the misrepresentations done by )arie is not considered as raud but rather such misrepresentations constitute her aberrant beha"iour which urther constitutes P/. 2er misrepresentations are not lies sought to "itiate 3eo7s consent to marry her. 2er misrepresentations

are e"idence that )arie cannot simply distinguish ictionI antasy rom reality which is so gra"e and it alls under the ourth guideline laid down in the )olina Case. Republic vs %yoy

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drun'ard, womaniBer, had no -ob, and thatsince 19:: she was already an American citiBen and not co"ered by our laws. The #TC ound the e"idences su icient and granted thedecree9 it was a irmed in the CA. /ssue:

Facts: The case is a petition or re"iew by the #P represented by the ! ice o the Solicitor @eneral on certiorari praying or there"ersal o the decision o the CA dated +uly (=, F==1 a irming the -udgment o the #TC declaring the marriage o Crasus 3. /yoy>respondent? and Ada #osal6/yoy null and "oid based on Article (;. !n 4ecember 1;, 19;1 Crasus /yoy and Ada #osal6/yoy married each other, they had * children. /n 19:$, Fely went to the 0S, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus as'ing him to sign di"orce papers. /n 19:*, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went bac' to the Philippines on se"eral occasions, during one she attended the marriage o one o her children inwhich she used her husband7s last name as hers in the in"itation. )arch F*, 199<, Crasus iled a complaint or declaration o nullity alleging that Fely7s acts brought Cdanger and dishonorD to the amily and were mani estations o her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certi ication o the recording o their marriage contract, and the in"itation where Fely used her newhusband7s last name as e"idences. 4oes abandonment and se%ual in idelity per constitute psychological incapacityK 2eld: The e"idences presented by the respondent establish psychological incapacity. ail to se

Furthermore, Article (; Ccontemplates downright incapacity or inability to ta'e cogniBance o and to assume the basic marital obligations9 not a mere re usal, neglect or di iculty, much less, ill will, on the part o the errant spouse. /rreconcilable di erences, con licting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, se%ual in idelity or per"ersion, and abandonment, by themsel"es, also do not warrant a inding o psychological incapacity under the said Article.D Finally, Article (; Cis not to be con used with a di"orce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes there ore mani est themsel"es. /t re ers to a serious psychological illness a licting aparty e"en be ore the celebration o marriage. /t is a malady so gra"e and so permanent as to depri"e one o awareness o the duties and responsibilities o the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.D

Almelor vs RTC as Pinas )anuel married 3eonida in 19:9. They are both medical practitioners. They begot ( children. 11 years later, 3eonida sought to annul her marriage with )anuel claiming that )anuel is psychologically incapacitated to per orm the essential marital obligations. 3eonida testi ied that )anuel is a harsh disciplinarian and that his policy towards their children are o ten uncon"entional and was the cause o their re5uent ight. )anuel has an unreasonable way o imposing discipline towards their children but is remar'ably so gentle towards his mom. 2e is more a ectionate towards his mom and this is a actor which is unreasonable or 3eonida. Further, 3eonida also testi ied that )anuel is a homose%ual as e"idenced by his unusual closeness to his male companions and that he concealed his homose%uality rom 3eonida prior to their marriage. She once caught )anuel tal'ing to a man a ectionately o"er the phone and she con irmed all her ear when she saw )anuel 'iss a man. The #TC ruled that their marriage is null and "oid not because o P/ but rather due to raud by reason o )anuel7s concealment o his homose%uality >Art $* o the FC?. The CA a irmed the #TC7s decision. /SS01: &hether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and "oid due to raud by reason o )anuel7s concealment o his homose%uality. 2134: The SC emphasiBed that homose%uality per se is not a ground to nulli y a marriage. /t is the concealment o homose%uality that would. /n the case at bar howe"er, it is not pro"en that )anuel is a homose%ual. The lower court should not ha"e ta'en the public7s perception against )anuel7s se%uality. 2is

peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower court as an indication o his homose%uality or those are not conclusi"e and are not su icient enough to pro"e so. 1"en granting that )anuel is indeed a homose%ual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and pro"en that )anuel hid such se%uality rom 3eonida and that 3eonida7s consent had been "itiated by such. Te vs Te Nenneth met #owena in a Filipino6Chinese gathering on campus. They did not ha"e interest with each other at irst but they de"eloped a certain degree o closeness due to the act that they share the same angst with their amilies. /n 199;, while still in college, #owena proposed that they should elope. Nenneth initially re used on the ground that he is young and -obless but due to #owena7s persistence Nenneth complied bringing with him P:=N. The money soon a ter disappeared and they ound themsel"es orced to return to their respecti"e home. Subse5uently, #owena7s uncle brought the two be ore a court and had had them be married. A ter marriage, Nenneth and #owena stayed with her uncle7s house where Nenneth was treated li'e a prisoner. Nenneth was ad"ised by his dad to come home otherwise he will be disinherited. !ne month later, Nenneth was able to escape and he was hidden rom #owena7s amily. Nenneth later contacted #owena urging her to li"e with his parents instead. #owena howe"er suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could li"e together separately or -ust stay with her uncle. Nenneth howe"er was already disinherited. 0pon 'nowing this, #owena said that it is better i they li"e separate li"es rom then on. Four years later, iled or

an annulment o their marriage. #owena did not ile an answer. The City Prosecutor, a ter in"estigation, submitted that he cannot determine i there is collusion between the F parties hence the need to try the merits o the case. The opinion o an e%pert was sought wherein the psychologist subse5uently ruled that both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The said relationship between 1dward and #owena is said to be undoubtedly in the wrec' and wea'ly6 ounded. The brea'6up was caused by both parties7 unreadiness to commitment and their young age. 2e was still in the state o inding his ate and ighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically in"ol"ed with hersel . The trial court ruled that the marriage is "oid upon the ruling o the e%pert psychologist. The !S@ appealed and the CA ruled in a"or o the !S@. The !S@ claimed that the psychological incapacity o both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable >)olina case?. The clinical psychologist did not personally e%amine respondent, and relied only on the in ormation pro"ided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gra"ity, -uridical antecedence and incurability. All these were re5uirements set orth in the )olina case to be ollowed as guidelines. /SS01: &hether or not the e%pert opinion o the psychologist should be admitted in lieu o the guidelines established in the landmar' case o )olina. 2134: The SC ruled that admittedly, the SC may ha"e inappropriately imposed a set o rigid rules in ascertaining P/. So much so that the subse5uent cases a ter )olina were ruled accordingly to the doctrine set therein. And that there is not much regard or the

law7s clear intention that each case is to be treated di erently, as Ccourts should interpret the pro"ision on a case6to6case basis9 guided by e%perience, the indings o e%perts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions o church tribunals.D The SC howe"er is not abandoning the )olina guidelines, the SC merely reemphasiBed that there is need to emphasiBe other perspecti"es as well which should go"ern the disposition o petitions or declaration o nullity under Article (; such as in the case at bar. The principle that each case must be -udged, not on the basis o a priori assumptions, predilections or generaliBations but according to its own acts. And, to repeat or emphasis, courts should interpret the pro"ision on a case6to6case basis9 guided by e%perience, the indings o e%perts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions o church tribunals. The SC then ruled that the marriage o Nenneth and #owena is null and "oid due to both parties7 psychological disorder as e"idenced by the inding o the e%pert psychologist. ,oth parties being a licted with gra"e, se"ere and incurable psychological incapacity. Nenneth cannot assume the essential marital obligations o li"ing together, obser"ing lo"e, respect and idelity and rendering help and support, or he is unable to ma'e e"eryday decisions without ad"ice rom others. 2e is too dependent on others. #owena cannot per orm the essential marital obligations as well due to her intolerance and impulsi"eness.

Set o Strict Standards in the /nterpretation o Art (; o the FC 1stablished in the )olina Case >#P "s )olina?

>1? The burden o proo to show the nullity o the marriage belongs to the plainti . Any doubt should be resol"ed in a"or o the e%istence and continuation o the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the act that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the "alidity o marriage and unity o the amily. Thus, our Constitution de"otes an entire Article on the Family, recogniBing it Cas the oundation o the nation.D /t decrees marriage as legally Cin"iolable,D thereby protecting it rom dissolution at the whim o the parties. ,oth the amily and marriage are to be CprotectedD by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the amily and emphasiBes their permanence, in"iolability and solidarity.

thereo . Although no e%ample o such incapacity need be gi"en here so as not to limit the application o the pro"ision under the principle o e-usdem generis, ne"ertheless such root cause must be identi ied as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature ully e%plained. 1%pert e"idence may be gi"en by 5uali ied psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

>(? The incapacity must be pro"en to be e%isting at Cthe time o the celebrationD o the marriage. The e"idence must show that the illness was e%isting when the parties e%changed their C/ do7s.D The mani estation o the illness need not be percei"able at such time, but the illness itsel must ha"e attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

>F? The root cause o the psychological incapacity must be >a? medically or clinically identi ied, >b? alleged in the complaint, >c? su iciently pro"en by e%perts and >d? clearly e%plained in the decision. Article (; o the Family Code re5uires that the incapacity must be psychologicalOnot physical, although its mani estations andIor symptoms may be physical. The e"idence must con"ince the court that the parties, or one o them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an e%tent that the person could not ha"e 'nown the obligations he was assuming, or 'nowing them, could not ha"e gi"en "alid assumption

>$? Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or e"en relati"e only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against e"eryone o the same se%. Furthermore, such incapacity must be rele"ant to the assumption o marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, li'e the e%ercise o a pro ession or employment in a -ob. 2ence, a pediatrician may be e ecti"e in diagnosing illnesses o children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise hisIher own children as an essential obligation o marriage.

>*? Such illness must be gra"e enough to bring about the disability o the party to assume the essential obligations o marriage. Thus, Cmild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outburstsD cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a re usal, neglect or di iculty, much less ill will. /n other words, there is a natal or super"ening disabling actor in the person, an ad"erse integral element in the personality structure that e ecti"ely incapacitates the person rom really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

CThe ollowing are incapable o contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations o marriage due to causes o psychological nature.D Since the purpose o including such pro"ision in our Family Code is to harmoniBe our ci"il laws with the religious aith o our people, it stands to reason that to achie"e such harmoniBation, great persuasi"e weight should be gi"en to decisions o such appellate tribunal. /deallyO sub-ect to our law on e"idenceOwhat is decreed as canonically in"alid should also be decreed ci"illy "oid. This is one instance where, in "iew o the e"ident source and purpose o the Family Code pro"ision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be gi"en persuasi"e e ect. 2ere, the State and the ChurchOwhile remaining independent, separate and apart rom each otherOshall wal' together in synodal cadence towards the same goal o protecting and cherishing marriage and the amily as the in"iolable base o the nation.

>;? The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles ;: up to <1 o the Family Code as regards the husband and wi e as well as Articles FF=, FF1 and FF* o the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non6complied marital obligation>s? must also be stated in the petition, pro"en by e"idence and included in the te%t o the decision.

><? /nterpretations gi"en by the .ational Appellate )atrimonial Tribunal o the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisi"e, should be gi"en great respect by our courts. /t is clear that Article (; was ta'en by the Family Code #e"ision Committee rom Canon 1=9* o the .ew Code o Canon 3aw, which became e ecti"e in 19:( and which pro"ides:

>:? The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or iscal and the Solicitor @eneral to appear as counsel or the state. .o decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor @eneral issues a certi ication, which will be 5uoted in the decision, brie ly stating therein his reasons or his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor @eneral, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certi ication within i teen >1*? days

rom the date the case is deemed submitted or resolution o the court. The Solicitor @eneral shall discharge the e5ui"alent unction o the de ensor "inculi contemplated under Canon 1=9*. $alili vs !antos $alili FACTS: This resol"es the motion or reconsideration o the April 1;, F==: resolution o this Court denying petitioners petition or re"iew on certiorari >under #ule $* o the #ules o Court?. The petition sought to set aside the +anuary F;, F==$ decision and September F$, F==$ resolution o the Court o Appeals >CA? in CA6 @.#. CA .o. ;==1=. Petitioner 3ester ,en-amin S. 2alili iled a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona ). Santos6 2alili null and "oid on the basis o his psychological incapacity to per orm the essential obligations o marriage in the #egional Trial Court >#TC?, Pasig City, ,ranch 1*:. 2e alleged that he wed respondent in ci"il rites thin'ing that it was a -o'e. A ter the ceremonies, they ne"er li"ed together as husband and wi e, but maintained the relationship. 2owe"er, they started ighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. /mmediately therea ter, he recei"ed pran' calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. /t was only upon ma'ing an in5uiry that he ound out that the marriage was not a'e. 1"entually, the #TC ound petitioner to be su ering rom a mi%ed personality disorder, particularly

dependent and sel 6de eating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his e%pert witness, 4r. .ati"idad 4ayan. The court a 5uo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly a ected his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. /t thus declared the marriage null and "oid. !n appeal, the CA re"ersed and set aside the decision o the trial court on the ground that the totality o the e"idence presented ailed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner mo"ed or reconsideration. /t was denied. The case was ele"ated to the Supreme Court "ia a petition or re"iew under #ule $*. &e a irmed the CAs decision and resolution upholding the "alidity o the marriage. Petitioner then iled this motion or reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and "oid on the basis o his psychological incapacity. 2e stressed that the e"idence he presented, especially the testimony o his e%pert witness, was more than enough to sustain the indings and conclusions o the trial court that he was and still is psychologically incapable o complying with the essential obligations o marriage. /SS01: &hether or not, psychological incapacity o the petitioner is a su icient ground or the nullity o marriage. &hether or not decision o the #egional Trial Court should be reinstated. 2134: Court reiterated that courts should interpret the pro"ision on psychological incapacity >as a ground or

the declaration o nullity o a marriage? on a case6to6 case basis guided by e%perience, the indings o e%perts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions o church tribunals. /n Te, this Court de ined disorder as: dependent personality

The decision o the #egional Trial Court, Pasig City, ,ranch 1*: dated April 1<, 199: is #1/.STAT14. Aspillaga vs Aspillaga Facts: #odol o Aspillaga iled a petition or annulment o marriage on the ground o psychological incapacity on the part o Aurora Aspillaga. Aurora alleged upon her return to )anila, she disco"ered that while she was in +apan, #odol o brought into their con-ugal home her cousin, 3ecita #ose A. ,esina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that #odol o7s cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration o their marriage and their e"entual separation. 4uring trial, e%pert witness 4r. 1duardo )aaba e%plained that both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The #TC ound the parties psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage. The CA re"ersed the #TC decision and declared the marriage o #odol o and Aurora Aspillaga "alid. Petitioner iled a motion or reconsideration, but the motion was also denied. 2ence this petition. /ssue: &hether or not the marriage is "oid on the ground o the parties7 psychological incapacity 2eld: .o. As early as 199*, in Santos ". Court o Appeals >@.#. .o. 11F=19, +anuary $, 199*?, it has been categorically ruled that:

a personality disorder characteriBed by a pattern o dependent and submissi"e beha"ior. Such indi"iduals usually lac' sel 6esteem and re5uently belittle their capabilities9 they ear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a 5uest or o"erprotection. /n her psychological report, 4r. 4ayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was e"ident in the act that petitioner was "ery much attached to his parents and depended on them or decisions. Petitioners mother e"en had to be the one to tell him to see' legal help when he elt con used on what action to ta'e upon learning that his marriage to respondent was or real. 0ltimately, 4r. 4ayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was gra"e and incurable and already e%istent at the time o the celebration o his marriage to respondent From the oregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed su ering rom psychological incapacity that e ecti"ely renders him unable to per orm the essential obligations o marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and "oid

Psychological incapacity re5uired by Art. (; must be characteriBed by >a? gra"ity, >b? -uridical antecedence, and >c? incurability. The incapacity must be gra"e or serious such that the party would be incapable o carrying out the ordinary duties re5uired in marriage9 it must be rooted in the history o the party antedating the marriage, although the o"ert mani estations may emerge only a ter the marriage9 and it must be incurable or, e"en i it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means o the party in"ol"ed. /n the instant case, 4r. )aaba ailed to re"eal that the psychological conditions were gra"e or serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations o marriage. /ndeed, 4r. )aaba was able to establish the parties7 personality disorder9 howe"er, he ailed to lin' the parties7 psychological disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to per orm their obligations as husband and wi e. The act that these psychological conditions will hamper their per ormance o their marital obligations does not mean that they su er rom psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article (; o the Family Code. )ere di iculty is not synonymous to incapacity. /t must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than -ust a Cdi iculty,D Cre usalD or CneglectD in the per ormance o some marital obligations >#epublic ". CA?. The intention o the law is to con ine the meaning o Cpsychological incapacityD to the most serious cases o personality disorders clearly demonstrati"e o an utter insensiti"ity or inability to gi"e meaning and signi icance to the marriage >Tongol ". Tongol, @.#. .o. 1*<;1=, !ctober 19, F==<?.

Psychological disorders do not mani est that both parties are truly incapacitated to per orm the basic marital co"enants. )oreo"er, there is nothing that shows incurability o these disorders. /ncompatibility and irreconcilable di erences cannot be e5uated with psychological incapacity as understood -uristically. As to #odol o7s allegation that Aurora was a spendthri t, the same li'ewise ails to con"ince. &hile disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, a ect the other aspects o one7s marriage as to ma'e the wedloc' unsatis actory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage null and "oid. /n act, the Court ta'es -udicial notice o the act that disagreements regarding money matters are a common, and e"en normal, occurrence between husbands and wi"es.

Ninal vs Bayadog FACTS: Pepito .inal was married with Teodul a ,ellones on September F;, 19<$. They had ( children namely ,abyline, /ngrid and Archie, petitioners. 4ue to the shot in licted by Pepito to Teodul a, the latter died on April F$, 19:* lea"ing the children under the guardianship o 1ngrace .inal. 1 year and : months later, Pepito and .orma ,adayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an a ida"it stating that they had li"ed together or at least * years e%empting rom securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 19<<. A ter his

death, petitioners iled a petition or declaration o nullity o the marriage o Pepito and .orma alleging that said marriage was "oid or lac' o marriage license. /SS01S: 1. &hether or not the second marriage o Pepito was "oidK F. &hether or not the heirs o the deceased may ile or the declaration o the nullity o Pepito7s marriage a ter his deathK 2134: The marriage o Pepito and .orma is "oid or absence o the marriage license. They cannot be e%empted e"en though they instituted an a ida"it and claimed that they cohabit or at least * years because rom the time o Pepito7s irst marriage was dissol"ed to the time o his marriage with .orma, only about F= months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his irst wi e had separated in act, and therea ter both Pepito and .orma had started li"ing with each other that has already lasted or i"e years, the act remains that their i"e6year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. 2ence, his marriage to .orma is still "oid. Aoid marriages are deemed to ha"e not ta'en place and cannot be the source o rights. /t can be 5uestioned e"en a ter the death o one o the parties and any proper interested party may attac' a "oid marriage. Carlos vs !andoval

Teo ilo Carlos and petitioner +uan 4e 4ios Carlos were brothers who each ha"e three parcels o land by "irtue o inheritance. 3ater Teo ilo died intestate. 2e was sur"i"ed by respondents Felicidad Sando"al and their son, Teo ilo Carlos //. 0pon Teo ilo7s death, two parcels o land were registered in the name o Felicidad and Teo ilo //. /n August 199*, Carlos commenced an action against respondents be ore the court a 5uo. /n his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in "iew o the absence o the re5uired marriage license. 2e li'ewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adopti"e ather o Teo ilo Carlos //. 2e argued that the properties co"ered by such certi icates o title, including the sums recei"ed by respondents as proceeds, should be recon"eyed to him. 2134: The grounds or declaration o absolute nullity o marriage must be pro"ed. .either -udgment on the pleadings nor summary -udgment is allowed. So is con ession o -udgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should ha"e applied #ule (* o the #ules o Court go"erning summary -udgment, instead o the rule on -udgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. &hether it is based on -udgment on the pleadings or summary -udgment, the CA was correct in re"ersing the summary -udgment rendered by the trial court. ,oth the rules on -udgment on the pleadings and summary -udgments ha"e no place in cases o declaration o absolute nullity o marriage and e"en in annulment o marriage. A petition or declaration o absolute nullity o "oid marriage may be iled solely by the husband or wi e.

1%ceptions: >1? .ullity o marriage cases commenced be ore the e ecti"ity o A.). .o. =F61161=6SC9 and >F? )arriages celebrated during the e ecti"ity o the Ci"il Code. 0nder the #ule on 4eclaration o Absolute .ullity o Aoid )arriages and Annulment o Aoidable )arriages, the petition or declaration o absolute nullity o marriage may not be iled by any party outside o the marriage. A petition or declaration o absolute nullity o "oid marriage may be iled solely by the husband or the wi e. !nly an aggrie"ed or in-ured spouse may ile a petition or annulment o "oidable marriages or declaration o absolute nullity o "oid marriages. Such petition cannot be iled by compulsory or intestate heirs o the spouses or by the State. The Committee is o the belie that they do not ha"e a legal right to ile the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs ha"e only inchoate rights prior to the death o their predecessor, and, hence, can only 5uestion the "alidity o the marriage o the spouses upon the death o a spouse in a proceeding or the settlement o the estate o the deceased spouse iled in the regular courts. !n the other hand, the concern o the State is to preser"e marriage and not to see' its dissolution. The #ule e%tends only to marriages entered into during the e ecti"ity o the Family Code which too' e ect on August (, 19::. The ad"ent o the #ule on 4eclaration o Absolute .ullity o Aoid )arriages mar's the beginning o the end o the right o the heirs o the deceased spouse to bring a nullity o marriage case against the sur"i"ing spouse. ,ut the #ule ne"er intended to depri"e the compulsory or intestate heirs o their successional rights.

&hile A.). .o. =F61161=6SC declares that a petition or declaration o absolute nullity o marriage may be iled solely by the husband or the wi e, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, or, as stated in the #ationale o the #ules on Annulment o Aoidable )arriages and 4eclaration o Absolute .ullity o Aoid )arriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still 5uestion the "alidity o the marriage o the spouses, not in a proceeding or declaration o nullity but upon the death o a spouse in a proceeding or the settlement o the estate o the deceased spouse iled in the regular courts. /t is emphasiBed, howe"er, that the #ule does not apply to cases already commenced be ore )arch 1*, F==( although the marriage in"ol"ed is within the co"erage o the Family Code. This is so, as the new #ule which became e ecti"e on )arch 1*, F==( is prospecti"e in its application. Petitioner commenced the nullity o marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 199*. The marriage in contro"ersy was celebrated on )ay 1$, 19;F. &hich law would go"ern depends upon when the marriage too' place. The marriage ha"ing been solemniBed prior to the e ecti"ity o the Family Code, the applicable law is the Ci"il Code which was the law in e ect at the time o its celebration. ,ut the Ci"il Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage "oid. 4oes this mean that any person can bring an action or the declaration o nullity o marriageK

True, under the .ew Ci"il Code which is the law in orce at the time the respondents were married, or e"en in the Family Code, there is no speci ic pro"ision as to who can ile a petition to declare the nullity o marriage9 howe"er, only a party who can demonstrate Cproper interestD can ile the same. A petition to declare the nullity o marriage, li'e any other actions, must be prosecuted or de ended in the name o the real party6in6interest and must be based on a cause o action. Thus, in .iHal ". ,adayog, the Court held that the children ha"e the personality to ile the petition to declare the nullity o marriage o their deceased ather to their stepmother as it a ects their successional rights.