Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Itwwrrv(
t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a c u l t y o f t h e U.S. H r m Y Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of the requirement5 for the degree MASTER OF M I L I T A R Y ART AND SCIENCE
bY
B.S.,
F o r t Leavenwor th,
Kansas
I985
A p p r o v e d fur p u b 1 i c r e l e a s e ;
di;tr
itutior,
1 5
u n l i m t~ ed.
SCIENCE
PAC;
Name o f c a n d i d a t e
R o b e r t J. S t .
ilnue.
Jr.
1 1t l e o f t h e s i s
A p p r o v e d by:
The C o m b i n e d Arms R o l e ot A r m o r e d I n t a n t r y
, ,,!/.3>. ' ) () . .
,
4(...f
..
K T L ,
,
Ful ton,
T h e s i s Commi t t e e C h a i r m a n
Lidd'tenant Colonel
J o h n S.
PI.&<.
Member
C. C r o w l e y , B . S .
Member
C a p t a i n J o n a t h a n M.
Accepted t h i s
/3 d a y
'
H o u s e , Ph.
D.
1985 b y :
of
9
,
Phi I i p
2.
Brookes, Ph.D.
The o p i n i o n s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r e t h o s e o f t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r a n d do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t t h e v i e w s ot t h e U.S. A r m y Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e o r any o!her government agency. t References t o t h i s study s h o u l i l include the foresoino s t ~ t e m e n t . )
ABSTRACT
by MaJOr R o b e r t
T h i s s t u d y i s an a n a l y s i s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p r o p e r t a c t i c a l r o l e of i n f a n t r y e q u i p p e d w i t h t h e B r a d l e y I n f a n t r y F i g h t i n g V e h i c l e (BIFU). T h a t r o l e i s s h a p e d by t h e demands of t h e modern b a t t l e f i e l d i n c l u d i n g t h e e x p e c t e d S o v i e t - t y p e t h r e a t , t h e n a t u r a l s e t t i n g f o r b a t t l e c r e a t e d by t e r r a i n a n d w e a t h e r , a n d t h e e f f e c t s o f w e a p o n s w h i c h s i g n i f i c a n t l y a1 t e r that natural setting. The r o l e i s a l s o a t t e c t e d b y t h e p r a c t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s t o f i g h t a s c o m b i n e d arms. The h i s t o r y of c o m b i n e d a r m s w a r f a r e f r o m World War I t o t h e p r e s e n t r e v e a l s t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y and s u p p l e m e n t a r y e f f e c t s t h a t each p r i n c i p a l g r o u n d arm - i n f a n t r y , t a n k s , and artillery c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e c o m b i n e d arms b a t t l e .
T h i s study concludes that there i s a requirement f o r three kinds of infantry: l i g h t i n f a n t r y which f i g h t s i n close, d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n ; regular i n f a n t r y which fights the manpower-intensive, dismounted b a t t l e s such as p o s i t i o n a l d e f e n s e s a n d a t t a c k s o f f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s , s u p p o r t e d by t a n k s a n d o t h e r h e a v y weapons; a n d a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y , e q u i p p e d w i t h t h e BIFU, w h i c h t i g h t s i n c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h m a i n b a t t l e t a n k s i n o f f e n s i v e and m o b i l e d e f e n s i v e combat. T h i s s t u d y a l s o c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e U.S. Army s h o u l d s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r r e t e n t i o n of M l l 3 - e q u i p p e d , r e g u l a r i n f a n t r y f a r c e s t o fight the manpower-intensive, dismounted b a t t l e s for which b o t h t h e new l i g h t a n d a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y a r e i l l - d e s i g n e d . Heavy d i v i s i o n s , even b r i g a d e s , s h o u l d c o n t a i n a m i x o f t a n k , BIFV-equipped i n f a n t r y , and M113-equipped i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s t o m e e t t h e demands o f t h e m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d a n d c o m b i n e d arms w a r f a r e .
i i
TABLE OF LONTENT5
...................................
I i i
.
.
................................... .....................................
i 4 5
6
II
12
I1
DEMANDS OF THE MODERN B A T T L E F I E L D Threat l e r r a i n a n d Weather C e n t r a l Europe Desert Environments B a t t l e f i e l d Condi t i o n s Summary Endnotes DEMANDS OF C O M B I M D HHMS WARFARE
..............
13
121
28
31 3.5
39
41 45 56
7U
111
World War
...............
84
yo
98
1u2 102 1u5
IU .
INFANTRY ROLES AND COMBlNED ARMS Evolution of I n f a n t r y E v o l u t i o n of Tanks E v o l u t i o r i of A r t i l l e r y R e q u i r e m e n t s of Combined Arms I n f a n t r y Requirements i n Combined Arms "Three K i n d s of I n f a n t r y " l j e s i r e d C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ot A r m o r e d I r i f a n t r y Armored I n f a n t r y TasKs R e l a t i v e M e r i t s of t h e M I 1 3 R e l a t i v e M e r i t s ot t h e M2 61FU B r a d l e y m p I o y n i e n t Consi d e r ' a t I on . ; Summary Endnotes
.......................... ...................... 1U5 ............... 1 0 5 ...... 1 0 7 ................... 1u8 .1 11 ...................... 114 ................. 1 1 . . .............. 1 1 "
...........
1% I 130 132
.......................
..............
.....................................
....................................
I l l
u.
ZONCLUSIUNS
................................... ....................................
134
134
GIGLIOGRAPHY
INITIAL
CWIPTER I JNTRODUCT1M.l
I n mos a r m i e s we see weapons e v c , i n g on n o r a t i w i a l plan. New arms a r e i n v e n t e d and introduced without a d e f i n i t e t a c t i c a l r e a s o n , and w i t h o u t a d e f i n i t e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o s t r u c t u r e , m a i n t e n a n c e , and c o n t r o l . Old weapons a r e m a i n t a i n e d ; t h e o l d and new a r e mixed i r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e i r elemental values. Proportions are not l o g i c a l l y a r r i v e d a t , but a r e t h e o u t c a n e o f i g n o r a n t o p p o s i t i o n on t h e one s i d e and e n t h u s i a s t i c a g g r e s s i v e n e s s on t h e o t h e r . The w h o l e p r o c e s s i s a l c h e m i c a l , i s slow and c o s t l y and i n e f f i c i e n t ; u l t i m a t e l y t r i a l and e r r o r w i n s t h r o u g h . t l 1
Fuller
J.F.C.
1925
T h i s h a r s h i n d i c t m e n t o f m i l i t a r y s y s t e m s i n g e n e r a l and t h e i r a b i l i t y t o adapt, penned i n 1925 b y one of t h e most
h a s an a i r o f One must o n l y
Army t o d a y .
r e v i e w c u r r e n t d e f e n s e r e l a t e d p e r i o d i c a l s t o g a i n an a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r the f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s ample u n c e r t a i n t y
i s such a system.
involvement i n the
s i g n i f i c a n t Change,
, but
i t s a c t i v i t i e s . A s C o l o n e l Huba
t h e 1982 v e r s i o n o f FM
100-5,
weapons, army.'C21
ODerations,
the " t r i a d o f s o l d i e r s ,
O f course,
changes i n each o f
these a r e a s impact
s i g n i f i c a n t l y on t h e o t h e r two a r e a s .
Doctrine.
b a s i c d o c t r i n e were i n t r o d u c e d a s FM 100-5,
Operations, 1982.
its t i t l e
implie5
t r a i n i n g and
d o c t r i n e . A s e r i e s o f "hcw-to-fight"
f i e l d m a n u a l s were techniques f o r
Efforts to
f i g h t f u t u r e w a r s began w i t h
Soldiers.
Introduction of
the a l l - u o l u n t e e r
army a n d i n the
w a r t i m e s t r e n g t h t h r o u g h a s e r i e s of reduction actions.
S t r i n g e n t manpower c e i l i n g s imposed by 2
Congress c o u p l e d w i t h t h e c o m p l e x i tr o f modern weapons a n d s u p p o r t s y s t e m s have r e q u i r e d e m p h a s i s on r e c r u i t i n g and r e t a i n i n g h i g h q u a l i t y s o l d i e r s and l e a d e r s i n p e a c e t i m e a s never b e f o r e i n our h i s t o r y . The introduction of t h e New combat
i m p a c t on U.S.
Weaoons. massive,
defense r e s o u r c e s a r e c o n s t r a i n e d , t y p e and
S e v e r a l management p r a c t i c e s i n c l u d i n g a c o n c e p t s b a s e d development p h i l o s o p h y i n w h i c h d o c t r i n e ,
or c o n c e p t s ,
form
11 and development e f f o r t s t o f o c u s on p r o j e c t e d A r m y
o p e r a t i o n a l requirements.
the and
A r m y today:
t o be both e f f i c i e n t
(cost effective)
e f f e c t i v e ( f i g h t outnumbered and w i n )
i t must have a c l e a r l y
c a p a b i l i t i e s of n u m e r i c a l l y i n f e r i o r but q u a l i t a t i v e l y
p a r i t y w i t h the S o v i e t s . super.I.
e q u i p m e n t t h a t w i l l b e employed by b e t t e r l e d and
The P r o b l e m
volunteer
i n f a n t r y m a n may t h e t o o l s of his
b e of h i g h e r q u a l i t y than h i s predecessor,
t r a d e c o n t i n u e t o become i n c r e a s i n g l y complex.
of
The v a r i e t y
i n f a n t r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s a t t e s t s t o the complexity o f
b a t t a l i o n s w i t h d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t c a p a b i l i t i e s and
1 i m i t a t i o n s : ranger,
1 ight,
standard,
airborne, airmobile,
motorized ( h i g h tech),
mechanized,
i n f a n t r y o f t e n d i s c o v e r s t h e weapon
are c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e d i n d o c t r i n e .
highly
T h i s new t y p e o f
B I N i s b e i n g f i e l d e d now i n Europe a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
w i t h o u t c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e d d o c t r i n e a s t o how i t i s t o fight.
Purpose
i n h i s 1980 book
W i t h mechanized i n f a n t r y t h e d i f f i c u l t y l i e s i n a r r i v i n g a t a m e a n i n g f u l and l u c i d d e f i n i t i o n o f the r o l e o f i n f a n t r y i n the a r m o r e d b a t t l e and t h e w a y i t s h o u l d f i g h t by w h i c h I mean s a n e t h i n g a t t h e g r a s s r o o t s l e v e l b u t r a t h e r broader than minor t a c t i CS. C 3 1
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o make a d i s t i n c t i o n between
armored
and
mechanized
infantry.
The t e r m
armored i n f a n t r y
was
u s e d i n t h e U.S.
for
A r m y f r o m W o r l d War 1 1 u n t i l t h e l a t e 1950's
The U.S.
Army
for
i n f a n t r y equipped
w i t h any a r m o r e d p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r ,
i n r e f e r r i n g t o those
mechanized i n f a n t r y
i n f a n t r y f o r c e s e q u i p p e d w i t h BIFU and
..
as those equipped w i t h the M113. T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n n o t o n l y p r o v i d e s c o n v e n i e n t l a b e l s b u t a l s o draws a t t e n t i o n t o t h e significant differences i n capabilities, limitations, and
c o m p l e x i t y t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e these t w o forms of
infantry.
Methodology
To d e t e r m i n e t h e o p t i m a l r o l e of a n y arm o f t h e o v e r a l l
philosophy
and t h e
The demands of
t h e modern b a t t l e f i e 1 d. The
These demands
w i l l shape t h e r o l e of maneuver f o r c e s .
organizes, equips,
U.S. Army
perceived threat,
A r m y h a s been r e q u i r e d t o m a i n t a i n f o r c e s c a p a b l e o f
o p e r a t i n g v i r t u a l l y anywhere i n t h e w o r l d .
O n one hand,
it
C e n t r a l Europe and t h e M i d d l e E a s t .
I ighter forces
o f s w i f t s t r a t e g i c d e p l o y m e n t t o p e r i p h e r a l combat in terrain
zones o f t e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d by l o w i n t e n s i t y w a r f a r e
armored i n f a n t r y ,
t h e h e a v y f o r c e s employed i n e n v i r o n m e n t s l i k e c e n t r a l Europe
o r t h e M i d d l e E a s t w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d .
the
T h i s st..dr
w i l l examine a S o v i e t t y p e t h r e a t .
Although the S o v i e t s
designed t o f i g h t
E u r a s i a n l a n d mass.
the type o f
Armys
a s p a r t of
t h e U.S.
heavy
most l i k e l y be e m p l o y e d a g a i n s t a S o v i e t t y p e be shaped by t h e
The modern b a t t l e f i e l d w i l l
e l e c t r o n i c warfare,
I t w i l l be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by
non-linear
maneuver b a t t l e s ,
i n t e n s e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of h i g h l y high tempo o f a c t i v i t i e s ,
FM 100-5,
ODerations, operation
d e s c r i b e s t h e U.S.
Armys
T h i s d o c t r i n e i s b a s e d on g a i n i n g a n d m a i n t a i n i n g
enemy.
t h e y i m p l y an o f f e n s i v e l y s p i r i t e d ,
f o r c e t h a t seeks t o a c t f a s t e r
t h a n t h e enemy a n d t o m a x i m i z e
i t s c o m b a t p o w e r through u n i t y o f e f f o r t o f c o m b i n e d a r m s
r e s u l t i n g i n the d i s r u p t i o n of t h e enemy p l a n a n d d e s t r u c t i o n the b a t l e f i e l d .
o f h i s f o r c e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e d e p t h of
A key aspect of A i r L a n d B a t t l e d o c t r i n e
s combined
often
arms.
T h i s term i s used f r e e l y i n mi I i t a r y I i t e r a t u r e , l a c k of
it.
The t e r m
combined arms
includes
three r e l a t e d elements:
combined a r m s o r g a n i z a t i o n s , operations.[51
T h i s study w i l l d e t a i l
tanks,
c o n t r i b u t i o n s of other
combat a r m s ,
a i r defense and e n g i n e e r s ,
n o t be t h e f o c u s o f tank-infantry-arti
this study.
I l e r y cooperation
f r o m W o r l d War
1 through t h e r e c e n t l s r a e l i e x c u r s i o n i n t o
i n combined arms.
These p a t t e r n s the
t a c t i c a l warfare w i l l
be c o n s i d e r e d a s f u n c t i o n s o f
t h r e e p h y s i c a l e l e m e n t s of w a r e n u m e r a t e d by J . F . C .
FullerL61
mobility, protection,
and o f f e n s i v e pcwer
or
in current
t e r m s of
FM 1 0 0 - 5 a 5 t h e e l e m e n t s o f c o m b a t p o w e r : m a n e u v e r , and p r o t e c t i o n . The f o u r t h e l e m e n t o f c o m b a t
firepower, power,
leadership,
i s a m o r a l f a c t o r a n d i s d e s c r i b e d i n FM e l e m e n t by w h i c h t h e e f f e c t s o f These p a t t e r n s o f the
100-5 a s t h e c r u c i a l
f i r s t t h r e e a r e optimized.C71
tactical Army m u s t
i t s a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s t o op i m i z
t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e combined arms p o t e n t i a l .
An a n a l y s i s o f conditions,
infantry.
t h e demands of
combined arms w a r f a r e ,
in the future.
An a n a l y s i s o f
the
c a p a b i l i t i e s o f o u r v a r i o u s t y p e s of
i n f a n t r y match d a g a i n s t armored
leading,
and t r a i n i n g
armored i n f a n t r y t o b e s t accomplish t h i s o p t i m a l r o l e .
A s s t a t e d above,
combat s y s t e m s a r e o i t e n f i e l d e d b e f o r e The
t h e r e i s a c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f how t h e y a r e t o f i g h t .
U.S.
Army f i n d s i t s e l f
w r i t e how-to-fight study w i l l
d o c t r i n e f o r t h e armored i n f a n t r y .
attempt t o p r o v i d e meaningful
insights to solving
t h i s c u r r e n t B I N d o c t r i n a l dilemma.
UJWOTES
CHFIPTER I
2. C o l o n e l Huba Wass de Czege, T o w a r d a New h e r i c a n Approach t o Warfare, ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1 9 8 3 ) , p. 10-1-46.
3 . R i c h a r d E. S i m p k i n , Mechanized Infantry B r a s s e r s P u b l i s h i n g L t d , 1 9 8 0 ) , p . 2.
(Oxford:
4. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army, O D e r a t i o n s F i e l d Manual 100-5 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 8 2 ) , p p . 1-1 t h r o u g h 1-3. 5. J o n a t h a n M. H o u s e , Towards Combined A r m s W a r f a r e : A S u r v e y of T a c t i c s . D o c t r i n e . a n d O r a a n i z a t i o n i n t h e 2 0 t h C e n t u r y ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: Cunbat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e , Camand a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1984), p . 2-3.
6.
p.
J.F.C. 148.
Fuller,
T h e F o u n d a t i o n s of p. 2-5.
t h e S c i e n c e o f War,
7.
F i e l d M a n u a l 100-5,
11
Sun .rzu
FI4 1 U O - 5 ,
t h e U.S.
Army:
and t r a i n i n g . L 2 1
and t r a i n i n g c h a l l e n g e s a r e ,
it.
derivative of
What w i l l
the mid-
and h i g h - i n t e n s i t y
b a t t l e f i e l d of
is
tomorrow be l i k e '
The f u t u r i s t i c
v i e w i n FM 1 0 0 - 5
n e a r maneuver
i n each
o f modern weapons
i n c l u d e s t h e g r o w i n g t h r e a t o f n u c l e a r a n d c h e m i c a l weapons
12
of m a s s k i l l i n g a n d d e s t r u c t i v e p o w e r c u n p l e m e n t e d by new
p r e c i s i o n weaponry w i t h i n c r e a s e d range and d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s , such a s p r e c i s i o n g u i d e d m u n i t i o n s and e v e n t u a l l y d i r e c t e d e n e r g y weapons. These p o t e n t f o r c e s w i l l r e l y on
t h e sea,
a n d d e n i a l of
a medium o f
i n c r e a s i n g importance,
e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c spectrum. t h i s spectrum w i l l be v i t a l
The r e l a t i v e l y unimpeded u s e of
t o command a n d c o n t r o l
and t o the
e f f e c t i v e employment o f an e v e r t e c h n o l o g y weapon s y s t e m s .
i n c r e a s i n g a r r a y of high
Non-linearity
of
the b a t t l e f i e l d
w i l l s t r a i n comnand and c o n t r o l
and l o g i s t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s .
M o d e r n f o r c e s w i l l b e c u n e m o r e d e p e n d e n t on s p e c i a l i z e d s u p p o r t not a v a i l a b l e f r o m l o c a l environments,
stores,
c a p t u r e d enemy o f t e n be
o r e v e n frun a l l i e s .
Modern f o r c e s w i l l
vulnerable l i n e s of
A c l o s e r e x a m i n a t i o n of
threat,
t e r r a i n and weatll..,
and
The T h r e a t
Any b r i e f one,
d e s c r i p t i o n of
such a s t h i s
r i s k s e r r o r t h r o u g h o v e r - s i m p 1 i f i c a t i o n or o m i s s i o n .
13
T h e r e a r e many e x c e l l e n t t e x t s on t h e S o v i e t
today;
threat available
current,
personnel.
Only a general
threat as
i t c o n t r i b u t e s t o d e f i n i n g t h e c h a l l e n g e s of
b a t t l e f i e l d w i l l be o u t l i n e d h e r e .
t h e modern
Traditionally,
ground f o r c e s a r e t h e f o c u s o f air,
the Soviet
armed f o r c e s w i t h n a v a l ,
and o t h e r s p e c i a l i z e d f o r c e s
A1 t h o u g h f o r c e d o n t h e
employed p r i m a r i l y i n s u p p o r t r o l e s . defense
i n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s o f W o r l d War
11,
t h e S o v i e t s have
C41
When I t r e v e r t e d
sought t o a c h i e v e s u r p r i s e ,
w i t h special troops,
t o operate
rear
a n d t o a c h i e v e m a s s i v e combat S o v i e t s r e l i e d h e a v i l y on
superiority at
the d e c i s i v e p o i n t .
of tanks,
groups,
s o m e t i m e s o r g a n i z e d as c o m b i n e d a r m s m a n e u v e r penetration to
w o u l d b r e a k through a t t h e s e p o i n t s of
a t t a c k deep exploit,
or e n c i r c l e t h e enemy.
14
D u r i n g t h e p o s t W o r l d War
I 1 p e r i o d i n which the U n i t e d
p e r c e i v e d a s new r e q u i r e m e n t s o f n u c l e a r w a r .
The m a s s i n g o f combat f o r m a t i o n s , a h i s t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f S o v i e t o p e r a t i o n s , was v i e w e d a s a c r i t i c a l v u l n e r a b i l i t y and t h e c o n c e p t of c o n c e n t r a t i n g f o r a b r e a k t h r o u g h was abandoned i n f a v o r o f d i s p e r s e d m u l t i p l e a x e s o f advance a c r o s s the b r e a d t h o f the front.CS1
artillery.[61
first
I t had t h e
t o e x p l o i t n u c l e a r weapons e f f e c t s
w e a p o n s by W T O , p o w e r of
t h e S o v i e t s begar;
i n c r e a s e t h e combat
t h e i r c o n v e n t i o n a l ground f o r c e s .
During t h e p e r i o d
t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was p o u r i n g i t s d e f e n s e r e s o u r c e s i n t o t h e V i e t n a m War, i n t o a massive, t h e S o v i e t s were r e f i t t i n g and r e o r g a n i z i n g sophisticated force with increased b a t t l e under
c a p a b i l i t i e s t o fight a conventional
land-air
t h e t h r e a t of sudden e s c a l a t i o n t o n u c l e a r war.
t o complement more c l o s e l y t h e
t h e maneuver f o r c e s . and chemical
c a p a b i l i t i e s of
h e l i c o p t e r , engineer,
a i r defense,
c o n f l i c t caused the S o v i e t s t o
t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e and +orce s t r u c t u r e ,
the apparent
e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of weapons o v e r
a d v a n t a g e o f new a n t i t a n k
Interes ingly,
m o s t vu n e r a b l e i n t h i s k i n d o f b a t t l e f i e l d e n v i r o n m e n t w a 5
n o t the
t a n k b u t t h e BMP i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e . C 8 1
16
S o v i e t s o r g a n i z e and t r a i n t o f i g h t a s c a n b i n e d a r m s . r e v i e w of S o v i e t d o c t r i n a l l i t e r a t u r e f r o m t h e 1936
Field
S e r v i c e R e a u l a t i o n S o v i e t Army entitled
t o Savkin's
1972 t e x t
B a s i c P r i n c i D l e s of O p e r a t i o n a l A r t and T a c t i c s ,
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e i r e a r l y and c o n t i n u e d a p p r e c i a t i o n of a n d c o m m i t m e n t t o c o m b i n e d arms.
Second, norms.
S o v i e t t a c t i c s a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by r e 1 l a n c e on the
B a s e d on t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f d i a l e c t i c m e t h o d , approach, and h i s t o r i c a l
scientific
a n a l y s i s of w a r a n d
e x e r c i s e experiences,
t h e S o v i e t s have d e t e r m i n e d t h a t f o r
i n combat b a s e d upon t h e a p p r o v e d h i g h e r
How much
c o m m a n d e r ' s p l a n a n d t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of n o r m s .
i n i t i a t i v e a S o v i e t commander ma y d i s p l a y when c o n f r o n t e d
w i t h u n e x p e c t e d s i t u a t i o n s i n combat
i s undoubtedly a
f u n c t i o n of
the correctness of
t h e p r e s c r i b e d norms and t h e
i s t r a i n e d t o a p p l y them.
degree t o w h i c h t h a t c m a n d e r
Third, rugged,
S i w i e t equipment
i s n o t o r i o u s l y simple,
reliable,
I t i s a d a p t e d by d e s i g n n o t
only to t h e i r
the b a t t l e f i e l d environments
it will
potentially
fight.
their
For e x a m p l e ,
low s i l h o u e t t e a n d l i m i t e d e l e v a t i o n a n d d e p r e s s i o n
t h e i r m a i n armament.
U.S.
c a p a b i l i t i e s of
analysts often
c i t e t h e s e as w e a k n e s s e s c o n s i d e r i n g t h e h i l l y t e r r a i n o f
17
C e n t r a l Europe,
but t h e s e v e h i c l e s a r e p e r f e c t l y s u i t e d for
o f f e n s i v e weapon s y s t e m s w h i c h w i l l d e f i l a d e or d e t e n s i u e p o s i t i o n s ,
l o w s i l h o u e t t e and l i m i t e d
low cost,
and c r e w
D e s p i t e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of
simp1 i c i ty,
Lastly,
in
The p r i n c i p l e s I i s t e d
The B a s i c P r i n c i D l e s of
by U. S a u k i n .
A l t h o u g h t h e book
f o c u s e s on t h e n u c l e a r b a t t l e f i e l d , v a l i d for a conventional b a t t l e ,
e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of
Soviet
-achieve
of o p e r a t i o n s t o k e e p t h e enemy o f f
constant pressure. -concentrate effort
t o c r e a t e s u p e r i o r i t y of
torces
18
l e a s t expected w h i l e ensuring s e c u r i t y o f f r i e n d l y forces, i.e. d e n y i n g t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f s u r p r i s e t o t h e enemy. -achieve initiative, combat a c t i v e n e s s t h r o u g h b o l d n e s s , i n offensive action.
-protect e f f e c t i veness.
i t s combat
- c o n f o r m g o a l s of
s i t u a t i on.
combat
-coordinate
I n summary,
the Soviet
threat
on t h e m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d
The S o v i e t s p r e f e r
i s not
a c t i o n a n d o n l y d e f e n d when t h e o f f e n s e
rear.
a r t i l l e r y i n s u p p o r t o t t h e p r i m a r y maneuver e f f o r t s .
T e r r a i n and Weather
1Y
FM 100-5 remark
b e r a t i o n s (1982),
i s q u o t e d , goe s on t o s t a t e t h a t t e r r a i n a n d w e a t h e r
The commander who
w i l l p r e s e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o both s i d e s .
u n d e r s t a n d s t h e e f f e c t s of c a p a b i l i t i e s and those of r e i n f o r c e s these success. successful
effects w i l l
b e t t e r c h a n c e of
Interestingly,
i n a n h i s t o r i c a l study of 200
c o n d u c t e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h e 1983-84 O f f i c e r 'terrain sense"
combat a c t i o n s ,
M i l i t a r y Academy i n s u p p o r t o f
P r o f e s s i o n a l Management S y s t e m S t u d y G r o u p ,
Many e x c e l l e n t
texts detail
the e f f e c t s of FM 30-10,
t e r r a i n and
Military
a v a i l a b l e t o U.S.
a r e a s t u d i e s p r o v i d e d a t a on s p e c i f i c environments.
potential battlefield
f a c t o r s which e f f e c t the t a c t i c a l
i n two s t r i k i n g l y d i + f e r e n t
a r e a s i n w h i c h t h e y w i l l most
l i k e l y be employed:
C e n t r a l Europe and a M i d d l e E a s t or
Southwest A s i a d e s e r t environment.
Of
t h e f i v e m i l i t a r y a s p e c t s of
terrain,
w i l l c o n c e n t r a t e on
c o v e r and concealment,
mobi 1 i t y ,
and
when s t u d i e d i n l i g h t o f
20
firr
r e l a t e most d i r e c t l y t o f i r e p o w e r ,
t o p r o t e c t i o n , and
c once a 1men t
maneuver.
o b s t a c l e s a n d mobi 1 i tr
C e n t r a l EuPODQ
i s one o f t h e most d e n s e l y
T h i s compact East
p o p u l a t e d and bu 1 t up a r e a s i n Europe.
L-shaped c o u n t r y i s 850 k i l o m e t e r s f r o m n o r t h t o s o u t h .
Overall,
t h e FRG h a s t h r e e
(1)
There i s l a c k o f d e p t h of a r e a between t h e
b o r d e r w i t h t h e W a r s a w P a c t c o u n t r i e s and t h e R h i n e R i v e r .
t 2 ) T h e r e a r e numerous t e r r a i n - d e p e n d e n t
natural
m i l i t a r y operations.tl41
21
The f i r s t o f strategic
these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
has operational
and
'.fi
tti
a quick,
to
the normal w a r n i n g 5 i n o r d e r
s e i z e d e e p o b j e c t i v e s b e f o r e NATO f o r c e s c o u l d e i t h e r f u l l y o c c u p y a n d p r e p a r e f o r w a r d d e f e n s e s or e x e r c i s e a l l the
d e c i s i o n mak i ng a p p a r a t u s n e c e s s a r y t o u s e n u c 1 e a r w e a p o n s .
The s e c o n d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , natural
s t r a t e g i c and o p e r a t i o n a l
a r e s h a r e d w i t h communist C z e c h o s l o v a k i a and E a s t Germany.tl51 A l o n g the border there a r e a t l e a s t twelve i n v a s i o n g a p s f o r m e d by t h e t e r r a i n . t l 6 1 lowland, favorable a wide r e l a t i v e l y f l a t p l a i n , The N o r t h German
t e r r a i n f o r an a t t a c k by t h e S o v i e t s .
s u c h a s t h e F u l d a Gap,
I n the
a ready
I t i s along
f i n d the
the Soviets w i l l
t e r r a i n f a v o r a b l e f o r h i g h tempo o p e r a t i o n s w i t h t h e i r h i g h l y mechanized f o r c e s .
22
The t h i r d e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
i m p a c t s t h e most on
t h e t a c t i c a l employment o f f o r c e s .
characteristics.Cl71
I n h i s book
German General F r a n z
a r g u e s c o n v i n c i n g l y f o r t h e use o f l i g h t
i n f a n t r y f o r c e s on t h e European b a t t l e f i e l d . A m a i n p o i n t i n
t h i s argument c e n t e r s on t e r r a i n and,
more s p e c i f i c a l l y , on
i s affected not
l i n e of
s i g h t considerations.
L i n e o f sight
T h i s h a s made
t h e f o l l o w i n g average l i n e o f s i g h t d i s t a n c e s f o r t h e
30%
9% 16% 18% 10%
7/.
2
96%
23
maximum e f f e c t i v e r a n g e of
t h e DRAGW a n t i t a n k m i s s i l e . t l 9 1
T h i s s i t u a t i o n is n o t a s t a t i c o n e ;
is
s t e a d i l y c h a n g i n g a s u r b a n growth c o n t i n u e s . notes:
J.A.
English
What h a s p a s s e d p r a c t i c a l l y u n n o t i c e d t o many m i l i t a r y e y e s s i n c e W o r l d War 11 i s t h e g r a d u a l l y a l t e r e d n a t u r e of t h e v e r y t e r r a i n over w h i c h the n e x t war may b e f o u g h t . The phenomenal and r e l e n t l e s s p r o c e s s o f u r b a n i z a t i o n of Europe, a l r e a d y w i t h 374 c i t i e s of 100,000 or more, h a s r a d i c a l l y changed t h e f a c e of t h e p o t e n t i a l b a t t l e f i e l d . . . . M o r e o v e r , w i t h C e n t r a l European u r b a n g r o w t h p r o j e c t e d a t a r a t e of two o r t h r e e t i m e s t h e p o p u l a t i o n r i s e , t h e r e w i l l b e , by 1995, a 50% i n c r e a s e i n t o t a l u r b a n area.CZ11 P a u l B r a c k e n p o i n t s o u t t h a t a t t h e same t i m e 'government a f f o r e s t a t i o n programmes have i n c r e a s e d f o r e s t e d
a r e a s by a b o u t 0.8% p e r year.'C221
v i s i b i l i t y and t h e r e f o r e
l i n e of s i g h t .
Fog, i n t e r m s o f v i s i b i l i t i e s o f l e s s t h a n 1000 m, o c c u r s on an average o f 100-120 d a y s t h r o u g h o u t t h e Year, p r e d o m i n a n t l y between September and March, w i t h a maximum i n October and November.CP31
24
I n summary,
l o n g r a n g e a n t i - t a n k weapons o v e r t h e t a n k i s e l i m i n a t e d i n t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y o f s i t u a t i o n s i n C e n t r a l Europe.
The p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n o f 1 i n e
i s not a major
p r o b l e m i n t h e FRG.
i n t h e FRG i s c o n d u c i v e i n the
t o the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f f i e l d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s except
O b s t a c l e s and M o b i l i t y .
the b e s t
one p e r c e n t p e r year.C251 of
M o b i l i t y i s hampered s i g n i f i c a n t l y by e x t e n s i v e f o r e s t a t i o n ,
by t h e e v e r
sprawl,
i n c r e a s i n g amount o f b u i l t u p a r e a s a n d u r b a n
a n d by h y d r o g r a p h y .
W h i l e f o r e s t a r e a s have a more s i g n i f i c a n t
they f o r c e
c o n c e n t r a t e a n d become
O b s t a c l e s w h i c h r e q u i r e l i t t l e equipment and
a standard i n f a n t r y task.
On one hand,
most a u t o b a h n s and a
O n t h e o t h e r hand,
refugee,
a r e a s become d i f f i c u l t o b s t a c l e s when r u b b l e l i t t e r s t h e
s t r e e t s or when d e f e n d e d by i n f a n t r y .
g r e a t e s t p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t y i n t h e FRG, e x p e r i e n c i n g the g r e a t e s t growth,
are east o f
River.
A r e a s c o v e r e d by w a t e r a r e o n l y a b o u t
T/:of t h e t o t a l
26
a r e a of
these water o b s t a c l e s i s
t h e s t r e a m s and r i v e r s a r e w i d e r
These
or s n o r k e l must h a l t and u n d e r g o
A l l armored v e h i c l e l a u n c h e d b r i d g e s
(AVLBs)
b r i d g e s l e s s t h a n 30 m e t e r s long.CZ91
Significant
s o u t h e r n Germany t h e Rhine-Main-Danube
m e t e r s or m o r e deep).[311
I n sumnary,
t h e FRGs
d i s t i n c t l y different
settings for b a t t l e .
27
have f a r
f e w e r m a j o r w a t e r o b s t a c l e s or b u i l t - u p
areas,
but
impede o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s .
Cover
is excellent;
v i s i b i l i t y and l i n e s of s i g h t The a l p i n e f o o t h i l l s
r a n g e f r o m e x t r e m e l y poor t o m a r g i n a l .
to satisfactory.C321
Desert Environments
Deserts environments are, the a n t i t h e s i s o f require different weather. personnel the Central
i n m i l i t a r y respects, European b a t t l e f i e l d .
nearly Deserts
t a c t i c s p r i m a r i l y because of
t e r r a i n and
T r a i n i n g Center
i n t h e M o j a v e D e s e r t of C a l i + o r n i a
h e a v y f o r c e s may h a v e
u n d e r s c o r e s t h e a n t i c i p a t i o n t h a t U.S.
to f i g h t
i n t h e d e s e r t a r e a s of
Asia.
The m o s t r e c e n t c l a s h e s o f
these areas:
t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i W a r s a n d t h e I r a n - I r a q War.
but i n general
Key t e r r a i n i n t h e d e s e r t ,
n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n of w a t e r e d a r e a s such a s oases, d e t e r m i n e d by t h e o t h e r m i l i t a r r a s p e c t s of
is
terrain.
few
a n d f e w roads o r o t h e r c o m b a t s e r v i c e s u p p o r t
28
c h a r a c t e r i z e d by h i g h t e m p e r a t u r e s , temperature, l a c k of p r e c i p i t a t i o n ,
O b s e r v a t i o n and f i e l d s o f f i r e . desert
The r e l a t i v e l y f l a t
therefore,
I t i s not
rock
due t o t h e p r e s e n c e o f wadis,
some s p a r s e g r o u n d c o v e r ,
and s l i g h t u n d u l a t i o n s .
h a m p e r e d by s e v e r a l u n i q u e d e s e r t e f f e c t s . estimation
is difficult,
h e a t and temperature v a r i a t i o n s
and d u s t ,
cause severe
image d i s t o r t i o n s ,
sandstorms,
and
impossible for
D u s t c l o u d s c r e a t e d by w e a p o n s
i m p o s s i b l e most of
There
i s a general
l a c k of
in the desert.
T e r r a i n masKing b e h i n d mountain r i d g e s
29
overhead cover.
i s o f t e n a g g r a v a t e d by l a r g e a r e a s o f soi I .
Concealment
is vital
i n the d e s e r t because of
the
excellent observation.
Camouflage e f f o r t s must t a k e i n t o
much i n t h e d e s e r t a n d a r e s e n s e d a t g r e a t e r d i s t a n c e s . M o v e m e n t s c r e a t e d u s t c l o u d s v i s i b l e f o r many m i l e s .
Obstacles and m o b i l i t y .
t o success i n d e s e r t operations.
desert "permit similar
t r u e t w o d i m e n s i o n a l movement b y g r o u n d t r o o p s Natural
t o t h a t o f a n a v a l t a s k f o r c e a t sea.*C331
l i m i t i n g t h e use of p o s i t i o n a l
heavy
wheeled v e h i c l e s .
a r t i l l e r y may b e r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e f e w roads a n d t r a i l s .
The r u g g e d m o u n t a i n s t h a t c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e m o s t d e s e r t s become m a j o r o b s t a c l e s t o movement. Mountain passes and the Lava beds are a l s o
o b s t a c l e s and m i n e f i e l d s a r e m o s t 30
t e r r a i n obstacles
I n summary,
U.S.
in
tactics
of t e r r a i n and weather.
As English,
Uhle-Wettler,
and o t h e r s h a v e p o i n t e d o u t ,
f a c e many c o n d i t i o n s
i n C e n t r a l Europe w h i c h w i l l Forests,
t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s t o be m a x i m i z e d .
urban a r e a s ,
and
and o t h e r t e r r a i n t e a t u r e s l i m i t m o b i l i t y , o b s e r v a t i o n ,
long range f i r e s .
defenses.
I n desert environments
B a t t l e f i e l d Condition2
c o n s t i t u t e the b a s i c p h y s i c a l
unparalleled destruction,
Second,
c a s u a l t i e s but,
I i k e n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , may d e n y u s e o f
the b a t t l e f i e l d . Third, use of
contaminated p o r t i o n s of
e l e c t r o n i c warfare to control
s u c h a s cannon or a i r the n a t u r a l e f f e c t s
c a n change or r e i n f o r c e
31
of
The
thermal
fires,
and p o s s i b l y f l o o d i n g .
Protection.
The d e g r e e t o w h i c h t h e p h y s i c a l e f f e c t s o f
or g r o u n d z e r o ,
and
these
o n l y a r m o r e d v e h i c l e s and
i n the desert.
Despite the
armored v e h i c l e s themselves
EMP c a n d e s t r o y t h e i r u n s h i e l d e d e l e c t r o n i c A d e q u a t e l y warned, a
i n c r e a s e d i s t a n c e from the
t e r r a i n t h a t masKs t h e u n i t .
Maneuver.
damage v e h i c l e s t h r o u g h b l a s t ,
32
but
f o r e s t e d C e n t r a l Europe t r e e
Additionally,
t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f dams and d i s r u p t i o n
t h e f l o w o f w a t e r w a y s by n u c l e a r weapons c o u l d f l o o d f l a t , I n desert
open a r e a s f u r t h e r d e g r a d i n g I i m i t e d mobi 1 i t y .
roads,
and b r i d g e s c o u l d b e
Firepower.
B e s i d e d i r e c t d e s t r u c t i o n of weapon s y s t e m s ,
b e caused
systems
fire
control c i r c u i t r y in
.
S o v i e t f o r c e s a r e r e p o r t e d l y we1 1
Chemical Weanons.
33
Protection. personnel.
Non-persistent
agents p r i m a r i l y a f f e c t
P r o p e r l y e q u i p p e d a n d t r a i n e d s o l d i e r s may b e
only m i n i m a l l y e f f e c t e d compared t o p o o r l y t r a i n e d or
e q u i p p e d t r o o p s or t h e c i v i l i a n p o p u l o u s . p e r s i s t e n t agents a f f e c t personnel, On t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
and t e r r a i n .
equipment,
personnel
i n t e n s i v e b u t a l s o r e q u i r e 5 much w a t e r .
Water for
decontamination w i l l
d e f i n i t e l y be a p r o b l e m i n t h e d e s e r t .
Maneuver. vital
P e r s i s t e n t c h e m i c a l s can r a p i d l y degrade
materials,
c h e m i c a l s a l s o c r e a t e h a z a r d o u s a r e a s w h i c h become o b s t a c l e s
t o maneuver.
Firepower.
w e a p o n s o r weapon c o m p o n e n t s .
p r o t e c t i v e mask d e g r a d e s a s o l d i e r s i n d i v i d u a l or c r e w s e r v e d w e a p o n s .
a b i l i t y t o employ
U.S.
armored v e h i c l e s a r e
not e q u i p p e d w i t h o v e r p r e s s u r e s y s t e m s that w o u l d o b v i a t e t h e
c r e w r e q u i r e m e n t t o mask.
F i r e p o w e r c a n b e d e g r a d e d by t h e
chemical attacks,
s u c h as a i r or a r t i l l e r y a t t a c k s
E l e c t r o n i c w a r f a r e (EW).
T h e p r i m a r y e f f e c t of
E W is
d i s r u p t i o n o f t h e command a n d c o n t r o l . effect
E W can d i r e c t l y
capability to
u n i t s by r e d u c i n g t h e c o m m a n d e r ' s
c o o r d i n a t e a n d s y n c h r o n i z e t h e i r m a n e u v e r and f i r e s . Indirectly,
E W c a n c o n t r i b u t e t o w e a p o n s b e i n g jammed a n d t o
t h e y p r o v i d e c o n c e a l m e n t .r
A s advances i n t e c h n o l o g y p r o d u c e more
s o p h i s t i c a t e d o b s c u r a n t s s u c h as t h e r m a l d e f e a t i n g smoke, a d v e r s e e f f e c t s on f i r e p o w e r w i l l b e i n c r e a s e d .
the
a n d damage a n enemy f o r c e .
t e m p o r a r i l y by m i n e f i e l d s a r e s u b j e c t tires.
A i r o r c a n n o n d e l i v e r e d s c a t t e r a b l e m i n e s h a v e a much
g r e a t e r p o t e n t i a l a s t h e y c a n b e d e l i v e r e d on a n u n s u s p e c t i n g enemy a f t e r area.
Also,
i t s r e c o n n a i s s a n c e e l e m e n t s h a v e c h e c k e d out an
t h e y c a n b e e m p l o y e d a f t e r a n enemy u n i t has
b e e n c o m m i t t e d t o a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n thus r e d u c i n g i t s f l e x i b i l i t y t o r e s o r t t o an a l t e r n a t e p l a n .
A potential
weakness i n t h e employment of s c a t t e r a b l e m i n e s i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e y w o u l d n o t b e c o v e r e d by o b s e r v e d f i r e .
I n summary,
s p e c i a l weapons w i l l
substantially alter
the
35
future forces.
b a t t l e f i e l d and w i l l
e f f e c t t h e employment of heavy
W e a p o n s o f m a s s d e s t r u c t i o n w i l l p u t a p r e m i u m on t r o o p s and t h e i r f i g h t i n g s y s t e m s . Special
p r o t e c t i o n of
i n C e n t r a l Europe.
At
t h e same t i m e , integrated
m o b i l i t y w i l l b e i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t on t h e
b a t t l e f i e l d as h e a v y f o r c e s m u s t q u i c k l y d i s p e r s e o r m a s s .
and f u r t h e r
Summary
by t h e e m p l o y m e n t of s p e c i a l w e a p o n s c m p l e t e t h e d e s c r i p t i o n
o f t h e c h a l l e n g i n g and d y n a m i c f u t u r e b a t t l e f i e l d .
demands a f f e c t c o m b a t p o w e r .
These
T h r e a t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s shape t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r
opposing f o r c e s .
i t s opponents
d e f e n s e s a p p e a r s t o d i c t a t e t h a t o p p o s i n g + o r c e s also b e
highly mobile,
s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons, weapons.
and b e e q u i p p e d w i t h a r m o r d e f e a t i n g
B a t t l e f i e l d C e n t r a l Europe,
small,
compact and l a c k i n g
36
depth,
is c r o w d e d w i t h p o t e n t i a l o b s t a c l e s a n d i m p e d i m e n t s t o S p e c i a l weapons w i l l
m a n e u v e r by h e a v y g r o u n d f o r c e s . e n h a n c e t h e o b s t a c l e v a l u e of m a n e u v e r by h e a v y f o r c e s w i l l provides a substantial
t h i s European b a t t l e f i e l d ;
be s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d .
It
e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d o b s e r v a t i o n a n d f i e l d s of r a n g e d i r e c t f i r e weapons,
t a n k m a i n gun i s v i r t u a l l y and o t h e r s
As E n g l i s h , S i m p k i n , U h l e - W e t t l e r
i t i s an e n v i r o n m e n t s u i t e d f o r o p e r a t i o n s
and mountains,
as i n o p e n t e r r a i n .
e m p l o y m e n t of canalize,
s t a t i c defenses
a n d s t o p enemy f o r c e s .
tempo of S o v i e t o p e r a t i o n s ,
t i e up h i s f o r c e s ,
o p p o r t u n i t e s f o r c o u n t e r a t t a c k s by m o b i l e f o r c e s .
On t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
t h e v a s t e x p a n s e s of
generally flat
Luttwak p o i n t s out,
f o r c e d e n s i t y t h e f o r c e s w i t h t h e m o s t m o b i l i t y may b e l i g h t f o r c e s t r a n s p o r t e d by a i r . C 3 5 1 E x c e l l e n t v i s i b i l i t y and l i n e
o f s i g h t a l l o w w e a p o n s t o b e e m p l o y e d a t maximum r a n g e s .
37
future b a t t l e ,
n e x t e x a m i n e t h e t h e o r y and h i s t o r i c a l p r a c t i c e of arms.
doctrine of
38
CHAPTER 2
trans.
S.B.
G r i f f i t h (London:
F i e l d Manual
100-5,
pp.
1-1
t h r o u g h 1-3.
Ibld.
Ibid.
p. p.
11. V a s i l i r Y. S a v k i n , T h e B a s ~ cP r i n c i p l e s o f O D e r a t i o n a l A r t and T a c t i c s , t r a n s . by t h e U.S. A i r F o r c e . ( 1 Y 7 2 ; r p t . Washington, D.C.: U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 8 2 ) , p p . 167-273. 12. F i e l d Manual 100-5, p. 3-1.
13. U.S. D e D a r t m e n t of t h e ClrmY. "OPMS S t u d y GrOuD A f t e r A c t i o n Repor't," Commanders C a l l ' DA Pam 3 6 0 - 8 8 5 ( S e p - O c t 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 27.
14. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army, J o i n t US/GE A r m y C o n c e p t Paper M i l i t a r y GeoaraDhic DeSCriDtlOn of t h e F e d e r a l R e D u b l i c of Germany, ( F t . M o n r o e , VA: l r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e Command, 3 O c t 1 9 7 8 ) , p . ~ i i .
15.
Ibid.
p.
1-6.
39
16. 17.
Ibid.
p.
p.
1-7.
iii.
Ibid.
18. Franz Uhle-Wettler, B a t t l e f i e l d C e n t r a l EuroDe, trans. f r o m German t o E n g l i s h u n k n o w n , copy r e c e i v e d f r o m U.S. A r m y T r a i n i n g a n d D o c t r i n e Command. ( G u t e r s l o t h , FRG: 1980), p . 15. 19. J o i n t US/GE A r m y C o n c e p t P a p e r D e s c r i ~ t i o no f t h e FRG, p. v i i i .
20.
M i l i t a r y Geographic
Ibld.
21. J o h n A. E n g l i s h , A P e r s o e c t i v e on I n f a n t r y P r a e g e r , 1 9 8 1 ) , p . 259. 22. P a u l B r a c k e n , " U r b a n S p r a w l a n d NATO D e f e n c e , " Survival, (Nov-Dec 1976), p . 257. 23. J o i n t US/GE A r m y C o n c e p t PaDer D e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e FRti, p . 1-13. 24. 25.
M i l i t a r y Geographic
Ibid.
p . 1-59.
p . 257.
BracKen,
M i l i t a r y GeograDhic
27. F.M. v o n S e n g e r und E t t e r l i n , T a n k s o f t h e World 1983. ( A n n a p o l i s , MD: The N a u t i c a l a n d A v i a t i o n P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1983), s e e t a b l e s pp.717-769. 28.
Ibid.
p.772.
29.
30. 31. 32.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
p. pp. p.
33. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army, Desert Operations, FM 90-3 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 7 7 ) , p . 4-3. 34. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e A r m y , The S o v i e t Army: m e r a t i o n s and 1-actics, FM 100-2-1 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 16-1.
35.
U.S
Luttwak,
p.5. 40
CHAPTER 3
U E W D S OF COMBINED ARMS WURFARE
t h e b a t t l e f i e l d demands
so t o o t h e c o n c e p t o f how an
Although
Army e s p o u s e s a c o n c e p t
A d o c t r i n a l c o n c e p t w h i c h has come t o m a t u r i t y i n t h i s
c e n t u r y and has b e e n a s u b t l e , Army d o c t r i n e but central, i s s u e i n U. S. T h i s concept
i s t h e c o n c e p t o f c o m b i n e d arms.
is often praised,
s e l d o m u n d e r s t o o d , and r o u t i n e l y s h o v e d b r a n c h p a r o c h i a l isms,
a s i d e as s e r v i c e r i v a l r i e s ,
and w e a p o n
N o t e d m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n and S o v i e t
a n a l y s t John E r i c k s o n w r o t e ,
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e r e a r e no w e a p o n s ,
or m i l i t a r y
s e r v i c e s t h a t c a n so d o m i n a t e a w a r as t o b e a b l e t o go i t
41
alone,
despite
t h e c l a i m s of
t h e i r v a r i o u s advocates.
in a
i n an
the
engagement,
m i l i t a r y h a s l i m i t a t i o n s u p o n w h i c h t h e enemy c a n c a p i t a l i z e .
RI 100-5,
Operations,
o n l y a d d r e s s e s combined arms
What
i s i t s essence?
C a p t a i n J o n a t h a n House h e l p s t o c l a r i f y t h e n o t i o n a n d e l i m i n a t e t h e v a g u e n e s s by d i s c u s s i n g t h r e e r e l a t e d e l e m e n t s
of
" c o m b i n e d arms'
--
concept,
organization,
and t a c t i c s and
operations. t31
The c o m b i n e d a r m s combination of
concept
i s the basic
idea that a
t w o o r m o r e w e a p o n s or a r m s i n m u t u a l s u p p o r t t h a t each d i f f e r e n t arms
o r w e a p o n s c a n e n h a n c e t h e e f f e c t s of
m i n i m i z e each o t h e r ' s
vulnerabilities.
For e x a m p l e ,
the to
e n g a g e t a r g e t 5 i n d e a d s p a c e t h a t m a c h i n e guns c a n n o t r e a c h .
42
T h e e f f e c t s of
g r e n a d e s and m i n e s G r e n a d e s and m i n e s
c a n ~ l e m e n t t h e e f f e c t s ot s u ~ ~ l e m e no t r
t h e m a c h i n e gun. reinforce
each o t h e r ;
w h i l e t h e y both c o v e r t h e d e a d s p a c e ,
t h e y a r e u n i q u e w e a p o n s t h a t a c c o m p l i s h t h e same t a s k differently.
A s FM 100-5,
ODerations.
states:
All
a r m s and w e a p o n s f i t
i n t o t h e e q u a t i o n of
t h e combined
arms concept.
T h i s study w i l l b e l i m i t e d p r i m a r i l y t o t h e
and a r t i l l e r y .
organizations
either
task-organizing
l e v e l s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n , as t h e r i f l e
autonomous c o m b i n e d a r m s u n i t i n t h e U.S. A r m y i s t h e
division. T h e U.S. h e a v y d i v i s i o n i s p e r m a n e n t l y a s s i g n e d a
f i x e d n u m b e r of
tank, m e c h a n i z e d i n f a n t r y ,
self-propelled
a r t i l l e r y and o t h e r t y p e s of
combat s u p p o r t and s e r v i c e s u p p o r t u n i t s .
sub-units
as b r i g a d e a n d b a t t a l i o n
T h e s e t e m p o r a r y groupings enemy, terrain,
t a s k f o r c e s a n d as c o m p a n y t e a m s .
a r e t a i l o r e d as t h e f a c t o r s ot m i s s i o n ,
43
t r o o p s a v a i l a b l e and t i m e d i c t a t e .
The S o v i e t s l o w e s t f i x e d
t h e s e combined arms g r o u p i n g s i s t o p u t a t t h e
.
t a c t i c s and o p e r a t i o n s are the actual
Combined arms
paramount
i n t e r e s t and concern t o p r o f e s s i o n a l
Additionally,
t o c l o s e l y resemble a c t u a l
t h e t r u e e f f e c t s o f combined arms
t a c t i c s a r e o f t e n not r e a l i z e d .
The s t u d y o f
t h a t may c o n t r i b u t e t o d e t e r m i n i n g how a r m o r e d
i n f a n t r y can b e s t be employed.
44
W o r 1 d War I
arms:
infantry,
artillery,
and c a v a l r y .
Understandably,
each
i n t h e G r e a t War.
I n general,
S p e a k i n g of
the B r i t i s h
t h e y were unaware of t h e p r i n c i p l e o f c o - o p e r a t i o n , and d i d n o t g r a s p how t o c o - o r d i n a t e t h e d i f f e r e n t arms. The a r t o f o r c h e s t r a t i n g t h e f i r e o f d i t f e r e n t weapons was not s t u d i e d a n d i n consequence t h e c l o s e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n f i r e and m a n o e u v r e n o t u n d e r s t o o d . [ 61
The t h r e e a r m s e f f e c t i v e l y
What w a s l a c k i n g i n most a r m i e s w a s a n o v e r a l l d o c t r i n e on
how a r m i e s were t o f i g h t .
I n 1914,
v i e w of
t h e coming war: The w a r w i l l b e p r i m a r i l y a s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n t w o infantries...the army m u s t b e a n a r m y of p e r s o n n e l and not of machines. The a r t i l l e r y w i l l o n l y b e a n a c c e s s o r y arm.CB1
The F r e n c h ,
s t i l l m e s m e r i z e d by t h e o f f e n s i v e
s u c c e s s e s ot
P r u s s i a i n 1870-71,
c o u p l e d w i t h o t h e r f a c t o r s would cause
45
firepcwer
t o dominate the b a t t l e f i e l d q u i c k l y a f t e r
the
o p e n i n g campaigns on both f r o n t s .
Infantry, armies,
the traditional
f i g h t i n g arm o f t h e European
u p t o World War 1.
infantry p r a c t i c e of v o l l e y f i r e and
T h i s accurate long range firepower the
a l s o r e n d e r e d o b s o l e t e t h e massed i n f a n t r y f o r m a t i o n :
r i g i d square,
b a t t l e formations. order
t o p r o t e c t i t s e l f from c a v a l r y because i n f a n t r y
saber, carbine, and p i s t o l
The r e s u l t i n g " o p e n
well t r a i n e d j u n i o r l e a d e r s a5 w e l l a s i m p r o v e d
Mobilization of partially trained c i v i l i a n s made l e a d e r s , believe that the
command a n d c o n t r o l means.
r e s e r v e s a n d m a s s i v e c o n s c r i p t i o n of
T h i s and the f i r m
in the offensive
l e d t o g r e a t c a r n a g e c a u s e d by human
wave a s s a u l t s d i r e c t l y i n t o d e a d l y f i r e .
46
D e s p i t e e x t e n s i v e movement of t a c t i c a l m o b i l i t y of
t r o o p s by r a i l and t r u c k , Thus,
r e s e r v e s c o u l d b e r u s h e d f o r w a r d b y r a i l or
to plug a
e n t r e n c h m e n t s r e d u c e d t h e p r e d i c t e d 'war s t a t i c proportions;
of m a n e u v e r "
to
o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r e n v e l opmen t w e r e g o n e . t h e d o m i n a n t mode o f w a r f a r e .
A s T h e o d o r e Ropp p u t
it,
Now t h e r e w e r e no f l a n k s t o go a r o u n d .
Improvised trenches ran from Switzerland to s a l t water. When t h e s e w e r e r e i n f o r c e d w i t h b a r b e d w i r e and c o n c r e t e , t h e w a r i n t h e w e s t became a w a r o f a t t r i t i o n , o n e o f t h e l o n g e s t and b l o o d i e s t i n h i s t o r r . [ l l l
The a r t i l l e r y arm, t h o u g h a l s o c a n p e l l e d t o s e e k p r o t e c t i o n i n t h e b o w e l s of t h e e a r t h or b e h i n d t h e c o v e r o f h i l l s , became m o r e and m o r e dominant a s t h e r a n g e o f guns i n c r e a s e d a n d a m o r e s c i e n t i f i c i n d i r e c t m e t h o d of f i r e w a s a d o p t e d . A s t h e f i r e of machine guns tended t o b r i n g most advances t o a h a l t , so a g r e a t e r w e i g h t o f a r t i l l e r y f i r e w a s g r a d u a l l y b r o u g h t t o b e a r t o smash d e f e n d i n g 1 i n e s . t l 2 1
M o s t a r m i e s e n t e r e d t h e war w i t h a predominance o f
light,
d i r e c t f i r e a r t i l l e r y t h a t fought u p f r o n t
I n close
I t was l i g h t enough t o b e p u l l e d
by h o r s e s a n d t o k e e p u p w i t h t h e m a r c h i n g i n f a n t r y .
I t was
p r i m a r i l y e m p l o y e d t o s u p p r e s s t h e enemy.
Heavy a r t i l l e r y
47
was f a r l e s s m o b i l e a n d w a s u s e d t o r e d u c e f o r t s or t o d e f e n d
c o a s t 1 i n e s and o t h e r f i x e d l o c a t i o n s . However, technological New
to d e l i v e r quick,
instead o f
massed f i r e s on a t a r g e t
t h e d i r e c t f i r e methods
t h a t had been t h e s t a n d a r d .
Once t h e
many e x p e c t e d t h a t
so t h a t i n f a n t r y c o u l d mop up and c a v a l r y c o u l d e x p l o i t .
Tactics,
i t appears,
h a d made a s h a r p t u r n a b o u t f r o m t h e
A r t i l l e r y conquers,
1 131
New
and
b e c r e a t e d so t h a t t h e a r t i l l e r y c o u l d b e p o s i t i o n e d o u t of r a n g e o f enemy i n f a n t r y a n d a r t i l l e r y d i r e c t + i r e .
l h i s also
r e q u i r e d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a c c u r a t e maps w i t h a c o m p a t i b l e
grid reference
system.
48
Massed i n d i r e c t a r t i l l e r y f i r e , unexpected r e s u l t s .
d a y s p r i o r t o an a t t a c k , that
t o r e up t h e ground t o s u c h a n e x t e n t
i n f a n t r y f o r c e s c o u l d n o t move q u i c k l y on t h e s u b s e q u e n t t h e enemy e n t r e n c h m e n t s .
a t t a c k of
The n i n e t e e n - d a y B r i t i s h b m b a r d m e n t a t T h i r d r p r e s ( 1 9 1 7 ) u s e d 321 t r a i n l o a d s o f s h e l l s , a y e a r ' s p r o d u c t i o n f o r 55,000 w a r w o r k e r s . The w h o l e b a t t l e a r e a r e v e r t e d t o a swamp i n w h i c h t h e B r i t i s h a r m y took 45 s q u a r e m i l e s i n f i v e m o n t h s a t a c o s t of 370,000 men, or 8,222 p e r s q u a r e m i l e . C l 4 1
t r e n c h e s i n d e p t h or deeper
a r t i l l e r y f i r e was l i f t e d .
i n J u l y 1916,
o f shrapnel
fire
i n f a n t r y a t t a c k e d a s German p o s i t i o n s w e r e
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , w h i l e s h r a p n e l was s a f e r
t o march
i t had
Difficulty
i n c o o r d i n a t i n g i n f a n t r y advances w i t h t h e p r e - p l a n n e d and
ever f o r w a r d - s h i f t i n g a r t i l l e r y f i r e often of l e f t the infantry
t a n g l e d up i n w i r e i n f r o n t s u p p r e s s i v e f i r e moved away.
t h e tierman p o s i t i o n s a 5 t h e
Thus,
p e r h a p s t h e g r e a t e s t p r o b l e m was i n
49
artillery-infantry
cooperation.
L a c k of
experienced staff
o f f i c e r s caused p l a n n i n g t o take p l a c e a t a h i g h l e v e l of command; m a n e u v e r p l a n s w e r e c r e a t e d f i r s t then tasked t o support consideration for and a r t i l l e r y was
the a r t i l l e r y ' s
it.
Responsive communications,
k e y t o e x p l o i t i n g t h e p o t e n t i a l of
Without f l e x i b i l i t y ,
a t t a c k s d i d s u c c e e d i n f a n t r y o f t e n o u t r a n t h e f i r e of r e l a t i v e l y immobile a r t i l l e r y and g r o u n d t o a h a l t .
its
Horse
drawn, w h e e l e d a r t i l l e r y ,
pre-war d i r e c t f i r e days,
t h e m o r a s s o f no-man's defenses
land that
i t had created.
German
i n d e p t h a n d t h e r a p i d movement o f r e s e r v e s l o n g sought A l l i e d p e n e t r a t i o n t h a t
in e x p l o i t a t i o n by the cavalry.
C a v a l r y c l u n g t o i t s m i s s i o n s of reconnaissance and security, shock a c t i o n , and p u r s u i t a s t i g h t l y a s i t dtd t o Significant forces of cavalry t h e i r g o l d e n moment
the horse,saber
and lance.
The f i r e p o w e r
of
the other
Mobi e f i r e
was t o p l a y a r o l e
i n W o r l d War I 50
i n t h e f o r m o f an a r m o r e d
motor vehicle,
the tank.
The d e v e l o p m e n t of
t h e t a n k w a s a d i r e c t r e s u l t of O b s e s s e d w i t h t h e s p i r i t of the
c r u s h i n g b a r b e d w i r e and b r e a c h i n g t r e n c h e s . t a n k c o n c e p t c e n t e r e d on m o b i l e ,
s a w t h e t a n k a s a maneuver f o r c e
protected firepower.
i n i t s own r i g h t :
i t was
infantry in
in fact,
regarded
o r i g i n a l l y designating
C151
I t was r e c o g n i z e d e a r l y t h a t
surprise, mass,
t a n k s had t o c a p i t a l i z e on impact as w e l l as t h e i r
and p s y c h o l o g i c a l
p h y s i c a l e f f e c t s o n t h e enemy.
Surprise
i n t h i s w a r was The
t h e German u n i t s
f i r s t use d i d not
a c c o m p l i s h m a s s as o n l y f o r t y - n i n e
failure.
i n tank employment,
the
A l l i e s may h a v e p r e m a t u r e l y l o s t t h e g r e a t e r e f f e c t s o f s u r p r i s e by t h e t i m e 474 t a n k s w e r e u s e d i n m a s s a t C a m b r a i
i n November, anti-tank
1917.
t a c t i c s a n d some s p e c i a l w e a p o n s ,
a r m o r p i e r c i n g r i f l e a n d m a c h i n e g u n round,
51
A l t h o u g h t h e massed,
surprise attack of
t a n k s a t Cambrai
t h e B r i t i sh w e r e u n a b l e
One n o t e w o r t h y t a n k a t t a c k a t Cambrai was an a b j e c t f a i l u r e due t o t h e l a c k o f e f f e c t i v e m u t u a l s u p p o r t between t h e v a r i o u s arms o f the B r i t i s h f o r c e . First, the aeroscouts
the tanks,
German d i r e c t f i r e a r t i l l e r guns.
'The German a r t i l l e r y k n o c k e d o u t s i x t e e n t a n k s q u i c k l y
171
promulgate the idea through the inter-war a r e i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t weapons and m u s t work cooperation w i t h infantry.
and t h e m i l i t a r y use o f a i r p o w e r
I
t i e s t h a t would intantry
break the s t a l e m a t e .
t h e war
i t s organization
52
At
the b e g i n n i n g of
the war
and lower
l e v e l s had c o n s i s t e d p u r e l y of
with rifles.
M a c h i n e guns w e r e f e w a n d w e r e p r i m a r i l y u s e d e.g.
t o p r o t e c t an open
t r e n c h w a r f a r e soon caused t h e
i n f a n t r y t o be armed not o n l y w i t h machine guns but a l s o w i t h trench mortars, t h e German s i d e , grenades, anti-tank
I i g h t a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s , a n d , on
weapons. The g r e n a d e , in
g r e n a d e p r o v e d t o be t h e m o s t e f f e c t i v e m a c h i n e gun
I(
i I 1e r [201
Light m o r t a r s ,
such a s the B r i t i s h 3 i n c h S t o k e s m o r t a r ,
Heavy m o r t a r s w e r e r e t a i n e d i n b a t t e r i e s
a n d w e r e e m p l o y e d by a r t i l l e r y m e n i n a l l i e d a r m i e s a n d by e n g i n e e r 5 i n t h e German a r m y . [ 2 1 1 gave
L i g h t a u t o m a t i c weapons
i n f a n t r y m o b i l e a u t o m a t i c f i r e t o s u p p r e s s enemy f i r e s T h e German i n f a n t r y m e n w e r e a l s o p r o v i d e d
d u r i n g an a s s a u l t .
anti-tank
w e a p o n s i n c l u d i n g l o n g b a r r e l l e d M a u s e r r i f l e s and
The
of
the course
t h e w a r f r o m a s i n g l e weapon e n t i t y t o a c o m b i n e d a r m s
unit.
I t h a d a number o f d i f f e r e n t w e a p o n s w h i c h
53
Quentin i n August
1918, by
s u p p r e s s i n g enemy m a c h i n e g u n s w i t h f i r e f r o m L e w i s l i g h t a u t o m a t i c r i f l e s a n d d e s t r o y e d them w i t h r i f l e g r e n a d e
f ire.[231
The s e c o n d i n f a n t r y e v o l u t i o n w a s i n t a c t i c s . v i r t u a l l y a simultaneous r e a l i z a t i o n
There was
i n several armies t h a t
a t t r i t i o n w a r f a r e t a c t i c s of a t t a c k i n g s t r e n g t h w i t h s t r e n g t h
in order
t o i n f 1 i c t u n a c c e p t a b 1 e c a s u a l t i e s on t h e o p p o n e n t
An a l t e r n a t i v e
i n f a n t r y m e n armed w i t h
l i g h t a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s a n d g r e n a d e s w o r k e d t h e i r way f o r w a r d
t o f i n d enemy weak p o i n t s a n d t o a t t a c k k e y m a c h i n e gun
positions.
T h i s i d e a was f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n t h e west
i n an
slow t o c h a n g e t h e i r t a c t i c s . E q u a l l y u n f o r t u n a t e f o r t h e
Allies, t h e Germans h a d c a p t u r e d a c o p y o f
WI
1 1 i n g t o a d o p t t h e s e new a n d m o r e
were u n i q u e l y adept a t a l t e r i n g t a c t i c a l
m i d s t of
t h e s t r u g g l e and t h e r e f o r e
" u s u a l l y achieved a
relative
change.'[251
t a c t i c s a s e a r l y a s Uerdun, w e r e on t h e E a s t e r n f r o n t
but t h e i r m o s t successful
against
uses
a t Riga,
the I t a l i a n s a t
54
Caporetto, F i f t h Army
crushing defeat of
the B r i t i s h
not area,
and r e s e r v e s .
P r e p a r a t o r y f i r e s were
l i m i t e d a n d were s h i f t e d p e r i o d i c a l l y along t h e l i n e t o d i s g u i s e the main e f f o r t . a r m s u n i t s of infantry, I n f i l t r a t i n g f o r c e s were combined engineers, and s i g n a l troops which
I ight
a n d demo1 i t i o n s . the
Once t h e p r e c i s e a r e a f o r
infantry
t h e m a i n a t t a c k was d e t e r m i n e d ,
barrage. that
t h e y w e r e doomed t o f a i l u r e .
i n t h e German Army b e t w e e n t h e w a r s .
On t h e E a s t e r n f r o n t
i n t h e summer o f f e n s e o f 1 9 1 6 ,
G e n e r a l B r u s i l o v made d r a s t i c c h a n g e s i n R u s s i a n o f f e n s i v e m e t h o d s by a t t a c k i n g w i t h s m a l l f o r w a r d e l e m e n t s a t many
t h e commitment of
the
By a t t a c k i n g a c r o s s a b r o a d f r o n t
i n place,
not knowing
too l a t e .
The b r i e f
World War I a m p l y d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a l l
arms t o c o o p e r a t e . alone, E a c h a r m w a s u n s u c c e s s f u l when a c t i n g neophyte tank.
i n c l u d i n g t h e somewhat f r a g i l e ,
c o m b i n e d a r m s by t h e w a r ' s
t a r r thinkers
Overwhelming i n f a n t r y casual t i e s , p o t e n t I a l c o n tr i b u t i on
d I sgu i s e d t h e i n f an t r y m a n ' s
in future battles.
Interwar Years
l e s s o n s o f World War
I , p r e d i c t the type f o r c e s
f u t u r e war a n d t o c o n v i n c e t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e
56
w h i c h r e t a r d e d m i l i t a r y m o d e r n i z a t i o n and c h a n g e .
1.
T h i s r e v u l s i o n c a u s e d popular d i s i n t e r e s t i n a l l
military.
things
T h e h u g e c o s t s of w a r m a t e r i e l a n d t h e l a r g e s u r p l u s equipment,
s t o c k p i l e s of victors,
a t l e a s t on t h e s i d e ot t h e
to
was a v a i l a b l e for
t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of m o d e r n a r m e d f o r c e s .
a t t h e same t i m e ,
revealing the
m i l i t a r r p o t e n t i a l o f new s y s t e m s ;
and w i r e l e s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w e r e b u t a f e w o f
which expensive mi 1
new w a r f i g h t i n g c o n c e p t s . themselves,
of
T h e a d v o c a t e s of
change
however,
or on
the types
Lastly,
traditionalist
c h a n g e b e c a u s e t h e y w a n t e d t h i n g s t o r e m a i n as t h e y w e r e .
T h e s e " a p o s t l e s of m o b i I i ty'C291
i n c a u s i n g some e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n W i t h m o b i l e
e s p e c i a l l y tanks. w h i c h had a Their
1927-28,
p r o f o u n d e f f e c t on German and A m e r i c a n o b s e r v e r s .
57
c o l l e c t i v e e f f o r t s met w i t h o n l y p a r t i a l success.
G r e a t B r i t a i n was a l s o i n a n e c o n o m i c p i n c h .
Its
defense r e s o u r c e s f o r i n d e p e n d e n t a i r arm,
t h e R o y a l A i r F o r c e (REIF).
grossly l a c k i n g was a p l a n f o r m o d e r n i z i n g i t s g r o u n d f o r c e s .
The p o s t - w a r r e d u c i o n s and e c o n o m i e s i n d e t e n c e a n d t h e 'Ten Year R u l e ( w h i c h governed defence p l a n n i n g a n d e x p e n d i t u r e on t h e b a s i s o f a n a s s u m p t i o n t h a t no m a j o r war was 1 i k e Y f o r a decade were s e n s i b l e and p r u d e n t . What w a s n o t j u s t i f a b l e w a s t h e v i r t u a l suspension o f any r a t i o n a a n a l y s i s o f what T h e r e was n o t h e f u t u r e n e e d s of d e f e n c e m i g h t b e . c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d or c o h e r e n t p o l c y t o g u i d e t h e a r m e d f o r c e s C 321
..)
t o heated
of m o b i l i t y "
m i I i t a r y c m m a n d e r s a n d p o l i t i c i a n s whose f o c u s w a s on t h e
E m p i r e and n o t o n c o n t i n e n t a l w a r . all-tank F u l l e r espoused an
f o r c e s u p p o r t e d by a i r p o w e r w h i c h w o u l d a t t a c k d e e p a n d r e a r areas i n a
t o d e s t r o y enemy command a n d c o n t r o l
b a t t l e of annihilation.
He saw l i t t l e or n o n e e d f o r
i n f a n t r y o r c a v a l r y w h i c h was i n d i r e c t o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e
58
traditionalists.
L i d d e l l H a r t e n v i s i o n e d a f u l l y mechantzed tanks,
He also
B r i t i s h a i r strategy
r e s i s t e d attempts to
t a c t i c a l air missions in
except f o r reconnaissance.C331
I n t h e e n d b o t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s a n d those d e m a n d i n g
m o b i l i t y h a d t h e i r way. The b u l k of armored v e h i c l e
1 i g h t tanKs
and m a c h i n e g u n c a r r i e r s
to
T h e s e v e h i c l e s w e r e u s e d by i n f a n t r y a n d The
B r e n gun c a r r i e r s a n d
t h e c a v a l r y b e g a n t o o r g a n i z e m e c h a n i z e d c a v a l r y b r i g a d e s of
1 i g h t l r armored reconnaissance
t a n k s and c a r s .
The in
'all-tank'
t h e l a t e 19305, o f
It
c o n s i s t e d of b r i g a d e s o f M a t i l d a tanks for
l i g h t c r u i s e r t a n k s and heavy
infantry support.
T h e r e was v e r y l i t t l e
the
a deficiency recognized a f t e r
59
remedied.
B r i t i s h mobile
i n f a n t r y t h r o u g h o u t the war r o d e
almost e x c l u s i v e l y i n trucks.C341
I w i t h a much c h a n g e d
the offense versus the
F a c e d w i t h an u n s t a b l e German n e i g h b o r a n d w i t h i t decided to b u i l d
p o t e n t i a l a l l i e s i n t h e Low C o u n t r i e s ,
t h e M a g i n o t L i n e d e f e n s e s y s t e m a l o n g i t s common b o r d e r w i t h Germany. These i n i t i a l defenses would g i v e France t i m e t o This often criticized fixation
m o b i l i z e i f Germany a t t a c k e d .
If we w e r e s h o r t o f t a n k s ,
A s House p o i n t s o u t ,
had a s i g n i f i c a n t l y negative
t h i n k i n g a5 i t r e i n f o r c e d the b e l i e f
t h e u r g i n g s o f m i l i t a r y t h i n k e r s E t i e n n e a n d DeGaul e ,
60
I t s v i e w of
a r m s s u p p o r t t h e f o r w a r d movement
of
infantry.
I t s 1921 d o c t r i n e ,
for example, s t a t e d :
i t s f o r c e s i n t h e 1930s.
i t p r o d u c e d some o f t h e b e s t t a n k s of
the era.
I t
m o d e r n i z e d s l o w l y p i e c e m e a l i n g m o s t of support.
the tanks t o i n f a n t r y
i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h an e l a b o r a t e
I t s f r a n t i c e f f o r t s t o p u t t o g e t h e r more armored
l a c k of d o c t r i n e and
L i k e i t s European a l l i e s t h e
U.S. A r m y f o u n d i t s e f f o r t s
to modernize
in the
i n t e r w a r y e a r s h a m p e r e d by b u d g e t sentiment, d o c t r i n a l confusion,
c o n s t r a i n t s , general anti-war
p o l i c i n g America's reserves.
61
t h e U.S.
C o m b i n e d arms w a s g i v e n f a i n t p r a i s e and,
t a n k s were s u b o r d i n a t e d a s i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t
of
the
i n f a n t r y b r a n c h by
The A r m y even i s s u e d f i e l d
i n regimental and b a t t a l i o n s i z e u n i t s .
There were
11.
lhe
envisioned supported
i n f a n t r y armies a t t a c k i n g tanks,
on
p a r a l l e l routes,
by m a s s i v e a r t i l l e r y ,
and a i r p o w e r ;
d i r e c t e d by
e l e c t r o n i c communications;
a n d t r a n s p o r t e d a n d s u p p l i e d by
motor v e h i c l e s . [ 4 0 1
Despite f i s c a l
c o n s t r a i n t s t h e army e s t a b l i s h e d a i n 1Y28 a n d
s h o r t l i v e d e x p e r i m e n t a l mechanized f o r c e
a mechanized f o r c e .
A s e c o n d e x p e r i m e n t a l b r i g a d e was f o r m e d
1 9 3 2 , when, under the the
Knox.
BY l a w ,
t y for
the tank;
c a v a l r y began
c e n t e r e d on t h e
trade off
fast tanks.
W i t h c a v a l r y i n the v a n g u a r d
the
of
d e v e l o p i n g mechanized u n i t s i t i s n o t s u p r i s i n g t h a t
U.S.
l i g h t t a n k s w e r e f a v o r e d by m o s t . T h u s ,
War
t a n k s i n World
11 were g e n e r a l l r " r e l i a b l e
i n t e r m s o f m o b i l i t y but
vulnerable
When w a r b r o k e o u t s c a t t e r i n g of
i n E u r o p e t h e U.S.
Army h a d a and
l i g h t tanks,
n o major armored f o r m a t i o n s ,
the experimental
companies t o 7 i n f a n t r y companies),
i t was r e m o d e l l e d a f t e r t h e 1941 p a n z e r d i v i s i o n w i t h a
balance between t a n k s and m o b i l e w i t h self propelled a r t i l l e r y , infantry units, complemented
an e n g i n e e r company a n d
s u p p o r t un i t s .
World War
much of
I a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g t r e a t y l e f t Germany w i t h
t e r r i t o r y o c c u p i e d or i n t h e h a n d s of
i t s former
I t had massive
turmoil
i m p o t e n t by t h e t r e a t y , w a s a u t h o r i z e d was n o t p e r m i t t e d i t s
man home d e f e n s e f o r c e ,
Staff,
a n d w a s s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d a s t o t h e k i n d s of
While
to develop s o p h i s t i c a t e d f o r c e s
i t s neighbors,
63
digested the m i l
t a r y l e s s o n s ot t h e w a r a n d t h e German
the f u t u r e .
A s John Engl i s h w r o t e of
interwar years.
German m i l i t a r y t h i n k e r s w e r e experiences, m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y ,
i n f l u e n c e d by t h e i r o w n and c u l t u r e a s w e l l J.F.C. as
numerous f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y t h e o r i s t s .
F u l l e r and B a s i l
L i d d e l l H a r t a r e p o p u l a r l y c r c d i t e d w i t h h a v i n g an enormous i n f l u e n c e o n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of bl i tzkries.
e s p e c I a l 1 Y v o n Seeck t ,
p h y s i c a l l y f r a g m e n t e d by t r e a t y ( D a n z i g C o r r i d o r , et al)
t h e r e were no n a t u r a l b o r d e r s l e f t t o defend.
It is
several f r o n t s again.
The e m e r g i n g m i 1 i t a r y t h i n k e r o f
i n t e r w a r Germany w a s
64
Heinz Guderian,
c a n m o n l r c r e d i t e d a s t h e f a t h e r of
the panzer
f o r c e s and t h e c r e a t o r of b l i t z k r i e g . war e x p e r i e n c e
An i n f a n t r y m a n , w i t h and a
i n wireless signal c m u n i c a t i o n s ,
he was p o s t e d t o t h e M o t o r T r a n s p o r t He s t u d i e d t a c t i c a l m o b i l t t r l e a d i n g advocate f o r i n f l u e n c e s of f o r e i g n
i n t h e e a r l y 1920s.
t i m e became Germany's
mechanization.
He a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e
t h e o r i s t s whom h e r e a d p r o f u s e l y .
i n t o the F u l l e r " a l l
tank"
trap as
L i d d e l l H a r t seemed t o h a v e d o n e ,
a s he r e a l i z e d e a r l y i n h i s
I n t h e y e a r 1929, I became c o n v i n c e d t h a t t a n k s w o r k i n g on t h e i r own or i n c o n J u n c t i o n w i t h i n t a n t r r c o u l d never achieve d e c i s i v e importance. My h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s , the e x e r c i s e s c a r r i e d o u t i n E n g l a n d a n d our e x p e r i e n c e s w i t h m o c k u p s h a d p e r s u a d e d me t h a t t a n k s w o u l d n e v e r b e a b l e t o p r o d u c e t h e i r f u l l e f f e c t u n t i l t h e o t h e r w e a p o n s on whose s u p p o r t t h e y m u s t i n e v i t a b l y r e l y w e r e b r o u g h t up t o t h e i r s t a n d a r d o f s p e e d a n d c r o s s - c o u n t r y performance. I n s u c h a f o r m a t i o n o f a l l arms, t h e tank must p l a y t h e p r i m a r y r o l e , t h e o t h e r weapons b e i n g s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of armour.C441
A s J o n a t h a n House w r o t e ,
65
T h i s i s an e s p e c i a l l y t e m p t i n g argument r e c o g n i t i o n of
in light of
the e a r l y
the p o t e n t i a l of airpower.
T h e r e r e m a i n e d i n t h e German Army,
however,
t h e new m e c h a n i z e d a n d m o t o r i z e d s y s t e m s , c a v a l r y and i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s .
Guderians
b a t t l e s may we1 1 h a v e b e e n h i s f i g h t
1 i m i t e d mechanized systems
t o c o n c e n t r a t e Germanys
i n t o t h e panzer u n i t s and n o t t o
A t t h e s t a r t o f t h e P o l i s h c a m p a i g n t h e Germans h a d o n l y
a few panzer divisions;
towed a r t i l l e r y ,
anti-tank
f o r c e s h a d d i v e bombers s p e c i a l l y d e s i g n e d f o r support r o l e
by c i v i l w a r w h i c h l a s t e d u n t i l
1921. The w i d e e x p a n s e s of
m i l i t a r y thinker, 66
M.N.
lukhachevsky,
s t u d y m o b i l e combined arms,
i n i t i a l l y f o c u s i n g on t h e interdependence of
A s John E r i c k s o n h a s w r i t t e n ,
The t e r m c o m b i n e d arms came i n t o g e n e r a l u s e i n t h e 1920s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f i n t e n s e i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o t h e e x p e r i e n c e s o f W o r l d War I a n d t h e C i v i l War a n d n o t l e a s t a s a p a r t of t h e e f f o r t s t o d e v e l o p a n d implement a unique S o v i e t / p r o l e t a r i a n t h e o r y of w a r f a r e . [ 461 T h o u g h t h e S o v i e t s u n d e r S t a l i n w e r e commi t t e d t o developing the S o v i e t Union i n t e r n a l l y f i r s t , t h e Red Army
e s p e c i a l l y Europe.
The in
became a d r i v i n g f o r c e t a r y machine.
developing a d o c t r i n e for m a n e u v e r b a t t l e s of
The f l u i d
o p e r a t i o n s must be c o n d u c t e d i n d e p t h .
combined arms,
one t h a t
T h e 1936
F i e l d Service
i s the c u l m i n a t i n g p i e c e of
TuKhachevskys
e f f o r t s a n d i s a m a s t e r p i e c e o f p r e - W o r l d War He e n v i s i o n e d a c o m h i n e d a r m s a n d a r t i l l e r y a t t a c k i n g i n m a s s on followed by a
to destroy
1 1 combined arms d o c t r i n e .
f o r c e of
infantry,
tanks,
a narrow f r o n t
t o p e n e t r a t e enemy d e f e n s e s ,
artillery,
67
I n f a n t r y was s t i l l e n v i s i o n e d a s t h e c e n t e r p i e c e ot t h e c o m b i n e d a r m s team.
The infantry in close cooperation w i t h the artillery and tanks. by d e c i s i v e a c t i o n i n a t t a c k a n d by m a i n t a i n i n g t h e p o s i t i o n i n t h e d e f e n s e , d e c i d e s t h e outcome of t h e b a t t l e . Therefore, the o t h e r types of f o r c e s o p e r a t l n g j o i n t l y w i t h the i n f a n t r y are c a r r y i n g o u t t h e i r mi5sions i n the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i n f a n t r y , e n a b l ~ n gi t t o a d v a n c e i n an o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n and t o m a i n t a i n i t s e l f i n defense.[471
I t w a s s e e n a s t h e a r m t h a t " p a v e s t h e way t o r
i n an a d u a n c e , " a n d w a s t h e p r i m a r y means a n d enemy p e r s o n n e l ,
a l l ground f o r c e s
of destroying tanks,
weapons, and v e h i c l e s
fortifications,
i n t h e open.C481
p r o t e c t i o n and f i r e p o w e r obstacles,
especially wire.
strategic
tanks.C49l
were t o c o n t a i n m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y ,
in
..
The t e n d e n c y f o r S o v i e t t a n k s t o a t t a c k and l e a v e t h e i r
68
i n f a n t r y b e h i n d would r e s u l t
i n many t a c t i c a l f a i l u r e s
in
t h e i r f i g h t a g a i n s t t h e Germans.
Unfortunately for
the Soviets,
s e v e r a l f a c t o r s caused
t h i s m a t u r e c o m b i n e d a r m s d o c t r i n e t o become u n e x e c u t a b l e by
t h e o u t b r e a k of World War X I . T u k h a c h e v s k r a n d many o f Second, apparent Stal in's purges eliminated
lessons o f
doubts about
the d o c t r i n e .
time of
t h e German their
Some m o t o r i z e d d i v i s i o n s w e r e c r e a t e d t h e m o s t p a r t t a n k s were r e l e g a t e d
t o r e p l a c e them,
but for
t o infantry support r o l e s .
The p u r g e s ,
reorganization,
a n d doc tr. i n a l c h a n g e s 1 e t t
the
i n Manchuria i n
1939 d i d S o v i e t f o r c e s ,
Tukhachevsky's
under t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f
'Thus,
t h e i n t e r w a r p e r i o d w a s one o f
was t h e a p p a r e n t answer.
69
arms,
t h e r e was a w i d e v a r i e t y of
"how to" d o c t r i n e .
World War I 1
Infantry,
by f o r c e
o f e c o n o m i c s and d o c t r i n e ,
was s t i l l
the p r i n c i p a l
f i g h t i n g a r m o f a l l a r m i e s a t t h e o u t s e t of
T h e bulk o f a l l
World W a r 11.
i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s u p p o r t e d b y h o r s e or v e h i c l e t o w e d
artillery. M o b i l e f o r c e s e x i s t e d i n each army but
i n 1439
o n l y G e r m a n y had c o n c e n t r a t e d m o s t of
i t s mechanized f o r c e s
i n t o a l l a r m m o b i l e d i v i s i o n s that w e r e c a p a b l e of f l u i d ,
high tempo o p e r a t i o n s .
The d e s i r e t o p r o v i d e m o b i l e ,
protected firepower to i t s infantry d i v i s ~ o n s precluded most armies f r o m f o r m i n g l a r g e mechanized formations. German a t t a c k After the
into Poland,
the French,
British,
and A m e r i c a n
and t h e S o v i e t s
The F r e n c h who
had p i e c e m e a l e d m o s t o f
t h e i r s u p e r i o r tanks t o i n f a n t r y
i n f i 1 t r a t i on
1 e x e c u t e d by a c o m b i n e d a r m s m e c h a n i z e d
forward
t o p e n e t r a t e t h e c r u s t of
b y p a s s strong r e s i s t a n c e ,
and q u i c k l y a t t a c k
for the
into
t h e enemy r e a r a r e a s . penetration;
S u r p r i s e was v i t a l
initial
s p e e d a n d t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f momentum w e r e k e y
70
~n p a r a l y z i n g t h e enemy, r e c o n s t i t u t e a defense.
a f f o r d i n g him no time to
d i v i s i o n s d e p e n d e d on s p e e d . substantial p a r t of
t h e needed f i r e p o w e r , Rather
German a r t i l l e r y w a s h o r s e drawn.
m a r c h i n g i n f a n t r y t o e f f e c t a pene r a t i o n , l e d the a t t a c k ;
i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s f o l l o w e d on f o o t c l e a r p o c k e t s of r e s i s t a n c e ,
and keep t h e
To m a i n t a i n a h i g h tempo a n d t o e x p l o i t
the panzer f o r m a t i o n s d i d n o t d e l a y
m o b i l e s t r i k i n g power,
t h e c o n t i n u e d a t t a c k b u t d r o v e deep r e l y i n g on t h e i r o r g a n i c ,
but 1 i m i t e d ,
m a i n t a i n f o r w a r d m o b i l i t y and t o p r o v i d e l o c a l s e c u r i t y for
t h e tank spearheads.
Marching i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s closed w i t h
D e s p i t e s h o c k i n g success i n these e a r l y campaigns, Germans l e a r n e d many v a l u a b l e concerns were equipment. lessons. The r f o r e m o s t tactics, and
the
i n the areas of o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
The t a n k h e a v y p a n z e r d i v i s i o n
f o u r tank,
three
and the l i g h t d i v i s i o n ( t w o m o t o r i z e d
A s G e n e r a l F.M.
von Senger u n d
Tank
71
the f a i l u r e o f the panzer d i v i s i o n s i n Guderian's corps t o e n c i r c l e the B r i t i s h f o r c e s a t Dunkirk p r o v i d e s t h e most s t r i k i n g p r o o f o f t h e imbalance of t a n k s and i n f a n t r y i n the o l d d i v i s i o n s . BY t h e t i m e t h e y r e a c h e d t h e Channel c o a s t h i s p a n z e r d i v i s i o n s had so f e w i n f a n t r y a v a i l a b l e t h a t t h e c o r p s w a s n o t i n a p o s i t i o n t o push f o r w a r d a c r o s s t h e marshes and take Dunkirk.rJ11
s t i l l c o n s t i t u t e d t h e b u l k of
t h e C h a n n e l c o a s t Rommel's
the force.
f o r c e s were s t r u c k The
a small f o r c e of h e a v i e r B r i t i s h tanks.
t a n k s were o u t matched and o n l y t h e
improvised use of
f i r e a r t i l l e r y a n d d i r e c t ground f i r e of
the anti-airc.raft
guns (88's) t u r n e d t h e B r i t i s h b a c k .
Kenneth Macksey c i t e s
i n t h e German
t h i s engagement a s a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r
t a n k s so t h a t
Not o n l y h a d t h e
b u t the h a l f
weapons,
u s e d i n p a n z e r d i v i s i o n s as a n
I t became a n i d e a l v e h i c l e
i n armored b a t t l e s ,
72
o f f e r e d no a r m o r p r o t e c t i o n f o r panzerarenadierwaaen
the troops.
l w o such
were produced,
t h e l i g h t Sd.Kfz.250, which
w h i c h c o u l d c a r r y 6 men, c o u l d c a r r y 1 2 men.1531
a s t h e number o f p a n z e r
armored i n f a n t r y t o t a n k s
providing firepower
for
panzer f o r m a t i o n s proved v i t a l .
The m o s t n o t a b l e i n c i d e n t
f o r w a r d movement of engineer
u n i t s c r o s s e d t h e Meuse i n r u b b e r b o a t s t o s e c u r e a
c r i t i c a l bridgehead.
I n March 1941,
t h e Germans i s s u e d a m a n u a l d e t a i l i n g t h e
i m p o r t a n c e a n d t h e p r o p e r employment of m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y . Motorized infantry u n i t s form the offensive i n f a n t r y element i n t h e armored d i v i s i o n . Their strength l i e s i n t h e i r speed and c r o s s - c o u n t r y performance, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f numerous a u t o m a t i c weapons and p r o t e c t i v e armor..
M o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a b i l i t y t o a l t e r n a t e r a p i d l y between f i g h t i n g f r o m c a r r i e r s and
73
The
i n v a s i o n of R u s s i a i n 1941 was a m a s s i v e u n d e r t a k i n g
that
its
b u t f a i l e d t o achieve,
another quick v i c t o r y .
The v a s t e x p a n s e s of
the l o n g supply l i n e s ,
1 i m i t a t i o n s of German manpower a n d i n d u s t r i a l c a p a c i t y ,
the pigheaded r e f u s a l
of
t h e S o v i e t s t o be b e a t e n a l l
c o n t r i b u t e d t o e v e n t u a l German f a i l u r e .
t a c t i c s of
1941-42 were
improved
p e r m i t t e d many S o v i e t f o r c e s t o s l i p o u t of encirclements.
The p a n z e r f o r c e s w e r e f o r c e d t o w a t t f o r 74
a r r i v a l of
i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s to deal w i t h e n c i r c l e d a n d c a p t u r e d enemy.
i n f a n t r y marched a c r o s s the e n d l e s s
s l o w e d t h e tempo o f o p e r a t i o n s a n d a l l o w e d
As p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d ,
t h e R e d Army w a s n o t After
i n good
s h a p e when t h e Germans a t t a c k e d .
t h e heavy l o s s e s of
1941,
i t had t o v i r t u a l l y s t a r t over
in rebuilding its
These l o s s e s f u r t h e r
forces,
e s p e c i a l l y i t s armored f o r c e s .
d e p l e t e d t h e l i m i t e d number o f
t r a i n e d and knowledgeable
i t
infantry
combined arms,
W h i l e t h e Red Army r e m a i n e d p r i m a r i l y a n i n f a n t r y f o r c e ,
t h e S o v i e t s produced t w o o f
t h e most a d v a n c e d t a n k s o f
Too f e w o f
the
era,
t h e T34 a n d t h e K U l .
these t a n k s h a d been
usual 1Y
in
s u p p o r t of
75
i n t e n d e d t o be u s e d a s m o b i l e g r o u p s t o e x p l o i t p e n e t r a t i o n s a n d t o a t t a c k d e e p i n t o t h e German r e a r . Tank p r o d u c t i o n
p r o d u c t i o n a n d l e n d l e a s e o f w h i c h n e v e r came c l o s e t o m e e t i n g demands.
As a r e s u l t t h e S o v i e t s d i d n o t d e v e l o p a
i t s tank forces.
i s d e s c r i b e d by G e n e r a l v o n Tank W a r f a r e :
Senger u n d E t t e r l i n i n S i m p k i n s
The S o v i e t t a n k s b r o k e t h r o u g h t h e t h i n l i n e o f German i n f a n t r y a n d p e n e t r a t e d f a i r l y d e e p l y . Having r e a c h e d t h i s d e p t h w i t h o u t i n f a n t r y o f t h e i r own t h e y q u i c k l y f e l l v i c t i m t o h a s t i l y r e g r o u p e d German a r m o r e d r e s e r v e s , or t o t h e 88mm guns.. . T h e y w e r e h e l p l e s s b e c a u s e t h e i r i n f a n t r y f o l l o w i n g on f o o t became s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e t a n k s a t t h e n e a r edge o f t h e combat zone. Whenever German a r t i 1 l e r y w a s i n a c t i o n w i t h r e a s o n a b l e s u p p l i e s of a m m u n i t i o n a n d s c o p e f o r o b s e r v a t i o n , i t s u c c e e d e d i n p i n n i n g down or a n n i h i l a t i n g t h e u n p r o t e c t e d i n f a n t r y . . . T h e tanKs w e r e n o t h a n d l e d f l e x i b l y e n o u g h t o make u p f o r t h e a b s e n c e o f i n f a n t r y , or f o r t h a t m a t t e r o f o t h e r a r m s . C 561
G e n e r a l v o n S e n g e r u n d E t t e r l i n sums u p t h e p r o b l e m s o f
the
76
S o v i e t a r m o r e d f o r m a t i o n s i n t h i s manner:
T h r o u g h t h e w h o l e o f W o r l d War I 1 t h e S o v i e t s h a d no armored i n f a n t r y . T h e i r t a n k s were some i f n o t most of t h e t i m e t e c h n i c a l l y s u p e r i o r t o t h e Germans; a s t i m e went on t h e y came t o b e w e l l h a n d l e d . Yet t h e i r t a n k s a l o n e d i d n o t have t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o s u c c e e d a t the t a c t i c a l l e v e l , l e t alone the o p e r a t i o n a l the S o v i e t A r m y , d e s p i t e i t s s u p e r i o r e q u i p m e n t , was p r i m a r i l y h a n d i c a p p e d by t h e s t r u c t u r a l i m b a l a n c e of i t s mechanized f o r m a t i o n s . I t l a c k e d t h e c a p a b i l i t y of b r i n g i n g i n f a n t r y t o b a t t l e u n d e r a r m o r . t 5 7 1
....
W i t h o u t m o b i l e means f o r
i t s infantry,
the S o v i e t s had
t o i m p r o v i s e t o i n s u r e t h a t a t l e a s t some i n f a n t r y
I n f a n t r y began t o h a b i t u a l l y r i d e
into
a t c o n s i d e r a b l e r i s k , on t o p o f t h e t a n k s .
While
t h i s was n o t e x c l u s i v e l y a S o v i e t p r a c t i c e ,
i t became
w e r e s u s c e p t i b l e t o t h e e f f e c t s of
any d i r e c t f i r e s a t them or
i t s e l f as i t t r a v e r s e d i t s t u r r e t o r
The B r i t i s h h a d an e a s y t i m e w i t h t h e I t a l i a n s ,
p a r t due t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e I t a l i a n A r m y c o n s i s t e d a l m o s t e n t i r e l y o f non-motorized of i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t e d by a s m a t t e r i n g As
outmoded, g r o s s l y u n r e l i a b l e t a n k s and a r t i l l e r y .
Rome1 w r o t e :
77
I n the N o r t h A f r i c a n d e s e r t , non-motorized t r o o p s are o f p r a c t i c a l l y n o v a l u e a g a i n s t m o t o r i z e d enemy, s i n c e t h e enemy h a s t h e chance i n a l m o s t e v e r y p o s i t i o n , o f m a k i n g t h e a c t i o n f l u i d by a t u r n i n g movement .Non-motor i z e d f o r m a t i o n s . .can on1 Y b e u s e d a g a i n s t a modern army d e f e n s i v e l y and i n prepared p o s i t i o n s I n m o b i l e w a r f a r e , t h e advantage l i e s a s a r u l e w i t h the side which i s s u b j e c t t o the l e a s t r e s t r a i n t on a c c o u n t o f i t s n o n - m o t o r i z e d troops.[591
..
...
Tactically, though i m p o r t a n t ,
even m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y p l a y e d a s u p p o r t i n g , r o l e i n d e s e r t w a r f a r e where t h e r a n g e o f
The Germans r u l e d
i n t h e d e s e r t by t h e i r guns.[601 Motorized
a g g r e s s i v e employment o f a n t i - t a n k
i n f i g h t i n g enemy i n p o s i t i o n a l d e f e n s e s and i n
removing m i n e f i e l d s .
A s i n other
t h e a t e r s , armor c o m m i t t e d
s u p p r e s s e d by a r t i l l e r y and e l i m i n a t e d by i n f a n t r y . [ 6 t l
Rommel h i m s e l f became h a n d i c a p p e d b y l a r g e c o n t i n g e n t s
o f non-motorized
He was c o n s t a n t l y r e q u i r e d i n t h e
78
I t was t h e m e t i c u l o u s l y p l a n n e d , c a r e f u l l y e x e c u t e d ,
combined arms o p e r a t i o n s of Montgomery t h a t f i n a l l y p u t t h e A f r i k a CorDs on t h e t r a i l
t o defeat.
Rommel d e s c r i b e d t h e
c o m b i n e d a r m s t a c t i c s of A l a m e i n onward:
t h e B r i t i s h E i g h t h Army f r o m E l
When o u r d e f e n s e h a d b e e n s h a t t e r e d by a r t i 1 l e r r , tanks a n d a i r f o r c e , t h e B r i t i s h i n f a n t r y a t t a c k e d . W i t h o u r o u t p o s t s p i n n e d down b y a r t i l l e r r fire highly t r a i n e d sappers, w o r k i n g under cover of smoke, c l e a r e d m i n e s a n d c u t b r o a d l a n e s t h r o u g h our minefields. Then t h e tanks a t t a c k e d , f o l l o w e d c l o s e l y by i n f a n t r y E u e r y t h i n g went m e t h o d i c a l l y a n d a c c o r d i n g t o d r i l l .[631
...
...
A s mentioned,
mobile,
t h e U.S.
Army h a d o p t e d t o p r o d u c e m o r e
r e l l a b l o t a n k s a t t h e e x p e n s e o f armament a n d a r m o r
The initial armored d i u i s i o n , modeled a f t e r
the
protection.
panzer d i v i s i o n ,
wa5 t a n k h e a v y ,
c o n s i s t i n g of s i x l i g h t and
t w o h e a v y t a n k b a t t a l i o n s c o m p l e m e n t e d by o n l y t w o b a t t a l on s
of
mobile
i n f a n t r y and t h r e e a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s .
Later n a
comnand s t r u c t u r e t o f a c i 1 i t a t e f o r m i n g c o m b i n e d a r m s c o m b a t commands. T h e s e b a t t l e g r o u p s w e r e f o r m e d by c r o s s a t t a c h i n g companies between tank and armored i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s . Often a i r defense a r t i l l e r y , tank d e s t r o y e r s , and e n g i n e e r s
w e r e a d d e d t o c o m p l e t e t h e c o m b i n e d a r m s team.
The
t r i a n g u l a r s i n c e t h e l a t e 19305,
c o n s i s t e d of artillery.
i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t s and s u p p o r t i n g Chief
General L e s l i e McNair,
o f Army G r o u n d
79
Tanks,
a i r defense a r t i l l e r y ,
other special
most service
i n c l u d i n g t r a n s p o r t a t i o n assets,
were t o be
t h e t y p e s of
t o q u i c k l y respond to r a p i d l y
changing t a c t i c a l
Once i n c o m b a t
i n France the
A typical
tank d e s t r o y e r ,
time.
i n f a n t r y regiments.
"regimental
f o r m a t i o n s of
U n l i k e t h e Germans and t h e S o v i e t s ,
t h e U.S.
Army d i d
n o t m a s s i t s a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s i i i t o a r m o r e d c o r p s or a r m i e s . The t y p i c a l U.S.
di v s i o n s ,
d l V
infantry
augmented a s n o t e d above,
a n d one a r m o r e d
sion,
u s u a l l y p o i s e d i n r e s e r v e t o e x p l o i t successes of
80
the
i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s or t o c o u n t e r a t t a c k .
A s i g n i f i c a n t advantage of
effective f i e l d artillery.
t h e U.S.
Army w a s i t s v e r y i n t e r w a r y e a r s U.S.
During the
d i r e c t i o n center
(FDC)
a r t i l l e r y t o c o n c e n t r a t e on i n d i r e c t f i r e s u p p o r t .
such a5 a n t i - t a n k
fires,
which reduced
t y t o rnass.[641
A s U.S. K i
lers,
t h e U.S.
an i - t a n k
fires.
Two k e y U.S.
developments
i n anti-tank
p r o v e d i t s e l f b e c a u s e i t w a s m o b i l e , was a b l e t o b e e m p l o y e d q u i c k l y a n d a f f o r d e d some a r m o r e d p r o t e c
I n a d d i t i o n to engaging tanks,
ion for
i t s crew.
d i r e c t f i r e for
the
i n f a n t r y to which
81
While o t h e r armies,
n o t a b l y t h e Germans a n d t h e S o v i e t s ,
t a n k s s t a r t e d t h e war a s i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t systems o r
w e r e f o c u s e d on d e s t r o y i n g s o f t t a r g e t s i n t h e enemy r e a r areas;
by t h e e n d o f
t h e war
t a n k s were viewed a s t h e
principal
anti-tank
system i n m o s t armies.
T h e man p o r t a b l e a n t i - t a n k
r o c k e t gave t h e
infantry
capability.
rhis
Uhle-Wettler panzerfaust,
t h e German v e r s i o n ,
may h a v e d e s t r o y e d a s many a s 1 0 , 0 0 0
armored vehicles.[661
i n f a n t r y m a n w i t h some p o s i t i v e d e f e n s e a g a i n s t
Its
t o s u p p r e s s a n d d e s t r o y enemy i n f a n t r y a r m e d w i t h s u c h
weapons.
an a n t i - t a n k
I n f a n t r y and tank c o o p e r a t i o n r e q u i r e d e i t h e r
tanks t o in
f i g h t a t t h e pace of
s u p p o r t of t h e pace o f
infantry,
or f o i -
To a c c o m p l i s h
needed m o b i l i t y s i m i l a r t o the tank and i t needed i n c r e a s e d protection. Development of the armored personnel carrier
82
(APC),
however,
l a g g e d b e h i n d tank development.
When f a c e d
w i t h s e t t i n g i n d u s t r i a l p r i o r i t i e s f o r p r o d u c t i o n of armored
vehicles, v i r t u a l l y e v e r y n a t i o n o p t e d f o r t a n k s and m o b i l e infantry.
f i r e p o w e r over armored t r a n s p o r t f o r
infantry armies
t h e s t a r t of
the war,
and i n s e v e r a l
The r e q u i r e m e n t
t o move i n f a n t r y u n d e r some a r m o r p r o t e c t i o n l e a d t o t h e
development of armored p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r s . t h e U . S . Army s e t t l e d o n a o p e n t o p , L i k e t h e Germans
half-tracked vehicle.
The o p e n t o p w a s n o t s u c h a v u l n e r a b i l i t y a s I t may a p p e a r . The l i m i t e d u s e o f v a r i a b l e t i m e f u s e d a r t i l l e r y made airbursts rare, and the U.S.-invented p r o x i m i t y f u z e was
i n t r o d u c e d l a t e i n t h e war.
The o p e n t o p w a s a l i a b i l i t y
A l l o f the armored i n f a n t r y
it.
T h i s v e r s a t i l e p i e c e of
e q u i p m e n t w a s m o d i f i e d a n d u s e d f o r many o t h e r p u r p o s e s a n d
was a u p p l i e d t o the a l l i e s .
O v e r 40,000
were p r o d u c e d f r o m
1941-45.[671
World War
1 1 w i t n e s s e d t h e emergence of
muor partner
a b s o l u t e r e q u i r e m e n t t o f g h t as c o m b i n e d a r m s , m o r e r a p i d p a c e , w a s a ma o r lesson o f
t h i s war.
h a d b e e n r e q u i r e d t o d e v e op t h e m o b i l i t y a n d p r o t e c t i o n t o
83
f i g h t on t h e same b a t t l e f i e l d a s t a n k s .
Despite the r a p i d
11 t o an end.
T h e Nuc 1 e a r Age
D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d a f t e r World War
11,
t h e r o l e of
U.S.
The
h e a v y g r o u n d f o r c e s e n t e r e d a p e r i o d of u n c e r t a i n t y . advent of
t h e a t o m i c bomb made t h e n e e d f o r
B e h i n d t h e s h i e l d of
i m p o t e n c e i n t h e few y e a r s a f t e r
i n l i g h t of a t o m i c ,
A new wave o f l o w i n t e n s i t y c o n f l i c t s c o u p l e d w i t h
manpower i n t e n s i v e o c c u p a t i o n d u t i e s caused the g e n e r a l h e a v y f o r c e s i n f a v o r of lighter infantry forces. a n d w a r s of Greece, i n the
n e g l e c t of
The s e r i e s o f p e r i p h e r a l c o n f l i c t s , national
insurgencies,
l i b e r a t i o n i n p l a c e s l i k e French Indochina,
ground warfare
84
Caught g r o s s l y unprepared,
t h e U.S.
Army f o u g h t t h e
p r i m a r i l y an i n f a n t r y war because of
2.36
inch rocket
i n f a n t r y c o u l d do l i t t l e t o s t o p t h e lesson i n
T h e U.S.
Army h a d l e a r n e d a n o t h e r p a i n f u l
combined arms:
t a n k s and a n t i - t a n k valuable
e v e n u s e d on o c c a s i o n f o r
Many o f
i n t o b a t t l e on t a n k s .
strong s u i t .
A i r p o w e r was the
c l o s e s u p p o r t of
I imi t e d
ground troops.
T h e U.S.
Army l o o k e d t o f i r e p o w e r ,
i n s t e a d of m a n e u v e r ,
to s o l v e i t s t a c t t c a l problems.
D u r i n g t h e 1950s a n d e a r l y 19605,
numerous t a c t i c a l
a t o m i c w e a p o n s w e r e d e v e l o p e d and f i e l d e d i n t h e U.S. A r m y . These weapons i n c l u d e d r a c k e t s y s t ems s u c h a s t h e Honest John, a r t i l l e r y delivered munitions, i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t weapons
and e v e n man p o r t a b l e s p e c i a l
w e a p o n s t o become r e f i n e d o v e r
f o r example,
atomic p r o j e c t i l e s i n i t i a l l y had t o be f i r e d
Army t o d e v e l o p d o c t r i n e and f o r c e s t h a t w o u l d a l l o w
t o upgrade i t s n e g l e c t e d armored f o r c e s .
i n f a n t r y , a i r b o r n e , and
q u i c k l y d i s p e r s e t o r e d u c e v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o weapons o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n and t o c o n c e n t r a t e t o combat enemy g r o u n d f o r c e s . Armored v e h i c l e s also p r o t e c t e d t r o o p s frm a t o m i c weapons effects including radiation. W h i l e t h e armored d i v i s i o n tanks, armored i n f a n t r y
r e t a i n e d i t s b a l a n c e d s t r u c t u r e of and s e l f - p r o p e l l e d a r t i l l e r y ,
t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s went
i n t h e e a r l y 1960s.
A t t h e h e i g h t o f t h e U.S. t h e mid-19505,
c o n c e r n s about n u c l e a r war
in
pentomic s t r u c t u r e .
t h e a r m y saw n e c e s s a r y t o f i g h t and s u r v i v e
n o t o n l y on a n u c l e a r b a t t l e f i e l d b u t i n a n y h o t s p o t i n t h e
world. e a c h of The s t r u c t u r e r e c o g n i z e d t h e n e e d f o r c o m b i n e d a r m s ; the f i v e b a t t l e groups was designed to be a u n i t w h i c h c o u l d b e r e i n f o r c e d by t a n k s a n d The d i v i s i o n h a d l e s s The
self-contained
other arms f r o m t h e d i v i s i o n t r o o p s .
trucks,
and A P C ' s
to increase
T h o u g h some d i v i s i o n s w e r e so o r g a n i z e d t h i s c o n c e p t w a s
short l i v e d .
One o f t h e u n i q u e a s p e c t of
the pentomic
d i v i s i o n was t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of APC's
i n t o the i n f a n t r y
APC a s a means o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o r p r o t e c t e d m o b i l i t y f o r
infantry.
The a d v e n t o f
and p r o t e c t i o n .
atomic firepower
p u t a p r e m i u m on m a n e u v e r
t h e U.S.
t o d e v e l o p i t s t a n k and APC
fleet. APC's,
these These
were f u l l y enclosed,
f u l l y t r a c k e d squad c a r r i e r s .
v e h i c l e s were e s s e n t i a l l y b a t t l e t a x i s ;
t h e y gave t h e
o t h e r a t o m i c weapons e f f e c t s .
1 9 6 0 s b y t h e M 1 1 3 , w h i c h h a s p r o v e n t o b e one o f
p o p u l a r APC's ever f i e l d e d ,
t h e most
j u d g i n g f r o m t h e number p r o d u c e d ,
armies, t h e number o f
its service
i n o v e r 40 d i f f e r e n t
v a r i a n t s produced,
and i t s r e l i a b i l i t y i n o v e r t w e n t y y e a r s
the
of s e r v i c e .
P i o n e e r i n g e f f o r t s i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of
c a p a b i l i t y t o w e l d b a l l i s t i c a l u m i n u m p l a t e made t h e M 1 1 3
l i g h t e n o u g h t o b e a i r t r a n s p o r t a b l e and t o s w i m i n l a n d
b o d i e s of w a t e r w i t h o u t e x t e n s i v e p r e p a r a t i o n .
full
I t carried a
r i f l e s q u a d a n d o f f e r e d i t t h e same r e l a t i v e d e g r e e of
p r o t e c t i o n as e a r l i e r f u l l y enclosed models.
As successful
a s t h e M i 1 3 has b e e n ( a n d i t i s s t i l l i n t h e U.S.
the
s t a n d a r d mechanized i n f a n t r y c a r r i e r
Army t o d a y ) ,
A s t h e army
i n t h e e a r l y 19705,
i t recognized
and p r o t e c t i o n than
t h e M113.
as t h e S o v i e t s d e v e l o p e d new
i n f a n t r y c o m b a t v e h i c l e s s u c h as t h e BMP, outclassed.
t h e M 1 1 3 became the
I t s caliber
.SO m a c h i n e g u n c o u l d n o t d e f e a t
88
BMP, t h e M 1 1 3 g u n n e r w a s u n p r o t e c t e d ,
or f i r i n g p o r t 5 f o r
t h e squad,
i t lacked v i s i o n blocks
i n c r e a s i n g l y more v u l n e r a b l e t o a g r o w i n g a r r a y of weapons.
an i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e t h a t h a d h a t c h
through several
the death o f S t a l i n
i t c o n t i n u e d t o f i e l d a m a s s i v e a r m y t h a t was b a s e d on t h e
Infantry,
i n c l u d i n g APC's
and d i r e c t
Artlllerr
t h e p r i n c i p a l c o m b a t arm.
the Tanks
forces,
artillery
a n d i n f a n t r y b e g a n t o move
toward f u l l m e c h a n i z a t i o n .
infantry fighting
The S o v i e t s began f i e l d i n g w h e e l e d a n d t r a c k e d
i n 1967 t h e
S o v i e t s f i e l d e d t h e world's vehicle,
f i r s t modern i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g
t h e BMP w a s t h e c o n c e r n f o r the e f f e c t s
t h e BMP. T h e i m p e t u s f o r
k e e p i n g i n f a n t r y l i n k e d up w i t h t a n k s t o e x p l o i t of n u c l e a r weapons.
The c a p a b i l i t y t o f i g h t m o u n t e d
T h e i r one v a r i a n t ,
a t o m i c war o n l y ,
v i e w began t o lose
its luster
i n t h e l a t e 1960s i n t h e f a c e o f p o l i t i c a l
The in
w i t h NATO w a s by p r o s e c u t i n g a q u i c k c o n v e n t i o n a l c a m p a i g n
b e f o r e NATO c o u l d e f f e c t t h e d e c i s i o n t o u s e n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . I n any case S o v i e t ground f o r c e s , on a n i n t e g r a t e d b a t t l e f i e l d , a l r e a d y capable of f i g h t i n g
began t o m o d e r n i z e d t o
90
deemphasized u n d e r t h e one v a r i a n t s t r a t e g y .
The combined
..."1-59]
John E n g l i s h p o i n t s o u t an examp e o f t h e
r e s u l t s of
quick With the v i r t u a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f the I s r a e l r e a c t i o n 1 9 0 t h Armored B r i g a d e , w h i c h coun e r a t t a c k e d u n s u p p o r t e d by i n f a n t r y and l i g h t l y s u p p o r e d b y a r t i l l e r y , the ' a l l - t a n k ' i d e a was once a g a i n shown t o have s e r i o u s 1 i m i t a t i o n s . [ 7 0 1
He g o e s on t o s t a t e t h a t many I s r a e l i
t a n k s were
d e a l t w i t h t h e s e f o r c e s and s a v e d many t a n k s .
Not a l l t a n k s w e r e d e s t r o y e d a t s h o r t r a n g e s d u r i n g t h i s
confl i c t .
e f f e c t i v e A r a b use of
t h e S n a p p e r and S a g g e r .
heavy t o l l
on I s r a e l i u e h i c l + s ,
i n no small
l a c k o f adequate I s r a e l i s u p p r e s s i v e a r t i l l e r y f i r e . war r e a f f i r m e d
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t o f i g h t a s c o m b i n e d arms.
these a n t i - t a n k
g u i d e d m i s s i l e s (ATGM's) Both
attention,
e s p e c i a l l y t h e superpowers.
r e a l i z e d t h a t a n y t h i n g t h a t c o u l d be seen c o u l d be h i t .
its tactical
on
the b a t t l e f i e l d , relooking
d o c t r i n e as i t s h i f t e d e m p h a s i s f r o m V i e t n a m t o
Europe.
doctrine,
to a
c o n v e n t i o n a l -nucl e a r phase.
Operations,
was p r i m a r i l y
p u b l i s h e d i n 1976, was a t t r i t i o n o r i e n t e d ,
92
i n tone,
and emphasized c o n c e n t r a t i o n ,
massive
a n d movement t o i n c r e a s e r e l a t i v e c o m b a t p o w e r
I n l i g h t of significantly
t h e l e t h a l i t y o f ATGMs,
t h e U.S.
Army
i n c r e a s e d t h e number a n d q u a l i t y o f t h e s e
I t developed the
on a M i 1 3 v a r i a n t
ATGMs
v e h i c l e t h a t n o t only a f f o r d e d t h e gunner l i g h t armored p r o t e c t i o n but a l s o p r o v i d e d h i m w i t h s u p e r b d a y a n d t h e r m a l sights. Perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e army d i r e c t e d t h a t then under
t h e d e s i g n of development,
t h e new i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e , i n c l u d e l o n g r a n g e ATGM c a p a b i l i t y .
The S o v i e t s e n t e r e d i n t o a l e n g t h y d e b a t e a b o u t e f f e c t s o f ATGMs
on t h e i r o f f e n s i v e
the
doctrine.
What w a s s e e n
t o be a t g r e a t e s t r i s k was n o t
t h e S o v i e t tank b u t t h e more
l i g h t l y a r m o r e d BMP, w h i c h t h e y d e t e r m i n e d t o b e t w i c e a s v u l n e r a b l e a5 t h e tank.
721
They r e c o g n i z e d t h a t
i f BMP-5
i n e i t h e r a s e p a r a t i o n of t h e t a n k - i n f a n t r y
t a n k s t o o p e r a t e a t r e d u c e d pace, the a t t a c k .
would force
severely
s l o w i n g t h e tempo o f
Not o n l y w o u l d t h e
campaign was s u s p e c t .
d e v e l o p e d i n t o a d i s c o u r s e on m o t o r i z e d r i f l e t a c t i c s a n d
93
t h e i r e f f e c t s on o p e r a t i o n a l methods.
One r e s u l t o f
t h e S o v i e t s made a c o m m i t m e n t
" a major s h i f t
l e s s o n s of
t h e 1973 War a n d
I t developed s e l f - p r o p e l l e d
enemy a n t i - t a n k
i t w a s a h i g h l y m e c h a n i z e d army w h i c h
i n t e r r a i n l i k e i t had fought i n o v e r t h e l a s t f e w w a r s .
was not p r o p e r l y p r e p a r e d t o f i g h t t e r r a i n o f Lebanon, where
I t
i n r e s t r i c t e d mountainous
i t s l a r g e tank f o r m a t i o n s c o u l d n o t
Its
I t was t r a i n e d t o
94
t h e long range a n t i - t a n k
f i r e s employed a g a i n s t t h e I s r a e l i s i n Lebanon w r e c k e d havoc w i t h t h e APC's. T h e M 1 1 3 s w i t h l i g h t aluminum a l l o y armor infantry riding inside "the
i f h i t by
As Gabriel noted,
t r o o p s became so
t o w a l k i n g a l o n g s i d e t h e m o r r i d i n g on t h e
outside."[761
The I s r a e l i s b e g a n t o u s e t h e i r M e r k a v a t a n k s ,
infantrymen,
a s a means o f
transporting l i m i t e d
numbers of
infantrymen w i t h tanks.
D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e d e f e n s i v e n a t u r e of doctrine
t h e 1976 Army.
l e a d t o a s u b s t a n t i a l d e b a t e w i t h i n t h e U.S.
Among o t h e r f a c t o r s w h i c h c a u s e d t h e a r m y ' s
basic doctrine to
c h a n g e a g a i n w e r e t h e r e s u l t s o f n u m e r o u s c o m p u t e r w a r games
and o t h e r e x e r c i s e s t h a t
indicated that
i t w o u l d not r e s u l t
ODerations.
in victory.
The 1 9 8 2 v e r s i o n o f FM 100-5,
depend upon
initiative,
depth,
agility,
and s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n . pro-active
Collectively, force
t h e y i m p l y an o f f e n s i v e l y s p i r i t e d ,
t h a t seeks t o a c t f a s t e r
t h a n t h e enemy a n d t o m a x i m i z e effort
i t s c o m b a t p o w e r t h r o u g h u n i t y of
of combined arms
r e s u l t i n g i n t h e d i s r u p t i o n o f t h e enemy p l a n a n d d e s t r u c t i o n
9s
of h i s f o r c e s
t h r o u g h o u t t h e d e p t h of
the b a t t l e f i e l d .
I n t h e mid-19605,
t h e U.S.
A r m y b e g a n a l o n g study,
delayed b y i t s involvement
i n the Vietnam c o n f l i c t ,
to
t h a t would be a The f i e l d i n g o f
transportation.
t h e M2 B r a d l e y I F V c o i n c i d e d w i t h t h e 1982 v e r s i o n o f FM
100-5.
A s t h e U.S.
Army w o r k s t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h e s e t a c t i c a l m a n u a l s i t also
f a c e s t h e task o f d e t e r m i n i n g h w t h i s c o m p l e x new s y s t e m
w i l l f i g h t a s p a r t of
t h e combined a r m s e f f o r t .
Summary
The p r i n c i p a l consistent,
l e s s o n of
almost absolute,
to fight
tactical
together failures
t o i n s u r e success.
A g r e a t number of
i n t h i s c e n t u r y seem t o h i n g e on a n
These f a i l u r e s t a k e t r a i n i n g of
Some c a n b e t r a c e d t o t h e l a c k o f
organizational infantry
i n World War 1 1 ; a n d s t i l l o t h e r s r e f l e c t
of a c o h e r e n t combined arms d o c t r i n e ,
tank' o r i e n t a t i o n of
l i k e the I s r a e l i " a l l
1973.
96
Certainly,
t h e l e s s o n s o f combined arms w a r f a r e s h o u l d
As the l e n g t h y S o v i e t debate
n o t be q u i c k and e a s y d e c i s i o n s .
97
ENDNOTES
1. John E r i c k s o n , P r a c t i c e , " p . 1.
CHAPTER 3
S o v i e t C o m b i n e d Arms: T h e o r y a n d
2.
3.
4.
p.
7-3.
2-3.
p,
F i e l d M a n u a l 100-5, House,
p,
7-4.
5.
3.
6. S h e l f o r d B i d w e l l a n d D o m i n i c k Graham, FireDWer ( L o n d o n : G e o r g e A l l e n L U n w i n , 1 9 8 2 ) , p . 3.
7.
8.
Ibid.
p.
15.
L-
9.
English,
p.
10.
1 0 . House,
p , 13.
i n t h e M o d e r n World
p.14. (New Y o r K :
P e r s p e c t i v e on I n f a n t r y .
rbid.
p.
1 4 . Ropp,
250.
15. R i c h a r d O g o r k i e w i c z , A r m o u r e d F o r c e s : A H i s t o r y of A r m o u r e d F o r c e s and T h e r e V e h i c l e s (New Y o r k : Arco, 1970), p . 13. 16. J o h n WeeKs, Men A g a i n s t T a n k s . A H i s t o r y o f A n t i - t a n k Warfare (New Y o r K : Mason, C h a r t e r , 1 9 7 S ) , p . 22. 1 7 . Ibid, p p . 18. House, 25-26. 13.
p.
19. B i d w e l l ,
20.
21.
p.
124.
Ibld.
House,
p - 125. p . 32.
98
22. Weeks,
23.
pp. p.
22-24.
125. p. 22.
Bidwell, English,
24.
25.
P e r s D e c t i v e on I n f a n t r y ,
Timothy LuDfer, The D y n a m i c s o f D o c t r i n e : T h e C h a n a e s i n German T a c t i c a . 1 D o c t r i n e D u r i n g t h e F i r s t World War, L e a v e n w o r t h P a p e r # 4 . ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: U.S. A r m y Command and General S t a f f C o l l e g e P r e s s , 1981), pp. v i i - i x .
26.
English,
P e r s p e c t i v e on I n f a n t r y ,
p.
26.
(New Y o r k :
Ibid.
p.
11.
3 0 . T h e r e w a s a n d i s g e n e r a l c o n f u s i o n about t h e t e r m s " m o t o r i z e d " and "mechanized". I n the interwar years they were o f t e n u s e d i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y . I t appears that t h e t e r m " m o t o r i z a t i o n " wa5 t h e m o r e g e n e r a l t e r m w h i c h r e f e r r e d t o e q u i p i n g f o r c e s w i t h motor v e h i c l e s , a r m o r e d o r n o t . The "mechanization" g e n e r a l l y r e f e r r e d to equiping troops w i t h t r a c k lay(ng, armored v e h i c l e s . That the Soviets r e f e r t o t h e i r armored i n f a n t r y a s " m o t o r r i f l e ' t r o o p s h i g h l i g h t s the cross u s a g e of t e r m s . 31. C a r v e r , p . 33.
32. B i d w e l l , p . 1 5 0 .
33.
Ibid.
pp. p.
34.
Ibid.
35. M a r c B l o c h , 1 9 6 8 ) , p . 52.
36. 37.
W.W.
Norton,
H o u s e , p . 60.
Ibid.
38.
39.
Ibid.
p . 64.
Ibid.
p.
71.
99
41. 42.
Ibid.
p.
6.
P e r s p e c t i v e on I n f a n t r y . p. 61. D.C.:
English,
(Washington,
24.
House,
p.
53.
p . 3. S o v i e t Army. 1936, p.
Erickson,
F i e l d Service Reaulation.
3.
Ibid.
Ibid. Ibid.
p . 84. p.
5.
Tank W a r f a r e (Oxford: Brasser's, Jane's, 1979.
R i c h a r d SimpKin,
52. K e n n e t h M a c k s e y , 1 9 8 1 ) , p . 160-2.
The Tank P i o n e e r s
(London:
53. O g o r k i e w ~ c z , p . 388.
The German M o t o r i z e d I n f a n t r y
Simpkin,
p.
14-15.
57.
Ibid.
p. 391. (New T o r k : Harcourt,
58. O g o r k i e w i c z ,
50. B l d w e l l , p p . 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 .
61.
Ibid.
p.
239.
The R o m e 1 Paoers, p. p.
331.
p.
314.
Ibld.
House,
75.
NATO's
67.
OgorKiewicz,
p.
390.
68. John H. Cushman, " P e n t o r n i c I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n i n Combat," M i l i t a r y Review ( J a n 1 9 5 8 ) 19-30. 69. English, p. P e r s p e c t i v e on I n f a n t r y , 244. pp. 240-1.
7 0 . I_bld.
71. R o b e r t D o u g h t y , The E v o l u t i o n o f US A r m y T a c t i c a l D o c t r i n e , 1946-76 Leavenworth Paper # I . ( F t . Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1 9 7 9 ) , p . 41.
Soviet Anti-tank
Debate,"
Survival
rbid,
p.
110.
7 4 . R i c h a r d A. G a b r i e l , O D e r a t i o n P e a c e f o r G a l i l e e (New Y o r k : H i l l a n d Wang, 1 9 8 1 ) , p p . 1 9 - 2 1 .
75. 76.
Ibid.
Ibid.
p. p.
192-3.
200.
101
CHAPTER 4
I N F W T R Y ROLES AND COMBINED ARMS
The e v o l u t i o n o f c o m b i n e d a r m s c o o p e r a t i o n from W o r l d
War
for
I until
today r e v e a l s 5 m e
i n t e r e 5 t i n g trends.
Ignoring
t h e moment t h e aspects of
t h e o t h e r arms,
several their
and a r t i l l e r y u n i t s and
i n t e r a c t i o n become a p p a r e n t .
The E v o l u t i o n of
Infantry
infantry roles,
a n d c a p a b i l i t i e s h a v e become m o r e
complex and d i v e r s i f i e d .
I n 1914,
and t h e y g a i n e d p r o t e c t i o n f r o m
i n f a n t r y a l s o fought w i t h
machine guns,
1 i g h t a u t o m a t i c weapons,
While t a c t i c a l mobility
and
rudimentary anti-tanK
r e m a i n e d b a s i c a l l y t h e same,
I 1 p o r t i o n s of
the i n f a n t r y gained t a c t i c a l
P r o t e c t i o n w a s i n c r e a s e d forInfantry
added a n t i - t a n k
w i t h v e h i c u l a r m o u n t e d a u t o m a t i c weapons.
During t h e atomic
in
and i n c r e a s i n g l y
i n f a n t r y was a c h i e v e d w i t h
The
h e l i c o p t e r s and a i r a s s a u l t u n i t s .
c o n t r a s t between the
I F V squad of
today a m p l y r e f l e c t s t h e p h e n o m e n a l
weapons d i v e r s i t y ,
and employment
The E v o l u t i o n o f T a n k s
and m i s s i o n s
I n W o r l d War I t a n k s p r o v i d e d
B y W o r l d War I 1 t h e y h a d d e v e l o p e d i n t o Such s y s t e m s c o u l d n o t
m o b i l e , p r o t e c t e d f i r e p o w e r systems.
only support
infantry,
b u t a 1 5 0 c a p i t a l i z e on t h e i r s p e e d ,
shock a c t i o n ,
and f i r e p o w e r
t o maneuver a s t a n k u n i t s t o
d i s r u p t i n g or d e s t r o y i n g
a t t a c k a n enemy f l a n k or r e a r a r e a ,
As t a n k
t a n k guns w e r e By t h e end of
World War 1 1 ,
anti-tank
srstem.[ll
speed, m o b i l i t y ,
t o p e r m i t t a n k s t o s u c c e s s f u l l y combat o t h e r
tanks i n b a t t l e .
t a n k s have
The b a s i c
rounds.
Against soft
t a r g e t s these spot
rounds p r o d u c e g r o s s o v e r k i 1 1 s or, i f n o v i t a l
i s hi t,
t h e y c a n p a s s r i g h t t h r o u g h a t a r g e t w i t h a l m o s t no e f f e c t a t all. T a n k s c a r r y n e i t h e r t h e v a r i e t y n o r t h e amount o f
a m u n i t i o n f o r a n M60A3 t a n k
i s 63 r o u n d s c o m p r i s e d 18 h i g h
of
a b o u t 5 w h i t e p h o s p h o r o u s r o u n d s u s e d f o r smoke,
rounds u s e d a g a i n s t n o n - t a n k
armored rounds.
a n d 40 s a b o t - t y p e
k i n e t i c energy a n t i - t a n k
120mm m a i n g u n i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e rounds,
it w i l l
v i r t u a l l y a l l k i n e t i c e n e r g y rounds.121
I n the
target-rich
U.S.
e n v i r o n m e n t e x p e c t e d on t h e m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d ,
t a n k s m u s t c o n c e n t r a t e on d e s t r o y i n g t h e g r e a t number o f
S o v i e t t a n k s a n d m u s t r e s i s t t h e t e m p t a t i o n t o engage w i t h a n y t h i n g but machine guns the pro1 i f e r a t i o n o f s o f t e r v e h i c l e s t h a t t h e complementary systems can d e s t r o y . have, i n effect, Tank5
become a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y t a n k k i l l e r s .
104
The E v o l u t i o n of A r t i l l e r y
A r t i l l e r y h a s a l s o changed.
I n World War I
i t went
through a d r a s t i c m e t a m o r p h o s i s f r o m a p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t f i r e
s y s t e m t o an i n d i r e c t f i r e one. destruction. During World W a r
I t became a s y s t e m f o r m a s s
I 1 a r t i l l e r y developed i n t o a
i t supported.
I t was s t i l l
t h e g r e a t e s t k i l l e r on t h e
i t h a s been
g i v i n g i t a t r u e mass
I n c o n v e n t i o n a l r o l e s i t ha5 been
t a r g e t s on t h e
focused on s u p p r e s s i o n a s t h e degree o f s o f t
d i r e c t f i r e for
r e m a i n s a v i t a l c o m p o n e n t of firepower,
I t provides
and i t
i t maneuvers w i t h f o r c e s t h a t
i t supports,
R e a u i r e m e n t s of Combined Arms
T h e l e s s o n s of h i s t o r y c l e a r l y p o i n t o u t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t
for
t h e v a r i o u s arms t o f i g h t t o g e t h e r
t o i n s u r e success.
g r e a t number o f
t h e t a c t i c a l f a i l u r e s i n t h i s c e n t u r y seem t o
I05
h i n g e on a n i m p r o p e r a p p l i c a t i o n of have f r e q u e n t l y themselves.
c o m b i n e d arms.
Weapons
seemed t o b e a b l e t o f i g h t a n d w i n b y
i n p r a c t i c e no one weapon o r
However,
type o f
u n i t h a s been a b l e t o s u c c e s s f u l l y d e f e a t a c o m b i n e d arms
enemy.
cooperation,
i t i s apparent
that tank
protected firepower
or t a n k - l i k e
systems can p r o v i d e .
T h i s o r i g i n a l reason f o r
A s t h e p o s t - W o r l d War
mobi I e ,
protected firepower:
The u n i f o r m l y b e t t e r p e r f o r m a n c e o f i n f a n t r y , i n any o p e r a t i o n , when c l o s e l y s u p p o r t e d by t a n k s i s probably the biggest s i n g l e t a c t i c a l lesson of the E u r o p e a n Campaign. F r e q u e n t l y t a n k s w e r r employed p r i m a r i l y a s c l o s e s u p p o r t w e a p o n s , b u t r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r r o l e t h e y m a t e r i a l l y enhanced the a g g r e s s i v e n e s s of i n f a n t r y i n the a t t a c k and i t ; s t a y i n g power i n t h e d e f e n s e . [ 3 1
On t h e o t h e r hand,
t h e c i t e d examples of R u s s i a n s i n World War amply demonstrate,
As
t h e B r i t i s h i n W o r l d War 11,
I, t h e
a n d t h e I s r a e l i s i n t h e 1973 War
t a n k s f a c e a n a r r a y of b a t t l e f i e l d h a z a r d s infantry.
The n e c e s s a r y p r o p o r t i o n a l m i x of
terrain,
10.3
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e tank-heavy
c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e i n f a n t r y dominated forces.
analysis,
I n the f i n a l
however,
commanders o f c o m b i n e d a r m s f o r c e s m u s t a l l o f the t y p e s of f o r c e s
have a t t h e i r
immediate d i s p o s a l
I n f a n t r y R e a u i r e m e n t s i n Combined Arms
The f o r e g o i n g a n a l y s e s of
c o m b i n e d a r m s s u g g e s t a broad r a n g e o f
-whose -that
p r i m a r y tasks i n v o l v e c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t a n k s ; c a n go t o g r o u n d t o d e f e n d f o r t i f i e d a r e a s a n d
or e x p l o i t i n g ;
-that -that
jungle, and
can conduct s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s .
To s a t i s f y t h i s v e r y b r o a d range o f
107
tactical
requirements,
t h e U.S.
Army h a s a w i d e v a r i e t y of ranger,
infantry
light, standard,
mechanized
i s the
m o t o r i z e d (high tech),
infantryman,
each t y p e u n i t i s o r g a n i z e d ,
and
c o l l e c t i v e t a s k s s u c h a s e m p l o y i n g c r e w s e r v e d weapons, p a t r o l 1 ing,
and so on,
c o l l e c t i v e requirements.
infantry i s organized,
equipped,
and t r a i n e d t o a d d r e s s some
p a r t i c u l a r b a t t l e f i e l d requirement,
each h a s u n i q u e
i n f a n t r y has b e e n
found i t n e c e s s a r y t o d e v e l o p s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d
infanterie
d'accomDaanement
to fight
i n s u p p o r t of t a n k s . C 4 1
" T h r e e K i n d s of
Infantry"CS1
In h i s a r t i c l e "Three K i n d s of I n f a n t r y , '
Wass d e Czege c i t e s t h e n e e d f o r i n f a n t r y i n t h e U.S. Army t o d a y ,
C o l o n e l Huba
f o r c e s such a s r a n g e r s .
They a r e :
1.
I n f a n t r y whose p r i m a r y t a s k s r e q u i r e high s t r a t e g i c ,
operational,
a n d t a c t i c a l m o b i l i t y m o s t o f t e n b y Army o r A i r
I08
a r e many v a r i a n t s i n c l u d i n g a i r b o r n e ,
a i r assault,
2.
I n f a n t r y whose p r i m a r y t a s k s i n v o l v e h o l d i n g g r o u n d ,
or a t t a c k i n g f o r
i f i e d pos t i o n s .
He
3.
o f tanks.
I n f a n t r y whose p r i m a r y t a s k s
He c a l l s t h i s
armored i n f a n t r y .
I n f a n t r y i n t h i s general category
is
I t s s t r e n g t h l i e s i n infantrymen,
highly
t r a i n e d f o r small u n i t ,
independent o p e r a t i o n s .
i t is,
The f a c t
t o move q u i c k l y on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d by f o o t or a i r ,
such a s j u n g l e o r mounta n s .
These f o r c e s can employ a v a r i e t y o f t a c t i c s a g a i n s t heavy enemy f o r c e s t o t i e down s u p e r i o r f o r c e s , deny enemy use o f r o a d n e t s through r e s t r i c t i v e t e r r a i n ,
109
and o p e r a t e a g a i n s t
L i g h t i n f a n t r y can s e i z e and
I t can f i g h t
or t o d e f e n d u r b a n s t r o n g p o i n t s , u n l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t l y
r e i n f o r c e s w i t h s p e c i a l i z e d equipment, tools, and m a t e r i a l s .
Reaular I n f a n t r y .
Regular i n f a n t r y i s a l s o i n f a n t r y
i n t e n s i v e , b u t i t i s more h e a v i l y e q u i p p e d t h a n l i g h t infantry.
I t employs a v a i l a b l e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o move
s o l d i e r s and equipment t o b a t t l e b u t f i g h t s on t h e g r o u n d .
I t accomplishes the l i o n ' s
share o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l
infantry
m i s s i o n s of
h o l d i n g ground.
I t a l s o a t t a c k s dismounted t o
I t can t h e n f o l l o w
Regular i n f a n t r y
i s t r a i n e d t o f i g h t d e f e n s i v e l y or o f f e n s i v e l y i n urban
terrain.
I t r e q u i r e s a f u l l r a n g e of
s u p p o r t i n g arms,
esDec i a l l y t a n k s support.
A s t h e i n f a n t r y i n W o r l d War I 1 a n d K o r e a r e q u i r e d
t h e s u p p o r t o f t a n k s , so w i l l here. types,
the r e g u l a r i n f a n t r y envisioned
Armored I n f a n t r y .
Armored i n f a n t r y f o c u s e s on t h e
advance o f t h e m a i n b a t t l e t a n k .
110
D e s i r e d C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Armored I n f a n t r y
F i r s t and f o r e m o s t ,
c a p a b l e d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y component.
i n f a n t r y s k i l l s must b e h i g h l y d e v e l o p e d , t h e r e a r e fewer
others standard i n f a n t r y u n i t s .
s k i l l s t e n d t o a t r o p h y i n mechanized i n f a n t r y u n i t s . T r a i n i n g o f t e n o r i e n t s on mounted s k i l l s and m a i n t e n a n c e . M e c h a n i z e d s o l d i e r s can e a s i l y grow t o o c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h " r i d i n g a r o u n d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . " They can q u i c k l y become
This i s not a
wrote o f the a n c i e n t
C y r u s t a u g h t h i s m o u n t a i n e e r s t o l o o k upon i t a s d i s c r e d i t a b l e f o r any man who h a d a h o r s e t o go on foot. I n t h e open p l a i n s o f Mesopotamia he h a d f o u n d t h a t he must have c a v a l r y t o r e a p t h e f r u i t s o f v i c t o r y ; b u t i n f a n t r y never reaches a h i g h standard were f o o t s e r v i c e i s despised.CS3 Armored i n f a n t r y c o u l d s u f f e r f r a n t h e s e t e n d e n c i e s t o an even g r e a t e r e x t e n t . s h o u l d f i g h t mounted, advancing tanks, The p e r c e p t i o n t h a t i t can and
t h e p r e s s u r e t o move r a p i d l y w i t h
and t h e n a t u r a l r e l u c t a n c e t o s e p a r a t e
veh c l e and i n f a n t r y a l l p o t e n t i a l l y c o n t r i b u t e t o an
d i s n c l i n a t i o n t o dismount.
L e a d e r s h i p must be h i g h q u a l i t y
a n d t r a i n i n g of d i s m o u n t e d e l e m e n t s m u s t b e d e m a n d i n g .
Second, b a t t l e tank
i t must be e q u i p p e d w i t h a r m o r e d
T r u c k mounted i n f a n t r y accompanying t a n k f o r c e s
1 1 l a c k e d b o t h of
World War
these v i t a l
capabilities,
as d o e s
B e c a u s e a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y v e h i c l e s may o f t e n h a v e t o s t o p
to dismount t h e i r
infantry,
i d e a l l y t h e y s h o u l d be f a s t e r t h e German M a r d e r a n d t h e
than tanks.
A major strength of
S o v i e t BMP i s t h e i r s p e e d r e l a t i v e t o t h e t a n k s t h e y s u p p o r t ; t h e y c a n q u i c k l y c l o s e on a c c o m p a n y i n g t a n k s a f t e r s t o p p t o d i s c h a r g e or r e c o v e r t h e i r infantrymen.
While tank-like
protection i s desired,
i t i s seldom
Armored
a c h i e v e d i n i n f a n t r y v e h i c l e s f o r many r e a s o n s .
i n f a n t r y v e h i c l e s a r e o f t e n d e s i g n e d a s a compromise between requirements for a h e a v i l y armored i n f a n t r y v e h i c l e t h a t can s u r v i v e t h e same h i t a s a t a n k a n d r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a 1 g h t , agile vehicle t h a t can f i l l a w i d e v a r i e t y of battlefie d
r o l e s f o r c a v a l r y a s w e l l as i n f a n t r y . 112
B e s i d e s t h e obu ou s
1 i g h t e r armor.
Armored personnel
i n t h e U.S.
Army a f t e r
1 1 , h a d t o be a i r t r a n s p o r t a b l e .
1941 i n s t r u c t i o n s
f o r m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y t h e Germans s t a t e
The p o s s e s s i o n of a r m o r e d p e r s o n n e l
c a r r i e r s enables
m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y u n i t s t o o v e r c o m e weak o p p o s i t i o n w i t h o u t dismounting. T h e y c a n f o l l o w up t a n k a t t a c k s
on t h e f i e l d o f b a t t l e w i t h o u t d i s m o u n t i n g . M o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e a b i l i t y t o a l t e r n a t e r a p i d l y b e t w e e n f i g h t i n g f r o m c a r r i e r s and f i g h t i n g on f o o t O w i n g t o t h e l a c k of s u f f i c i e n t armor, m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y cannot f i g h t f r o m t h e i r truck<.C91
...
as t h e
They
either.
agil
ty,
and
When t h e
i t was t o maneuver
f o r c e came u n d e r h e a v y f i r e ,
if possible,
or t o dismount
s u p p o r t e d by t h e f i r e s o f
t r a c k s and u s u a l I Y u n d e r t h e c o v e r o f smoke.
A s G e n e r a l Adan o f
the quest f o r
p e r f e c t p r o t e c t i o n i s an e n d l e s s a n d f r u s t r a t i n g e n d e a v o r .
F r o m t h e o u t s e t of t h e h i s t o r i c c o m p e t i t i o n between t h e p r o d u c t i o n of a r m o r e d v e h i c l e s a n d t h e 113
d e v e l o p m e n t o f a r m o r - p e n e t r a t i n g weapons, t h o s e w o r k i n g on t h e l a t t e r h a d t h e u p p e r h a n d . Whenever a h e a v i e r t a n k a p p e a r e d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , i t s advantage was short l i v e d . A new a r m o r - p i e r c i n g s h e l l or a n t i a r m o r m i s s i l e w o u l d s o o n b e d e v e l o p e d t h a t c o u l d p e n e t r a t e t h e new t a n k . I t w a s n o t by s t r e n g t h e n i n g the v e h i c l e ' s passive p e n e t r a t i o n w i t h s t a n d i n g c a p a c i t y t h a t t h i s p r o b l e m c o u l d be o v e r c o m e b u t by i n c r e a s i n g s u r v i v a b i 1 i t y by means o f improved b a t t l e f i e l d t a c t i c s . L i k e the tank, the armored p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r seeks t o enhance i t s s u r v i v a b i l i t y by means o f h i g h m o b i l i t y a n d i n c r e a s e d firepower. I t s h i g h m o b i l i t y and a g i l i t y e n a b l e i t t o move m o r e q u i c k l y o u t o f f i r e - b l a n k e t e d a r e a s . I t s h i g h r a t e of f i r e p o w e r e n a b l e s i t t o s u p p r e s s s o u r c e s o f f i r e a n d p r e v e n t them f r o m e n d a n g e r i n g i t.Cl01
Armored I n f a n t r y Tasks
What a r e t h e a c t u a l
perform
t a s k s t h a t armored i n f a n t r y must A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y f o c u s e s on
i n s u p p o r t i n g tanks?
m a t c h i n g i t s i n f a n t r y c a p a b i l i t i e s t o complement t a n k
1 imitations.
A s t a n k f o r m a t i o n s h a v e p r i m a r i l y an o f f e n s i v e
orientation,
a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y m u s t a l s o b e so o r i e n t e d .
Even
i n the defense
i t accompanies t a n k s i n t h e f l u i d a s p e c t s of
d e f e n s i v e combat,
such a s the c o u n t e r a t t a c K .
Armored
i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t s t a n k s by o v e r c o m i n g t h o s e b a t t l e f i e l d h a z a r d s t h a t r e s t r i c t armor o p e r a t i o n s .
armored i n f a n t r y i 5 t o s u s t a i n t h e
t a n k s t h r o u g h d i f f i c u l t or o b s t r u c t e d
l i f t i n g mines,
and
1-hese t y p i c a l
e s p e c i a l l y c o n s i d e r i n g the f a c t
114
i n f a n t e r i e d'accomDaQnement
o f World War 1 w a s t r a i n e d t o
t o c l e a n up w i t h r i f l e a n d g r e n a d e ,
small nests
enemy r e s i s t a n c e . . . ' C l l I
n o t p r o t e c t e d by f r i e n d l y
shore s u p p o r t i n g f i r e s for
c r o s s i n g tanks, Interestingly,
the
i s t h e o n l y modern armored i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g
I S
not amphibious.tl31
i n c l u d e s s u p p r e s s i n g and d e s t r o y i n g enemy a n t i - t a n k
fires.
Most armored i n f a n t r y v e h i c l e s and i n f a n t r y elements a r e e q u i p p e d w i t h weapons d e s i g n e d t o be e f f e c t i v e p r i m a r i l y a g a i n s t enemy i n f a n t r y , t h e i r v e h i c l e s and equipment. resistance, consolidates
A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y mops u p p o c k e t s of g a i n s of
tanks.
t h e armored f o r c e ,
and e x p l o i t s and p u r s u e s w i t h
l i k e t h e BMP,
are equipped w i t h f i r i n g p o r t s ,
p e r m i t t i n g mounted i n f a n t r y t o d e l i v e r f i r e s w h i l e under armor. range, These f i r e s a r e p r i m a r i l y b u r s t - o n - t a r g e t , small arms s u p p r e s s i v e f i r e s . h a s remarked that C.N. Donnelly, limited a noted
Soviet expert,
t h e f i r i n g p o r t weapons makes f i g h t i n g m o u n t e d a
risky alternative.
Many m o d e r n I F U ' s h a v e a u t o m a t i c c a n n o n s t h a t a r e n o t
only deadly against
l i g h t l y a r m o r e d v e h i c l e s but a r e also
helicopter threat. threat
e f f e c t i v e against After
t h e t a n k m a i n gun,
[ t o tanks1
I16
engaging
slow m o v i n g a i r c r a f t b u t s u r f a c e t o a i r cannon f i r e
r e q u i r e s s u b s t a n t i a l ammunition.
ATGM's g i v e t h e I F U t h e c a p a b i l i t y tcj e f f e c t i v e l y o v e r w a t c h
tanks. T h i s c a p a b i l i t y may be b e s t e x p l o i t e d i n d e s e r t can g i v e
t e r r a i n where t h e v i r t u a l l y u n l i m i t e d 1 i n e - o f - s i g h t ATGMs a d e f i n i t e a d v a n t a g e o v e r t a n k s .
Lastly,
a t h a l t s by d i s m o u n t e d p a t r o l s , l i s t e n i n g posts.
l i s t of
'in-house
The mundane,
b u t important,
c l o s e l y f o l l o w i n g combat s e r v i c e s u p p o r t e l e m e n t f r o m t h e combat t r a i n s .
R e l a t i v e M e r i t s o f t h e M113
To a c c o m p l i s h t h e s e a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y t a s k s t h e U.S.
Army
117
carrier.
The M i 1 3
As
t o f i g h t o n t h e same t e r r a i n a s t a n k s ;
m o s t w e a p o n s e m p l o y e d by S o v i e t m o t o r r i f l e t r o o p s , a s t o t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of tank and a n t i - t a n k
systems
e x p e c t e d i n S o v i e t formations.
I t lacks the m o b i l i t y
Army's new m a i n b a t t l e
to
n e c e s s a r y t o k e e p p a c e w i t h t h e U.S.
tank,
t h e M i Abrams.
d e s t r o y t h e BMP and o t h e r S o v i e t
Lastly,
b a t t l e f i e l d before dismounting.
t h e M i 1 3 o f f e r s many i n close
tanks.
First,
t h e M i 1 3 d o e s p r o v i d e some d e g r e e
It
and 1 imi t e d
Second,
t h e M i 1 3 i s r e l a t i v e l y cheap,
a d a p t a b l e t o a w i d e a r r a y of uses,
and p l e n t i f u l . the
i n f a n t r y t h a t f i g h t s on
t o effectively
b u i l d and d e f e n d f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s o r
118
a t t a c k f o r t i f i e d enemy p o s i t i o n s .
Relative M e r i t s of
t h e M2 BIFU
With t h e
i n t r o d u c t i o n of
t h e M2 BIFU,
t h e U.S.
Army h a s The M 2 i s
but a f i g h t i n g
as i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s b e l o w r e f l e c t .
Maneuver.
T h e B r a d l e y h a s t h e s p e e d a n d cross c o u n t r y
m o b i l i t y t o s t a r w i t h t h e M I Abrams.
I t c a r r i e s a squad of
t w o men i n t h e
n i n e men w h o c a n f i g h t f r o m t h e v e h i c l e ,
l a r g e r dismounted p l a t o o n f o r c e . vehicle
t o d r i v e a n d man t h e t u r r e t .
a m p h i b i o u s a f t e r some p r e p a r a t i o n .
FireDower.
The B r a d l e y i s a p o t e n t f i r e p o w e r
system.
B e s i d e s t h e man p o r t a b l e w e a p o n s t h a t employs,
i t h a s f o u r o n - b o a r d weapons s y s t e m s : a 2%
ATGM s y s t e m ,
s t a b i l i z e d a u t o m a t i c cannon,
cannon,
i n c l u d i n g thermal "see'
Protection.
The B r a d l e y i s f i t t e d w i t h s p a c e l a m i n a t e d
armor t h a t p r o v i d e s p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t a u t o m a t i c weapons up
t o 14.5mm a n d a g a i n s t a i r b u r s t s f r o m 155mm a r t i l l e r y .
b e e n t e s t e d a g a i n s t a S o v i e t RPG 7 t y p e weapon w i t h o u t catastrophic destruction.tl71 While
I t ha5
i t does n o t have t h e
a b i l i t y t o w i t h s t a n d t h e same d i r e c t h i t a s t h e t a n K supports,
its
i t r e 1 i e s o n i t s s p e e d a n d a g i I i t y and on t h e
c a p a b i l i t i e s a f f o r d e d by i t s As C l i f f o r d
t o secure
t h e U.S.
increased p r o t e c t i o n .
Army T a n k A u t o m o t i v e Command h a s w r i t t e n ,
I n a d d i t i o n t o i t s l e s s than d e s i r e d p r o t e c t i o n ,
the
A full
dismount o n l y 5 i x
t w e n t y men a s a d i s m o u n t e d e l e m e n t .
U.S.
authorized strength;
e s p e c i a l l y i n w a r t ime
.
25mm
The m a j o r w e a p o n s s y s t e m s on t h e B r a d l e y (TOW,
120
cannonl
a n d m a c h i n e g u n ) c a n n o t b e d i s m o u n t e d a n d e m p l o y e d on
t h e ground a s p a r t o f a p o s i t i o n a l d e f e n s e .
B r a d l e y EmDloYment C o n s i d e r a t i o n s
Bradley infantry
indicate that
h o l d i n g ground or c o n d u c t i n g manpower
Bradley infantry
I S
p o s i t i o n a l defenses,
to attack
or d i s m o u n t e d o p e r a t i o n s
I t i s o r g a n i z e d and
f o r t i f i e d enemy p o s i t i o n s .
e q u i p p e d t o c o o p e r a t e w i t h t a n k s and t o c o n d u c t m o b i l e o p e r a t io n s
.
i 5
As the Bradley
being fielded,
t h e r e has been
t h e IFU o n c e t h e s q u a d d i s m o u n t s . those of
These c o n c e r n s a r e n o t
too d i f f e r e n t f r o m
t h e S o v i e t s a n d t h e Germans o v e r
121
m e a s u r e d e p e n d on t h e s i t u a t i o n . T h i s t r i t e b u t t r u e r e p l y does n o t s a t i s f y t h e n e e d t o a d d r e s s how I F U e q u i p p e d
its
i n f a n t r y s h o u l d be t r a i n e d a n d employed t o o p t i m i z e capabil
I
t i e s as p a r t o f
t h e c o m b i n e d a r m s team.
Several
i n t h i s s t u d y provide guidance
a d d r e 5s i n g t h e s e que 5 t i ons
.
the main
1.)
A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y f o c u s e s on t h e a d v a n c e of
b a t t l e tank.
2.)
of
Tanks
depend
upon t h e complementary c a p a b i l i t i e s
3.)
I n g e n e r a l , complementary a s p e c t s of
combined arms
a r e more v i t a l
t h a n s u p p l e m e n t a r y f u n c t i o n s a s t h e y c a n n o t be
r e p 1 i c a t e d by t h e o t h e r a r m s .
i s t r u l y complementary. c a p a b i l i t y of
the t a n k - k i l l i n g supported.
the tank f o r c e b e i n g
a n d i s also s u p p l e m e n t a l . non-tank
v e h i c l e s w i t h i n the range of
i n t h a t r e g a r d i t i s a supplemental
system a l s o .
t a n k s become i n c r e a s i n g l y l i m i t e d i n t h e v a r i e t y a n d amount
of ammunition for o t h e r
t h a n t a n k e n g a g e m e n t s t h e 25mm c a n n o n
I t
may b e p u s h e d t o w a r d b e c o m i n g a c o m p l e m e n t a r y s y s t e m . certa;nlr
is
t h e m o r e c o s t e f f e c t i v e means o f a t t a c k i n g n o n - t a n k I f t h e 25mm c a n n o n c a n d e m o n s t r a t e
its
t a r g e t s w i t h i n range.
122
effectiveness
against r o t a r y winged a i r c r a f t
it w i l l
become a
r e c o g n i z e d c o m p l e m e n t a r y component o f s u p p o r t i n g tank f o r c e s ,
especially if tactical
t o m a i n t a i n the
The B r a d l e y i t s e l f c o u l d b e
i t s water
A s t a n k s r e q u i r e i n f a n t r y a n d as t h e d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y
i s the
t r u e complement t o tanks,
t h e o p e r a t i o n s of
the
d i s m o u n t e d f o r c e s s h o u l d be a paramount c o n c e r n t o t h e B r a d l e y f o r c e commander.
When a n d w h e r e t h e two g e n e r a l f a c t o r s :
i n f a n t r y s h o u l d d i s m o u n t d e p e n d on
t h e m i n l i g h t of
the
tactical
d e s i r e d tempo o f
operations w i l l
affect
provide security,
f i r e a n d m a n e u v e r on enemy
Of
i s most c h a l l a n g i n g i s t h e a s s a u l t of
enemy d e f e n s e s .
The S o v i e t s o l u t i o n a p p e a r s t o b e t o t h e enemy d e f e n s e s
As the concluding a r t i c l e i n
l e t t e r s on BMP then Deputy wrote
Military Herald
s e r i e s of
General Colonel U i k t o r A. M e r i m s k i y ,
C h i e f o f Combat T r a i n i n g of
t h a t w h i l e t h e d i s m o u n t p o i n t d e p e n d s h e a v i l y on t h e f a c t o r s
o f METT-T,
i n a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e commander m u s t s t r i v e , f i r s t , t o m a k e t h e l i n e of a t t a c k and t h e l i n e o f d i s m o u n t i n g a s c l o s e as p o s s i b l e t o t h e f o r w a r d e d g e of t h e enemy's d e f e n s e s . Second, h e m u s t t a k e t h e necessary steps t o p r o t e c t the dismounted r i f l e m e n f r o m m a c h i n e gun f i r e and t h e BMPs f r o m b e i n g h i t b y short-range a n t i t a n k systems. T h i r d and f i n a l l y , h e m u s t p r o v i d e f o r t h e m a x i m u m u s e of t h e f i r e p o w e r of t h e BMPs and p r o v i d e a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n d u c t e f f e c t i v e f i r e w i t h a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s of t h e m o t o r i z e d r i f l e m e n i n o r d e r t o d e s t r o y t h e enemy's f o r c e s and f i r i n g s y s t e m . [ l 9 1
C.N.
o t h e r s on t h e BMP d e b a t e as f o l l o w s .
w o u l d not b e p i n n e d down t o a n o r m a l d i s t a n c e ,
c o n t r i b u t o r s t o t h e BMP d e b a t e g e n e r a l l y a g r e e d t h a t
unwise for
i n f a n t r y i n BMPs t o a p p r o a c h c l o s e r t o t h e enemy
Normally d i s m o u n t i n g w i l l o c c u r b e t w e e n 300-400
I n f a n t r y should
m e t e r s b u t n e v e r m o r e t h a n 1000 m e t e r s .
of
infantry w i l l
SG
i n s u r e that
formations
t h a t BMPs t r a i l i n g 3 0 0 - 4 0 0
s u p p o r t by f i r e
through t h e s e gaps.
The a t t a c k must b e
s y n c h r o n i z e d so t h a t a r t i l l e r y i s n o t l i f t e d p r e m a t u r e l y l e a v i n g t a n k s and i n f a n t r y a t t h e m e r c y of relatively
124
L a s t l y , as a general r u l e ,
the
a v o i d u s i n g BMPs i n t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n o f a n
a s s a u l t on a p r e p a r e d d e f e n s e when a n y s u i t a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e ex i s t s . t 201
t h a t armored
a t t a c k mounted, m i x e d i n c l o s e f o r m a t i o n w i t h dismount t o s o l v e t a c t i c a l
Y
Infantry w i l l
w i l l mount t h e v e h i c l e s a g a i n q u i c k
the a t t a c k . I n the defense armored
to sustain the
nfantrymen f i g h t
dismounted f r o m prepared p o s i t i o n s .
21 I
on t h e g r o u n d .
a l l s y s t e m s ( d i s m o u n t e d s q u a d , TOW,
u s u a l l y b e o p t i m a l l y e m p l o y e d on t h e same
terrain.
T e n t a t i u e s o l u t i o n s w i t h i n t h e U.S. the
recognition of
importance of a s s o c i a t i n g s e l e c t e d p r i m a r y
o r i e n t e d on t h e b a t t l e ) ,
i s a d r i v i n g consideration.
125
the
1.)
i t can be h a n d l e d
conservatively to r e t a i n a t a l l
c o s t t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o p i c k up t h e s q u a d o n c e t h e d i s m o u n t e d
mission i s complete.
2.)
i t can be s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e
missions,
or
i n f a n t r y a n d s e n t on like
indeDendent qua1 i t i e s ;
c a p i t a l i z i n g on i t s own t a n k
3.)
i t can be employed t o
support by f i r e t h e i n f a n t r y
i n t h e c o n d u c t of
the
W h i l e t h i s method
r e t a i n i n g the protected
the
infantry,
i t r e d u c e s t h i s complex f i g h t i n g
s y s t e m t o t h e same t a c t i c a l s t a t u s o f only.
t h e M113
a carrier
t h e p o t e n t i a l advantage of
A s p r e v i o u s l y shown,
126
tanks w i l l
i n f a n t r y support.
IFUs a c t i n g a 5 t a n k s ,
Independent f i r e and range of
to the
need s i m i l a r support. o u t of
maneuver m i s s i o n s ,
t h e immediate e f f e c t i v e
dismounted i n f a n t r y ,
l e a v e t h e IFJ f o r c e s u b j e c t
i n f a n t r y s much n e e d e d p r o t e c t e d m o b i l i t y D e s p i t e i t s more v a r i e d f i r e p o w e r ,
speed,
i n t e n d e d t o o p e r a t e a5 a tank.[231
the
i s t h e m e t h o d p r e f e r r e d by t h e S o v i e t s . i n an a t t a c k
General M e r i m s k i r s t a t e d the g r e a t e s t r e s u l t
seems t o b e t h e b e 5 t it:
o p t i o n when t h e t e r r a i n a n d t a c t i c a l
s i t u a t i o n permit
destructive firepower.
A s Simpkin w r o t e ,
I n o f f e n s i v e f o r w a r d movements a t a l l l e v e l s , b o t h i n t h e a t t a c k a n d w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of an a g g r e s s i v e defense, armored i n f a n t r y m a i n t a i n s the m o b i l i t y o f tanks; the I F U s u p p o r t s b o t h t h e tank and i t s squad and m a i n t a i n s the m o b i l i t y o f both.[251
i n d e p e n d e n t o p e r a t i o n s by u n l a d e n o c c a s i o n s may o c c u r when a
B r a d l e y I F V s i s not o p t i m a l ,
i s r e q u i r e d to operate
without
tanks.
W h i l e IFUs c a n n o t b e h a n d l e d a s b o l d l y a s infantrymen, an a r m o r e d
tanks,
e s p e c i a l l y when l o a d e d w i t h
a g r e e m e n t t h a t BMP f o r c e s w e r e s u i t a b l e f o r
c e r t a i n m i s s i o n s where speed and a g i l i t y were a d e c i d e d advantage. I n c o n s i d e r i n g such m i s s i o n s as reconnaissance, o r deep r a i d s i n enemy r e a r a r e a s , defenses t o the
f o r w a r d detachment,
S o v i e t s presume t h e r e a r e n o s u b s t a n t i a l penetrate.C261
i f the s i t u a t i o n dictated.
i n f a n t r y c o m b i n e d a r m s team,
A s i t u a t i o n i n which such a m i s s i o n c o u l d b e
t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n by t h e
i s i n the e x e c u t i o n of
armored force.
Tank-heavy
f o r c e s c o u l d b e u s e d t o b l o c k or
be a b e t t e r e x p l o i t a t i o n v e h i c l e than the
i n f a n t r y d e p e n d s on t a n k s f o r p r o t e c t i o n f r o m o t h e r
most t a c t i c a l
situations.
There
i s another p o s i t i o n ,
Army I n f a n t r y S c h o o l , w h i c h e n v i s i o n s B r a d l e y - p u r e
128
While feasible
u n d e r c e r t a i n METT-T
i n m o s t c a s e s t h i s s o l u t i o n seems t o r e p r e s e n t a
u s e o f f o r c e c a p a b i l i t i e s . A c a s e c a n b e made f o r f o r example,
i n desert environments
f a c t o r s f a v o r ATGMs. A p u r e in a
B r a d l e y - e q u i p p e d . f o r c e c o u l d be e m p l o y e d e f f e c t i v e l y positional defense
to block or f i x
force
a n a t t a c l t i n g enemy f o r c e , t h e enemy
p e r m i t t i n g a tank-heavy f l a n k or r e a r . Similar
t o maneuver t o a t t a c k
t a c t i c s w e r e u s e d b y Rommel a s h e
l u r e d enemy t a n k f o r m a t i o n s i n t o a t t a c k i n g h i s a n t i - t a n k defenses.
W i th favorable
t e r r a i n and s u p e r i o r r a n g e ,
he
However,
defense.
In E u r o p e a m o r e
regular
infantry,
can e s t a b l i s h a s t r o n g p o s i t i o n a l defense
s u p p o r t e d b y some t a n k s a n d i t s o r g a n i c ATGMs, b u l k of
ITUs.
f l u i d battle,
c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n g t o the
f l a n k or r e a r of
129
Summary
No a n a l y s i s c a n c o n s i d e r e v e r y t a c t i c a l
variant.
The
f a c t o i ~ sd i s c u s s e d h e r e i n d i c a t e t h a t B r a d l e y - e q u i p p e d infantry
i s t h e b e s t e q u i p p e d i n f a n t r y i n t h e U.S.
Army t o the
p e r f o r m a s armored i n f a n t r y
t o f o c u s o n t h e a d v a n c e of
main b a t t l e t a n k .
I n so d o i n g i t m u s t f o c u s on i t s
t h e d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y and tlic
I t s o t h e r c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e s u p p l e m e n t a r y and, t h e y can be r e p l i c a t e d i n k i n d b y t a n k s .
important,
How c l o s e d e p e n d s on METT-T
t h e dismounted i n f a n t r y must a f e c t
t h e same
t h e b a t t l e f i e l d upon w h i c h t h e t a n k s a r e
it-;
a5 a l i g h t t a n k
must be a v o i d e d .
the v e h i c l e
is to
Although
f o r c e s may t a k e on 1 i m i t e d i n d e p e n d e n t
t h e y c a n do so o n l y when t h e g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n mutually
The o p t i m a l r o l e f o r
u n l a d e n IFUs i s t o s u p p o r t b y f i r e
130
Army r e o r i e n t s i t s i n f a n t r y d o c t r ~ n e ,
suffer
i 5 symptomatic o f
M113s.
I t w i l l be employed i n r o l e s a n d g i v e n m i s 5 i o n s f o r
o r g a n i z e d or t r a i n e d .
which i t i s i l l - e q u i p p e d ,
I31
ENDNOTES
CWIPTER 4
1.
2. u o n S e n g e r und E t t e r l i n , 729-738.
Tanks of
t h e World 15'83.
pp.
3.
# 1 7 .
4. 5. 1.
TYDeS o f D i u i s i o n s - P o s t p . 8. p. 386.
War Army
General Board R e p o r t
Ogorkiewicz, Colonel
" T h r e e K i n d s of
Infantry,"
p.
6. G e n e r a l W i l l i a m R. R i c h a r d s o n , Kermit Rooseuelt Lecture. L e c t u r e d e l i u e r e d t o t h e R o y a l C o l l e g e o f D e f e n c e S t u d i e s , 23 May 1984. I n t h i s speech General R i c h a r d s o n d i s c u s s e d the o r i e n t a t i o n a n d e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e U.S. A r m y ' s new l i g h t infantry units.
7. The d e g r a d a t i o n of i n f a n t r y s k i l l s i n m e c h a n i z e d i n f a n t r y has been n o t e d o f t e n i n r e c e n t m i l i t a r y 1 i t e r a t u r e , such as Richard Simpkin's Mechanized I n f a n t r y and John E n g l i s h ' s P e r s D e c t i u e on I n f a n t r y . P e r h a p s m o r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t wa5 n o t e d b y BG E d w i n B u r b a , D e p u t y Commandant o f t h e U.S. Army I n f a n t r y S c h o o l , i n a n u n p u b l i s h e d p a p e r e n t i t l e d "M2 D o c t r i n a l C o n c e p t s . " See p a g e 26.
Infantry
1. Rafael, CA:
1 0 . A v r a h a m Adan, On t h e B a n k s o f P r e s i d i o P r e s s , 1 9 8 0 ) , p . 210.
1 1 . O g o r k i e w i c z , p . 386.
12. T h e German M o t o r i z e d I n f a n t r y R e q i m e n t , Tanks o f p.
2.
p.
1 3 . v o n Senger u n d E t t e r l i n , 745.
t h e World 1983,
15. R i c h a r d S i m p k i n ,
Mechanized I n f a n t r y , 132
p.
43.
16.
Ibid.
pp.
43-57.
'The
F u t u r e IFV,"
Infantry.
Donnelly,
p.
1407.
t i . The German v i e w o f a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y t a c t i c s a r e d e s c r i b e d
i n a r t i c l e s by S i m p k i n , W a l t e r , a n d K l a f f u s . The r e p o r t f r o m t h e TRADOC I i a s i o n w i t h t h e German G e n e r a l A r m y O f f i c e e n t i t l e d " C o n c e p t a n d O p e r a t i n g P r i n c i p l e s o f t h e German A r m o r e d Combat T r o o p s " i s d l 5 0 h e l p f u l . 22. R i c h a r d S i m p k i n , (Nov-Dec 83) 15. "When t h e S q u a d D i s m o u n t s , " Infantry,
23. M a h a f f e y ,
24. M e r i m s k i r ,
p. p.
3.
285.
p. 17.
25.
Simpkin,
26. D o n n e l l y , p .
27. BG E d w i n B u r b a , D e p u t y Commandant o f t h e U.8. Army I n f a n t r y School, which has r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r developing t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e for B r a d l e y i n f a n t r y , h a s w r i t t e n a " t h i n k p i e c e " e n t i t l e d "M2 D o c t r i n a l Concepts." T h i s unpublished d o c u m e n t p r e s e n t s h i s t h o u g h t s on B r a d l e y t a c t i c s a n d i s i l l u s t r a t e d w i t h a number o f s i t u a t i o n a l e x a m p l e s . Some of t h e s e e x a m p l e s show B r a d l e y i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g r e l a t i v e l y independently, n o t i n close cooperation w i t h tank forces.
133
CWPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS
imal r o l e
B r a d l e y e q u i p p e d i n f a n t r y i n t h e U.S.
I t i s not an a t t e m p t t o
n t h e n e x t decade.
in detail
t h e t a c t i c s u s e d by B r a d l e y i n f a n t r y , or t o recommend a r e d e s i g n f o r
to
t s shortcomings,
Rather,
f u t u r e IFUs.
g i v e n t h e B r a d l e y IFU, how s h o u l d
i t maximize
i n f a n t r y equipped w i t h
As t h e U.S.
Army f i e l d s t h e B r a d l e y I F U i t m u s t r e f l e c t
on t h e many c h a n g e s t h a t t h i s a n d o t h e r m o d e r n i z a t i o n e + f o r t . ;
w i l l
i n l i g h t of conditions,
terrain,
and t h e l e s s o n s o f modern m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y ,
summar I z e d u n d e r soldiers
and
used e a r l i e r .
O o c t r ine
For y e a r s t h e s h o r t c o m i n g s o f t h e M I 1 3 h a v e l e + t t h e
134
U.S.
Army w i t h o u t
in
c l o s e mutual support o f
tanus.
Mechanized i n f a n t r y w i t h
t h e tasU a d o p t e d a r o l e and
Its inability
i t was b e t t e r e q u i p p e d .
t a n k s c l o s e l y c a u s e d many t o d o u b t
the requirement
t o d o so. close
The m i s m a t c h b e t w e e n t a n U f o r c e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r
i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t and t h e lacU of c a p a b i l i t y of M I 1 3
i t , have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e
c o o p e r a t i o n a n d t h e r o l e ot
tank-infantry
t an t r y .
The a d o p t i o n o f a m a n e u v e r - o r i e n t e d
AirLand B a t t l e
FM 1 0 0 - 5 ,
Mi A b r a m s a n d t h e
infantry
c o m p l e x M2 B r a d l e y I F U demand a r e e x a m i n a t i o n o f roles.
A s each mechanized i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n i s r e o r g a n i z e d
l o n g e r t a c U l e w i t h t h e same d e g r e e of
i t c o u l d a5 m e c h a n i z e d i n f a n t r y .
I t l a c k s the
b a t t a l i o n can,
increased protection,
firepower,
a n d m o b i l i t y t o f i g h t w i t h and s u p p o r t t h e m a i n b a t t l e t a n k
135
torce.
The o p t i m a l
infantry
i n c l o s e s u p p o r t of
B r a d l e y IFUs and d i s m o u n t e d i n t a n t r y f o r m a
c o m p l e m e n t a r y c o m b i n e d a r m s team t h a t m u s t f o c u s on t h e same engagement and n o t be p i e c e m e a l e d i n t o s e p a r a t e engagements where t h e mutual supporting e f f e c t s are lost.
Ml13-equipped analysis of
i n f a n t r y s t i l l has a r o l e .
As the much of
t h e E u r o p e a n b a t t l e f i e l d h a s shown,
defenses.
forested,
and u n d u l a t i n g
l i m i t e d o b s e r v a t i o n and
t i e l d of fire,
and t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o r e i n f o r c e t e r r a i n
m a i n t a i n i n g some M i 1 3 e q u i p p e d
i t i s nar, p r e p a r e d .
136
f i e l d armored i n f a n t r y (Bradley) p u r p o s e of
b a t t a l i o n s for
the s p e c i f i c
c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h main b a t t l e tank b a t t a l i o n s .
I n l i g h t of r a p i d r e i n f o r c e m e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s and
t h e U.S.
or POMCUS s e t s ,
Under t h e o l d p e n t o m i c d i v i s i o n
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n u n i t s o f p o o l e d APLs w e r e a s s i g n e d ( t h a t fought
the b a t t l e f i e l d . C l 1
Bradley i n f a n t r y are a l l
i s required.
They q u e s t i o n t h e and
s u r v i v a b i l i t y o i dismounted r e g u l a r high-intensity
i n f a n t r y on t h e m i d -
b a t t l e f i e l d i n l i g h t of
the c e r t a i n S o v i e t use
a n d t h e p o s s i b l e u s e of Against
t h i s r a n g e ot w e a p o n s o f m a s s d e s t r u c t i o n
dismounted r e g u l a r
i n f a n t r y must
I t r e 1 i e s on c o u n t e r - r e c o n n a i s s a n c e
on i t s a b i l i t y t o c a m o u f l a g e , and
on i t s g e n e r a l
thermal
and o t h e r s i g n a t u r e s g i v e n o t f
137
by v e h i c l e s a n d r a d i o s .
w i r e communications t o the f u l l e s t e x t e n t p o s s i b l e .
m a s s i v e f i r e p r e p a r a t i o n on t h e " w r o n g h i l l "
i t may b e
these
s t r a i n e d l o g i s t i c a l l y and t a c t i c a l l y t o q u i c k l y r e p e a t p r e p a r a t o r y f i r e s on s t r o n g l y h e l d p o s i t i o n s i n d e p t h .
Second, protection.
d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y r e l i e s on t h e e a r t h f o r
I t i s t h e b e s t p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t the immediate
I n Europe dismounted i n f a n t r y
e f f e c t s o f n u c l e a r weapons.
can a l s o seek p r o t e c t i o n f r o m t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f s m a l l
towns t h a t d o t t h e c o u n t r y s i d e e v e r y 2-3 k i l o m e t e r s .
i n f a n t r y m u s t be s u p p l i e d w i t h ample c h e m i c a l and w i t h p o r t a b l e d e c o n t a m i n a t i o n equipment.
Regular
p r o t e c t l v e gear
I t may n o t be
a b l e t o be p u l l e d f r o m t h e l i n e t o d e c o n t a m i n a t e a t a pre-prepared s i t e . I f Ml13s w e r e a v a i l a b l e ,
to the r e a r ,
t h e y c o u l d move
up f r o m h i d e p o s i t i o n s w e l l
rendezvous w i t h the
dismounted force,
and move i t f r o m c o n t a m i n a t e d a r e a s t o
s u b s e q u e n t or a1 t e r n a t i v e b a t t l e p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n t h e d e f e n s e as the s i t u a t i o n permitted.
Light
which
in
i t fights,
and f r o m i t s
r e l a t i v e l y h i g h t a c t i c a l m o b i l i t y i n rugged t e r r a i n .
than
I t i s j u s t b e t t e r o r g a n i z e d and
138
Mechanized i n f a n t r y i s
t h a n a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y i n many o f
the
infantry
c o n s i s t o f b o t h "armored" make t h e d i s t i n c t i o n
(BMP)
(BTR) and
i n motorized r i f l e divisions
t h e r e a r e t w o B T R - e q u i p p e d r e g i m e n t s a n d o n e BMP r e g i m e n t m a t c h e d w i t h one t a n k r e g i m e n t .
A U.S.
tank,
armored
infantry.
heavy d i v i s i o n .
c o i n c i d e w i t h the f i e l d i n g of division;
e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h M60A3 t a n K s a l s o .
139
W e aD on s
T h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e U.S.
Army s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r
important factors.
First, Second,
i n f a n t r y has a v i a b l e t a c t i c a l r o l e .
I f r e t a i n e d , however,
i n f a n t r y n e e d s a b e t t e r BMP k i l l i n g c a p a b i l i t y ;
.SO m a c h i n e g u n c a n n o t do i t a n d t h e DRAGON i s o f t e n t o o s l o w
T h e h i s t o r y of
tanks and
q u i c k l y r e a c t t o the changing t a c t i c a l
A s i g n i f i c a n t dilemma f o r
15
t h e M1/M2
t a 5 k f o r c e commander key t o
the
i n a b i l i t y of many s u p p o r t i n g a r m s a n d s y s t e m s ,
140
t o m a i n t a i n t h e p o t e n t i a l p a c e of
command a n d c o n t r o l , service
Mortars,
and d e d i c a t e d a n t i - t a n k
weapons ( I T U S ) i n t h e M i a n d
M2 b a t t a l i o n s a r e equipped w i t h M i 1 3 type v e h i c l e s .
Additionally, engineers, a i r defense, a n d a r t i l l e r r and a i r
Just a s t h e
I o u t r a n i t s non-mobile
o c c a s i o n a l l y be
a r t i l l e r y support,
task f o r c e w i l l
s e p a r a t i n g f r o m i t s s u p p o r t arms or
i t s Gperations.
t h e tempo o f
As the
accompany a n d s u p p o r t t h e h e a v y t a s k f o r c e .
m o b i l i t y a n d p r o t e c t i o n c o u l d a l s o b e a t t a i n e d by a d o p t i n g the cheaper M i i 3 A 3 .
Until
ad h o c
solutions w i l l message
undoubtedly be
FISTS e q u i p p e d w i t h dig1 t a l
may h a v e t o r i d e i n S t i n g e r o r Redeye
141
Soldiers
C m o n Sense
Army
Army,
except armored c a v a l r y ,
but i t must a l s o
i n t e n s i v e gunnery t r a i n i n g a t e v e r y l e v e l from
s q u a d t o b a t t a l i o n commander. mobile,
I t m u s t t r a i n for
highly
f l u i d o p e r a t i o n s a s p a r t of
t h e c o m b i n e d a r m s team.
and i t m u s t t r a i n d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y e l e m e n t s .
A n y t r a i n i n g s t r a t e g y m u s t b e t h e r e s u l t of a n a l y s i s of the
detailed
be a b l e t o e x e c u t e . infantry,
armored
l i k e o t h e r u n i t s , may seem t o b e so e x t e n s i v e t h a t
therefore,
m u s t b e p r i o r i t i z e d b a s e d on t h e Through i n n o v a t i v e
i m p o r t a n t r o l e s and m i s s i o n s .
m e t h o d s a n d mu1 t i - e c h e l o n e d be t r a i n e d t o a c c o m p l i s h
t r a i n i n g t h e armored i n f a n t r y can
i t s c o m p l e m e n t a r y and s u p p l e m e n t a r y
142
Some o f
t h e f a c t o r s t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e armored i n f a n t r y
i m p a c t on l e a d e r , s o l d i e r and u n i t
Leader t r a i n i n g .
t h i n k l i k e i n f a n t r y m e n and l i k e t a n k e r s .
1 i k e i n f a n t r y m e n because employment o f t h e i r d i s m o u n t e d
e l e m e n t s i s o f paramount c o n c e r n . tankers f o r They m u s t t h i n k l i k e
t h r e e s i g n i f i c a n t reasons:
(1)
advancement of capabilities,
and t a c t i c a l m e t h o d s and
t e c h n i q u e s as w e l l
a s t h e i r own.
( 2 ) Armored i n f a n t r y l e a d e r s w i l l h a b i t u a l l y command
tanks. Under c u r r e n t U.S.
Army methods o f t a s k - o r g a n i z i n g ,
cross a t t a c h t o form
(3)
The tempo o f o p e r a t i o n s w i l l
be more l i k e t a n k
i n f a n t r y operations.
As Richard
an i n f a n t r y m a n
I n t h i s r e g a r d perhaps armored
have t o t h i n k more l i k e t a n k e r s t h a n
i n f a n t r y l e a d e r s do.
The i m p o r t a n c e o f
l e a d e r s s o l i d l y based i n i n f a n t r y t a c t i c s .
143
o p e r a t i o n s and s u p p o r t of
l e a d e r s who can
L e a d e r d e v e l o p m e n t comes
Perhaps armored i n f a n t r y
s p e c i f i c a l l y o r i e n t e d on a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y - t a n k
t h e s o l d i e r s who make u p t h e i r
i n c l u d i n g a l l mechanized i n + a n t r y a t the
I t i s a m i s s i o n o f the
from v e h i c l e
t r a i n and educate l e a d e r s ,
c m a n d e r s t o b a t t a l i o n commanders,
so t h a t t h e y c a n l e a d
w h i c h s u b o r d i n a t e s a r e a l l o w e d a l a r g e d e g r e e of operate.
I t r e q u i r e s leader mental
f l e x i b i l i t y and a s p i r i t task
o f command a d a p t a b l e t o r a p i d c h a n g e s i n l o c a t i o n ,
organization, mission, and b a t t l e c o n d i t i o n s . [ 7 1
P e r h a p s t h e b e s t l e a d e r t r a i n i n g comes f r o m t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t r a i n i n g w i t h l e a d e r s of t h e o t h e r arms. As
cross
i n s u r e t h a t camnanders o f
Armored i n f a n t r y l e a d e r s f r o m squad t o b a t t a l i o n a r e
a l s o v e h i c l e commanders who r i d e i n t h e t u r r e t a n d m u s t b e
144
f u l l y c a p a b l e of
f i g h t i n g t h e v e h i c l e sjrstems.
While the
Army s o l u t i o n a p p e a r s t o be t o d e d i c a t e c e r t a i n l e a d e r s t o
tasks.
Collective training.
T r a i n i n g as p u r e B r a d l e y u n i t s squad and
t h e c u r r e n t army
s t r u c t u r e c a l l f o r single-weapon
companies t a n o b v i o u s Combined
c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t h e case of B r a d l e y i n f a n t r y ) .
arms t a c t i c s ,
however,
seem t o d i c t a t e t a s k o r g a n i z i n g t a n k s
i n many i n s t a n c e s .
f o r example,
.mb i n e d
W h i l e t h e o p t i m a l m i x s i t u a t i o n a l l r d e p e n d s on the
same e n g a g e m e n t i n m u t u a l
s u p p o r t f o r combined arms e f f e c t s
to occur.
This w i l l
o f t e n b e a t company l e v e l .
I n keeping w i t h i t s r o l e ,
Bradley i n f a n t r y w i l l i n offensive
f o c u s on
and f l u i d
establishing strongpoints,
p o s i t i o n a l defenses,
145
warfare,
and
so on, w i l l t a k e a l o w p r i o r i t y .
Bradley rapid
maneuver t h r o u g h smoke, woods and c l o s e t e r r a i n t o a t t a c k enemy p o s i t i o n s , p a t r o l l i n g , o b s t a c l e and mine c l e a r i n g and emplacement and o t h e r t a s k s s u p p o r t i n g t h e advance of tanks.
I n f a n t r y must be a b l e t o d i s m o u n t q u i c k l y ,
orient rapidly,
and move o u t s w i f t l y t o a c c o m p l i s h i t s m i s s i o n .
Individual drivers,
training.
Except f o r
leaders,
gunners,
and
e x c l u s i v e l y i n dismounted s k i l l s .
b e tough,
F o r t h e s e men
such as engaging t a r g e t s w i t h f i r i n g p o r t
low return for
are low p r i o r i t y ,
training time
endeavors.
t o t h e d r i v e r and gunner u n d e r t h e
i s the
t h o s e l e a d e r s whose p r i m a r y o r i e n t a t i o n
A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y m e n must b e t r a i n e d t o a h i g h s t a n d a r d i n combat e n g i n e e r s k i l l s .
A s t h e combat e n g i n e e r
15
an
146
engineer of
f i r s t a n d an i n f a n t r y m a n s ec ond,
the reverse
is true
he m u s t be a
almost as a secondary
sapper-pioneer-combat specialty. He w i l l
engineer
o f t e n be r e q u i r e d t o b r e e c h o b s t a c l e s a n d
t o o p e n l a n e s t h r o u g h m i n e f i e l d s so t h a t t a n k s c a n a d v a n c e .
He m u s t b e t r a i n e d i n p e a c e t i m e a n d e q u i p p e d i n c o m b a t f o r suc h t a s k s .
1 ight anti-tank
weapon (LAW).
-Other.
Concerns
First,
i t s p r i m a r y r o l e of s u p p o r t i n g t a n k s and because
vehicle, many a r g u e
t h e B r a d l e y I F V a p p e a r s t o be a t a n k - l i k e
armored i n t a n t r r
examples w h i c h s u p p o r t e i t h e r p o s i t i o n .
i t s Armor School.
On t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
as the I s r a e l i
i t s armor
m e c h a n i z e d i n f a n t r y was a l l o w e d t o l a n g u i s h u n d e r corpst91,
so m i g h t a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y u n d e r
t h e U.S. A r m o r
147
Branch.
it IS
c e r t a i n l y p r e d i c t a b l e t h a t a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y w o u l d f o c u s on
armor s k i l l s ,
l i k e B r a d l e y gunnery,
a t t h e e x p e n s e of
the
d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y s k i l l s i f t h e BIFU w e r e a s s i g n e d t o F t . Knox.
I n the f i n a l
analysis,
armored i n f a n t r y m u s t f i r s t be
i t s d i s m o u n t e d s k i l l s must b e of
O t h e r s k i l l s a r e i m p o r t a n t but
.
armored infantrymen
S e c o n d , d e s p i t e t h e l o w number of
a v a i l a b l e p e r u n i t t o h a n d l e a b r o a d spectrum of mounted and dismounted tasks, Army l e a d e r s seem c o n v i n c e d t h a t " e l i t e " infantry leaders are the continuum.
U.S.
u n i t s t a t u s a n d p r i o r i t y on t o p - n o t c h the p u r v i e w of
i n f a n t r y on t h e l i g h t e n d o f Richardson, Commander,
A s G e n e r a l W i l l i a m R.
Army
T r a i n i n g A n d D o c t r i n e Comnand,
has stated:
A l l u n i t s i n t h e l i g h t d i v i s i o n s w i l l be f u l l y
s t r u c t u r e d a n d manned a t 100% o f a u t h o r i z e d l e v e l s . Q u a l i t y o f f i c e r s and noncommissioned o f f i c e r s w i l l meet s t r i n g e n t s e l e c t i o n and r e t e n t i o n standards. Many l e a d e r s h i p p o s i t i o n s w i l l r e q u i r e r a n g e r t r a i n i n g , w h i l e u n i t commanders w i l l b e t h e m o s t e x p e r i e n c e d i n t h e Army. Noncommissioned o f f i c e r s w i l l be t h e most t e c h n i c a l l y competent, p h y s i c a l l y f i t t r a i n e r s we c a n m u s t e r . t l 0 1
I n a manpower c o n s t r a i n e d f o r c e ,
the tendency t o
w a s c e r t a i n l y t h e case i n t h e IDF.
148
Sumary
Th s s t u d y s u g g e s t s t h a t b a t t 1 e f e l d and of
t h e demands o f
t h e modern
s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d and equipped i n f a n t r y .
t h e c r e a t i o n of
light
infantry organizations.
i t
organized t o conduct.
armored i n f a n t r y position
i s not
manned or e q u i p p e d t o t a k e on t h e m i s s i o n s of d e f e n s e or the a t t a c k o f f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s .
The c o n c e r n s
the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t the p o s i t i o n a l ,
i s n o t capable o f
i s needed i s r e g u l a r
infantry of
Each
armored,
regular,
and l i g h t
i s capable
o f o p t i m a l l y a c c o m p l i s h i n g a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f t h e U.S.
Army's i n f a n t r y missions. Each c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e c o m b i n e d E a c h d e s e r v e command e m p h a s i s
arms w a r f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s .
and a f a i r
s h a r e of q u a l i t y s o l d i e r s a n d l e a d e r s .
T h i s s t u d y b e g a n a n d e n d s b y q u o t i n g J.F.C. c r i t i c i s m of armies.
Fuller's
149
I n m o s t a r m i e s we s e e w e a p o n s e v o l v i n g on no r a t i o n a l plan. New a r m s a r e i n v e n t e d a n d i n t r o d u c e d w i t h o u t a d e f i n i t e t a c t i c a l reason, and w i t h o u t a d e f i n i t e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o s t r u c t u r e , maintenance, and c o n t r o l . O l d w e a p o n s a r e m a i n t a i n e d ; t h e o l d a n d new a r e m i x e d i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r elemental v a l u e s . Proportions a r e n o t l o g i c a l l y a r r i v e d a t , b u t a r e t h e o u t c o m e of i g n o r a n t o p p o s i t i o n on t h e o n e s i d e a n d e n t h u s i a s t i c a g g r e s s i v e n e s s on t h e o t h e r . The w h o l e p r o c e s s i s a l c h e m i c a l , i s slow and c o s t l y and i n e f f i c i e n t ; u l t i m a t e l y t r i a l and e r r o r w i n s t h r o u g h . C l l 1 t h e U.S.
T h i s i n d i c t m e n t d o e s not have t o be t r u e of
Army
today a s i t i n t e g r a t e s t h e B I F V and s t r i v e s t o d e t e r m i n e i t s
impact on the t r i a d of d o c t r i n e , weapons, and s o l d i e r s .
This
to
heavy
e s p e c i a1 1 y B r a d 1 e y - e q u i p p e d a r m o r e d
n f an t r y .
150
ENDNOTES
CHAPTER 5
I.
Cushman,
p . 20.
Ibld.
6.
Simpkin,
Mechanized Infantry,
p.
57.
8. tlajor R.P. Cousens, " L i g h t I n f a n t r y - A R e n a i s s a n c e ? " tNov 82) p . 2 Y . A l s o s e e e x p l a n a t o r y B r i t i s h Army Review n o t e #7, C h a p t e r 4.
9.
Adan,
pp.
206-207.
10. R i c h a r d s o n , p.
11. F u l l e r ,
22.
p.
1.11.
151
B I BLI OGFAPHY
B I BL 1 OGRAPHY
Boolts
Adan, Avraham. O n t h e B a n k s of P r e s i d i o P r e s s , 1980. t h e Suez. San R a t a e l , CA:
A d d i n g t o n , L a r r y H. The B l i t z k r i e g E r a and t h e German G e n e r a l S t a f f 1865-1941. New B r u n s w i c k , N.J.: Rutgers U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1971. B i d w e l l , S h e l f o r d a n d D o m i n i c k Graham. Army Weapons a n d T h e o r i e s of War. George A l l e n a n d Unwin, 1982. Bloch, Marc. Stranoe Defeat. Y o r k : W.W. N o r t o n , 1 9 6 8 . Trans. F i r e Power: B r i t i s h 1904-1945. Boston:
~ ~~~ ~~~
by G e r a l d H o p k i n s .
New
C a r v e r , R i c h a r d M.P. The A ~ o s t l e so f M o b i l i t y . Holmes a n d M e i e r , 1979. Cary, James. Tanks and Armor i n Modern W a r f a r e . F r a n k 1 i n W a t t s , I n c . , 1966. LTG A r t h u r S . Common Sense T r a i n i n q . P r e s i d i o P r e s s , 1978.
New Y o r k :
New Y o r k :
C o l l ins,
San R a f a e l ,
CA:
Doughty, R o b e r t A. The E v o l u t i o n o f US Army T a c t i c a l D o c t r i n e . 1946-1976. L e a v e n w o r t h P a p e r Number I . F - t . L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e , U.5. Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1 9 7 9 . U u p u r ! T r e u o r N. E l u s i v e V i c t o r y : The A r a b - I s r a e l i W a r s 1947-1974. New Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d Row, 1 9 7 8 . E n g l i s h , J o h n A. P e r s p e c t i v e on I n f a n t r y . P r a e g e r , 1981. New Y o r k : PA: M i l i t a r y
London:
New Y o r k :
T r a n s . by C o n s t a n t i n e Z e n g e r , 1952.
W a r s : War a n d P e a c e i n t h e
Middle East.
New Y o r k :
Randan House,
1982.
H o u s e , J o n a t h a n M. Towards Combined Arms W a r f a r e : H S u r v e > of T a c t i c s , D o c t r i n e , a n d O r a a n i z a t i o n i n t h e 2 0 t h Century. F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: U.S. Army Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1984.
L u p f e r , T i m o t h y T. The D y n a m i c s o f D o c t r i n e : The Chanues i n German T a c t i c a l D o c t r i n e D u r i n a t h e F i r s t World War. L e a v e n w o r t h P a p e r Number 4. F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , h'S: Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e , U.S. Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1981. L u t t w a k , Edward. B o o k s , 1983. The I s r a e l i Army. C a m b r i d g e , MA: A b t
M a c k s e y , K e n n e t h J. Guderian. C r e a t o r of New Y o r k : S t e i n a n d D a y , 1 9 7 6 .
t h e 81 I t z k r i e u .
The T a n k P i o n e e r s .
London:
Jane's,
1981.
M a t a x i s , T h e o d o r e C. a n d G o l d b e r g , Seymour L. Nuclear T a c t i c s . Weapons. a n d F i r e p o w e r i n t h e P e n t o m i c D i v i s i o n . B a t t l e G r o u p . and Company. H a r r i s b u r g , PA: M i l i t a r y S e r v i c e Pub1 i s h i n g Company, 1 9 5 8 . O g o r k i e w i c z , R i c h a r d M. Armoured Forces: A r m o u r e d Forces a n d t h e i r V e h i c l e s . 1970. A H i s t o r y of New Y o r k : A r c o ,
R e z n i c h e n k o , V.G. T a c t i c s (The O f f i c e r ' s L i b r a r y ) . Trans. by t h e U.S. A i r F o r c e s f r o m 1 9 6 6 R u z s i a n p u b l i c a t i o n . Wright P a t t e r s o n A i r F o r c e B a s e , OH: F o r e i g n T e c h n o l o g y D i u i s i o n , 1967. Rommel, E r w i n . Infantry Attacks. T r a n s . b y G . E. K i d d e . W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: The I n f a n t r y J o u r n a l , 1944.
T h e Rommel P a p e r s
New Y o r k :
Harcourt,
Brace,
953.
i n t h e M o d e r n War.
New Y o r k :
Coll er
A i r Force U.S.
The B a s i c P r i n c i p l e s of O p e r a t i o n a l A r t T r a n s . by t h e U.S. A i r F o r c e f r o m 1 9 7 2
153
Russian p u b l i c a t i o n . W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1982.
Simpkin, R i c h a r d E. Anti-tank. Oxford:
U.S.
Government
Brasser's,
1782.
Oxford:
. .
.
Oxford:
Brassey's,
1980.
1984. 1979.
Charles
Brasser's,
New Y o r k :
1982.
T i e d e , R o l a n d V. On t h e A n a l y s i s o f Ground C o m b a t . M a n h a t t a n , KS: M i l i t a r r A f f a i r s / A e r o s p a c e H i s t o r i a n P u b 1 i s h i n g C o . , 1978. Uh 1 e-We t t I e r F r an z Ge f e c h t s f e 1 d M i t t e 1 - E u r o D a , G u t e r s l o t h , G e r m a n y : B e r n a r d and G r a e f e , 1980. i l r a n s l a t i o n o b t a i n e d f r o m USA TRADOC.) v a n C r e v e l d , M a r t i n L. Fiahtina Power. G r e e n w o o d P r e s s , 1982. Westport, CT:
uon S e n g e r und E t t e r l i n , F.M. Tanks of t h e World 1983. A n n a p o l i s: The Nau t i c a l and A v i a t i on Pub1 i sh i ng Company o f A m e r i c a , 1983.
W e e k s , John. Warfare.
Zaloga, S t e v e n J. and LTC James W. L o o p . Modern American Armor. London: A r m s and A r m o r P r e s s , 1982.
B u r b a , E d w i n Jr., "M2 D o c t r i n a l C o n c e p t s , " u n p u b l i s h e d c o n c e p t p a p e r , F t . B e n n i n g , GA; T h e U.S. A r m y I n f a n t r y S c h o o l , 1984. Donovan, BG C l a u d e B. " B r a d l l e y Fighting V e h i c l e Systems."
154
L e c t u r e d e l i v e r e d to the Advanced M i l I tary S t u d i e s P r o g r a m , CGSC, F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , KS, 31 J u l 84. E r i c k s o n , J o h n . " S o u i e t C o m b i n e d A r m s : T h e o r y and P r a c t i c e . " U n i v e r s i t y o f Edinburgh, 1980. ( C o p y a v a i l a b l e a t Combined Arms Research Library, Fort L e a v e n w o r t h , K a n s a s ; d o c u m e n t n u m b e r N20335.1) German War O f f i c e , " T h e German M o t o r 1 i z e d I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t " T r a n s l a t e d and r e p u b l i s h e d by t h e M i l i t a r y I n t e l l i g e n c e S e r v i c e , War D e p a r t m e n t , Washington, D.C., 1941. H a l d e r , F r a n z and M u e l l e r - H i l l e b r a n d , B u r k h a r d t . " I n t e g r a t e d A r m o r e d A r m y . " D e a p r t m e n t of t h e A r m y , O f f i c e of t h e C h i e f of M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , 1952. ( D T I C R16993.2-10, K a r b e r , P h i l l i p A. The T a c t i c a l R e v o l u t i o n i n S o v i e t MII i t a r y ~ o c t r i n e . 1977 r p t . C a r l l s l e G r r a c k T , A r t o f War C o l l o q u i u m , 1983.
~~ ~~
PA:
Loza,
D.F., G.I. G a r b u z , and S a z o n o y I . F . " T h e M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n i n M o d e r n Combat." M o s c o w : M i l i t a r y P u b l i s h i n g H o u s e of t h e M i n i s t r y o f D e f e n s e o f t h e USSR, 1965. ( T r a n s l a t e d by t h e F o r e i g n S c i e n c e and T e c h n o l o g r C e n t e r , U.S. A r m y M a t e r i e l Command.)
L u t t w a k , E d w a r d N. " A H i s t o r i c a l A n a l y s i s and P r o g r a m f o r A r m y 2000." V o l u m e 11. P r o d u c e d u n d e r c o n t r a c t f o r H e a d q u a r t e r s T r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e Command, M a y 83. " T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m y i n t h e S e c o n d World War: T h e Tank D e s t r o y e r F o r c e s . " P r o d u c e d u n d e r c o n t r a c t f o r H e a d q u a r t e r s T r a i n i n g a n d D o c t r i n e Command, M a y 83. M a h a f f e y , LTG F r e d K. " B r a d l e y F i g h t i n g V e h i c l e S y s t e m s (BFUS) -- I n f o r m a t i o n Memorandum." W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : O f f i c e o f t h e D e p u t y C h i e f o f S t a f f f o r P l a n s and O p e r a t i o n s . 7 M a r 1983. P e r e s s , P h i 1 i p p e C. " T h e C o m b i n e d A r m s B a t t a l ion C o n c e p t i n t h e F r e n c h A r m y . " S t u d e n t p r o j e c t , U.S. A r m y Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , F t . L e a u e n w o r t h , 1977. Rheinhart,
11."
R i c h a r d s o n , Gen W i 1 1 l a m R. " K e r m i t R o o s e v e l t L e c t u r e , " l e c t u r e d e l i v e r e d t o t h e R o y a l C o l l e g e of D e f e n c e S t u d i e s , 23 M a y 1984. S t e a d m a n , K e n n e t h A. " T h e E v o l u t i o n of t h e Tank i n t h e U.S. A r m y . " Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e , U.S. A r m y Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , KS, 1982.
155
U n i o n of S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s . F i e l d Service R e a u l a t i o n S o v i e t Army 1936. T r a n s . by SSG C h a r l e s Berman, The A r m y War C o i l ege Repr i n t e d C a r I i s le B a r r a c k s , PA: A r t o f War C o l l o q u i u m , 1 9 8 3 .
U.5.
D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army. A r e a Handbook f o r E a Y D t . P a m p h l e t 5 5 0 - 4 3 . W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: US G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1976. A r e a Handbook f o r I s r a e l . Pamphlet 550-25. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: US G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 7 9 . A r e a Handbook f o r L e b a n o n . Pamphlet 550-24. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: US G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 7 4 . " T h e BMP: C a p a b i l i t i e s and L i m i t a t i o n s . " TRADOC B u l l e t i n 7 . F t . M o n r o e VA: TRADOC P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 7 7 . "Combat R e p o r t s F r o m K o r e a . " H e a d q u a r t e r s , 5 t h A r m y , 1952.
. .
. .
Chicago,
IL:
" C o n c e p t and O p e r a t i n g P r i n c i p l e s o f t h e German A r m o r e d Combat T r o o p s . " C o l o g n e , FRG: T r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e Command L i a i s o n O f f i c e , German G e n e r a l A r m y O f f i c e , 1980.
D.C.:
Washington,
.
.
0 . Washington,
1982.
. .
.
.
Washington,
D.C.:
"OPMS S t u d y G r o u p A f t e r
156
A c t i o n Report."
Commanders
Call.
U.S.
O r a a n i z a t i o n . EauiDment. a n d T a c t i c a l Employment o f t h e I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n - G e n e r a l B o a r d R e p o r t #15. H e a d q u a r t e r s , U.S. F o r c e s , E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r , 1 9 4 5 . Panzer . . i a d i e r c _ . F t . P o l k , LA: H e a d q u a r t e r c , 5 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n (Mechanized), undated. " R u s s i a n Combat M e t h o d s i n W o r l d War 1 1 . " P a m p h l e t 2 0 - 2 3 0 . W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1950. S e l e c t e d Readinas i n M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y : E v o l u t i o l i of C o m b i n e d A r m s W a r f a r e . R e f e r e n c e Book 20-18. Fort L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1983. The S o v i e t Army: O D e r a t i o n s a n d T a c t i c s . Field Mamual 100-2-1. Washington,D.C.: U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1984. T Y D of ~ ~ D i v i s i o n s - P o s t War Army R e D o r t #17. H e a d q u a r t e r s , U.S. F o r c e s , T h e a t e r , 1945.
. .
PP.
B r a c k e n , P a u l . " U r b a n S p r a w l a n d NATO D e f e n c e . " Nov-Dec 1 9 7 6 , p p . 254-260. B r a d l e y , CI i f f o r d D. " T h e F u t u r e I F U . " 1981, p p . 21-27. Infantry.
Surv i ual
Jul-Aug
C o u s e n s , M a j o r R.P. " L i g h t I n f a n t r y A Renaissance?" B r i t i s h Army Reu I ew. Nov 82, p p . 25-33. Cushman, J o h n H. 'Pentamic I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n i n Combat." M i l i t a r y Review. J a n 58, p p . 19-30. D o n n e l l y , C.N. " T a c t i c a l Problems F a c i n g the S o v i e t Army." I n t e r n a t i o n a l Defense Reuiew. 9:78, pp. 1405-1412. 157
Infantry.
H o l m e s , D a v i d G. " T h e U.S. A r m y ' s I F U a n d CFV." I n t e r n a t i o n a l Defense Review, 7:80, pp 1075-1081. J e n k i n s , D.H.C. " O p e r a t i n g t h e B r a d l e y IFU." Defense Review. 9:62, p p . 1 2 0 3 - 1 2 0 6 . K a r b e r , P h i l 1 i p A . "The S o v i e t A n t i - T a n k M a r - J u n e 1976, p p . 1 0 5 - 1 1 1 . International
Debate."
Surviual.
"The IFU."
N a t i o n a l Defense.
Jul--Aug the
M e r i m s k i y , G e n e r a l C o l o n e l V i k t o r A. " T h e BMP i n C o m b a t . " I n Ed. H a r r i e t F . S c o t t a n d W i l l i a m T h e S o v i e t A r t of War. F. S c o t t , B o u l d e r , CO: W e s t v i e w P r e s s , 1 9 8 2 , p p . 2 8 4 - i 6 6 . "New C l o u t f o r Mech I n f a n t r y : T h e M 2 a n d A i r l a n d 2 0 0 0 Tactics." Armr. A u g 83, p p 1 8 - 2 9 . P e t r a e u s , D a v i d H. " L i g h t I n f a n t r y i n E u r o p e : S t r a t e g i c F l e x i b i l i t y and Conventional Deterrence." Military Review. Dec 1 9 8 4 , p p . 35-55. R o s s e t t o , C a p t a i n L u i g i . "Armoured I n f a n t r y . " Quarterly. 109:1979, p p . 147-152. S i m p k i n , R i c h a r d E. "When t h e S q u a d D i s m o u n t s . " Nuv-Dec 83, p p . 15-18. The A r m y
Infantry.
T u r b i v i l l e , Graham A . " S o v i e t I n f a n t r y A s s a u l t D e t a c h m e n t s . " Infantry. Sep-Oct 75, p p . 37-42. U h l e - W e t t l e r , LTG F r a n z . " I n f a n t r y V e r s u s T a n k s . " Sixteen Nations. M a r - J u n e 84, p p . 49-52.
NA'rO's
158
I N I T I A L L i I S T R I B U T I O N LISl
Training Directorate
159