Now that you have some idea of March's logics, and passing references to culture, coalitions, and anarchic

decision environments. We can turn to Allison's study of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Why, why the Cuban missile crisis? It's clearly a policy environment. but it has lots of nice qualities applicable to nonprofits and government organizations. In fact crisis management is common in, in many organizations. And in many instances the stakes of policies and decisions are enourmous. Take for example the United States we have no child left behind is this massive policy effort in education that creates crises in schools and whether they get money. Take for example harassment and grievance claims within organizations, suicides and deaths within organizations. In these circumstances what do you do? How can you describe what happened and how people reacted and whether people followed some kind of a reasonable procedure? How can we successfully manage in those situations? And here we have kind of a wonderful example of the Cuban missile crisis that's been well laid out by Graham Allison for us to begin this kind of conversation. The Cuban missile crisis was a huge event. It was arguably the closest we came to world war three, when well over a 100 million people could have died. In fact John Kennedy, the president at the time in the United States, is quoted as estimating the chance of failure in that event as one and three, or even one and two. It's a little too close for comfort for most of us. because of this, analysts want to understand how national governments and their organizations maneuver crisis. they want to get a better sense for how to prevent disasters in the future, and possibly manage these crises better. Let me give a brief summary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, in case anyone is unfamiliar with it.

The events that we're going to discuss occurred back in 1962. And it led the United States to be in it's higher state of war-readiness ever. And the Soviet field commanders were prepared to use battlefield nuclear weapons to defend Cuba, if invaded. Fortunately, war was averted. A little context may help you though. back in 1962 the Soviet missile could only reach Europe. While US missiles could reach the entire Soviet Union, so this was a time of advantage for the United States, and upon meeting with Kennedy at a summit, the Soviet Nikita Kruschev walked away thinking somewhat little of Kennedy as a statesmen and thought that he might have an upper hand in some kind of encounter. So in April 1962, Khrushchev started think that the placement of intermediate range missiles in Cuba could deter potential US attack against the Soviet Union and serve their interest of de tat, right. Fidel Castro, on the other hand, in Cuba, was worried the US would attack again after it failed to do so in the Bay of Pigs in 1971. Fidel approved Khrushchev's plan to place missiles on the island. And saw them as a deterrent to a US invasion of Cuba. So the two sides kind of agreed to have this happen. In the summer of 1962, the Soviet Union began to secretly build, it's missiles and installations in Cuba. The crisis for the United States began around October 15, 1962 when US, u-2 reconnaissance planes photographed Soviet missiles under construction in Cuba, and they look though [INAUDIBLE] the plans are as follows and the kind of reconnaissance photos, look like the ones, on the screen now. At the time, when President Kennedy was informed of these installations, he convened what was called the ExComm a, a group of his 12 most important advisers. An ExComm met, for a bunch of days seven days, and Kennedy decided to impose a naval

quarantine around Cuba in this meetings. quite a few key actors were in this group from Robert Kennedy who was the Attorney general, Dean Rusk the US secretary of state, George Ball who is the under-secretary of state, John McCohn, George, George Bundy, the National Security advisor. and Robert McNamara, very important figure who was pretty domineering in the meetings was the Secretary of Defense. and then Mulin Thompson, an Ambassador at large. the former US Ambassador u, the Soviet Union is the only Russian expert on that committee. On October 22nd, Kennedy announced the discovery of the missile installations to the public and his decision to quarantine the island. And here you see the letter that he wrote, to Khrushchev announcing his, being, upset about, the, the state of events. On October 23rd, Kennedy orders the quarantine to actually occur the blockade against Cuba. he also proclaimed that any nuclear missile launched from Cuba would be regarded as an attack on the United States by the Soviet Union, and he demanded that the Soviets remove all of their offensive weapons from Cuba. And as you'll see here, you can see the blockade committee signing that act, and then the, the planes on the tarmac, are spread out in case of, a, a counter attack, or some kind of attack, on the United States in Florida. The [INAUDIBLE] bombs would, would not hit all the planes at once. On October 23, Khrushchev wrote Kennedy stating the quarantine constituting an act of aggression propelling humankind into the abyss of a world nuclear missile war. On the 25th, Russian vessels turned away from the blockade. So they saw eyeball to eyeball as Dean Rusk said.

And then on the 25th, the blockade was pulled out further to see because Kennedy and, and his naval commanders were worried about mistakes and boarding in a craft that might trigger a nuclear war. So tensions were pretty high. And you know, Kennedy raised military readiness to DEFCON-2 on the 25th. On the 26th, the ExComm received a letter from Khrushchev proposing the removal of Soviet missiles and personnel if the US can guarantee they would not invade Cuba. On October 27th, a U-2 plane was shot down over Cuba, and the ExComm received a second letter from Khrushchev demanding the removal of US missiles in Turkey in exchange for Soviet missiles in Cuba. At this point, the Trollope Ploy was, was done, which is the United States responded to the first letter, accepting the conditions and both sides largely agreed to this. so it was kind of an interesting ploy, and deal of compromise in trying to, to, get advantage of the situation. On October 28th, tensions eased a bit when Khrushchev publicly announced that he would dismantle the installations and return the missiles to the Soviet Union. And he expressed his trust the United States would not invade Cuba. Further negotiations arose to implement the October 28th agreement and during that time the US secretly removed missiles from Turkey. And here you see photos of, of the actual effort to kind of observe and record the actual removal of missiles [INAUDIBLE] that was actually occurring.