Universitt Wien Institut fr Philosophie Course: Egalitarianism Teacher: Prof.

Alexandra Couto Student: Thomas Bullemore Problematization This brief essay is about the caretakers objection. It is divided into two parts, of which the first is rather expositive and the second a bit more creative. I would like to work out a plea for luck-egalitarians answering the topic question is there a way to rescue luckegalitarianism from the vulnerability of dependent caretakers objection? in an affirmative way. First, I would like to reconstruct Elizabeth Andersons counter-example within the scheme of her more general assault on luck egalitarianism as sketched in her Whats the Point of Equality?, to then proceed to analyze her treatment of the contested view to finally cast some objections in order to show that this counter-example does not defeat what has been elsewhere called a moderate version of luck-egalitarianism. 1. The Dependent Caretakers Objection Anderson stresses the point on those who stay at home to care for their children or elderly family members and do not earn a wage for it. In so doing she attributes to luckegalitarianism the judgement that society does not owe any compensation to non-wage earning carers (who often depend on male partners) if they voluntarily chose to engage in this type of work against a background of equal opportunity.1 This state of affairs, as told by Anderson, provokes two situations of inequality: First, due to the fact that no-wage-earning carers do not earn a wage, they would be exposed to extreme poverty, lacking the income required to function as human beings and members of societywhich could also lead to a knock-on effect on their children. Subsequently women in this situation are often vulnerable to exploitation and violence by their couples, the purported difficulty for the luckegalitarians doctrine implies that poverty and resulting subordination is by choice and therefore generates no claims of justice on others. In contrast to this, Anderson defends the policy of socializing some of the costs of dependent care through subsidies.2 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

In order to marshal Andersons assault on luck-egalitarianism correctly, I should identify her argument as fivefold: (a) LE permits otherwise unacceptable forms of social oppression; (b) it doesnt help those who are left unable to function as human beings and normally cooperating members of society as a result of their own negligent decision-making; (c) it argues for paternalistic intervention in order to inhibit social oppression and provide access to basic human functionings on grounds that are disrespectful; (d) its attitude towards victims of bad brute luck is based on contemptuous pity rather than genuine egalitarian concern; and finally (e) it favours redistribution above what justice as equality would demand. 2 Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality? Ethics 109 (1999) p. 324.

The first objection raised by Anderson against luck-egalitarianisms denial of compensation to those with bad option luck focuses on the extremity or disproportionality of this position, without involving any doubt about its deeming the persons in question as less deserving or less entitled to resources than others on account of their behavior. On the contrary, it suggests that it is unreasonable not to offer protection even to the dis-praiseworthy. Her second objection is much more aggressive, because she claims that luck-egalitarianism punishes certain types of prudent or even laudable behavior.3 This way of addressing the problem, emphasizes the apparent dependence of luck egalitarians on social systems that presume the male economic agent as the norm, thus treating those who choose to devote themselves to caring for children, the elderly, and the infirm, and who consequently command little or no market wage, on the same terms as those who choose to be lazy. This criticism ends by concluding: it is not clear whether luck egalitarians have any basis for remedying the injustices that attend [caretakers] dependence on male wage earners. 4 Doesnt them? 2. Rescuing Luck Egalitarianism I think there is a difference between being a pure choice luck Egalitarian and being a luck Egalitarian who tries to combine choice and responsibility with certain basic social norms. The fact that someone could be left without access to the capabilities necessary to function as a human being out of sheer option luck, seems to me a situation that might not worry Rakowski but certainly worries Arneson. Moving from one comprehension to the other might sort ought some of the challenges posed by Anderson on luck egalitarianism. My defence will slightly follow this direction, though I genuinely believe that Andersons counter-examples do not commit luck Egalitarians to the denial of traditional egalitarian concerns as she thinks. The great caveat of Dworkins egalitarian equation is to warn us against arriving to the point in which we might end forcing ourselves equal among things we value differently.5 It is an egalitarian concern that those choices which reflect our personality and lead us to be who we choose to become, must be genuine choices.6 And I gather that although Anderson thinks she could find cases in which there are women willing to devout themselves to homemaking and child rearing with absolute freedom, it is very unlikely that this would remain a genuine choice. It seems to me, following Dworkin, that this is much more a consequence of gender stereotyping and unequal division of labour, and as such might transform a big number of cases under scrutiny we might deem lacking equality from cases of an option luck turned miserable (i.e. the poor, exploited housewife who freely decided to become a carer once), to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3

Carl Knight, Luck Egalitarianism: Equality, Responsibility and Justice (EdinburghUniversity Press, 2009), p. 141 4 Elizabeth Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 297-8 5 This is, in fact, one of his criticisms against welfarist positions. See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 11. See also Ronald Dworkin What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981). 6 Genuine in the sense used by Cohen.

cases of pure brute luck (where the woman didnt choose freely because of social conditions).7 Since a decision taken on unfair circumstances is not a completely free decision, then its outcome is closer to luck than choice; someone coming from a poorer background doesnt have the same option-set than someone who does not,8 and thus should be held responsible for her choice to a lesser extent. Given this, most probably the luck egalitarian would agree that the situation is unjust and demands compensation, because now the problem has been restated as a problem of inequality of opportunities, and sure a luck egalitarian would not seek to defend the distributive outcomes of such a society.9 Stated this way, it is clear that this counter example does not cast any flaw on the luck egalitarian argument, because it is indeed a matter of its concern (equality of opportunities).10 Anderson might extreme the claim by looking for women who choose care rearing over career chasing knowing perfectly well that their husbands would result selfish and oppressive, and yet still argue for redistribution. I think that luck egalitarianism will likewise hold, because any such decisions are always taken in non-ideal contexts, and our context regarding life projects and public roles is much more rather like a very unfair world.11 For all this, I dont see why a luckegalitarian should be coined as a victim of the caretakers objection. I think luck egalitarians could rightly answer Andersons objection in terms of casting some doubts on allegedly genuine decisions such as these, by saying that such decisions couldnt be genuine and thus they dont encompass any sort of personal responsibility such as those which disqualify compensation. However, if Andersons claim really is that such decisions could nonetheless be genuine, given perfect information and clear judgement about the disempowering prospects for the mother (or will be mother), and still those women could call for redistribution if they result oppressed, then it seems to me she is rather compromising herself with an emotion-laden vindication. I think it is straightforwardly egalitarian to compensate for a well-known unpaid job [such as this], but it doesnt seem to me to be just that everyone is required to share their resources with this new caretaker just because she decided to enslave herself. Collecting taxes in order to dispense such selfdeprecating needs is obnoxious. If the reason to subsidize is not based on this, but on the fact that there is a societal structure that doesnt allow people to choose freely, then I think democratic egalitarianism and luck egalitarianism offer the same solution in total harmony, though only because the decision under scrutiny is far from genuine. Well not quite, because luck egalitarians prefer to compensate through market structure than through positive action, or something likewise. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 8

See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue Revisited, Ethics 113 (2002), p. 137. Here I follow Alexander Kaufman. On option-sets see Alexander Kaufman, Choice, Responsibility and Equality, Political Studies 52 (2004). 9 Luck-egalitarians like Cohen stressed the point of opportunities. 10 See Alexander Brown, Luck Egalitarianism and Democratic Equality, Ethical Perspectives 12, no. 3 (2005), p. 320 11 I do know that such an argument, unveiled of all its contextual disguise, could be recognized as nothing less than the claim that there is no free will at all. But now, I suppose, it will not be necessary to dogmatize in advance.

Subsequently, I think it is also perfectly in line with luck egalitarianism that true equality requires a shift in social norms so that men and women accept an equal role in primary child-care. If, again, we understand the problem of vulnerable dependent caretakers not as the consequence of mere sheer chance and choice, but as the consequence of an intrinsically unfair societal infrastructure that distributes burdens within the family unequally, the luck egalitarian can answeras Rakowski doesthat it is unfair that the opportunity cost of choosing to remain at home to look after ones own children rather than go out to work must fall exclusively on the maternal parent. So, how should a luck egalitarian compensate the vulnerable dependent caretaker? Within the luck egalitarian scheme, distributions remain sensitive to choice, but the institutional background of those choices is corrected in order to reward worthy choices that would otherwise go unrewarded.12 I agree that Anderson scores a goal against luck egalitarianism by saying that its bias towards market choices leads in some cases to injure the non-negligent, but assuming that, we might still postpone her harsh conclusion13 when luck egalitarianism is flexible to the regulation of markets better to represent social value. As Knight says, recognition of the components of social value requires no modification of the central ideas of luck egalitarianism, because the very young and the infirm are not responsible for their need for assistance, and hence are entitled. 14 We must, then, adequate (regulate) markets in accordance to social value. Dworkin himself should have been prone to this strategy when he said [t]here is no such thing as a natural market: we use market to designate a range of economic mechanisms all of them regulated and therefore defined in some way.15 Nothing keeps us out from commodifying this new realm as yet not commodified by applying market rhetoric to it,16 it is quite within luck egalitarian doctrine to reward those who perform a socially valuable activity that happens to be underpaid by the market by remunerating at a rate higher than that naturally set by the unregulated market itself.17 Having children and taking care of the infirm are matters of social value, and those devoted to fulfill those roles are genuine addressees of a market regulated by social value. Deeming these socially valuable activities as a type of individual choice bound to be subsidize, appears to be in agreement with Dworkins maxima people should pay the price of the life they lead, measured in what others give up in order that they can do so,18 and thus granted on luck-egalitarian principles, if we are in front of a choice which benefits society, the cost of it should be endured by society.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 13

Carl Knight, Op. Cit., p 143. See footnote number 4. 14 Knight, ibid. 15 See Ronald Dworkin, Op. Cit., p. 327 16 I use these terms in the way they were first introduced by Margaret Radin. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, Harvard Law Review Vol. 100, No. 8 (Jun., 1987), pp. 1849-1937 17 Knight, Op. Cit., p. 142 18 See Ronald Dworkin, What is (), p. 294

3. Concluding Remarks I conclude this brief essay by summing up in a nutshell my two basic arguments to rescue luck-egalitarianism from the nets of the Andersonian objection. First, I argued in order to show that such a choice that leaves the caretaker in an unequal position is by no means genuine, thus the problem should be re-stated in order to take into account the social phenomena which affects such a decision. Once this is done, clearly luck-egalitarians who are concerned with equality of opportunities could hand a proper luck-egalitarian solution to the problem (and thus forget the problem of pure option luck). Taken this into account, in a second argument I showed that an application of Dworkins market rhetoric to an area which is yet uncommodified, could also solve the problem in a proper luck-egalitarian way.