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THE COMBINED

ARMS ROLE OF ARMORED

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t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a c u l t y o f t h e U.S. H r m Y Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of the requirement5 for the degree MASTER OF M I L I T A R Y ART AND SCIENCE

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ROBERT J . ST. ONGE, J R . , IWJ, USA U n i t e d S t a t e s M i l i t a r y A c a d e m y , 1949 M.S., P u r d u e U n i v r r s i t j , 15'76

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The o p i n i o n s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r e t h o s e o f t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r a n d do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t t h e v i e w s ot t h e U.S. A r m y Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e o r any o!her government agency. t References t o t h i s study s h o u l i l include the foresoino s t ~ t e m e n t . )

ABSTRACT

THE COMBINEL) HHMS ROLE O F ARMORED INFANTRI, J. S t . Onge, J r . , USA, 165 p a g e s .

by MaJOr R o b e r t

T h i s s t u d y i s an a n a l y s i s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p r o p e r t a c t i c a l r o l e of i n f a n t r y e q u i p p e d w i t h t h e B r a d l e y I n f a n t r y F i g h t i n g V e h i c l e (BIFU). T h a t r o l e i s s h a p e d by t h e demands of t h e modern b a t t l e f i e l d i n c l u d i n g t h e e x p e c t e d S o v i e t - t y p e t h r e a t , t h e n a t u r a l s e t t i n g f o r b a t t l e c r e a t e d by t e r r a i n a n d w e a t h e r , a n d t h e e f f e c t s o f w e a p o n s w h i c h s i g n i f i c a n t l y a1 t e r that natural setting. The r o l e i s a l s o a t t e c t e d b y t h e p r a c t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s t o f i g h t a s c o m b i n e d arms. The h i s t o r y of c o m b i n e d a r m s w a r f a r e f r o m World War I t o t h e p r e s e n t r e v e a l s t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y and s u p p l e m e n t a r y e f f e c t s t h a t each p r i n c i p a l g r o u n d arm - i n f a n t r y , t a n k s , and artillery c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e c o m b i n e d arms b a t t l e .

T h i s study concludes that there i s a requirement f o r three kinds of infantry: l i g h t i n f a n t r y which f i g h t s i n close, d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n ; regular i n f a n t r y which fights the manpower-intensive, dismounted b a t t l e s such as p o s i t i o n a l d e f e n s e s a n d a t t a c k s o f f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s , s u p p o r t e d by t a n k s a n d o t h e r h e a v y weapons; a n d a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y , e q u i p p e d w i t h t h e BIFU, w h i c h t i g h t s i n c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h m a i n b a t t l e t a n k s i n o f f e n s i v e and m o b i l e d e f e n s i v e combat. T h i s s t u d y a l s o c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e U.S. Army s h o u l d s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r r e t e n t i o n of M l l 3 - e q u i p p e d , r e g u l a r i n f a n t r y f a r c e s t o fight the manpower-intensive, dismounted b a t t l e s for which b o t h t h e new l i g h t a n d a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y a r e i l l - d e s i g n e d . Heavy d i v i s i o n s , even b r i g a d e s , s h o u l d c o n t a i n a m i x o f t a n k , BIFV-equipped i n f a n t r y , and M113-equipped i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s t o m e e t t h e demands o f t h e m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d a n d c o m b i n e d arms w a r f a r e .

i i

TABLE OF LONTENT5

.................................. HBSTRACT ..............................................


T H E S I S APPROVAL PAGE TABLE OF CONTENlS
C HkPTER

...................................

I i i

.
.

INTRODUCTION The Prob\enl Purpose Methodolog,. Endnotes

.................................... ................................... .......................................

................................... .....................................

i 4 5
6

II
12

I1

DEMANDS OF THE MODERN B A T T L E F I E L D Threat l e r r a i n a n d Weather C e n t r a l Europe Desert Environments B a t t l e f i e l d Condi t i o n s Summary Endnotes DEMANDS OF C O M B I M D HHMS WARFARE

....................................... .......................... ............................. ........................ ....................... ...................................... .....................................


I

..............

13
121

28
31 3.5

39
41 45 56
7U

111

World War

.................................. I n t e r w a r b e a r s ............................... W o r l d War 1 1 ................................. N u c l e a r Age .................................. Summary ...................................... L n d n o t e s .....................................

...............

84
yo

98
1u2 102 1u5

IU .

INFANTRY ROLES AND COMBlNED ARMS Evolution of I n f a n t r y E v o l u t i o n of Tanks E v o l u t i o r i of A r t i l l e r y R e q u i r e m e n t s of Combined Arms I n f a n t r y Requirements i n Combined Arms "Three K i n d s of I n f a n t r y " l j e s i r e d C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ot A r m o r e d I r i f a n t r y Armored I n f a n t r y TasKs R e l a t i v e M e r i t s of t h e M I 1 3 R e l a t i v e M e r i t s ot t h e M2 61FU B r a d l e y m p I o y n i e n t Consi d e r ' a t I on . ; Summary Endnotes

.......................... ...................... 1U5 ............... 1 0 5 ...... 1 0 7 ................... 1u8 .1 11 ...................... 114 ................. 1 1 . . .............. 1 1 "
...........
1% I 130 132

.......................

..............

.....................................

....................................
I l l

u.

ZONCLUSIUNS

Doctrine Weaporls Soldiers Other Loncernc Summary Endrlotes

..................................... .................................... .............................. ..................................... ....................................

................................... ....................................

134
134

140 14i 147 149 151


152
15'9

GIGLIOGRAPHY

INITIAL

........................................ DISTRIBUTION L I S T ...........................

CWIPTER I JNTRODUCT1M.l

I n mos a r m i e s we see weapons e v c , i n g on n o r a t i w i a l plan. New arms a r e i n v e n t e d and introduced without a d e f i n i t e t a c t i c a l r e a s o n , and w i t h o u t a d e f i n i t e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o s t r u c t u r e , m a i n t e n a n c e , and c o n t r o l . Old weapons a r e m a i n t a i n e d ; t h e o l d and new a r e mixed i r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e i r elemental values. Proportions are not l o g i c a l l y a r r i v e d a t , but a r e t h e o u t c a n e o f i g n o r a n t o p p o s i t i o n on t h e one s i d e and e n t h u s i a s t i c a g g r e s s i v e n e s s on t h e o t h e r . The w h o l e p r o c e s s i s a l c h e m i c a l , i s slow and c o s t l y and i n e f f i c i e n t ; u l t i m a t e l y t r i a l and e r r o r w i n s t h r o u g h . t l 1
Fuller

J.F.C.

1925
T h i s h a r s h i n d i c t m e n t o f m i l i t a r y s y s t e m s i n g e n e r a l and t h e i r a b i l i t y t o adapt, penned i n 1925 b y one of t h e most

noted m i l i t a r y thinkers o f t h i s century, c u r r e n c y when one l o o k s a t t h e U.S.

h a s an a i r o f One must o n l y

Army t o d a y .

r e v i e w c u r r e n t d e f e n s e r e l a t e d p e r i o d i c a l s t o g a i n an a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r the f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s ample u n c e r t a i n t y

a b o u t t h e p r o p e r r o l e s and i n t e g r a t i o n of new and e x p e n s i v e combat s y s t e m s . The B r a d l e y I n f a n t r y F i g h t i n g V e h i c l e ( B I F U )

i s such a system.

I n t h e decade s i n c e t h e end o f U.S. V i e t n a m War t h e U.S.

involvement i n the

Army h a s e x p e r i e n c e d a p e r i o d of not j u s t i n i n t e g r a t i n g new w e a p w

s i g n i f i c a n t Change,

, but

a c r o s s the w i d e spectrum o f Wass d e Czege,

i t s a c t i v i t i e s . A s C o l o n e l Huba
t h e 1982 v e r s i o n o f FM

p r i n c i p a l author o f points out,

100-5,
weapons, army.'C21

ODerations,

the " t r i a d o f s o l d i e r s ,

and d o c t r i n e c o n s t i t u t e s the f o u n d a t i o n o f e v e r y T h i s p a r a d i g m p r o v e s a u s e f u l framework f o r Army's adaptive

d i s c u s s i n g t h i s p e r i o d o f change a n d t h e U.S. efforts.

O f course,

changes i n each o f

these a r e a s impact

s i g n i f i c a n t l y on t h e o t h e r two a r e a s .

Doctrine.

The l a s t decade i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by m a j o r Several comprehensive r e o r i e n t a t i o n s of

d o c t r i n a l changes. t h e U.S. Army's

b a s i c d o c t r i n e were i n t r o d u c e d a s FM 100-5,

Operations, 1982.

was s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e v i s e d i n 1976 and a g a i n i n

A m a j o r command, T r a i n i n g and D r c t r i n e Command

(TRADOC), was c r e a t e d i n t h e 1970s t o f o c u s on t h o s e important f u n c t i o n s t h a t

its t i t l e

implie5

t r a i n i n g and

d o c t r i n e . A s e r i e s o f "hcw-to-fight"

f i e l d m a n u a l s were techniques f o r

p u b l i s h e d t o promulgate d o c t r i n e and t a c t i c a l combat u n i t s down t o t h e l o w e s t l e u e l . c o n c e p t u a l i z e how t h e A r m y w i l l TRADOC's

Efforts to

f i g h t f u t u r e w a r s began w i t h

" A i r L a n d B a t t l e 2000" a n d " A r m y 21" s t u d i e s .

Soldiers.

Introduction of

the a l l - u o l u n t e e r

army a n d i n the

the e l i m i n a t i o n o f the d r a f t h i g h l i g h t the t u r b u l e n c e v i t a l f u n c t i o n o f manning t h e f o r c e . A d d i t i o n a l l y , officer the

c o r p s was s i g n i f i c a n t l y c u t back f r o m i t s V i e t n a m necessary b u t d i s r u p t i v e

w a r t i m e s t r e n g t h t h r o u g h a s e r i e s of reduction actions.

S t r i n g e n t manpower c e i l i n g s imposed by 2

Congress c o u p l e d w i t h t h e c o m p l e x i tr o f modern weapons a n d s u p p o r t s y s t e m s have r e q u i r e d e m p h a s i s on r e c r u i t i n g and r e t a i n i n g h i g h q u a l i t y s o l d i e r s and l e a d e r s i n p e a c e t i m e a s never b e f o r e i n our h i s t o r y . The introduction of t h e New combat

M a n n i n g System w i l l have a s i g n i f i c a n t units, e s p e c i a l l y the i n f a n t r y .

i m p a c t on U.S.

Weaoons. massive,

T e c h n o l o g i c a l advances and t h e emergence of

s o p h i s t i c a t e d S o v i e t ground t h r e a t d u r i n g t h i s Army t o m o d e r n i z e and t o

p e r i o d have f o r c e d t h e U.S. i n t e g r a t e h u n d r e d s of equipment i n v e n t o r i e s .

new a n d complex s y s t e m s i n t o i t s Because new s y s t e m s a r e e x p e n s i v e and c a r e f u l p l a n n i n g as t o the

defense r e s o u r c e s a r e c o n s t r a i n e d , t y p e and

r e q u i r e d number of each new s y s t e m i s c r i t i c a l .

S e v e r a l management p r a c t i c e s i n c l u d i n g a c o n c e p t s b a s e d development p h i l o s o p h y i n w h i c h d o c t r i n e ,

or c o n c e p t s ,

form

t h e b a g i s f o r m a t e r i e l needs, were i n i t i a t e d d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d i n an a t t e m p t t o p r o c u r e new s y s t e m s t h a t f i t t h e Armys reseal


I

c o n c e p t u a l v i e w o f f u t u r e war and t o encourage

11 and development e f f o r t s t o f o c u s on p r o j e c t e d A r m y

o p e r a t i o n a l requirements.

These changes h i g h l i g h t a c e n t r a l r e q u i r e m e n t f o r U.S.

the and

A r m y today:

t o be both e f f i c i e n t

(cost effective)

e f f e c t i v e ( f i g h t outnumbered and w i n )

i t must have a c l e a r l y

a r t i c u l a t e d d o c t r i n e t h a t g u i d e s a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l f o r c e of h i g h qua1 i t y s o l d i e r s and l e a d e r s t o optimize the

c a p a b i l i t i e s of n u m e r i c a l l y i n f e r i o r but q u a l i t a t i v e l y

s u p e r i o r s y s t e m s i n f i g h t i n g and w i n n i n g t h e n e x t w a r . Obviously, t h e U.S.

A r m y cannot e a s i l y achieve numerical


I t must c o n c e n t r a t e on d e v e l o p i n g

p a r i t y w i t h the S o v i e t s . super.I.

e q u i p m e n t t h a t w i l l b e employed by b e t t e r l e d and

b e t t e r t r a i n e d s o l d i e r s and u n i t s u s i n g s u p e r or t a c t i c s and o p e r a t i o n a l m e t h o d s t h a t o p t i m i z e t h e c o l l e c t ve c a p a b i 1 i t i e s o f a1 1 arms.

The P r o b l e m

P e r h a p s no arm o f o u r g r o u n d f o r c e h a s been a f f e c t e d a s much d u r i n g t h i s decade o f change a s o u r t r a d i t i o n a l f i g h t i n g arm

the i n f a n t r y . While today's

volunteer

i n f a n t r y m a n may t h e t o o l s of his

b e of h i g h e r q u a l i t y than h i s predecessor,

t r a d e c o n t i n u e t o become i n c r e a s i n g l y complex.
of

The v a r i e t y

i n f a n t r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s a t t e s t s t o the complexity o f

i n f a n t r y t a s k s and m y r i a d p o t e n t i a l b a t t l e f i e l d e n v i r o n m e n t s . Currently, there are e i g h t d i f f e r e n t types o f infantry

b a t t a l i o n s w i t h d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t c a p a b i l i t i e s and
1 i m i t a t i o n s : ranger,

1 ight,

standard,

airborne, airmobile,

motorized ( h i g h tech),

mechanized,

a n d a r m o r e d (my t e r m f o r This variety also

i n f a n t r y equipped w i t h the BIFU).

h i g h l i g h t s an a p p a r e n t c o n f u s i o n r e g a r d i n g i n f a n t r y t a s k s and missions. Despite the Army's the attempts t o think

futuristicdl ly, systems i t


1 5

i n f a n t r y o f t e n d i s c o v e r s t h e weapon

t o employ a r e d e v e l o p e d and f i e l d e d and i t s the concepts

o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e determined w e l l before o f how-to-fight

are c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e d i n d o c t r i n e .

T h i s i s c e r t a i n l y t h e case w i t h t h e new, s o p h i s t i c a t e d BIFV,


w i t h it.

highly

and t h e armored i n f a n t r y u n i t s e q u i p p e d i n f a n t r y brings a unique s e t o f

T h i s new t y p e o f

c a p a b i l i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s t o t h e modern b a t t l e f i e l d . A l t h o u g h t h e U.S. Army has been i n t h e p r o c e s s o f p r o c u r i n g an i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e f o r n e a r l y t w e n t y y e a r s , the

B I N i s b e i n g f i e l d e d now i n Europe a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
w i t h o u t c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e d d o c t r i n e a s t o how i t i s t o fight.

Purpose

The p u r p o s e o f t h i s s t u d y i s t o i s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e optimal r o l e of the BIN-equipped infantry, or armored

i n f a n t r y , u n d e r A i r L a n d B a t t l e d o c t r i n e . The n o t e d B r i t i s h s o l d i e r and c o n t e m p o r a r y m i l i t a r y w r i t e r , R i c h a r d E. Simpkin,

s t a t e d t h e f l a v o r o f the problem q u i t e w e l l entitled Mechanized I n f a n t r y :

i n h i s 1980 book

W i t h mechanized i n f a n t r y t h e d i f f i c u l t y l i e s i n a r r i v i n g a t a m e a n i n g f u l and l u c i d d e f i n i t i o n o f the r o l e o f i n f a n t r y i n the a r m o r e d b a t t l e and t h e w a y i t s h o u l d f i g h t by w h i c h I mean s a n e t h i n g a t t h e g r a s s r o o t s l e v e l b u t r a t h e r broader than minor t a c t i CS. C 3 1
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o make a d i s t i n c t i o n between

armored

and

mechanized

infantry.

The t e r m

armored i n f a n t r y

was

u s e d i n t h e U.S.
for

A r m y f r o m W o r l d War 1 1 u n t i l t h e l a t e 1950's

those i n f a n t r y u n i t s equipped w i t h armored personnel


5

c a r r i e r s and a s s i g n e d t o a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s . now u s e s t h e t e r m mechanized i n f a n t r y

The U.S.

Army

for

i n f a n t r y equipped

w i t h any a r m o r e d p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r ,

including both infantry T h i s s t u d y maKes t h e

w i t h t h e MI13 and t h o s e w i t h t h e BIFU. d i s t i n c t i o n between armored i n f a n t r y

i n r e f e r r i n g t o those
mechanized i n f a n t r y

i n f a n t r y f o r c e s e q u i p p e d w i t h BIFU and

..

as those equipped w i t h the M113. T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n n o t o n l y p r o v i d e s c o n v e n i e n t l a b e l s b u t a l s o draws a t t e n t i o n t o t h e significant differences i n capabilities, limitations, and

c o m p l e x i t y t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e these t w o forms of

infantry.

Methodology

To d e t e r m i n e t h e o p t i m a l r o l e of a n y arm o f t h e o v e r a l l

f o r c e one m u s t r i g o r o u s l y examine t h r e e a r e a s o f c o n c e r n : t h e demands of how-to-fight t h e modern b a t t l e f i e l d ; t h e U.S. A r m y s basic

philosophy

4irLand Battle doctrine;

and t h e

c a p a b i l i t i e s and v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s n o t o n l y o f t h a t arm but o f each arm o f t h e f o r c e w i t h w h i c h i t must c o o p e r a t e as p a r t of t h e combined arms t e a m .

The demands of

t h e modern b a t t l e f i e 1 d. The

These demands

w i l l shape t h e r o l e of maneuver f o r c e s .
organizes, equips,

U.S. Army

and t r a i n s i t s f o r c e s b a s e d upon t h e t e r r a i n and w e a t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and T h i s c a n be r e a d i l y seen

perceived threat,

anticipated b a t t l e f i e l d conditions. i n a s t r a t e g i c sense;

s i n c e t h e e n d o f World War I 1 t h e U.S.

A r m y h a s been r e q u i r e d t o m a i n t a i n f o r c e s c a p a b l e o f

o p e r a t i n g v i r t u a l l y anywhere i n t h e w o r l d .

O n one hand,

it

h a s m a i n t a i n e d heavy f o r c e s c a p a b l e o f f i g h t i n g o t h e r modern armies i n m i d t o h i g h - i n t e n s i t y w a r f a r e i n such p l a c e s a s On t h e o t h e r hand, it

C e n t r a l Europe and t h e M i d d l e E a s t .

has maintained (and i s c u r r e n t l y r e v i t a l i r i n g ) cap;,lgle

I ighter forces

o f s w i f t s t r a t e g i c d e p l o y m e n t t o p e r i p h e r a l combat in terrain

zones o f t e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d by l o w i n t e n s i t y w a r f a r e

w h i c h i s most o f t e n n o t s u i t a b l e f o r t h e employment o f heavy forces. I n t h i s attempt t o determine the optimal r o l e o f o n l y i t s p o t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s as p a r t o f

armored i n f a n t r y ,

t h e h e a v y f o r c e s employed i n e n v i r o n m e n t s l i k e c e n t r a l Europe
o r t h e M i d d l e E a s t w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d .

T h r e e m a j o r f a c t o r s w h i c h d e t e r m i n e t h e demands of modern b a t t l e f i e l d a r e c o n s i d e r e d i n t h i s s t u d y : t e r r a i n and weather, and b a t t l e f i e l d c o n d i t i o n s . threat,

the

T h i s st..dr

w i l l examine a S o v i e t t y p e t h r e a t .

Although the S o v i e t s

s u p p o r t w a r s o f n a t i o n a l 1 i b e r a t i o n a n d o t h e r low i n t e n s i t v conflicts, t h e i r armed f o r c e s a r e p r e d o m i n a n t l y h e a v y f o r c e s i n m i d and h i g h i n t e n s i t y c o n f l i c t s on t h e T h i s s t u d y w i l l f o c u s on t e r r a i n and

designed t o f i g h t

E u r a s i a n l a n d mass.

w e a t h e r o f C e n t r a l Europe a n d t h e M i d d l e E a s t t e r r a i n on w h i c h t h e B I N , forces, threat.


w i l l

the type o f
Armys

a s p a r t of

t h e U.S.

heavy

most l i k e l y be e m p l o y e d a g a i n s t a S o v i e t t y p e be shaped by t h e

The modern b a t t l e f i e l d w i l l

p o t e n t i a l use o f n u c l e a r weapons, of c h e m i c a l weapons,

and t h e a l m o s t c e r t a i n use m i n e s and o b s t a c l e s ,

e l e c t r o n i c warfare,

and smoke and o b s c u r a n t s .

I t w i l l be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by

non-linear

maneuver b a t t l e s ,

i n t e n s e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of h i g h l y high tempo o f a c t i v i t i e s ,

l e t h a l d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t f i r e s , d i s r u p t e d carmand and c o n t r o l ,

and austere supportt41.

AirLand Ba ttl e doctrine. p u b l i s h e d i n 1982, concept. the

FM 100-5,

ODerations, operation

d e s c r i b e s t h e U.S.

Armys

T h i s d o c t r i n e i s b a s e d on g a i n i n g a n d m a i n t a i n i n g

i n i t i a t i v e and e x e r c i s i n g i t a g g r e s s i v e l y t o defeat the T h i s o p e r a t i o n a l c o n c e p t e n v i s i o n s t h a t s u c c e s s on

enemy.

t h e m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d w i l l d e p e n d on f o u r b a s i c t e n e t s : i n i t i a t i v e , depth, Collectively, agility, and synchronization. pro-active

t h e y i m p l y an o f f e n s i v e l y s p i r i t e d ,

f o r c e t h a t seeks t o a c t f a s t e r

t h a n t h e enemy a n d t o m a x i m i z e

i t s c o m b a t p o w e r through u n i t y o f e f f o r t o f c o m b i n e d a r m s
r e s u l t i n g i n the d i s r u p t i o n of t h e enemy p l a n a n d d e s t r u c t i o n the b a t l e f i e l d .

o f h i s f o r c e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e d e p t h of

A key aspect of A i r L a n d B a t t l e d o c t r i n e

s combined
often

arms.

T h i s term i s used f r e e l y i n mi I i t a r y I i t e r a t u r e , l a c k of

i n a v a g u e manner c o n t r i b u t i n g t o a g e n e r a l understanding about

it.

The t e r m

combined arms

includes

three r e l a t e d elements:

t h e c o n c e p t o f c o m b i n e d arms, a n d combined arms t a c t i c s and t h e s e e l e m e n t s of

combined a r m s o r g a n i z a t i o n s , operations.[51

T h i s study w i l l d e t a i l

c o m b i n e d a r m s a n d w i l l e x a m i n e them a s t h e y p e r t a i n t o tactical Infantry, c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p r i m a r y combat arms: a n d a r t i l l e r y . The v i t a l including aviation,


8

tanks,

c o n t r i b u t i o n s of other

combat a r m s ,

a i r defense and e n g i n e e r s ,

a r e r e c o g n i z e d but w i l l r e v i e w of the history o f

n o t be t h e f o c u s o f tank-infantry-arti

this study.

I l e r y cooperation

f r o m W o r l d War

1 through t h e r e c e n t l s r a e l i e x c u r s i o n i n t o

L e b a n o n w i l l r e v e a l p a t t e r n s t h a t w i l l h e l p c l a r i f y how U.S. f o r c e s should p l a n t o f i g h t


of

i n combined arms.

These p a t t e r n s the

t a c t i c a l warfare w i l l

be c o n s i d e r e d a s f u n c t i o n s o f

t h r e e p h y s i c a l e l e m e n t s of w a r e n u m e r a t e d by J . F . C .

FullerL61

mobility, protection,

and o f f e n s i v e pcwer

or

in current

t e r m s of

FM 1 0 0 - 5 a 5 t h e e l e m e n t s o f c o m b a t p o w e r : m a n e u v e r , and p r o t e c t i o n . The f o u r t h e l e m e n t o f c o m b a t

firepower, power,

leadership,

i s a m o r a l f a c t o r a n d i s d e s c r i b e d i n FM e l e m e n t by w h i c h t h e e f f e c t s o f These p a t t e r n s o f the

100-5 a s t h e c r u c i a l

f i r s t t h r e e a r e optimized.C71

tactical Army m u s t

w a r f a r e w i l l b e k e y t o d e t e r m i n i n g how t h e U.S. combine t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f

i t s a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s t o op i m i z

t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e combined arms p o t e n t i a l .

An a n a l y s i s o f conditions,

infantry.

The study o f b a t l e f i e d and t h e

t h e demands of

combined arms w a r f a r e ,

l e s s o n s o f 2 0 t h C e n t u r y w a r f a r e h e l p e s t a b l i s h some broad requirements for infantry

in the future.

An a n a l y s i s o f

the

c a p a b i l i t i e s o f o u r v a r i o u s t y p e s of

i n f a n t r y match d a g a i n s t armored

these requirements s h o u l d suggest a p r o p e r r o l e for infantry. This analysis w i l l

provide a clearer p i c ure o f and i t w i l lead t o

how a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y s h o u l d b e e m p l o y e d , suggestions for organizing, equipping,

leading,

and t r a i n i n g

armored i n f a n t r y t o b e s t accomplish t h i s o p t i m a l r o l e .

A s s t a t e d above,

combat s y s t e m s a r e o i t e n f i e l d e d b e f o r e The

t h e r e i s a c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f how t h e y a r e t o f i g h t .
U.S.
Army f i n d s i t s e l f

i n t h a t dilemma now a s i t a t t e m p t s t o This

w r i t e how-to-fight study w i l l

d o c t r i n e f o r t h e armored i n f a n t r y .

attempt t o p r o v i d e meaningful

insights to solving

t h i s c u r r e n t B I N d o c t r i n a l dilemma.

UJWOTES

CHFIPTER I

1. J.F.C. F u l l e r , T h e F o u n d a t i o n s a n d S c i e n c e of War (London: H u t c h i n s o n a n d Co., 1925>, p . 147.

2. C o l o n e l Huba Wass de Czege, T o w a r d a New h e r i c a n Approach t o Warfare, ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1 9 8 3 ) , p. 10-1-46.

3 . R i c h a r d E. S i m p k i n , Mechanized Infantry B r a s s e r s P u b l i s h i n g L t d , 1 9 8 0 ) , p . 2.

(Oxford:

4. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army, O D e r a t i o n s F i e l d Manual 100-5 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 8 2 ) , p p . 1-1 t h r o u g h 1-3. 5. J o n a t h a n M. H o u s e , Towards Combined A r m s W a r f a r e : A S u r v e y of T a c t i c s . D o c t r i n e . a n d O r a a n i z a t i o n i n t h e 2 0 t h C e n t u r y ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: Cunbat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e , Camand a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1984), p . 2-3.

6.
p.

J.F.C. 148.

Fuller,

T h e F o u n d a t i o n s of p. 2-5.

t h e S c i e n c e o f War,

7.

F i e l d M a n u a l 100-5,

11

CMPTER 2 THE DEMCINDS OF THE MODERN BfiTTLEFlELD

find t h e r e f o r e I s a y : . k n o w t h e enemy, know y o u r s e l f ; your v i c t o r y w i l l n e v e r b e Know t h e g r o u n d , know t h e endangered. w e a t h e r ; y o u r v i c t o r y w i l l be t o t a l . L 1 1

Sun .rzu

T h i s a n c i e n t Chinese d i c t u m , w h i c h e x t o l s knowledge o t the b a t t l e f i e l d ,


i s r e c o g n i z e d as
J U S ~a s

wise today as i t ODeratior&t the lhr

w a s when w r i t t e n o v e r 200U y e a r s ago. i d e n t i f i e s tour basic challenges f o r battlefield, leadership, readiness,

FI4 1 U O - 5 ,
t h e U.S.

Army:

and t r a i n i n g . L 2 1

b a t t l e f i e l d i s the most basic o f leadership, most p a r t , readiness,

these challenges; for the

and t r a i n i n g c h a l l e n g e s a r e ,
it.

derivative of

What w i l l

the mid-

and h i g h - i n t e n s i t y

b a t t l e f i e l d of
is

tomorrow be l i k e '

The f u t u r i s t i c

v i e w i n FM 1 0 0 - 5

s o b e r i n g a n d p r o d u c e s thoughts ot a chamber o t h o r r o r s . F u t u r e b a t t I e s are e n v i s i o n e d as non-l


I

n e a r maneuver

engagements between mobi l e f o r c e s w i e l d i n g h i g h l y l e t h a l d i r e c t a n d i n d i r e c t f i r e s y s t e m s o p e r a t i n g deep other's traditional r e a r areas. Lethal


i t y

i n each

o f modern weapons

i n c l u d e s t h e g r o w i n g t h r e a t o f n u c l e a r a n d c h e m i c a l weapons
12

of m a s s k i l l i n g a n d d e s t r u c t i v e p o w e r c u n p l e m e n t e d by new
p r e c i s i o n weaponry w i t h i n c r e a s e d range and d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s , such a s p r e c i s i o n g u i d e d m u n i t i o n s and e v e n t u a l l y d i r e c t e d e n e r g y weapons. These p o t e n t f o r c e s w i l l r e l y on

s o p h i s t i c a t e d sensor and communication systems t o see the b a t t l e f i e l d a n d t o s y n c h r o n i z e t h e e f f e c t s of p o w e r on t h e i r a d v e r s a r i e s . c o n t r o l of the ground, t h e i r combat

B a t t l e s w i l l r a g e not o n l y f o r a n d t h e a i r but a l s o f o r the use

t h e sea,

a n d d e n i a l of

a medium o f

i n c r e a s i n g importance,

e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c spectrum. t h i s spectrum w i l l be v i t a l

The r e l a t i v e l y unimpeded u s e of

t o command a n d c o n t r o l

and t o the

e f f e c t i v e employment o f an e v e r t e c h n o l o g y weapon s y s t e m s .

i n c r e a s i n g a r r a y of high

Non-linearity

of

the b a t t l e f i e l d

w i l l s t r a i n comnand and c o n t r o l

and l o g i s t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s .

M o d e r n f o r c e s w i l l b e c u n e m o r e d e p e n d e n t on s p e c i a l i z e d s u p p o r t not a v a i l a b l e f r o m l o c a l environments,
stores,

c a p t u r e d enemy o f t e n be

o r e v e n frun a l l i e s .

Modern f o r c e s w i l l

r e q u i r e d t o operate a t t h e end of long, l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t . [31

vulnerable l i n e s of

A c l o s e r e x a m i n a t i o n of

threat,

t e r r a i n and weatll..,

and

o t h e r b a t t l e f i e l d c o n d i t i o n s i s n e c e s s a r y t o a n y a n a l y s i s of haw t h e U.S. Army i s t o f i g h t .

The T h r e a t

Any b r i e f one,

d e s c r i p t i o n of

the Soviet threat,

such a s t h i s

r i s k s e r r o r t h r o u g h o v e r - s i m p 1 i f i c a t i o n or o m i s s i o n .
13

T h e r e a r e many e x c e l l e n t t e x t s on t h e S o v i e t
today;

threat available

t h e U.S. A r m y ' s unclassified,

new FM 100-2 s e r i e s i s c o m p r e h e n s i v e , a n d r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e t o U.S. o v e r v i e w of the Soviet military

current,

personnel.

Only a general

threat as

i t c o n t r i b u t e s t o d e f i n i n g t h e c h a l l e n g e s of
b a t t l e f i e l d w i l l be o u t l i n e d h e r e .

t h e modern

Traditionally,

ground f o r c e s a r e t h e f o c u s o f air,

the Soviet

armed f o r c e s w i t h n a v a l ,

and o t h e r s p e c i a l i z e d f o r c e s
A1 t h o u g h f o r c e d o n t h e

employed p r i m a r i l y i n s u p p o r t r o l e s . defense

i n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s o f W o r l d War

11,

t h e S o v i e t s have

l o n g p r e f e r r e d t h e o f f e n s i v e as i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e 1936 F i e l d S e r v i c e R e a u l a t i o n S o v i e t Army. t o t h e g e n e r a l o f f e n s i v e i n World War

C41

When I t r e v e r t e d

11, Soviet forces


i n t h e enemy's

sought t o a c h i e v e s u r p r i s e ,
w i t h special troops,

t o operate

rear

a n d t o a c h i e v e m a s s i v e combat S o v i e t s r e l i e d h e a v i l y on

superiority at

the d e c i s i v e p o i n t .

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and s e c u r i t y t r o o p s a n d advanced detachments t o p i n p o i n t enemy d e f e n s e s a n d r e s e r v e f o r m a t i o n s b e f o r e committing the main f o r c e t o the a t t a c k . Once t h e a t t a c k

b e g a n , momentum w a s m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h m a s s i n g o v e r w h e l m i n g c o m b a t p o w e r a t t h e p o i n t of penetration. Massed f o r m a t i o n s

of tanks,
groups,

s o m e t i m e s o r g a n i z e d as c o m b i n e d a r m s m a n e u v e r penetration to

w o u l d b r e a k through a t t h e s e p o i n t s of

a t t a c k deep exploit,

i n t o t h e r e a r o f enemy d e f e n s e s t o p u r s u e , The Red Army sought a h i g h

or e n c i r c l e t h e enemy.

tempo o f o p e r a t i o n s t o k e e p t h e d e f e n d e r s d i s o r g a n i z e d a n d unable t o recover and r e c o n s t i t u t e a defense.

14

D u r i n g t h e p o s t W o r l d War

I 1 p e r i o d i n which the U n i t e d

S t a t e s e n j o y e d r e l a t i v e s u p e r i o r i t y i n n u c l e a r weapons o v e r the S o v i e t s , t h e S o v i e t Army r e o r g a n i z e d t o d e a l w i t h what


it

p e r c e i v e d a s new r e q u i r e m e n t s o f n u c l e a r w a r .

The m a s s i n g o f combat f o r m a t i o n s , a h i s t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f S o v i e t o p e r a t i o n s , was v i e w e d a s a c r i t i c a l v u l n e r a b i l i t y and t h e c o n c e p t of c o n c e n t r a t i n g f o r a b r e a k t h r o u g h was abandoned i n f a v o r o f d i s p e r s e d m u l t i p l e a x e s o f advance a c r o s s the b r e a d t h o f the front.CS1

S t r a t e g i c r o c k e t f o r c e s r e c e i v e d p r i o r i t y and t h e t a n k , w h i c h c o u l d s u r v i v e and e x p l o i t the e f f e c t s o f n u c l e a r war,

became t h e c e n t e r p i e c e o f t h e S o v i e t g r o u n d f o r c e s a t t h e expense o f their t r a d i t i o n a l arms, the i n f a n t r y and

artillery.[61

I n f a n t r y forces were converted t o f u l l

m e c h a n i z a t i o n and a new b r a n c h , m m t o r i z + d i n f a n t r y , was f o r m e d in 1 9 6 3 . [ 7 1 as the w o r l d s The BMP w a s i n t r o d u c e d i n t h e m i d - l Y 6 u s true infantry f i g h t i n g vehicle t o

first

complement t a n k s and t o p r o v i d e i n f a n t r y w i t h t h e p r o t e c t i o n n e c e s s a r y t o s u r v i v e on t h e n u c l e a r b a t t l e f i e l d . m o b i l i t y and f i r e p o w e r a l o n g w i t h tank f o r c e s .

I t had t h e

t o e x p l o i t n u c l e a r weapons e f f e c t s

By t h e m i d t o l a t e 1940s t h e S o v i e t s began t o c o n s i d e r a c o n v e n t i o n a l v a r i a n t t o t h e i r s i n g l e v i e w o f war n u c l e a r age. i n the

Recognizing the undesirable e f f e c t s t h a t

n u c l e a r war w o u l d have on t h e S o v i e t U n i o n and t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t w o u l d p r o b a b l y d e l a y employment o f n u c l e a r 15

w e a p o n s by W T O , p o w e r of

t h e S o v i e t s begar;

i n c r e a s e t h e combat

t h e i r c o n v e n t i o n a l ground f o r c e s .

During t h e p e r i o d

t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was p o u r i n g i t s d e f e n s e r e s o u r c e s i n t o t h e V i e t n a m War, i n t o a massive, t h e S o v i e t s were r e f i t t i n g and r e o r g a n i z i n g sophisticated force with increased b a t t l e under

c a p a b i l i t i e s t o fight a conventional

land-air

t h e t h r e a t of sudden e s c a l a t i o n t o n u c l e a r war.

S o v i e t t a n k a n d m o t o r i z e d r i f l e d i v i s i o n s became t o t a l l y mechanized combined arms u n i t s . Even a i r b o r n e d i v i s i o n s w e r e t h e BMD. rhe

equipped w i t h the l i g h t armored t r o o p c a r r i e r ,

S o v i e t a r t i l l e r y s u p p o r t i n g t h e s e d i v i s i o n s was t r a n s f o r m e d f r o m towed t o s e l f - p r o p e l l e d p r o t e c t i o n and m o b i l i t y Hnti-tank,

t o complement more c l o s e l y t h e
t h e maneuver f o r c e s . and chemical

c a p a b i l i t i e s of

h e l i c o p t e r , engineer,

a i r defense,

defense components were upgraded t o produce a complete combined arms f o r c e .

T h e 1973 A r a b - I s r a e l i debate openly t h e i r

c o n f l i c t caused the S o v i e t s t o

t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e and +orce s t r u c t u r e ,
the apparent

e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of weapons o v e r

a d v a n t a g e o f new a n t i t a n k

t a n k s and o t h e r armored v e h i c l e s . the vehicle that t h e S o v i e t s d e t e r m i n e d t o be

Interes ingly,

m o s t vu n e r a b l e i n t h i s k i n d o f b a t t l e f i e l d e n v i r o n m e n t w a 5

n o t the

t a n k b u t t h e BMP i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e . C 8 1

D e s p i t e these apparent changes i n o p e r a t i o n a l o u t l o o k , s e v e r a l c o n s t a n t s pervade t h e S o v i e t methods. First, the

16

S o v i e t s o r g a n i z e and t r a i n t o f i g h t a s c a n b i n e d a r m s . r e v i e w of S o v i e t d o c t r i n a l l i t e r a t u r e f r o m t h e 1936

Field

S e r v i c e R e a u l a t i o n S o v i e t Army entitled

t o Savkin's

1972 t e x t

B a s i c P r i n c i D l e s of O p e r a t i o n a l A r t and T a c t i c s ,

d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e i r e a r l y and c o n t i n u e d a p p r e c i a t i o n of a n d c o m m i t m e n t t o c o m b i n e d arms.

Second, norms.

S o v i e t t a c t i c s a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by r e 1 l a n c e on the

B a s e d on t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f d i a l e c t i c m e t h o d , approach, and h i s t o r i c a l

scientific

a n a l y s i s of w a r a n d

e x e r c i s e experiences,

t h e S o v i e t s have d e t e r m i n e d t h a t f o r

any g i v e n combat s i t u a t i o n t h e r e i s a c o r r e c t r e s p o n s e . S o v i e t c m a n d e r s a r e t a u g h t these norms and a r e e x p e c t e d t o take proper action

i n combat b a s e d upon t h e a p p r o v e d h i g h e r
How much

c o m m a n d e r ' s p l a n a n d t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of n o r m s .

i n i t i a t i v e a S o v i e t commander ma y d i s p l a y when c o n f r o n t e d
w i t h u n e x p e c t e d s i t u a t i o n s i n combat
i s undoubtedly a

f u n c t i o n of

the correctness of

t h e p r e s c r i b e d norms and t h e
i s t r a i n e d t o a p p l y them.

degree t o w h i c h t h a t c m a n d e r

Third, rugged,

S i w i e t equipment

i s n o t o r i o u s l y simple,

reliable,

and easy t o m a i n t a i n . tactical

I t i s a d a p t e d by d e s i g n n o t

only to t h e i r

and o p e r a t i o n a l methods but a l s o t o


in which

the b a t t l e f i e l d environments

it will

potentially

fight.
their

For e x a m p l e ,

S o v i e t armored v e h i c l e s are n o t e d for

low s i l h o u e t t e a n d l i m i t e d e l e v a t i o n a n d d e p r e s s i o n
t h e i r m a i n armament.
U.S.

c a p a b i l i t i e s of

analysts often

c i t e t h e s e as w e a k n e s s e s c o n s i d e r i n g t h e h i l l y t e r r a i n o f

17

C e n t r a l Europe,

but t h e s e v e h i c l e s a r e p e r f e c t l y s u i t e d for

t h e e n d l e s s l y f l a t t e r r a i n of t h e S o v i e t s t e p p e for w h i c h t h e y have been e n g i n e e r e d . Because S o v i e t t a n k s a r e


o n l y t e m p o r a r i l y seek

o f f e n s i v e weapon s y s t e m s w h i c h w i l l d e f i l a d e or d e t e n s i u e p o s i t i o n s ,

l o w s i l h o u e t t e and l i m i t e d

gun e l e v a t i o n a n d d e p r e s s i o n a r e i n t e n t i o n a l e n g i n e e r i n g c r i t e r i a i n keeping w i t h s i m p l i c i t y , protection.C91

low cost,

and c r e w

D e s p i t e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of

simp1 i c i ty,

S o v i e t e q u i p m e n t may b e m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d t h a n i s c o m m o n l y s u s p e c t e d i n WTO. V i c t o r Suvorov h a s warned t h a t equipment

t h e S o v i e t s d i s t r i b u t e t o a l l i e s i s much l e s s s o p h i s t i c a t e d than those models w i t h which Soviet f o r c e s are equipped.Cl01

Lastly,

the S o v i e t s can be expected t o operate

in

accordance w i t h s e v e r a l p r i n c i p l e s . b e l o w a r e s u m m a r i z e d from t h e ODerational A r t and T a c t i c s

The p r i n c i p l e s I i s t e d

The B a s i c P r i n c i D l e s of

by U. S a u k i n .

A l t h o u g h t h e book

f o c u s e s on t h e n u c l e a r b a t t l e f i e l d , v a l i d for a conventional b a t t l e ,

i t s lessons are j u s t as the

e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of

ever present t h r e a t of e s c a l a t i o n to nuclear war. f o r c e s can be e x p e c t e d t o a t t e m p t t o :

Soviet

-achieve

a n d s u s t a l n r a p i d movement a n d a h i g h tempo b a l a n c e and under

of o p e r a t i o n s t o k e e p t h e enemy o f f
constant pressure. -concentrate effort

t o c r e a t e s u p e r i o r i t y of

torces

a n d means o v e r t h e enemy a t t h e d e c i s i v e p l a c e a n d t i m e . -surprise t h e enemy by t a k i n g a c t i o n when a n d w h e r e

18

l e a s t expected w h i l e ensuring s e c u r i t y o f f r i e n d l y forces, i.e. d e n y i n g t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f s u r p r i s e t o t h e enemy. -achieve initiative, combat a c t i v e n e s s t h r o u g h b o l d n e s s , i n offensive action.

and d e c i s i v e n e s s i n h e r e n t the f o r c e and s u s t a i n

-protect e f f e c t i veness.

i t s combat

- c o n f o r m g o a l s of
s i t u a t i on.

the operation to the actual

combat

-coordinate

a l l arms and e l e m e n t s t o a c h i e v e a n d maximum c o m b a t p o w e r . [ l l l

cooperation, mutual assistance,

I n summary,

the Soviet

threat

on t h e m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d

c a n b e e x p e c t e d t o b e a h e a v i I Ym e c h a n i z e d c o m b i n e d a r m s force which w i l l attempt to surprise


i t s enemy and t o

m a i n t a i n a h i g h tempo o f a c t i v i t y . offensive possible.

The S o v i e t s p r e f e r
i s not

a c t i o n a n d o n l y d e f e n d when t h e o f f e n s e

They p r e f e r t o a t t a c k enemy w e a k n e s s e s t o f o c u s and t o operate The S o v i e t s a r e

o v e r w h e l m i n g power a t t h e d e c i s i v e p o i n t , a g a i n s t f l a n k s a n d deep i n t h e enemy's

rear.

h e a v i l y d e p e n d e n t on r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a n d s e c u r i t y t r o o p s a n d employ s i z e a b l e advanced detachments t o r e c o n n o i t e r and f i x t h e enemy. T h e y a r e c a p a b l e of e m p l o y i n g m a s s i v e a m o u n t s of

a r t i l l e r y i n s u p p o r t o t t h e p r i m a r y maneuver e f f o r t s .

T e r r a i n and Weather

Weather a n d t e r r a i n have more i m p a c t an b a t t l e t h a n any o t h e r p h y s i c a l f a c t o r , i n c l u d i n g weapons, e q u i p m e n t or s u p p l i e s . [ l 2 1

1Y

FM 100-5 remark

b e r a t i o n s (1982),

from which this s t r i k i n g

i s q u o t e d , goe s on t o s t a t e t h a t t e r r a i n a n d w e a t h e r
The commander who

w i l l p r e s e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o both s i d e s .
u n d e r s t a n d s t h e e f f e c t s of c a p a b i l i t i e s and those of r e i n f o r c e s these success. successful

t e r r a i n a n d w e a t h e r on h i s u n i t t h e enemy a n d t h e n a d a p t s , s t a n d a far uses and

effects w i l l

b e t t e r c h a n c e of

Interestingly,

i n a n h i s t o r i c a l study of 200
c o n d u c t e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h e 1983-84 O f f i c e r 'terrain sense"

combat a c t i o n s ,

M i l i t a r y Academy i n s u p p o r t o f

P r o f e s s i o n a l Management S y s t e m S t u d y G r o u p ,

w a s r a t e d a s one o f o n l y f i v e f a c t o r s w h i c h c o r r e l a t e s h i g h l y w i t h success i n combat.[131

Many e x c e l l e n t

texts detail

the e f f e c t s of FM 30-10,

t e r r a i n and

w e a t h e r on m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . Geographic I n t e l l i g e n c e (Terrain), Army p e r s o n n e l .

Military

i s among t h e b e s t r e a d i l y Additionally, numerous

a v a i l a b l e t o U.S.

a r e a s t u d i e s p r o v i d e d a t a on s p e c i f i c environments.

potential battlefield

The i n t e n t i o n h e r e i s t o examine s i g n i f i c a n t employment o f h e a v y f o r c e s

f a c t o r s which e f f e c t the t a c t i c a l
i n two s t r i k i n g l y d i + f e r e n t

a r e a s i n w h i c h t h e y w i l l most

l i k e l y be employed:

C e n t r a l Europe and a M i d d l e E a s t or

Southwest A s i a d e s e r t environment.

Of

t h e f i v e m i l i t a r y a s p e c t s of

terrain,

t h i s analysis obstacles and

w i l l c o n c e n t r a t e on

c o v e r and concealment,

mobi 1 i t y ,

and

observation and f i r e s . the n a t u r e of

These t h r e e f a c t o r s the m i l i t a r r operation

when s t u d i e d i n l i g h t o f

20

contemplated, w i l l usually determine t h e o t h e r t w o m i l i t a r y aspects o f t e r r a i n : key t e r r a i n and u u e s of annroach.

These t h r e e f a c t o r s a150 a r e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e t h r e e p h y s i c a l e l e m e n t s o f combat power: o b s e r v a t l o n and f i e l d s o f c o v e r and to

firr

r e l a t e most d i r e c t l y t o f i r e p o w e r ,
t o p r o t e c t i o n , and

c once a 1men t
maneuver.

o b s t a c l e s a n d mobi 1 i tr

C e n t r a l EuPODQ

B a t t l e f i e l d C e n t r a l Europe, o r more s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f Germany,

i s one o f t h e most d e n s e l y
T h i s compact East

p o p u l a t e d and bu 1 t up a r e a s i n Europe.

L-shaped c o u n t r y i s 850 k i l o m e t e r s f r o m n o r t h t o s o u t h .

t o w e s t i t i s n a r r o w i n t h e n o r t h and c e n t r a l r e g i o n s ( 2 2 5 k i l o m e t e r s i n the narrow c e n t e r ) and w i d e s t (450 k i l o m e t e r s )


a c r o s s the s o u t h e r n region.

Overall,

t h e FRG h a s t h r e e

essential characteristics that effect m i l i t a r y operatlons:

(1)

There i s l a c k o f d e p t h of a r e a between t h e

b o r d e r w i t h t h e W a r s a w P a c t c o u n t r i e s and t h e R h i n e R i v e r .

t 2 ) T h e r e a r e numerous t e r r a i n - d e p e n d e n t

natural

invasion c o r r i d o r s from the east.

(3) S e v e r a l f e a t u r e s o f t h e t e r r a i n , such a s woods,


urban areas, and h y d r o g r a p h y , have a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on

m i l i t a r y operations.tl41
21

The f i r s t o f strategic

these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s

has operational

and
'.fi

imp1 i c a t i o n s b u t n o i n h e r e n t t a c t i c a l e + f e c t s First, t h i s lack of depth has t o i n s i s t or1 a

tti

two possible exceptions.

c a u s e d NATU, e s p e c i a l l y t h e West Germans, forward, options.

l i n e a r defense which c o u l d p o s s i b l y l i m i t m i l i t a r y Second, lack of operational thrust" d e p t h has e n t i c e d t h e strategy

Soviets to consider a 'daring unexpected a t t a c k w i t h o u t

a quick,
to

the normal w a r n i n g 5 i n o r d e r

s e i z e d e e p o b j e c t i v e s b e f o r e NATO f o r c e s c o u l d e i t h e r f u l l y o c c u p y a n d p r e p a r e f o r w a r d d e f e n s e s or e x e r c i s e a l l the

d e c i s i o n mak i ng a p p a r a t u s n e c e s s a r y t o u s e n u c 1 e a r w e a p o n s .

The s e c o n d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , natural

t h e e x i s t e n c e of s e v e r a l a l s o has p r i m a r i l y t h e FRG's borders

invasion c o r r i d o r s from the east, impact.


41% o f

s t r a t e g i c and o p e r a t i o n a l

a r e s h a r e d w i t h communist C z e c h o s l o v a k i a and E a s t Germany.tl51 A l o n g the border there a r e a t l e a s t twelve i n v a s i o n g a p s f o r m e d by t h e t e r r a i n . t l 6 1 lowland, favorable a wide r e l a t i v e l y f l a t p l a i n , The N o r t h German

a p p e a r s t o b e t h e most I n the offer

t e r r a i n f o r an a t t a c k by t h e S o v i e t s .

c e n t r a l u p l a n d s natural gaps, narrow,

s u c h a s t h e F u l d a Gap,

h i g h speed approaches t o t h e Rhine R i v e r .

I n the

a l p i n e f o o t h i l l s t h e Danube R i v e r v a l l e y o f f e r s a p p r o a c h i n t o k e y a r e a of these n a t u r a l s o u t h e r n Germany.

a ready

I t i s along
f i n d the

invasion routes that

the Soviets w i l l

t e r r a i n f a v o r a b l e f o r h i g h tempo o p e r a t i o n s w i t h t h e i r h i g h l y mechanized f o r c e s .

22

The t h i r d e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c

i m p a c t s t h e most on

t h e t a c t i c a l employment o f f o r c e s .

The 1978 US/German Army

Concept Paper c o n c e r n i n g m i l i t a r y geography o f t h e FRG s t a t e s that forests, u r b a n a r e a s , and h y d r o g r a p h y have s i g n i f i c a n t l y

g r e a t e r e f f e c t s on t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s t h a n do o t h e r f a c t o r s such a s w e a t h e r , s o i l composition, and o t h e r t e r r a i n

characteristics.Cl71

O b s e r v a t i o n and f i e l d s o f f i r e . B a t t l e f i e l d C e n t r a l EuroDe, Uhle-Wettler

I n h i s book

German General F r a n z

a r g u e s c o n v i n c i n g l y f o r t h e use o f l i g h t

i n f a n t r y f o r c e s on t h e European b a t t l e f i e l d . A m a i n p o i n t i n
t h i s argument c e n t e r s on t e r r a i n and,

more s p e c i f i c a l l y , on
i s affected not

l i n e of

s i g h t considerations.

L i n e o f sight

o n l y by t h e t e r r a i n b u t a l s o by f o r e s t s and b u i l t up a r e a s . U h l e - W e t t l e r s t a t e s t h a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30% o f t h e FRG f o r e s t e d and 11% i s b u i l t - u p a r e a s . C i 8 1


15

T h i s h a s made

a c t u a l l i n e o f s i g h t d i s t a n c e s much s h o r t e r t h a n one m i g h t expect. reflect FRG: Bundeswehr M i l i t a r y Geographical O f f i c e r e p o r t s

t h e f o l l o w i n g average l i n e o f s i g h t d i s t a n c e s f o r t h e

0-50 m e t e r s 50-200 m e t e r s 200-500 m e t e r s 500-1000 m e t e r s 1000-1500 m e t e r s 1500-2000 m e t e r s 2000-3000 m e t e r s

30%
9% 16% 18% 10%

7/.

2
96%

23

W h i l e t h e s e f i g u r e s show t h a t 96% o f t h e l i n e s o+ s i g h t a r e l e s s t h a n t h e c u r r e n t maximum r a n g e o f t h e TOW a n t i t a n k

m i s s i l e (3000 m u ) , t h e y a l s o show t h a t most o f t h e l i n e s of s i g h t are f a r shorter. 73% a r e l e s s t h a n 1000 m e t e r s , the

maximum e f f e c t i v e r a n g e of

t h e DRAGW a n t i t a n k m i s s i l e . t l 9 1

These f i g u r e s o n l y i n c l u d e l i n e of s i g h t l i m i t s caused by f o r e s t s a n d b u i l t up a r e a s , n o t by t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s such a s h i l l s or by w e a t h e r c o n d i t i o n s . C 2 0 1

T h i s s i t u a t i o n is n o t a s t a t i c o n e ;

the ' t e r r a i n '

is

s t e a d i l y c h a n g i n g a s u r b a n growth c o n t i n u e s . notes:

J.A.

English

What h a s p a s s e d p r a c t i c a l l y u n n o t i c e d t o many m i l i t a r y e y e s s i n c e W o r l d War 11 i s t h e g r a d u a l l y a l t e r e d n a t u r e of t h e v e r y t e r r a i n over w h i c h the n e x t war may b e f o u g h t . The phenomenal and r e l e n t l e s s p r o c e s s o f u r b a n i z a t i o n of Europe, a l r e a d y w i t h 374 c i t i e s of 100,000 or more, h a s r a d i c a l l y changed t h e f a c e of t h e p o t e n t i a l b a t t l e f i e l d . . . . M o r e o v e r , w i t h C e n t r a l European u r b a n g r o w t h p r o j e c t e d a t a r a t e of two o r t h r e e t i m e s t h e p o p u l a t i o n r i s e , t h e r e w i l l b e , by 1995, a 50% i n c r e a s e i n t o t a l u r b a n area.CZ11 P a u l B r a c k e n p o i n t s o u t t h a t a t t h e same t i m e 'government a f f o r e s t a t i o n programmes have i n c r e a s e d f o r e s t e d

a r e a s by a b o u t 0.8% p e r year.'C221

Weather c o n d i t i o n s , p r i m a r i l y p r e c i p i t a t i o n and fog, effect

v i s i b i l i t y and t h e r e f o r e

l i n e of s i g h t .

Fog, i n t e r m s o f v i s i b i l i t i e s o f l e s s t h a n 1000 m, o c c u r s on an average o f 100-120 d a y s t h r o u g h o u t t h e Year, p r e d o m i n a n t l y between September and March, w i t h a maximum i n October and November.CP31
24

I n summary,

o b s e r v a t i o n and f i e l d s o f f i r e a r e now advantage ot t h e

l i m i t e d and w i l l g e t worse. The s t a n d o f f

l o n g r a n g e a n t i - t a n k weapons o v e r t h e t a n k i s e l i m i n a t e d i n t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y o f s i t u a t i o n s i n C e n t r a l Europe.

Cover and Concealment.


of

The p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n o f 1 i n e
i s not a major

s i g h t c o r r e c t l y s u g g e s t s t h a t concealment Forests, urban areas,

p r o b l e m i n t h e FRG.

and t h e n a t u r a l Urban a r e a s and

u n d u l a t i o n s o f f e r p l e n t y o f concealment. f o r e s t s a l s o o f f e r cover. The s o i l

i n t h e FRG i s c o n d u c i v e i n the

t o the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f f i e l d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s except

e x t r e m e l y c o l d o r wet seasons o r i n t h e m o u n t a i n a r e a s w h i c h are predominantly rock w i t h l i t t l e s o i l . T h e r e i s ample and

m a t e r i a l a v a i l a b l e f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f f o r t i f i c a t i o n s overhead cover.

O b s t a c l e s and M o b i l i t y .

The FRG h a s one of

the b e s t

highway n e t w o r k s i n Europe, w i t h o v e r 670 m e t e r s o f r o a d p e r square k i l o m e t e r . [ 2 4 1 T h i s r o a d n e t i s i n c r e a s i n g by about Despite the f a c t t h a t the m a J o r i t y

one p e r c e n t p e r year.C251 of

l a r g e r o a d s ( m o r e t h a n two l a n e s ) t e n d t o r u n n o r t h - s o u t h roads are

a l o n g the l o n g a x i s o f the c o u n t r y , all-weather

dense enough t h a t t h e y s u p p o r t movement of m i l i t a r r f o r c e s i n a1 1 d i r e c t i o n s .

B e s i d e s t h e s u p e r b s y s t e m o f r o a d s and b r i d g e s , s e v e r a l f a c t o r s t e n d t o make mechanized a r m i e s r o a d b o u n d i n t h e FRG. 25

M o b i l i t y i s hampered s i g n i f i c a n t l y by e x t e n s i v e f o r e s t a t i o n ,

by t h e e v e r
sprawl,

i n c r e a s i n g amount o f b u i l t u p a r e a s a n d u r b a n

a n d by h y d r o g r a p h y .

F o r e s t r y i n t h e FRG i s an i n t e n s i v e l y managed i n d u s t r y . M o s t f o r e s t s a r e dense b u t a r e g e n e r a l l y p a s s a b l e because of t h e e x i s t e n c e of trails. a relatively well developed network o f i m p a c t on

W h i l e f o r e s t a r e a s have a more s i g n i f i c a n t

c o v e r and concealment and o b s e r v a t i o n and f i r e s , m e c h a n i z e d t o r c e s t o s l o w down, channelized.

they f o r c e

c o n c e n t r a t e a n d become

O b s t a c l e s w h i c h r e q u i r e l i t t l e equipment and

manpower a n d a r e e a s y t o i n s t a l l can cause f o r e s t s t o become i m p a s s a b l e i f c o v e r e d by f i r e

a standard i n f a n t r y task.

Urban a r e a s have a v a r i e t y of of them a r e a d v e r s e e f f e c t s .

e f f e c t s on m o b i l i tr; most the g r e a t e s t

On one hand,

d e n s i t y o f roads a r e i n the urban areas; g r e a t percentage o f areas.

most a u t o b a h n s and a

l a r g e r o a d s a r e w i t h i n or c o n n e c t u r b a n i n t h e e v e n t o f war u r b a n a r e a s They may become i m p a s s a b l e due t o and m i l i t a r y t r a f f i c . Urban

O n t h e o t h e r hand,

can become m a j o r o b s t a c l e s . c o n g e s t i o n of ciuilian,

refugee,

a r e a s become d i f f i c u l t o b s t a c l e s when r u b b l e l i t t e r s t h e

s t r e e t s or when d e f e n d e d by i n f a n t r y .
g r e a t e s t p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t y i n t h e FRG, e x p e r i e n c i n g the g r e a t e s t growth,

l h e areas w i t h and t h o s e the Rhine

are east o f

River.

A r e a s c o v e r e d by w a t e r a r e o n l y a b o u t

T/:of t h e t o t a l

26

a r e a of

t h e FRG, b u t t h e s e b o d i e s of w a t e r can a f f e c t I n the N o r t h

m i l i t a r y operations t o a great extent.[261 German l o w l a n d s t h e v a l u e of formidable. About 40% of

these water o b s t a c l e s i s

t h e s t r e a m s and r i v e r s a r e w i d e r

t h a n 30 m e t e r s and more t h a n 2.5 m e t e r s deep.CZ71

These

f i g u r e s a r e i m p o r t a n t because v i r t u a l l y a l l armored v e h i c l e s c a n n o t f o r d s t r e a m s deeper t h a n 1.5 m e t e r s ; f o r d deeper w a t e r s , swim, t h o s e t h a t can

or s n o r k e l must h a l t and u n d e r g o

p r e p a r a t i o n s t h a t a r e t i m e consuming and i n t e r r u p t operations.tZ81

A l l armored v e h i c l e l a u n c h e d b r i d g e s

(AVLBs)

c u r r e n t l y f o u n d i n both t h r e a t and a l l i e d f o r c e s l a y Additionally, the

b r i d g e s l e s s t h a n 30 m e t e r s long.CZ91

l o w l a n d s a r e r e p l e t e w i t h marshes and moors.

Significant

amounts o f e n g i n e e r equipment and e f f o r t a r e r e q u i r e d t o s u s t a i n m o b i l i t y i n t h i s region.C301 water obstacles are o f l i m i t e d value.


f o o t h i l l s of

I n the c e n t r a l uplands I n the a l p i n e Canal and

s o u t h e r n Germany t h e Rhine-Main-Danube

t h e a l p i n e r l v e r s s o u t h o f t h e Danube a r e s i g n i f i c a n t o b s t a c l e s and c r o s s i n g s r e q u i r e m a j o r e f f o r t . t h i s r e g i o n a r e w i d e s t of t h a n 30 m e t e r s w i d e ) Waterways i n

the three r e g i o n s (5W. are g r e a t e r

and a r e r e l a t i v e l y deep (36% a r e 2.5

m e t e r s or m o r e deep).[311

I n sumnary,

t h e FRGs

three d i f f e r e n t regions provide The n o r t h e r n

d i s t i n c t l y different

settings for b a t t l e .

lowlands are i n v i t i n g l y f l a t b u t present s i g n i f i c a n t water and u r b a n o b s t a c l e s t o maneuver. U i s i b i l i t y and 1 i n e o f s i g h t i n t h i s s e c t o r a r e r a t e d a s p o o r t o good. The c e n t r a l u p l a n d s

27

have f a r

f e w e r m a j o r w a t e r o b s t a c l e s or b u i l t - u p

areas,

but

u n d u l a t i o n s and f o r e s t s and concealment

impede o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s .

Cover

is excellent;

v i s i b i l i t y and l i n e s of s i g h t The a l p i n e f o o t h i l l s

r a n g e f r o m e x t r e m e l y poor t o m a r g i n a l .

c o n t a i n many i m p e d i m e n t s t o m a n e u v e r , e s p e c i a l l y r i v e r s . Cover and concealment sight a r e r a t e d poor i s adequate, a n d v i s i b i l i t y a n d l i n e of

to satisfactory.C321

Desert Environments

Deserts environments are, the a n t i t h e s i s o f require different weather. personnel the Central

i n m i l i t a r y respects, European b a t t l e f i e l d .

nearly Deserts

t a c t i c s p r i m a r i l y because of

t e r r a i n and

D e s e r t s a l s o h a v e much d i f f e r e n t e f f e c t s on and equipment. T h e l o c a t i o n of the National

T r a i n i n g Center

i n t h e M o j a v e D e s e r t of C a l i + o r n i a
h e a v y f o r c e s may h a v e

u n d e r s c o r e s t h e a n t i c i p a t i o n t h a t U.S.
to f i g h t

i n t h e d e s e r t a r e a s of

t h e M i d d l e E a s t or S o u t h w e s t heavy f o r c e s have been i n

Asia.

The m o s t r e c e n t c l a s h e s o f

these areas:

t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i W a r s a n d t h e I r a n - I r a q War.

Desert environments vary, t r a d i t i o n a l key t e r r a i n .

but i n general

they lack w i t h the

Key t e r r a i n i n t h e d e s e r t ,

n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n of w a t e r e d a r e a s such a s oases, d e t e r m i n e d by t h e o t h e r m i l i t a r r a s p e c t s of

is

terrain.

Geherts are austere regions w i t h no f o r e s t s , settlements,

few

a n d f e w roads o r o t h e r c o m b a t s e r v i c e s u p p o r t

28

acconunodations f o r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s such a s power s o u r c e s , building materials, supplies,


or w a t e r .

Desert climates are

c h a r a c t e r i z e d by h i g h t e m p e r a t u r e s , temperature, l a c k of p r e c i p i t a t i o n ,

e x t r e m e r a n g e s of low humidity, and wind.

E x t r e m e t e m p e r a t u r e and l o w h u m i d i t y a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t s o l d i e r s and t h e i r e q u i p m e n t , e l e c t r o n i c equipment. especially sophisticated

O b s e r v a t i o n and f i e l d s o f f i r e . desert

The r e l a t i v e l y f l a t

t e r r a i n a f f o r d s v i r t u a l l y u n l i m i t e d v i s i b i l i t y and, w e a p o n s e m p l o y m e n t a t maximum r a n g e s . however,

therefore,

I t i s not
rock

absolutely flat, formations,

due t o t h e p r e s e n c e o f wadis,

some s p a r s e g r o u n d c o v e r ,

and s l i g h t u n d u l a t i o n s .

R u g g e d m o u n t a i n r i d g e s a l s o b r e a k up t h e f l a t n e s s of m o s t desert areas. Weapons a n d o b s e r v a t i o n p o s t s h a v e a n even i f o n l y a f e w O b s e r v a t i o n c a n be Hccurate range

a d v a n t a g e when s i t e d on h i g h e r g r o u n d , m e t e r s above the s u r r o u n d i n g t e r r a i n .

h a m p e r e d by s e v e r a l u n i q u e d e s e r t e f f e c t s . estimation
is difficult,

h e a t and temperature v a r i a t i o n s
and d u s t ,

cause severe

image d i s t o r t i o n s ,

sandstorms,

and

b a t t l e f i e l d smoke c a n make d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d s of time.

impossible for

D u s t c l o u d s c r e a t e d by w e a p o n s

f i r i n g a n d i m p a c t make s e n s i n g a n d a d j u s t m e n t s o t f i r e much more d i f f i c u l t . B u r s t on t a r g e t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e a l m o s t the time.

i m p o s s i b l e most of

Cover and concealment. cover

There

i s a general

l a c k of

in the desert.

T e r r a i n masKing b e h i n d mountain r i d g e s

29

and l a r g e sanddunes or moving.

i n wadis provides the o n l y cover w h i l e

The d e s e r t p r o v i d e s v i r t u a l l y no m a t e r i a l s f o r The d i f f i c u l t y o f d i g g i n g i n a r m o r v e h i c l e s predominantly rocky

overhead cover.

i s o f t e n a g g r a v a t e d by l a r g e a r e a s o f soi I .

Concealment

is vital

i n the d e s e r t because of

the

excellent observation.

Camouflage e f f o r t s must t a k e i n t o

c o n s i d e r a t i o n n o t o n l y c o n t r a s t and c o l o r but a l s o shape, shadow, and s h i n e . L i g h t a n d n o i s e a r e not a t t e n u a t e d a s

much i n t h e d e s e r t a n d a r e s e n s e d a t g r e a t e r d i s t a n c e s . M o v e m e n t s c r e a t e d u s t c l o u d s v i s i b l e f o r many m i l e s .

Obstacles and m o b i l i t y .

T a c t i c a l m o b i l i t y i s the key M a j o r p o r t i o n s of the

t o success i n d e s e r t operations.
desert "permit similar

t r u e t w o d i m e n s i o n a l movement b y g r o u n d t r o o p s Natural

t o t h a t o f a n a v a l t a s k f o r c e a t sea.*C331

defensive p o s i t i o n s are rare, defenses. m a n e u v e r of While the harsh, tracked vehicles

l i m i t i n g t h e use of p o s i t i o n a l

abusive d e s e r t does not p r e c l u d e


i t d o e s l i m i t movement o f

heavy

wheeled v e h i c l e s .

I n many a r e a s r e s u p p l y v e h i c l e s and towed

a r t i l l e r y may b e r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e f e w roads a n d t r a i l s .

The r u g g e d m o u n t a i n s t h a t c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e m o s t d e s e r t s become m a j o r o b s t a c l e s t o movement. Mountain passes and the Lava beds are a l s o

f e w r o a d s t h r o u g h t h e s e p a s s e s become k e y t e r r a i n . a n d s a l t m a r s h e s , w h i c h p r e c l u d e s u r f a c e movement, major obstacles. Man-made

o b s t a c l e s and m i n e f i e l d s a r e m o s t 30

e f f e c t i v e when t i e d t o t h e s e n a t u r a l reinforcing their effects.

t e r r a i n obstacles

I n summary,

U.S.

heavy f o r c e s a r e d e s t i n e d t o f i g h t each demanding d i f f e r e n t

in

two very different settings,


b e c a u s e of the effects

tactics

of t e r r a i n and weather.

As English,

Uhle-Wettler,

and o t h e r s h a v e p o i n t e d o u t ,

heavy f o r c e s w i l l not allow

f a c e many c o n d i t i o n s

i n C e n t r a l Europe w h i c h w i l l Forests,

t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s t o be m a x i m i z e d .

urban a r e a s ,
and

and o t h e r t e r r a i n t e a t u r e s l i m i t m o b i l i t y , o b s e r v a t i o n ,

long range f i r e s .
defenses.

Many a r e a s a r e m o r e s u i t e d f o r p o s i t i o n a l the opposite i s t h e case.

I n desert environments

The g e n e r a l f l a t n e s s a n d n e a r l y u n l i m i t e d v i s i b i l i t y and f i e l d s of f i r e a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y s u i t e d t o maneuver w a r f a r e .

B a t t l e f i e l d Condition2

While t e r r a i n and weather

c o n s t i t u t e the b a s i c p h y s i c a l

s e t t i n g s o f b a t t l e several o t h e r f a c t o r s can s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l t e r the b a t t l e f i e l d . e n v i r o n m e n t of stress. F i r s t , n u c l e a r weapons can c r e a t e an contusion, and

unparalleled destruction,

Second,

c h e m i c a l weapons not o n l y c r e a t e mass

c a s u a l t i e s but,

I i k e n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , may d e n y u s e o f
the b a t t l e f i e l d . Third, use of

contaminated p o r t i o n s of

e l e c t r o n i c warfare to control

the electromagnetic spectrum F o u r t h , use of

c a n d e s t r o y a n d d i s r u p t command a n d c o n t r o l . smoke a n d s o p h i s t i c a t e d m i n e w a r f a r e , d e l i v e r e d mines,

s u c h a s cannon or a i r the n a t u r a l e f f e c t s

c a n change or r e i n f o r c e

31

of

t e r r a i n and weather q u i c k l y and unexpectedly

N u c l e a r Weapons. weapons a r e b l a s t , radiation,


o n l y cause

The

i m n e d i a t e e f f e c t s of n u c l e a r radiation, i n i t i a l nuclear These f o r c e s not the

thermal

a n d e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c p u l s e (EMP). injury, death,

and d e s t r u c t i o n but a l s o a l t e r urban destruction,

b a t t l e f i e l d t h r o u g h t r e e blowdown, r a d i o l o g i c a l contaminat ion,

fires,

and p o s s i b l y f l o o d i n g .

Protection.

The d e g r e e t o w h i c h t h e p h y s i c a l e f f e c t s o f

n u c l e a r w e a p o n s i m p a c t on m i l i t a r y u n i t s i s d e p e n d e n t on several impact, factors including the distance of the f o r c e f r o m the

or g r o u n d z e r o ,

and t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h s o l d i e r s and S o l d i e r s g a i n p r o t e c t i o n when field fortifications,


I n E u r o p e a l l of

t h e i r equipment a r e s h i e l d e d . w i t h i n heavy armored v e h i c l e s ,

and

b u i l d i n g s of heavy c o n s t r u c t i o n . forms of p r o t e c t i o n a r e a v a i l a b l e ; digging in are feasible

these

o n l y a r m o r e d v e h i c l e s and

i n the desert.

Despite the

p r o t e c t i o n they afford troops,

armored v e h i c l e s themselves

c a n b e damaged o r r e n d e r e d u n u s a b l e by n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . B l a s t and thermal systems; r a d i a t i o n c a n damage or d e s t r o y t h e s e

EMP c a n d e s t r o y t h e i r u n s h i e l d e d e l e c t r o n i c A d e q u a t e l y warned, a

components a t even g r e a t e r ranges. m o b i l e f o r c e can q u i c k l y disperse, s u s p e c t e d ground z e r o ,


o r seek

i n c r e a s e d i s t a n c e from the

t e r r a i n t h a t masKs t h e u n i t .

Maneuver.

N u c l e a r weapons c a n not o n l y d e s t r o y o r thermal radiation, a n d EMP

damage v e h i c l e s t h r o u g h b l a s t ,

32

( w h i c h can damage e l e c t r i c a l a u t o m o t i v e components),

but

t h e s e weapons a l s o d r a s t i c a l l y a l t e r t h e t r a f f i c a b i 1 i tr o f the t e r r a i n . I n builtup,

f o r e s t e d C e n t r a l Europe t r e e

blowdown and u r b a n r u b b l e c o u l d r e d u c e m o b i l t t y t o a W a l k i n g pace.


of

Additionally,

t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f dams and d i s r u p t i o n

t h e f l o w o f w a t e r w a y s by n u c l e a r weapons c o u l d f l o o d f l a t , I n desert

open a r e a s f u r t h e r d e g r a d i n g I i m i t e d mobi 1 i t y .

e n v i r o n m e n t s maneuver w o u l d b e f a r less e f f e c t e d by n u c l e a r weapons.


K e y m o u n t a i n passes,

roads,

and b r i d g e s c o u l d b e

d e s t r o y e d o r c o n t a m i n a t e d , however, m a l t i n g movement o f v e h i c l e s t h r o u g h t h e s e k e y a r e a s i m p o s s i b l e or e x t r e m e l y risky.

Firepower.

B e s i d e d i r e c t d e s t r u c t i o n of weapon s y s t e m s ,
b e caused

the o n l y p r e d i c t a b l e degradation o f firepower w i l l


by EMP e f f e c t s on s o p h i s t i c a t e d f i r e c o n t r o l

systems

i n c l u d i n g a r t i l l e r y computers, modern v e h i c l e s , such a s a n t i - t a n k

fire

control c i r c u i t r y in

and s y s t e m s t h a t depend on b a t t e r y power guided m i s s i l e s (ATGM'5). D e s t r u c t i o n of

r a d i o s and o t h e r command and c o n t r o l h a r d w a r e w i l l a l s o r e d u c e t h e a b i l i t y of commanders t o s y n c h r o n i z e weapons


emp I oymen t

.
S o v i e t f o r c e s a r e r e p o r t e d l y we1 1

Chemical Weanons.

e q u i p p e d and t r a i n e d f o r o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e c h e m i c a l warfare. Indeed, they 'consider chemical m u n i t i o n s t o b e

'conventional' d o c t r i n e , ' C 341

weapons when d i s c u s s i n g employment

33

Protection. personnel.

Non-persistent

agents p r i m a r i l y a f f e c t

P r o p e r l y e q u i p p e d a n d t r a i n e d s o l d i e r s may b e

only m i n i m a l l y e f f e c t e d compared t o p o o r l y t r a i n e d or
e q u i p p e d t r o o p s or t h e c i v i l i a n p o p u l o u s . p e r s i s t e n t agents a f f e c t personnel, On t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
and t e r r a i n .

equipment,

E f f e c t s a r e r e l a t i v e t o the degree t o which u n i t s a r e e q u i p p e d and t r a i n e d f o r c h e m i c a l d e f e n s e . of t r o o p s and equipment Decontamination

i s n o t only t i m e consuming and

personnel

i n t e n s i v e b u t a l s o r e q u i r e 5 much w a t e r .

Water for

decontamination w i l l

d e f i n i t e l y be a p r o b l e m i n t h e d e s e r t .

A u n i t w h i c h engages i n more t h a n a h a s t y d e c o n t a m i n a t i o n w i l l o f t e n have t o be t e m p o r a r i l y r e l i e v e d of i t s mission.

Maneuver. vital

P e r s i s t e n t c h e m i c a l s can r a p i d l y degrade

a u t o m o t i v e c o m p o n e n t s made o f r u b b e r a n d o t h e r such as t i r e s , r o a d wheels, and seals. Perslstent

materials,

c h e m i c a l s a l s o c r e a t e h a z a r d o u s a r e a s w h i c h become o b s t a c l e s
t o maneuver.

Firepower.

P e r s i s t e n t c h e m i c a l s c a n a l s o damage some Additionally, t h e w e a r l n g of a

w e a p o n s o r weapon c o m p o n e n t s .

p r o t e c t i v e mask d e g r a d e s a s o l d i e r s i n d i v i d u a l or c r e w s e r v e d w e a p o n s .

a b i l i t y t o employ

U.S.

armored v e h i c l e s a r e

not e q u i p p e d w i t h o v e r p r e s s u r e s y s t e m s that w o u l d o b v i a t e t h e

c r e w r e q u i r e m e n t t o mask.

F i r e p o w e r c a n b e d e g r a d e d by t h e

m e r e t h r e a t o f enemy c h e m i c a l u s e as many u n i t s r e q u i r e t h a t a c e r t a i n p e r c e n t a g e of a l l s o l d i e r s mask d u r l n g s u s p e c t e d


34

chemical attacks,

s u c h as a i r or a r t i l l e r y a t t a c k s

E l e c t r o n i c w a r f a r e (EW).

T h e p r i m a r y e f f e c t of

E W is

d i s r u p t i o n o f t h e command a n d c o n t r o l . effect

E W can d i r e c t l y
capability to

u n i t s by r e d u c i n g t h e c o m m a n d e r ' s

c o o r d i n a t e a n d s y n c h r o n i z e t h e i r m a n e u v e r and f i r e s . Indirectly,

E W c a n c o n t r i b u t e t o w e a p o n s b e i n g jammed a n d t o

units being targeted.

Smoke and o b s c u r a n t s . visibility;


of f i r e p o w e r .

These weapons a r e o r i e n t e d on ?duce the e f f e c t s

t h e y p r o v i d e c o n c e a l m e n t .r

A s advances i n t e c h n o l o g y p r o d u c e more

s o p h i s t i c a t e d o b s c u r a n t s s u c h as t h e r m a l d e f e a t i n g smoke, a d v e r s e e f f e c t s on f i r e p o w e r w i l l b e i n c r e a s e d .

the

Mine warfare. channelize,

Obviously, mines are used to delay, U n i t s s t o p p e d even


to d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t

a n d damage a n enemy f o r c e .

t e m p o r a r i l y by m i n e f i e l d s a r e s u b j e c t tires.

A i r o r c a n n o n d e l i v e r e d s c a t t e r a b l e m i n e s h a v e a much

g r e a t e r p o t e n t i a l a s t h e y c a n b e d e l i v e r e d on a n u n s u s p e c t i n g enemy a f t e r area.
Also,

i t s r e c o n n a i s s a n c e e l e m e n t s h a v e c h e c k e d out an
t h e y c a n b e e m p l o y e d a f t e r a n enemy u n i t has

b e e n c o m m i t t e d t o a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n thus r e d u c i n g i t s f l e x i b i l i t y t o r e s o r t t o an a l t e r n a t e p l a n .
A potential

weakness i n t h e employment of s c a t t e r a b l e m i n e s i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e y w o u l d n o t b e c o v e r e d by o b s e r v e d f i r e .

I n summary,

s p e c i a l weapons w i l l

substantially alter

the

35

future forces.

b a t t l e f i e l d and w i l l

e f f e c t t h e employment of heavy

W e a p o n s o f m a s s d e s t r u c t i o n w i l l p u t a p r e m i u m on t r o o p s and t h e i r f i g h t i n g s y s t e m s . Special

p r o t e c t i o n of

w e a p o n s w i 1 1 h a v e t h e i r n e x t g r e a t e s t e f f e c t on m o b i 1 i t y and maneuver, especially

i n C e n t r a l Europe.

At

t h e same t i m e , integrated

m o b i l i t y w i l l b e i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t on t h e

b a t t l e f i e l d as h e a v y f o r c e s m u s t q u i c k l y d i s p e r s e o r m a s s .

EMP and e l e c t r o n i c w a r f a r e w i l l d e g r a d e f i r e p o w e r s t r a i n command a n d c o n t r o l .

and f u r t h e r

Summary

T e r r a i n and w e a t h e r c o n s t i t u t e t h e b a s i c p h y s i c a l s e t t i n g for b a t t l e ; t h r e a t f o r c e s and t h e c o n d i t i o n s c a u s e d

by t h e e m p l o y m e n t of s p e c i a l w e a p o n s c m p l e t e t h e d e s c r i p t i o n

o f t h e c h a l l e n g i n g and d y n a m i c f u t u r e b a t t l e f i e l d .
demands a f f e c t c o m b a t p o w e r .

These

T h r e a t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s shape t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r
opposing f o r c e s .

The h e a v i l y mechanized S o v i e t combined arms

t h r e a t w i t h i t s penchant f o r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s a t a high tempo against t h e f l a n k s and t h e d e p t h o f

i t s opponents

d e f e n s e s a p p e a r s t o d i c t a t e t h a t o p p o s i n g + o r c e s also b e

highly mobile,

be able to p r o t e c t themselves from

s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons, weapons.

and b e e q u i p p e d w i t h a r m o r d e f e a t i n g

B a t t l e f i e l d C e n t r a l Europe,

small,

compact and l a c k i n g

36

depth,

is c r o w d e d w i t h p o t e n t i a l o b s t a c l e s a n d i m p e d i m e n t s t o S p e c i a l weapons w i l l

m a n e u v e r by h e a v y g r o u n d f o r c e s . e n h a n c e t h e o b s t a c l e v a l u e of m a n e u v e r by h e a v y f o r c e s w i l l provides a substantial

t h i s European b a t t l e f i e l d ;
be s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d .

It

d e g r e e of c o v e r a n d c o n c e a l m e n t y e t fire. Most l o n g not

e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d o b s e r v a t i o n a n d f i e l d s of r a n g e d i r e c t f i r e weapons,

s u c h a s t a n k s and A T W ' s w i l l the range

b e a b l e t o b e e m p l o y e d a t t h e i r maximum r a n g e s ; a d v a n t a g e of ATGM's eliminated. have argued, over

t a n k m a i n gun i s v i r t u a l l y and o t h e r s

As E n g l i s h , S i m p k i n , U h l e - W e t t l e r

i t i s an e n v i r o n m e n t s u i t e d f o r o p e r a t i o n s

a g a i n s t S o v i e t f o r c e s n o t o n l y by m o b i l e h e a v y f o r c e s b u t a l s o b y l i g h t e r f o r c e s i n p o s i t i o n a l defenses. Terrain intense as w e l l

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s r e q u i r e f o r c e s c a p a b l e o+ manpower combat o p e r a t i o n s i n c i t i e s , forests,

and mountains,

as i n o p e n t e r r a i n .
e m p l o y m e n t of canalize,

R e s t r i c t i v e t e r r a i n o f t e n favors the f r o m w h i c h f o r c e s can c o n t r o l , These a c t i o n s b r e a k t h e and p r o v i d e

s t a t i c defenses

a n d s t o p enemy f o r c e s .

tempo of S o v i e t o p e r a t i o n s ,

t i e up h i s f o r c e s ,

o p p o r t u n i t e s f o r c o u n t e r a t t a c k s by m o b i l e f o r c e s .

On t h e o t h e r h a n d ,

t h e v a s t e x p a n s e s of

generally flat

d e s e r t t e r r a i n seem m o r e sui t e d f o r m a n e u v e r w a r f a r e . M o b i l i t y i s the key t o success i n desert operations,


but a s

Luttwak p o i n t s out,

i n large desert environments w i t h a low

f o r c e d e n s i t y t h e f o r c e s w i t h t h e m o s t m o b i l i t y may b e l i g h t f o r c e s t r a n s p o r t e d by a i r . C 3 5 1 E x c e l l e n t v i s i b i l i t y and l i n e

o f s i g h t a l l o w w e a p o n s t o b e e m p l o y e d a t maximum r a n g e s .

37

Having s e t the stage f o r

future b a t t l e ,

t h i s study w l l l combined the

n e x t e x a m i n e t h e t h e o r y and h i s t o r i c a l p r a c t i c e of arms.

O p e r a t i n g a s combined arms i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the U.S. Army, i t s a l l i e s , and t h e S o u i e t s .

doctrine of

38

ENDNOTES 1. Sun T s u , T h e A r t o f War, O x f o r d , 1 9 8 2 ) , p . 129.

CHAPTER 2
trans.

S.B.

G r i f f i t h (London:

2. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e A r m y , Operations, FM 1 0 0 - 5 (Washington,D.C.: U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1982), p . 1-1.


3.

F i e l d Manual

100-5,

pp.

1-1

t h r o u g h 1-3.

4. U n i o n ot S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s , F i e l d Service R e o u l a t i o n S o v i e t A r m y 1 9 3 6 t r a n s . SSG C h a r l e s B o r m a n , T h e A r m y W a r C o l l e g e . (1957; r p t . C a r l i s l e B a r r a c k s , P A : A r t of War C o l l o q u i u m , 1 9 8 3 ) , p . 1 . 5. P h i l l i p A. K a r b e r , The T a c t i c a l R e v o l u t i o n i n S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Doctrine ( 1 9 7 7 , r p t . C a r l i s l e B a r r a c K s , PA: A r t of War C o l l o q u i u m , 1 9 8 3 ) , p . 2.


6.
7.

Ibld.
Ibid.

p. p.

12. 13. Debate,"

8. P h i l l i p A. K a r b e r , " T h e S o v i e t A n t i - T a n k Survival (May-June 1976) p . 106.

Y . D a v i d C. I s b y , WeaDons and T a c t i c s o f t h e S o v i e t A r m y . (London: J a n e ' s , 1 9 8 1 ) , p . 78.


10. V i c t o r Suvorov, I n s i d e t h e S o v i e t Army Macmi 1 1 i a n , 1 9 8 2 ) , p . 1 8 1 - 1 8 5 . (New . f o r k :

11. V a s i l i r Y. S a v k i n , T h e B a s ~ cP r i n c i p l e s o f O D e r a t i o n a l A r t and T a c t i c s , t r a n s . by t h e U.S. A i r F o r c e . ( 1 Y 7 2 ; r p t . Washington, D.C.: U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 8 2 ) , p p . 167-273. 12. F i e l d Manual 100-5, p. 3-1.

13. U.S. D e D a r t m e n t of t h e ClrmY. "OPMS S t u d y GrOuD A f t e r A c t i o n Repor't," Commanders C a l l ' DA Pam 3 6 0 - 8 8 5 ( S e p - O c t 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 27.

14. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army, J o i n t US/GE A r m y C o n c e p t Paper M i l i t a r y GeoaraDhic DeSCriDtlOn of t h e F e d e r a l R e D u b l i c of Germany, ( F t . M o n r o e , VA: l r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e Command, 3 O c t 1 9 7 8 ) , p . ~ i i .

15.

Ibid.

p.

1-6.

39

16. 17.

Ibid.

p.
p.

1-7.
iii.

Ibid.

18. Franz Uhle-Wettler, B a t t l e f i e l d C e n t r a l EuroDe, trans. f r o m German t o E n g l i s h u n k n o w n , copy r e c e i v e d f r o m U.S. A r m y T r a i n i n g a n d D o c t r i n e Command. ( G u t e r s l o t h , FRG: 1980), p . 15. 19. J o i n t US/GE A r m y C o n c e p t P a p e r D e s c r i ~ t i o no f t h e FRG, p. v i i i .
20.

M i l i t a r y Geographic

Ibld.

p . 6-A-5. (New 'fork:

21. J o h n A. E n g l i s h , A P e r s o e c t i v e on I n f a n t r y P r a e g e r , 1 9 8 1 ) , p . 259. 22. P a u l B r a c k e n , " U r b a n S p r a w l a n d NATO D e f e n c e , " Survival, (Nov-Dec 1976), p . 257. 23. J o i n t US/GE A r m y C o n c e p t PaDer D e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e FRti, p . 1-13. 24. 25.

M i l i t a r y Geographic

Ibid.

p . 1-59.
p . 257.

BracKen,

26. J o i n t U W G E Army Concept Pa o e r t j e S C r i D t i O n o f t h e FRG, p . 5-2.

M i l i t a r y GeograDhic

27. F.M. v o n S e n g e r und E t t e r l i n , T a n k s o f t h e World 1983. ( A n n a p o l i s , MD: The N a u t i c a l a n d A v i a t i o n P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1983), s e e t a b l e s pp.717-769. 28.

Ibid.

p.772.

29.
30. 31. 32.

J o i n t US/GE Army C o n c e p t PaDer - M i l i t a r y G e o a r a D h i c D e s c r i D t i o n o f t h e FRG, p p . 5-10 through 5-11.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

p. pp. p.

5-2. 5-18 vii.


through 5-19.

33. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army, Desert Operations, FM 90-3 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 7 7 ) , p . 4-3. 34. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e A r m y , The S o v i e t Army: m e r a t i o n s and 1-actics, FM 100-2-1 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 16-1.
35.

U.S

Luttwak,

p.5. 40

CHAPTER 3
U E W D S OF COMBINED ARMS WURFARE

A s t h e Changing n a t u r e o f certain force characteristics,

t h e b a t t l e f i e l d demands

so t o o t h e c o n c e p t o f how an
Although

army i s e x p e c t e d t o f i g h t shapes i t s c h a r a c t e r . never o p t i m a l l y practiced, t h e U.S.

Army e s p o u s e s a c o n c e p t

based development p h i l o s o p h y i n w h i c h d o c t r i n e f o r m s t h e b a s i s f o r m a t e r i e l r e q u i r e m e n t s and f o r c e s t r u c t u r e .

A d o c t r i n a l c o n c e p t w h i c h has come t o m a t u r i t y i n t h i s
c e n t u r y and has b e e n a s u b t l e , Army d o c t r i n e but central, i s s u e i n U. S. T h i s concept

i s t h e c o n c e p t o f c o m b i n e d arms.

is often praised,

s e l d o m u n d e r s t o o d , and r o u t i n e l y s h o v e d b r a n c h p a r o c h i a l isms,

a s i d e as s e r v i c e r i v a l r i e s ,

and w e a p o n

systems m a r k e t i n g have been strong m o t i v e s i n t h e q u e s t f o r


d o l l a r s and p r i o r i t i e s .

N o t e d m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n and S o v i e t

a n a l y s t John E r i c k s o n w r o t e ,

I t i s d o u b t f u l i f t h e t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e o f combined arms i s f u l l y g r a s p e d i n W e s t e r n c i r c l e s , or, s t r a n g e l y enough, even i n t h e S o v i e t armed f o r c e s , t h e p r o c l a i m e d home o f t h e i d e a i n t h e f i r s t p l ace. [ 11


As t h e h i s t o r y of t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y w a r f a r e amply combat arms,

d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e r e a r e no w e a p o n s ,

or m i l i t a r y

s e r v i c e s t h a t c a n so d o m i n a t e a w a r as t o b e a b l e t o go i t

41

alone,

despite

t h e c l a i m s of

t h e i r v a r i o u s advocates.

C e r t a i n l y s i n g l e weapon s y s t e m s o r b r a n c h e s may d o m i n a t e type of t e r r a i n or a g a i n s t a p a r t i c u l a r o p p o n e n t

in a

i n an
the

engagement,

b u t i n t h e a g g r e g a t e each system o r arm of

m i l i t a r y h a s l i m i t a t i o n s u p o n w h i c h t h e enemy c a n c a p i t a l i z e .

RI 100-5,

Operations,

o n l y a d d r e s s e s combined arms

b r i e f l y a s an i m p o r t a n t means o f b a t t l e c o n t r o l by w h i c h comanders synchronize t h e i r forces. Still, the necessity t o

f i g h t a s combined arms p e r v a d e s t h e manual.

V i c t o r y on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d w i I I h i n g e on f u l l y s y n c h r o n i z e d combat f o r c e s . Weapons a n d u n i t s a r e m o r e e f f e c t i v e when t h e y o p e r a t e J o i n t l y t h a n when they function separately.[ZI

What d o e s ' c o m b i n e d a r m s " mean?

What

i s i t s essence?

C a p t a i n J o n a t h a n House h e l p s t o c l a r i f y t h e n o t i o n a n d e l i m i n a t e t h e v a g u e n e s s by d i s c u s s i n g t h r e e r e l a t e d e l e m e n t s

of

" c o m b i n e d arms'

--

concept,

organization,

and t a c t i c s and

operations. t31

The c o m b i n e d a r m s combination of

concept

i s the basic

idea that a

t w o o r m o r e w e a p o n s or a r m s i n m u t u a l s u p p o r t t h a t each d i f f e r e n t arms

produce complementary and supplementary e f f e c t s cannot produce separately. P r o p e r l y employed,

o r w e a p o n s c a n e n h a n c e t h e e f f e c t s of

each o t h e r and can

m i n i m i z e each o t h e r ' s

vulnerabilities.

For e x a m p l e ,

the to

r i f l e squad uses grenade l a u n c h e r s and m i n e s t o c o v e r or

e n g a g e t a r g e t 5 i n d e a d s p a c e t h a t m a c h i n e guns c a n n o t r e a c h .

42

T h e e f f e c t s of

g r e n a d e s and m i n e s G r e n a d e s and m i n e s

c a n ~ l e m e n t t h e e f f e c t s ot s u ~ ~ l e m e no t r

t h e m a c h i n e gun. reinforce

each o t h e r ;

w h i l e t h e y both c o v e r t h e d e a d s p a c e ,

t h e y a r e u n i q u e w e a p o n s t h a t a c c o m p l i s h t h e same t a s k differently.

A s FM 100-5,

ODerations.

states:

C u n p l e m e n t a r r c a n b i n e d a r m s should p o s e a d i l e m m a t o t h e enemy. A s h e e v a d e s t h e e f f e c t s of o n e w e a p o n o r a r m , h e p l a c e s h i m s e l f i n j e o p a r d y of a t t a c k by t h e o t h e r . C41

All

a r m s and w e a p o n s f i t

i n t o t h e e q u a t i o n of

t h e combined

arms concept.

T h i s study w i l l b e l i m i t e d p r i m a r i l y t o t h e

combined arms i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e t r a d i t i o n a l combat arms:


infantry, armor,

and a r t i l l e r y .

Modern armies f o r m combined arms


through f i x e d ,

organizations

either

p e r m a n e n t l y o r g a n i z e d u n i t s or b y t e m p o r a r i l y d i f f e r e n t t y p e u n i t s as t h e t a c t i c a l While combined arms e f f e c t s are realized squad

task-organizing

situation dictates. a t the lowest

l e v e l s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n , as t h e r i f l e

example above demonstrates,

normally the lowest fixed,

autonomous c o m b i n e d a r m s u n i t i n t h e U.S. A r m y i s t h e
division. T h e U.S. h e a v y d i v i s i o n i s p e r m a n e n t l y a s s i g n e d a

f i x e d n u m b e r of

tank, m e c h a n i z e d i n f a n t r y ,

self-propelled

a r t i l l e r y and o t h e r t y p e s of

s i n g l e arm battalions plus Cunbined arms

combat s u p p o r t and s e r v i c e s u p p o r t u n i t s .

sub-units

are then task-organized

as b r i g a d e a n d b a t t a l i o n
T h e s e t e m p o r a r y groupings enemy, terrain,

t a s k f o r c e s a n d as c o m p a n y t e a m s .

a r e t a i l o r e d as t h e f a c t o r s ot m i s s i o n ,

43

t r o o p s a v a i l a b l e and t i m e d i c t a t e .

The S o v i e t s l o w e s t f i x e d

u n i t of combined arms i s t h e r e g i m e n t w i t h s i m i l a r c r o s s r e i n f o r c i n g t a k i n g p l a c e a t sub-uni t l e v e l . purpose of The u n d e r l y i n g

t h e s e combined arms g r o u p i n g s i s t o p u t a t t h e

i m m e d i a t e d i s p o s a l o f t h e c o m b i n e d a r m s f o r c e commander a l l t h e weapons a n d c a p a b i l i t i e s t h a t a r e needed t o w i n batt 1e in

.
t a c t i c s and o p e r a t i o n s are the actual

Combined arms

r o l e s p e r f o r m e d by t h e d i f f e r e n t a r m s i n s u p p o r t o f e a c h other. Combined arms tactics a s House p o i n t s o u t a r e o f soldiers yet

paramount

i n t e r e s t and concern t o p r o f e s s i o n a l

t h i s i s t h e a r e a w h e r e h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d s and t a c t i c a l manuals o f t e n n e g l e c t important d e t a i l s . [ 5 1 Combined arms

t a c t i c s change a s t e c h n o l o g y and o t h e r f a c t o r s change weapons and t h e i r capabi 1 i t i e s . I n t h e U.S. Army c o m b i n e d a r m s

tactics are often not well often t r a i n separately.

u n d e r s t o o d because d i f f e r e n t arms s a f e t y and c o s t s cause

Additionally,

t r a i n i n g environments to f a i l combat and t h e r e f o r e

t o c l o s e l y resemble a c t u a l

t h e t r u e e f f e c t s o f combined arms

t a c t i c s a r e o f t e n not r e a l i z e d .

The s t u d y o f

t h e g e n e r a l e v o l u t i o n o f combined arms tactical

t a c t i c s d u r i n g the 2 0 t h Century r e v e a l s p a t t e r n s of war.fare

t h a t may c o n t r i b u t e t o d e t e r m i n i n g how a r m o r e d

i n f a n t r y can b e s t be employed.

44

W o r 1 d War I

European a r m i e s e n t e r e d the war w i t h t h r e e p r i n c i p a l

arms:

infantry,

artillery,

and c a v a l r y .

Understandably,

each

a r m v i e w e d i t s p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e s t h r o u g h i t s own e y e s , c a u s i n g each t o have a d i f f e r e n t v i e w of war


t o be i n a p p r o p r i a t e

t h a t would prove combined

i n t h e G r e a t War.

I n general,

arms c o o p e r a t i o n was n o n - e x i s t e n t . Army B i & e I l a n d Graham s t a t e ,

S p e a k i n g of

the B r i t i s h

t h e y were unaware of t h e p r i n c i p l e o f c o - o p e r a t i o n , and d i d n o t g r a s p how t o c o - o r d i n a t e t h e d i f f e r e n t arms. The a r t o f o r c h e s t r a t i n g t h e f i r e o f d i t f e r e n t weapons was not s t u d i e d a n d i n consequence t h e c l o s e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n f i r e and m a n o e u v r e n o t u n d e r s t o o d . [ 61

The t h r e e a r m s e f f e c t i v e l y

" d i n e d a t separate tables."C71

What w a s l a c k i n g i n most a r m i e s w a s a n o v e r a l l d o c t r i n e on
how a r m i e s were t o f i g h t .

I n 1914,

French General H e r r d e s c r i b e d h i s c o u n t r y ' s

v i e w of

t h e coming war: The w a r w i l l b e p r i m a r i l y a s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n t w o infantries...the army m u s t b e a n a r m y of p e r s o n n e l and not of machines. The a r t i l l e r y w i l l o n l y b e a n a c c e s s o r y arm.CB1

The F r e n c h ,

s t i l l m e s m e r i z e d by t h e o f f e n s i v e

s u c c e s s e s ot

P r u s s i a i n 1870-71,

were c o n v i n c e d that o f f e n s i v e maneuver, would dominate b a t t l e . Technological

r a t h e r than firepower, changes, however,

c o u p l e d w i t h o t h e r f a c t o r s would cause

45

firepcwer

t o dominate the b a t t l e f i e l d q u i c k l y a f t e r

the

o p e n i n g campaigns on both f r o n t s .

Infantry, armies,

the traditional

f i g h t i n g arm o f t h e European

h a d undergone numerous changes i n t h e decades l e a d i n g Magazine-fed, breech-loading r i f l e s and the

u p t o World War 1.

a c c u r a t e t o r a n g e s i n a c c e s s o f 400 m e t e r s t 9 1 , m a c h i n e gun o b v i a t e d t h e the use of the bayonet.

infantry p r a c t i c e of v o l l e y f i r e and
T h i s accurate long range firepower the

a l s o r e n d e r e d o b s o l e t e t h e massed i n f a n t r y f o r m a t i o n :

r i g i d square,

column and l i n e were n o l o n g e r a p p r o p r i a t e The i n f a n t r y n o l o n g e r n e e d e d t o mass i n

b a t t l e formations. order

t o p r o t e c t i t s e l f from c a v a l r y because i n f a n t r y
saber, carbine, and p i s t o l

f i r e p o w e r c o u l d d e s t r o y the lance, equipped c a v a l r y a t g r e a t e r ranges. order" greatly

The r e s u l t i n g " o p e n

t a c t i c s i n c r e a s e d p r o t e c t i o n t h r o u g h d i s p e r s a l but increased c m a n d and c o n t r o l requirements. t r a i n e d s o l d i e r s and, m o r e Proper

execution required well importantly,

well t r a i n e d j u n i o r l e a d e r s a5 w e l l a s i m p r o v e d
Mobilization of partially trained c i v i l i a n s made l e a d e r s , believe that the

command a n d c o n t r o l means.

r e s e r v e s a n d m a s s i v e c o n s c r i p t i o n of

e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e French and B r i t i s h armies, open o r d e r belief t a c t i c s were t o o d i f f i c u l t .

T h i s and the f i r m

in the offensive

l e d t o g r e a t c a r n a g e c a u s e d by human

wave a s s a u l t s d i r e c t l y i n t o d e a d l y f i r e .

The t i r e p o w e r o f b r e e c h - l o a d i n g , magaz i ne l e d r i t l e s and machine guns had g r e a t l y o u t s t r i p p e d t h e m o b i l i t y and s u r v i v a b i l i t y o f f o o t m o b i l e i n + a n t r y . C l U I

46

D e s p i t e e x t e n s i v e movement of t a c t i c a l m o b i l i t y of

t r o o p s by r a i l and t r u c k , Thus,

i n f a n t r y was a t w a l k i n g speed. truck

r e s e r v e s c o u l d b e r u s h e d f o r w a r d b y r a i l or

to plug a

gap b e f o r e f o r c e s a t t a c k i n g on f o o t c o u l d e x p l o i t any successful penetration. The r e s u l t i n g s y s t e m of

e n t r e n c h m e n t s r e d u c e d t h e p r e d i c t e d 'war s t a t i c proportions;

of m a n e u v e r "

to

b y l a t e 1914, open f l a n k s a n d The d e f e n s e became

o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r e n v e l opmen t w e r e g o n e . t h e d o m i n a n t mode o f w a r f a r e .

A s T h e o d o r e Ropp p u t

it,

Now t h e r e w e r e no f l a n k s t o go a r o u n d .

Improvised trenches ran from Switzerland to s a l t water. When t h e s e w e r e r e i n f o r c e d w i t h b a r b e d w i r e and c o n c r e t e , t h e w a r i n t h e w e s t became a w a r o f a t t r i t i o n , o n e o f t h e l o n g e s t and b l o o d i e s t i n h i s t o r r . [ l l l

A f t e r s e v e r a l a b o r t i v e a t t e m p t s t o p e n e t r a t e enemy d e f e n s e s w i t h t h e w e i g h t of massed i n f a n t r y a t t a c k s , the in

i m e d i a t e solution t o b r e a k i n g the stalemate was sought more f i r e p o w e r , t h u s massive a r t i l l e r y .

The a r t i l l e r y arm, t h o u g h a l s o c a n p e l l e d t o s e e k p r o t e c t i o n i n t h e b o w e l s of t h e e a r t h or b e h i n d t h e c o v e r o f h i l l s , became m o r e and m o r e dominant a s t h e r a n g e o f guns i n c r e a s e d a n d a m o r e s c i e n t i f i c i n d i r e c t m e t h o d of f i r e w a s a d o p t e d . A s t h e f i r e of machine guns tended t o b r i n g most advances t o a h a l t , so a g r e a t e r w e i g h t o f a r t i l l e r y f i r e w a s g r a d u a l l y b r o u g h t t o b e a r t o smash d e f e n d i n g 1 i n e s . t l 2 1

M o s t a r m i e s e n t e r e d t h e war w i t h a predominance o f

light,

d i r e c t f i r e a r t i l l e r y t h a t fought u p f r o n t

I n close

proximity t o the infantry.

I t was l i g h t enough t o b e p u l l e d

by h o r s e s a n d t o k e e p u p w i t h t h e m a r c h i n g i n f a n t r y .

I t was

p r i m a r i l y e m p l o y e d t o s u p p r e s s t h e enemy.

Heavy a r t i l l e r y

47

was f a r l e s s m o b i l e a n d w a s u s e d t o r e d u c e f o r t s or t o d e f e n d
c o a s t 1 i n e s and o t h e r f i x e d l o c a t i o n s . However, technological New

advances were c h a n g i n g t h e p o t e n t i a l of a r t i l l e r y . r e c o i l and sight systems a l l w e d f o r methods of indirect fire

t h e more s c i e n t i f i c accurate, and

to d e l i v e r quick,
instead o f

massed f i r e s on a t a r g e t

t h e d i r e c t f i r e methods

t h a t had been t h e s t a n d a r d .

Once t h e

infantry attacks failed,

many e x p e c t e d t h a t

m a 5 s i v e a r t i l l e r y f i r e c o u l d c r e a t e a p e n e t r a t i o n by d e s t r o y i n g enemy o b s t a c l e s , trenches, and t h e f o r c e s i n them

so t h a t i n f a n t r y c o u l d mop up and c a v a l r y c o u l d e x p l o i t .
Tactics,

i t appears,

h a d made a s h a r p t u r n a b o u t f r o m t h e

v i e w s o f General H e r r n o t e d e a r l i e r a s French Marshal P e t a i n expressed a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t n o t i o n about the r e l a t i o n s h i p in+antrY

between i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y : occup I es.

A r t i l l e r y conquers,

1 131

These c h a n g e s c o u l d n o t be i n c o r p o r a t e d o v e r n i g h t . a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s h a d t o be d e s i g n e d a n d p r o d u c e d , m a s s i v e amounts of a r t i l l e r y ammunition had t o be manufactured.

New

and

a r t i l l e r y u n i t s h a d t o b e o r g a n i z e d and t r a i n e d i n t h e m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d m e t h o d s of indirect fire. Additionally, a system

o f communications between o b s e r v e r s and t h e b a t t e r i e s h a d t o

b e c r e a t e d so t h a t t h e a r t i l l e r y c o u l d b e p o s i t i o n e d o u t of r a n g e o f enemy i n f a n t r y a n d a r t i l l e r y d i r e c t + i r e .

l h i s also

r e q u i r e d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a c c u r a t e maps w i t h a c o m p a t i b l e
grid reference

system.

48

Massed i n d i r e c t a r t i l l e r y f i r e , unexpected r e s u l t s .

once employed, h a d l a s t e d for

Preparations, which often

d a y s p r i o r t o an a t t a c k , that

t o r e up t h e ground t o s u c h a n e x t e n t

i n f a n t r y f o r c e s c o u l d n o t move q u i c k l y on t h e s u b s e q u e n t t h e enemy e n t r e n c h m e n t s .

a t t a c k of

The n i n e t e e n - d a y B r i t i s h b m b a r d m e n t a t T h i r d r p r e s ( 1 9 1 7 ) u s e d 321 t r a i n l o a d s o f s h e l l s , a y e a r ' s p r o d u c t i o n f o r 55,000 w a r w o r k e r s . The w h o l e b a t t l e a r e a r e v e r t e d t o a swamp i n w h i c h t h e B r i t i s h a r m y took 45 s q u a r e m i l e s i n f i v e m o n t h s a t a c o s t of 370,000 men, or 8,222 p e r s q u a r e m i l e . C l 4 1

H i g h e x p l o s i v e a m m u n i t i o n was n o t e f f e c t i v e l y K i l l i n g t h e enemy, a s German d e f e n d e r s s i m p l y m o v e d t r o o p s t o i n t o t h e ground. The B r i t i s h a n d

t r e n c h e s i n d e p t h or deeper

F r e n c h w e r e amazed t o f i n d German d e f e n d e r s m a n n i n g what w a s l e f t of t h e i r forward trenches j u s t minutes a f t e r At t h e Somme, the the

a r t i l l e r y f i r e was l i f t e d .

i n J u l y 1916,
o f shrapnel

B r i t i s h introduced the 'creeping barrage' behind which the suppressed.

fire

i n f a n t r y a t t a c k e d a s German p o s i t i o n s w e r e

U n f o r t u n a t e l y , w h i l e s h r a p n e l was s a f e r

t o march

b e h i n d because i t s e f f e c t s were p r o j e c t e d f o r w a r d , v i r t u a l l y no effect on b a r b e d w i r e o r t r e n c h e s .

i t had

Difficulty

i n c o o r d i n a t i n g i n f a n t r y advances w i t h t h e p r e - p l a n n e d and
ever f o r w a r d - s h i f t i n g a r t i l l e r y f i r e often of l e f t the infantry

t a n g l e d up i n w i r e i n f r o n t s u p p r e s s i v e f i r e moved away.

t h e tierman p o s i t i o n s a 5 t h e

Thus,

p e r h a p s t h e g r e a t e s t p r o b l e m was i n

49

artillery-infantry

cooperation.

L a c k of

experienced staff

o f f i c e r s caused p l a n n i n g t o take p l a c e a t a h i g h l e v e l of command; m a n e u v e r p l a n s w e r e c r e a t e d f i r s t then tasked t o support consideration for and a r t i l l e r y was

that plan often with l i t t l e c a p a b i l i t y to support

the a r t i l l e r y ' s

it.

Responsive communications,

k e y t o e x p l o i t i n g t h e p o t e n t i a l of

q u i c k f i r i n g i n d i r e c t a r t i l l e r y , were g e n e r a l l y l a c k i n g . T h e r e w a s l i t t l e a b i l i t y t o a d j u s t from t h e maneuver a n d f i r e s u p p o r t . i n i t i a l p l a n of artillery

Without f l e x i b i l i t y ,

and i n f a n t r y were o f t e n u n s y n c h r o n i z e d and t h u s n o t effective. On t h o s e o c c a s i o n s when t h e i n i t i a l c o o r d i n a t e d

a t t a c k s d i d s u c c e e d i n f a n t r y o f t e n o u t r a n t h e f i r e of r e l a t i v e l y immobile a r t i l l e r y and g r o u n d t o a h a l t .

its
Horse

drawn, w h e e l e d a r t i l l e r y ,
pre-war d i r e c t f i r e days,

no l o n g e r t h e l i g h t p i e c e s of found i t almost impossible to cross

t h e m o r a s s o f no-man's defenses

land that

i t had created.

German

i n d e p t h a n d t h e r a p i d movement o f r e s e r v e s l o n g sought A l l i e d p e n e t r a t i o n t h a t

e f f e c t i v e l y prevented the could result

in e x p l o i t a t i o n by the cavalry.

C a v a l r y c l u n g t o i t s m i s s i o n s of reconnaissance and security, shock a c t i o n , and p u r s u i t a s t i g h t l y a s i t dtd t o Significant forces of cavalry t h e i r g o l d e n moment

the horse,saber

and lance.

w a i t e d o u t the s t a t i c trench warfare for w h i c h n e v e r came on e i t h e r f r o n t .

The f i r e p o w e r

of

the other

arm5 a n d t h e l a c k o f f l a n k s n e g a t e d over infantry i n open t e r r a i n .

h e i r p r e v i o u s advantage and shock a c t i o n

Mobi e f i r e

was t o p l a y a r o l e

i n W o r l d War I 50

i n t h e f o r m o f an a r m o r e d

motor vehicle,

the tank.

The d e v e l o p m e n t of

t h e t a n k w a s a d i r e c t r e s u l t of O b s e s s e d w i t h t h e s p i r i t of the

trench warfare conditions. offense

t h e A l I i e s n e e d e d a means o f d e s t r o y i n g m a c h i n e guns, The i n i t i a l Few

c r u s h i n g b a r b e d w i r e and b r e a c h i n g t r e n c h e s . t a n k c o n c e p t c e n t e r e d on m o b i l e ,
s a w t h e t a n k a s a maneuver f o r c e

protected firepower.
i n i t s own r i g h t :

i t was

m e r e l y a s p e c i a l i z e d weapon t o s u p p o r t t h e accomplishing a breakthrough. The F r e n c h ,

infantry in

in fact,

regarded

the tank a s mobile a s s a u l t a r t i l l e r y , t h e m a5 a r t i l l e r i e d'assaut.

o r i g i n a l l y designating

C151

I t was r e c o g n i z e d e a r l y t h a t
surprise, mass,

t a n k s had t o c a p i t a l i z e on impact as w e l l as t h e i r

and p s y c h o l o g i c a l

p h y s i c a l e f f e c t s o n t h e enemy.

Surprise

i n t h i s w a r was The

g a i n e d p r i m a r i l y by l i m i t i n g t h e a r t i l l e r y p r e p a r a t i o n . initial t a n K a t t a c k s on t h e Somme i n 1916 w e r e a t o t a l

s u r p r i s e and a m a j o r b l o w t o t h e m o r a l e of that they attacked. T h i s experimental

t h e German u n i t s

f i r s t use d i d not

a c c o m p l i s h m a s s as o n l y f o r t y - n i n e

tanks s t a r t e d the attack,

m o s t o f w h i c h went o u t of a c t i o n because of mechanical

failure.

While gaining experience

i n tank employment,

the

A l l i e s may h a v e p r e m a t u r e l y l o s t t h e g r e a t e r e f f e c t s o f s u r p r i s e by t h e t i m e 474 t a n k s w e r e u s e d i n m a s s a t C a m b r a i

i n November, anti-tank

1917.

BY t h i s t i m e t h e Germans h a d d e v i s e d s a n e i n c l u d i n g an t h e 'K" bullet.

t a c t i c s a n d some s p e c i a l w e a p o n s ,

a r m o r p i e r c i n g r i f l e a n d m a c h i n e g u n round,
51

A l t h o u g h t h e massed,

surprise attack of

t a n k s a t Cambrai

succeeded i n c r e a t i n g a pene t r a t i on, t o exploit for a h o s t o f reasons.Cl61

t h e B r i t i sh w e r e u n a b l e

One n o t e w o r t h y t a n k a t t a c k a t Cambrai was an a b j e c t f a i l u r e due t o t h e l a c k o f e f f e c t i v e m u t u a l s u p p o r t between t h e v a r i o u s arms o f the B r i t i s h f o r c e . First, the aeroscouts

f a i l e d t o f i n d and engage t h e German f i e l d guns known t o b e i n the area. Second, t h e t a n k s became s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e

i n f a n t r y w h i c h was t o s u p p r e s s by f i r e t h e German a n t i - t a n k positions. c o v e r of Had t h e i n f a n t r y been a d v a n c i n g c l o s e l y u n d e r t h e

the tanks,

i t c o u l d have been i n p o s i t i o n t o engage

German d i r e c t f i r e a r t i l l e r guns.

w i t h s m a l l arms and machine

'The German a r t i l l e r y k n o c k e d o u t s i x t e e n t a n k s q u i c k l y

with direct f i r e artillery.

171

T h i s i n c i d e n t d i d much t o years t h a t tanks i n close

promulgate the idea through the inter-war a r e i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t weapons and m u s t work cooperation w i t h infantry.

The c o n t i n u e d i n a b i l i t y t o maneuver, infantry's

e s p e c i a l l y the caused many the

i n a b i l i t y t o p e n e t r a t e enemy d e f e n s e s , Advancements i n a r t i l l e r y methods, the tank,

innovations. development o f were

and t h e m i l i t a r y use o f a i r p o w e r
I

i n g r e a t measure a t t e m p t s t o add c a p a b i I Over t h e c0urc.e o f

t i e s t h a t would intantry

break the s t a l e m a t e .

t h e war

a l s o e v o l v e d most n o t a b l y i n t h e n a t u r e o f and i n i t s t a c t i c a l employment.

i t s organization

52

At

the b e g i n n i n g of

the war

infantry units a t brigade i n f a n t r y m e n armed

and lower

l e v e l s had c o n s i s t e d p u r e l y of

with rifles.

M a c h i n e guns w e r e f e w a n d w e r e p r i m a r i l y u s e d e.g.

i n a n economy o f f o r c e r o l e , flank.1181 The demands o f

t o p r o t e c t an open

t r e n c h w a r f a r e soon caused t h e

i n f a n t r y t o be armed not o n l y w i t h machine guns but a l s o w i t h trench mortars, t h e German s i d e , grenades, anti-tank

I i g h t a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s , a n d , on
weapons. The g r e n a d e , in

t r a d i t i o n a l l y an e n g i n e e r weapon, the trenches.[iPI

became t h e m a s t e r weapon the r i f l e

Perfected l a t e i n the war,

g r e n a d e p r o v e d t o be t h e m o s t e f f e c t i v e m a c h i n e gun
I(

i I 1e r [201

Light m o r t a r s ,

such a s the B r i t i s h 3 i n c h S t o k e s m o r t a r ,

p r o v i d e d i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s w i t h r e s p o n s i v e high t r a J e c t o r r f i r e w i t h w h i c h t o bomb enemy t r e n c h e s o u t t o a r a n g e o f


about 400 m e t e r s .

Heavy m o r t a r s w e r e r e t a i n e d i n b a t t e r i e s

a n d w e r e e m p l o y e d by a r t i l l e r y m e n i n a l l i e d a r m i e s a n d by e n g i n e e r 5 i n t h e German a r m y . [ 2 1 1 gave

L i g h t a u t o m a t i c weapons

i n f a n t r y m o b i l e a u t o m a t i c f i r e t o s u p p r e s s enemy f i r e s T h e German i n f a n t r y m e n w e r e a l s o p r o v i d e d

d u r i n g an a s s a u l t .
anti-tank

w e a p o n s i n c l u d i n g l o n g b a r r e l l e d M a u s e r r i f l e s and

low t r a j e c t o r y m o r t a r s capable of b e i n g f i r e d i n the d i r e c t or


the i n d i r e c t modes.[221

The
of

i n f a n t r y squad and p l a t o o n d e v e l o p e d over

the course

t h e w a r f r o m a s i n g l e weapon e n t i t y t o a c o m b i n e d a r m s

unit.

I t h a d a number o f d i f f e r e n t w e a p o n s w h i c h

53

complemented and supplemented each o t h e r t o c r e a t e t h e s y n e r g i s t i c combined arms e f f e c t s . i n f a n t r y c a p t u r e d Mont S t . For example, A u s t r a l i a n

Quentin i n August

1918, by

s u p p r e s s i n g enemy m a c h i n e g u n s w i t h f i r e f r o m L e w i s l i g h t a u t o m a t i c r i f l e s a n d d e s t r o y e d them w i t h r i f l e g r e n a d e
f ire.[231

The s e c o n d i n f a n t r y e v o l u t i o n w a s i n t a c t i c s . v i r t u a l l y a simultaneous r e a l i z a t i o n

There was

i n several armies t h a t

a t t r i t i o n w a r f a r e t a c t i c s of a t t a c k i n g s t r e n g t h w i t h s t r e n g t h

in order

t o i n f 1 i c t u n a c c e p t a b 1 e c a s u a l t i e s on t h e o p p o n e n t

was o n l y b l e e d i n g both s i d e s t o n o a d v a n t a g e . t a c t i c was t o have s m a l l f o r c e s of

An a l t e r n a t i v e

i n f a n t r y m e n armed w i t h

l i g h t a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s a n d g r e n a d e s w o r k e d t h e i r way f o r w a r d
t o f i n d enemy weak p o i n t s a n d t o a t t a c k k e y m a c h i n e gun

positions.

T h i s i d e a was f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n t h e west

i n an

u n o f f i c i a l p a m p h l e t by a n unknown F r e n c h c a p t a i n named Laffargue.[241 Unfortunately, t h e F r e n c h and B r i t i s h w e r e

slow t o c h a n g e t h e i r t a c t i c s . E q u a l l y u n f o r t u n a t e f o r t h e
Allies, t h e Germans h a d c a p t u r e d a c o p y o f
WI

the pamphlet and

were q u i t e r e a d y and p r o m i s i n g methods.

1 1 i n g t o a d o p t t h e s e new a n d m o r e

A s T i m o t h y L u p f e r p o i n t s o u t t h e Germans procedures i n the

were u n i q u e l y adept a t a l t e r i n g t a c t i c a l
m i d s t of

t h e s t r u g g l e and t h e r e f o r e

" u s u a l l y achieved a

relative

advantage over t h e A l l i e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t a c t i c a l The German army h a d a t t e m p t e d " i n f i l t r a t i o n "

change.'[251

t a c t i c s a s e a r l y a s Uerdun, w e r e on t h e E a s t e r n f r o n t

but t h e i r m o s t successful
against

uses

a t Riga,

the I t a l i a n s a t

54

Caporetto, F i f t h Army

and i n uon H u t i e r ' s i n March,


9 1 8 . t261

crushing defeat of

the B r i t i s h

German i n f i 1 t r a t on t a c t i c s d e p e n d e d on c l o s e artillery-infantry assigned p o i n t , cooperation. A r t i l l e r y b a t t e r i e s were

not area,

t a r g e t s s u c h a s command a n d f o r w a r d observer positions,

cmunications facilities, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n modes,

and r e s e r v e s .

P r e p a r a t o r y f i r e s were

l i m i t e d a n d were s h i f t e d p e r i o d i c a l l y along t h e l i n e t o d i s g u i s e the main e f f o r t . a r m s u n i t s of infantry, I n f i l t r a t i n g f o r c e s were combined engineers, and s i g n a l troops which

b y p a s s e d or e l i m i n a t e d s t r o n g p o i n t s a n d r e l a y e d i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e enemy b a c k t o t h e a t t a c k i n g m a i n f o r c e . They were

e q u i p p e d w i t h a v a r i e t y of w e a p o n s i n c l u d i n g m a r t a r s , a u t o m a t i c weapons, grenades, flamethrowers,

I ight

a n d demo1 i t i o n s . the

Once t h e p r e c i s e a r e a f o r
infantry

t h e m a i n a t t a c k was d e t e r m i n e d ,

t r o o p s advanced under t h e c o v e r of a c r e e p i n g Ironically, i n f i l t r a t i o n t a c t i c s w e r e so s u c c e s s f u l T h e k e y role o f the

barrage. that

t h e y w e r e doomed t o f a i l u r e .

a r t i l l e r y c o u l d n o t be s u s t a i n e d a s r a p i d l y a d v a n c i n g t r o o p s outran t h e i r supporting f i r e s . an o b s e s s i o n M o b i l e f i r e p o w e r w o u l d become

i n t h e German Army b e t w e e n t h e w a r s .

On t h e E a s t e r n f r o n t

i n t h e summer o f f e n s e o f 1 9 1 6 ,

G e n e r a l B r u s i l o v made d r a s t i c c h a n g e s i n R u s s i a n o f f e n s i v e m e t h o d s by a t t a c k i n g w i t h s m a l l f o r w a r d e l e m e n t s a t many

places across a broad front a f t e r a b r i e f a r t i l l e r y preparation. These i n f i 1 t r a t i o n g r o u p s d e s t r o y e d k e y


55

p o s i t i o n s a n d f o u n d weak p o i n t s f o r follow-on main a t t a c k .

t h e commitment of

the

By a t t a c k i n g a c r o s s a b r o a d f r o n t
i n place,

enemy r e s e r v e s w e r e e f f e c t i v e l y f r o z e n which w a s the main e f f o r t until

not knowing

too l a t e .

The b r i e f

a r t i l l e r y preparation helped insure surprise.[271

World War I a m p l y d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a l l
arms t o c o o p e r a t e . alone, E a c h a r m w a s u n s u c c e s s f u l when a c t i n g neophyte tank.

i n c l u d i n g t h e somewhat f r a g i l e ,

A l t h o u g h t h e age o f m a c h i n e s i n g r o u n d c o m b a t t o o k a g i a n t leap f o r w a r d i n t h i s war, role i n t h e p a r t n e r s h i p of the infantryman proved h i s v i t a l end.

c o m b i n e d a r m s by t h e w a r ' s

D e t e r m i n i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p a r t each arm was t o p l a y i n f u t u r e w a r s became t h e m a j o r f o c u s o f m i 1 between the w o r l d wars. however


i

t a r r thinkers

Overwhelming i n f a n t r y casual t i e s , p o t e n t I a l c o n tr i b u t i on

d I sgu i s e d t h e i n f an t r y m a n ' s

in future battles.

Interwar Years

T h e p e r i o d b e t w e e n t h e w a r s w a s m a r k e d by a n u n p r e c e d e n t e d number of i n t e r p r e t the r e q u i r e d for b r i l l i a n t men who a t t e m p t e d t o

l e s s o n s o f World War

I , p r e d i c t the type f o r c e s

f u t u r e war a n d t o c o n v i n c e t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e

g o v e r n m e n t s t o i n t e g r a t e new w e a p o n s a n d d o c t r i n e i n t o t h e i r forces. The intensity of t h o u g h t by t h o s e L o r d C a r v e r c a l l e d w a s c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d by many

t h e " p r o p h e t s w i t h o u t honor'C281 factors,

some common t o a l m o s t e v e r y n a t i o n a n d some u n i q u e ,

56

w h i c h r e t a r d e d m i l i t a r y m o d e r n i z a t i o n and c h a n g e .

P e o p l e w e r e r e p u l s e d by t h e human w a s t e of World War

1.

T h i s r e v u l s i o n c a u s e d popular d i s i n t e r e s t i n a l l
military.

things

T h e h u g e c o s t s of w a r m a t e r i e l a n d t h e l a r g e s u r p l u s equipment,

s t o c k p i l e s of victors,

a t l e a s t on t h e s i d e ot t h e
to

made p o l i t i c i a n s and v o t e r s a l i k e u n r e c e p t i v e Later,

investment in expensive modernization. p r o b l e m s of

the economic l i t t l e money

t h e worldwide d e p r e s s i o n meant that

was a v a i l a b l e for

t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of m o d e r n a r m e d f o r c e s .

Technological advances were,

a t t h e same t i m e ,

revealing the

m i l i t a r r p o t e n t i a l o f new s y s t e m s ;

airpower, mechanization, the areas i n

and w i r e l e s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w e r e b u t a f e w o f

which expensive mi 1

tary hardware c o u l d be developed t o match

new w a r f i g h t i n g c o n c e p t s . themselves,
of

T h e a d v o c a t e s of

change

however,

did not agree in concept

or on

the types

f o r c e s and w e a p o n 5 w h i c h w e r e r e q u i r e d i n t h e f u t u r e . e a c h n a t i o n c e r t a i n l y had i t s s h a r e o f p o w e r f u l w i t h i n t h e m i l i t a r y h i e r a r c h y who r e s i s t e d

Lastly,

traditionalist

c h a n g e b e c a u s e t h e y w a n t e d t h i n g s t o r e m a i n as t h e y w e r e .

G r e a t B r i a i n p r o d u c e d t h e m o s t p r o l i f i c t h i n k e r s and w r i t e r s of t h e p e r i o d i n t h e p e r s o n a g e o f J.F.C. Hart. F u l l e r and were

Basil Liddel I instrumental

T h e s e " a p o s t l e s of m o b i I i ty'C291

i n c a u s i n g some e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n W i t h m o b i l e
e s p e c i a l l y tanks. w h i c h had a Their

w a r f a r e and w i t h mechanized forcesC301, M o s t n o t a b l e w e r e t h e m a n e u v e r s of

1927-28,

p r o f o u n d e f f e c t on German and A m e r i c a n o b s e r v e r s .

57

c o l l e c t i v e e f f o r t s met w i t h o n l y p a r t i a l success.

R e v u l s i o n a t t h e thought o f e v e r e n g a g i n g a g a i n i n m a s s c o n t i n e n t a l w a r f a r e l e d t o e m p h a s i s on a r e t u r n t o t h e A r m y ' s t r u e f u n c t i o n of s e c u r i n g t h e E m p i r e , f o r w h i c h , i t w a s h e l d , t h e o l d - f a s h i o n e d a r m s of c a v a l r y and i n f a n t r y were b e t t e r s u i t e d . [ 3 1 1

G r e a t B r i t a i n was a l s o i n a n e c o n o m i c p i n c h .

Its

d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s w e r e p r i m a r i l y s p e n t on f o r c e s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e navy, empire ever. t o s u p p o r t r u l e of E n g l a n d ' s largest

I n t h e 1920s t h e B r i t i s h w e r e a l s o c o m m i t t i n g t h e development of the f i r s t What w a s

defense r e s o u r c e s f o r i n d e p e n d e n t a i r arm,

t h e R o y a l A i r F o r c e (REIF).

grossly l a c k i n g was a p l a n f o r m o d e r n i z i n g i t s g r o u n d f o r c e s .

The p o s t - w a r r e d u c i o n s and e c o n o m i e s i n d e t e n c e a n d t h e 'Ten Year R u l e ( w h i c h governed defence p l a n n i n g a n d e x p e n d i t u r e on t h e b a s i s o f a n a s s u m p t i o n t h a t no m a j o r war was 1 i k e Y f o r a decade were s e n s i b l e and p r u d e n t . What w a s n o t j u s t i f a b l e w a s t h e v i r t u a l suspension o f any r a t i o n a a n a l y s i s o f what T h e r e was n o t h e f u t u r e n e e d s of d e f e n c e m i g h t b e . c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d or c o h e r e n t p o l c y t o g u i d e t h e a r m e d f o r c e s C 321

..)

The f u t u r e r o l e o f ground f o r c e s w a s s u b j e c t debate t h a t l a s t e d for t w o decades.

t o heated

E v e n among t h e " a p o s t l e s disagreement. Their the

of m o b i l i t y "

there was substantial

extreme p o s i t i o n s a l i e n a t e d those t h e y needed t o c o n v e r t ,

m i I i t a r y c m m a n d e r s a n d p o l i t i c i a n s whose f o c u s w a s on t h e
E m p i r e and n o t o n c o n t i n e n t a l w a r . all-tank F u l l e r espoused an

f o r c e s u p p o r t e d by a i r p o w e r w h i c h w o u l d a t t a c k d e e p a n d r e a r areas i n a

t o d e s t r o y enemy command a n d c o n t r o l
b a t t l e of annihilation.

He saw l i t t l e or n o n e e d f o r

i n f a n t r y o r c a v a l r y w h i c h was i n d i r e c t o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e
58

traditionalists.

L i d d e l l H a r t e n v i s i o n e d a f u l l y mechantzed tanks,

f o r c e but r e c o g n i z e d t h e n e e d f o r a b a l a n c e d team of artillery, and i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t e d b y a i r p o w e r .

He also

a d v o c a t e d a v o i d i n g a t t r i t i o n w a r f a r e by s t r i k i n g enemy w e a k n e s s i n an " e x p a n d i n g t o r r e n t s ' fashion. Meanwhile, the

RAF w a s d e v e l o p i n g a n a i r d o c t r i n e t h a t w a s b a s e d on t h e w r i t i n g s of s t a t e d that the I t a l i a n ,


G i u l i o Douhet.

B r i t i s h a i r strategy

t h e m o s t e c o n o m i c a l a n d e f f e c t i v e w a y t o wage w a r t h e enemy's therefore, homeland. The

w a 5 by s t r a t e g i c b o m b i n g o f independent Royal A i r Force,

r e s i s t e d attempts to

develop the c a p a b i l i t y to conduct c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e army,

t a c t i c a l air missions in

except f o r reconnaissance.C331

I n t h e e n d b o t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s a n d those d e m a n d i n g
m o b i l i t y h a d t h e i r way. The b u l k of armored v e h i c l e
1 i g h t tanKs

development had r e s u l t e d i n armored c a r s , s u i t a b l e for reconnaissance, support infantry.

and m a c h i n e g u n c a r r i e r s

to

T h e s e v e h i c l e s w e r e u s e d by i n f a n t r y a n d The

c a v a l r y u n i t s and were q u i t e s u i t a b l e for c o l o n i a l d u t y . infantry received tracked, three-man

B r e n gun c a r r i e r s a n d

t h e c a v a l r y b e g a n t o o r g a n i z e m e c h a n i z e d c a v a l r y b r i g a d e s of
1 i g h t l r armored reconnaissance

t a n k s and c a r s .

The in

'all-tank'

e n t h u s i a s t s w e r e s a t i s f i e d by t h e f o r m a t i o n , the tank heavy armored d i v i s i o n .

t h e l a t e 19305, o f

It

c o n s i s t e d of b r i g a d e s o f M a t i l d a tanks for

l i g h t c r u i s e r t a n k s and heavy

infantry support.

T h e r e was v e r y l i t t l e
the

infantry i n this division,

a deficiency recognized a f t e r

b a t t l e s i n France and North A f r i c a b u t never e f f e c t i v e l y

59

remedied.

B r i t i s h mobile

i n f a n t r y t h r o u g h o u t the war r o d e

almost e x c l u s i v e l y i n trucks.C341

F r a n c e came o u t o f W o r l d War a t t i t u d e concerning the m e r i t s o f defense.

I w i t h a much c h a n g e d
the offense versus the

F a c e d w i t h an u n s t a b l e German n e i g h b o r a n d w i t h i t decided to b u i l d

p o t e n t i a l a l l i e s i n t h e Low C o u n t r i e s ,

t h e M a g i n o t L i n e d e f e n s e s y s t e m a l o n g i t s common b o r d e r w i t h Germany. These i n i t i a l defenses would g i v e France t i m e t o This often criticized fixation

m o b i l i z e i f Germany a t t a c k e d .

on s t a t i c d e f e n s e w a s a h u g e d r a i n on F r e n c h d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g i n the Bloch, i n t e r w a r y e a r s a n d y e t was n e v e r c o m p l e t e d . i n h i s book Stranae Defeat, Marc

expressed a Frenchman's t h e s t u n n i n g German

perspective of the Maginot Line a f t e r sweep p a s t


i t t o t h e s e a i n 1940.

aeroplanes, and t r a c t o r s , i t w a s m a i n l y b e c a u s e we h a d p u t our n o t i n e x h a u s t i b l e s u p p l i e s of money a n d l a b o u r i n t o c o n c r e t e . C351

If we w e r e s h o r t o f t a n k s ,

A s House p o i n t s o u t ,

the a p p a r e n t l y impregnable f o r t i f i c a t i o n i m p a c t on F r e n c h m i l i t a r y that "France s h o u l d

had a s i g n i f i c a n t l y negative

t h i n k i n g a5 i t r e i n f o r c e d the b e l i e f

a v o i d any a g g r e s s i v e a c t i o n s a n d b e c o n t e n t t o d e f e n d I t s f r o n t i e r s . ' C 361

The F r e n c h d e t e r m i n e d t h a t w a r w o u l d b e s t b e c n d u c t e d b a s e d on d e t a i l e d p l a n s a n d e x t e n s i v e p r e p a r a t i o n . Despi t e French

t h e u r g i n g s o f m i l i t a r y t h i n k e r s E t i e n n e a n d DeGaul e ,

60

d o c t r i n e w a s b a s e d on t h e m a r c h i n g i n f a n t r y . combined arms was t h a t a l l

I t s v i e w of

a r m s s u p p o r t t h e f o r w a r d movement

of

infantry.

I t s 1921 d o c t r i n e ,

for example, s t a t e d :

The i n f a n t r y i s c h a r g e d w i t h t h e p r i n c i p a l m i s s i o n i n combat. P r e c e d e d , p r o t e c t e d , a n d a c c o m p a n i e d by a r t i l l e r y f i r e , a i d e d w h e r e p o s s i b l e by t a n k s a n d a v i a t i o n , i t conquers, occupies, organizes, and h o l d s t e r r a i n t 371

D e s p i t e t h i s m i n d s e t a n d t h e e c o n o m i c b u r d e n s i m p o s e d by t h e M a g i n o t L i n e and l a t e r the Great Depression, t a k e s t e p s t o w a r d m e c h a n i z a t i o n of I n fact, France d i d

i t s f o r c e s i n t h e 1930s.

i t p r o d u c e d some o f t h e b e s t t a n k s of

the era.

I t

m o d e r n i z e d s l o w l y p i e c e m e a l i n g m o s t of support.

the tanks t o i n f a n t r y

When t h e Germans r o l l e d through P o l a n d i n 1939, of infantry,

F r e n c h d o c t r i n e w a s s t i l l b a s e d on t h e ' p r i m a c y the c a r e f u l advance of plan."[381 o r g a n i z a t i o n of a l l elements

a r t i l l e r y and the methodical

i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h an e l a b o r a t e

I t s f r a n t i c e f f o r t s t o p u t t o g e t h e r more armored

f o r m a t i o n s c o u l d not overcome t h e i r training.

l a c k of d o c t r i n e and

L i k e i t s European a l l i e s t h e

U.S. A r m y f o u n d i t s e f f o r t s

to modernize

in the

i n t e r w a r y e a r s h a m p e r e d by b u d g e t sentiment, d o c t r i n a l confusion,

c o n s t r a i n t s , general anti-war

and the b i a s o f c a v a l r y and i n f a n t r y t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s . America's power; i s o l a t i o n i s t a t t i t u d e s l e d t o a f o c u s on n a v a l

a c t i v e ground f o r c e s were t e w and were p r i m a r i l y few overseas h o l d i n g s and t r a i n i n g

p o l i c i n g America's reserves.

61

Doctrinally, the French. the French,

t h e U.S.

Army was p r o f o u n d l y i n f l u e n c e d by like

C o m b i n e d arms w a s g i v e n f a i n t p r a i s e and,

t a n k s were s u b o r d i n a t e d a s i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t

v e h i c l e s and p u t under the c o n t r o l t h e N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e A c t of 1920.

of

the

i n f a n t r y b r a n c h by

The A r m y even i s s u e d f i e l d

manuals t h a t were d i r e c t t r a n s l a t i o n s of French manuals.[371 The a c t i v e a r m y w a s r e d u c e d i n s i z e a n d w a s s p r e a d a c r o s s America

i n regimental and b a t t a l i o n s i z e u n i t s .

There were

n o a c t i v e d i v i s i o n s u n t i l j u s t b e t o r e W o r l d War Armys large general concept of f u t u r e war, however,

11.

lhe

envisioned supported

i n f a n t r y armies a t t a c k i n g tanks,

on

p a r a l l e l routes,

by m a s s i v e a r t i l l e r y ,

and a i r p o w e r ;

d i r e c t e d by

e l e c t r o n i c communications;

a n d t r a n s p o r t e d a n d s u p p l i e d by

motor v e h i c l e s . [ 4 0 1

Despite f i s c a l

c o n s t r a i n t s t h e army e s t a b l i s h e d a i n 1Y28 a n d

s h o r t l i v e d e x p e r i m e n t a l mechanized f o r c e

c o l l o c a t e d i t w i t h t h e I n f a n t r y T a n k S c h o o l a t Camp Meade, Maryland, t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p r o p e r equipment and d o c t r i n e tor

a mechanized f o r c e .

A s e c o n d e x p e r i m e n t a l b r i g a d e was f o r m e d
1 9 3 2 , when, under the the

a t F t . E u s t i s i n 1930 a n d e x i s t e d u n t i l leadership o f Chief o f Staff

General Douglas MacArthur,

e x p e r i m e n t a l m e c h a n i z e d f o r c e was r e o r g a n i z e d i n t o a m e c h a n i z e d c a v a l r y r e g i m e n t a n d moved t o F t . infantry retained responsibil t o d e v e l o p combat c a r s . i m p a c t of m e c h a n i z a t i o n .


i

Knox.

BY l a w ,

t y for

the tank;

c a v a l r y began

O t h e r b r a n c h e s began t o study t h e D u r i n g the 1Y3Os tank development 62

c e n t e r e d on t h e

trade off

between h e a v i l y armed and p r o t e c t e d

tanks versus light,

fast tanks.

W i t h c a v a l r y i n the v a n g u a r d
the

of

d e v e l o p i n g mechanized u n i t s i t i s n o t s u p r i s i n g t h a t
U.S.

l i g h t t a n k s w e r e f a v o r e d by m o s t . T h u s ,
War

t a n k s i n World

11 were g e n e r a l l r " r e l i a b l e

i n t e r m s o f m o b i l i t y but

vulnerable

i n armor and armament."t411

When w a r b r o k e o u t s c a t t e r i n g of

i n E u r o p e t h e U.S.

Army h a d a and

l i g h t tanks,

n o major armored f o r m a t i o n s ,

h a d n o t c o n d u c t e d l a r g e s c a l e maneuvers of armored f o r c e s . The i n i t i a l a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n w a s f o r m e d a r o u n d t h e n u c l e u s of units. I n i t i a l l y t a n k h e a v y (25 t a n k after t h e 1941 m a n e u v e r s

the experimental

companies t o 7 i n f a n t r y companies),

i t was r e m o d e l l e d a f t e r t h e 1941 p a n z e r d i v i s i o n w i t h a
balance between t a n k s and m o b i l e w i t h self propelled a r t i l l e r y , infantry units, complemented

an e n g i n e e r company a n d

s u p p o r t un i t s .

World War
much of

I a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g t r e a t y l e f t Germany w i t h
t e r r i t o r y o c c u p i e d or i n t h e h a n d s of

i t s former

other nations. political

I t had massive

i n t e r n a l economic and taste of a humiliating defeat.

turmoil

and t h e sour left

'The German Army, a 100,000 General

i m p o t e n t by t h e t r e a t y , w a s a u t h o r i z e d was n o t p e r m i t t e d i t s

man home d e f e n s e f o r c e ,

Staff,

a n d w a s s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d a s t o t h e k i n d s of

weapons and f o r c e s forbidden

i t c o u l d develop and possess.

While

to develop s o p h i s t i c a t e d f o r c e s

t h a t might b e used t h e German A r m y ,

in offensive action against

i t s neighbors,

63

nevertheless, planned f o r Army i n the

digested the m i l

t a r y l e s s o n s ot t h e w a r a n d t h e German

the f u t u r e .

A s John Engl i s h w r o t e of

interwar years.

i t s v e r y w e a k n e s s became a s t r e n g t h ; i n so smal 1 a f o r c e , no e f f o r t w a s s p a r e d t o e n c o u r a g e i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y and the p u r s u i t of p r o f e s s i o n a l Knowledge.[421

German m i l i t a r y t h i n k e r s w e r e experiences, m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y ,

i n f l u e n c e d by t h e i r o w n and c u l t u r e a s w e l l J.F.C. as

numerous f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y t h e o r i s t s .

F u l l e r and B a s i l

L i d d e l l H a r t a r e p o p u l a r l y c r c d i t e d w i t h h a v i n g an enormous i n f l u e n c e o n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of bl i tzkries.

P o s t w a r German commanders, ascertained that

e s p e c I a l 1 Y v o n Seeck t ,

improved b a t t l e f i e l d m o b i l i t y w o u l d have i n f i l t r a t i o n t a c t i c s o f 1918 w o r k

made t h e " s o f t s p o t " decisively.

They a l s o r e a l i z e d the need f o r m o b i l e

s u p p o r t i n g f i r e a n d saw t h e a i r c r a f t a s a p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n . T h e i r f u t u r e v i e w of war i n t h e e a r l y 1920s w a s o f large,

m o b i l e i n f a n t r y f o r c e s e m p l o y i n g i n f i l t r a t i o n t a c t i c s using aircraft t o p r o ~ e c tf i r e p o w e r f o r w a r d . W i t h Germany Hhineland,

p h y s i c a l l y f r a g m e n t e d by t r e a t y ( D a n z i g C o r r i d o r , et al)

t h e r e were no n a t u r a l b o r d e r s l e f t t o defend.

It is

n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e Germans saw t h e n e x t w a r a s a f l u i d , mobile, p r i m a r i l y o f f e n s i v e war t h a t r i s k e d b e i n g + O u g h t on

several f r o n t s again.

The e m e r g i n g m i 1 i t a r y t h i n k e r o f

i n t e r w a r Germany w a s

64

Heinz Guderian,

c a n m o n l r c r e d i t e d a s t h e f a t h e r of

the panzer

f o r c e s and t h e c r e a t o r of b l i t z k r i e g . war e x p e r i e n c e

An i n f a n t r y m a n , w i t h and a

i n wireless signal c m u n i c a t i o n s ,

General S t a f f o f f i c e r , Department and o v e r

he was p o s t e d t o t h e M o t o r T r a n s p o r t He s t u d i e d t a c t i c a l m o b i l t t r l e a d i n g advocate f o r i n f l u e n c e s of f o r e i g n

i n t h e e a r l y 1920s.

t i m e became Germany's

mechanization.

He a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e

t h e o r i s t s whom h e r e a d p r o f u s e l y .

I t was p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e b o o k s a n d a r t i c l e s of t h e Englishmen, F u l l e r , L i d d e l l H a r t , and M a r t e l , t h a t e x c i t e d m y i n t e r e s t a n d g a v e me f o o d f o r t h o u g h t . These f a r - s i g h t e d s o l d i e r s were even t h e n t r y i n g t o make of t h e t a n k s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n a i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t weapon. t 4 3 1


Guderian d i d n o t f a l l

i n t o the F u l l e r " a l l

tank"

trap as

L i d d e l l H a r t seemed t o h a v e d o n e ,

a s he r e a l i z e d e a r l y i n h i s

s t u d i e s t h a t a combined arms f o r c e was p a r a m o u n t .

I n t h e y e a r 1929, I became c o n v i n c e d t h a t t a n k s w o r k i n g on t h e i r own or i n c o n J u n c t i o n w i t h i n t a n t r r c o u l d never achieve d e c i s i v e importance. My h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s , the e x e r c i s e s c a r r i e d o u t i n E n g l a n d a n d our e x p e r i e n c e s w i t h m o c k u p s h a d p e r s u a d e d me t h a t t a n k s w o u l d n e v e r b e a b l e t o p r o d u c e t h e i r f u l l e f f e c t u n t i l t h e o t h e r w e a p o n s on whose s u p p o r t t h e y m u s t i n e v i t a b l y r e l y w e r e b r o u g h t up t o t h e i r s t a n d a r d o f s p e e d a n d c r o s s - c o u n t r y performance. I n s u c h a f o r m a t i o n o f a l l arms, t h e tank must p l a y t h e p r i m a r y r o l e , t h e o t h e r weapons b e i n g s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of armour.C441

A s J o n a t h a n House w r o t e ,

i t m i g h t seem i n e v i t a b l e t h a t o n c e c o m b i n e d w i t h t h e German e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l e f f e c t s o f t a n k s d u r i n g W o r l d War 1 , t h e German i n f i l t r a t i o n t a c t i c s , t h e b e l i e f i n massing on a n a r r o w f r o n t , and d e c e n t r a l i z e d e x e c u t i o n would l e a d t o b l i t z k r e i g . C 4 5 1

65

T h i s i s an e s p e c i a l l y t e m p t i n g argument r e c o g n i t i o n of

in light of

the e a r l y

the p o t e n t i a l of airpower.

T h e r e r e m a i n e d i n t h e German Army,

however,

c o n s i d e r a b l e number o f h i g h commanders w h o s t i 1 1 s a w m e c h a n i z a t i o n a s s p e c i a l weapons t o s u p p o r t m a r c h i n g i n f a n t r y divisions. The o t h e r b r a n c h e s o f t h e a r m y w a n t e d a s h a r e of e s p e c i a l l y for most s i g n i f i c a n t

t h e new m e c h a n i z e d a n d m o t o r i z e d s y s t e m s , c a v a l r y and i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s .

Guderians

b a t t l e s may we1 1 h a v e b e e n h i s f i g h t
1 i m i t e d mechanized systems

t o c o n c e n t r a t e Germanys

i n t o t h e panzer u n i t s and n o t t o

d i s s i p a t e them t o a l l d i v i s i o n s a s t h e F r e n c h h a d done. Guderian had the o p p o r t u n i t y t o demonstrate panzer t a c t i c s t o H i t l e r i n t h e m i d 1930s a n d won h i s s u p p o r t .

A t t h e s t a r t o f t h e P o l i s h c a m p a i g n t h e Germans h a d o n l y
a few panzer divisions;

although tank heavy,

they contained forces,

motorized infantry, engineers,

towed a r t i l l e r y ,

anti-tank

reconnaissance and signal u n i t s .

The German a i r the close a i r

f o r c e s h a d d i v e bombers s p e c i a l l y d e s i g n e d f o r support r o l e

The S o v i e t U n i o n a n d i t s Red Army w e r e b o r n i n t h e a f t e r m a t h o f W o r l d War


I. I n t e r w a r d e v e l o p m e n t s w e r e s h a p e d

by c i v i l w a r w h i c h l a s t e d u n t i l

1921. The w i d e e x p a n s e s of

S o v i e t t e r r a i n a n d u n d e r s t r e n g t h f o r c e s l e d t o maneuver w a r f a r e during the c i v i l war. l e d i t s pre-eminent The s u c c e s s e s o f t h e Red Army to

m i l i t a r y thinker, 66

M.N.

lukhachevsky,

s t u d y m o b i l e combined arms,

i n i t i a l l y f o c u s i n g on t h e interdependence of

i n t e r a c t i o n a l processes that explain the i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y .

A s John E r i c k s o n h a s w r i t t e n ,

The t e r m c o m b i n e d arms came i n t o g e n e r a l u s e i n t h e 1920s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f i n t e n s e i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o t h e e x p e r i e n c e s o f W o r l d War I a n d t h e C i v i l War a n d n o t l e a s t a s a p a r t of t h e e f f o r t s t o d e v e l o p a n d implement a unique S o v i e t / p r o l e t a r i a n t h e o r y of w a r f a r e . [ 461 T h o u g h t h e S o v i e t s u n d e r S t a l i n w e r e commi t t e d t o developing the S o v i e t Union i n t e r n a l l y f i r s t , t h e Red Army

w a s i n t e n d e d t o e v e n t u a l l y become a v e h i c l e f o r s p r e a d i n g i t s p o l i t i c a l doctrine to other nations, p r i m a c y of the offense, therefore, this mil


I

e s p e c i a l l y Europe.

The in

became a d r i v i n g f o r c e t a r y machine.

developing a d o c t r i n e for m a n e u v e r b a t t l e s of

The f l u i d

t h e C i v i l War c o n v i n c e d T u K h a c h e v s k y t h a t This theory of

o p e r a t i o n s must be c o n d u c t e d i n d e p t h .

o p e r a t i o n s i n d e p t h w e l d e d a number o f o t h e r o p e r a t i o n a l i m p e r a t i v e s such a s o f f e n s i v e a n e x p a n d i n g v i e w of action, shock, and s u r p r i s e t o included

combined arms,

one t h a t

mechanized f o r c e s and a i r p o w e r . Requlation. S o v i e t Army

T h e 1936

F i e l d Service

i s the c u l m i n a t i n g p i e c e of

TuKhachevskys

e f f o r t s a n d i s a m a s t e r p i e c e o f p r e - W o r l d War He e n v i s i o n e d a c o m h i n e d a r m s a n d a r t i l l e r y a t t a c k i n g i n m a s s on followed by a
to destroy

1 1 combined arms d o c t r i n e .

f o r c e of

infantry,

tanks,

a narrow f r o n t

t o p e n e t r a t e enemy d e f e n s e s ,

second e c h e l o n of mechanized f o r c e s t o e x p l o i t enemy r e a r a r e a f o r c e s s u c h a s r e s e r v e s , headquarters, and support i n s t a l l a t i o n s .

artillery,

67

I n f a n t r y was s t i l l e n v i s i o n e d a s t h e c e n t e r p i e c e ot t h e c o m b i n e d a r m s team.

The infantry in close cooperation w i t h the artillery and tanks. by d e c i s i v e a c t i o n i n a t t a c k a n d by m a i n t a i n i n g t h e p o s i t i o n i n t h e d e f e n s e , d e c i d e s t h e outcome of t h e b a t t l e . Therefore, the o t h e r types of f o r c e s o p e r a t l n g j o i n t l y w i t h the i n f a n t r y are c a r r y i n g o u t t h e i r mi5sions i n the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i n f a n t r y , e n a b l ~ n gi t t o a d v a n c e i n an o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n and t o m a i n t a i n i t s e l f i n defense.[471

The S o v i e t s r a t e d a r t i l l e r y a 5 " t h e m o s t e f f i c a c i o u s a n d pcrwerful


arm."

I t w a s s e e n a s t h e a r m t h a t " p a v e s t h e way t o r
i n an a d u a n c e , " a n d w a s t h e p r i m a r y means a n d enemy p e r s o n n e l ,

a l l ground f o r c e s

of destroying tanks,
weapons, and v e h i c l e s

fortifications,

i n t h e open.C481

The S o v i e t s e n v i s i o n e d t a n k s a s h a v i n g t w o d i s t i n c t roles. I n s u p p o r t of i n f a n t r y t h e y took advantage of t o d e s t r o y machine guns and Tanks i n massed f o r m a t i o n s

p r o t e c t i o n and f i r e p o w e r obstacles,

especially wire.

s u p p o r t e d by o t h e r m e c h a n i z e d a r m s w o u l d b r e a k t h r o u g h t o attack i n depth. These t a n k s t h e S o v i e t s r e f e r r e d t o a s While these s t r a t e g i c the tank f o r m a t i o n s

strategic

tanks.C49l

were t o c o n t a i n m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y ,

p r i n c i p a l m e t h o d o f a c t i o n of a m e c h a n i z e d f o r c e b a t t l e i 5 by a tanK a t t a c k c o v e r e d by o r g a n i z e d artillery fire. and...should b e s u p p o r t e d by au i a t i o n . C501

in

..

The t e n d e n c y f o r S o v i e t t a n k s t o a t t a c k and l e a v e t h e i r

68

i n f a n t r y b e h i n d would r e s u l t

i n many t a c t i c a l f a i l u r e s

in

t h e i r f i g h t a g a i n s t t h e Germans.

Unfortunately for

the Soviets,

s e v e r a l f a c t o r s caused

t h i s m a t u r e c o m b i n e d a r m s d o c t r i n e t o become u n e x e c u t a b l e by
t h e o u t b r e a k of World War X I . T u k h a c h e v s k r a n d many o f Second, apparent Stal in's purges eliminated

t h o s e who u n d e r s t o o d h i s t e a c h i n g s . t h e S p a n i s h C i v i 1 War c a u s e d Third,


by t h e

lessons o f

doubts about

the d o c t r i n e .

time of

t h e German their

i n v a s i o n of P o l a n d t h e S o v i e t s h a d disbanded m o s t of strategic tank corps.

Some m o t o r i z e d d i v i s i o n s w e r e c r e a t e d t h e m o s t p a r t t a n k s were r e l e g a t e d

t o r e p l a c e them,

but for

t o infantry support r o l e s .

The p u r g e s ,

reorganization,

a n d doc tr. i n a l c h a n g e s 1 e t t

t h e Red A r m y i n s a d c o n d i t i o n a s t h e a b o r t i v e a c t i o n s t o o c c u p y P o l a n d and t o d e f e a t F i n l a n d d e m o n s t r a t e d . h i g h l y successful action against t h e Japanese


Only in

the

i n Manchuria i n

1939 d i d S o v i e t f o r c e s ,
Tukhachevsky's

under t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f

d i s c i p l e G e n e r a l Z h u k o v , ma55 m e c h a n i z e d combined arms b a t t l e in

f o r c e s and conduct a w e l l executed, the o p e n i n g phases o f the war.

'Thus,

t h e i n t e r w a r p e r i o d w a s one o f

thought and the trench

e x a m i n a t i o n of m e t h o d s t o a v o i d a r e p e t i t i o n o f w a r f a r e of firepower, the p r e v i o u s war.

M o b i l i t y , more p r e c i s e l y m o b i l e Although nations

was t h e a p p a r e n t answer.

u n d e r s t o o d t o v a r y i n g degrees the need t o t i g h t as combined

69

arms,

t h e r e was a w i d e v a r i e t y of

"how to" d o c t r i n e .

World War I 1

Infantry,

by f o r c e

o f e c o n o m i c s and d o c t r i n e ,

was s t i l l

the p r i n c i p a l

f i g h t i n g a r m o f a l l a r m i e s a t t h e o u t s e t of
T h e bulk o f a l l

World W a r 11.

armies remained the marching

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s u p p o r t e d b y h o r s e or v e h i c l e t o w e d
artillery. M o b i l e f o r c e s e x i s t e d i n each army but

i n 1439

o n l y G e r m a n y had c o n c e n t r a t e d m o s t of

i t s mechanized f o r c e s

i n t o a l l a r m m o b i l e d i v i s i o n s that w e r e c a p a b l e of f l u i d ,

high tempo o p e r a t i o n s .

The d e s i r e t o p r o v i d e m o b i l e ,

protected firepower to i t s infantry d i v i s ~ o n s precluded most armies f r o m f o r m i n g l a r g e mechanized formations. German a t t a c k After the

into Poland,

the French,

British,

and A m e r i c a n

armies scrambled to c r e a t e s i m i l a r forces, moved t o r e c o n s t i t u t e t h e i r m o b i l e f o r c e s .

and t h e S o v i e t s
The F r e n c h who

had p i e c e m e a l e d m o s t o f

t h e i r s u p e r i o r tanks t o i n f a n t r y

f o r m a t i o n s were s t i l l f r a n t i c a l l y t r y i n g t o f o r m armored d i v i s i o n s w h e n G u d e r i a n and c o m p a n y d r o v e t h r o u g h t h e Ardennes t o t h e sea.

B I i t z k r i e g t a c t i c s were essent ial 1 y the t a c t i c s of W o r l d War f o r c e w h i c h sought defenses,

i n f i 1 t r a t i on

1 e x e c u t e d by a c o m b i n e d a r m s m e c h a n i z e d
forward

t o p e n e t r a t e t h e c r u s t of

b y p a s s strong r e s i s t a n c e ,

and q u i c k l y a t t a c k
for the

into

t h e enemy r e a r a r e a s . penetration;

S u r p r i s e was v i t a l

initial

s p e e d a n d t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f momentum w e r e k e y
70

~n p a r a l y z i n g t h e enemy, r e c o n s t i t u t e a defense.

a f f o r d i n g him no time to

I n b o t h P o l a n d and France t h e panzer


The d i v e b o m b e r p r o v i d e d a a s much o f
the

d i v i s i o n s d e p e n d e d on s p e e d . substantial p a r t of

t h e needed f i r e p o w e r , Rather

German a r t i l l e r y w a s h o r s e drawn.

than w a i t for armored f o r m a t i o n s


to

m a r c h i n g i n f a n t r y t o e f f e c t a pene r a t i o n , l e d the a t t a c k ;

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s f o l l o w e d on f o o t c l e a r p o c k e t s of r e s i s t a n c e ,

consol i d a t e gains, s u p p l y l i n e s open.

and keep t h e

To m a i n t a i n a h i g h tempo a n d t o e x p l o i t
the panzer f o r m a t i o n s d i d n o t d e l a y

m o b i l e s t r i k i n g power,

t h e c o n t i n u e d a t t a c k b u t d r o v e deep r e l y i n g on t h e i r o r g a n i c ,

but 1 i m i t e d ,

m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y and engineer elements t o

m a i n t a i n f o r w a r d m o b i l i t y and t o p r o v i d e l o c a l s e c u r i t y for

t h e tank spearheads.

Marching i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s closed w i t h

t h e f r a g m e n t e d enemy a s q u i c k l y a s p o s s i b l e t o c o m p l e t e t h e d e s t r u c t i o n and t o c o n s o l i d a t e gains.

D e s p i t e s h o c k i n g success i n these e a r l y campaigns, Germans l e a r n e d many v a l u a b l e concerns were equipment. lessons. The r f o r e m o s t tactics, and

the

i n the areas of o r g a n i z a t i o n ,

The t a n k h e a v y p a n z e r d i v i s i o n

f o u r tank,

three

t r u c k mounted i n f a n t r y , was too u n w i e l d y ,

and two towed a r t i l e r y b a t t a l i o n s )

and the l i g h t d i v i s i o n ( t w o m o t o r i z e d

i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t s a n d one t a n k b a t t a l i o n ) l a c k e d c o m b a t power t o s u s t a i n o p e r a t i o n s . have enough m o b i l e i n f a n t r y . The p a n z e r d i v i s i o n s d i d n o t

A s G e n e r a l F.M.

von Senger u n d

E t t e r l i n s t a t e d i n h i s forward to Richard Simpkins Warfare i

Tank

71

the f a i l u r e o f the panzer d i v i s i o n s i n Guderian's corps t o e n c i r c l e the B r i t i s h f o r c e s a t Dunkirk p r o v i d e s t h e most s t r i k i n g p r o o f o f t h e imbalance of t a n k s and i n f a n t r y i n the o l d d i v i s i o n s . BY t h e t i m e t h e y r e a c h e d t h e Channel c o a s t h i s p a n z e r d i v i s i o n s had so f e w i n f a n t r y a v a i l a b l e t h a t t h e c o r p s w a s n o t i n a p o s i t i o n t o push f o r w a r d a c r o s s t h e marshes and take Dunkirk.rJ11

German t a n k s h a d a l s o p r o v e d t o b e t o o 1 i g h t a n d u n r e l i a b l e . The M a r k I and I 1 t a n k s u s e d i n t h e Pol i s h c a m p a i g n w e r e v i r t u a l l y i m m o b i l e a t t h e e n d due t o s u p p l y a n d maintenance problems. I n t h e c a m p a i g n i n F r a n c e some n e w e r

and more r e 1 i a b l e t a n k s were a v a i l a b l e , b u t t h e o l d e r ones

s t i l l c o n s t i t u t e d t h e b u l k of
t h e C h a n n e l c o a s t Rommel's

the force.

D u r i n g t h e march t o i n t h e f l a n k by l i g h t German direct

f o r c e s were s t r u c k The

a small f o r c e of h e a v i e r B r i t i s h tanks.
t a n k s were o u t matched and o n l y t h e

improvised use of

f i r e a r t i l l e r y a n d d i r e c t ground f i r e of

the anti-airc.raft

guns (88's) t u r n e d t h e B r i t i s h b a c k .

Kenneth Macksey c i t e s
i n t h e German

t h i s engagement a s a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r

d e c i s i o n t o p u t m o r e p o w e r f u l armament on t h e i r t h e y c o u l d combat o t h e r tanks.C521

t a n k s so t h a t

There were a l s o unexpected b e n e f i t s .

Not o n l y h a d t h e
b u t the h a l f

88's proved to be deadly anti-tank


t r a c k e d armored v e h i c l e , a r t i l l e r y p r i m e mover,
mobility.

weapons,

u s e d i n p a n z e r d i v i s i o n s as a n

p r o v e d t o have superb cross c o u n t r y t o transport infantry

I t became a n i d e a l v e h i c l e

i n armored b a t t l e s ,

r e p l a c i n g the t r u c k which had v e r y

l i m i t e d cross c o u n t r y m o b i l i t y compared w i t h the tank and

72

o f f e r e d no a r m o r p r o t e c t i o n f o r panzerarenadierwaaen

the troops.

l w o such

were produced,

t h e l i g h t Sd.Kfz.250, which

w h i c h c o u l d c a r r y 6 men, c o u l d c a r r y 1 2 men.1531

and t h e h e a v i e r Sd.Kfz.251 Yet,

a s t h e number o f p a n z e r

d i v i s i o n s and t h e r a t i o of increased, p o r t i o n of tracks.

armored i n f a n t r y t o t a n k s

t h e Germans w e r e n e v e r a b l e t o e q u i p m o r e t h a n a t h e i r panzer d i v i s i o n i n f a n t r y w i t h these h a l f

Although n o t w i t h o u t problems i n execution,


of d i v e bombing Stultas

the concept advancing

providing firepower

for

panzer f o r m a t i o n s proved v i t a l .

The m o s t n o t a b l e i n c i d e n t

o c c u r r e d when a i r a t t a c k s on F r e n c h p o s i t i o n s a i d e d t h e German a s s a u l t c r o s s i n g o f t h e Meuse R i v e r a t S e d a n .

The b a t t l e a t Sedan a l s o g r a p h i c a l l y h i g h 1 i g h t s t t . c r i t i c a l r o l e of i n f a n t r y and engineers t o s u s t a i n the armor. Dismounted armored i n t a n t r y and

f o r w a r d movement of engineer

u n i t s c r o s s e d t h e Meuse i n r u b b e r b o a t s t o s e c u r e a

c r i t i c a l bridgehead.

I n March 1941,

t h e Germans i s s u e d a m a n u a l d e t a i l i n g t h e

i m p o r t a n c e a n d t h e p r o p e r employment of m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y . Motorized infantry u n i t s form the offensive i n f a n t r y element i n t h e armored d i v i s i o n . Their strength l i e s i n t h e i r speed and c r o s s - c o u n t r y performance, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f numerous a u t o m a t i c weapons and p r o t e c t i v e armor..

M o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a b i l i t y t o a l t e r n a t e r a p i d l y between f i g h t i n g f r o m c a r r i e r s and

73

f i g h t i n g o n f o o t , a n d a l s o t o c c i n b i n e t h e s e two methods of combat...


The c h i e f t a s k o f m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y i s c l o s e cooperation w i t h tanks. By f o l l o w i n g up c l o s e l y t h e y can q u i c k l y e x p l o i t the tanks' success... M o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y . . . p r e p a r e t h e ground f o r t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f t a n k s b y c l e a r i n g a way t h o u g h c o u n t r y di f f i c u l t or i m p o s s i b l e for tanks.. [541

The

i n v a s i o n of R u s s i a i n 1941 was a m a s s i v e u n d e r t a k i n g

f o r w h i c h Germany w a s n o t p r e p a r e d d e s p i t e t h e f a c t army was i n i t s b e s t c o n d i t i o n e v e r .


for,

that

its

The Germans p a n n e d The a trition the the and

b u t f a i l e d t o achieve,

another quick v i c t o r y .

e a s t e r n f r o n t by 1 9 4 2 became a l a r g e s c a l e w a r of t h a t Germany w a s d e s t i n e d t o l o s e . S o v i e t Union, the harsh c l i m a t e ,

The v a s t e x p a n s e s of

the l o n g supply l i n e s ,

1 i m i t a t i o n s of German manpower a n d i n d u s t r i a l c a p a c i t y ,
the pigheaded r e f u s a l
of

t h e S o v i e t s t o be b e a t e n a l l

c o n t r i b u t e d t o e v e n t u a l German f a i l u r e .

The German o f f e n s i v e versions of France.

t a c t i c s of

1941-42 were

improved

t h e t a c t i c s t h a t had succeeded i n P o l a n d and

E q u i p p e d w i t h more v e r s a t i l e and r e l i a b l e equipment the The

and o r g a n i z e d i n t o more b a l a n c e d panzer d i v i s i o n s , Germans q u i c K l y h a d t h e s u r p r i s e d S o v i e t s r e e l i n g .

Germans u s e d c o m b i n e d a r m s b a t t l e g r o u p s t o l e a d t h e a t t a c k s ; o n c e p e n e t r a t i o n s or f l a n k i n g m o v e m e n t s h a d s u c c e e d e d , panzer f o r c e s e n c i r c l e d l a r g e S o v i e t formations. insufficient amount of German m o b i l e f o r c e s , The the

however, these the

p e r m i t t e d many S o v i e t f o r c e s t o s l i p o u t of encirclements.

The p a n z e r f o r c e s w e r e f o r c e d t o w a t t f o r 74

a r r i v a l of

the foot mobile

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s to deal w i t h e n c i r c l e d a n d c a p t u r e d enemy.

t h e l a r g e number of b y p a s s e d , These pauses, w h i l e t h e Russian t e r r a i n ,

i n f a n t r y marched a c r o s s the e n d l e s s

s l o w e d t h e tempo o f o p e r a t i o n s a n d a l l o w e d

the S o v i e t s t o patch together defenses t h a t e v e n t u a l l y s t o p p e d t h e Germans i n f r o n t o f M o s c o w .

As p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d ,

t h e R e d Army w a s n o t After

i n good

s h a p e when t h e Germans a t t a c k e d .

t h e heavy l o s s e s of

1941,

i t had t o v i r t u a l l y s t a r t over

in rebuilding its
These l o s s e s f u r t h e r

forces,

e s p e c i a l l y i t s armored f o r c e s .

d e p l e t e d t h e l i m i t e d number o f

t r a i n e d and knowledgeable

o f f i c e r s i t needed t o employ t h e combined arms f o r c e s t h a t could regenerate. A s t o p gap s o l u t i o n w a s t o c r e a t e

i t

infantry

u n i t s and t o p o o l s p e c i a l i z e d weapons a n d u n i t s under h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s w h e r e t h e y c o u l d b e e m p l o y e d by m o r e e x p e r i e n c e d commanders. T h i s r e s u l t e d i n a near t o t a l e s p e c i a l l y a t the t a c t i c a l breakdown o f l e v e l .[551

combined arms,

W h i l e t h e Red Army r e m a i n e d p r i m a r i l y a n i n f a n t r y f o r c e ,
t h e S o v i e t s produced t w o o f

t h e most a d v a n c e d t a n k s o f
Too f e w o f

the

era,

t h e T34 a n d t h e K U l .

these t a n k s h a d been

p r o d u c e d by 1941 so t h e Germans i n i t i a l l y e n c o u n t e r e d l i g h t , outmoded models. A s t h e S o v i e t s s t r u g g l e d t o h a l t t h e German

a d v a n c e t h e f e w t a n k s t h a t became a v a i l a b l e w e r e h a s t i l y o r g a n i z e d a n d p i ecemeal e d i n t o b a t t 1 e infantry.

usual 1Y

in

s u p p o r t of

75

Once t h e S o v i e t s h a 1 t e d t h e Germans t h e y b e g a n t o r e b u i l d tank c o r p s a n d a r m i e s . These f o r m a t i o n s were

i n t e n d e d t o be u s e d a s m o b i l e g r o u p s t o e x p l o i t p e n e t r a t i o n s a n d t o a t t a c k d e e p i n t o t h e German r e a r . Tank p r o d u c t i o n

i n c r e a s e d a n d t h e S o v i e t s h a d both a q u a l i t a t i v e a n d q u a n t i t a t i v e e d g e by l a t e 1942. r e t a i n e d a d e c i d e d advantage over T h e Germans, however,

the Soviets i n trained

c r e w s a n d e x p e r i e n c e d commanders u n t i l a t l e a s t 1943, a n d a l t h o u g h outnumbered, l o s s e s on t h e S o v i e t s . usual I Yi n f l i c t e d d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e

S o v i e t a r m o r e d f o r m a t i o n s r e m a i n e d tanK h e a v y t h r o u g h o u t the war. P a r t of t h e p r o b l e m was t h e l r l a c k of trucks,

p r o d u c t i o n a n d l e n d l e a s e o f w h i c h n e v e r came c l o s e t o m e e t i n g demands.

As a r e s u l t t h e S o v i e t s d i d n o t d e v e l o p a
i t s tank forces.

c r e d i b l e armored i n f a n t r y p a r t n e r for typical S o v i e t armored a t t a c k

i s d e s c r i b e d by G e n e r a l v o n Tank W a r f a r e :

Senger u n d E t t e r l i n i n S i m p k i n s

The S o v i e t t a n k s b r o k e t h r o u g h t h e t h i n l i n e o f German i n f a n t r y a n d p e n e t r a t e d f a i r l y d e e p l y . Having r e a c h e d t h i s d e p t h w i t h o u t i n f a n t r y o f t h e i r own t h e y q u i c k l y f e l l v i c t i m t o h a s t i l y r e g r o u p e d German a r m o r e d r e s e r v e s , or t o t h e 88mm guns.. . T h e y w e r e h e l p l e s s b e c a u s e t h e i r i n f a n t r y f o l l o w i n g on f o o t became s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e t a n k s a t t h e n e a r edge o f t h e combat zone. Whenever German a r t i 1 l e r y w a s i n a c t i o n w i t h r e a s o n a b l e s u p p l i e s of a m m u n i t i o n a n d s c o p e f o r o b s e r v a t i o n , i t s u c c e e d e d i n p i n n i n g down or a n n i h i l a t i n g t h e u n p r o t e c t e d i n f a n t r y . . . T h e tanKs w e r e n o t h a n d l e d f l e x i b l y e n o u g h t o make u p f o r t h e a b s e n c e o f i n f a n t r y , or f o r t h a t m a t t e r o f o t h e r a r m s . C 561

G e n e r a l v o n S e n g e r u n d E t t e r l i n sums u p t h e p r o b l e m s o f

the

76

S o v i e t a r m o r e d f o r m a t i o n s i n t h i s manner:

T h r o u g h t h e w h o l e o f W o r l d War I 1 t h e S o v i e t s h a d no armored i n f a n t r y . T h e i r t a n k s were some i f n o t most of t h e t i m e t e c h n i c a l l y s u p e r i o r t o t h e Germans; a s t i m e went on t h e y came t o b e w e l l h a n d l e d . Yet t h e i r t a n k s a l o n e d i d n o t have t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o s u c c e e d a t the t a c t i c a l l e v e l , l e t alone the o p e r a t i o n a l the S o v i e t A r m y , d e s p i t e i t s s u p e r i o r e q u i p m e n t , was p r i m a r i l y h a n d i c a p p e d by t h e s t r u c t u r a l i m b a l a n c e of i t s mechanized f o r m a t i o n s . I t l a c k e d t h e c a p a b i l i t y of b r i n g i n g i n f a n t r y t o b a t t l e u n d e r a r m o r . t 5 7 1

....

W i t h o u t m o b i l e means f o r

i t s infantry,

the S o v i e t s had

t o i m p r o v i s e t o i n s u r e t h a t a t l e a s t some i n f a n t r y

accanpanied tanks. battle,

I n f a n t r y began t o h a b i t u a l l y r i d e

into

a t c o n s i d e r a b l e r i s k , on t o p o f t h e t a n k s .

While

t h i s was n o t e x c l u s i v e l y a S o v i e t p r a c t i c e ,

i t became

i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n t h a t army w h i l e r e m a i n i n g an improvisation i n others. s o l d i e r s were designated, Tank l a n d i n g troops,t581 a s these

w e r e s u s c e p t i b l e t o t h e e f f e c t s of
any d i r e c t f i r e s a t them or

a r t i l l e r y , mine5 h i t by the tank, a t t h e t a n k and t h e t a n k

i t s e l f as i t t r a v e r s e d i t s t u r r e t o r

sped c r o s s c o u n t r y over rough ground.

A c t i o n s i n N o r t h A f r i c a r e v e a l e d the absolute requirement f o r i n f a n t r y t o be mobile i n d e s e r t enu~ronments. i n no small

The B r i t i s h h a d an e a s y t i m e w i t h t h e I t a l i a n s ,

p a r t due t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e I t a l i a n A r m y c o n s i s t e d a l m o s t e n t i r e l y o f non-motorized of i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t e d by a s m a t t e r i n g As

outmoded, g r o s s l y u n r e l i a b l e t a n k s and a r t i l l e r y .

Rome1 w r o t e :

77

I n the N o r t h A f r i c a n d e s e r t , non-motorized t r o o p s are o f p r a c t i c a l l y n o v a l u e a g a i n s t m o t o r i z e d enemy, s i n c e t h e enemy h a s t h e chance i n a l m o s t e v e r y p o s i t i o n , o f m a k i n g t h e a c t i o n f l u i d by a t u r n i n g movement .Non-motor i z e d f o r m a t i o n s . .can on1 Y b e u s e d a g a i n s t a modern army d e f e n s i v e l y and i n prepared p o s i t i o n s I n m o b i l e w a r f a r e , t h e advantage l i e s a s a r u l e w i t h the side which i s s u b j e c t t o the l e a s t r e s t r a i n t on a c c o u n t o f i t s n o n - m o t o r i z e d troops.[591

..

...

Tactically, though i m p o r t a n t ,

even m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y p l a y e d a s u p p o r t i n g , r o l e i n d e s e r t w a r f a r e where t h e r a n g e o f

t a n k and a n t i - t a n k weapons were p a r a m o u n t . the major p o r t i o n o f t h e war

The Germans r u l e d

i n t h e d e s e r t by t h e i r guns.[601 Motorized

a g g r e s s i v e employment o f a n t i - t a n k

i n f a n t r y moved w i t h t a n k s and a n t i - t a n k mopped up p o s i t i o n s o v e r r u n by Rommel's invaluable

guns i n f o r m a t i o n and forces. They w e r e

i n f i g h t i n g enemy i n p o s i t i o n a l d e f e n s e s and i n

removing m i n e f i e l d s .

A s i n other

t h e a t e r s , armor c o m m i t t e d

t o a t t a c k w i t h o u t accompanying i n f a n t r y o r a r t i l l e r y s u p p o r t often f e l l v i c t i m t o anti-tank guns w h i c h c o u l d have been

s u p p r e s s e d by a r t i l l e r y and e l i m i n a t e d by i n f a n t r y . [ 6 t l

Rommel h i m s e l f became h a n d i c a p p e d b y l a r g e c o n t i n g e n t s
o f non-motorized

infantry, primarily I t a l i a n s but also

Germans a s h i s l i m i t e d s t o c k o f a r m o r e d v e h i c l e s and t r u c k s became a t t r i t e d i n b a t t l e .

He was c o n s t a n t l y r e q u i r e d i n t h e

d e f e n s e o r r e t r o g r a d e t o use h i s l i m i t e d a r m o r e d f o r c e s t o buy t i m e f o r i n f a n t r y . C 621 t h e w i t h d r a w a l o r movement o f h i s marching

78

I t was t h e m e t i c u l o u s l y p l a n n e d , c a r e f u l l y e x e c u t e d ,
combined arms o p e r a t i o n s of Montgomery t h a t f i n a l l y p u t t h e A f r i k a CorDs on t h e t r a i l

t o defeat.

Rommel d e s c r i b e d t h e

c o m b i n e d a r m s t a c t i c s of A l a m e i n onward:

t h e B r i t i s h E i g h t h Army f r o m E l

When o u r d e f e n s e h a d b e e n s h a t t e r e d by a r t i 1 l e r r , tanks a n d a i r f o r c e , t h e B r i t i s h i n f a n t r y a t t a c k e d . W i t h o u r o u t p o s t s p i n n e d down b y a r t i l l e r r fire highly t r a i n e d sappers, w o r k i n g under cover of smoke, c l e a r e d m i n e s a n d c u t b r o a d l a n e s t h r o u g h our minefields. Then t h e tanks a t t a c k e d , f o l l o w e d c l o s e l y by i n f a n t r y E u e r y t h i n g went m e t h o d i c a l l y a n d a c c o r d i n g t o d r i l l .[631

...

...

A s mentioned,
mobile,

t h e U.S.

Army h a d o p t e d t o p r o d u c e m o r e

r e l l a b l o t a n k s a t t h e e x p e n s e o f armament a n d a r m o r
The initial armored d i u i s i o n , modeled a f t e r
the

protection.

panzer d i v i s i o n ,

wa5 t a n k h e a v y ,

c o n s i s t i n g of s i x l i g h t and

t w o h e a v y t a n k b a t t a l i o n s c o m p l e m e n t e d by o n l y t w o b a t t a l on s
of

mobile

i n f a n t r y and t h r e e a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s .

Later n a

r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s f o l l o w e d German i n i t i a t i v e s a n d r e s u l t e d b a l a n c e d tank-armored i n f a n t r y m i x w i t h a more f l e x i b l e

comnand s t r u c t u r e t o f a c i 1 i t a t e f o r m i n g c o m b i n e d a r m s c o m b a t commands. T h e s e b a t t l e g r o u p s w e r e f o r m e d by c r o s s a t t a c h i n g companies between tank and armored i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s . Often a i r defense a r t i l l e r y , tank d e s t r o y e r s , and e n g i n e e r s

w e r e a d d e d t o c o m p l e t e t h e c o m b i n e d a r m s team.

The

infantry division, three

t r i a n g u l a r s i n c e t h e l a t e 19305,

c o n s i s t e d of artillery.

i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t s and s u p p o r t i n g Chief

General L e s l i e McNair,

o f Army G r o u n d

79

Forces, b e l i e v e d i n keeping the d i v i s i o n s t r u c t u r e small w i t h


only the minimal essential

forces permanently assigned. tank destroyers, e n g i n e e r s and

Tanks,

a i r defense a r t i l l e r y ,

other special

u n i t s were " p o o l e d " under h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s

c o n t r o l a n d w e r e t o be a t t a c h e d t o t h e s e d i v i s i o n s as t h e tactical support, situation dictated. Additionally,

most service

i n c l u d i n g t r a n s p o r t a t i o n assets,

were t o be

c o n t r o l l e d above d i v i s i o n a n d a l l o c a t e d a s t a c t i c a l requirements dictated. The d e c i s i o n t o k e e p i n f a n t r y

d i v i s i o n s l e a n c e r t a i n l y f a c i l i t a t e d s h i p p i n g them o v e r s e a s b u t r e s u l t e d i n problems i n combat. at their


t o fight

Commanders d i d n o t h a v e forces necessary

immediate d i s p o s a l a l l a s c o m b i n e d arms or situations.

t h e t y p e s of

t o q u i c k l y respond to r a p i d l y

changing t a c t i c a l

Once i n c o m b a t

i n France the

s p e c i a l t y u n i t s became m o r e or l e s s p e r m a n e n t l y a t t a c h e d tu the d i v i s i o n . have t a n k ,

A typical

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n i n the l i n e would a i r defense a r t i l l e r y , combat

tank d e s t r o y e r ,

e n g i n e e r s and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n u n i t s a t t a c h e d f o r extended periods of


t o the

time.

T h e s e a s s e t s o f t e n became f u r t h e r a l l o c a t e d Thus t a s k e d o r g a n i z e d , these

i n f a n t r y regiments.

"regimental

c o m b a t t e a m s " became t h e c o m b i n e d a r m s b a t t l e the infantry divisions.

f o r m a t i o n s of

U n l i k e t h e Germans and t h e S o v i e t s ,

t h e U.S.

Army d i d

n o t m a s s i t s a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s i i i t o a r m o r e d c o r p s or a r m i e s . The t y p i c a l U.S.
di v s i o n s ,
d l V

c o r p s i n France had t w o t o three

infantry

augmented a s n o t e d above,

a n d one a r m o r e d

sion,

u s u a l l y p o i s e d i n r e s e r v e t o e x p l o i t successes of
80

the

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s or t o c o u n t e r a t t a c k .

A s i g n i f i c a n t advantage of
effective f i e l d artillery.

t h e U.S.

Army w a s i t s v e r y i n t e r w a r y e a r s U.S.

During the

a r t i l l e r y had developed the f i r e

d i r e c t i o n center

(FDC)

c o n c e p t and an e x t e n s i v e f o r w a r d o b s e r v e r s y s t e m l i n k e d t o t h e FDC by r a d i o . T h e U.S. a r t i l l e r y was a b l e t o mass

a r t i l l e r y f i r e s f r o m numerous d i f f e r e n t f i r i n g u n i t s , a c c u r a t e l y and q u i c k l y . weapons, The d e v e l o p m e n t of other specialized

such as the tank d e s t r o y e r ,

a l s o permitted the f i e l d I n other

a r t i l l e r y t o c o n c e n t r a t e on i n d i r e c t f i r e s u p p o r t .

a r m i e s f i e l d a r t i l l e r y w a s t a s k e d t o p e r f o r m a number o f divergent missions, t h e i r capabi 1


i

such a5 a n t i - t a n k

fires,

which reduced

t y t o rnass.[641

A s U.S. K i
lers,

t a n k s were n o t armed n o r c o n c e i v e d a s t a n k Army d e v e l o p e d o t h e r w e a p o n s f o r


its

t h e U.S.

an i - t a n k

fires.

Two k e y U.S.

developments

i n anti-tank

w a r f a r e were the tank d e s t r o y e r ,

a tank surrogate w i t h a and l a t e r on a a

l a r g e c a l i b e r gun m o u n t e d on a h a l f - t r a c k , tank, chassis;

a n d t h e man p o r t a b l e " b a z o o k a , "

tube-launched, Improved over

s h a p e d c h a r g e r o u n d p r o p e l e d by a r o c k e t . the course o f the war, the tank destroyer

p r o v e d i t s e l f b e c a u s e i t w a s m o b i l e , was a b l e t o b e e m p l o y e d q u i c k l y a n d a f f o r d e d some a r m o r e d p r o t e c
I n a d d i t i o n to engaging tanks,

ion for

i t s crew.

i t often served as mobile,


i t was attached.C.551

d i r e c t f i r e for

the

i n f a n t r y to which

81

While o t h e r armies,

n o t a b l y t h e Germans a n d t h e S o v i e t s ,

developed s e l f p r o p e l l e d tank s u r r o g a t e s f o r a n t i - t a n k defense, t h e i r primary anti-tank weapons w e r e t o w e d a n t i - t a n k In

guns and t h e i r upgunned, more h e a v i l y p r o t e c t e d t a n k s . general,

t a n k s s t a r t e d t h e war a s i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t systems o r

w e r e f o c u s e d on d e s t r o y i n g s o f t t a r g e t s i n t h e enemy r e a r areas;
by t h e e n d o f

t h e war

t a n k s were viewed a s t h e

principal

anti-tank

system i n m o s t armies.

T h e man p o r t a b l e a n t i - t a n k

r o c k e t gave t h e

infantry

squad a n d p l a t o o n a b r o a d e r " c o m b i n e d arms' i n e x p e n s i v e s y s t e m w a s c o p i e d by o t h e r new e r a o f

capability.

rhis

armies ushering i n a German G e n e r a l the allied

i n f a n t r y d e f e n s e against t a n k s . claims that

Uhle-Wettler panzerfaust,

t h e German v e r s i o n ,

may h a v e d e s t r o y e d a s many a s 1 0 , 0 0 0

armored vehicles.[661

I t c e r t a i n l y provided the foxhole


tanks.

i n f a n t r y m a n w i t h some p o s i t i v e d e f e n s e a g a i n s t

Its

p r e s e n c e o n t h e b a t t l e f i e l d made m o r e a b s o l u t e t h e requirement for order i n f a n t r y t o accompany t a n k s i n t h e a t t a c k in

t o s u p p r e s s a n d d e s t r o y enemy i n f a n t r y a r m e d w i t h s u c h
weapons.

an a n t i - t a n k

I n f a n t r y and tank c o o p e r a t i o n r e q u i r e d e i t h e r

tanks t o in

f i g h t a t t h e pace of
s u p p o r t of t h e pace o f

infantry,

a s h a p p e n e d when t a n k s w e r e the infantry to fight at the l a t t e r , infantry

infantry units, the tank.

or f o i -

To a c c o m p l i s h

needed m o b i l i t y s i m i l a r t o the tank and i t needed i n c r e a s e d protection. Development of the armored personnel carrier

82

(APC),

however,

l a g g e d b e h i n d tank development.

When f a c e d

w i t h s e t t i n g i n d u s t r i a l p r i o r i t i e s f o r p r o d u c t i o n of armored
vehicles, v i r t u a l l y e v e r y n a t i o n o p t e d f o r t a n k s and m o b i l e infantry.

f i r e p o w e r over armored t r a n s p o r t f o r

T r u c k s were the p r i m a r y conveyance f o r m o b i l e


i n most armies a t

infantry armies

t h e s t a r t of

the war,

and i n s e v e r a l

that s i t u a t i o n p e r s i s t e d t h r o u g h o u t the war.

The r e q u i r e m e n t

t o move i n f a n t r y u n d e r some a r m o r p r o t e c t i o n l e a d t o t h e
development of armored p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r s . t h e U . S . Army s e t t l e d o n a o p e n t o p , L i k e t h e Germans

half-tracked vehicle.

The o p e n t o p w a s n o t s u c h a v u l n e r a b i l i t y a s I t may a p p e a r . The l i m i t e d u s e o f v a r i a b l e t i m e f u s e d a r t i l l e r y made airbursts rare, and the U.S.-invented p r o x i m i t y f u z e was

i n t r o d u c e d l a t e i n t h e war.

The o p e n t o p w a s a l i a b i l i t y

p r i m a r i l y when a t t a c k e d by a i r c r a f t o r when o p e r a t i n g i n c i t i e s or h i l l y t e r r a i n . The s t a n d a r d U . S . half-track was

t h e M 3 w h i c h c a r r i e d 14 men. b a t t a l i o n s were equipped w i t h

A l l o f the armored i n f a n t r y
it.

T h i s v e r s a t i l e p i e c e of

e q u i p m e n t w a s m o d i f i e d a n d u s e d f o r many o t h e r p u r p o s e s a n d

was a u p p l i e d t o the a l l i e s .

O v e r 40,000

were p r o d u c e d f r o m

1941-45.[671

World War

1 1 w i t n e s s e d t h e emergence of

tank f o r c e s a s a The albeit at a Infantry

muor partner

i n the combined arms g r o u n d f o r c e .

a b s o l u t e r e q u i r e m e n t t o f g h t as c o m b i n e d a r m s , m o r e r a p i d p a c e , w a s a ma o r lesson o f

t h i s war.

h a d b e e n r e q u i r e d t o d e v e op t h e m o b i l i t y a n d p r o t e c t i o n t o

83

f i g h t on t h e same b a t t l e f i e l d a s t a n k s .

Despite the r a p i d

a d v a n c e s i n w e a p o n s t e c h n o l o g y n o s i n g l e a r m o r weapon s y s t e m c o u l d dominate ground warfare, h a d b r o u g h t W o r l d War n o t e v e n t h e a t o m i c bomb w h i c h

11 t o an end.

T h e Nuc 1 e a r Age

D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d a f t e r World War

11,

t h e r o l e of

U.S.
The

h e a v y g r o u n d f o r c e s e n t e r e d a p e r i o d of u n c e r t a i n t y . advent of

t h e a t o m i c bomb made t h e n e e d f o r
B e h i n d t h e s h i e l d of

large ground an a t o m i c weapons

forces questionable. m o n o p o l y t h e U.S.

Army f o u n d i t s e l f r e d u c e d t o a s t a t e o f the war. Large s t o c k p i l e s of e f f e c t of precluding

i m p o t e n c e i n t h e few y e a r s a f t e r

s u r p l u s weaponry had the normal post-war m o d e r n i z a t i o n o f ground f o r c e s .

N a v a l and a i r f o r c e s became The t h r e a t o f large

t h e f o c i of American m i l i t a r y m i g h t . scale conventional warfare seemed r e m o t e

i n v o l v i n g massive ground f o r c e s a n d l a t e r n u c l e a r , weapons.

i n l i g h t of a t o m i c ,

A new wave o f l o w i n t e n s i t y c o n f l i c t s c o u p l e d w i t h
manpower i n t e n s i v e o c c u p a t i o n d u t i e s caused the g e n e r a l h e a v y f o r c e s i n f a v o r of lighter infantry forces. a n d w a r s of Greece, i n the

n e g l e c t of

The s e r i e s o f p e r i p h e r a l c o n f l i c t s , national

insurgencies,

l i b e r a t i o n i n p l a c e s l i k e French Indochina,

a n d M a l a y a seemed t o s e t a new t o n e f o r a t o m i c age. Korea. T h e U.S. b a p t i s m of f i r e

ground warfare

i n this era occurred i n

84

Caught g r o s s l y unprepared,

t h e U.S.

Army f o u g h t t h e

North Koreans and t h e Chinese Communists t o a b l o o d y


stalemate a f t e r several years. W h i l e t h e K o r e a n c o n f l i c t was the t e r r a i n , Allied

p r i m a r i l y an i n f a n t r y war because of

f o r c e s h a d been s h o c k e d a t t h e i r u n p r e p a r e d n e s s t o combat four b a t t a l i o n s of T34 t a n k s e m p l o y e d by t h e N o r t h K o r e a n s .

Armed i n i t i a l l y w i t h o n l y i n e f f e c t i v e launchers, tanks. t h e U.S.

2.36

inch rocket

i n f a n t r y c o u l d do l i t t l e t o s t o p t h e lesson i n

T h e U.S.

Army h a d l e a r n e d a n o t h e r p a i n f u l

combined arms:

even i n i n f a n t r y - d o m i n a t e d systems were r e q u i r e d .

p e r i p h e r a l wars, Tanks were and were the

t a n k s and a n t i - t a n k valuable

i n providing mobile protected firepower indirect fires.

e v e n u s e d on o c c a s i o n f o r

Many o f

l e s s o n s l e a r n e d f r o m World War I 1 w e r e r e l e a r n e d i n K o r e a , i n c l u d i n g t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t o f i g h t a s combined arms and t h e risk i n v o l v e d when infantry ride

i n t o b a t t l e on t a n k s .
strong s u i t .

A r t i l l e r y c o n t i n u e d t o b e a U.S. i n ever-increasing number o f demand f o r

A i r p o w e r was the

c l o s e s u p p o r t of

I imi t e d

ground troops.

T h e U.S.

Army l o o k e d t o f i r e p o w e r ,

i n s t e a d of m a n e u v e r ,

to s o l v e i t s t a c t t c a l problems.

D u r i n g t h e 1950s a n d e a r l y 19605,

numerous t a c t i c a l

a t o m i c w e a p o n s w e r e d e v e l o p e d and f i e l d e d i n t h e U.S. A r m y . These weapons i n c l u d e d r a c k e t s y s t ems s u c h a s t h e Honest John, a r t i l l e r y delivered munitions, i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t weapons

such a s t h e Davy C r o c k e t t , atomic m u n i t i o n s .

and e v e n man p o r t a b l e s p e c i a l

T e c h n o l o g i c a l advances caused these time. 85 I n the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y ,

w e a p o n s t o become r e f i n e d o v e r

f o r example,

atomic p r o j e c t i l e s i n i t i a l l y had t o be f i r e d

f r o m a m o n s t r o u s 2 8 0 m cannon, b u t can now b e f i r e d f r o m s t a n d a r d d i r e c t s u p p o r t 155mm h o w i t z e r s . The mass

d e s t r u c t i veness o f t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r f i r e p o w e r on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d caused a r m i e s t o r e e x a m i n e i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n s and doctrine.

The development o f a S o v i e t a t o m i c c a p a b i l i t y caused t h e


U.S.

Army t o d e v e l o p d o c t r i n e and f o r c e s t h a t w o u l d a l l o w

g r o u n d f o r c e s t o f u n c t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y on a n u c l e a r battlefield. T e n s i o n s between t h e U.S. and S o v i e t s f o c u s e d The l e s s o n s o f K o r e a

on a d i v i d e d Europe t h r o u g h t h e 1950s. caused t h e U.S.

t o upgrade i t s n e g l e c t e d armored f o r c e s .

Faced w i t h deployment c o n c e r n s and i t s w o r l d w i d e c o n m i t m e n t s , however, t h e U.S. k e p t the b u l k o f


i t s ground f o r c e s

r e l a t i v e l y l i g h t i n the form o f eventually airmobile divisions.

i n f a n t r y , a i r b o r n e , and

Armored f o r c e s seemed most s u i t a b l e f o r t h e n u c l e a r battlefield. These f o r c e s h a d t h e i n h e r e n t m o b i l i t y t o

q u i c k l y d i s p e r s e t o r e d u c e v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o weapons o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n and t o c o n c e n t r a t e t o combat enemy g r o u n d f o r c e s . Armored v e h i c l e s also p r o t e c t e d t r o o p s frm a t o m i c weapons effects including radiation. W h i l e t h e armored d i v i s i o n tanks, armored i n f a n t r y

r e t a i n e d i t s b a l a n c e d s t r u c t u r e of and s e l f - p r o p e l l e d a r t i l l e r y ,

t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s went

t h r o u g h a s e r i e s o f changes b e f o r e t h e R e o r g a n i z e d O b j e c t i v e Army D i v i s i o n (ROAD) s t r u c t u r e was a d o p t e d f o r 86 a l l divisions

i n t h e e a r l y 1960s.

A t t h e h e i g h t o f t h e U.S. t h e mid-19505,

c o n c e r n s about n u c l e a r war

in

the non-armored d i v i s i o n s c o n v e r t e d t o a The p e n t o m i c i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n w a s

pentomic s t r u c t u r e .

o r g a n i z e d and equipped t o t a k e advantage of t h e f l e x i b i l i t y


and m o b i l i t y t h a t

t h e a r m y saw n e c e s s a r y t o f i g h t and s u r v i v e

n o t o n l y on a n u c l e a r b a t t l e f i e l d b u t i n a n y h o t s p o t i n t h e
world. e a c h of The s t r u c t u r e r e c o g n i z e d t h e n e e d f o r c o m b i n e d a r m s ; the f i v e b a t t l e groups was designed to be a u n i t w h i c h c o u l d b e r e i n f o r c e d by t a n k s a n d The d i v i s i o n h a d l e s s The

self-contained

other arms f r o m t h e d i v i s i o n t r o o p s .

t u b e a r t i l l e r y but d i d h a v e a t o m i c d e l i v e r y means. d i v i s i o n had l i m i t e d a i r c r a f t ,


i t b a t t l e f i e l d mobility.t.581

trucks,

and A P C ' s

to increase

T h o u g h some d i v i s i o n s w e r e so o r g a n i z e d t h i s c o n c e p t w a s
short l i v e d .

One o f t h e u n i q u e a s p e c t of

the pentomic

d i v i s i o n was t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of APC's

i n t o the i n f a n t r y

d i v i s i o n a n d c o n s o l i d a t i n g them i n t o a t r a n s p o r t a t i o n b a t t a l i o n . T h i s c e r t a i n l y u n d e r s c o r e s t h e U.S. v i e w o f the

APC a s a means o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o r p r o t e c t e d m o b i l i t y f o r

infantry.

The a d v e n t o f
and p r o t e c t i o n .

atomic firepower

p u t a p r e m i u m on m a n e u v e r

D u r i n g t h e f i f t e e n y e a r s f o l l o w i n g W o r l d War the shocKing N o r t h Korean use of tanks,

11, especially after

t h e U.S.

intensified its effort


87

t o d e v e l o p i t s t a n k and APC

fleet. APC's,

A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y was e q u i p p e d t h e n w i t h a s e r i e s o f improved over t h e M3 h a l f t r a c k .


I n general,

these These

were f u l l y enclosed,

f u l l y t r a c k e d squad c a r r i e r s .

v e h i c l e s were e s s e n t i a l l y b a t t l e t a x i s ;

t h e y gave t h e

i n f a n t r y m o b i l i t y and p r o t e c t i o n from s m a l l arms f i r e , a r t i l l e r y fragments, a n d t o some e x t e n t f r o m r a d i a t i o n a n d

o t h e r a t o m i c weapons e f f e c t s .

These heavy b a t t l e t a x i s were r e p l a c e d i n t h e e a r l y

1 9 6 0 s b y t h e M 1 1 3 , w h i c h h a s p r o v e n t o b e one o f
p o p u l a r APC's ever f i e l d e d ,

t h e most

j u d g i n g f r o m t h e number p r o d u c e d ,
armies, t h e number o f

its service

i n o v e r 40 d i f f e r e n t

v a r i a n t s produced,

and i t s r e l i a b i l i t y i n o v e r t w e n t y y e a r s
the

of s e r v i c e .

P i o n e e r i n g e f f o r t s i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of

c a p a b i l i t y t o w e l d b a l l i s t i c a l u m i n u m p l a t e made t h e M 1 1 3

l i g h t e n o u g h t o b e a i r t r a n s p o r t a b l e and t o s w i m i n l a n d
b o d i e s of w a t e r w i t h o u t e x t e n s i v e p r e p a r a t i o n .
full

I t carried a

r i f l e s q u a d a n d o f f e r e d i t t h e same r e l a t i v e d e g r e e of

p r o t e c t i o n as e a r l i e r f u l l y enclosed models.

As successful

a s t h e M i 1 3 has b e e n ( a n d i t i s s t i l l i n t h e U.S.

the

s t a n d a r d mechanized i n f a n t r y c a r r i e r

Army t o d a y ) ,

i t s o o n m a n i f e s t e d some s e r i o u s s h o r t c o m i n g s . developed i t s f u t u r e tank that

A s t h e army

i n t h e e a r l y 19705,

i t recognized

i t would have more speed, m o b i l i t y ,


Additionally,

and p r o t e c t i o n than

t h e M113.

as t h e S o v i e t s d e v e l o p e d new

i n f a n t r y c o m b a t v e h i c l e s s u c h as t h e BMP, outclassed.

t h e M 1 1 3 became the

I t s caliber

.SO m a c h i n e g u n c o u l d n o t d e f e a t
88

BMP, t h e M 1 1 3 g u n n e r w a s u n p r o t e c t e d ,
or f i r i n g p o r t 5 f o r
t h e squad,

i t lacked v i s i o n blocks

a n d i t s I l g h t armor was infantry

i n c r e a s i n g l y more v u l n e r a b l e t o a g r o w i n g a r r a y of weapons.

O t h e r f a c t o r s u r g e d t h e U.S. modern i n f a n t r y combat v e h i c l e . equipping t h e i r newly organized SchuetzenDanzer,

Army t o l o o k t o w a r d a more The Germans w e r e t h e n Bundeswehr w i t h the

an i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e t h a t h a d h a t c h

o p e n i n g s from w h i c h i t s i n f a n t r y c o u l d f i g h t and a t u r r e t m o u n t e d 20mm a u t o m a t i c c a n n o n . The F r e n c h w e r e e q u i p p i n g a l s o s p o r t i n g an infantry could f i r e

t h e i r a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y w i t h t h e NIX-UTT, a u t o m a t i c c a n n o n a n d f i r i n g p o r t s so t h a t from w i t h i n the v e h i c l e .

The S o v i e t Army a f t e r World War I 1 w e n t s t a g e s of development.


From 1945 u n t i l

through several

the death o f S t a l i n

i t c o n t i n u e d t o f i e l d a m a s s i v e a r m y t h a t was b a s e d on t h e

l e s s o n s l e a r n e d i n t h e G r e a t P a t r i o t i c War. r e a r m e d w i t h more modern equipment s u p p o r t t a n k s , was s t i l l

Infantry,

i n c l u d i n g APC's

and d i r e c t
Artlllerr

t h e p r i n c i p a l c o m b a t arm.

wa5 t h e m a i n s o u r c e o f f i r e p o w e r . p r i n c i p a l arm f o r e x p l o i t a t i o n . was s t r e s s e d a t a l l levels.

Tank f o r m a t i o n s w e r e t h e Combined arms c o o p e r a t i o n

A f t e r d e v e l o p i n g an a t o m i c w e a p o n s c a p a b i l i t y , Soviets s h i f t e d p r i o r i t y to strategic rocket forces. became t h e c e n t e r p i e c e o f the conventional


89

the Tanks

forces,

artillery

lost i t s prestigious position,

a n d i n f a n t r y b e g a n t o move

toward f u l l m e c h a n i z a t i o n .

B y 1963 i n f a n t r y f o r c e s w e r e S o v i e t g r o u n d f o r c e s were battlefield tactical

redesignated motor r i f l e troops. d e s i g n e d t o e x p l o i t t h e e f f e c t s of a t o m i c weapons.

Key t o t h i s c a p a b i l i t y was t h e vehicle.

infantry fighting

The S o v i e t s began f i e l d i n g w h e e l e d a n d t r a c k e d

i n f a n t r y c o m b a t v e h i c l e s w i t h f i r i n g p o r t s 1 i k e t h e BTR s e r i e s o f v e h i c l e s w h i c h w a s i n t r o d u c e d i n t h e l a t e 1950s. After a s e r i e s of p r o d u c t improved v e r s i o n s ,

i n 1967 t h e

S o v i e t s f i e l d e d t h e world's vehicle,

f i r s t modern i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g
t h e BMP w a s t h e c o n c e r n f o r the e f f e c t s

t h e BMP. T h e i m p e t u s f o r

k e e p i n g i n f a n t r y l i n k e d up w i t h t a n k s t o e x p l o i t of n u c l e a r weapons.

The c a p a b i l i t y t o f i g h t m o u n t e d

s u s t a i n e d t h e tempo o f a r m o r e d o p e r a t i o n s a n d r e d u c e d t r o o p s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o b a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r and chemical e f f e c t s .

T h e i r one v a r i a n t ,

a t o m i c war o n l y ,

v i e w began t o lose

its luster

i n t h e l a t e 1960s i n t h e f a c e o f p o l i t i c a l

r e a l i t i e s and the assuredness o f mutual d e s t r u c t i o n . S o v i e t s began t o c o n s i d e r a second more p l a u s i b l e case w h i c h t h e y saw t h a t

The in

t h e i r b e s t chance o f w i n n i n g a maJor war

w i t h NATO w a s by p r o s e c u t i n g a q u i c k c o n v e n t i o n a l c a m p a i g n
b e f o r e NATO c o u l d e f f e c t t h e d e c i s i o n t o u s e n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . I n any case S o v i e t ground f o r c e s , on a n i n t e g r a t e d b a t t l e f i e l d , a l r e a d y capable of f i g h t i n g

began t o m o d e r n i z e d t o

r e e s t a b l i s h f u l l combined arms c a p a b i l i t i e s t h a t h a d been

90

deemphasized u n d e r t h e one v a r i a n t s t r a t e g y .

The combined

arms army was made more b a l a n c e d a n d a r t i 1 1 e r y r e g a i n e d much of i t s former s t a t u s .

The most r e c e n t s e r i e s o f c o n f l i c t s between modern armored f o r c e s , the A r a b - I s r a e l i wars, have r e i n f o r c e d o l d

l e s s o n s a b o u t combined arms w a r f a r e and have h a d a p r o f o u n d e f f e c t on t h e d o c t r i n e , e q u i p m e n t , modern a r m i e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d . and f o r c e s t r u c t u r e of These c l a s h e s a r e

n o t e w o r t h y a l s o because t h e y have v i r t u a l l y p i t t e d a f o r c e armed w i t h NATO t y p e e q u i p m e n t , (IDF), t h e I s r a e l i Defense F o r c e

against Soviet surrogate forces.

The l i g h t n i n g s u c c e s s o f IDF t a n k and a i r f o r c e s i n t h e

S i x Day War o f 1967 e n c o u r a g e d t h e I s r a e l i s t o be1 i e v e t h a t


armor ' c o u l d o p e r a t e f r e e l y w i t h o u t i n f a n t r y support,' a

n o t i o n t h a t General H e r z o g o p i n e d a s "one o f t h e most dangerous c o n c e p t s t h a t had e n t e r e d I s r a e l i m i I i t a r r thinking

..."1-59]

John E n g l i s h p o i n t s o u t an examp e o f t h e

r e s u l t s of

this faulty logic.

quick With the v i r t u a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f the I s r a e l r e a c t i o n 1 9 0 t h Armored B r i g a d e , w h i c h coun e r a t t a c k e d u n s u p p o r t e d by i n f a n t r y and l i g h t l y s u p p o r e d b y a r t i l l e r y , the ' a l l - t a n k ' i d e a was once a g a i n shown t o have s e r i o u s 1 i m i t a t i o n s . [ 7 0 1
He g o e s on t o s t a t e t h a t many I s r a e l i

t a n k s were

d e s t r o y e d by E g y p t i a n i n f a n t r y m e n who w a i t e d u n t i l t a n k s were a t c l o s e r a n g e and t h e n d e s t r o y e d them w i t h RPG-7 h a n d h e l d , anti-tank rockets. C e r t a i n l y , s u p p o r t i n g i n f a n t r y c o u l d have


91

d e a l t w i t h t h e s e f o r c e s and s a v e d many t a n k s .

Not a l l t a n k s w e r e d e s t r o y e d a t s h o r t r a n g e s d u r i n g t h i s

confl i c t .

The I s r a e l i s w e r e u n d o u b t e d l y s u r p r i s e d by t h e longer range wire-guided m i s s i l e s l i k e M a s s e d f i r e s of due t h e s e weapons t o o k a p a r t to the This

e f f e c t i v e A r a b use of

t h e S n a p p e r and S a g g e r .
heavy t o l l

on I s r a e l i u e h i c l + s ,

i n no small

l a c k o f adequate I s r a e l i s u p p r e s s i v e a r t i l l e r y f i r e . war r e a f f i r m e d

t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t o f i g h t a s c o m b i n e d arms.

I n f a n t r y h a d g a i n e d a c a p a b i l i t y t o t a k e on t a n k s n o t o n l y a t c l o s e range b u t a l s o a t ranges o u t s i d e the e f f e c t i v e range of t h e t a n k s weapons.

The e f f e c t s of got the world's

these a n t i - t a n k

g u i d e d m i s s i l e s (ATGM's) Both

attention,

e s p e c i a l l y t h e superpowers.

r e a l i z e d t h a t a n y t h i n g t h a t c o u l d be seen c o u l d be h i t .
its tactical

on

the b a t t l e f i e l d , relooking

The U.S. Army w a s i n t h e p r o c e s s of

d o c t r i n e as i t s h i f t e d e m p h a s i s f r o m V i e t n a m t o

Europe.

I n h i s s t u d y o f t h e e v o l u t i o n o f U.S. Army t a c t i c a l R o b e r t Doughty n o t e d t h a t

doctrine,

the s t a r t l i n g v i o l e n c e and consuming n a t u r e of t h a t war served t o accelerate the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m the p r e v i o u s f o c u s on c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y t o t h e new t o c u s on c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e . 1 7 1 3

T h e new v i e w e n v i s i o n e d t h a t w a r c o u l d b e g i n w i t h a conventional b a t t l e a n d t r a n s i t i o n a t some t i m e


FM 100-5,

to a

c o n v e n t i o n a l -nucl e a r phase.

Operations,
was p r i m a r i l y

p u b l i s h e d i n 1976, was a t t r i t i o n o r i e n t e d ,

92

defensive firepower, ratios.

i n tone,

and emphasized c o n c e n t r a t i o n ,

massive

a n d movement t o i n c r e a s e r e l a t i v e c o m b a t p o w e r

I n l i g h t of significantly

t h e l e t h a l i t y o f ATGMs,

t h e U.S.

Army

i n c r e a s e d t h e number a n d q u a l i t y o f t h e s e

systems i n i t s i n f a n t r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Improved T O W V e h i c l e w h i c h mounted

I t developed the
on a M i 1 3 v a r i a n t

ATGMs

v e h i c l e t h a t n o t only a f f o r d e d t h e gunner l i g h t armored p r o t e c t i o n but a l s o p r o v i d e d h i m w i t h s u p e r b d a y a n d t h e r m a l sights. Perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e army d i r e c t e d t h a t then under

t h e d e s i g n of development,

t h e new i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e , i n c l u d e l o n g r a n g e ATGM c a p a b i l i t y .

The S o v i e t s e n t e r e d i n t o a l e n g t h y d e b a t e a b o u t e f f e c t s o f ATGMs
on t h e i r o f f e n s i v e

the

doctrine.

What w a s s e e n

t o be a t g r e a t e s t r i s k was n o t

t h e S o v i e t tank b u t t h e more

l i g h t l y a r m o r e d BMP, w h i c h t h e y d e t e r m i n e d t o b e t w i c e a s v u l n e r a b l e a5 t h e tank.

721

They r e c o g n i z e d t h a t

i f BMP-5

w e r e more v u l n e r a b l e t h e y c o u l d be d e s t r o y e d a t a g r e a t e r rate, result f o r c i n g infantrymen t o dismount sooner. T h i s would team or

i n e i t h e r a s e p a r a t i o n of t h e t a n k - i n f a n t r y
t a n k s t o o p e r a t e a t r e d u c e d pace, the a t t a c k .

would force

severely

s l o w i n g t h e tempo o f

Not o n l y w o u l d t h e

dismounted i n f a n t r y be a t g r e a t e r r i s K t o m y r i a d b a t t l e f i e l d hazards but, conventional more i m p o r t a n t l y , the whole s t r a t e g y of a q u l c k The d e b a t e , therefore,

campaign was s u s p e c t .

d e v e l o p e d i n t o a d i s c o u r s e on m o t o r i z e d r i f l e t a c t i c s a n d

93

t h e i r e f f e c t s on o p e r a t i o n a l methods.

One r e s u l t o f

these concerns was the p r e v i o u s l y The

m e n t i o n e d i n c r e a s e d S o v i e t emphasis on f i e l d a r t i l l e r y . S o v i e t s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t d i r e c t f i r e more e f f e c t i v e l y s u p p r e s s e s ATGM's. Therefore,

t h e S o v i e t s made a c o m m i t m e n t

t o n o t o n l y i n c r e a s e i t s a r t i l l e r y but t o d e v e l o p a r m o r e d , self propelled a r t i l l e r y w i t h greater d i r e c t f i r e capability, i n t r a d i t i o n a l S o v i e t thought which h i t h e r t o

" a major s h i f t

emphasized massed i n d i r e c t a r t i l l e r y b a r r a g e s f r o m towed e q u i pmen t " 7 3 1

The I D F a l s o a s s i m i l a t e d t h e made s u b s t a n t i a l a r m s team. efforts

l e s s o n s of

t h e 1973 War a n d

t o d e v e l o p a more b a l a n c e d combined a r t i l l e r y to suppress

I t developed s e l f - p r o p e l l e d

enemy a n t i - t a n k

systems and i t g r e a t l y expanded i t s When t h e I D F a t t a c K e d

mechanized i n f a n t r y component.[741 i n t o Lebanon i n 1982,

i t w a s a h i g h l y m e c h a n i z e d army w h i c h

wss p r e p a r e d t o f i g h t a s combined arms a g a i n s t modern f o r c e s

i n t e r r a i n l i k e i t had fought i n o v e r t h e l a s t f e w w a r s .
was not p r o p e r l y p r e p a r e d t o f i g h t t e r r a i n o f Lebanon, where

I t

i n r e s t r i c t e d mountainous

i t s l a r g e tank f o r m a t i o n s c o u l d n o t

m a n e u v e r r a p i d l y t o s t r i k e enemy f l a n k s and r e a r . m e c h a n i z e d i n f a n t r y was n o t t r a i n e d s u f f i c i e n t l y dismounted, much l e s s m o u n t a i n o p e r a t i o n s . in

Its

I t was t r a i n e d t o

cooperate w i t h tanks in mobile warfare b u t could not sustain o p e r a t i o n s i n w h i c h i t was t h e m a i n s t r i k i n g f o r c e s u p p o r t e d


by t a n k s and a r t i l l e r y . C 7 5 1

94

As the S o v i e t s had determined,

t h e long range a n t i - t a n k

f i r e s employed a g a i n s t t h e I s r a e l i s i n Lebanon w r e c k e d havoc w i t h t h e APC's. T h e M 1 1 3 s w i t h l i g h t aluminum a l l o y armor infantry riding inside "the
i f h i t by

were d e a t h t r a p s f o r anti-tank fire.

As Gabriel noted,

t r o o p s became so

f r i g h t e n e d o f b u r n i n g t o d e a t h t h a t many r e f u s e d t o r i d e i n t h e APC's and took

t o w a l k i n g a l o n g s i d e t h e m o r r i d i n g on t h e

outside."[761

The I s r a e l i s b e g a n t o u s e t h e i r M e r k a v a t a n k s ,

w h i c h have a r e a r e n t r y compartment t h a t can s t o r e ammunition


or c a r r y some

infantrymen,

a s a means o f

transporting l i m i t e d

numbers of

infantrymen w i t h tanks.

D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e d e f e n s i v e n a t u r e of doctrine

t h e 1976 Army.

l e a d t o a s u b s t a n t i a l d e b a t e w i t h i n t h e U.S.

Among o t h e r f a c t o r s w h i c h c a u s e d t h e a r m y ' s

basic doctrine to

c h a n g e a g a i n w e r e t h e r e s u l t s o f n u m e r o u s c o m p u t e r w a r games
and o t h e r e x e r c i s e s t h a t

indicated that

i t w o u l d not r e s u l t
ODerations.

in victory.

The 1 9 8 2 v e r s i o n o f FM 100-5,

r e s t r e s s e d t h e o f f e n s e and the o f f e n s i v e a s p e c t s of defense, the counterattack. T h i s new d o c t r i n e i s b a s e d on g a i n i n g a n d

m a i n t a i n i n g the i n i t i a t i v e and e x e r c i s i n g i t a g g r e s s i v e l y t o defeat


t h e enemy.
I t e n v i s i o n s t h a t success w i l l

depend upon

initiative,

depth,

agility,

and s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n . pro-active

Collectively, force

t h e y i m p l y an o f f e n s i v e l y s p i r i t e d ,

t h a t seeks t o a c t f a s t e r

t h a n t h e enemy a n d t o m a x i m i z e effort

i t s c o m b a t p o w e r t h r o u g h u n i t y of

of combined arms

r e s u l t i n g i n t h e d i s r u p t i o n o f t h e enemy p l a n a n d d e s t r u c t i o n

9s

of h i s f o r c e s

t h r o u g h o u t t h e d e p t h of

the b a t t l e f i e l d .

I n t h e mid-19605,

t h e U.S.

A r m y b e g a n a l o n g study,

delayed b y i t s involvement

i n the Vietnam c o n f l i c t ,

to

p r o d u c e a m e c h a n i z e d i n f a n t r y combat v e h i c l e fighting vehicle,


not j u s t

t h a t would be a The f i e l d i n g o f

transportation.

t h e M2 B r a d l e y I F V c o i n c i d e d w i t h t h e 1982 v e r s i o n o f FM

100-5.

A s t h e U.S.

Army w o r k s t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h e s e t a c t i c a l m a n u a l s i t also

operational concepts into i t s other

f a c e s t h e task o f d e t e r m i n i n g h w t h i s c o m p l e x new s y s t e m

w i l l f i g h t a s p a r t of

t h e combined a r m s e f f o r t .

Summary

The p r i n c i p a l consistent,

l e s s o n of

this h i s t o r i c a l review i s the


requirement f o r t h e v a r i o u s arms the

almost absolute,

to fight
tactical

together failures

t o i n s u r e success.

A g r e a t number of

i n t h i s c e n t u r y seem t o h i n g e on a n
These f a i l u r e s t a k e t r a i n i n g of

i m p r o p e r a p p l i c a t i o n of c o m b i n e d arms. various forms.

Some c a n b e t r a c e d t o t h e l a c k o f

t h e v a r i o u s arms t o c o o p e r a t e and t o m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t each o t h e r on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , Cambrai; as he B r i t i s h e x p e r i e n c e d a t

o t h e r s a r e t h e r e s u t of equipment and shortfalls, l i k e t h e S o v i e t s l a c k of armored the lack

organizational infantry

i n World War 1 1 ; a n d s t i l l o t h e r s r e f l e c t

of a c o h e r e n t combined arms d o c t r i n e ,
tank' o r i e n t a t i o n of

l i k e the I s r a e l i " a l l

1973.

96

Certainly,

t h e l e s s o n s o f combined arms w a r f a r e s h o u l d

c o n t r i b u t e s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of f i g h t i n g d o c t r i n e f o r the BIFV. i n d i c a t e s , these w i l l

As the l e n g t h y S o v i e t debate
n o t be q u i c k and e a s y d e c i s i o n s .

97

ENDNOTES
1. John E r i c k s o n , P r a c t i c e , " p . 1.

CHAPTER 3

S o v i e t C o m b i n e d Arms: T h e o r y a n d

2.
3.
4.

F i e l d M a n u a l 100-5, House, pp.

p.

7-3.

2-3.
p,

F i e l d M a n u a l 100-5, House,
p,

7-4.

5.

3.

6. S h e l f o r d B i d w e l l a n d D o m i n i c k Graham, FireDWer ( L o n d o n : G e o r g e A l l e n L U n w i n , 1 9 8 2 ) , p . 3.

7.
8.

Ibid.
p.

15.
L-

9.

English,

p.

10.

1 0 . House,

p , 13.
i n t h e M o d e r n World
p.14. (New Y o r K :

11. T h e o d o r e Ropp, War C o l l i e r , 1 9 6 2 ) , p . 243.


12. E n g l i s h , 13.

P e r s p e c t i v e on I n f a n t r y .

rbid.
p.

1 4 . Ropp,

250.

15. R i c h a r d O g o r k i e w i c z , A r m o u r e d F o r c e s : A H i s t o r y of A r m o u r e d F o r c e s and T h e r e V e h i c l e s (New Y o r k : Arco, 1970), p . 13. 16. J o h n WeeKs, Men A g a i n s t T a n k s . A H i s t o r y o f A n t i - t a n k Warfare (New Y o r K : Mason, C h a r t e r , 1 9 7 S ) , p . 22. 1 7 . Ibid, p p . 18. House, 25-26. 13.

p.

19. B i d w e l l ,
20.
21.

p.

124.

Ibld.
House,

p - 125. p . 32.

98

22. Weeks,
23.

pp. p.

22-24.
125. p. 22.

Bidwell, English,

24.
25.

P e r s D e c t i v e on I n f a n t r y ,

Timothy LuDfer, The D y n a m i c s o f D o c t r i n e : T h e C h a n a e s i n German T a c t i c a . 1 D o c t r i n e D u r i n g t h e F i r s t World War, L e a v e n w o r t h P a p e r # 4 . ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: U.S. A r m y Command and General S t a f f C o l l e g e P r e s s , 1981), pp. v i i - i x .
26.

English,

P e r s p e c t i v e on I n f a n t r y ,

p.

26.

27. A d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e s e t a c t i c s a n d t h e u n s u c c e s s f u l one5 t h a t p r e c e d e d them c a n be f o u n d i n Norman Stone's T h e E a s t e r n F r o n t 1914-1917.

28. R i c h a r d C a r v e r , The A p o s t l e s o f M o b i l i t y H o l m e s a n d M e i e r , 1 9 7 9 1 , p . 31. 29.

(New Y o r k :

Ibid.

p.

11.

3 0 . T h e r e w a s a n d i s g e n e r a l c o n f u s i o n about t h e t e r m s " m o t o r i z e d " and "mechanized". I n the interwar years they were o f t e n u s e d i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y . I t appears that t h e t e r m " m o t o r i z a t i o n " wa5 t h e m o r e g e n e r a l t e r m w h i c h r e f e r r e d t o e q u i p i n g f o r c e s w i t h motor v e h i c l e s , a r m o r e d o r n o t . The "mechanization" g e n e r a l l y r e f e r r e d to equiping troops w i t h t r a c k lay(ng, armored v e h i c l e s . That the Soviets r e f e r t o t h e i r armored i n f a n t r y a s " m o t o r r i f l e ' t r o o p s h i g h l i g h t s the cross u s a g e of t e r m s . 31. C a r v e r , p . 33.

32. B i d w e l l , p . 1 5 0 .
33.

Ibid.

pp. p.

184-5. 191. StranQe Defeat (New Y o r k :

34.

Ibid.

35. M a r c B l o c h , 1 9 6 8 ) , p . 52.
36. 37.

W.W.

Norton,

H o u s e , p . 60.

Ibid.

38.
39.

Ibid.

p . 64.

Ibid.

p.

71.

40. K e n n e t h S t e a d m a n , " T h e E v o l u t i o n of t h e T a n k i n t h e U.S. A r m y , " ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: U.S. Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1982), p. 1 .

99

41. 42.

Ibid.

p.

6.
P e r s p e c t i v e on I n f a n t r y . p. 61. D.C.:

English,

43. H e i n z G u d e r i a n , Panzer Leader Z e n g e r , 1 9 5 2 ) , p. 20. 4 4 . Ibid, p . 45.


46.

(Washington,

24.

House,

p.

53.
p . 3. S o v i e t Army. 1936, p.

Erickson,

47. 48. 49. 50.


51.

F i e l d Service Reaulation.

3.

Ibid.

Ibid. Ibid.

p . 84. p.

5.
Tank W a r f a r e (Oxford: Brasser's, Jane's, 1979.

R i c h a r d SimpKin,

52. K e n n e t h M a c k s e y , 1 9 8 1 ) , p . 160-2.

The Tank P i o n e e r s

(London:

53. O g o r k i e w ~ c z , p . 388.

54. German War O f f i c e , Reqiment, p . 1-2.


55. H o u s e , p ,
56. 100.

The German M o t o r i z e d I n f a n t r y

Simpkin,

Tank W arf are,

p.

14-15.

57.

Ibid.
p. 391. (New T o r k : Harcourt,

58. O g o r k i e w i c z ,

59. E r w i n Rommel, The Rommel P a D e r s Brace, 1953), p. 91.

50. B l d w e l l , p p . 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 .
61.

Ibid.

p.

239.

52. RommeI, 63.


54.

The R o m e 1 Paoers, p. p.
331.

p.

314.

Ibld.
House,

75.

65. E d w a r d L u t t w a k , " T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Army o f t h e S e c o n d World War: The T a n k D e s t r o y e r F o r c e s " ( W r l t t e n u n d e r c o n t r a c t f o r t h e U.S. Army, 1 9 8 3 ) , p p . i - i i i .


100

66. F r a n z U h l e - W e t t l e r , ' I n f a n t r y V e r s u s T a n k , ' Sixteen Nations, (May-June 1 9 8 4 ) 4 9 .

NATO's

67.

OgorKiewicz,

p.

390.

68. John H. Cushman, " P e n t o r n i c I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n i n Combat," M i l i t a r y Review ( J a n 1 9 5 8 ) 19-30. 69. English, p. P e r s p e c t i v e on I n f a n t r y , 244. pp. 240-1.

7 0 . I_bld.

71. R o b e r t D o u g h t y , The E v o l u t i o n o f US A r m y T a c t i c a l D o c t r i n e , 1946-76 Leavenworth Paper # I . ( F t . Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1 9 7 9 ) , p . 41.

72. P h i l l i p K a r b e r , 'The (Mar-June 1976) 106.


73.

Soviet Anti-tank

Debate,"

Survival

rbid,

p.

110.

7 4 . R i c h a r d A. G a b r i e l , O D e r a t i o n P e a c e f o r G a l i l e e (New Y o r k : H i l l a n d Wang, 1 9 8 1 ) , p p . 1 9 - 2 1 .
75. 76.

Ibid.
Ibid.

p. p.

192-3.

200.

101

CHAPTER 4
I N F W T R Y ROLES AND COMBINED ARMS

The e v o l u t i o n o f c o m b i n e d a r m s c o o p e r a t i o n from W o r l d

War
for

I until

today r e v e a l s 5 m e

i n t e r e 5 t i n g trends.

Ignoring

t h e moment t h e aspects of

important c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f tank, infantry,

t h e o t h e r arms,

several their

and a r t i l l e r y u n i t s and

i n t e r a c t i o n become a p p a r e n t .

The E v o l u t i o n of

Infantry

S i n c e t h e b e g i n n i n g o f World W a r I equipment, organization,

infantry roles,

a n d c a p a b i l i t i e s h a v e become m o r e

complex and d i v e r s i f i e d .

I n 1914,

i n f a n t r y companies and t h e y were the

subunits were armed a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h r i f l e s ;


t a c t i c a l l y footmobile; spade.

and t h e y g a i n e d p r o t e c t i o n f r o m

B e f o r e t h a t w a r was o v e r , mortars, grenades, weapons.

i n f a n t r y a l s o fought w i t h

machine guns,

1 i g h t a u t o m a t i c weapons,
While t a c t i c a l mobility

and

rudimentary anti-tanK

r e m a i n e d b a s i c a l l y t h e same,

i n f a n t r y did increase i t 5 tactics. During

p r o t e c t i o n t h r o u g h d i s p e r s i o n and open o r d e r W o r l d War

I 1 p o r t i o n s of

the i n f a n t r y gained t a c t i c a l

mobi 1 i t y t h r o u g h t h e use o f m o t o r v e h i c l e s and t h e development of a i r b o r n e f o r c e s .


some

P r o t e c t i o n w a s i n c r e a s e d forInfantry

i n f a n t r y t h r o u g h t h e use of armored v e h i c l e s . 102

added a n t i - t a n k

r o c k e t s and towed guns t o i t s a r s e n a l a l o n g

w i t h v e h i c u l a r m o u n t e d a u t o m a t i c weapons.

During t h e atomic

and n u c l e a r ages i n f a n t r y a c q u i r e d a d d i t i o n a l f i r e p o w e r t h e f o r m o f r e c o i l l e s s r i f l e s , ATCiMs,

in

and i n c r e a s i n g l y

s o p h i s t i c a t e d v e h i c u l a r l y - m o u n t e d weapons s u c h a s t h e a u t o m a t i c cannon. I n f a n t r y even had t a c t i c a l nuclear

c a p a b i l i t y when a r m e d b r i e f l y w i t h t h e D a v y C r o c k e t t . Increased m o b i l i t y for l i g h t d e v e l o p m e n t of

i n f a n t r y was a c h i e v e d w i t h
The

h e l i c o p t e r s and a i r a s s a u l t u n i t s .

c o n t r a s t between the

i n f a n t r y squad of 1914 and t h e B r a d l e y increase i n

I F V squad of

today a m p l y r e f l e c t s t h e p h e n o m e n a l

technical complexity, capabilities.

weapons d i v e r s i t y ,

and employment

The E v o l u t i o n o f T a n k s

A t t h e same t i m e tanK r o l e s , e q u i p m e n t , h a v e become m o r e s t r e a m 1 i n e d . i n f a n t r y support.

and m i s s i o n s

I n W o r l d War I t a n k s p r o v i d e d

B y W o r l d War I 1 t h e y h a d d e v e l o p e d i n t o Such s y s t e m s c o u l d n o t

m o b i l e , p r o t e c t e d f i r e p o w e r systems.
only support

infantry,

b u t a 1 5 0 c a p i t a l i z e on t h e i r s p e e d ,

shock a c t i o n ,

and f i r e p o w e r

t o maneuver a s t a n k u n i t s t o
d i s r u p t i n g or d e s t r o y i n g

a t t a c k a n enemy f l a n k or r e a r a r e a ,

h i s r e l a t i v e l y soft r e a r u n i t s and i n s t a l l a t i o n s . versus tank encounters increased i n frequency, e n l a r g e d t o add tank k i l l i n g a s a m a j o r r o l e .

As t a n k

t a n k guns w e r e By t h e end of

World War 1 1 ,
anti-tank

t h e t a n k was u n i v e r s a l l y r e c o g n i z e d a s t h e b e s t From 1 9 4 5 u n t i l 103 today tank developments

srstem.[ll

have s t r e s s e d i n c r e a s e d armor p r o t e c t i o n , and f i r e p o w e r

speed, m o b i l i t y ,

t o p e r m i t t a n k s t o s u c c e s s f u l l y combat o t h e r

tanks i n b a t t l e .

W h i l e becoming more t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y complex, become less c a p a b l e o f e n g a g i n g s o f t targets.

t a n k s have

The b a s i c

l o a d s of m o s t m o d e r n t a n k s today c o n s i s t a l m o s t e n t i r e l y of k i n e t i c energy anti-tank

rounds.

Against soft

t a r g e t s these spot

rounds p r o d u c e g r o s s o v e r k i 1 1 s or, i f n o v i t a l

i s hi t,

t h e y c a n p a s s r i g h t t h r o u g h a t a r g e t w i t h a l m o s t no e f f e c t a t all. T a n k s c a r r y n e i t h e r t h e v a r i e t y n o r t h e amount o f

ammunition t h a t a r e needed t o have t h e b e s t e f f e c t s a g a i n s t a n a r r a y of m a i n gun non-tank targets. The s t a n d a r d o n - b o a r d l o a d of

a m u n i t i o n f o r a n M60A3 t a n k

i s 63 r o u n d s c o m p r i s e d 18 h i g h

of

a b o u t 5 w h i t e p h o s p h o r o u s r o u n d s u s e d f o r smoke,

explosive anti-tank vehicles,

rounds u s e d a g a i n s t n o n - t a n k

armored rounds.

a n d 40 s a b o t - t y p e

k i n e t i c energy a n t i - t a n k

T h e MI A b r a m s c a r r i e s o n l y 55 r o u n d s t h e m a j o r i t y of w h i c h are k i n e t i c energy anti-tank rounds. When e q u i p p e d w i t h t h e c a r r y o n l y a b o u t 40

120mm m a i n g u n i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e rounds,

it w i l l

v i r t u a l l y a l l k i n e t i c e n e r g y rounds.121

I n the

target-rich
U.S.

e n v i r o n m e n t e x p e c t e d on t h e m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d ,

t a n k s m u s t c o n c e n t r a t e on d e s t r o y i n g t h e g r e a t number o f

S o v i e t t a n k s a n d m u s t r e s i s t t h e t e m p t a t i o n t o engage w i t h a n y t h i n g but machine guns the pro1 i f e r a t i o n o f s o f t e r v e h i c l e s t h a t t h e complementary systems can d e s t r o y . have, i n effect, Tank5

become a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y t a n k k i l l e r s .

104

The E v o l u t i o n of A r t i l l e r y

A r t i l l e r y h a s a l s o changed.

I n World War I

i t went

through a d r a s t i c m e t a m o r p h o s i s f r o m a p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t f i r e
s y s t e m t o an i n d i r e c t f i r e one. destruction. During World W a r

I t became a s y s t e m f o r m a s s

I 1 a r t i l l e r y developed i n t o a

more m o b i l e arm a b l e t o keep pace w i t h the mechanized u n i t s that

i t supported.

I t was s t i l l

t h e g r e a t e s t k i l l e r on t h e

b a t t l e f i e l d because t h e p r e p o n d e r a n c e of f i e l d a r m i e s was still the marching infantry. I n t h e n u c l e a r age

i t h a s been

armed w i t h n u c l e a r warheads, destruction capability.

g i v i n g i t a t r u e mass

I n c o n v e n t i o n a l r o l e s i t ha5 been
t a r g e t s on t h e

focused on s u p p r e s s i o n a s t h e degree o f s o f t

b a t t l e f i e l d decreases and t h e t h r e a t o f m i s s i l e s and i n f a n t r y anti-tanlc weapons i n c r e a s e s . Today, a r t i l l e r y r o l e s such as

d i r e c t f i r e for

s u p p r e s s i o n and i n d i r e c t f i r e t o d e s t r o y such a s tanks, are being considered i n the a r t i l l e r y

moving p o i n t targets, several armies.

From World War I t o t o d a y ,


c o m b i n e d arms.

r e m a i n s a v i t a l c o m p o n e n t of firepower,

I t provides
and i t

i t maneuvers w i t h f o r c e s t h a t

i t supports,

p r o t e c t s f r i e n d l y f o r c e s through s u p p r e s s i o n and c o u n t e r f i r e s on enemy a r t i l l e r y .

R e a u i r e m e n t s of Combined Arms

T h e l e s s o n s of h i s t o r y c l e a r l y p o i n t o u t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t

for

t h e v a r i o u s arms t o f i g h t t o g e t h e r

t o i n s u r e success.

g r e a t number o f

t h e t a c t i c a l f a i l u r e s i n t h i s c e n t u r y seem t o

I05

h i n g e on a n i m p r o p e r a p p l i c a t i o n of have f r e q u e n t l y themselves.

c o m b i n e d arms.

Weapons

seemed t o b e a b l e t o f i g h t a n d w i n b y
i n p r a c t i c e no one weapon o r

However,

type o f

u n i t h a s been a b l e t o s u c c e s s f u l l y d e f e a t a c o m b i n e d arms
enemy.

F o c u s i n g on t a n k - i n f a n t r y that i n f a n t r y needs the m o b i l e ,

cooperation,

i t i s apparent
that tank

protected firepower

or t a n k - l i k e

systems can p r o v i d e .

T h i s o r i g i n a l reason f o r

tank development r e m a i n s v a l i d today.

A s t h e p o s t - W o r l d War

I 1 General B o a r d s t u d i e s r e f l e c t e d , c l o s e t a n k s u p p o r t of i n f a n t r y goes beyond the obvious e f f e c t o f m e r e l y p r o v i d i n g

mobi I e ,

protected firepower:

The u n i f o r m l y b e t t e r p e r f o r m a n c e o f i n f a n t r y , i n any o p e r a t i o n , when c l o s e l y s u p p o r t e d by t a n k s i s probably the biggest s i n g l e t a c t i c a l lesson of the E u r o p e a n Campaign. F r e q u e n t l y t a n k s w e r r employed p r i m a r i l y a s c l o s e s u p p o r t w e a p o n s , b u t r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r r o l e t h e y m a t e r i a l l y enhanced the a g g r e s s i v e n e s s of i n f a n t r y i n the a t t a c k and i t ; s t a y i n g power i n t h e d e f e n s e . [ 3 1

On t h e o t h e r hand,
t h e c i t e d examples of R u s s i a n s i n World War amply demonstrate,

tanks require i n f a n t r y support.

As

t h e B r i t i s h i n W o r l d War 11,

I, t h e

a n d t h e I s r a e l i s i n t h e 1973 War

t a n k s f a c e a n a r r a y of b a t t l e f i e l d h a z a r d s infantry.

that d i c t a t e the close support o f

The n e c e s s a r y p r o p o r t i o n a l m i x of

t a n k s and i n f a n t r y v a r y w i t h the a n d enemy

( a n d o t h e r s u p p o r t i n g arms and s e r v i c e s ) f a c t o r s o f METT-T. Certain missions,

terrain,

10.3

c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e tank-heavy

forces while other

c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e i n f a n t r y dominated forces.
analysis,

I n the f i n a l

however,

commanders o f c o m b i n e d a r m s f o r c e s m u s t a l l o f the t y p e s of f o r c e s

have a t t h e i r

immediate d i s p o s a l

necessary to q u i c k l y r e a c t to the changing t a c t i c a l


s i t u a t i on

I n f a n t r y R e a u i r e m e n t s i n Combined Arms

The f o r e g o i n g a n a l y s e s of

t h e b a t t l e f i e l d and of infantry tactical In

c o m b i n e d a r m s s u g g e s t a broad r a n g e o f

m i s s i o n s on t h e i n c r e a s i n g l y c o m p l e x m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d . general terms, t h e U.S. Army r e q u i r e 5 i n f a n t r y :

-whose -that

p r i m a r y tasks i n v o l v e c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t a n k s ; c a n go t o g r o u n d t o d e f e n d f o r t i f i e d a r e a s a n d

strongpoi nts; -that can a t t a c k f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s and c r e a t e i n i t i a l

penetration5 for e x p l o i t i n g forces; -that can f o l l o w and s u p p o r t heavy f o r c e s which a r e p u r s u i n g

or e x p l o i t i n g ;

-that -that

can conduct m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s i n urban t e r r a i n ; can operate i n d i f f i c u l t , r e s t r i c t i v e terrain 1 ike


or swamps t h a t a r e n o t

heavy f o r e s t s , mountains, s u i t a b l e f o r heavy f o r c e s ; -that

jungle, and

can conduct s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s .

To s a t i s f y t h i s v e r y b r o a d range o f
107

tactical

requirements,

t h e U.S.

Army h a s a w i d e v a r i e t y of ranger,

infantry

u n i t s in its force structure: airborne,


(M113),
a i r assault,

light, standard,
mechanized
i s the

m o t o r i z e d (high tech),

and armored (BIFV).

While t h e commonality equipped,

infantryman,

each t y p e u n i t i s o r g a n i z e d ,

and

t r a i n e d t o p e r f o r m i n f a n t r y missions under d i f f e r e n t conditions. All i n f a n t r y s u b u n i t s can p e r f o r m c o r e i n f a n t r y

c o l l e c t i v e t a s k s s u c h a s e m p l o y i n g c r e w s e r v e d weapons, p a t r o l 1 ing,
and so on,

b a s e d on t h e i r common i n d i v i d u a l a n d Because each d i f f e r e n t type of

c o l l e c t i v e requirements.
infantry i s organized,

equipped,

and t r a i n e d t o a d d r e s s some

p a r t i c u l a r b a t t l e f i e l d requirement,

each h a s u n i q u e

c a p a b i l i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s t h a t d i c t a t e how i t c a n b e s t b e employed. S i n c e World War 1 , no g e n e r i c

i n f a n t r y has b e e n

a b l e t o accomplish w e l l a l l of infantry functions.

the increasingly varied example,

The F r e n c h i n World War I , f o r

found i t n e c e s s a r y t o d e v e l o p s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d

infanterie

d'accomDaanement

to fight

i n s u p p o r t of t a n k s . C 4 1

" T h r e e K i n d s of

Infantry"CS1

In h i s a r t i c l e "Three K i n d s of I n f a n t r y , '
Wass d e Czege c i t e s t h e n e e d f o r i n f a n t r y i n t h e U.S. Army t o d a y ,

C o l o n e l Huba

t h r e e g e n e r a l k i n d s of excluding special operating

f o r c e s such a s r a n g e r s .

They a r e :

1.

I n f a n t r y whose p r i m a r y t a s k s r e q u i r e high s t r a t e g i c ,

operational,

a n d t a c t i c a l m o b i l i t y m o s t o f t e n b y Army o r A i r

I08

F o r c e a i r c r a f t and who can f i g h t on r u g g e d and r e s t r i c t i v e terrain. He c a l l s t h i s l i a h t infantry and n o t e s t h a t t h e r e and so on.

a r e many v a r i a n t s i n c l u d i n g a i r b o r n e ,

a i r assault,

2.

I n f a n t r y whose p r i m a r y t a s k s i n v o l v e h o l d i n g g r o u n d ,
or a t t a c k i n g f o r

defending p o s i t i o n s , calls this

i f i e d pos t i o n s .

He

reaular infantry. i n c l u d e c ose s u p p o r t

3.
o f tanks.

I n f a n t r y whose p r i m a r y t a s k s
He c a l l s t h i s

armored i n f a n t r y .

Lioht Infantry. l i g h t l y equipped.

I n f a n t r y i n t h i s general category

is

I t s s t r e n g t h l i e s i n infantrymen,

highly

t r a i n e d f o r small u n i t ,

independent o p e r a t i o n s .
i t is,

Light therefore, that

i n f a n t r y i s n o t designed t o h o l d ground; p r i m a r i l y a o f f e n s i v e l y o r i e n t e d force.t61

The f a c t

l i g h t i n f a n t r y f o r c e s are designed f o r r a p i d a i r t r a n s p o r t a b i l i t y and f o r combat t h e y w i l l most o f t e n n o t f i g h t tanks. i n r u g g e d t e r r a i n means t h a t i n close cooperation w i t h

They r e l y p r e d o m i n a n t l y on m a n - p o r t a b l e weapons and air-delivered, P r o p e r l y employed t h e i r abi 1 i tr the r They

r e c e i v e t h e i r f i r e support from l i g h t , v e h i c u l a r mounted weapons and a i r p o w e r .

they o b t a i n p r o t e c t i o n from the rugged t e r r a i n ,

t o move q u i c k l y on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d by f o o t or a i r ,

a b i l i t y t o o p e r a t e a t n i g h t , and t h e i r s m a l l s i g n a t u r e can o p e r a t e s u c c e s s f u l l y a g a i n s t o t h e r 1 i g h t i n f a n t r y e s p e c i a l l y i n rugged t e r r a i n ,

such a s j u n g l e o r mounta n s .

These f o r c e s can employ a v a r i e t y o f t a c t i c s a g a i n s t heavy enemy f o r c e s t o t i e down s u p e r i o r f o r c e s , deny enemy use o f r o a d n e t s through r e s t r i c t i v e t e r r a i n ,
109

and o p e r a t e a g a i n s t

enemy l i n e s o f communications. deny c h o k e p o i n t s , attack.

L i g h t i n f a n t r y can s e i z e and

t h u s s l o w i n g t h e tempo o f t h e enemy's i n c i t i e s b u t i s n o t equipped t o c r e a t e

I t can f i g h t

or t o d e f e n d u r b a n s t r o n g p o i n t s , u n l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t l y
r e i n f o r c e s w i t h s p e c i a l i z e d equipment, tools, and m a t e r i a l s .

Reaular I n f a n t r y .

Regular i n f a n t r y i s a l s o i n f a n t r y

i n t e n s i v e , b u t i t i s more h e a v i l y e q u i p p e d t h a n l i g h t infantry.
I t employs a v a i l a b l e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o move

s o l d i e r s and equipment t o b a t t l e b u t f i g h t s on t h e g r o u n d .
I t accomplishes the l i o n ' s

share o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l

infantry

m i s s i o n s of

h o l d i n g ground.

I t a l s o a t t a c k s dismounted t o

p e n e t r a t e p r e p a r e d enemy d e f e n s e s so t h a t heavy m o b i l e f o r c e s can b r e a k t h r o u g h and e x p l o i t or p u r s u e . and s u p p o r t t h e more m o b i l e heavy f o r c e s .

I t can t h e n f o l l o w
Regular i n f a n t r y

i s t r a i n e d t o f i g h t d e f e n s i v e l y or o f f e n s i v e l y i n urban

terrain.

I t r e q u i r e s a f u l l r a n g e of

s u p p o r t i n g arms,

esDec i a l l y t a n k s support.

whose p r imary r o l e becomes i n f a n t r y

A s t h e i n f a n t r y i n W o r l d War I 1 a n d K o r e a r e q u i r e d

t h e s u p p o r t o f t a n k s , so w i l l here. types,

the r e g u l a r i n f a n t r y envisioned

These t a n k s s h o u l d c a r r y a f u l l a r r a y o f ammunition including

HEP, smoke, and a n t i - p e r s o n n e l r o u n d s .

Armored I n f a n t r y .

Armored i n f a n t r y f o c u s e s on t h e

advance o f t h e m a i n b a t t l e t a n k .

110

D e s i r e d C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Armored I n f a n t r y

F i r s t and f o r e m o s t ,

armored i n f a n t r y must have a t o u g h , On-the-ground i n p a r t because

c a p a b l e d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y component.

i n f a n t r y s k i l l s must b e h i g h l y d e v e l o p e d , t h e r e a r e fewer

i n f a n t r y m e n i n armored i n f a n t r y u n i t s t h a n i n Unfortunately, infantry

others standard i n f a n t r y u n i t s .

s k i l l s t e n d t o a t r o p h y i n mechanized i n f a n t r y u n i t s . T r a i n i n g o f t e n o r i e n t s on mounted s k i l l s and m a i n t e n a n c e . M e c h a n i z e d s o l d i e r s can e a s i l y grow t o o c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h " r i d i n g a r o u n d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . " They can q u i c k l y become

r e l u c t a n t t o l e a v e t h e p e r c e i v e d s a f e t y and c o m f o r t o f t h e "mother s h i p , ' especially at night, i n inclement weather,


or

i n r o u g h , p h y s i c a l l y demanding t e r r a i n . 1 7 3 new phenanenon. Persians: C o l o n e l E.M.Lloyd

This i s not a

wrote o f the a n c i e n t

C y r u s t a u g h t h i s m o u n t a i n e e r s t o l o o k upon i t a s d i s c r e d i t a b l e f o r any man who h a d a h o r s e t o go on foot. I n t h e open p l a i n s o f Mesopotamia he h a d f o u n d t h a t he must have c a v a l r y t o r e a p t h e f r u i t s o f v i c t o r y ; b u t i n f a n t r y never reaches a h i g h standard were f o o t s e r v i c e i s despised.CS3 Armored i n f a n t r y c o u l d s u f f e r f r a n t h e s e t e n d e n c i e s t o an even g r e a t e r e x t e n t . s h o u l d f i g h t mounted, advancing tanks, The p e r c e p t i o n t h a t i t can and

t h e p r e s s u r e t o move r a p i d l y w i t h

and t h e n a t u r a l r e l u c t a n c e t o s e p a r a t e

veh c l e and i n f a n t r y a l l p o t e n t i a l l y c o n t r i b u t e t o an

d i s n c l i n a t i o n t o dismount.

L e a d e r s h i p must be h i g h q u a l i t y

a n d t r a i n i n g of d i s m o u n t e d e l e m e n t s m u s t b e d e m a n d i n g .

Second, b a t t l e tank

b e c a u s e a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y m u s t accompany t h e m a i n into battle,

i t must be e q u i p p e d w i t h a r m o r e d

v e h i c l e s t h a t c a n c l o s e l y m a t c h t h e p r o t e c t i o n a n d cross c o u n t r y m o b i l i t y of tanks. Shortcomings i n armored i n f a n t r y

m o b i l i t y or p r o t e c t i o n may c a u s e t a n k s t o e i t h e r s l o w a n d d e l a y t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s or t o s e p a r a t e from t h e i n f a n t r y ; thus, force. the i n f a n t r y f a i l s t o e f f e c t i v e l y complement t h e tank in

T r u c k mounted i n f a n t r y accompanying t a n k f o r c e s
1 1 l a c k e d b o t h of

World War

these v i t a l

capabilities,

as d o e s

the M i 1 3 armored personnel c a r r i e r used i n mechanized i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i u n s i n t h e U.S. a n d o t h e r a r m i e s today.

B e c a u s e a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y v e h i c l e s may o f t e n h a v e t o s t o p
to dismount t h e i r

infantry,

i d e a l l y t h e y s h o u l d be f a s t e r t h e German M a r d e r a n d t h e

than tanks.

A major strength of

S o v i e t BMP i s t h e i r s p e e d r e l a t i v e t o t h e t a n k s t h e y s u p p o r t ; t h e y c a n q u i c k l y c l o s e on a c c o m p a n y i n g t a n k s a f t e r s t o p p t o d i s c h a r g e or r e c o v e r t h e i r infantrymen.

While tank-like

protection i s desired,

i t i s seldom
Armored

a c h i e v e d i n i n f a n t r y v e h i c l e s f o r many r e a s o n s .

i n f a n t r y v e h i c l e s a r e o f t e n d e s i g n e d a s a compromise between requirements for a h e a v i l y armored i n f a n t r y v e h i c l e t h a t can s u r v i v e t h e same h i t a s a t a n k a n d r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a 1 g h t , agile vehicle t h a t can f i l l a w i d e v a r i e t y of battlefie d

r o l e s f o r c a v a l r y a s w e l l as i n f a n t r y . 112

B e s i d e s t h e obu ou s

economic and f i n a n c i a l optimal protection for p r a c t i c a l reasons for

r e a s o n s f o r s e t t l i n g on l e s s t h a n infantry vehicles, t h e r e were

1 i g h t e r armor.

Armored personnel

c a r r i e r s h a d t o be a m p h i b i o u s and, World War

i n t h e U.S.

Army a f t e r

1 1 , h a d t o be a i r t r a n s p o r t a b l e .

Tactically, with the

c a r r i e r s were n o t thought of a s f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e s , n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n of t h e Germans.


In their

1941 i n s t r u c t i o n s

f o r m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y t h e Germans s t a t e

The p o s s e s s i o n of a r m o r e d p e r s o n n e l

c a r r i e r s enables

m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y u n i t s t o o v e r c o m e weak o p p o s i t i o n w i t h o u t dismounting. T h e y c a n f o l l o w up t a n k a t t a c k s
on t h e f i e l d o f b a t t l e w i t h o u t d i s m o u n t i n g . M o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e a b i l i t y t o a l t e r n a t e r a p i d l y b e t w e e n f i g h t i n g f r o m c a r r i e r s and f i g h t i n g on f o o t O w i n g t o t h e l a c k of s u f f i c i e n t armor, m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y cannot f i g h t f r o m t h e i r truck<.C91

...

The k e y w o r d i n t h i s q u o t a t i o n i s " s u f f i c i e n t , " German h a l f t r a c k s w e r e n o t a s r o b u s t as t a n k s ,

as t h e
They

either.

were capable o f p r o t e c t i n g mounted t r o o p s f r o m t h e e f f e c t s o f most i n f a n t r y w e a p o n s a n d d e p e n d e d on s p e e d ,


to avoid heavier f i r e .

agil

ty,

and

suppressive f i r e tank-infantry around i t ,


the threat,

When t h e
i t was t o maneuver

f o r c e came u n d e r h e a v y f i r e ,

if possible,

or t o dismount

i n f a n t r y to eliminate the t a n k s and h a l f

s u p p o r t e d by t h e f i r e s o f

t r a c k s and u s u a l I Y u n d e r t h e c o v e r o f smoke.

A s G e n e r a l Adan o f

the IDF has observed,

the quest f o r

p e r f e c t p r o t e c t i o n i s an e n d l e s s a n d f r u s t r a t i n g e n d e a v o r .

F r o m t h e o u t s e t of t h e h i s t o r i c c o m p e t i t i o n between t h e p r o d u c t i o n of a r m o r e d v e h i c l e s a n d t h e 113

d e v e l o p m e n t o f a r m o r - p e n e t r a t i n g weapons, t h o s e w o r k i n g on t h e l a t t e r h a d t h e u p p e r h a n d . Whenever a h e a v i e r t a n k a p p e a r e d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , i t s advantage was short l i v e d . A new a r m o r - p i e r c i n g s h e l l or a n t i a r m o r m i s s i l e w o u l d s o o n b e d e v e l o p e d t h a t c o u l d p e n e t r a t e t h e new t a n k . I t w a s n o t by s t r e n g t h e n i n g the v e h i c l e ' s passive p e n e t r a t i o n w i t h s t a n d i n g c a p a c i t y t h a t t h i s p r o b l e m c o u l d be o v e r c o m e b u t by i n c r e a s i n g s u r v i v a b i 1 i t y by means o f improved b a t t l e f i e l d t a c t i c s . L i k e the tank, the armored p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r seeks t o enhance i t s s u r v i v a b i l i t y by means o f h i g h m o b i l i t y a n d i n c r e a s e d firepower. I t s h i g h m o b i l i t y and a g i l i t y e n a b l e i t t o move m o r e q u i c k l y o u t o f f i r e - b l a n k e t e d a r e a s . I t s h i g h r a t e of f i r e p o w e r e n a b l e s i t t o s u p p r e s s s o u r c e s o f f i r e a n d p r e v e n t them f r o m e n d a n g e r i n g i t.Cl01

Armored I n f a n t r y Tasks

What a r e t h e a c t u a l
perform

t a s k s t h a t armored i n f a n t r y must A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y f o c u s e s on

i n s u p p o r t i n g tanks?

m a t c h i n g i t s i n f a n t r y c a p a b i l i t i e s t o complement t a n k
1 imitations.

A s t a n k f o r m a t i o n s h a v e p r i m a r i l y an o f f e n s i v e

orientation,

a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y m u s t a l s o b e so o r i e n t e d .

Even

i n the defense

i t accompanies t a n k s i n t h e f l u i d a s p e c t s of

d e f e n s i v e combat,

such a s the c o u n t e r a t t a c K .

Armored

i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t s t a n k s by o v e r c o m i n g t h o s e b a t t l e f i e l d h a z a r d s t h a t r e s t r i c t armor o p e r a t i o n s .

A primary mission for


f o r w a r d movement of

armored i n f a n t r y i 5 t o s u s t a i n t h e

t a n k s t h r o u g h d i f f i c u l t or o b s t r u c t e d
l i f t i n g mines,

t e r r a i n . T h i s includes removing obstacles,

and

c l e a r i n g emergency p a t h s t h r o u g h m i n e f i e l d s . combat e n g i n e e r t a s k s a r e v i t a l . everywhere,

1-hese t y p i c a l

Engineers cannot b e that i n t h e U.S.

e s p e c i a l l y c o n s i d e r i n g the f a c t

114

Army t h e y a r e n o t e q u i p p e d w i t h v e h i c l e s t h a t c a n m a i n t a i n the pace of t h e M1 A b r a m s and M2 B r a d l e y team. The F r e n c h

i n f a n t e r i e d'accomDaQnement

o f World War 1 w a s t r a i n e d t o

" a c t a s a s s a u l t p i o n e e r s " as w e l l a s " t o p r o v i d e c l o s e - i n protection,


of

t o c l e a n up w i t h r i f l e a n d g r e n a d e ,

small nests

enemy r e s i s t a n c e . . . ' C l l I

I n World War 11 t h e Germans

charged t h e i r armored i n f a n t r y w i t h p r e p a r i n g " t h e ground f o r t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f t a n k s by c l e a r i n g a way t h r o u g h c o u n t r y d i f f i c u l t or impossible f o r tanks."[121

I n f o r e s t s and u r b a n a r e a s w h e r e t a n k s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y vulnerable, observation, i n f a n t r y p r o t e c t s tanks t h r o u g h a1 1 - a r o u n d suppressive f i r e s , and dismounted o p e r a t i o n s t o

c l e a r c h o k e p o i n t s a n d r o o t o u t enemy i n f a n t r y . Not o n l y d o t a n k s have b l i n d s p o t s and c l o s e - i n dead zones, but in narrow

s t r e e t s a n d c l o s e woods t h e y o f t e n c a n n o t f r e e l y t r a v e r s e their turrets, m a k i n g them s u s c e p t i b l e t o i n f a n t r y a t t a c k s i f infantry. Armored i n f a n t r y a l s o

n o t p r o t e c t e d by f r i e n d l y

u s e s d i s m o u n t e d s o l d i e r s and i t s a m p h i b i o u s c a p a b i l i t i e s t o make a s s a u l t r i v e r c r o s s i n g s , p r o v i d e far. e s t a b l i s h bridgeheads, and


as t h e

shore s u p p o r t i n g f i r e s for

c r o s s i n g tanks, Interestingly,

German i n f a n t r y d i d a t Sedan i n 1940. German M a r d e r vehicle that

the

i s t h e o n l y modern armored i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g
I S

not amphibious.tl31

A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y a l s o c o m b a t s enemy f o r c e s w h i c h c o m p l e m e n t enemy t a n k f o r m a t i o n s , thereby reducing the t h e enemy. This

s y n e r g i s t i c combined arms e f f e c t s f o r 115

i n c l u d e s s u p p r e s s i n g and d e s t r o y i n g enemy a n t i - t a n k

fires.

Most armored i n f a n t r y v e h i c l e s and i n f a n t r y elements a r e e q u i p p e d w i t h weapons d e s i g n e d t o be e f f e c t i v e p r i m a r i l y a g a i n s t enemy i n f a n t r y , t h e i r v e h i c l e s and equipment. resistance, consolidates

A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y mops u p p o c k e t s of g a i n s of
tanks.

t h e armored f o r c e ,

and e x p l o i t s and p u r s u e s w i t h

Some m o d e r n a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y v e h i c l e s , Marder, and Bradley,

l i k e t h e BMP,

are equipped w i t h f i r i n g p o r t s ,

p e r m i t t i n g mounted i n f a n t r y t o d e l i v e r f i r e s w h i l e under armor. range, These f i r e s a r e p r i m a r i l y b u r s t - o n - t a r g e t , small arms s u p p r e s s i v e f i r e s . h a s remarked that C.N. Donnelly, limited a noted

Soviet expert,

in recent studies the

S o v i e t s have f o u n d t h a t t h e i r f i r i n g p o r t weapons a r e e x t r e m e l y i n a c c u r a t e a n d can be u s e d t o s u p p r e s s o n l y t h e weakest o f d e f e n s e s . f i 4 1 W h i l e t h i s c a p a b i l i t y does a l l o w

a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y so e q u i p p e d t o m a i n t a i n p a c e w i t h t a n k s m o r e readily, value of l e s s than optimal p r o t e c t i o n and t h e q u e s t i o n a b l e

t h e f i r i n g p o r t weapons makes f i g h t i n g m o u n t e d a

risky alternative.

Many m o d e r n I F U ' s h a v e a u t o m a t i c c a n n o n s t h a t a r e n o t
only deadly against

l i g h t l y a r m o r e d v e h i c l e s but a r e also
helicopter threat. threat

e f f e c t i v e against After

the growing anti-tank

t h e t a n k m a i n gun,

the "next greatest

[ t o tanks1

i s f r o m the a i r , from f i x e d and r o t a r y w i n g a i r c r a f t alike."[lSI The a u t o m a t i c c a n n o n may b e a n a t u r a l f o r

I16

engaging

slow m o v i n g a i r c r a f t b u t s u r f a c e t o a i r cannon f i r e

r e q u i r e s s u b s t a n t i a l ammunition.

IFLJ's e q u i p p e d w i t h a n t i - t a n k weapons, such as ATGM'.s,


can s u p p l e m e n t t a n k s i n d e s t r o y i n g enemy a r m o r . Long range

ATGM's g i v e t h e I F U t h e c a p a b i l i t y tcj e f f e c t i v e l y o v e r w a t c h
tanks. T h i s c a p a b i l i t y may be b e s t e x p l o i t e d i n d e s e r t can g i v e

t e r r a i n where t h e v i r t u a l l y u n l i m i t e d 1 i n e - o f - s i g h t ATGMs a d e f i n i t e a d v a n t a g e o v e r t a n k s .

Lastly,

i n f a n t r y can p r o t e c t t a n k s i n a s s e m b l y a r e a s and observation posts, and

a t h a l t s by d i s m o u n t e d p a t r o l s , l i s t e n i n g posts.

A n t i c i p a t i n g e v e n t u a l r e d u c t i o n s i n the crew s i z e of f u t u r e main b a t t l e tanks, additional tanks. R i c h a r d S i m p k i n a r g u e s f o r an i n f a n t r y " c h o r e s i n s u p p o r t of s e r v i c e s he mentions

l i s t of

'in-house

The mundane,

b u t important,

i n c l u d e minor r e p a i r s (such as r e a t t a c h i n g thrown t r a c k ) , tank crew r e c o v e r y , recouery.[l63 tank crew r o t a t i o n , and v e h i c l e

These t a s k s seem more a p p r o p r i a t e f o r a

c l o s e l y f o l l o w i n g combat s e r v i c e s u p p o r t e l e m e n t f r o m t h e combat t r a i n s .

R e l a t i v e M e r i t s o f t h e M113

To a c c o m p l i s h t h e s e a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y t a s k s t h e U.S.

Army

h a s depended for t h e l a s t two decades on m e c h a n i z e d i n f a n t r y

117

equipped w i t h the M i 1 3 armored personnel

carrier.

The M i 1 3

has l o n g been r e c o g n i z e d a s a s u b s t a n d a r d v e h i c l e for i n f a n t r y whose p r i m a r y r o l e i n v o l v e s s u p p o r t i n g t a n k s . m e n t i o n e d above,

As

i t l a c k s t h e degree of p r o t e c t i o n necessary i t i s vulnerable to


as w e l l

t o f i g h t o n t h e same t e r r a i n a s t a n k s ;

m o s t w e a p o n s e m p l o y e d by S o v i e t m o t o r r i f l e t r o o p s , a s t o t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of tank and a n t i - t a n k

systems

e x p e c t e d i n S o v i e t formations.

I t lacks the m o b i l i t y
Army's new m a i n b a t t l e
to

n e c e s s a r y t o k e e p p a c e w i t h t h e U.S.

tank,

t h e M i Abrams.

The M i 1 3 a l s o l a c k s t h e f i r e p o w e r infantry carriers.

d e s t r o y t h e BMP and o t h e r S o v i e t

Lastly,

the M i 1 3 o f f e r s n o p r o t e c t i o n t o t h e gunner and l i m i t e d o p p o r t u n i t y for t h e s q u a d b e i n g t r a n s p o r t e d t o o r i e n t on t h e

b a t t l e f i e l d before dismounting.

Despite the shortcomings,

t h e M i 1 3 o f f e r s many i n close

advantages t o i n f a n t r y w h i c h does n o t have t o f i g h t s u p p o r t of


of

tanks.

First,

t h e M i 1 3 d o e s p r o v i d e some d e g r e e

protected m o b i l i t y to s o l d i e r s being transported. s m a l l arms,

It

p r o v i d e s p r o t e c t i o n from shrapnel, r e d u c t i o n of hazards. r e 1 iable, the harmful

and 1 imi t e d

e f f e c t s of chemical and n u c l e a r mechanically

Second,

t h e M i 1 3 i s r e l a t i v e l y cheap,

a d a p t a b l e t o a w i d e a r r a y of uses,

and p l e n t i f u l . the

I t r e p r e s e n t s a ready source of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n for


regular i n f a n t r y d e s c r i b e d above

i n f a n t r y t h a t f i g h t s on

t h e ground b u t r e q u i r e s t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d t h e a b i l i t y t o haul t h e v o l u m e of m u n i t i o n s , m a t e r i a l s , and equipment needed


to

t o effectively

b u i l d and d e f e n d f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s o r

118

a t t a c k f o r t i f i e d enemy p o s i t i o n s .

Relative M e r i t s of

t h e M2 BIFU

With t h e

i n t r o d u c t i o n of

t h e M2 BIFU,

t h e U.S.

Army h a s The M 2 i s

a much m o r e c a p a b l e v e h i c l e f o r a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y . n o t j u s t an i n f a n t r y c a r r i e r , v e h i c l e system, l i k e t h e M113,

but a f i g h t i n g

as i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s b e l o w r e f l e c t .

Maneuver.

T h e B r a d l e y h a s t h e s p e e d a n d cross c o u n t r y

m o b i l i t y t o s t a r w i t h t h e M I Abrams.

I t c a r r i e s a squad of
t w o men i n t h e

n i n e men w h o c a n f i g h t f r o m t h e v e h i c l e ,

t u r r e t a n d s i x u s i n g v i s i o n b l o c k s and f i r i n g p o r t s t o d e l i v e r s m a l l arms f i r e . perform minor independent T h e s e s i x men c a n d i s m o u n t a n d i n f a n t r y t a s k s or become p a r t o f a T h r e e men r e m a i n w i t h e a c h The B r a d l e y i s

l a r g e r dismounted p l a t o o n f o r c e . vehicle

t o d r i v e a n d man t h e t u r r e t .

a m p h i b i o u s a f t e r some p r e p a r a t i o n .

FireDower.

The B r a d l e y i s a p o t e n t f i r e p o w e r

system.

B e s i d e s t h e man p o r t a b l e w e a p o n s t h a t employs,

the dismounted element a two-tube a 7.62mm TOW

i t h a s f o u r o n - b o a r d weapons s y s t e m s : a 2%

ATGM s y s t e m ,

s t a b i l i z e d a u t o m a t i c cannon,

c o a x i a l machine gun, aboue. two-man T h e TOW,

a n d t h e f i r i n g p o r t weapons m e n t i o n e d and machine gun a r e mounted i n a

cannon,

t u r r e t w i t h a s o p h i s t i c a t e d f i r e c o n t r o l system imaging c a p a b i l i t y which can p a s s i v e l y

i n c l u d i n g thermal "see'

a t night and through obscurants. 119

Protection.

The B r a d l e y i s f i t t e d w i t h s p a c e l a m i n a t e d

armor t h a t p r o v i d e s p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t a u t o m a t i c weapons up

t o 14.5mm a n d a g a i n s t a i r b u r s t s f r o m 155mm a r t i l l e r y .
b e e n t e s t e d a g a i n s t a S o v i e t RPG 7 t y p e weapon w i t h o u t catastrophic destruction.tl71 While

I t ha5

i t does n o t have t h e

a b i l i t y t o w i t h s t a n d t h e same d i r e c t h i t a s t h e t a n K supports,

its

i t r e 1 i e s o n i t s s p e e d a n d a g i I i t y and on t h e
c a p a b i l i t i e s a f f o r d e d by i t s As C l i f f o r d

s u p p r e s s i v e and standoff firepower B r a d l e y of

t o secure
t h e U.S.

increased p r o t e c t i o n .

Army T a n k A u t o m o t i v e Command h a s w r i t t e n ,

From a t e c h n i c a l s t a n d p o i n t , a n y s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e i n t h e a r m o r w e i g h t of t h e M 2 w o u l d h a v e a n a d v e r s e e f f e c t on t h e v e h i c l e s a u t o m o t i v e p e r f o r m a n c e and RAM [ r e l i a b i l i t y , a v a i l a b i l i t y , a n d m a i n t a i n a b i l i t r l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , and these d e g r a d a t i o n s c o u l d r e a c h u n a c c e p t a b l e l i m i t s l o n g b e f o r e a n y a p p r e c i a b l e or m e a n i n g f u l i n c r e a s e i n p r o t e c t i o n c o u l d be o b t a i n e d against a high i n t e n s i t y b a t t l e f i e l d threat.tl81

I n a d d i t i o n t o i t s l e s s than d e s i r e d p r o t e c t i o n ,

the

Bradley equipped i n f a n t r y has other n o t a b l e 1 i m i t a t i o n s .

A full

s t r e n g t h B r a d l e y i n f a n t r y squad can n o r m a l l y infantrymen. A p l a t o o n can t h e r e f o r e

dismount o n l y 5 i x

aggregate o n l y about However, at full

t w e n t y men a s a d i s m o u n t e d e l e m e n t .

U.S.

Army u n i t s w i t h t h e h i g h e s t p r i o r i t y a r e s e l d o m deployable strengths r u n lower,

authorized strength;

e s p e c i a l l y i n w a r t ime

.
25mm

The m a j o r w e a p o n s s y s t e m s on t h e B r a d l e y (TOW,

120

cannonl

a n d m a c h i n e g u n ) c a n n o t b e d i s m o u n t e d a n d e m p l o y e d on

t h e ground a s p a r t o f a p o s i t i o n a l d e f e n s e .

Squad a n d p l a t o o n l e a d e r s a r e f a c e d w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n of r e m a i n i n g w i t h t h e v e h i c l e or g o i n g w i t h t h e d i s m o u n t e d e l e m e n t when t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n r e q u i r e s d i s m o u n t e d o p e r a t i ons

B r a d l e y EmDloYment C o n s i d e r a t i o n s

These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f i t i s not suited for those

Bradley infantry

indicate that

i n f a n t r y tasks that require intensive a c t i v i t i e s .

h o l d i n g ground or c o n d u c t i n g manpower
Bradley infantry
I S

n o t o p t i m a l l y organized o r equipped for strongpoints,

p o s i t i o n a l defenses,
to attack

or d i s m o u n t e d o p e r a t i o n s
I t i s o r g a n i z e d and

f o r t i f i e d enemy p o s i t i o n s .

e q u i p p e d t o c o o p e r a t e w i t h t a n k s and t o c o n d u c t m o b i l e o p e r a t io n s

.
i 5

As the Bradley

being fielded,

t h e r e has been

s i g n i f i c a n t d i s c u s s i o n among d o c t r i n e w r i t e r s a b o u t how t h e B r a d l e y e q u i p p e d i n f a n t r y s h o u l d be employed. The p r i n c i p a l

c o n c e r n s c e n t e r on when a n d w h e r e t h e i n f a n t r y s h o u l d dismount, which leaders dismount, of and what


i s the proper r o l e

t h e IFU o n c e t h e s q u a d d i s m o u n t s . those of

These c o n c e r n s a r e n o t

too d i f f e r e n t f r o m

t h e S o v i e t s a n d t h e Germans o v e r

t h e l a s t t w e n t y y e a r s a s t h e y c o n s i d e r e d how b e s t t o e m p l o y their infantry f i g h t i n g vehicles. The s o l u t i o n s i n g r e a t

121

m e a s u r e d e p e n d on t h e s i t u a t i o n . T h i s t r i t e b u t t r u e r e p l y does n o t s a t i s f y t h e n e e d t o a d d r e s s how I F U e q u i p p e d
its

i n f a n t r y s h o u l d be t r a i n e d a n d employed t o o p t i m i z e capabil
I

t i e s as p a r t o f

t h e c o m b i n e d a r m s team.

Several

factors established earlier


for

i n t h i s s t u d y provide guidance

a d d r e 5s i n g t h e s e que 5 t i ons

.
the main

1.)

A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y f o c u s e s on t h e a d v a n c e of

b a t t l e tank.

2.)
of

Tanks

depend

upon t h e complementary c a p a b i l i t i e s

i n f a n t r y and b e n e f i t f r o m the supplementary e f f e c t s .

3.)

I n g e n e r a l , complementary a s p e c t s of

combined arms

a r e more v i t a l

t h a n s u p p l e m e n t a r y f u n c t i o n s a s t h e y c a n n o t be

r e p 1 i c a t e d by t h e o t h e r a r m s .

When o n e e x a m i n e s t h o s e s y s t e m s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e t h e Bradley equipped i n f a n t r y , capability o n l y the dismounted i n f a n t r y T h e ATGM f i r e s s u p p l e m e n t

i s t r u l y complementary. c a p a b i l i t y of

the t a n k - k i l l i n g supported.

the tank f o r c e b e i n g

The c o a x i a l m a c h i n e gun m a t c h e s a t a n k c a p a b i 1 i t y The 25mm c a n n o n c a n d e s t r o y t h e t a n k ' s m a i n gun a n d However, a s

a n d i s also s u p p l e m e n t a l . non-tank

v e h i c l e s w i t h i n the range of

i n t h a t r e g a r d i t i s a supplemental

system a l s o .

t a n k s become i n c r e a s i n g l y l i m i t e d i n t h e v a r i e t y a n d amount

of ammunition for o t h e r

t h a n t a n k e n g a g e m e n t s t h e 25mm c a n n o n
I t

may b e p u s h e d t o w a r d b e c o m i n g a c o m p l e m e n t a r y s y s t e m . certa;nlr

is

t h e m o r e c o s t e f f e c t i v e means o f a t t a c k i n g n o n - t a n k I f t h e 25mm c a n n o n c a n d e m o n s t r a t e
its

t a r g e t s w i t h i n range.

122

effectiveness

against r o t a r y winged a i r c r a f t

it w i l l

become a

r e c o g n i z e d c o m p l e m e n t a r y component o f s u p p o r t i n g tank f o r c e s ,

the B r a d l e y system a i r defense

especially if tactical

systems remain equipped w i t h v e h i c l e s unable pace o f t h e Ml/M2 team.

t o m a i n t a i n the

The B r a d l e y i t s e l f c o u l d b e

c o n s i d e r e d complementary t o t h e tank because of c r o s s i n g capabi 1 i ty.

i t s water

A s t a n k s r e q u i r e i n f a n t r y a n d as t h e d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y
i s the

t r u e complement t o tanks,

t h e o p e r a t i o n s of

the

d i s m o u n t e d f o r c e s s h o u l d be a paramount c o n c e r n t o t h e B r a d l e y f o r c e commander.

When a n d w h e r e t h e two g e n e r a l f a c t o r s :

i n f a n t r y s h o u l d d i s m o u n t d e p e n d on

where the t a n k s need t h e s u p p o r t and

where the B r a d l e y can s a f e l y d e l i v e r enemy t h r e a t .


C e r t a i n l y the

t h e m i n l i g h t of

the

tactical

s i t u a t i o n and the the d e c i s i o n . patrol,

d e s i r e d tempo o f

operations w i l l

affect

I n f a n t r y w i l l dismount t o o b s e r v e , b r e e c h and emplace o b s t a c l e s ,

provide security,

f i r e a n d m a n e u v e r on enemy
Of

p o s i t i o n s , a n d mop up a n d c o n s o l i d a t e o v e r r u n d e f e n s e s . these, the m i s s i o n t h a t

i s most c h a l l a n g i n g i s t h e a s s a u l t of

enemy d e f e n s e s .

The S o v i e t s o l u t i o n a p p e a r s t o b e t o t h e enemy d e f e n s e s

d i s m o u n t a 5 c l o s e t o t h e f o r w a r d edge of a s t h e enemy s i t u a t i o n p e r m i t s . the Soviet tactics,

As the concluding a r t i c l e i n
l e t t e r s on BMP then Deputy wrote

Military Herald

s e r i e s of

General Colonel U i k t o r A. M e r i m s k i y ,

C h i e f o f Combat T r a i n i n g of

the S o v i e t Ground Forces, 123

t h a t w h i l e t h e d i s m o u n t p o i n t d e p e n d s h e a v i l y on t h e f a c t o r s
o f METT-T,

i n a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e commander m u s t s t r i v e , f i r s t , t o m a k e t h e l i n e of a t t a c k and t h e l i n e o f d i s m o u n t i n g a s c l o s e as p o s s i b l e t o t h e f o r w a r d e d g e of t h e enemy's d e f e n s e s . Second, h e m u s t t a k e t h e necessary steps t o p r o t e c t the dismounted r i f l e m e n f r o m m a c h i n e gun f i r e and t h e BMPs f r o m b e i n g h i t b y short-range a n t i t a n k systems. T h i r d and f i n a l l y , h e m u s t p r o v i d e f o r t h e m a x i m u m u s e of t h e f i r e p o w e r of t h e BMPs and p r o v i d e a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n d u c t e f f e c t i v e f i r e w i t h a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s of t h e m o t o r i z e d r i f l e m e n i n o r d e r t o d e s t r o y t h e enemy's f o r c e s and f i r i n g s y s t e m . [ l 9 1

C.N.

D o n n e l l y summed u p t h e r e m a r k s of M e r i m s k i y and Although Merimskir the


i t was

o t h e r s on t h e BMP d e b a t e as f o l l o w s .

w o u l d not b e p i n n e d down t o a n o r m a l d i s t a n c e ,

c o n t r i b u t o r s t o t h e BMP d e b a t e g e n e r a l l y a g r e e d t h a t

unwise for

i n f a n t r y i n BMPs t o a p p r o a c h c l o s e r t o t h e enemy

d e f e n s e s and t h e i r own p r e p a r a t o r y a r t i 1 1 e r y b a r r a g e than 300 meters.

Normally d i s m o u n t i n g w i l l o c c u r b e t w e e n 300-400
I n f a n t r y should

m e t e r s b u t n e v e r m o r e t h a n 1000 m e t e r s .

a l w a y s dismount as c l o s e b e h i n d t h e t a n k s as p o s s i b l e and should a s s a u l t w i t h t h e t a n k s , s u p p r e s s i n g enemy i n f a n t r y a n d A t no t i m e s h o u l d t h e

antitank systems w i t h small arms f i r e .

r i f l e m e n f a l l m o r e t h a n 200 m e t e r s b e h i n d t h e t a n k s a s t h e i r small arms f i r e w i l l then be ineffective. Attacking sections

of

infantry w i l l
SG

i n s u r e that

there a r e gaps i n t h e i r a t t a c k meters behind can

formations

t h a t BMPs t r a i l i n g 3 0 0 - 4 0 0

s u p p o r t by f i r e

through t h e s e gaps.

The a t t a c k must b e

s y n c h r o n i z e d so t h a t a r t i l l e r y i s n o t l i f t e d p r e m a t u r e l y l e a v i n g t a n k s and i n f a n t r y a t t h e m e r c y of relatively

124

unsuppressed defenses. Soviets w i l l

L a s t l y , as a general r u l e ,

the

a v o i d u s i n g BMPs i n t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n o f a n

a s s a u l t on a p r e p a r e d d e f e n s e when a n y s u i t a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e ex i s t s . t 201

The German s o l u t i o n seems t o e x p e c t infantry w i l l tanks.

t h a t armored

a t t a c k mounted, m i x e d i n c l o s e f o r m a t i o n w i t h dismount t o s o l v e t a c t i c a l
Y

Infantry w i l l

dilemmas but empo o f

w i l l mount t h e v e h i c l e s a g a i n q u i c k
the a t t a c k . I n the defense armored

to sustain the

nfantrymen f i g h t

dismounted f r o m prepared p o s i t i o n s .

21 I

W h i c h l e a d e r s d i s m o u n t a g a i n d e p e n d s on t h e s i t u a t i o n and the m i s s i o n of the v e h i c l e system a f t e r the i n f a n t r y are

on t h e g r o u n d .

The p r o b l e m i s a g g r a v a t e d b y t h e r e a l i t y t h a t and cannon) cannot The

a l l s y s t e m s ( d i s m o u n t e d s q u a d , TOW,

u s u a l l y b e o p t i m a l l y e m p l o y e d on t h e same

terrain.

dismounted f o r c e does b e s t a n d s u p p o r t e d t a n k s do b e s t fires.

i n c l o s e t e r r a i n and the v e h i c l e i n t e r r a i n a f f o r d i n g l o n g range Army indicate a

T e n t a t i u e s o l u t i o n s w i t h i n t h e U.S. the

recognition of

importance of a s s o c i a t i n g s e l e c t e d p r i m a r y

l e a d e r s ( p l a t o o n l e a d e r a n d some s q u a d l e a d e r s ) w i t h t h e dismounted element w h i l e o t h e r the r e s t of vehicles. l e a d e r s ( p l a t o o n sergeant and

t h e squad l e a d e r s ) h a b i t u a l l y r e m a i n w i t h the I n s u r i n g t h a t some b a t t l e o r i e n t e d l e a d e r s who t h e t i m e of dismounting (and accompany t h e

h a v e b e e n i n t h e t u r r e t up u n t i l are therefore well dismounted element

o r i e n t e d on t h e b a t t l e ) ,

i s a d r i v i n g consideration.
125

Simpkin p o i n t s out three general p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r B r a d l e y v e h i c l e once t h e i n f a n t r y dismounts:

the

1.)

i t can be h a n d l e d

conservatively to r e t a i n a t a l l

c o s t t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o p i c k up t h e s q u a d o n c e t h e d i s m o u n t e d
mission i s complete.

2.)

i t can be s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e
missions,
or

i n f a n t r y a n d s e n t on like

indeDendent qua1 i t i e s ;

c a p i t a l i z i n g on i t s own t a n k

3.)

i t can be employed t o

support by f i r e t h e i n f a n t r y

i n t h e c o n d u c t of

the dismounted mission.CZ21

The c o n s e r v a t i v e o p t i o n i g n o r e s t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f B r a d l e y a n d w a s t e s p o t e n t i a l combat power. c e r t a i n l y o f f e r s t h e s a f e s t means of


mobility of

the

W h i l e t h i s method

r e t a i n i n g the protected

the

infantry,

i t r e d u c e s t h i s complex f i g h t i n g

s y s t e m t o t h e same t a c t i c a l s t a t u s o f only.

t h e M113

a carrier

T h e o p t i o n o f s e n d i n g u n l a d e n B r a d l e y IFUs on independent m i s s i o n s or i n d e p e n d e n t of t o move them w i t h t a n k s o n a n a x i s is similar t o the This

the dismounted element

m e t h o d p r e f e r r e d b y t h e Germans i n d e f e n s i v e b a t t l e s . option offers

t h e p o t e n t i a l advantage of

p u t t i n g both the their

d i s m o u n t e d a n d v e h i c l e s y s t e m s on t e r r a i n w h e r e e a c h o f s e p a r a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s can be m a x i m i z e d . s i g n i f i c a n t disadvantages. There a r e

A s p r e v i o u s l y shown,
126

tanks w i l l

often require close i t w o u l d seem,

i n f a n t r y support.

IFUs a c t i n g a 5 t a n k s ,
Independent f i r e and range of
to the

need s i m i l a r support. o u t of

maneuver m i s s i o n s ,

t h e immediate e f f e c t i v e

dismounted i n f a n t r y ,

l e a v e t h e IFJ f o r c e s u b j e c t

h a z a r d s o f enemy o b s t a c l e s a n d i n f a n t r y a n d l e a v e t h e dismounted element w i t h o u t vehicles. The the p o t e n t i a l f i r e s u p p o r t of


its
1 5

i n f a n t r y s much n e e d e d p r o t e c t e d m o b i l i t y D e s p i t e i t s more v a r i e d f i r e p o w e r ,

a t greater r i s k . and a g i l i t y , vulnerable not

speed,

i t s l i m i t e d armor p r o t e c t i o n makes i t more


The B r a d l e y I F U w a s

t o these hazards than tanks.

i n t e n d e d t o o p e r a t e a5 a tank.[231

The o p t i o n o f k e e p i n g t h e B r a d l e y i n s u p p o r t o f dismounted element

the

i s t h e m e t h o d p r e f e r r e d by t h e S o v i e t s . i n an a t t a c k

General M e r i m s k i r s t a t e d the g r e a t e s t r e s u l t

c a n b e a c h i e v e d when t h e BMPs s u p p o r t t h e r i - f l e m e n a n d t a n k s w i th their fire.[241 That,


o f course,

seems t o b e t h e b e 5 t it:

o p t i o n when t h e t e r r a i n a n d t a c t i c a l

s i t u a t i o n permit

t a n k s a r e c l o s e l y s u p p o r t e d by i n f a n t r y a n d t h e c o m b i n e d t a n k infantry force i s s u p p o r t e d by t h e I F U s s u p p r e s s i v e and

destructive firepower.

A s Simpkin w r o t e ,

I n o f f e n s i v e f o r w a r d movements a t a l l l e v e l s , b o t h i n t h e a t t a c k a n d w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of an a g g r e s s i v e defense, armored i n f a n t r y m a i n t a i n s the m o b i l i t y o f tanks; the I F U s u p p o r t s b o t h t h e tank and i t s squad and m a i n t a i n s the m o b i l i t y o f both.[251

While the conduct o f

i n d e p e n d e n t o p e r a t i o n s by u n l a d e n o c c a s i o n s may o c c u r when a

B r a d l e y I F V s i s not o p t i m a l ,

Bradley-equipped i n f a n t r y force 127

i s r e q u i r e d to operate

without

tanks.

W h i l e IFUs c a n n o t b e h a n d l e d a s b o l d l y a s infantrymen, an a r m o r e d

tanks,

e s p e c i a l l y when l o a d e d w i t h

i n f a n t r y p u r e f o r c e can conduct l i m i t e d independent operations. substantial D u r i n g t h e S o v i e t BMP d e b a t e , t h e r e was

a g r e e m e n t t h a t BMP f o r c e s w e r e s u i t a b l e f o r

c e r t a i n m i s s i o n s where speed and a g i l i t y were a d e c i d e d advantage. I n c o n s i d e r i n g such m i s s i o n s as reconnaissance, o r deep r a i d s i n enemy r e a r a r e a s , defenses t o the

f o r w a r d detachment,

S o v i e t s presume t h e r e a r e n o s u b s t a n t i a l penetrate.C261

Bradley-equipped 5im l a r fashion the tank-armored

i n f a n t r y c o u l d c e r t a i n l y be e m p l o y e d i n The b r e a k - u p however, t h e combined


of

i f the s i t u a t i o n dictated.

i n f a n t r y c o m b i n e d a r m s team,

p o t n t i a l l y reduces the o v e r a l l e f f e c t i v e n e s s of arms f o r c e . effective

A s i t u a t i o n i n which such a m i s s i o n c o u l d b e
t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n by t h e

i s i n the e x e c u t i o n of

armored force.

Tank-heavy

f o r c e s c o u l d b e u s e d t o b l o c k or

d e f e a t c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n g enemy a r m o r w h i l e a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y a t t a c k e d t o capture and d e s t r o y soft r e a r area i n s t a l l a t i o n s a g a i n s t w h i c h tank f i r e


is less effective.

The I F U may w e l l tank, b u t armored tanks i n

be a b e t t e r e x p l o i t a t i o n v e h i c l e than the

i n f a n t r y d e p e n d s on t a n k s f o r p r o t e c t i o n f r o m o t h e r

most t a c t i c a l

situations.

There

i s another p o s i t i o n ,

p r o p o s e d by some a t t h e U.S. force5

Army I n f a n t r y S c h o o l , w h i c h e n v i s i o n s B r a d l e y - p u r e

f i g h t i n g p o s i t i o n a l defenses thus f r e e i n g tank f o r c e s t o

128

maneuver.l271 conditions, sub-optimal

While feasible

u n d e r c e r t a i n METT-T

i n m o s t c a s e s t h i s s o l u t i o n seems t o r e p r e s e n t a
u s e o f f o r c e c a p a b i l i t i e s . A c a s e c a n b e made f o r f o r example,
i n desert environments

Bradley-pure defenses, where l i n e - o f - s i g h t

f a c t o r s f a v o r ATGMs. A p u r e in a

B r a d l e y - e q u i p p e d . f o r c e c o u l d be e m p l o y e d e f f e c t i v e l y positional defense

to block or f i x
force

a n a t t a c l t i n g enemy f o r c e , t h e enemy

p e r m i t t i n g a tank-heavy f l a n k or r e a r . Similar

t o maneuver t o a t t a c k

t a c t i c s w e r e u s e d b y Rommel a s h e

l u r e d enemy t a n k f o r m a t i o n s i n t o a t t a c k i n g h i s a n t i - t a n k defenses.
W i th favorable

t e r r a i n and s u p e r i o r r a n g e ,

he

f i x e d a n d d e s t r o y e d enemy a r m o r w h i l e h i s own a r m o r o u t f l a n k e d t h e enemy t o c o u n t e r a t t a c K i n t o s o f t e r , more

v u l n e r a b l e r e a r area f o r c e s and threatened l i n e s o f communications.

However,

the r e l a t i v e l y c l o s e d t e r r a i n of C e n t r a l Europe the t i m e , r e d u c i n g the

d e n i e s A'TGMs a r a n g e a d v a n t a g e m o s t o f e I f e c t i v e n e s s o f a Bradley-pure e f f e c t i v e and e f f i c i e n t cooperation of The r e g u l a r


b y M1135,

defense.

In E u r o p e a m o r e

s o l u t i o n seems t o i n v o l v e t h e infantry, armored i n f a n t r y , and tanks.

regular

infantry,

transported to i t s defensive positicrnz (anvil), The the

can e s t a b l i s h a s t r o n g p o s i t i o n a l defense

s u p p o r t e d b y some t a n k s a n d i t s o r g a n i c ATGMs, b u l k of

ITUs.

t h e armor and armored i n f a n t r y , more s u i t e d f o r c a n become t h e hammer, t h e enemy.

f l u i d battle,

c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n g t o the

f l a n k or r e a r of

129

Summary

No a n a l y s i s c a n c o n s i d e r e v e r y t a c t i c a l

variant.

The

f a c t o i ~ sd i s c u s s e d h e r e i n d i c a t e t h a t B r a d l e y - e q u i p p e d infantry

i s t h e b e s t e q u i p p e d i n f a n t r y i n t h e U.S.

Army t o the

p e r f o r m a s armored i n f a n t r y

t o f o c u s o n t h e a d v a n c e of

main b a t t l e t a n k .

I n so d o i n g i t m u s t f o c u s on i t s
t h e d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y and tlic

complementary c a p a b i l i t i e s , 25mm c a n n o n . while

I t s o t h e r c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e s u p p l e m e n t a r y and, t h e y can be r e p l i c a t e d i n k i n d b y t a n k s .

important,

A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y moues a n d f i g h t s i n c l o s e s u p p o r t o f tank f o r c e s . a c t i o n s of portion of operating.

How c l o s e d e p e n d s on METT-T

i n most case5 the

t h e dismounted i n f a n t r y must a f e c t

t h e same

t h e b a t t l e f i e l d upon w h i c h t h e t a n k s a r e

The g r e a t t e m p t a t i o n t o v i e w t h e B r a d l e y I F V , w i t h turret, firepower, m o b i l i t y , and p r o t e c t i o n , The p r i m a r y p u r p o s e o f

it-;

a5 a l i g h t t a n k

must be a v o i d e d .

the v e h i c l e

is to

move i n f a n t r y w i t h t a n k s u n d e r a r m o r . Bradley-equipped missions,

Although

f o r c e s may t a k e on 1 i m i t e d i n d e p e n d e n t

t h e y c a n do so o n l y when t h e g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n mutually

g r e a t l y reduces the need t o f i g h t as a c l o s e , s u p p o r t i n g combined arms f o r c e .

The o p t i m a l r o l e f o r

u n l a d e n IFUs i s t o s u p p o r t b y f i r e

the dismounted elements and the t a n k s t h e y complement.

130

Unless the U.S.

Army r e o r i e n t s i t s i n f a n t r y d o c t r ~ n e ,

the B r a d l e y i n f a n t r y w i l l frustration that

suffer

t h e same r o l e c o n f u s i o n and t h e rnechanlzed i n f a n t r y i n

i 5 symptomatic o f

M113s.

I t w i l l be employed i n r o l e s a n d g i v e n m i s 5 i o n s f o r
o r g a n i z e d or t r a i n e d .

which i t i s i l l - e q u i p p e d ,

I31

ENDNOTES

CWIPTER 4

T m e s o f D i v i s i o n s - P o s t War Army H e a d q u a r t e r s , H e a d q u a r t e r s , U.S. T h e a t e r , 1?45.

1.

General Board R e o o r t Forces, European

2. u o n S e n g e r und E t t e r l i n , 729-738.

Tanks of

t h e World 15'83.

pp.

3.

# 1 7 .
4. 5. 1.

TYDeS o f D i u i s i o n s - P o s t p . 8. p. 386.

War Army

General Board R e p o r t

Ogorkiewicz, Colonel

Huba Wass d e Czege,

" T h r e e K i n d s of

Infantry,"

p.

6. G e n e r a l W i l l i a m R. R i c h a r d s o n , Kermit Rooseuelt Lecture. L e c t u r e d e l i u e r e d t o t h e R o y a l C o l l e g e o f D e f e n c e S t u d i e s , 23 May 1984. I n t h i s speech General R i c h a r d s o n d i s c u s s e d the o r i e n t a t i o n a n d e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e U.S. A r m y ' s new l i g h t infantry units.
7. The d e g r a d a t i o n of i n f a n t r y s k i l l s i n m e c h a n i z e d i n f a n t r y has been n o t e d o f t e n i n r e c e n t m i l i t a r y 1 i t e r a t u r e , such as Richard Simpkin's Mechanized I n f a n t r y and John E n g l i s h ' s P e r s D e c t i u e on I n f a n t r y . P e r h a p s m o r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t wa5 n o t e d b y BG E d w i n B u r b a , D e p u t y Commandant o f t h e U.S. Army I n f a n t r y S c h o o l , i n a n u n p u b l i s h e d p a p e r e n t i t l e d "M2 D o c t r i n a l C o n c e p t s . " See p a g e 26.

8. Colone! E.M. Lloyd, A R e v i e w of t h e H i s t o r y o f ( L o n d o n : Longmans, G r e e n a n d C o . , 1 9 0 8 ) , p . 1 . 9. The German M o t o r i z e d I n f a n t r y R e q i m e n t , t h e Suez p.


(Sari

Infantry

1. Rafael, CA:

1 0 . A v r a h a m Adan, On t h e B a n k s o f P r e s i d i o P r e s s , 1 9 8 0 ) , p . 210.

1 1 . O g o r k i e w i c z , p . 386.
12. T h e German M o t o r i z e d I n f a n t r y R e q i m e n t , Tanks o f p.

2.
p.

1 3 . v o n Senger u n d E t t e r l i n , 745.

t h e World 1983,

14. C.N. D o n n e l l y , " T a c t i c a l P r o b l e m s F a c i n g t h e S o v i e t Army," I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e f e n s e Review, (9:78) p . 1407.

15. R i c h a r d S i m p k i n ,

Mechanized I n f a n t r y , 132

p.

43.

16.

Ibid.

pp.

43-57.

1 7 . LTG F r e d K. M a h a f f e y , " B r a d l e y F i g h t i n g V e h i c l e S y s t e m s (BFVS) - I n f o r m a t i o n Memorandum," W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: D e p a r t m e n t of t h e Army, O f f i c e o f t h e C h i e f of S t a f f f o r P l a n s a n d O p e r a t i o n s , 7 Mar 1 9 8 3 .


18. C 1 i f f o r d D. B r a d l e y , J u l - A u g 1 9 8 1 , p . 27.

'The

F u t u r e IFV,"

Infantry.

19. G e n e r a l C o l o n e l V i k t o r A. M e r i m s l t i y , " T h e EMF i n Combat," i n The S o v i e t A r t of War. Ed. H a r r i e t F. S c o t t a n d W i l l i a m F . S c o t t . ( B o u l d e r , CO: W e s t v i e w P r e s s , 1 9 8 2 ) , p . 285.


20.

Donnelly,

p.

1407.

t i . The German v i e w o f a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y t a c t i c s a r e d e s c r i b e d
i n a r t i c l e s by S i m p k i n , W a l t e r , a n d K l a f f u s . The r e p o r t f r o m t h e TRADOC I i a s i o n w i t h t h e German G e n e r a l A r m y O f f i c e e n t i t l e d " C o n c e p t a n d O p e r a t i n g P r i n c i p l e s o f t h e German A r m o r e d Combat T r o o p s " i s d l 5 0 h e l p f u l . 22. R i c h a r d S i m p k i n , (Nov-Dec 83) 15. "When t h e S q u a d D i s m o u n t s , " Infantry,

23. M a h a f f e y ,
24. M e r i m s k i r ,

p. p.

3.

285.
p. 17.

25.

Simpkin,

"When t h e S q u a d D i s m o u n t s , " 1407.

26. D o n n e l l y , p .

27. BG E d w i n B u r b a , D e p u t y Commandant o f t h e U.8. Army I n f a n t r y School, which has r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r developing t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e for B r a d l e y i n f a n t r y , h a s w r i t t e n a " t h i n k p i e c e " e n t i t l e d "M2 D o c t r i n a l Concepts." T h i s unpublished d o c u m e n t p r e s e n t s h i s t h o u g h t s on B r a d l e y t a c t i c s a n d i s i l l u s t r a t e d w i t h a number o f s i t u a t i o n a l e x a m p l e s . Some of t h e s e e x a m p l e s show B r a d l e y i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g r e l a t i v e l y independently, n o t i n close cooperation w i t h tank forces.

133

CWPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS

T h i s s t u d y h a s f o c u s e d on d e t e r m i n i n g a n op and o r i e n t a t i o n for Army t o d a y a n d prescribe bemoan


I

imal r o l e

B r a d l e y e q u i p p e d i n f a n t r y i n t h e U.S.
I t i s not an a t t e m p t t o

n t h e n e x t decade.

in detail

t h e t a c t i c s u s e d by B r a d l e y i n f a n t r y , or t o recommend a r e d e s i g n f o r

to

t s shortcomings,
Rather,

f u t u r e IFUs.

g i v e n t h e B r a d l e y IFU, how s h o u l d
i t maximize

i n f a n t r y equipped w i t h

its potential contribution

on the modern b a t t l e f ield'?

As t h e U.S.

Army f i e l d s t h e B r a d l e y I F U i t m u s t r e f l e c t

on t h e many c h a n g e s t h a t t h i s a n d o t h e r m o d e r n i z a t i o n e + f o r t . ;
w i l l

h a v e on t h e w a y t h e a r m y f i g h t s . the expected threat,

T h i s study s u g g e s t s , other b a t t l e f i e l d that Army

i n l i g h t of conditions,

terrain,

and t h e l e s s o n s o f modern m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y ,

s e v e r a l p r u d e n t a c t i o n s s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d by t h e U.S. i n order t o m a x i m i z e i t s combat c a p a b i l i t i e s . t h e p a r a d i gm o f d o c tr I n e

These can be weapons,

summar I z e d u n d e r soldiers

and

used e a r l i e r .

O o c t r ine

For y e a r s t h e s h o r t c o m i n g s o f t h e M I 1 3 h a v e l e + t t h e
134

U.S.

Army w i t h o u t

infantry that could fight e f f e c t i v e l y

in

c l o s e mutual support o f

tanus.

Mechanized i n f a n t r y w i t h

inadequate p r o t e c t i o n for o r i e n t a t i o n tor w h i c h


to support

t h e tasU a d o p t e d a r o l e and
Its inability

i t was b e t t e r e q u i p p e d .

t a n k s c l o s e l y c a u s e d many t o d o u b t

the requirement

t o d o so. close

The m i s m a t c h b e t w e e n t a n U f o r c e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r

i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t and t h e lacU of c a p a b i l i t y of M I 1 3

equipped i n f a n t r y t o provide c o n f u s i o n about me c h a n i z e d


in

i t , have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e
c o o p e r a t i o n a n d t h e r o l e ot

tank-infantry

t an t r y .

The a d o p t i o n o f a m a n e u v e r - o r i e n t e d

AirLand B a t t l e

d o c t r i n e d e s c r i b e d i n t h e 1982 p u b l i c a t i o n of Operations, and t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of the

FM 1 0 0 - 5 ,

Mi A b r a m s a n d t h e
infantry

c o m p l e x M2 B r a d l e y I F U demand a r e e x a m i n a t i o n o f roles.

A s each mechanized i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n i s r e o r g a n i z e d

and r e e q u i p p e d w i t h B r a d l e y IFVs i t must a l s o be r e t r a i n e d and r e o r i e n t e d a s armored infantry. The b a t t a l i o n c a n n o success t h e m i s s i o n s of

l o n g e r t a c U l e w i t h t h e same d e g r e e of

p o s i t i o n a l defense and dismounted a t t a c k of a f o r t i f l e d position that

i t c o u l d a5 m e c h a n i z e d i n f a n t r y .

I t l a c k s the

dismounted i n f a n t r y s t r e n g t h and the c a p a b i l i t y t o dismount weapons i n t o a f o r t i f i e d d e f e n s e or s t r o n g p o i n t . The

b a t t a l i o n can,

however, accomplish t h e J o b o f c o o p e r a t i n g attack, counterattacu, than i t c o u l d speed,

w i t h tanks i n the f l u i d defense,

e x p l o i t a t i o n , and p u r s u i t much m o r e e f f e c t i v e l y before.


I t has the

increased protection,

firepower,

a n d m o b i l i t y t o f i g h t w i t h and s u p p o r t t h e m a i n b a t t l e t a n k
135

torce.

The o p t i m a l
infantry

r o l e for B r a d l e y infantry i s a s armored tanks i n otfensiue operations Working

i n c l o s e s u p p o r t of

and i n t h e m o b i l e a s p e c t s o f d e f e n s i v e combat. together, tanks,

B r a d l e y IFUs and d i s m o u n t e d i n t a n t r y f o r m a

c o m p l e m e n t a r y c o m b i n e d a r m s team t h a t m u s t f o c u s on t h e same engagement and n o t be p i e c e m e a l e d i n t o s e p a r a t e engagements where t h e mutual supporting e f f e c t s are lost.

Ml13-equipped analysis of

i n f a n t r y s t i l l has a r o l e .

As the much of

t h e E u r o p e a n b a t t l e f i e l d h a s shown,

L e n t r a l Europe f a v o r s t h e use of dismounted i n f a n t r y , s u p p o r t e d b y t a n k s and o t h e r w e a p o n s , The s u b s t a n t i a l amount o f u r b a n ,


in positional

defenses.

forested,

and u n d u l a t i n g

t e r r a i n o f f e r s ample o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r employment of r e g u l a r i n f a n t r y w h i c h c a n go t o ground t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of a n d man-made cover and concealment, natural

l i m i t e d o b s e r v a t i o n and

t i e l d of fire,

and t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o r e i n f o r c e t e r r a i n

w i t h m i n e s and o b s t a c l e s t o slow and c a n a l i z e S o v i e t mechanized formations. E m p l o y i n g h e a v y f o r c e s w i t h M l s and

M 2 s i n open t e r r a i n and i n d e p t h b e h i n d t h e s e p o s i t i o n a l defenses and s t r o n g p o i n t s o f t e r s the o p p o r t u n i t y for fluid

m a n e u v e r b a t t l e s and c o u n t e r a t t a c k s w h i c h o p t i m i z e t h e a t t r i b u t e s of heavy f o r c e s . therefore, T h e U.S. Army s h o u l d c o n s i d e r , reaular the defensive

m a i n t a i n i n g some M i 1 3 e q u i p p e d

< m e c h a n i z e d ) i n f a n t r y i n E u r o p e t o r many o f r o l e s f o r which

i t i s nar, p r e p a r e d .
136

The U.S. Army s h o u l d

f i e l d armored i n f a n t r y (Bradley) p u r p o s e of

b a t t a l i o n s for

the s p e c i f i c

c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h main b a t t l e tank b a t t a l i o n s .

I n l i g h t of r a p i d r e i n f o r c e m e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s and

c o n s t r a i n e d a i r and sea l i f t , establishing a stockpile,

t h e U.S.

Army m i g h t c o n s i d e r o f M113s t o p r o v i d e i n f a n t r y which

or POMCUS s e t s ,

protected transportation tor other regular q u i c k l y d e p l o y t o Europe. structure,

Under t h e o l d p e n t o m i c d i v i s i o n

t r a n s p o r t a t i o n u n i t s o f p o o l e d APLs w e r e a s s i g n e d ( t h a t fought

to infantry d i v i s i o n s t o provide infantry


dismounted,

w i t h the p r o t e c t e d m o b i l i t y t o g e t t o and around

the b a t t l e f i e l d . C l 1

Sane m i l i t a r y c r i t i c s w h o s t r o n g l y f a v o r m a n e u v e r warfare t h i n k t h a t m o b i l e f i g h t i n g f o r c e s 1 i k e t a n k s and that

Bradley i n f a n t r y are a l l

i s required.

They q u e s t i o n t h e and

s u r v i v a b i l i t y o i dismounted r e g u l a r high-intensity

i n f a n t r y on t h e m i d -

b a t t l e f i e l d i n l i g h t of

the c e r t a i n S o v i e t use

of massive amounts of a r t i l l e r y , munitions, weapons.

the p r o b a b l e use of chemical b a t t l e f i e l d nuclear

a n d t h e p o s s i b l e u s e of Against

t h i s r a n g e ot w e a p o n s o f m a s s d e s t r u c t i o n

d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y d e p e n d s on p a s s i v e and a c t i v e means t o increase i t s protection.

F i r s t and foremost, remain undetected. e f f o r t s of

dismounted r e g u l a r

i n f a n t r y must

I t r e 1 i e s on c o u n t e r - r e c o n n a i s s a n c e
on i t s a b i l i t y t o c a m o u f l a g e , and

covering forces, lack of

on i t s g e n e r a l

thermal

and o t h e r s i g n a t u r e s g i v e n o t f

137

by v e h i c l e s a n d r a d i o s .

Dismounted f o r c e s i n the defense use They

w i r e communications t o the f u l l e s t e x t e n t p o s s i b l e .

c o n s t r u c t dummy p o s i t i o n s a n d u s e l i g h t l y h e l d c o m b a t o u t p o s t l i n e s t o d e c e i v e t h e enemy. Once t h e enemy has e x p e n d e d i t s

m a s s i v e f i r e p r e p a r a t i o n on t h e " w r o n g h i l l "

i t may b e
these

s t r a i n e d l o g i s t i c a l l y and t a c t i c a l l y t o q u i c k l y r e p e a t p r e p a r a t o r y f i r e s on s t r o n g l y h e l d p o s i t i o n s i n d e p t h .

Second, protection.

d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y r e l i e s on t h e e a r t h f o r

I t i s t h e b e s t p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t the immediate
I n Europe dismounted i n f a n t r y

e f f e c t s o f n u c l e a r weapons.

can a l s o seek p r o t e c t i o n f r o m t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f s m a l l

towns t h a t d o t t h e c o u n t r y s i d e e v e r y 2-3 k i l o m e t e r s .
i n f a n t r y m u s t be s u p p l i e d w i t h ample c h e m i c a l and w i t h p o r t a b l e d e c o n t a m i n a t i o n equipment.

Regular

p r o t e c t l v e gear
I t may n o t be

a b l e t o be p u l l e d f r o m t h e l i n e t o d e c o n t a m i n a t e a t a pre-prepared s i t e . I f Ml13s w e r e a v a i l a b l e ,
to the r e a r ,

t h e y c o u l d move

up f r o m h i d e p o s i t i o n s w e l l

rendezvous w i t h the

dismounted force,

and move i t f r o m c o n t a m i n a t e d a r e a s t o

s u b s e q u e n t or a1 t e r n a t i v e b a t t l e p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n t h e d e f e n s e as the s i t u a t i o n permitted.

Light
which

i n f a n t r y gains p r o t e c t i o n f r o m rugged t e r r a i n from d i s p e r s a l i n small groups,

in

i t fights,

and f r o m i t s

r e l a t i v e l y h i g h t a c t i c a l m o b i l i t y i n rugged t e r r a i n .

Bradley-equ ipped i n f a n t r y i s not " b e t t e r " mechanized i n f a n t r y .

than

I t i s j u s t b e t t e r o r g a n i z e d and

138

equipped tor c e r t a i n i n f a n t r y r o l e s . "better"

Mechanized i n f a n t r y i s

t h a n a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y i n many o f

the

infantry

r e q u i r e m e n t s on t h e m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d . M1I3-transported infantry for positional

Maintaining defenses and o t h e r

i n f a n t r y i n t e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s c e r t a i n l y seems a m o r e v i a b l e s o l u t i o n than c o n v e r t i n g a l 1 mechanized i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s i n E u r o p e t o t h e B r a d l e y a n d f o r c i n g t h e m t o t a k e on t a s k s , d i c t a t e d by the t e r r a i n ,

for which they are

ill-equipped. and Mechanized

The Germans m a i n t a i n b o t h a r m o r e d ( M a r d e r ) IM113) infantry battalions;

the Soviets motor r i f l e troops and "mechanized"

c o n s i s t o f b o t h "armored" make t h e d i s t i n c t i o n

(BMP)

(BTR) and

i n t h e t y p e s of m i s s i o n s g i v e n each. i n f a n t r y as the intantry

The S o v i e t s u s e BMP-equipped component of tank d i v i s i o n s ;

i n motorized r i f l e divisions

t h e r e a r e t w o B T R - e q u i p p e d r e g i m e n t s a n d o n e BMP r e g i m e n t m a t c h e d w i t h one t a n k r e g i m e n t .

A U.S.

heavy d i v i s i o n w i t h a m i x o f and M113-equipped, regular

tank,

armored

infantry.

infantry would certainly

he more v e r s a t i l e t h a n a d i v i s i o n w i t h o n l y t a n k s and BIFVs. W h i l e c u r r e n t f i e l d i n g p l a n s f o r t h e M 2 B I F U s f o c u s on d i v i s ~ o n si n t u r n , effective t h e more economical and t a c t i c a l l y

a p p r o a c h m a y be t o c r e a t e B I F V b a t t a l i o n s i n e a c h BIFV f i e l d i n g does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y have t o t h e M i Abrams t a n k i n each

heavy d i v i s i o n .

c o i n c i d e w i t h the f i e l d i n g of division;

armored i n f a n t r y equipped w i t h BlFUs can o p e r a t e

e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h M60A3 t a n K s a l s o .

139

W e aD on s

T h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e U.S.

Army s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r

b u i l d i n g i t s ground t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e around a force c o n s i s t i n g of tanks, armored i n f a n t r y , and r e g u l a r


infantry

i s made i n l i g h t o f s e v e r a l M113-equipped Ml13-equipped

important factors.

First, Second,

i n f a n t r y has a v i a b l e t a c t i c a l r o l e .

i n f a n t r y w i l l r e m a i n a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t o f U.S. Third, M113s the

h e a v y f o r c e s t r u c t u r e f o r many y e a r s t o come. a r e c h e a p r e l i a b l e and a v a i l a b l e .

I f r e t a i n e d , however,

M 1 1 3 - e q u i p p e d f o r c e s r e q u i r e some m i n o r m o d e r n i z a t i o n . P r o t e c t i o n and a u t o m o t i v e performance c o u l d be enhanced br a d o p t i n g t h e M113C13 u e r s i o n . t 2 1 Additionally, regular the c a l i b e r

i n f a n t r y n e e d s a b e t t e r BMP k i l l i n g c a p a b i l i t y ;

.SO m a c h i n e g u n c a n n o t do i t a n d t h e DRAGON i s o f t e n t o o s l o w

and remains i n e f f e c t i u e a t night and i n reduced v i s i b i l i t r .

T h e h i s t o r y of

t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y combined arms w a r t a r e While t h i s

c l e a r l y shows t h e n e e d t o f i g h t a s c o m b i n e d arms. s t u d y h a s c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e c o o p e r a t i o n o f infantry, a l l arms must work

tanks and

i n concert before the true

s y n e r g i s t i c e f f e c t s of c a n b i n e d a r m s a r e r e a l i z e d . Commanders o f c o m b i n e d a r m s f o r c e s must h a v e a t t h e i r i m m e d i a t e d i s p o s a l a l l of t h e t y p e s of f o r c e s necessary t o


situations.

q u i c k l y r e a c t t o the changing t a c t i c a l

A s i g n i f i c a n t dilemma f o r
15

t h e M1/M2

t a 5 k f o r c e commander key t o

the

i n a b i l i t y of many s u p p o r t i n g a r m s a n d s y s t e m s ,

140

combined arms o p e r a t i o n s , t h e maneuver f o r c e . support,

t o m a i n t a i n t h e p o t e n t i a l p a c e of
command a n d c o n t r o l , service

Mortars,

and d e d i c a t e d a n t i - t a n k

weapons ( I T U S ) i n t h e M i a n d

M2 b a t t a l i o n s a r e equipped w i t h M i 1 3 type v e h i c l e s .
Additionally, engineers, a i r defense, a n d a r t i l l e r r and a i r
Just a s t h e

l i a i s o n p a r t i e s a l l h a v e M113 t y p e v e h i c l e s . footmobile i n f a n t r y i n World War t h e M1/M2

I o u t r a n i t s non-mobile
o c c a s i o n a l l y be

a r t i l l e r y support,

task f o r c e w i l l

f a c e d w i t h the dilemma of having to c u r t a i l

s e p a r a t i n g f r o m i t s s u p p o r t arms or
i t s Gperations.

t h e tempo o f

As the

B r a d l e y w a s d e s i g n e d t o e v e n t u a l l y accommodate a f a m i l y o f v e h i c l e s [ 3 1 p e r h a p s i t w o u l d be p r u d e n t t o r e d i r e c t p r o d u c t i o n and f i e l d i n g p l a n s t o p r o v i d e v e h i c l e s w i t h Bradley automotive and p r o t e c t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s for the

a r t i l l e r y F I S T S a n d FSOs, a i r f o r c e l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s , b a t t a l i o n mortars, engineers, and a i r d e f e n d e r s who n o r m a l I Y The r e q u i r e d

accompany a n d s u p p o r t t h e h e a v y t a s k f o r c e .

m o b i l i t y a n d p r o t e c t i o n c o u l d a l s o b e a t t a i n e d by a d o p t i n g the cheaper M i i 3 A 3 .

Until

the dilemma i s r e s o l v e d , taken.

ad h o c

solutions w i l l message

undoubtedly be

FISTS e q u i p p e d w i t h dig1 t a l

d e v i c e s (TACFIRE communications d e v i c e s , t h e B r a d l e y company commander's vehicle.

may h a v e t o r i d e i n S t i n g e r o r Redeye

a i r d e f e n s e g u n n e r s may h a v e t o r i d e i n B r a d l e y p l a t o o n v e h i c l e s w i t h t h e a l r e a d y cramped i n f a n t r y m e n . i n c l u d e a n SA-7 gunner i n some BMP s q u a d s . [ 4 1 The S o v i e t s

141

Soldiers

A s LTG A r t h u r S. C o l l i n s , Jr. s t a t e d i n T r a i n i na.

C m o n Sense

The i n f a n t r y m a n m u s t l e a r n t o e x e c u t e m o r e d i f f e r e n t m i s s i o n s t h a n t h e s o l d i e r s of any o t h e r b r a n c h . . . l h e m o s t v a r i e d and d i f f i c u l t t r a i n i n g c o n f r o n t i n g the c o m b a t - a r m s commander i s i n f a n t r y t r a i n i n g . C 5 1

LTG Col 1 i n s w r o t e t h e s e words b e f o r e t h e U.S. f i e l d e d t h e B r a d l e y IFU.


U.S.

Army

T h e r e may b e n o t y p e u n i t i n t h e whose training


lhis

Army,

except armored c a v a l r y ,

requirements are as varied as the Bradley infantry.

i n f a n t r y m u s t n o t o n l y t r a i n on a f a i r l y w i d e a r r a y of i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e conduct leader i n f a n t r y tasks,

but i t must a l s o

i n t e n s i v e gunnery t r a i n i n g a t e v e r y l e v e l from

s q u a d t o b a t t a l i o n commander. mobile,

I t m u s t t r a i n for

highly

f l u i d o p e r a t i o n s a s p a r t of

t h e c o m b i n e d a r m s team.

and i t m u s t t r a i n d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y e l e m e n t s .

A n y t r a i n i n g s t r a t e g y m u s t b e t h e r e s u l t of a n a l y s i s of the

detailed

i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e t a s k s t h e u n i t must The r e s u l t i n g t a s k


l i s t for

be a b l e t o e x e c u t e . infantry,

armored

l i k e o t h e r u n i t s , may seem t o b e so e x t e n s i v e t h a t

the u n i t and s o l d i e r s c o u l d never be t r a i n e d t o s t a n d a r d . The t a s k most


list,

therefore,

m u s t b e p r i o r i t i z e d b a s e d on t h e Through i n n o v a t i v e

i m p o r t a n t r o l e s and m i s s i o n s .

m e t h o d s a n d mu1 t i - e c h e l o n e d be t r a i n e d t o a c c o m p l i s h

t r a i n i n g t h e armored i n f a n t r y can

i t s c o m p l e m e n t a r y and s u p p l e m e n t a r y

142

roles i n combined arms o p e r a t t o n s .

Some o f

t h e f a c t o r s t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e armored i n f a n t r y
i m p a c t on l e a d e r , s o l d i e r and u n i t

and make i t d i f f e r e n t t r a i n i ng.

Leader t r a i n i n g .

L e a d e r s o f B r a d l e y i n f a n t r y u n i t s must They must t h i n k

t h i n k l i k e i n f a n t r y m e n and l i k e t a n k e r s .

1 i k e i n f a n t r y m e n because employment o f t h e i r d i s m o u n t e d
e l e m e n t s i s o f paramount c o n c e r n . tankers f o r They m u s t t h i n k l i k e

t h r e e s i g n i f i c a n t reasons:

(1)

T h e i r p r i m a r y p u r p o s e i s t o f o c u s on t h e t h e the tank f o r c e . limitations, They must know armor

advancement of capabilities,

and t a c t i c a l m e t h o d s and

t e c h n i q u e s as w e l l

a s t h e i r own.

( 2 ) Armored i n f a n t r y l e a d e r s w i l l h a b i t u a l l y command
tanks. Under c u r r e n t U.S.

Army methods o f t a s k - o r g a n i z i n g ,
cross a t t a c h t o form

B r a d l e y b a t t a l i o n s and companies w i l l tank-infantry teams and t a s k f o r c e s .

(3)

The tempo o f o p e r a t i o n s w i l l

be more l i k e t a n k

o p e r a t i o n s than t r a d i t i o n a l Simpkin noted,

i n f a n t r y operations.

As Richard

" A t a n k e r h a l t s between moves;

an i n f a n t r y m a n

moves between l o c a t i o n s . " C 6 1 infantry leaders w i l l other

I n t h i s r e g a r d perhaps armored

have t o t h i n k more l i k e t a n k e r s t h a n

i n f a n t r y l e a d e r s do.

The i m p o r t a n c e o f

the dismounted element argues f o r The tempo o f

l e a d e r s s o l i d l y based i n i n f a n t r y t a c t i c s .

143

o p e r a t i o n s and s u p p o r t of

tanks argues for

l e a d e r s who can

t h i n k and o p e r a t e a t a n a r m o r p a c e . f r o m experience and schooling.

L e a d e r d e v e l o p m e n t comes

Perhaps armored i n f a n t r y

l e a d e r s s h o u l d h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o a t t e n d t h e armor officer's a d v a n c e d c o u r s e o r t o a t t e n d some precommand c o u r s e operations.

s p e c i f i c a l l y o r i e n t e d on a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y - t a n k

The Germans t r a i n a l l armored f o r c e s ,

t h e s o l d i e r s who make u p t h e i r

i n c l u d i n g a l l mechanized i n + a n t r y a t the

German Army A r m o r S c h o o l a t M u n s t e r . school t o develop,

I t i s a m i s s i o n o f the
from v e h i c l e

t r a i n and educate l e a d e r s ,

c m a n d e r s t o b a t t a l i o n commanders,

so t h a t t h e y c a n l e a d

t h e i r a r m o r e d c o m b a t t r o o p s u s i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e s of Bewealichkeit. T h i s t e r m d e s c r i b e s a s t y l e of leadership i n freedom t o

w h i c h s u b o r d i n a t e s a r e a l l o w e d a l a r g e d e g r e e of operate.
I t r e q u i r e s leader mental

f l e x i b i l i t y and a s p i r i t task

o f command a d a p t a b l e t o r a p i d c h a n g e s i n l o c a t i o n ,
organization, mission, and b a t t l e c o n d i t i o n s . [ 7 1

P e r h a p s t h e b e s t l e a d e r t r a i n i n g comes f r o m t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t r a i n i n g w i t h l e a d e r s of t h e o t h e r arms. As

b a t t a l i o n s a r e n o t permanently of semi-permanently a t t a c h e d i n peace t i m e t r a i n i n g , commanders m u s t

cross

b r i g a d e and d i v i s i o n tank and armored

i n s u r e t h a t camnanders o f

infantry unit h a b i t u a l l y t r a i n together.

Armored i n f a n t r y l e a d e r s f r o m squad t o b a t t a l i o n a r e

a l s o v e h i c l e commanders who r i d e i n t h e t u r r e t a n d m u s t b e
144

f u l l y c a p a b l e of

f i g h t i n g t h e v e h i c l e sjrstems.

While the

Army s o l u t i o n a p p e a r s t o be t o d e d i c a t e c e r t a i n l e a d e r s t o

t h e v e h i c l e t e a m and o t h e r s t o t h e d i s m o u n t e d e l e m e n t , c e r t a i n key leaders (platoon leader, company commander, etc.)

must be f u l l y q u a l i f i e d t o f u l f i l l b o t h r o l e s e q u a l l y w e l l . These l e a d e r s w i l l be c h a l l e n g e d t o b a l a n c e t h e i r p e r s o n a l t r a i n i n g e f f o r t s b e t w e e n t h e m o u n t e d and d i s m o u n t e d l e a d e r

tasks.

Collective training.

T r a i n i n g as p u r e B r a d l e y u n i t s squad and

makes l i t t l e sense e x c e p t a t t h e l o w e s t l e v e l s , platoon. The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l concepts for

t h e c u r r e n t army

s t r u c t u r e c a l l f o r single-weapon

companies t a n o b v i o u s Combined

c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t h e case of B r a d l e y i n f a n t r y ) .

arms t a c t i c s ,

however,

seem t o d i c t a t e t a s k o r g a n i z i n g t a n k s

a n d a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y a t company t e a m l e v e l There w i l l tanks,

i n many i n s t a n c e s .

a l w a y s be a c o n f l i c t between t h e d e s i r e t o mass and the a c t u a l tactical necessity t o m ix

f o r example,

t a n k s and armored i n f a n t r y t o r e a l i z e the d e c i r c , arms e f f e c t s . METT-1,

.mb i n e d

W h i l e t h e o p t i m a l m i x s i t u a t i o n a l l r d e p e n d s on the

t a n k s and armored i n f a n t r y must a t l e a s t f l g h t

same e n g a g e m e n t i n m u t u a l

s u p p o r t f o r combined arms e f f e c t s

to occur.

This w i l l

o f t e n b e a t company l e v e l .

I n keeping w i t h i t s r o l e ,

Bradley i n f a n t r y w i l l i n offensive

f o c u s on

t r a i n i n g t o cooperate w i t h tanks, defense missions. I n most cases,

and f l u i d

t r a i n i n g for missions l i k e urban

establishing strongpoints,

p o s i t i o n a l defenses,

145

warfare,

and

so on, w i l l t a k e a l o w p r i o r i t y .

Bradley rapid

dismounted elements should t r a i n i n a s s a u l t t a c t i c s ,

maneuver t h r o u g h smoke, woods and c l o s e t e r r a i n t o a t t a c k enemy p o s i t i o n s , p a t r o l l i n g , o b s t a c l e and mine c l e a r i n g and emplacement and o t h e r t a s k s s u p p o r t i n g t h e advance of tanks.

I n f a n t r y must be a b l e t o d i s m o u n t q u i c k l y ,

orient rapidly,

and move o u t s w i f t l y t o a c c o m p l i s h i t s m i s s i o n .

Individual drivers,

training.

Except f o r

leaders,

gunners,

and

a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y m e n must be t r a i n e d a l m o s t Armored i n f a n t r y m e n must

e x c l u s i v e l y i n dismounted s k i l l s .
b e tough,

v e r s a t i l e s o l d i e r s who a r e p h y s i c a l l y and intensely

p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y p r e p a r e d t o d i s m o u n t and t o f i g h t demanding, r a p i d - p a c e d b a t t l e s on t h e g r o u n d . mounted t a s k s , weapons,

F o r t h e s e men

such as engaging t a r g e t s w i t h f i r i n g p o r t
low return for

are low p r i o r i t y ,

training time

endeavors.

BY c o n c e n t r a t i n g on a I i m i t e d r a n g e o f d i s m o u n t e d t a s k s and by g i v i n g d i s m o u n t e d t r a i n i n g a h i g h p r i o r i t y , i n f a n t r y may a v o i d t h e d e g r a d a t i o n o f p l a g u e d t h e mechanized i n f a n t r y . [ 8 1 tasks should f a l l s u p e r v i s i o n of vehicle system. armored

infantry s k i l l s that V e h i c l e maintenance

t o t h e d r i v e r and gunner u n d e r t h e
i s the

t h o s e l e a d e r s whose p r i m a r y o r i e n t a t i o n

A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y m e n must b e t r a i n e d t o a h i g h s t a n d a r d i n combat e n g i n e e r s k i l l s .
A s t h e combat e n g i n e e r
15

an

146

engineer of

f i r s t a n d an i n f a n t r y m a n s ec ond,

the reverse

is true

the armored infantryman;

he m u s t be a
almost as a secondary

sapper-pioneer-combat specialty. He w i l l

engineer

o f t e n be r e q u i r e d t o b r e e c h o b s t a c l e s a n d

t o o p e n l a n e s t h r o u g h m i n e f i e l d s so t h a t t a n k s c a n a d v a n c e .
He m u s t b e t r a i n e d i n p e a c e t i m e a n d e q u i p p e d i n c o m b a t f o r suc h t a s k s .

T h e s m a l l number o f s o l d i e r s who f i g h t d i s m o u n t e d f r a m t each squad compared t o t h e v a r i e t y of weapons a v a i l a b l e r e q u i r e s e a c h man t o b e c a p a b l e o f e m p l o y i n g them a l l . These

s a l d i e r s m u s t b e q u a l i f i e d n o t o n l y o n a n a r r a y of e n g i n e e r m u n i t i o n s b u t o n t h e s q u a d a s s a u l t weapon (SAW), launcher, automatic r i f l e , DRAGON m e d i u m ATGM, grenade

and the M72

1 ight anti-tank

weapon (LAW).

-Other.

Concerns

Two a d d i t i o n a l c o n c e r n s must be a d d r e s s e d . because of

First,

i t s p r i m a r y r o l e of s u p p o r t i n g t a n k s and because
vehicle, many a r g u e

t h e B r a d l e y I F V a p p e a r s t o be a t a n k - l i k e

t h a t Armor B r a n c h should have p r o p o n e n c y f o r i n s t e a d of I n f a n t r y Branch.

armored i n t a n t r r

T h e r e a r e good r e a s o n s a n d On one h a n d , the

examples w h i c h s u p p o r t e i t h e r p o s i t i o n .

German Army seems t o e n j o y s u c c e s s w i t h a l 1 a r m o r e d f o r c e s under

i t s Armor School.

On t h e o t h e r h a n d ,

as the I s r a e l i
i t s armor

m e c h a n i z e d i n f a n t r y was a l l o w e d t o l a n g u i s h u n d e r corpst91,
so m i g h t a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y u n d e r

t h e U.S. A r m o r

147

Branch.

Even i f t h e s i t u a t i o n d i d not g e t out o f hand,

it IS

c e r t a i n l y p r e d i c t a b l e t h a t a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y w o u l d f o c u s on
armor s k i l l s ,

l i k e B r a d l e y gunnery,

a t t h e e x p e n s e of

the

d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y s k i l l s i f t h e BIFU w e r e a s s i g n e d t o F t . Knox.

I n the f i n a l

analysis,

armored i n f a n t r y m u s t f i r s t be

s u p e r b i n f a n t r y ; as a u n i t paramount concern. supp I emen t ar y

i t s d i s m o u n t e d s k i l l s must b e of

O t h e r s k i l l s a r e i m p o r t a n t but

.
armored infantrymen

S e c o n d , d e s p i t e t h e l o w number of

a v a i l a b l e p e r u n i t t o h a n d l e a b r o a d spectrum of mounted and dismounted tasks, Army l e a d e r s seem c o n v i n c e d t h a t " e l i t e " infantry leaders are the continuum.
U.S.

u n i t s t a t u s a n d p r i o r i t y on t o p - n o t c h the p u r v i e w of

i n f a n t r y on t h e l i g h t e n d o f Richardson, Commander,

A s G e n e r a l W i l l i a m R.

Army

T r a i n i n g A n d D o c t r i n e Comnand,

has stated:

A l l u n i t s i n t h e l i g h t d i v i s i o n s w i l l be f u l l y
s t r u c t u r e d a n d manned a t 100% o f a u t h o r i z e d l e v e l s . Q u a l i t y o f f i c e r s and noncommissioned o f f i c e r s w i l l meet s t r i n g e n t s e l e c t i o n and r e t e n t i o n standards. Many l e a d e r s h i p p o s i t i o n s w i l l r e q u i r e r a n g e r t r a i n i n g , w h i l e u n i t commanders w i l l b e t h e m o s t e x p e r i e n c e d i n t h e Army. Noncommissioned o f f i c e r s w i l l be t h e most t e c h n i c a l l y competent, p h y s i c a l l y f i t t r a i n e r s we c a n m u s t e r . t l 0 1

I n a manpower c o n s t r a i n e d f o r c e ,

the tendency t o

inequitably d i s t r i b u t e t a l e n t toward special operating force5 and l i g h t i n f a n t r y , may b e t h e g r e a t e s t o b s t a c l e t o t h e infantry. This

success of armored i n f a n t r y and the r e g u l a r

w a s c e r t a i n l y t h e case i n t h e IDF.

148

Sumary

Th s s t u d y s u g g e s t s t h a t b a t t 1 e f e l d and of

t h e demands o f

t h e modern

c o m b i n e d a r m s w a r f a r e r e q u i r e a v a r i e t y ot The U.S. Army t o d a y

s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d and equipped i n f a n t r y .

i s m o v i n g t o s t r e n g t h e n i n f a n t r y a t t h e heavy and l i g h t ends


of the continuum, w i t h t h e f i e l d i n g of the B r a d l e y IFU and
I n so d o i n g

t h e c r e a t i o n of

light

infantry organizations.

i t

a p p e a r s a l s o t o be c o n c e r n e d w i t h a d a p t i n g each t o c o v e r a wider range o f i n f a n t r y m i s s i o n s t h a n e a c h w a s e q u i p p e d and


As discussed,

organized t o conduct.

armored i n f a n t r y position

i s not

manned or e q u i p p e d t o t a k e on t h e m i s s i o n s of d e f e n s e or the a t t a c k o f f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s .

The c o n c e r n s

about augmenting 1 i g h t support highlight c o v e r i n g much o f either. What

i n f a n t r y w i t h tanks and other heavy


it

the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t the p o s i t i o n a l ,

i s n o t capable o f

i n f a n t r y intensive tasks, infantry, perhaps n o t t o o


today.

i s needed i s r e g u l a r

d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e MI13-equipped type of infantry

infantry of

Each

armored,

regular,

and l i g h t

i s capable

o f o p t i m a l l y a c c o m p l i s h i n g a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f t h e U.S.
Army's i n f a n t r y missions. Each c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e c o m b i n e d E a c h d e s e r v e command e m p h a s i s

arms w a r f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s .

and a f a i r

s h a r e of q u a l i t y s o l d i e r s a n d l e a d e r s .

T h i s s t u d y b e g a n a n d e n d s b y q u o t i n g J.F.C. c r i t i c i s m of armies.

Fuller's

t h e a d a p t i v e p r o c e s s e s he had observed i n most

149

I n m o s t a r m i e s we s e e w e a p o n s e v o l v i n g on no r a t i o n a l plan. New a r m s a r e i n v e n t e d a n d i n t r o d u c e d w i t h o u t a d e f i n i t e t a c t i c a l reason, and w i t h o u t a d e f i n i t e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o s t r u c t u r e , maintenance, and c o n t r o l . O l d w e a p o n s a r e m a i n t a i n e d ; t h e o l d a n d new a r e m i x e d i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r elemental v a l u e s . Proportions a r e n o t l o g i c a l l y a r r i v e d a t , b u t a r e t h e o u t c o m e of i g n o r a n t o p p o s i t i o n on t h e o n e s i d e a n d e n t h u s i a s t i c a g g r e s s i v e n e s s on t h e o t h e r . The w h o l e p r o c e s s i s a l c h e m i c a l , i s slow and c o s t l y and i n e f f i c i e n t ; u l t i m a t e l y t r i a l and e r r o r w i n s t h r o u g h . C l l 1 t h e U.S.

T h i s i n d i c t m e n t d o e s not have t o be t r u e of

Army

today a s i t i n t e g r a t e s t h e B I F V and s t r i v e s t o d e t e r m i n e i t s
impact on the t r i a d of d o c t r i n e , weapons, and s o l d i e r s .

This
to

s t u d y i s an a t t e m p t t o a n a l y z e t h e c r i t i c a l i a c t o r s v i t a l d e v e l o p i n g a r a t i o n a l p l a n f o r employment of U.S. maneuver f o r c e s ,


i

heavy

e s p e c i a1 1 y B r a d 1 e y - e q u i p p e d a r m o r e d

n f an t r y .

150

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER 5

I.

Cushman,

p . 20.

2. BG C l a u d e B. D o n o v a n , ' B r a d l e y F i g h t i n g V e h i c l e S y s t e m s , " l e c t u r e d e l i v e r e d to t h e Advanced Mi 1 I t a r y S t u d i e s Program, CGSC, 31 J u l 84.


3.

Ibld.

4. U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m y T r a i n i n g a n d D o c t r i n e Command, B u l l e t i n 7, " T h e BMP: C a p a b i l i t i e s and L i m i t a t i o n s , " F o r t M o n r o e , VA, 30 Jun 77.


5. LTG A r t h u r S. C o l l i n s , J r . Common S e n s e 7 - r a i n i n q R a f a e l , CA: P r e s i d i o P r e s s , 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 1 5 1 .
(Sari

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p.

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