PREFACE

This project was initiated by the late Professors Shelton U. Kodikara and K.P. Misra. They collected material and prepared the initial manuscript. Professor Kodikara, my teacher and colleague, discussed with me several times before his death in 1994 the necessity of completing the project in order to bring out a publication. After his demise, his son, Dilip Kodikara, made available for my use all the material collected by his father in collaboration with Professor Misra. When I visited Professor Misra in New Delhi while he was in hospital, he was delighted to learn of my desire to publish this volume. Professor Misra very kindly sent me his material soon after he returned home from hospital. My original intention was to name Professors Kodikara and Misra as co-editors of this volume. However, I was advised against this on the grounds that this volume is essentially a collection of documents from various sources, and in reproducing them, someone has to take responsibility for any errors or lacunae in this work. It was felt that since they passed away many years ago, it would be improper to cast any responsibility on them for any shortcomings in this final product as it was never seen by them. Even though their names do not appear here as co-editors, I wish to emphasize that their contribution to this enterprise is immense and immeasurable; if it were not for their initiative and efforts, this study would never have been undertaken. Professors Kodikara and Misra have rendered a yeoman service to the development of International Relations as an academic discipline in South Asia. To them, this volume is dedicated. For a small country, Sri Lankas role in international affairs has been remarkably active since the early days of independence. However, the students who wish to study the countrys foreign policy, particularly its earlier period, find it extremely difficult to locate the necessary source material as they are widely scattered and by no means easy to come by. This is an attempt to put together the relevant source material under one cover for the benefit of students as well as practitioners of diplomacy. Except for bilateral treaties and joint communiques, this collection of documents largely contains statements made by Sri Lankan dignitaries on various foreign policy issues. In that sense, what is presented here is essentially a collection of Sri Lankan perspectives on the islands foreign policy. I would like to thank the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) for awarding me a Kodikara Grant to undertake this work. I do wish to thank particularly Maj. Gen. (retd.) Dr. Dipankar Banerjee, the former Executive Director, and Professor Sridhar K. Khatri, the present Executive Director of the RCSS for all the support and encouragement given to me throughout the long period of preparation of this work. I am also very thankful to Professor R.A. Ariyaratna who helped me with this project in many ways. I am indebted to Mr. Dilip Kodikara who persuaded me to undertake this work.

My research assistants, M.M. Rohana Wasantha and Samantha Jayasundara, helped me a great deal in collecting material for this book. Ms. Renuka Weerakkody and Mr. Vishan Kandaudahewa typed the entire manuscript. I am immensely grateful to them. A special word of thanks to my wife, Deepthi, for not only assisting me with proof reading but also for putting up with her husband who had to spend so much of familytime on this work. I am also indebted to my children, Ishara and Sashini, for their understanding and patience with their fathers work.

Amal Jayawardane Department of History & International Relations University of Colombo Colombo 3, Sri Lanka

ii

CONTENTS
Preface Introduction Documents Page A : BASIC PRINCIPLES A (I) Non-Alignment with Power Blocs Document No. 1. 2. Prime Minister D.S. Senanayakes Middle Way Speech Delivered over the B.B.C., London, January 1951 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on Non-Alignment (Extract from his International Broadcast at Tokyo), 22 December 1954 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on Neutralism (Extract from his address to the Commonwealth Press Association, London), 5 July 1956 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on the Philosophy of Neutralism (Extract from his speech in the House of Representatives), 2 August 1956 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on Neutralism (Extract from his address to the U.N. General Assembly), 22 November 1956 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on Neutralism: (Extract from a Statement in the House of Representatives), 24 July 1957 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on Non-Alignment with Power Blocs (Speech at a Reception to Marshal Tito, the President of the Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia), 24 January 1959 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Policy of Non-Alignment: (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 20 October 1957 1

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

10

iii

9.

Sri Lanka Delegate on Peaceful Co-existence (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 30 September 1958 The Foreign Policy of the United National Party 1958 Mr.. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike, Minister of Finance and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence and External Affairs, on Non-Alignment (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 27 September, 1961 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike on Sri Lankas Non-Aligned Foreign Policy, 23 January 1964 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Speech at the First Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Belgrade, 1961 3 September 1961

10 11

10. 11.

12 14

12. 13.

16

A (II) Disarmament and Arms Control 14. Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on the Outcome of the South-East Asian Prime Ministers Conference held in Ceylon in 1954 (On the Issue of the Hydrogen Bomb), May 1954 Disarmament: The Views of the Sri Lanka Delegate at the First Committee, U.N. General Assembly, 16 Oct. 1958 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Issue of Disarmament (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 5 Oct. 1959 Disarmament (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 12 October 1960 Disarmament: Address by Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike, Minister of Finance and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence and External Affairs, in the UN General Assembly, 27 September 1961 Sri Lankas Reaction to the Explosion of a Nuclear Device by the U.S. (Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Message to the U.S. President), 30 April 1962

23 23 25 26

15. 16. 17. 18.

27

19.

29

iv

20.

Sri Lanka Delegate on the Conversion of Arms Expenditure for Peaceful Purposes (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 27 September 1962 Sri Lankas Response to the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of 1963, 27th July 1963 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Statement in the Senate on the Ban on Entry into Sri Lanka Airports, Seaports, and Territorial waters of Naval Vessels and Aircraft carrying Nuclear Weapons, 23 January 1964 Sri Lanka Delegate on Nuclear Free Zones (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 21 December 1964 The Statement of the Government of Sri Lanka on Chinas Second Nuclear Explosion, 20 May 1965

30 31

21. 22.

33

23.

34 35

24.

A (III) Anti-Colonialism 25. Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes Speech at the Plenary Session of the Asian Conference on Indonesia Convened in New Delhi, 20 January 1949 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawela on Colonialism (Extract from his speech to the Political Committee of the Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia), 21 April 1955 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on Colonialism (Statement in the House of Representatives), 24 July 1957 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Liberation Struggles in Algeria, Cyprus, and West Irian (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 20 October 1957 Sri Lankas Attitude Towards the Issue of Self-Government In Cyprus (Sri Lanka Delegate in the First Committee of the U.N.), 1 December 1958 Sri Lankas Attitude Towards the Algerian Quest for Self-Government (Sri Lanka Delegate in the First Committee of the U.N), 12 December 1958

36

26.

38

27.

40

28.

40

29.

42

30.

43

31.

Algeria and Independence for all Colonial and Dependent Countries (General Policy Statement in the UN), 12 October 1960 Situation in Tunisia (General Policy Statement in the U.N.), 21 August 1961 Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike on Colonialism in Africa (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 27 September 1961 Liberation of Goa (Speech of Sri Lanka Delegate in the U.N. Security Council), 18 December 1961 Sri Lanka Delegate on Colonialism (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 27 September 1962 Sri Lanka Delegate on Portuguese Colonialism (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 21 December 1964

45 47

32. 33.

48 49

34. 35.

53

36.

54

A (IV) Anti-Racism 37. 38. Apartheid (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 30 September 1958 Sri Lanka Delegate on Apartheid in South Africa (Statement in the U.N. Security Council), 30 March 1960 Apartheid: Prime Minister Dudley Senanayakes Statement to the Press, 31 March 1960 Apartheid: Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Statement in the Senate, 23 January 1964 Racialism in South Africa and Rhodesia (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 21 December 1964 Sri Lanka Delegate on South Africas Disregard of UN Resolutions (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 1 October 1965 55

55 59 59

39. 40. 41.

60

42.

62

vi

43.

Sri Lanka Governments Statement on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Southern Rhodesia, 12 November 1965

63

B : SRI LANKA AND THE MAJOR POWERS B (I) The United Kingdom 44. Defence Agreement between His Majestys Governmen in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon, November 1947 External Affairs Agreement between His Majesty Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon, 11 November 1947 Prime Minister D.S. Senanayakes Speech in the House of Representatives on the Motion on the Independence of Ceylon, 1 December 1947 Mr. P.G.B. Keunemans (Communist Party) Speech in the House of Representatives on the Motion on the Independence of Ceylon, 1 December 1947 Dr. N.M. Pereras (LSSP) Speech on the Motion on the Independence of Ceylon (Extract), 2 December 1947 Defence and External Affairs Agreements, 1947 Comment by Mr. W. Dahanayake (Independent) M.P., 1 December 1947 .Prime Minister D.S. Senanayakes Reply to the Motion on Independence, 3 December 1947 Dr. N.M. Pereras Comments on the Defence and External Affairs Agreements, 2 December 1947 Defence Agreement with Britain (Statement of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Minister of Health and Local Government, in the House of Representatives), 28 November 1947 Press Note of Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake on his Return From Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, January 1951

64

45.

65

46.

67

47.

72 78

48. 49.

79 80 83

50 51. 52.

85

53.

87

vii

54.

Mr. P.G.B. Keunemans (Communist Party) Speech on Proposed South-East Asia Treaty Organization and its Implications for British Bases in Ceylon, 7 September 1954 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on British Bases in Sri Lanka (Extract from his Address to the Commonwealth Press Association, London), 5 July 1956 Main Points in the UK-Ceylon Agreement on the Withdrawal of British Bases in Ceylon, 7 June 1957. Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandarannaike on British Bases In Sri Lanka (Extract from his Address to the Commonwealth Press Association, London), 24 July 1957 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes Speech on Handing over of the Royal Naval Base at a Ceremony in Trincomalee, 15 October 1957 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes Speech on the Handing Over of the Katunayake Air Base, 1 November 1957 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on What the Commonwealth Means to Us (Address to the Canadian Club, Niagara Falls), 4 December 1954 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes views on the Commonwealth (Extract from his Address to the Commonwealth Press Association, London), 5 July 1956 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes Address to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference held at New Delhi in 1957, 2 December 1957 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike on Sri Lankas Relationship with the Commonwealth, 23 January 1964. Mr. J.R. Jayewardenes Account of the Birth of the Colombo Plan (An Article Written on the Occasion of its Tenth Anniversary), January 1960

89

55.

90 91

56. 57.

93

58.

93

59.

94

60.

95

61.

98

62.

100 102

63. 64.

103

viii

65.

Prime Minister W. Dahanayake on the Colombo Plan (His Special Message given on the Occasion of its Tenth Anniversary), January 1960 Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaikes (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs and Defence) Statement in Parliament on the Defence Policy of Sri Lanka, 30 August 1963

107

66.

108

B (II) The United States of America 67. Statement by Mr. J.R. Jayewardene, Minister of Finance, on Sri Lankas Foreign Policy (Extract), 4 July 1950 Granting of Port Facilities to United States Navy: Questions raised in Parliament and the Reply given by Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake, 7 August 1950. Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes Attitude Towards the United States, 18 December 1956 Text of the Agreement between the Government of Ceylon and the Co-operative for American Remittances to Europe, Inc (CARE), 15 March 1950 Point Four General Agreement for Technical CoOperation between Ceylon and the United States of America , 7 November 1950 Agreement between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Installation by U.S.A. of Certain Radio Transmission and Associated Equipment for Use by Radio Ceylon in Return for Certain Facilities to be Accorded by Ceylon for the Broadcast of Voice of America Programs over Radio Ceylon, 14 May 1951 Press Communiqu Issued by the Ministry of External Affairs on Release of Natural Rubber from the United States Strategic Stockpile, February 1962

111

68.

111 112

69. 70.

113

71.

117

72.

120

73.

122

ix

74.

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon for Financing Certain Educational Exchange Programs, 29 August 1964 Finance Minister P.B.G. Kalugallas Statement on the Suspension of U.S. Aid to Sri Lanka, 20 February 1963. Mr. W.Dahanayaka on the Suspension of U.S. Aid 22 February 1963 Mr. J.R. Jayewardene on the Suspension of US Aid to Sri Lanka, 22 February 1963. Mr. Dudley Senanayake on the Suspension of US Aid, 22 February 1963. Dr. N.M. Perera on the Stoppage of American Aid, 22 February 1963. The Cuban Crisis: Speech of Sri Lanka Delegate in the Security Council (Support for the Draft Resolution Submitted to the U.N. Security Council by Argentina and Ecuador), 18 July 1960 The Cuban Crisis: Statement of Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike, Minister of Finance and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence and External Affairs, 20 April 1961 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Support for Cubas Independence, 23 January 1964

124

75.

129 134 135 139 140

76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

142

81.

145 146

82.

B (III) U.S.S.R. 83. 84. 85. Mr. J. R. Jayewardenes Account of Prime Minister D.S. Senanayakes Attitude Towards Communism D.S. Senanayakes Attitude Towards the Soviet Union and China, 7 July 1950 Mr. R.G. Senanayake on the Issue of Diplomatic Representation in the Soviet Union, 7 July 1950 147 147 148

86.

Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawalas Attitude Towards Communism (Extract from his Address to the Overseas Press Club, New York), 1 December 1954. Prime Minister Sir John Kotewala on What Can We Do to Check Communism in Asia? (from his Address to the National Press Club, Washington), 7 December, 1954. Agreement between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the U.S.S.R. for the Promotion of Cultural Co-operation, 15 January 1958 Agreement Between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the U.S.S.R. on Economic and Technical Co-operation, 25 February 1958. Joint Sri Lanka-Soviet Communiqu, 28 October 1963 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Senate Speech on Russian-Assisted Iron and Steel Plant, 23 January 1964.

148

87.

150

88.

152

89.

154 158 161

90. 91.

B (IV) The Peoples Republic of China 92. Text of the Trade Agreement Between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the Peoples Republic of China, 4 October 1952 Commerce Minister R.G. Senanayakes Statement on Trade Agreement with China, 7 November 1952 Prime Minister Dudley Senanayakes Statement on Trade Agreement with China 14 November 1952. China - Ceylon Rubber-Rice Trade Agreement 18 December 1952 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on the Trade Agreement with China (Extract from his Address to the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council, Honolulu), 14 December 1954

163 165

93. 94.

168 169

95. 96.

174

xi

97.

Prime Minister Sir Johan Kotelawalas Statement in Parliament on the Outcome of the South-East Asian Prime Ministers Conference held in Ceylon In 1954 (the Issue of the Admission of China to the U.N.), May 1954. Sri Lanka Delegate on Admission of China to the UN, 15 November 1956 Text of the Joint Statement by the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, and the Prime Minister of the Peoples Republic of China, Mr. Chou En-lai), 5 February 1957. Text of Agreement on Economic Aid between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the Peoples Republic of China, 19 September 1957. Exchange of Notes between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the Peoples Republic of China on the Grant of a Loan to the Government of Ceylon as a Support in its Flood Relief and Rehabilitation Work, 17 September 1958. Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on the Situation in Tibet, 22 April 1959 Speech made by Ceylons Ambassador in China, Mr. A.B. Perera, on the Occasion of the 14th Anniversary of Ceylons Independence, (Extract), 4 February 1962 Joint Communiqu Issued on Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Visit to China, 8 January 1963 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Banquet Speech in Peking, January 1963 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Speech at Peking Rally, January 1963

175 176

98. 99.

181

100.

182

101.

184 186

102. 103.

190 191 193 195

104. 105. 106.

xii

107.

Press Communiqu issued by the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, Government of Ceylon, on Alleged Offer of Naval Base to China, 8 February 1963. Text of Sri Lanka-China Maritime Agreement, 25 July 1963 Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Defence and External Affairs, Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaikes Statement on Maritime Agreement with China, 30 August 1963 Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Statement on the Maritime Agreement with China, 11 March 1965 Mr. D.P.R. Gunawardenas (MEP) Criticism of Sri Lankas Pro-Chinese Foreign Policy Orientation (Extract from his Speech in the House of Representatives), 30 August 1963 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Admission of China to the UN (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 21 December 1964

200 201

108. 109.

203

110.

204

111.

205

112.

207

C : SRI LANKA AND ASIA-AFRICA C (I) Asian-African Solidarity & World Peace 113. Mr. J.R. Jayewardenes Speech at the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, San Francisco, U.S.A., 6 September 1951 Conference of South-East Asian Prime Ministers held in Ceylon, 1954: Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawalas Statement in Parliament, 7 May 1954 Indo-China War: Speech of Mr. V. Nalliah, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence and External Affairs, 4 May 1954

209

114.

212

115.

214

xiii

116.

Indo-China War: Question by Communist Party Member P. Keuneman to Elicit Information on Sri Lanka Governments Attitude, 6 May 1954. Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on Bandung Conference, 28 April 1955 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes Call for an Asian Economic Conference (His Address at the Chinese Commodity Exhibition In Colombo), 18 March 1958. Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on Asian Economic Cooperation (Address to the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce), 27 March 1958 The Task before Newly Independent Nations: Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes Speech in the UN. General Assembly (Extract), 22 November 1956 Algeria: A Summary of Sri Lanka Delegates Speech in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, 8 February 1957 Algeria: A Summary of Sri Lanka Delegates Speech in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, 12 February 1957 Cyprus: A Summary of Sri Lanka Delegates Speech in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, 19 February 1957 The Question of Cyprus: Comments of the Sri Lanka Delegate on the Indian Draft Resolution, 22 February 1957 Cyprus: Sri Lanka Delegate Votes for the Indian Draft Resolution, 22 February 1957 Admission of Ghana to the U.N.: Sri Lanka Delegates Speech in the U.N. General Assembly (Extract), 8 March 1957

215 216

117. 118.

218

119.

219

120.

221

121.

221

122.

226

123.

228

124.

230 230

125. 126.

231

xiv

127.

Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on the Importance of Japanese Economic Assistance (Extract from his speech at Luncheon given by the Governor of Tokyo), 22 December 1954 The Joint Statement Issued on the Visit of the Prime Minister of Japan to Ceylon, 28 May 1957 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on the Middle-East Problem, 14 August 1958 Diplomatic Relations with Israel and Arab countries: Press Communiqu issued by the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, Government of Ceylon, 20 August 1960 Visit of Pakistan President to Sri Lanka: Joint Communiqu, 14 December 1963 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike on Katanga, 23 January 1964 Speech made by Mr. T.B. Illangaratne, the Minister of Commerce, Trade, Food and Shipping, in Welcoming the Burmese Trade Delegation, 27 September 1960

233 234 235

128. 129. 130.

238 238 241

131. 132. 133.

242

C (II) Indo-Sri Lanka Relations 134. 135. Nehru - Kotelawala Agreement on Persons of Indian Origin in Ceylon, 18 January 1954 Persons of Indian Origin in Ceylon : Text of the Joint Statement of the Prime Ministers of India and Ceylon, 10 October 1954. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehrus Visit to Sri Lanka: Text of Joint Communiqu, 20 May 1957 Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo Banadaranike on Indo-Ceylon Problem (Statement in the Senate), 23 January 1964. Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike on Indias Liberation of Goa (Statement in the Senate), 23 January 1964 244

245 248

136. 137.

251

138.

254

xv

139.

Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike on the Death of Shri Jawahrlal Nehru (Vote of Condolence in the Senate), 2 July 1964 Indo - Ceylon (Sirima - Shastri) Agreement of 30 October 1964 Indo - Ceylon Agreement of 30 October 1964 (Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Statement in the Senate), 10 November 1964 Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka on Sri Lankas Suggestion for a Separate Electoral Register, 22 November 1964 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Reply to Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India, 9 January 1965 Sino-Indian Border Dispute: Proposals Formulated by Conference of Six Non-Aligned Countries that met in Colombo Between 10th and 12th December, 1962 Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the Colombo Conference Proposals : Memoranda from the Chinese Government (January 6, 1963 and January 8, 1963) Statement Setting Out Attitude of Indian Government to the Colombo Conference Proposals, 12 January 1963 Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the Colombo Conference Proposals: Statement in Parliament by Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike, 30 August 1963 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike on the Colombo Conference Proposals (Statement in the Senate), 23 January 1964 Prime Minister Dudley Senanayaeke on the IndoPakistan Conflict, 5 May 1965

254 256

140. 141.

257

142.

266

143.

268

144.

272

145.

273

146.

276

147.

277

148.

281 284

149.

xvi

C (III) Vietnam 150. Persecution of Buddhists in South Vietnam: Communiqu of the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs), 19 June 1963 Vietnam: Communiqu issued by the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, 6 August 1964 Sri Lanka Delegate on Vietnam (General Policy Statement in the UN), 21 December 1964 Plea for Peace in Vietnam: Joint Statement of Seventeen Non-Aligned countries on Vietnam, April 1965 Statement by the Government of Sri Lanka on Vietnam, 10 April 1965 Sri Lanka Delegate on Vietnam (General Policy Statement in the UN), 1 October 1965

286 287 288

151. 152. 153.

289 291 291

154. 155.

D. SRI LANKA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 156. 157. Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on Admission to the United Nations, 22 November 1956 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Issue of Continental Shelf (Comment on the Report Submitted by the International Law Commission), 12 December 1956 Sri Lanka Delegate on Membership of the Security Council (on the Increase in Number and the Equitable Territorial Representation), 14 December 1956 Sri Lanka Delegate on the United Nations and World Peace, 20 October 1957 Sri Lanka Delegate on Strengthening of the United Nations, 20 October 1957 Sri Lanka Delegate on Peaceful Co-existence (Support for the Soviet- Sponsored Declaration on Peaceful Co- existence [A\3673]), 14 December 1957 293

293

158.

295 299 300

159. 160. 161.

301

xvii

162. 163. 164. 165.

Sri Lanka Delegate on the Convention on Genocide, 30 September 1958 Sri Lanka Delegate on Troika Proposal, 12 October 1960 Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike on Troika Proposal (General Policy Statement in the UN), 27 September 1961 Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike on Non- Representative Character of the United Nations (General Policy Statement in the UN), 27 September 1961 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Role of the United Nations, 27 June 1963 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike on the United Nations, 23 January 1964 Text of Prime Minister Dudley Senanayakes Message to the U.N. Secretary-General on on the 20th Anniversary of the Signing of the UN Charter, 25 June 1965 Sri Lanka Delegate on the U.N. as an Organization for the Promotion of World Peace, 1 October 1965 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Establishment of a World Food Reserve, 11 January 1957 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Establishment of a World Food Reserve, 15 January 1957 Special U.N. Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED): Sri Lankas Plea for its Establishment, 4 February 1957 Sri Lanka Delegates Support for the Special U.N. Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED), 20 October 1957 Sri Lankas Support for the Establishment of SUNFED, 28 November 1957

303 303 305

309 310 312

166. 167. 168.

313 314 318 319

169. 170. 171. 172.

320

173.

322 323

174.

xviii

175.

Sri Lankas Support for the Creation of a Regional Economic Commission for Africa, 22 October 1957 Sri Lanka Delegate on Disarmament and Economic Development, 12 October 1960 Sri Lanka Delegate on Economic Assistance for Under-Developed Countries, 30 September 1958 Sri Lanka Delegate on Disarmament and Economic Development of the Under Developed Countries, 5 October 1959 Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike on U.N. Role in Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries 27 September 1961 Sri Lanka Delegate on the European Common Market, 27 September 1962 Sri Lanka Delegate on UNCTAD 21 December 1964 Sri Lanka Delegate on the UN Role in Economic Development, 1 October 1965 Sri Lanka Delegates Statement on the Korean Unification (Plea for inviting both South and North Korea to the U.N. Debate), 7 January 1957 The Korean Question: Sri Lankas Support for Organizing Free Elections Aimed at Unification, 10 November 1958 Sri Lankas Position on the Korean Unification, 15 November 1957 The Suez Crisis, 1956: Speech of Sri Lanka Delegate at the First Emergency Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 3 November 1956 The Suez Crisis, 1956: Sri Lanka Delegates Plea for Complete Withdrawal of Troops of U.K. France and Israel, 7 November 1956

325 325 327

176. 177. 178.

330

179.

333 334 335 337

180. 181. 182. 183.

339

184.

340 341

185. 186.

342

187.

345

xix

188.

Suez Crisis: Prime Minister S.W.R.D.Bandaranaikes Statement in the U.N. General Assembly, 22 November 1956 The Suez Crisis: Sri Lanka Delegates Appeal for the Complete Withdrawal of Israeli Troops, 17 January 1957 The Suez Crisis: Sri Lanka Delegates Plea for the Complete Withdrawal of Israeli Troops, 2 February 1957 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Suez Crisis, 4 March 1957 Sri Lanka Delegate on Role of Great Powers in the Middle East, 20 October 1957 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Armed Intervention in Lebanon and Jordan, 20 August 1958 The Hungary Crisis: Reasons for Sri Lankas abstention on the United States Draft Resolution, 8 November 1956 The Hungary Crisis: On amendments (A/3325) to U.S. Draft Resolution (A/3319) Submitted by Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Burma, 9 November 1956 Hungary Crisis: Plea for Adopting by the Assembly the Draft Resolution (A/3368) Sponsored by India, Indonesia and Ceylon, 21 November 1956 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes Statement on Hungary in the U.N. General Assembly, 22 November 1956 Hungary: Appeal to the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and Hungary to Accept UN Observers, 3 December 1956 Hungary: Sri Lankas Position on Sending Independent U.N. Observers, 4 December 1956

347

189.

350

190.

352 354 357 358

191. 192. 193. 194.

362

195.

364

196.

368

197.

371

198.

373 376

199.

xx

200.

The Hungary Crisis : Sri Lanka Delegates Speech on the Draft Resolution (A/3437) Co-sponsored by Ceylon, India, Burma and Indonesia, 11 December 1956 Crisis in Congo: on the Draft Resolution (S/4404) Sponsored by Tunisia and Ceylon, 21 July 1960 Congo: On the Seventeen-Power Draft Resolution Co-sponsored by Ceylon, 19 September 1960 Congo : Statement by the Sri Lanka Delegate, 12 October 1960 Congo : A Statement by Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike (General Policy Statement in the United Nations), 27 September 1961 Congo : Sri Lankas Plea for the Complete Withdrawal of All Foreign Advisers, Military and Para-Military Personnel and Mercenaries and the Stoppage of the Flow of Arms to the Military Groups in the Congo, 4 April 1961

378 383 386 389

201. 202. 203. 204.

390

205.

391

xxi

xxii

INTRODUCTION I
The documents included in this volume cover a period of nineteen years: 1947-1965. The governments which took office during this period were as follows:Pre-Independence Period 1. September 1947 to February 1948 Prime Minister D.S.Senanayake Post-Independence Period 2. 3. 4. 5. February 1948 to March 1952 March 1952 to October 1953 October 1953 to April 1956 April 1956 to September 1959 Prime minister D.S.Senanayake Dudley Senanayake Sir John Kotelawala S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike Party UNP UNP * UNP MEP ** Party UNP

* Mr. Dudley Senanayake, having succeed his father as Prime Minister in March 1952, sought a mandate from the people two months later as a candidate from the UNP (United National Party) and was re-elected to office in May 1952. ** The MEP ( Mahajana Eksath Peramuna or Peoples United Front) was a coalition led by Mr. S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike and consisting of the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party), VLSSP (Viplavakari Lanka Sama Samaja Pakshaya), Bhasha Peremuna (Language Front), and a group of independent candidates.

xxiii

6. 7. 8. 9.

September 1959 to March 1960 March 1960 to July 1960 July 1960 to March 1965 March 1965 to May 1970

W.Dahanayake Dudley Senanayake Sirimavo Bandaranaike Dudley Senanayake

SLFP/LPP* UNP SLFP UNP

Dudley Senanayake took office in March 1965 following his electoral victory at the General Election. In order to complete the year 1965, documents relating to the first 9 months of Dudley Senanayakes regime have also been included in this volume. The previous governments orientation continued even during this period with regard to issues such as general disarmament, Chinas membership in the UN, the Rhodesian question, and the Vietnam question.

II
Sri Lanka became independent on 4th February 1948 but the processes by which the transfer of power was effected by the United Kingdom had already begun in 1947. For example, a new government was formed under the pre-independence (Soulbury) constitution, following the elections held in August-September 1947, and the grant of independence was effected by the removal of limitations on full self-government contained in the pre-independence constitution and by the signing of three agreements between Sri Lanka and the UK relating to Defence, External Affairs and Public Service Officers. There are five documents pertaining to the transfer of power from the UK to Sri Lanka. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) The Ceylon Independence Order in Council, 1947 The Ceylon Independence Act, 1947 The Ceylon-UK Defence Agreement, 1947 The Ceylon-UK External Affairs Agreement, 1947 The Ceylon-UK Public Officers Agreement, 1947

* In September 1959, Mr. W. Dahanayake was appointed Prime Minister after Mr. Bandaranaikes assassination but soon lost the confidence of the SLFP. On December 7, 1959, he announced his resignation from the SLFP and formed his own party, the LPP (Lanka Prajathanthravadi Pakshaya or Ceylon Democratic Party) to contest the March 1960 General Election.

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Legally, the independence of Sri Lanka was achieved by the Ceylon Independence Order-in-Council and the Ceylon Independence Act of 1947. The former removed the limitations on self-government contained in the (Soulbury) constitution of 1946, while the latter extended to Ceylon the powers of a Dominion under the Statute of Westminster. It also relieved the Government of the United Kingdom of responsibility for the Government of Ceylon, and made the necessary alterations in the laws of the United Kingdom. These two documents vested in Ceylon the full law-making powers of an independent State. The Defence and External Affairs Agreements (documents 44 & 45) which were signed on 11th November 1947 took effect on the date Sri Lanka became independent.* It needs to be noted that a considerable divergence of opinion existed in Sri Lanka and abroad regarding the nature of the independence gained by Sri Lanka in February 1948. When Sri Lanka became independent, she chose to remain in the Commonwealth of Nations as a matter of deliberate choice, for Dominion Status had been the declared objective of nationalist policy in Sri Lanka in the years immediately preceding independence. Sri Lankan statesmen sometimes had qualms about the use of the term Dominion Status, especially in view of the connotation it had acquired in certain circles in India and Sri Lanka, as a status somewhat short of complete independence. Sri Lankas able negotiator in London, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, was, during February-June 1947, in fact urging the substitution of fully self-governing status for Dominion Status. ** However, when the Indian National Congress, which had always drawn a distinction between Independence and Dominion Status, came round to accepting the latter, Sri Lankan opinion also followed suit, for it was now realized that fully self-governing status could well be interpreted as something inferior to Dominion Status. The status asked for by D.S. Senanayake, Sri Lankas first Prime Minister (1947-1952) was therefore independence or Dominion Status. In the legislation which transferred sovereignty to Sri Lanka, the term used is independence; in none of the relevant documents does the term Dominion occur though it was no doubt intended that Sri Lanka would enjoy the same status within the Commonwealth as the White Dominions and India and Pakistan. As D.S.Senanayake put it in December 1947 (document 46):
Several documents pertaining to independence, outside the realm of this study, have been excluded in this volume. For other documents on independence, see, W.I. Jennings, Constitution of Ceylon, Third Edition, (London, 1953).

** As Ivor Jennings has noted: The phrase fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations was used in the announcement made on 18 June 1947 in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and in the State Council by the Governor of Ceylon. In a telegram to Mr. D.S. Senanayake the previous day the Secretary of State explained that it meant what was usually connoted by Dominion Status, but that at Sir Oliver Goonetillekes suggestion Dominion Status was not used because it was not well understood in Ceylon. (Ibid. P. 145).

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Dominion Status is not a legal phrase and, I am advised, is never used by lawyers in formal documents. We asked for all the powers of an independent country within the British Commonwealth and these, the lawyers have given us in this [Independence] Bill. The Statute of Westminster is generally regarded as a Statute which gives or recognizes all such powers and all the provisions of that Statute have been incorporated in the Ceylon Independence Bill as they were in the Indian Independence Act. But members of the Parliamentary opposition in Sri Lanka found the Independence Bill unacceptable precisely because of its omission of the term Dominion Status. P. Keuneman of the Communist Party averred (document 47) that it is very significant that right throughout these negotiations the British Government has been most careful and cautious not to mention anything about Dominion Status for Ceylon and further alleged that unlike the White Dominions and India, the right to secede was not conceded to Sri Lanka in the transfer of power. Dr. N.M.Perera of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) contended (document 48) that the Ceylon Independence Bill fell short of the Indian Independence Act (1) by not referring to the concept of Dominion at all; (2) insofar as it did not, as in the Indian Independence Act, provide for the amendment of the Bill within its own provisions and (3) by its failure to disallow, as in India, the right of the British Parliament to legislate for Sri Lanka (a right which the United Kingdom Government could exercise under the Ceylon Independence Act, at the express request of the Sri Lanka Government). Some of these arguments appear now to be academic; but at the time they were made, they had considerable force. For unlike in India, in Sri Lanka, the transition from colonial to independent status was so gradual as to be almost imperceptible. There were no dramatic overtones accompanying the transfer of power in Sri Lanka. No Constituent Assembly was being appointed as India was doing; the United National Party Government of D.S.Senanayake, which had won the 1947 elections continued in power after independence was granted on 4th February 1948, and the colonial Governor had merely changed his title (to Governor-General). The Soviet Union also contested Sri Lankas sovereign status and used it as a justification for its successive vetoing of Sri Lankas application for United Nations membership. Sri Lanka eventually joined the UN only in December 1955, after the package deal between East and West made way for the admission of 16 new members to the international body. Connected with the debate on the nature of independence were divergences of opinion on the Defence Agreement with the UK and the role of British bases in Sri Lanka. This Agreement (document 44) made no specific mention of the naval base at Trincomalee and the airbase at Katunayake. But it provided that the Governments of the United Kingdom and Sri Lanka would give to each other such military assistance for the security of their territories, for defence against external aggression and for the protection of essential communications and that for this purpose the UK may have in Sri Lanka

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naval and air forces and land forces as may be mutually agreed; further, that for the objects aforementioned, Sri Lanka would grant to the UK all the necessary facilities including the use of naval and air bases and ports, military establishments, telecommunication facilities, etc. The signing of the Defence, External Affairs and Public Officers Agreements was a condition precedent to the grant of independence to Sri Lanka and this was made clear at the time by the British authorities. The British announcement to this effect was quoted by W. Dahanayake, an Opposition (Independent) M.P., who commented that there would have been no Independence whatever if the Agreements had not been concluded. (document 49). It was clear that D.S.Senanayake wanted to hasten Sri Lankas independence while the British wanted their security interests in South-East Asia adequately protected. The Agreements, particularly the Defence Agreement, thus became the quid pro quo for Sri Lankas independence. Documents 49,50,51,52 and 53 provide the arguments pro and con for the Agreements. The arguments against the Agreements implied a limitation of Sri Lankas sovereignty and independence of action with other nations by virtue of their existence. Another ground for criticism was the belief that besides the Agreements of November 1947 which were public documents, there were other secret treaties or arrangements between the UK and Sri Lanka which empowered the British to station military forces and hold bases in Sri Lanka. In document 54, the Communist leader Keuneman raised the issue of the role of British bases in Sri Lanka in the event of the Island being drawn into the orbit of the then projected South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The arguments for the Agreements stressed their mutuality provisions, a consideration of special relevance to the Defence Agreement, that they did not derogate from Sri Lankas independence in any way, and that they contributed to the building of Sri Lankas own armed services and added to Sri Lankas security. Emphasizing the importance of external assistance, Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake argued: The defence of its country is one of the primary obligations of an independent State, and this is not the sort of world in which small nations can be secure without large and expensive armed forces. We are in a specially dangerous position, because we are in one of the strategic highways of the world. The country which captures Ceylon could dominate the Indian Ocean. Nor is it only a question of protecting ourselves against invasion and air attack. If we had no imports for three months, we should starve, and we have therefore to protect our sea and air communications. I was in charge of food supplies and rice during the war and I know how much we relied on the British Navy and the British Air Force for our food supplies. Frankly, I cannot accept the responsibility of being Minister of Defence unless I am provided with the means of Defence. (document 46).

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S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, as a UNP Minister in 1947, had defended the Defence Agreement (document 52), but as the Leader of the Opposition in 1952, he had criticized the Agreements. When J.R. Jayewardene confronted him saying that you agreed to them, Bandaranaikes explanation was: Certainly I can be taken to have acquiesced in them but with great reluctance and with a number of misgivings.* After he became Prime Minister in 1956, S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike took steps, without any formal abrogation of the Defence Agreement itself, to terminate British possession of the bases in Trincomalee and Katunayake. Bandaranaikes announcement of such an intention to the Commonwealth Press Association in London in July 1956 is contained in document 55. Document 56 gives the Ceylon-UK Agreement (signed by an Exchange of letters between Sri Cecil Syers, UK High Commissioner in Colombo and Prime Minister Bandaranaike) on withdrawal of British bases from Sri Lanka. . Bandaranaike described the termination of British bases as a removal of the last remnants of Colonialism in this Country. (document 57). The speeches he made on the occasions of the handing over of Trincomalee and Katunayake bases on 15 October and November 1957, respectively, are found in documents 58 and 59. It was only belatedly, in 1972, that Sri Lanka was able to establish its first Republican Constitution framed by a Constituent Assembly, but even then Sri Lanka, like India , opted to remain within the Commonwealth. Documents 60, 61, 62 and 63 illustrate the continuing commitment of successive Governments in Sri Lanka to the concept of the Commonwealth and what it stood for.

III
The Soulbury Constitution recognized the special position of the Prime Minister in the conduct of foreign affairs of the country. Section 46 (4) states that the Prime Minister shall be in charge of the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs. Internal regime changes in Sri Lanka therefore had their impact on foreign policy change and the Prime Minister became, at the personal level, the most important part of the foreign policy decision-making process in the island. Each Prime Minister had his or her personal style and personal influence on foreign policy decision-making. D.S.Senanayakes foreign policy , for example, was based on close association with the Commonwealth, and the connection with Britain, through the Defence and External Affairs Agreements. Dudley Senanayakes four administrations were generally marked by a low-profile foreign policy, but Sir John Kotelawalas was characterized by a strongly articulated opposition to communism at home and abroad (documents 26, 86

* S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Towards a New Era (Selected Speeches of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike), Second Print (Colombo: the Government Press, 1976), PP. 816-817.

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& 87). In 1956, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike reversed this policy and established nonalignment as the proper course which a country such as Sri Lanka should follow, and this was carried further under Sirimavo Bandaranaike in whose first administration (1960-65) the first two Non-Aligned Summit Conferences were held in Belgrade(1961) and Cairo (1964). D.S.Senanayakes foreign policy veered towards Britain; Sir John Kotelawalas towards the United States; S.W.R.D.Bandarnaike established a close Indo-Sri Lanka identity on foreign affairs, while Mrs. Bandaranaike developed nonalignment as the accepted bipartisan mode in Sri Lankas foreign policy. Broadly speaking, UNP Governments tended to be pro-Western in their foreign policy orientation; SLFP Governments were more oriented towards the socialist countries; both parties however claimed to be non-aligned. Even before 1956, certain elements of non-alignment were clearly visible in Sri Lankas foreign policy. Several documents contained in this volume show that the UNP Governments throughout the period upheld the principles of anti-colonialism and antiracialism; espoused the cause of disarmament and arms control; strongly supported the idea of Asian-African solidarity; and steered clear from involvement in military pacts.* Even Kotelawala refrained from joining the South East Asia Treaty Organization. But despite their commitment to these principles, some have questioned the validity of the claim to non-aligned foreign relations in respect of the UNP governments during the period 1948-1956. Firstly, the possessions of bases in Sri Lanka by Britain, a senior partner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a member of the South East Asia Treaty Organization after its formation in 1954 created doubts about Sri Lankas non-aligned status since the bases could always potentially be used in the East-West conflict and the strong anti-Communist orientation of the governments of this period suggested that the mutuality provisions of the Defence Agreement would be no bar to the use of the bases in such a conflict if Sri Lankas anti-communist interests coincided with those of the Western powers. Secondly, the governments of the 1948-56 period also refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with Communist countries and even restricted travel to and from these countries. Partly this stemmed from the Soviet veto on Sri Lankas UN membership and the Soviet contention that Sri Lankas sovereign status was suspect. As R.G. Senanayake asked in Parliament: how could we send an ambassador to Russia when she does not accept the fact that we are an independent country. Up to now Russia has maintained that she will not permit Ceylon to be a member of the U.N.O. because she questions our independent status. (document 85).

* As Kodikara noted: For UNP Prime Ministers, non-alignment consisted primarily of three elements: first, opposition to colonialism; second, opposition to all forms of arms production and the armaments race and nuclear testing and nuclear weapons production in particular; third, rejection of the idea of collective security as the proper defence against communism. See, Shelton U. Kodikara, Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka: A Third World Perspective (Revised and Enlarged Second Edition), Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1992, P. 104.

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The important foreign policy speech, broadcast over the BBC, London, by Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake on 8 January 1951, in which he advocated a middle path in foreign affairs for Sri Lanka and condemned the play of power politics in the prevailing world situation and declared that the older among the Great Powers now realise the need to mobilize the moral power of the world in search of lasting peace in preference to mobilizing the physical power, but some of the new comers into the top rank have got to learn wisdom by experience (document 1) is included in the section on Non-Alignment. The statement, implicitly a denunciation of the United States and the Soviet Union, also by implication absolved Britain from the play of power politics, and was quite consistent with D.S. Senanayakes general approach to foreign affairs. Yet Sri Lankas first Prime Minister was not a non-aligned statesman in the proper sense of the term. He did , indeed, demonstrate his commitment to national liberation movements by his decision to deny facilities in Sri Lanka ports to Dutch ships or aircraft carrying forces or equipment to mount their police action against Indonesian independence. But he left no doubt as to where he stood on the issue of communism versus anti-communism, East versus West (documents 83 & 84). His anti-communist orientation led D.S.Senanayake to grant harbour facilities to a US flotilla on its way to Korea in 1950 on the grounds that facilities which were available to the Americans in the past should continue to be available to them (document 68), a policy carried to its extreme by Sir John Kotalawala who permitted US military aircraft carrying French paratroops to refuel at Katunayake on their way from France to Hanoi, at the time of the battle of Dien Bien Phu. Kotelawala clearly did not view the Indo-China War as a war of national liberation; for him it was simply a struggle between the forces of communism and anti-communism and he declared quite explicitly in Parliament that in this struggle he could not be expected to stand neutral for the benefit of the wrong side and that: even if the devil wants my help to fight communism, I am on his side. (document 116). Kotelawalas denunciation of Soviet colonialism (document 26) was a piece with this attitude. A different approach in non-aligned foreign policy was enunciated by S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike after he became Prime Minister in 1956. As he put it to the UN General Assembly: We want to be friends with all. We have to build up a new society for ourselves; one, as I have said, which best suits the genius of our country. We should like to get some ideas and some principles from this side, and some from the other, until a coherent form of society is made up that suits our own people in the context of the changing world of today. That is why we do not range ourselves on the side of this power-bloc or that powerbloc. That is the philosophy of neutralism (document 5). Though Bandaranaike often used the term neutralism in preference to non-alignment, which was yet not in vogue, he reacted sharply against the use of terms such as uncommitted nations and declared in the same UN speech, that we are committed

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up to the hilt in preserving decency in dealings between nations and in the cause of justice and freedom. The new policy of non-alignment was amplified by Bandaranaikes representatives in the UN (documents 8 and 9) and the fact that this policy was now influencing UNP pronouncements on foreign affairs is seen in document 10. Sirimavo Bandaranaike discounted the idea that the non-aligned nations were a Third Force in international politics. Nor was non-alignment tantamount to isolationism. Underlying the policy of non-alignment, she said is the belief that independent nations, although small and militarily weak, have a positive role to play in the world today. This attitude is completely different from that of washing our hands off these matters, which was perhaps the idea behind the classical theory of neutralism. (document 12). The question of Nuclear Tests and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the context of general disarmament engaged the special attention of Mrs Bandaranaikes aadministration, 1960-65. Sri Lankas special interest in disarmament and opposition to nuclear proliferation as concerning a developing country embarking on the arduous road to economic development and prosperity had been clearly articulated from the fifties in fora such as the South-East Asian Prime Ministers Conference, 1954, at the Bandung Conference, 1955, and in general policy statements in the United Nations (documents 14-24). Sirimavo Bandaranaikes administration and Dudley Senanayakes which followed, reiterated these concerns. Sirimavo Bandaranaike sent a personal message to the US President conveying her disappointment at the explosion of an American nuclear device in April 1962 (document 19). Both Prime Ministers Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Dudley Senanayake regretted Chinas nuclear tests in October 1964 and May 1965 respectively (document 24). Sri Lanka not only welcomed the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 but also decided to sign it (document 21). Mrs. Bandaranaike also declared in the Senate:In pursuance of the policy of the Government of Ceylon to oppose the further spread of nuclear weapons and to support the creation of atom-free zones, my Government will, in future, deny entry into our seaports, airports, and territorial waters of naval vessels and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons as well as those equipped for nuclear warfare (document 22). Carrying this policy further, Sirimavo Bandaranaike proposed, at the Cairo Summit of Non-Aligned Nations (October 1964) that:(a) (b) (c) The concept of nuclear-free zones should be extended to cover areas and oceans that have hitherto been free of nuclear weapons; All non-aligned nations should take immediate action to close their ports and airfields to ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons or which are equipped to carry nuclear weapons; Colonial Powers should not only undertake to liquidate existing bases in colonial territories, but they should refrain from establishing in colonial territories new bases capable of being used for aggressive purposes.(document 23).

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These proposals were accepted and incorporated in the Final Declaration of the Conference and became the basis for her later enunciation of the proposal to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace addressed to the Lusaka Summit Non-aligned Nations in 1970. During the period 1948-1956, Sri Lanka ideologically identified itself with the West. As J.R. Jayewardene declared: In this world today there are really two powerful factors, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. We have to follow either the one or the other. There can be no half-way house in the matter. We have decided, and we intend as long as we are in power, to follow the United States of America and its democratic principles. (document 67)* Sri Lanka continued to display a very friendly attitude towards the United States despite the fact that she did not receive any financial benefits out of this relationship. As Sir John Kotelawala said: Ceylon has not received a cent of American aid, although Ceylon is the stoutest adversary of Communism in Asia. (document 86). In November 1950 Sri Lanka signed with the US a general agreement for technical cooperation under the Point Four Programme (document 71). However, this agreement did not become fully operational due to the controversy over Sri Lankas export of rubber to China. The US cut off economic assistance to Sri Lanka under the Kem Amendment and the Battle Act. The United States reviewed its aid policy towards the end of Kotelawalas regime; however, it was S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike who became the beneficiary of the resumption of US aid to Sri Lanka (the two countries entered into an economic assistance agreement on April 28, 1956). During S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes visit to the United States in 1956 there appeared a report in the American press of a speech where he has said that the US approach to third world countries was not dictated by colonial or imperialist urges. When this issue was raised in parliament, he explained what he had actually meant by his remarks: It was to the effect that I said that I did believe that colonialism or imperialism, as we understood it earlier, is not really what the U.S.A. has in mind. The U.S.A. is so enormously rich, with still further potentialities of development, that the colonial, or imperialist, urge of other countries did not, in my view, to a great extent actuate the U.S.A. . . . . They wish to obtain some kind of influence over other countries in what they imagine is

* A similar view was expressed by D.S. Senanayake when he said: As far as the United States is concerned, there is not the slightest doubt that she holds the view that we hold. That is, they are for democracy. As long as they are for democracy, and as long as it becomes necessary for us to associate ourselves with either the United States or with anyone else, we will join that side. See, Hansard (HR), Vol. 8, 1 February 1950, Col. 1395.

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a tremendous fight against communism. You can say that that is colonialism in a sense, that their efforts to obtain that influence is in itself a form of colonialism, but really the position is that it is not for the exploitation of those countries and their resources that that move is directed. It is with the idea of getting into their sphere of influence, getting into their bloc, various countries in what the U.S.A. imagines to be a big fight against communism. (document 69). Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike had developed a different attitude towards the United States and this became clear when she used the phrase rapacious designs of the West in a banquet speech in Peking during her visit to China in January 1963. Mrs. Bandaranaike had declared: The nations that have newly emerged in Asia and Africa must stand together in their struggle or must run the risk of succumbing once more to the rapacious designs of the West. The old saying that united we stand divided we fall applies with equal force to nations as it does to individuals. The spirit of Bandung is in part a crystallization of this thought. ( document 105) Of course, this speech was made in the context of a dispute with the United States regarding Sri Lankas nationalization of foreign-owned oil companies and against the possibility that the United States would suspend economic assistance to Sri Lanka under the terms of its Foreign Assistance Act. Nevertheless, her comment was considered a rebuff to the West. During the Parliamentary debate over the suspension of US aid to Sri Lanka, there was a consensus of opinion that the American action was unduly harsh. J.R. Jayewardene observed that the United States was too hasty, and it has led to a situation which could very well be misunderstood in this country, misused in this country, creating illfeeling between a democratic people and the people of another powerful democratic country. (document 77). Dudley Senanayake, the Leader of the Opposition, asserted: I do not propose to hold a brief for the U.S.A. and I think they will be well advised to take some lessons in the manner of dealing with these questions from other nations in the world who have done so for a much longer time and who would, I think, certainly not have rushed in this hasty manner to take the action that they have taken. (document 78). In this debate an interesting point was raised by the opposition about the dangers of making foreign aid a part of the countrys budget. Since the country did not receive any significant monetary aid from the West, there was no practice of taking foreign aid as a budgetary revenue during the pre-1956 period. During the debate, Mr. J.R. Jayewardene pointed out:

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The principle on which our Government looked at aid was that it was necessary if we want to have a rapid pace of economic development: but we never made foreign aid a part of our Budget. That is an important divergence from our budgeting and this Governments budgeting. We had budgetary deficits; if the country wished to advance economically; but we did not want to make foreign aid, something given by somebody else, as part of our Budget, particularly to finance a deficit. Not only is it wrong, it is dangerous as you see today. (document 77). Dr. N.M. Perera looked at the question of foreign aid from a different perspective. He said: As for getting machinery and equipment and so on, from whichever country we are able to get, there is no question about that. That is not part of the whole budgetary system. That is what we are objecting to. That is where the main trouble lies. If you remember, during the last discussion of the Budget, I pointed out that one of the worst things, that we can do is to be so dependent upon foreign aid as to ruin the morale of this country. I said one of the worst things that can happen to a country is to depend upon foreign aid in that way, because by this concept of getting easy aid, by way of massive loans and so on, you are eating into the very morale of the people of this country, when the major concentration must be on the question of the development of our country, on the use of our resources by our own efforts, which is fundamental for the whole development of the economy of a country. (document 79). Even though the relations between the United States and Sri Lanka were strained during the early 1960s, an important agreement was signed on August 29, 1964, to promote mutual understanding between the two countries by a wider exchange of knowledge and professional talent through educational contacts (document 74). Dr. N.M. Perera, then Minster of Finance, signed this Agreement on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka. The United States Educational Foundation in Ceylon (presently known as the United StatesSri Lanka Fulbright Commission) was established by the Executive Agreement of November 17, 1952, to administer the educational exchange programme provided for by Public Law 87-256, the Fulbright-Hays Act. Initially established as a short-term program, the United States Educational Foundation was accorded permanent status in 1964 by the new Agreement which superseded the 1952 Agreement. Sri Lanka was one of the first Asian countries to accord de jure recognition to the Peoples Republic of China in early January 1950 (following in this respect a British initiative*) and even concluded, purely due to economic compulsions, a Rice-Rubber
* The United Kingdom and Sri Lanka recognized the new communist regime on the same day, January 5, 1950. Britain had earlier informed the other Commonwealth countries of its intention to accord recognition to the Peoples Republic of China. Shelton Kodikara has argued that in granting early recognition to China, . . . Ceylon was merely following Britains lead on the question. See, Kodikara, Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka , PP. 78-79.

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Trade Agreement with PRC in 1952 (document 95), though de facto recognition of the new regime was withheld for political reasons. It was not until S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike became Prime Minister that Sri Lanka established diplomatic relations with the USSR, China and other Communist countries and removed the existing travel restrictions with these countries. One of the salient features of Mrs Bandaranaikes foreign policy was the cordiality of the relations between Sri Lanka and the Peoples Republic of China in her time. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1957 and following upon Chinese Premier Chou En-lais visit to Sri Lanka in 1957 and the inauguration of Chinese economic assistance to Sri Lanka under Agreements signed in 1957 and 1958 (documents 100 and 101), the existing relationship with China, founded upon the RubberRice Agreement and Sri Lankas consistent advocacy of Chinas admission to the United Nations, acquired a new dimension of importance. Mrs. Bandaranaike visited Peking in January 1963 on behalf of the Six Asian-African countries which mediated in the India-China border dispute in December 1962 in Colombo. The Joint communiqu issued at the end of Mrs. Bandaranaikes January 1963 visit ended on the following note: China and Ceylon are bound by many ties of friendship, economic cooperation and cultural and religious exchanges. The two Prime Ministers are determined to strengthen these ties, further develop economic co-operation between the two countries and to work together in international relations in the cause of Asian-African solidarity and world Peace.(document 104) When, in July 1963, Sri Lanka and China entered into a Maritime Agreement (document 108) giving most favoured nation treatment to vessels engaged in cargo and passenger services between the two countries or a third country, it was construed in some quarters as a deal under which Sri Lanka had traded a naval base to China supposedly Trincomalee, in return for long term economic assistance. Documents 107, 109, and 110 deal with the Bandaranaike Governments rebuttal of this charge. Chinese influence in Sri Lanka, and Chinese access to the naval base at Trincomalee was, at this time, a matter of much concern in India, whose border dispute with China had erupted in war in October-November 1962. It was a characteristic of Sri Lankas foreign policy during this period that her good relations with China did not prejudice in any way the nexus of Indo-Lanka relations*. On the contrary, Pandit Nehru, a respected participant in the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Conference (1950), the South-East Asian Prime Ministers Conference (1954) and the Buddha Jayanthi Celebrations (1957) in Colombo, again accepted an official invitation to inaugurate the Ayurvedic Research

* According to D. M. Prasad, Celons inclination towards China during Sirimavos Premiership has also been explained partly as a move in the direction of the islands continual search for re-insurance against India. See, D.M. Prasad, Ceylons Foreign Policy Under the Bandaranaikes (1956-65), New Delhi: S. Chand & Co.(Pvt) Ltd., 1973, P. 398.

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Centre near Colombo in mid-October 1962 and had developed a close personal relationship with the Bandaranaike family. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and Pandit Nehru had developed a similar approach to many international issues and the close identity of their approach is demonstrated in the Joint Communique issued by them on the occasion of Nehrus visit to attend the Buddha Jayanthi celebrations in 1957 (document 136). This identity of view continued during the premiership of Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Mrs. Bandaranaikes vote of condolence in the Senate on the death of Pandit Nehru is in document 139. The Sirimavo Bandaranaike Governments attitude to the 1962 India-China conflict (documents 144-148) was not shared by opposition parties. The MEP leader Philip Gunewardene (document 111) charged the Government with a pro-Chinese, anti-Indian profile and with abandonment of the neutralism of S.W.R.D Bandaranaikes day. This view, however, does not appear to have been shared by the Indian Government. For Mrs. Bandaranaike was able to reach an agreement with India on the vexed and long standing problem relating to persons of Indian Origin in Sri Lanka (document 140), a success which had eluded many of her predecessors in office. Documents connected with this agreement are numbered 141, 142, and 143 and deal with divergent interpretations of the agreement by India and Sri Lanka. The antecedents of this Agreement going back to the abortive Nehru-Kotelawala Agreement of January 1954 are given in preceding documents. It was thought unnecessary to give any background to the problem of persons of Indian origin beyond 1954 though the origins of the problem and Sri Lankas efforts to resolve it have a long history, since the documents included in the volume contain sufficient background material. For further documents, one may consult a recently published five-volume book on Indo-Sri Lanka relations, edited by Mr. Avtar Singh Bhasin.* Sri Lankas neutrality vis a vis the Indo-Pakistan conflict is illustrated in document 149 which deals specifically with the April 1965 outbreak of hostilities between the two countries.

IV
A dominant motive of Sri Lankas foreign policy in this period was the expression of, at first, an Asian, later an Asian-African, identity in matters of common regional concern and international importance. At the height of the cold war in the 1950s, Sri Lanka, like other newly independent nations in Asia and the emerging new states of the African continent , was seriously concerned that her newly-won independence might be imperiled by the escalations of great power rivalries and that these may even engulf the world in a Third World War.
* Avtar Singh Bhasin, India Sri Lanka Relations and Sri Lankas Ethnic Conflict, documents 1947-2000, Volume II , New Delhi: India Research Press, 2001.

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An important foreign policy pronouncement in this respect was the speech made by J.R. Jayewardene, Minister of Finance, who was Sri Lankas chief delegate at the San Francisco Conference on the Japanese Peace Treaty in September 1951 (document 113). The speech in which Sri Lanka waived her claims for reparations for damage caused by Japanese air attacks during the Second World War, was to have an important bearing on Sri Lankas relations with Japan later. Jayewardenes reference in the speech to the Buddhist Dhammapada text that Hatred ceases not by hatred, but by love was to be quoted by royalty in Japan during a later visit by him as President of the Republic of Sri Lanka in 1979. This speech could be regarded as an early instance of an Asian identity in Sri Lankas foreign relations. In April 1954, Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala took the initiative in convening a Conference of South-East Asian Prime Ministers in Colombo at a time when the war in Indo China contained, as he put it all the elements of a situation which can provoke a Third World War, unless something is done very urgently to bring about a settlement (document 114) . This conference, represented by India, Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, became the precursor of several subsequent meetings of this group of countries which came to be known at this time as the Colombo Powers, which sponsored the important Asian-African conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. Kotelawalas indictment of Soviet Colonialism at this conference referred to above (document 26) was not supported by some of his Colombo Powers colleagues and other participants at Bandung, though he found Chinese Premier Chou En-lai , one of the prominent Bandung participants, to be a reasonable man who was prepared to respect the views of others (document 117). For Kotelawala the important thing about Bandung was that the nations in Asia and Africa were able to find an acceptable formula to express their concern over common problems and their determination to cooperate with one another in the promotion of their security and well being. The Conference, said Kotelawala, marks the consolidation of Asia, and of Asia with Africa. Two continents which have hitherto not had much say in international affairs will now work as a united force, together with others , for the peace and progress of the world (ibid). The joint statements signed by various Sri Lankan Prime Ministers with the Governments of other Asian countries ( documents 128, 131, 136) reflect this attitude and reiterate Sri Lankas continuing concern over the preservation of international peace. S.W. R. D. Bandaranaike defined the task before newly independent nations as one of converting a colonial society politically, socially and economically into a free society and of doing so amid a welter of conflicts, with reasonable peace and with the avoidance of conflicts that burst out into war (document 120). Mindful of the precarious nature of the political set up in South Asia, the initiator of SAARC, the late President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh suggested in 1980 that regional cooperation should start first with economic issues; it was thought that the inclusion of contentious political issues in the agenda would tear apart the movement at its very inception. A similar view on regional cooperation was expressed by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike as far back as the 1950s, when he said:

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As you know, it was contemplated at Bandung that another Conference should be held two years thereafter. . . For various reasons that Conference had to be postponed, one of the chief reasons being that some of us felt that the time was not opportune to hold a conference on the lines of Bandung again, owing to certain political trouble. But I now see that the time is most opportune to deal with economic questions, not political issues. . . . (document 119). For this purpose, Bandaranaike suggested the idea of holding an economic conference; preferably for Asian countries to start with. The idea has been developing in my mind for sometime that the time has come to pursue one of the important decisions of Bandung in greater detail in the realm of economics. It is my intention, if the countries concerned agree, to suggest the holding of an economic conference, if necessary of all the Bandung powers, perhaps the restriction at the beginning being to Asian countries. . . . (document 118). In fact, Sri Lanka convened a preliminary meeting in Colombo from May 25-28, 1959, to discuss the possibility of holding an Afro-Asian Economic Conference. Officials from four Colombo Power countries - India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka participated in this conference. The other member of the Colombo Powers, Burma, did not attend this meeting.* The problems of independence for Algeria and Cyprus, too , were viewed by Sri Lanka as involving threats to international peace and the speeches of Sri Lankas delegates to the United Nations were designed to assist in defusing international tension imminent in these problems ( documents 121-125). When Ghana was admitted to the United Nations in 1957, the Sri Lanka Representative in the United Nations R.S.S. Gunewardene was entrusted with the responsibility of conveying, on behalf of the Asian-African group of countries in the UN, felicitations to the Government and people of Ghana. ( document 126). Latin American concerns did not begin to figure prominently in the foreign policy of Sri Lanka during the period covered by this volume, but during the 1962 Cuban Crisis, Sri Lankas endeavour was to support measures to prevent escalation of the crisis into armed intervention by the United States against the revolutionary Cuban Government ( documents 80,81). In 1964 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike herself reiterated Cubas right to follow the ideology of her choice against attempts by imperialist forces to limit or curtail it. (document 82). These three documents have been included in the section under the sub- head United States of America because they relate to Sri Lankas attitude during this time to the US intervention in Cuba.
* Ceylon Today, Vol. 8 (No.6), June 1959, PP. 18-25; 32.

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Closer home and more closely related to domestic politics in Sri Lanka was the deterioration of the situation in the Indo Chinese peninsula after the 1954 Geneva Accords, the persecution of Buddhists of South Vietnam, and the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War. Successive Sri Lanka Governments under Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Dudley Senanayake in various communications, voiced their serious concern over persecution of Buddhists in South Vietnam. Mrs. Bandaranaike addressed a personal letter to President Kennedy on the subject. ( document 150). Sri Lankas UN Representative R.S.S. Gunewardene stated that the danger to peace and security arises primarily from the interference of foreign powers in the affairs of these countries. Internal dissensions and sources of friction in the area have been exploited by neocolonialist powers in their attempt to continue or extend their influence. (document 152) Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake signed a Joint Plea for Peace in Vietnam signed by 17 Heads of States and Governments of Non Aligned countries, and addressed to the US , USSR, UK, France, China, North and South Vietnam, National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, Canada and Poland (as members of the International Central Commission) and the UN Secretary-General. (document 153).

V
Sri Lanka in the United Nations
For a small power, Sri Lanka played a remarkably active role in interstate mediation, in urging the acceleration of the process of de-colonization and disarmament and in proclaiming Non Alignment as a means of alleviating great power-tensions. Many of these concerns were directly expressed in the forum of the United Nations General Assembly and the last section of documents in this volume deal with Sri Lankas role in the United Nations. Sri Lanka did not become a member of the UN until December 1955, having languished, as S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike said, in the anterooms of this Organization for many years. (document 156). Once admitted, however, Sri Lanka began to take an active interest in the UN as an institution necessary for the maintenance of international peace, in strengthening its potential, and in activating the UN role in furthering the economic development of the developing countries . Sri Lanka took the view that the implementation of the principle of universality of membership is necessary in order to strengthen the representative character of the UN. R.S.S. Gunewardene, then Sri Lankas UN Representative asserted: If this Organization is to be fully represented, it is essential that we accept the principle of universality of membership. We feel that a sovereign State, whatever its ideology and its political, economic or social system, should have the right of representation. (document 160)

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Sri Lankas support of the admission of the Peoples Republic of China to the UN, reflected in earlier documents and affirmed in other contexts, was constantly reiterated by her delegates in the United Nations. At the end of 1956, UN membership had increased to 80 from the original 51 and Sri Lanka also argued that representation in the Security Council, too, should increase with enlargement of UN membership and that it should have a basis in equitable geographic distribution. (Sri Lanka was elected to one of the non-permanent seats of the Security Council in October 1959). Sri Lanka even questioned the rationale behind the limitation in the number of permanent members in the Security Council. R.S.S. Gunewardene argued that when this question was considered originally, the principle was adopted that the great powers were able to represent the world. However, that picture has now changed, and we must recognize that change. (document 158). Sri Lanka did not support the Troika proposal put forward by the Soviet Union in 1960 which suggested the abolition of the office of the Secretary-General and the replacement of it by a triumvirate or collegium of three persons. It is our view, said Sir Claude Corea, then Sri Lankas UN Representative, that the establishment of a triumvirate to take the place of the Secretary-General will not contribute in any positive way to the better working of the United Nations. (document 163). It was his view that the abolition of the post of Secretary-General would weaken considerably the position of the United Nations and impair its future. This position was reiterated by Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence and External Affairs, the next year when he addressed the UN General Assembly:We see in the principle of a troika a grave danger, a danger that the United Nations may lose its capacity for effective executive action, and executive action we must have if the United Nations General Assembly and its other institutions are to become a true vehicle to establish a world order and international peace. (document 164) Mr. Bandaranaike too deplored the under-representative character of the UN Security Council and Economic and Social Council and supported the demand of Asian- African countries that the Secretariat as well should reflect in their due proportion the increased membership of Asian and African countries. (document 165) For Professor G.P. Malalasekera, another distinguished Representative of Sri Lanka in New York in 1963: the United Nations is not, as it is often said, the last hope for peace; it is the first hope and perhaps even the sole hope. (document 166) This view was echoed in 1965 by Mr. G .G. Ponnambalam, a prominent Sri Lankan Tamil political leader representing the country in the General Assembly, when he said: To the vast majority, if not all, of the smaller and recently independent nations of the world, this Organization is the repository of the ultimate hopes of their salvation and survival. (document 169).

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In his 20th Anniversary UN Day Message, Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake too declared that the United Nations still represents mankinds best hope for survival in a world which is in constant danger of extinction. (document 168). Sri Lankan spokesmen always referred to the achievements of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security; however, they were not unaware of the shortcomings of the United Nations peace keeping role. Some of them even advocated a UN standing army an integrated standing force to which every member state regardless of its size, importance , strength or affluence, would contribute in men and material, to be placed at the exclusive disposal and command of the United Nations. (document 169). G.G. Ponnambalam argued that the preservation of world peace should not remain the exclusive responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council alone. Without attempting to detract from the powers and functions of that body [the Security Council], said Ponnambalam, I should like to reassert that it is the inescapable duty of the General Assembly in the last resort, having regard to the near universality of its membership, to preserve world peace and stable international order. (document 169). Sri Lanka delegates in the United Nations also repeatedly emphasized the special role which the UN should play in concerting measures to assist the economic development of the developing countries. Many of the arguments made, even in Sri Lankas second year at the United Nations , 1957, their rationale and continuing relevance to the problems of the present day world make illuminating reading. Sri Lankas delegates strongly supported the establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) and endorsed the view expressed in the World Economic Survey 1955 (E2864) that far more could be done to promote the economic development of the under-developed areas in accordance with Article 55. (documents 171& 172). They considered the proposed World Food Reserve to be no answer except in the wider context of economic development as a whole, and therefore consistently supported the proposal to establish the SUNFED as a channel to provide under-developed countries with much needed capital funds. (documents 173 &174). Sri Lanka delegates reiterated what is still a familiar note in international advocacy by the developing countries that despite a satisfactory rate of economic growth of the world as a whole, the gap in the rate of growth between industrially advanced countries had tended to be wider than narrower. Interesting also was the argument adduced even at that time that economic development in the developing countries was no less vital to the economic well-being of the industrially advanced countries themselves, a theme which has reappeared in the Brandt Commission Report and which is now part of the accepted economic philosophy of Third World Countries. Sri Lankas UN Representative Sir Claude Corea said in October 1959: It is alarming that more than half of the worlds population belongs to what are called under-developed areas. This is the danger to themselves and to the rest of the world, even to those who are highly developed and who enjoy a high standard of living. (document 178).

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Later in October 1965 the same view was expressed this time by G.G. Ponnambalam when he said that true international amity cannot ultimately be built on secure foundations except upon the basis of growing economic equality among the nations and peoples of the world (document 182). It was Sri Lankas view constantly articulated at the United Nations that the widening chasm between the standards of living of the developed and developing countries constituted an even greater menace to world peace than the prevailing clash of ideologies. It was in this spirit that Sri Lanka had supported the creation of the Regional Economic Commission for Africa in 1957 on the same lines as the UN had established commissions for Asia and the far East and for Latin America (document 175 ). But by the mid sixties, Sri Lankas delegates were already beginning to despair of any worthwhile advance being made under UN auspices for the betterment of the developing countries. It was in this context that Sri Lanka hailed the establishment of the UN Committee on Trade and Development in 1964 as one of the most important events since the establishment of the United Nations. (document 181 ). Sri Lanka however was not wholly satisfied with the results of its deliberations nor had the developed countries shown themselves adequately prepared and ready to meet the challenge of the times. It must be appreciated, said R.S.S. Gunewardene, Sri Lankas UN Representative in 1964, that the decline in export earnings of the developing countries, the deterioration in terms of trade and the increasing burden of servicing debts are factors beyond the control of developing countries and led to the frustration of their economic policies . We must, therefore, be dominated by a sense of urgency and take practical steps for accelerating an increasing flow of capital and for liberalizing trade relationships in favour of the developing countries (ibid). Sri Lanka delegates were also prominent among UN spokesmen in pointing out the connection between disarmament and development . As Rajapathirana put it in February 1957: It was a fact, however, that world tensions were in part due to the arms race and to economic instability . Furthermore, the cost of setting up SUNFED would be negligible compared with the cost of defence measures and his delegation was convinced that the highly developed countries could contribute to SUNFED without detriment to their defence programmes. ( document 172). This view was reiterated time and again in the UN by Sri Lankan spokesmen. Sir Claude Corea averred in October 1960:

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The question of economic development is closely connected with disarmament, because the financial resources of countries involved in the arms race are committed almost to the maximum of their capacity to the building up and maintaining of the best and most modern weapons of destruction.(document 176) He further elaborated that the needs of developing countries could only be met if we put an end to the arms race and transfer a major part of what is so lavishly spent on weapons of destruction built solely with the object of destroying humanity on a mass scale - to the constructive humanitarian purpose of improving the standards of living of all people so that they may live in dignity and contentment. (ibid) The rest of the documents presented in this volume reflect Sri Lankas attitude to several international conflicts which threatened world peace at the time. In the first of these, the problem of Korean Unification (documents 183-185), Sri Lanka delegates supported in principle the unification of Korea and emphasized the role that UN can play in bringing about such unification. But it was Sri Lankas view that the UN effort should be limited to facilitating representatives of North and South Korea to meet so that they might work out the organization of free elections by a process of conciliation and negotiation, a question on which both parties appeared to be agreed on. But an essential pre-requisite to such a meeting was that all foreign forces must be evacuated from the country so that the two parties concerned could meet to discuss their common future. R.S.S. Gunewardene declared in November 1957:The United Nations could not seek Korean unification by force of arms. It must find a method which would enable the North Koreans and the South Koreans to meet as kinsmen and as equals. A rigid and intransigent attitude was no help; compromise was the essence of life, although there should of course be no compromise on principles. . . Ways and means must be devised for securing the evacuation of all foreign forces from the country so that the two sections of the population could meet to discuss their common future. (document 185) Sri Lankas delegates took an active part in the UN debate on the Suez crisis and the concurrent crisis which arose over the events in Hungary in 1956. Sri Lankas membership of the Commonwealth did not preclude her from taking a firm stand on the Franco British- Israeli invasion of Egypt after President Nassers nationalization of the Suez Canal. Sri Lankas view on the nationalization issue was succinctly expressed by Prime minister S.W.R.D Bandaranaike himself when he addressed the UN General Assembly in November 1956. The President of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company. I do not find in any quarter a disposition seriously to question his right to do so. . . . If that is correct, I consider that it follows as a corollary to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company that the power of operation of the Canal should also be vested in Egypt. (document 188)

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After the three-Power invasion of Egypt, Sri Lankan delegates persistently supported UN Resolutions calling for a cease-fire in the Middle East and for complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian territory. Sri Lanka also co-sponsored with nineteen Asian and African nations a UN Resolution which resulted in the establishment of the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East (document 187) and strongly opposed Israeli attempts to hold on to the Gaza Strip and to the strip of territory along the west coast of the Gulf of Aquaba (documents 190 and 191) insisting that Israel should withdraw all its forces to the armistice lines established by the Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949. In his address to the UN General Assembly cited above, Prime Minister Bandaranaike put the case with characteristic force: A United Nations Emergency Force is already in the process of being established in Egypt in order to carry out the decisions of the United Nations in supervising a withdrawal of these forces. I say this, and I say it with all seriousness, that as long as foreign troops - be they Israel, United Kingdom or French - continued to remain on Egyptian territory, the position is one that is fraught with the greatest danger and one that may bring about results leading to a third world war. I wish to say that these forces must be withdrawn now without any delay. (document 188). Speaking several months later, in October 1957, the Sri Lanka Representative in the UN averred that one of the major causes of tension in the Middle East today is the rivalry of the two power blocs. It is our view that the alignment of countries in military pacts in any part of the world will create a climate of suspicion and distrust and consequently lead to an increase of international tension. (document 192). In August 1958 the Sri Lankan representative strongly condemned the armed intervention by the United States in Lebanon and by the United Kingdom in Jordan (document 193). Hungary in 1956 presented yet another case of foreign intervention but in this instance the issue seemed to be clouded by the existence of rival factions in Hungary and by doubts whether, as the Soviets maintained, their forces were assisting to put down a counter-revolution on the invitation of the Hungarian Government itself. Sri Lanka abstained from voting on a United States sponsored resolution in the UN General Assembly, which was adopted. This resolution called upon the Soviet Union to desist from armed intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary, requested the SecretaryGeneral to investigate the situation caused by foreign intervention in Hungary, and called upon the Governments of Hungary and the Soviet Union to permit UN Observers to enter Hungary with freedom of travel so that they could report their findings to the Secretary-General. The reasons for Sri Lankas abstention are given in her representatives speech of 8 November 1956 (document 194). R.S.S Gunewardene said: we need a little time to examine the situation carefully, to examine the evidence before us, and our Government needs a little time to arrive at a correct verdict. He declared that self determination

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is a matter which is decided entirely by the people of a given country. He deplored armed intervention on any account whatsoever, and favoured a cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Hungary. But he could not accept all the parts of the US Resolution. Regarding the Secretary-General sending an observer team to Hungary, he said that he has no objection to the proposal if it could be arranged with mutual consent, because no team can visit a country except with the express permission of the Government of that country, unless one wants to start another world war. Sri Lanka abstained from voting on two further resolutions adopted by the Assembly on 9 November 1956. One of these (sponsored by Cuba, Ireland , Italy, Pakistan and Peru) called upon the Soviet Union again to withdraw its forces from Hungary; reaffirmed the request to the Secretary-General to investigate the situation and called for free elections in Hungary under UN auspices. The other Resolution sponsored by the United States called upon the Soviet Union to cease immediately actions against the Hungarian population which are in violation of the accepted standards and principles of international law, justice and morality. Both Resolutions were passed. Speaking on these Resolutions (document 195), Mr. Gunewardene averred that in the same way that we registered our protest against the United Kingdom and France for their armed intervention in Egypt, we certainly protest even in stronger language against the action of Soviet forces in Hungary. He also welcomed the idea of free elections but he thought that the five- power resolution served no practical purpose. It might have good propaganda value but he would not be party to that business. Sri Lanka together with India , Indonesia and Burma, felt that the US Resolution injected political considerations into what should be a purely humanitarian matter and accordingly moved an amendment, which was rejected, which would in effect have deleted references to the Soviet Union in the US Draft resolution. However, a Resolution jointly sponsored by Sri Lanka, India and Indonesia requested Hungary to permit UN observers to enter its territory, without prejudice to its sovereignty, to determine conditions there. (document 196). In his November 22nd speech at the UN General Assembly in 1958, |Prime Minister Bandaranaike referred to events in Hungary as well as the Suez (document 197) and summed up his position in the following terms:We agreed with the request that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Budapest and from Hungarian territory without any delay. We could not quite agree with that portion of the draft resolution that requested that free elections be held in Hungary under the vigilant eyes of United Nations observers. You will have noted what we said at Delhi. What we said there was that the USSR troops should be withdrawn and that Hungary should be left free to work out its own destiny. Why should we dictate to any country that it should have elections as we want it to have them? Surely, whether it is a Soviet dictatorship in Hungary, an Anglo-French dictatorship in Egypt or even the dictatorship of the United Nations which militates against the sovereignty of a country, they are all, I think, equally unwise and undesirable.

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In his speech to the General Assembly on 3rd December 1956 (document 198), R.S.S. Gunewardene rejected both the explanation given by the representative of the USSR that the Soviet forces were in Hungary by reason of the Warsaw Pact since no pact was recognized as giving any kind of excuse for interfering in the internal affairs of any region or country. Sri Lanka also rejected the Soviet plea that it was an internal affair of Hungary. Sri Lanka urged again the acceptance of independent observers under the aegis of the UN to investigate conditions in Hungary. Speaking on 11th December when neither the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary nor the acceptance of UN observers by Hungary had materialized , the Sri Lanka Representative gave expression to his disillusionment at the turn of events:World opinion has been shocked by recent events. We even gave credit to the Soviet Union for creating the Geneva spirit, a spirit which we thought had come to stay. It is greatly to be regretted, therefore, that there has been a violation of the code of conduct by a nation, which we expected, believed in preserving peace, order and the well-being of the world. ( document No 200). In this speech, the Sri Lanka Representative rejected the contention that the Hungarian issue was a matter of domestic jurisdiction, outside the purview of the United Nations. That plea he said is not tenable any more and I am sorry that the Soviet Union and its friends are tenaciously clinging to the plea of domestic jurisdiction. In January 1957, Sri Lanka, Denmark , Australia, Tunisia and Uruguay were appointed as a five-nation UN committee by the General Assembly to report on the situation in Hungary on the basis of direct evidence. Since both the Soviets and the Kadar regime in Hungary refused all cooperation with the Committee, the investigation had perforce to be conducted ex parte. The committee report which was signed unanimously and published on 20 June 1957 described the Hungarian events of October- November 1956 as a spontaneous national uprising due to various longstanding grievances one of which was the inferior status of Hungary with regard to the USSR. When the Report was debated in the General Assembly in September 1957, however, the Sri Lanka Representative, under instructions from the home government, was constrained to abstain from voting against Hungary and the Soviet Union. The United National Party (U.N.P.) criticized the government for compelling our representative to take a course of action not in keeping with our previous reputation for integrity and impartiality. (document 10). When the crisis in Congo erupted in July 1960 following upon the Belgian armed action in that country, Sri Lanka fully supported the United Nations efforts to bring about a speedy solution to the crisis (documents 201-205). In his speech to the General Assembly on 19th September 1960, the Sri Lanka Representative Sir Claude Corea succinctly summarized his Governments attitude to the crisis as follows:

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First, we support unreservedly the political independence, territorial integrity and unity of the sovereign Republic of the Congo which the Security Council recommended for admission to the United Nations. Second, we accepted with sympathetic understanding the appeal of the Government of the Republic of the Congo for assistance, the request that was addressed to the United Nations on 13 July 1960. . . . Third, we fully endorsed also the ready response of the United Nations to this appeal and we appreciate the generosity and speed with which several countries answered the Secretary-Generals call, enabling him to assemble in the territory of the Congo a military force of almost 11,000 troops in a few days time. . . . Fourth, we are convinced that if international peace and security are to be maintained, it is absolutely essential that the Republic of the Congo be insulated from the direct or indirect effects of the Cold War, for, if by our indifference we permit that conflict to enter into the situation in the Congo, we fear it will be difficult to prevent the rest of the African continent also from becoming involved. ( document 202) The only instrument of such insulation then available was the United Nations, and Sri Lanka consistently supported the UN presence in Congo and the role of its SecretaryGeneral in the conflict. T.B. Subasinghe addressing the General Assembly on behalf of Sri Lanka in April 1961 strongly condemned the continued presence of Belgian troops in Katanga province, the continued defiance of numerous Security Council resolutions requesting their withdrawal, and characterized the Congolese situation as one of a people struggling to establish its independence against the manoeuvres and intrigues of a colonial power which was unwilling to loosen its grip on the politics, the economy and the lives of the Congolese people. (document 205 ). He also stated that any attempt to create separate states in the territory of the Congo in collusion with individuals who have always opposed the Central Government and unified Congo and who have worked for the secession of the provinces is contrary to the provisions of the Loi Fondamentale. (ibid). Felix R.Dias Bandaranaike deploring the death of Patrice Lumumba declared his support for the successor government which had parliamentary backing but maintained that insidious forces still remained in Katanga province and rejected the view propounded by the British Foreign Secretary that the situation there was analogous to one of provincial autonomy. (document 204). For a small power, Sri Lanka played a remarkably active role in the UN and was very outspoken on controversial issues that came up for discussion. She maintained adherence to basic principles such as non-alignment with power blocs, support for disarmament and arms control, anti-colonialism, anti-racism, and Third-World solidarity. It was in this spirit that Mr. R.S.S. Gunewardene took pride in saying: Being what is described as a neutral country, Ceylon would not hesitate to pass its verdict on issues as and when they arise, without fear or favor. That right is one which we claim as a sovereign state, and that is exactly the

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reason why we are not aligned with any bloc, because no other considerations should guide us except what we think is important in the interests of humanity and for the preservation of peace in the world. We have not hesitated to register our disagreement with the United Kingdom, with which we have the closest possible ties. The United Kingdom may be described as the closest friend we have, but we have not hesitated to express our dissent from, and our disapproval of, its actions in Egypt. We have very close diplomatic relations with France. But we never hesitated to express our views with regard to its actions in Egypt or Algeria. We have also not hesitated to express our viewpoint with regard to another permanent member of the Security Council, China. We recognize the Communist regime of China; we trade with nationalist Chinese, too. We have also not hesitated at any moment in the past to dissent from the position taken by the Soviet Union Government. Nor have we hesitated to disagree with that great Republic, the United States, with regard to military pacts in our region. (document 194).

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BASIC P RINCIPLES: N ON-ALIGNMENT

WITH

POWER B LOCS

Document No. 1 Prime Minister D.S. Senanayakes Middle Way Speech Delivered Over B.B.C., London*
January 1951 My own country, Ceylon, is the smallest single entity in the vast region of South-East Asia. Today, South-East Asia, weak and somewhat dazed, finds herself launched into a world of troubles and cross-currents. The region is the home of some 500,000,000 people of different races and religions, but they all share a common background of oriental culture. They are cut off by high mountains and stretches of ocean from the rest of the world, and they are cut off from each other also because they have been under different foreign dominations. So these countries of South-East Asia only awoke to the idea that they made a cohesive whole, as a region, a little while before the Second World War. By South-East Asia I mean the group of countries comprising India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Siam and the Philippines. I am not going to talk a great deal about the economic importance of this region, but here is a fantasy of mine which may suggest its importance to you: it is that if the countries of this region, weak and disjointed though it be, should ever feel obliged to agree that they should impose an economic sanction against the rest of the world, there would have to be a world conference to solve the deadlock. And this conference could not be held in Washington or London, Paris or Moscow, or Peking; it would have to be held in some central spot in South-East Asia itself. If South-East Asia is a problem today, both for its own countries and for the rest of the world, it is largely because all the countries there were subject to colonial rule by Western Powers for several centuries. Nearly all of them have become independent Sovereign States since the last war. In ancient times they had highly developed civilizations, but under Western colonial rule they have remained at an inferior level as far as material civilization was concerned, while the West itself made rapid advances in scientific and industrial development. But the South-East Asian countries were not in a position to develop their own resources, they had to be content with supplying raw materials to feed the industries of the powers which dominated them. Those which were occupied by the Japanese had to pay a heavy toll in their resources, and the others also suffered from having to strain their economies to support the allied war effort.

Source : The Listener, 18 January 1951.

DOCUMENTS

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In the past, national self-expression in these countries took the form of political agitation and discontent against the existing governments, for the people wanted their political freedom. Today they may not all be equally well-prepared - politically, administratively or economically - to exercise their new independence in the most wise or efficient way, but they have all absorbed the principles of democracy and they are all anxious to grow strong and healthy on democratic lines. What South-East Asia needs most today is a little breathing time. She wants to collect her thoughts, estimate her resources, both human and material, and plan her reconstruction. There is a lot of talk nowadays about help from the greater powers. It is natural, of course, for an under-developed country to expect assistance from her more developed neighbours, to whom she herself is of some value as a source or raw material, a market for industrial goods, or even a source of strength in friendly man power. But such help, whether it is technical, material or financial, is not the first need for the reconstruction of a nation. In fact, too much of that kind of help may reduce an underdeveloped country to a new kind of dependence, from which she might again have to struggle to escape. Some support in time of distress, or a grasp of a friendly hand on the hard road to progress is welcome. But it is part of our oriental philosophy that, for the salvation of the individual, he should be completely self-reliant, and that his personal effort alone can lead him to perfection. What is good for the individual, we think, should be good for the nations. So what the nations of South-East Asia need first of all now are conditions which will make it possible for them to reconstruct their political, social and economic structure largely by their own efforts. A world at peace is, therefore, her first and foremost need, the worlds goodwill next, and then some timely and appropriate assistance, if it can get it. When I say peace I am not referring to the sort of peace which is so much publicized by world peace congresses and the peace petitions. Their objective seems questionable. I mean a genuine settled peace among the nations of the world, big and small. Now that the group of countries in South-East Asia have become independent, the question arises about their political relationship with the Powers and about their attitude in a divided world. For these countries not only command rich natural resources which the modern world urgently needs, they also command strategic positions which lie across the sea and land routes from the East to the West. As peace is so vital to them at this point in their existence, they naturally incline to range themselves on the side of the Powers which are generally working towards peace. But the people of South -East Asia are very much puzzled by the ease and speed with which the Allies, who yesterday were fighting together against intolerance and violence, have now divided into two uncompromisingly hostile camps. Both camps declare from the United Nations, in their national assemblies, and on every conceivable occasion that each is working to safeguard the peace of the world. I cannot analyse their objective in a short talk like this. I can only deal with generalizations. But

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I am happy that I am speaking to the understanding British public who, as shown by their Commonwealth idea, have an unrivalled genius for compromise and for discovering harmonizing factors in what looks like conflicting ideas and interests. The present world situation is rooted in the old, old play of power politics - a system which the nations of the world fought two world wars to immunise, and apparently in vain. From the sixteenth century to the outbreak of the First World War, Europe held sway in the world and at the beginning of the Twentieth Century her sway seemed unassailable and eternal. An oligarchy of the major European Powers assumed the function of regulating the conduct of international affairs and were capable of intervening effectually in any quarter of the globe, whether the scene affected them directly or not. The international aristocracy of Sovereign States, jealous of their special positions, carefully chose their colleagues in the charmed circle. International peace was necessary not for the greater happiness of humanity, but to impose their own domination of the world, and it was maintained by a balance of power among themselves. When peace was disturbed by one or more of the group coveting world domination the oligarchy proceeded to restore the balance of power by force. After the war that ensued, the victor and vanquished would emerge bleeding and impoverished, and this meant that the composition of the oligarchy had to be re-arranged with due regard to the prestige of the great. Consideration for the happiness of humanity as a whole took second place, and the welfare of the oligarchy came first. Equality among Sovereign States was only in name. So other powers, whether middle-class or small, remained on the periphery and were powerless either to influence the delicate mechanism of the balance of power or to bring about greater stability in international affairs. In the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisation an attempt was, no doubt, made to base international authority more broadly, but those who could speak the language of the balance of power, with its war-making potential, still seemed to have it all their own way. The United Nations Organisation has now become an arena for power manoeuvres. The older among the Great Powers now realize the need to mobilize the moral power of the world in search of lasting peace in preference to mobilizing the physical power, but some of the newcomers into the top rank have got to learn wisdom by experience. Though none of the major Powers genuinely desires the consequences of modern war, they seem unable to prevent the slow drift into arbitration by force. It is not as if they were not aware that a Third World War would reduce the world to barbarism - the greatest tragedy that civilization may yet be called upon to face. South-East Asia, which breaks into new life in this situation of the world, has naturally her own views about the problem, particularly as, should a conflict arise, every Sovereign State must sooner or later make a choice in sympathy with one or other of the contending parties. Besides the play of power politics we are also told of the existence in the world of two ways of life to choose from. But we have to be satisfied that there is no other way of life which is even better than the two ways now in

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conflict. The oriental mind will not be satisfied with political philosophy, whether of the right or left wing of the world oligarchy, which denies the higher values of mind and soul of man and seeks to clamp him down to a materialistic ideology which limits and stunts the growth of the individual. Asia, which is the land of birth of all great religions and of high idealism, wonders whether humanity is really progressing towards realization of ultimate truth and perfection, which is its goal, and whether the Great Powers are not placing too great an emphasis on the form of the machinery of government and improvement of the social and economic organisation of a nation as a means of great human happiness. We in the East, throughout long periods of struggle towards the light, have learned the bitter lessons of suspicion and fear, of greed and aggrandizement, of lust for power and exploitation of the weak, and we are convinced that only through clearer knowledge of the fundamental spiritual values of existence can international understanding be reached. We believe in a way of life which I may be permitted to call the middle way and in which the rule of the moral law founded on a firm faith in the one-ness of human life would hold sway, where power-politics or power-economics would not find place in the conduct of international affairs, where there will be no armament race as a direct result of a fear of insecurity, and where, instead of force as arbiter in international disputes, there would arise mutual confidence and co-operation as a pre-requisite of lasting peace. If, therefore, the world wants peace, its way of life must break the vicious circle of balance of power, fear of insecurity, and armament race. This can only be brought about by a change in the attitude of the international aristocracy of the Great Powers, as it calls for some sacrifice of prestige and privilege on their part. I hope and believe that there are a sufficient number of influential men of goodwill among them who could find peace on this basis.

Document No. 2 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on Non-Alignment (Extract from his International Broadcast At Tokyo)*
22 December 1954 I know that the moment one talks of closer association in Asia, there are some who think at once in terms of another bloc. Let me tell you from the outset that nothing is further from my mind. I do not believe in blocs and to my mind most of the international tensions that prevail today are due to the existence of two rival power blocs, which are

* Source : Between the Two Worlds (The Collected Speeches of the Right Honourable Sir John Kotelawala), Colombo: The Government Press, 1954, PP. 47-48.

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mutually afraid and suspicious of each other. History has repeatedly shown that power blocs only endanger peace, for they give rise to counter blocs and provoke counter measures, which inevitably leads to a trial of strength and in an armed clash. If they do not eventually result in a shooting war, they cause a division of the worlds material resources into a mad race for armaments, when these resources can more profitably be used in peaceful development. Ceylon, together with several other Asian countries, has already declared itself unequivocally against alignment with either of the existing power groups, and has, instead, pursued a policy of friendship towards all nations alike. We have chosen this course - it has sometimes been called the Middle Path - after very careful deliberation, and we are convinced that it is the only means preventing a permanent division of the world into two Camps, as well as of keeping ourselves from being drawn into a war which is not of our seeking. Our policy of non-alignment has, I know, been criticized as short-sighted neutralism, but we certainly do not regard it in that light. We, in Asia, have neither the energy nor the time to waste in indulging in the activities of power blocs, and it would for us be a move in the wrong direction to think in terms of an Asian group. We are trying to steer clear of war because we want peace, the peace that is so badly needed by us, to enable us to bring ourselves into line with the more prosperous countries of the world, after centuries of exploitation at foreign hands.

Document No. 3 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on Neutralism (Extract from his address to the Commonwealth Press Association, London )*
5 July 1956 We . . . who have recently regained our freedom, are feeling our way, groping forward, keeping our minds open in many matters and in many ways, in order that we may discover for ourselves that form of society which is best suited to our own need. How does it work? Take the subject of foreign policy. Our attitude, the attitude of my own country, is an attitude of neutralism, and is one which some in the West do not understand, perhaps do not wish to understand. It is not a sign of cowardice; it is not a desire to have the best of both worlds. It is something much more than a negative and passive attitude; something very positive. You may remember the saying long ago in Galilee, that the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath. I feel that every ism, whether capitalism, communism, or any other ism, has really been made for man and not man for some particular ideology or some particular so-called way of life.
* Source: S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Speeches and Writings, Colombo: Government Press 1963, pp. 374-375.

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I am not prepared to sacrifice mankind in the name of any ism, to condemn man to what is almost inevitable extinction through a process of immense suffering which a new war would involve. We want peace. I do not say peace at any price, but peace as far as it is possible to obtain peace today in conformity with honour and with justice. That is why, in the pursuit of peace, some of our countries feel that we do not wish to align ourselves with power blocs; power blocs built on mutual fear and suspicion; power blocs which, in the name of defence, find themselves compelled to create a Frankenstein which perhaps they themselves may not ultimately be able to control. I do not say that we should not protect ourselves. We must be alert and we must keep our eyes open, but we must not now think in terms of hatred of some particular country, of some particular ideology, of those who belong to some other race, be they coloured or white, for in that way lies madness in the context of those very neat little gadgets which the human brain has evolved for the destruction of its kind. Now I feel that in pursuing this ideal of peace for us, it is best that we do not align ourselves with these military blocs, either of the West or of the East; that we preserve friendship with all and try perhaps to provide a bridge between the two radically opposed points of view. Neutralism, but dynamic neutralism, is in the interest not only of our own countries but of mankind as a whole. I am glad that there is more evidence of understanding, even in countries which, understandably, do not quite appreciate our point of view.

Document No. 4 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on the Philosophy of Neutralism (Extract from his speech in the House of Representatives)*
2 August 1956 I think the House will agree with me that the foreign affairs of this country have taken a more positive turn today than before. Earlier, we did not know where we were. There was talk of non-aligning, power blocs, preserving an attitude of neutralism, though, in fact, their [the previous governments] actions were quite different. We have altered that now. What do we mean by this word neutralism? I do not like that word. In this period of world history, when a good many of our Asian countries have once again regained their freedom, and the world itself is in a state of change, is it wrong for us to look about - we do not want to look either to the capitalism of the West or the communism of the East or to find our feet at the precise form of society that we think is more suited to our country ? Is it wrong in pursuance of that view that we do not range ourselves

* Source : Hansard (HR), Vol. 25, 1956, Cols. 1600-1601.

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on the side of one or the other of those power blocs but would like to be friendly with all ? I say, in this world today of a system which is changing but not yet completely disappeared, where the world is still in doubt as to various countries of the world, as to what particular thing it would like to take in place of the old, in that state of affairs, naturally, various conflicts emerge in the world, ideological conflicts, conflicts arising out of the resurgence of nationalism here, there and everywhere, various types of conflicts in the world; the wise course obviously is that which is summed up by the rather ugly phrase co-existence. We have just to make up our minds to avoid any serious danger of a general flare-up of war. The potentialities of some of the weapons that have been discovered are very vaguely known by ordinary laymen. There is in them something more terrible than what even the most imaginative writer can imagine. They are so terrible in their results. We therefore want peace and we have to achieve peace under very difficult circumstances today, amidst so many conflicts all over, while preserving fundamentally the things for which we stand. We have to work out some scheme of living and letting others live if we are to prevent humanity from generally going down. That is the minimum - the philosophy of Neutralism for which I stand.

Document No. 5 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on Neutralism (Extract from his address to the U.N. General Assembly)*
22 November 1956, Mr. [S.W.R.D.] Bandaranaike (Ceylon) : This is an age when we have to live and let live, when we cannot afford to hate each other so much that we are prepared to sacrifice all mankind in the name of peace or for some other reason. We cannot afford to do that today. Within the limits of honour, of course, and those principles which we hold dear, we have to live and let live. That is the philosophy behind the doctrine of co-existence. We in Asia do not hate anybody. We want to be friends with all. We have to build up a new society for ourselves; one, as I have said, which best suits the genius of our country. We should like to get some ideas and some principles from this side, and some from the other, until a coherent form of society is made up that suits our own people in the context of the changing world of today. That is why we do not range ourselves on the side of this power-bloc or that power bloc. This is the philosophy of neutralism. It is not something dishonest; it is not a matter of sitting on the fence to see whether we can get the best of

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 11th Session, 1956, 590th Pl. Mtg. Paras. 37-41.

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both worlds. It is a position that is inexorably thrust upon us by the circumstances of the case. It is a position that will be of great help in the world situation today, for we do provide a bridge over the gulf between the two opposing factions. We are supposed to be the uncommitted nations. I strongly object to that word. We are committed up to the hilt. We are committed to preserve decency in dealings between nations, we are committed to the cause of justice and freedom, as much as anyone is. That briefly, is our position in Asia. I trust it will not be misunderstood. Sometimes the feeling comes over me, as I am sure it does over many of us, that fight is not worthwhile - that there is, in fact, no hope for mankind to escape the perplexities, problems, conflicts, hatreds and enmities that seem to be arising all about us. But sometimes when I feel like that I am fortified by the thought that through the dark fabric of human history there passes one golden thread of unfailing strength and firmness - the unconquered, unconquerable spirit of man. It has manifested itself through the ages in various, diverse, different ways: first of all, the unconquerable spirit of man fighting for bare survival and existence; later, fighting for various causes - national causes maybe, or the cause of justice, the cause of freedom or the pursuit of truth on the part of the great religious leaders down through history. Today it is needed in the cause of human friendship and of peace. What is peace ? Peace is not merely a negative thing - the absence of one set of people trying to kill another set of people. No doubt the prevention of war is a necessary factor for peace, but peace, believe me, is something much more positive than that, for peace in its true sense means human understanding, human friendship and co-operation out of which, indeed, peace in its true form alone can rise. I look upon the United Nations as the one machine available to mankind today through which it can express this unconquerable spirit of man in its efforts to achieve that peace, friendship and collaboration which is, I hope, the object of us all.

Document No. 6 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on Neutralism (Extract from a Statement in the House of Representatives)*
24 July 1957 It [neutralism] certainly means this : that in the pursuit of that policy we reserve to ourselves the right of criticizing our friends and I hope all our friends - when we feel they have not acted correctly. We shall not incur the charge of having double standards

* Source : Hansard (HR), Vol. 28, 1957, Cols. 1779-80.

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in dealing with questions of this kind, nor indeed shall we play to the tune of anyone side of powers in trying to get their own back irrespective of the merits of any particular case or another. It is in that spirit that we shall conduct our foreign affairs. It is one that I trust will not be misunderstood by any of our friends whether they are of the Western world, within the Commonwealth or whether they are representatives of any other section.

Document No. 7 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on Non-alignment with Power Blocs (Speech at a Reception to Marshal Tito, the President of the Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia)*
24 January 1959 Yugoslavia is one of these countries, like ourselves, which is labeled sometimes as neutralist, sometimes as uncommitted. I do not like either of those words, though they are used for convenience. We are not neutralists. We do not adopt a negative attitude. Our attitude is a very positive one in following our different ways of life in non-alignment with power blocs, and therefore, as we think, helping the general cause of world peace and friendship, not in a negative or neutral sense but in a positive way. I do not like the word uncommitted. We know of course the meaning the word conveys. But we are very much committed - we are committed to the hilt to peace in a positive form, friendship amongst all nations and to the peace and prosperity and happiness of all mankind. We are committed quite as much as anyone else, perhaps even more so. As I said before, I do not like those two words, though they are of course used popularly. But still our policy is one in which we - Yugoslavia, ourselves, as well as a number of other countries do not believe that the best interests of peace can be served by belonging to one bloc or the other of the two great power blocs that are in existence today. Nor do we believe - as some people have spread rumour - in any effort to create a third bloc. For that would indeed be a contradiction. We who are opposed to power blocs have no intention whatsoever of creating a third power bloc or a third force, whatever you may like to call it: However, I am certain that the socalled uncommitted countries, in the policies that they follow, can serve a useful purpose in promoting peace and understanding amongst all, and perhaps of helping on occasion to bridge the gulf between the two great power blocs in the world today. We feel that there is a definite role for countries with a general pattern of foreign policy, as we possess, to play a useful, perhaps even an important, part in promoting those things in this troubled era, which we are all, in our different ways, striving to achieve.

* Source: The Foreign Policy of Ceylon (Extracts from Statements by the Late Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike), Colombo: The Government Press, 1963, PP 101 102.

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Document No. 8 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Policy of Non- Alignment (General Policy Statement in the United Nations)*
20 October 1957 Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon) : War today is inconceivable as an instrument of national policy. The weapons of destruction in human hands today are so terrible in their scope and power that world conflict can only mean the destruction of civilization. It is imperative, therefore, that the nations of the world, with their differing ideologies and systems of Government, should find a way of co-existing peacefully. We firmly believe that the principles of the Pancha Shila, if faithfully followed, provide such a path. They establish a firm basis for relationships between nations through mutual respect, non-violence and co-operation. Our policy of nonalignment is the logical outcome of our faith in the principles of the Pancha Shila. As a newly independent country, we are faced with the urgent task of transforming a colonial economy into a free economy. We have still a long way to go in order to assure our people of an adequate standard of living. This can best be done by devoting our energies to the constructive task of developing our economy than by frittering away our resources on armaments. We in Ceylon have been able to devote practically two thirds of our national budget to development programmes and social services because we have been successful in steering clear of heavy liabilities on armaments.

Document No. 9 Sri Lanka Delegate on Peaceful Co-existence (General Policy Statements in the United Nations)**
30 September 1958 Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): We have stated on earlier occasions that one of the major causes of tension in the world is the existence of power blocs. Unfortunately, this state of affairs continues unabated, thereby causing mutual suspicion and fear. This state of mind increases international tension and in turn accelerates the race for armaments. Today, we are witnessing the spectacle of mighty Powers allied with many other countries and armed with nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, ready for any eventuality.
* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 12th Session, 698th Pl. Mtg., Paras 95-96. ** Source : U.N.G.A.O.R. 13th Session. 764th Pl. Mtg. Paras 33-34.

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The delegation of Ceylon feels that if this vicious circle of suspicion, fear and preparations for war is to be arrested then steps should be taken to remove mutual suspicion and fear and to build up faith and confidence between nations. There is a lot of truth in the saying that the seeds of war are sown in the minds of men. One of the ways we can arrest this downward trend towards destruction is to abandon military blocs and to enter into treaties of non-aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of each country. The principles of peaceful co-existence to which I have already referred, if faithfully followed by all Powers and particularly by the big Powers, will greatly facilitate the taking of a step forward in creating an atmosphere of confidence and trust. The creation of this atmosphere will help considerably in the solution of all other problems that confront us. It will help also in dealing with the problem of disarmament. And if we succeed, large sums of money that we now waste in the manufacture of dreadful weapons of destruction could be usefully channeled in the economic development of countries, particularly the under-developed ones which are badly in need of capital and technical know-how. We feel that in the present state of world tension, uncommitted countries such as Ceylon and other smaller countries could play a vital part in bringing about better understanding between the two power blocs. This attitude of non-involvement in power bloc conflicts will not only enable us to judge issues that come up before this Assembly on their merits, but will also enable us to make positive suggestions, unhampered by any military bloc loyalties. It is our belief that this policy will help in the reduction of international tension and increase the area of peace.

Document No. 10 The Foreign Policy of the United National Party (Extract)*
1958 From the time Ceylon achieved independence and throughout the period in office of the United National Party, the foreign policy was one of friendship to all nations regardless of their internal political systems. As there are many who endeavour to present a different picture to the public, it is necessary to point out that Ceylon was one of the first Commonwealth countries which recognized Communist China and it was also a United National Party Government that broke new ground in trade relations with communist countries when the Rubber-Rice Agreement with China and other trade agreements with several other Communist countries were entered into. It was also the Unied National Party Government that took a leading part in the inauguration of the Colombo Plan, which has been of immense benefit to the peoples of South and South-

* Source: The Manifesto of the United National Party (UNP), 1958.

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East Asia, and in the summoning of the Colombo Powers Conference and the AfroAsian Conference held at Bandung, where all forms of Imperialism, Communist as well as Western, were condemned, and it was the Ceylon delegation on that occasion that took a leading part in this condemnation. However, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that friendship with all nations and a policy of neutrality do not mean the opening of the gates of this country to the subversive activities of foreign powers. We believe in the right of the people of this country alone to choose its own form of Government uninfluenced by such activities. The greatest threat that mankind faces today is its possible extinction caused by another major war on a hitherto unprecedented scale. This threat, caused by the division of the world into two camps through bitterness and suspicion, can only be lessened by following the paths of peace, such as discussions and conferences at international levels. The United Nations Organisation, in many instances, has served that purpose and strives to do so. We are happy to note that it was during the tenure of office of the United National Party that we gained admission to this body, and we have always during that time taken up an impartial and unprejudiced view on all questions coming up for discussion, but we deplore the recent tendency under the M.E.P. Government exemplified by its attitude on the Hungarian question, where the government obviously compelled our representative to take a course of action not in keeping with our previous reputation for integrity and impartiality.

Document No. 11 Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike on Non-Alignment (General Policy Statement in the United Nations)*
27 September, 1961 Mr. [F.R.D.] Bandaranaike (Ceylon): The battle for the minds of the uncommitted world has taken various new forms and has produced curious results. It has sometimes meant intervention - I am sorry to have to say it, but it has - in the internal affairs of those countries. There has been political subversion and attempts to influence forms of government, economic and social systems in one way or another and, in extreme instances, there have been attempts to intervene directly by military action. The examples of the Congo and Laos reflect the degree of disruption which has been brought into the lives of those nations with further accentuation of world tensions. Most of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America want to be free from cold war pressures. We would like to be left to work out our own destiny and our own forms

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 16th Session, 1017th Pl. Mtg., Paras. 129134.

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of social, economic and political life according to the action and inter-action of our own internal domestic forces. The reason for this attitude is not just a wish to be left in splendid isolation or to be removed from current world events. No, we want to be in a position to make direct contribution to the cause of world peace and to the building up of a world order for international security. We think this can only be ensured if the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America can be insulated from external ideological pressures and cold war tensions. These areas of the world do not want to be the cause of any accentuation of world conflict nor to become the battleground for it. It seems to me, therefore, that an ideological truce covering Asia, Africa and Latin America is vital. The basic principle in the relations of the great Powers to these countries must be non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs. For instance, military assistance to countries which need it for their internal security purposes should be given only through the United Nations. The widening ideological conflict makes it all the more imperative to implement the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples [Resolution 1514 (XV)] formulated during the last session. When actual arrangements are being made for the transfer of power to dependent countries, it is essential that metropolitan States should be placed under the obligation not to involve colonial territories in cold war arrangements by, for example, the retention of military bases. We do appreciate that the success or failure of one ideology or another is a matter of paramount concern to one or other of the Great Powers. But it must be realized, and the Great Powers must act in the realization that the conflict must take peaceful forms. If any country, by virtue of purely indigenous development, were to choose one ideological form of government in preference to another, the choice must rest with that country; and it is a choice which must be respected and with which all nations must learn to live.

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Document No. 12 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike on Sri Lankas Non-aligned Foreign Policy*
23 January 1964 To say that we are non-aligned is no more than a way of saying that Ceylon does not propose to align itself with power blocs whether of the Western world or of the Socialist world. In a situation of cold war between the N.A.T.O. Pact countries on the one hand and the Warsaw Pact countries on the other, the word non-alignment had a special meaning for us; that is to say, we did not propose to assume attitudes favourable to one side or the other, but would adopt an independent course of action regardless of such military alliances. There are many other countries like Ceylon which have been and are non-aligned in that sense. Some of these countries agree among themselves in regard to some questions of foreign policy; while some countries do not agree among themselves on a number of other important questions of foreign policy. Non-alignment, therefore, does not become a concept of a third force in international politics. It merely means that each country that is non-aligned adopts independent judgements on foreign policy without being tied to the ideas or ideologies of opposing military power blocs. Non-aligned nations do not necessarily stand together on any given question. They are not even non-aligned as regards one another, or in relation to any particular dispute. This became very evident, for instance, at the Belgrade Conference which I attended in August 1961. Many of you must be aware that it was mutually agreed by the group of nations that assembled there that specific questions relating to particular disputes that existed then in the framework of world affairs would be excluded from the discussion. Indonesia agreed not to raise the question of West Irian. India refrained from raising any question about Kashmir. Yemen refrained from raising any question about the protectorate of Aden, and Burma indeed objected to the raising of questions pertaining to the Palestinian refugees from Israel. The Conference instead concerned itself only with general questions affecting cold war politics, such as problems of general and complete disarmament, the conclusion of Nuclear Test Ban Treaties and the easing of cold war tensions in particular areas such as Berlin and Laos.

* Source : Hansard (Senate), Vol. 19, 1964, cols. 2391-2396

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This attitude was taken up at Belgrade because every country recognized that nonalignment did not constitute a third force in international politics. Each of the countries at that conference table may have had its own views in regard to particular international disputes or questions, and it was generally accepted that merely because all these countries were non-aligned, it did not mean that they had to accept common attitudes in regard to particular questions. On general questions, however, particularly those relating to the Cold War, directly or indirectly, such as for example the relaxation of cold war tensions, colonialism and apartheid, it was possible for general principles to be formulated, as indeed they were, in the final communiqus issued at that Conference. The fact that Ceylon is a nonaligned country in the sense in which I have already described, it does not mean that Ceylon has no attitudes on particular international questions or that it is not willing to associate itself with other neighbouring and friendly countries in the pursuit of its own independent foreign policy. . . . It has never been the view of our Government that non-alignment is a substitute for regional international co-operation or the association of neighbouring countries, newly emerging from the yoke of colonialism to express themselves forcefully and fully. In this sense, many other Afro-Asian countries adopt the same attitude. . . . Therefore, although some Senators seem to see an apparent conflict between Ceylons participation in a conference of non-aligned nations, and in her possible participation in a conference of Afro-Asian States, so far as the Government is concerned, there is no conflict at all because each type of conference has a different purpose and objective. If, at this time, a conference of non-aligned nations was summoned, as President Nasser and I had suggested during the course of my recent visit to Cairo, that conference will not really be in a position to take up specific international disputes. It will rather concern itself with the further progress of the disarmament process and the elimination of colonialism in all its forms and furtherance of world peace. While such general questions are important, it is also necessary that Ceylon should participate as fully as possible in any conference that may be convened region-wise, of Afro-asian or Asian states, so as to help in the settlement of particular disputes. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia has already proved the value of his intervention by bringing about a cease-fire between Morocco and Algeria, and yet, hon. Senators will recall, Emperor Haile Selassies nation, Ethiopia, participated in the Belgrade conference of non-aligned nations. This is surely not inconsistent with the stand of non-alignment just as Ceylons intervention between China and India, along with five other nations, was not inconsistent with the stand of non-alignment that Ceylon has always taken. I have so far tried to point out to hon. Senators that non-alignment must not be confused with other concepts and that in pursuit of its independent foreign policy non-alignment must not be mistaken for an isolationist attitude which would be the

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very negation of having a foreign policy at all. But if, after independent evaluation of the situation, we decide that the path of justice, of truth, and what conduces to peace, and which is ultimately in our own national interest, is to throw our moral weight on one side instead of the other, we would not hesitate to do so and we would use the Councils of the world for that purpose. Underlying the policy of non-alignment is the belief that independent nations, although small and militarily weak, have a positive role to play in the world today. This attitude is completely different from that of washing our hands off these matters, which was perhaps the idea behind the classical theory of neutralism. That was noninvolvement - remaining in splendid isolation. There is, as hon. Senators would agree, a world of difference between this and non-alignment. Non-alignment for Ceylon does not mean that we must adopt the attitude of saying that we have no attitude to anything or that we decline to regard ourselves as a part of the international community of nations. Surely, the very membership of the United Nations makes it vitally necessary that Ceylon regards herself as part of the international community; and we will not be fulfilling our responsibilities if we refuse to express attitudes on particular international questions and seek to help in their resolution either through our contributions at the United Nations or by participation in regional conferences. If this position is clearly understood, then it will be seen that Ceylon has had but one line of foreign policy since 1956. It is a policy adopted in the first instance by the late Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. He established diplomatic relations with countries, irrespective of their ideologies or military alliances. He remained non-aligned amidst the tensions of the cold war. . . .

Document No. 13 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Speech at the First Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Belgrade, 1961*
3 September 1961 Mr. Chairman and friends: I consider it a great honour to represent my country at this Conference which could prove to be of historic significance in the cause of world peace. I am happy to attend this great assembly not only as a representative of my country but also as a woman and a mother who can understand the thoughts and feelings of those millions of women, the mothers of this world, who are deeply concerned with

* Source: Ceylon Today, Vol X (No. 9), September 1961, PP. 1-9.

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the preservation of the human race. I am also happy that we have chosen to hold the Conference in this beautiful city of Belgrade not only because of the warmth and hospitality of the Yugoslav people of which there is so much evidence but also because in holding it in a European city we have demonstrated to the world that the ideals and hopes which we all share are not confined to a continent or region but reflect an awareness on the part of human beings, wherever they may be, of the urgent need for international peace and security. We in Ceylon count ourselves fortunate that the people of our land were spared the horrors of two world wars and that we were able to throw off the shackles of colonial power without strife or bloodshed. But it was not until eight years after the attainment of independence, when my late husband was elected Prime Minister that the foreign bases were taken over and a definite and positive policy of non-alignment with power blocs adopted in foreign affairs. The experience of many countries represented around this conference table has not been so fortunate. Some countries, like Yugoslavia, have had to see their homelands made into battle-grounds; others, like Cuba and Algeria, have had to sacrifice their sons and daughters in order to be free; and some others, like Tunisia, are yet striving to exercise sovereign power over the bases situated within their territory. This conference at Belgrade has not been convened, however, for the consideration of specific problems peculiar to individual nations; we are gathered here in the firm belief that the positive policy of non-alignment with power blocs followed by each of our several countries and that our common dedication to the cause of peace and peaceful coexistence has given us the right to raise our voices in common decisions and declarations in a world divided into power blocs and moving rapidly towards the brink of a nuclear war. Many of the Heads of States and Heads of Governments who addressed this Conference in the plenary session have emphasized the point that our group of nations do not propose to become a third bloc or a third force. None of us can really disagree with that view, for that would be inconsistent with the very idea of non-alignment. But it is important to remember that in our anxiety to avoid becoming a third force we must not allow our spirit of unity and purpose which has been so evident at this conference to disintegrate and fall apart. We should endeavour to maximize the influence of nonaligned thinking in world affairs. We cannot, in my view, rely on the haphazard form of consultation which we have employed in the past. We are meeting in challenging circumstances and in a critical hour in the worlds history. We must adapt our procedures to meet that challenge. I would therefore suggest that some method should be devised by this conference to enable our individual countries to ascertain the maximum area of agreement among ourselves, without the need of a formal conference of Heads of States and Heads of Governments. I am sure that this conference does not wish to pass moral judgments on the policies of nations. We do not profess to be the guardians of international morality. Nor do we consider that our position of non-alignment makes us in any way morally superior to other nations in the international community.

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We believe that the ideals which have drawn us together will continue to inspire our thinking on international problems. We must recognize, however, that national policy is seldom divorced from national interest and that it is in the nature of international politics that competitive interests should arise. It would be unreal for us to believe that such conflicts of interest can be resolved by any appeal to principle alone. It would be equally unreal, and indeed positively dangerous, to allow these conflicts to remain unresolved. It is in this spirit that I would like to express our thoughts on some of the problems which confront us. None of the countries of the world, big or small, rich or poor, can afford to look with indifference at the increasing international tension and at the steady deterioration in mutual trust and understanding among the committed nations of the world, particularly the Big Powers. The present crisis in Berlin must be reviewed not as a separate question but as part of the larger problem of a divided Germany and against the background of the failure of the Great Powers to agree on a firm peace settlement for that country. The tensions which have grown in various parts of the world in recent years can be traced to the clash of interest between the two power blocs. Nowhere is this clash more pronounced than over Germany. Here, we have the case of two governments, each of them committed to opposing military alliances, each of them dependent upon the policies pursued by their stronger allies. Is there no way of bridging the gulf between the two German States and of reconciling the interests of the two blocs which have created this division ? In my view, this problem will not be solved if the governments concerned continue to insist on legal arguments of a technical kind. We have our own views on the legal status of the respective German Governments. We may hold differing opinions on whether the right of the Western Powers to have their forces in what has since become West Berlin gives with it also the right of access to their respective sectors. But we do not propose to air them here. A discussion of legal aspects will not, in our view, contribute towards a solution. The fact remains that the German problem is one of the legacies of the last war, and the earlier this question is resolved of uniting the two sections, the better it will be for peace and understanding among nations. We regret to note, however, that no satisfactory solution acceptable to all the parties concerned has yet been found. Fears and prejudices, some real and others imaginary, have stood in the way of a solution. A spirit of compromise and conciliation should therefore be adopted by the parties directly concerned in order to arrive at a settlement of this question. We believe that the situation in Germany today should not be regarded as a testing-ground for courage and will in the military sense, but as a practical challenge to the politics and strength of the forces of universal progress and of total peace. It is our view that as a first step towards creating international confidence the great powers should firmly resolve and make it known to the world that they will not resort to military engagements and will depend solely on peaceful negotiations to arrive at a

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solution. The great powers must also agree to the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from their respective sectors in Germany and to the demilitarization of Germany. The great powers must immediately get down to the task of re-opening direct EastWest negotiations designed to achieve a final settlement by peaceful means. For the success of such negotiations it would be essential for the two Germanies to participate in the discussions, since the future of Germany must be determined not in accordance with the cold war strategy to suit either of the great powers but in order to establish a unified state, insulated as far as possible from the cold war and unaligned with either of the existing power blocs. No lasting solution of the German problem can be found on the basis of unilateral abrogation of rights and obligations. Likewise, a rigid attachment to positions formulated by mere legal technicalities cannot pave the way towards an abiding settlement. The great powers must recognize that whatever rights and obligations they hold must be regarded as capable of modification in the face of existing realities. We feel that a settlement on these lines would permit the reunification of Germany on conditions acceptable not only to the German people but also to those countries who, with good reason, have cause to fear a revival of German militarism. The world has been devastated by two major wars in the first half of this century and we cannot allow a third one to destroy mankind and all that we cherish in our civilization. A satisfactory solution must be found. That solution must reconcile the conflicting interests of the various nations concerned if we are to move away from tensions and war towards a lasting and abiding peace. Ceylon has consistently advocated the eradication of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. We share the view expressed at this Conference that colonialism is morally unjust and politically out of date. Though many of the countries of Asia and Africa have emerged as full-fledged sovereign states in the past, nonetheless, a few colonial powers today doggedly cling to their colonial positions on various pretexts, claiming peaceful motives but in practice resorting to rough and ruthless methods to retain them. The refusal of these powers to read the writing on the wall only causes human suffering and creates bitterness and hatred - a state of affairs which is not conducive to peaceful co-existence and which constitutes a threat to peace. The United Nations General Assembly at its fifteenth session made a significant declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. That resolution called for immediate action to be taken to end the colonial issue in all dependent territories but did not specify a date line. One of the matters which this conference may have to consider will be the desirability of translating that resolution into practical terms. Disarmament is a crucial question of our times. An early settlement of this question will be of paramount importance in building confidence among nations and in decreasing the dangers of war. It would also be an important milestone in the improvement of relations between nations and would mark the end of two power blocs with all this portends for the future peace and security of the world. Vast sums of money that are

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expended in manufacturing these weapons of destruction could usefully be spent on economic and social development in various countries of the world. Unfortunately, no tangible results have followed. The mutual fear and suspicion of the powers concerned have prevented even a start being made in disarmament. We accept the need for an immediate treaty for general and complete disarmament, and this should be achieved in rapid stages. Every stage or phase should be established by having an effective method of inspection and control over its operation and maintenance. In this connection I would commend to this Conference the statement on disarmament referred to in the final communiqu of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference held in March of this year. Cyprus, Ghana and India together with Ceylon, who are represented at this conference, were parties to this statement. We felt at that time that an effective international agreement could be concluded on the lines indicated in that statement. The Commonwealth Premiers statement on disarmament urged the reopening of disarmament negotiations, at the earliest possible moment with the aim of completely eliminating all means of waging war. This document was later circulated to other members of the United Nations for their information. Unfortunately, disarmament negotiations regarding both nuclear tests and general disarmament, have come to a standstill, and what is worse, nuclear tests have been resumed by the Soviet Union. As countries having a vested interest in peace we should make an immediate appeal to the big powers to resume negotiations with a view to the achievement of complete and general disarmament. In my view, it would help these negotiations if a certain number of the non-aligned countries are also included in the Disarmament Commission. This Conference of non-aligned states does not in any way act contrary to the aims and objectives for which the United Nations stands. On the contrary, this Conference supports and supplements the work of the United Nations. Since the founding of this organization the membership of this body has considerably increased. Most of the new members have come from the Asian-African group, and they generally follow the policy of non-alignment. This change in the composition of this organization has taken away the prestige and influence wielded by the West European group, and consequently there is a threat among certain members to undermine its authority. This attempt should be checked. The United Nations stands for the maintenance of international peace and security and it is in the interest of all concerned, particularly the small countries, to maintain and strengthen this organization. We would prefer basic changes in the Charter in order to strengthen this organisation, but disagreement among the big powers makes this difficult. The failure to seat the representative of the Peoples Republic of China has contributed to this impasse. It is our earnest hope that wise counsels will prevail and that China will take her legitimate seat in the United Nations. The office of the Secretary-General has in recent times come in for much criticism, and a new proposal has been made by the Soviet Union to change the office of the SecretaryGeneral into a triumvirate of three persons having the same power and the right of veto.

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An alternative suggestion has been the appointment of three deputies on a similar basis. We do not conform to either viewpoint in spite of the mistakes made by the Secretary-General over the Congo situation last year. On the contrary, we feel that the Secretary-General should retain sole executive authority for carrying out the directives of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the other bodies of the United Nations. We also feel that the office and authority of the Secretary-General should be upheld and strengthened, and one of the positive ways to achieve this would be to reorganise the Security Council in such a way as to enable it to give clear directives to the Secretary-General. The composition of the Security Council and the other institutions of the United Nations does not adequately reflect the present membership of the United Nations. When a satisfactory solution is reached as regards the representation of the Peoples Republic of China we feel a reallocation of seats could be made in those bodies so that greater representation might be given to the Asian - African group. The existence of an economic imbalance and the problems of unequal economic development assume considerable significance in our exchange of views on the international situation. It is not a coincidence that the majority of the under-developed nations believe in a policy of non-alignment. They are only too aware of the enormous tasks which confront them in the economic field and the need to devote their slender resources to the fulfillment of these tasks. They also realize that the tension which exists between ideological blocs can be traced directly to the existence of economic imbalance. As long as there exists a gulf between the developed and the underdeveloped countries the possibilities of tension are immense. This tension is highlighted by the enormous resources which the more developed countries allocate to military expenditure. Conversely, if this tension could be reduced the resultant saving could be diverted to economic aid for the underdeveloped countries. In most of the countries represented here there has been some acceleration in the process of development. In many cases, however, this acceleration does not keep pace with the increase in population, and even if it did, it could not match the rate of growth obtained in the more developed nations of the world. I need hardly say that what is required is that the process of equalization should be hastened. It would of course be absurd to suggest that the developed countries should slow down or even reverse their development. The alternative would therefore lie in the acceleration of the rate of growth of the underdeveloped countries. Increasing economic and political contacts between the peoples of the world make comparisons inevitable, and in the result a note of frustration has been introduced into the revolution of rising expectations. Of course, the solution to this problem lies primarily with the under-developed countries. We need to increase our productive capacity, widen our investment opportunities and plan our economic development. These tasks command our full attention but we need the assistance of the more developed countries. That assistance has been forthcoming but if it is to reduce the economic imbalance which exists today, it must be on a considerably wider scale. Fortunately, there is an increasing awareness

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of the urgency of this problem in the more enlightened countries, and this Conference would do well to consider what more we can do to widen the area of understanding. I have very nearly finished what I have to say on the subjects of this Conference, but before I conclude I should like to express my firm conviction that there is no single country in the world at this moment that looks forward to the prospects of war without dismay. I do not for one moment believe that there is a single mother in the world who could bear to contemplate the possible danger of her children being exposed to atomic radiation and a slow and lingering death, if not swift annihilation. The statesmen of the great powers, who have been placed in positions of trust and authority by millions of ordinary people who do not want war, have no right to assume that they have a mandate to precipitate a nuclear war and immense destructive power either to defend a way of life or to extend a political ideology. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sabre-rattling was sometimes an expensive political game for the bigger countries. Today, when a major conflict could be started off by accident or hysteria, the consequences of sabre-rattling could be disastrous. We talk of peaceful co-existence, but what kind of co-existence is possible between countries which maintain a battery of intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed prominently at one another ? The whole basis of peaceful co-existence depends on the premise that inconsistent ideologies in the modern world do no require an armoury for their survival. We do not expect, nor have we any right to expect, that in the short space of five or six days we shall succeed in solving all the world problems, but we are here in Belgrade because it is our firm conviction that the non-aligned nations have a positive contribution to make in the cause of peace. If I may attempt to assess the contribution that the nonaligned countries can make at this time, I would say that our endeavour should be to influence world opinion to such an extent that governments, however powerful, cannot regard warfare as an alternative to negotiation. Too much is at stake today to allow us the luxury of considerations of prestige and honour. When human life is involved all else is secondary. Let us in our deliberations make this clear in no uncertain terms.

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Document No. 14 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on the Outcome of the South-East Asian Prime Ministers Conference held in Ceylon in 1954 (On the Issue of the Hydrogen Bomb)*
May 1954 On the subject of the hydrogen bomb, the Prime Ministers expressed the view that, until such time a political settlement can be worked out to regulate and control the development of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, no further test explosion should take place. Apart from various reports in the press, little authoritative information is available to the public of the disastrous effects of these nuclear weapons. The Prime Ministers, therefore, decided to call upon the powers principally concerned, viz. the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, to take steps to publish such information. They felt that a great realization on the part of mankind of the effects of these weapons would awaken in them a firmer determination to condemn and prevent the use of such weapons in time of war.

Document No. 15 Disarmament: The Views of the Sri Lanka Delegate at the First Committee, U.N. General Assembly**
16 October 1958 Mr.[T.B.] Subasinghe (Ceylon) said that the problem of disarmament grew graver with every day that passed. The armaments race was accompanied by the establishment of military bases all over the world and the conclusion of regional pacts which tended to increase tension in the regions concerned. Morever, the economic policies of the contending parties towards the countries in those regions had in no small measure been influenced by strategic considerations. . . . Countries which had only recently attained their independence were somewhat anxious in the face of those developments, for all countries, whether large or small, had a right to protest against policies which endangered their very existence.

* Source : Hansard (HR), 1954, vol. 17, Col. 523-524. ** Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 13th Session, First Committee (Summary Records), 950th Mtg., October 16, 1958, Paras. 1521.

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The question of disarmament was obviously extremely complex, but, in the opinion of his delegation it would be unwise to concentrate on the technical aspect while postponing the political aspect to a later stage. The technical agreement reached by the Geneva Conference of Experts would have no effect unless the countries concerned took the political decision to cease atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. It should not be forgotten that the obstacles which had prevented the achievement of disarmament after two world wars were political and not technical. That view was strengthened by the experience of disarmament negotiations in recent years. Technical and political discussions should accordingly proceed paripassu. His delegation thought that it would be impossible to embody in one resolution all that the Assembly would wish to recommend on disarmament. It would be better for the Assembly to adopt a resolution on each of the questions which had been brought up. Although disarmament in all its stages was a connected whole, it could only be considered in stages. The first stage of disarmament must be the banning of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons tests. That was why Ceylon, with twelve other countries, had sponsored a draft resolution on that question [A/C.1/L.202/Rev. and Add.1]. Although attempts had been made to minimize the dangers arising from those tests, the peoples of the world had not been deceived, and persisted in their demand that the tests should be banned. Moreover, scientists had admitted that ionizing radiation had already affected vegetation, animal life and, or course, human life itself. The members of the United Nations, representing mankind, had a duty to call upon the countries concerned to cease their tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons apart from any other consideration. The stocks of those weapons which would in any case have to be destroyed if total disarmament was to be achieved, were already too large. As countries could not be expected to pursue a policy of unilateral disarmament, balanced disarmament was the practical approach. His delegation was of the opinion that the realization of one stage of disarmament did not have to depend on the possibility of realizing all the later stages. It also believed that because of unchangeable geographical and political factors, a perfect balance in disarmament was impossible. For instance, if one party insisted on maintaining a ring of bases around the territory of the other party in the name of balanced disarmament, it would not be possible to obtain agreement. An attempt must accordingly be made to reach agreement while maintaining the most perfect balance possible. His delegation did not believe in the deterrent effect of atomic weapons. The factor which was preventing a war was the overwhelming desire of mankind for peace. Disarmament should accordingly be instituted without delay, beginning with the immediate banning of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. Simultaneously with disarmament discussions, talks at the highest level should take place with a view to finding political solutions to the many issues that caused tension and motivated the armaments race. His delegation was convinced that the United Nations should play a leading role in that regard.

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It also thought that the United Nations body entrusted with that responsibility should have equal representation for the various political trends existing in the United Nations. It should not be forgotten that disarmament was not a matter which concerned the parties in the armaments race alone. The group of countries which were not aligned with either side could also make a substantial contribution and should accordingly be better represented in the discussions on disarmament.

Document No. 16 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Issue of Disarmament (General Policy Statement in the United Nations)*
5 October 1959 Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): He would be a brave man who would deny that the most pressing international problem to which we have to find a solution is that of disarmament. The President of this Assembly, in his remarks at the very commencement of this session [795th meeting], prayed that this Assembly may come to be known in the future as the Assembly of Peace, implying thereby the hope that before we conclude our deliberations under his able guidance, we would have taken the first step towards agreement on the reduction and control of armaments. The delegation of Ceylon echoes that hope, and we pray with him that it may indeed be so. . . . The armaments race between Great Powers is fraught with peril at any time, but the danger is considerably heightened when such a race takes place in the tense international atmosphere which we have commonly come to call the cold war. With the terrific destructive capacity which science has enabled man to possess, the results of war can be restricted neither in space nor in time. The scientists of the world say with one voice that it is not only our own generation that will be exposed to death and suffering, but that a generation still to be born is under a similar threat. That more than one million persons will die and one and a quarter million abnormal children will be born as a result of radioactive fallout from nuclear bombs already exploded is the considered opinion of five prominent American, Japanese and French scientists, expressed in a memorandum submitted by them to the French Academy of Science. Comment on this appears to be superfluous. Here is a moral consideration which was absent from the questions of war and peace in the past. For the first time, perhaps, in recorded history, we have a cold war situation in which two Powers are sitting on unparalleled means of destruction.

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R. 14th Session, 821st Pl. Mtg., Paras 133-135.

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It is in this context that the fourteenth session of the General Assembly has met and it would be tragic if we failed to consider sincerely all disarmament proposals and endeavour to indicate a way to put them into practice by the adoption of a reasonable scheme of implementation, generally acceptable . . . . It is somewhat astonishing that there appear to be people, at this time, who dislike the emergence of a conciliatory and more friendly feeling between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on the theory that it would lead to a weakening of the defensive arrangements made by the Western Powers and that it would make these Powers let down their guard. Obviously, nothing could be more foolish or more dangerous than such specious arguments. It will not be expected that the mere relaxation of tension and the beginning of better understanding could lead to unilateral disarmament or reduction of the strength of defensive armaments on the part of either side. Disarmament, as I said before, must be a matter of multilateral agreement, acceptable to all and certainly acceptable to the great Powers under reasonable conditions of control and effective supervision. Even if a disarmament agreement is not reached, which God forbid, improved international relations will reduce frictions and prevent, at any rate for some time, any major conflict. Therefore, it is the imperative duty of all men of goodwill and certainly of the Member States of our Organization, to do everything possible to promote and foster the growth of better understanding among nations and especially among the great Powers. This is surely not the time to talk of increasing armaments, as some people seem to be doing at the present time, even if such increase is suggested to increase defensive strength. . . .

Document No.17 Disarmament: General Policy Statement in the United Nations*

12 October 1960 Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): Finally, I come to the question of disarmament. This is today the most vital and most important mater this Assembly has before it. On its solution hangs the fate of the world. The tragedy of the arms race that is going on is that either it will disrupt severely the economy of countries which have entered the race or lead to a clash which could result in the destruction of the world. The arms race is mans most colossal folly. It is an absurd monstrosity. We hope, therefore, that sanity will return and enable us to see the danger in time so that we may take such measures as we can to avert a catastrophe.

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 15th Session, 901st Pl. Mtg.

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History has a habit of repeating itself. We should therefore learn the lessons which history has to teach. If we ignore them, we do so at our peril. One is alarmed at the leisurely and almost indifferent way in which we stand at the threshold of the most horrible danger that faces mankind. It would seem that when disarmament is the subject, there is no hurry. Since the failure of the London talks on disarmament in 1957, nothing has been done, except to accelerate the pace of arming, until August 1959, when it was decided to establish a new disarmament committee; but the first meeting of this committee did not take place until March 1960, only to break up, without any solution, in a few months. Obviously, the most important task confronting us is to find the means to halt the arms race and to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war. This cannot, or course, be done by unilateral action. The nations of the whole world, and especially the nuclear Powers, must make a superhuman effort to reach agreement as soon as possible. Let us not wait until the house has burnt down to become interested in adequate fire protection. In our country, we have an old saying which we might well take to heart. It runs like this: Dont repair the leaks in your roof when it begins to rain. I think that there is a good lesson in that saying. History teaches us that wars happen with uncomfortable regularity. Knowing how the arms race led to the first World War in 1914, we should see that, if we continue do drift along as we are now doing, another major war - and this time a nuclear war will be a certainty, with consequences so terrible that one shudders even to think of them. . . .

Document No.18 Disarmament: Address by Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike (Minister of Finance & Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence & External Affairs) in UN General Assembly*
27 September 1961 Mr. [F.R.D]. Bandaranaike (Ceylon): Then, there is the question of disarmament. The hopes which we had that the Ten-Nation Committee would reach some affirmative decisions on disarmament have been disappointed. But it is heartening to feel that the great powers do realize the need to persevere, for on the success of negotiations on disarmament depend all hopes of world peace. However much we may seek ideological conflicts within bounds and seek to minimize tensions in given areas of the world, world peace will remain insecure as long as the world is possessed of weapons and the armaments race continues.

* Source : U.N.G.A.O. R., 16 th Session, 1017th Pl. Mtg., Paras 167 174.

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Our consistent view has been that there should be general and complete disarmament, and that the objective of negotiations should be to achieve an agreement on general and complete disarmament. This is a radical and not a pragmatic or partial concept. The compelling argument for it is not just the negative fear of a future war, with all that it means for mankind, but the positive and affirmative need for a secure world basis for peace for the evolving international community of States. It is no more our purpose, on the old theory of the balance of power, to provide for the security of one group of Powers as against another. What we urgently require is an international order of security for our international community of States, an order which would enable all nations, large or small, to find security and resolve differences by peaceful means. Disarmament is a compelling issue for all of us; it is not the concern of only the great Powers and of militarily significant states. As I have said before, disarmament must proceed side by side and step by step with the construction of a world order which would provide for security in a disarmed world. We, the small nations, have an abiding concern in the construction of this order and want to be associated from the outset with its formulation. We are very happy indeed that the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to agree on the general principles which are to form the basis of negotiations on disarmament [see A/4879]. We are particularly happy that the agreement was reached in consonance with the concept of general and complete disarmament, and that in this the great Powers have heeded the General Assemblys resolution [1378 (XIV] on this subject and the desire of peoples everywhere to be freed for ever from the dreaded prospect of war and conflict. . . . My Prime Minister has asked me to suggest to the Assembly that future negotiations between the great Powers should be joined by representatives of non-aligned countries. Non-aligned countries do represent a significant point of view, although perhaps they lack the cohesion of a bloc of countries committed to a particular ideology. Fundamentally, what we the non-aligned countries, have in common is that we are outside the cold war and want to remain outside. The non-aligned countries reject the contradictions and assumptions of the cold war. They are committed by their very policies to an unfettered exercise of judgement on the basic issues which confront the world within the framework of the realities. This should not be unacceptable to either side since the non-aligned countries are pre-eminently in a position to exercise a salutary influence on the course of negotiations. We should therefore propose that the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament be expanded to include a number of non aligned states. We do not really think that the enlargement of that Committee should be on a population or geographical basis. The only merit in such a proposal would be the purely formal one of increasing the representation of the Committee. We, the nonaligned nations, want to be able to affect the argument , and this can be done effectively only by associating non-aligned countries with the ten nations.

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It is our firm conviction that atmospheric and underground nuclear tests should be immediately abandoned. We appreciate the fact that nuclear testing cannot be viewed in isolation from the many inter-related and complicating factors which are causing world tension, but the tests must cease, if only because they cause international tension, prejudice the health of mankind and affect even the kindliness of our human environment. Such a situation cannot be allowed to continue, and no cold war argument, however inevitable the situation may appear within the framework of that war, can justify its continuance. We do not think that a treaty on nuclear tests is of immediate importance. For three years man has been able to live free from these menacing blasts on the basis of a voluntary moratorium. Do we really need to wait for a treaty ? It may even turn out to be unnecessary if there is agreement on total disarmament: but what we do need meanwhile is a moratorium. This must be immediately restored.

Document No. 19 Sri Lankas Reaction to the Explosion of a Nuclear Device by the U.S. (Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Message to the U.S. President)*
30 April 1962 I have read with great disappointment of the explosion by the United States on the 26th April of the first nuclear device in its new series of atmospheric tests. Coming at a time when there is a universal demand for the outlawing of these tests and when the hopes of the world are centred on the current negotiations in Geneva, the resumption of these tests is a grave setback to peace and brings mankind once again to the brink of nuclear destruction. The neutralist nations like Ceylon who are dedicated to the cause of disarmament and the banning of nuclear tests are shocked at this disregard of their earnest wishes. Mankind will now face the future with dread because we do not know what cumulative effects these tests will have on the atmosphere. I earnestly request your personal intervention even at this stage to stop these tests. Reply from the U.S. President John F. Kennedy: I appreciate the concern expressed in your message of April thirtieth. My decision to order a resumption of tests in the atmosphere was not an easy one, but three fruitless years of negotiations and the effect of Soviet atmospheric tests on the defence and security of the United States and the entire Free World provided no alternative. The present United States tests series can be brought to an end by the signature and implementation of an effectively monitored agreement. I hope the efforts now being made at Geneva to achieve such an agreement will receive the thoughtful support of Ceylon.
* Source: Ceylon Today, Vol. XI, No. 6, June 1962, pp. 30 - 31

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If the Soviet Union finds it impossible to accept the modest verification requirements for a nuclear test agreement, then the possibilities for progress in disarmament appear gloomy. I recall that you said in your speech at the Belgrade Conference last September that every stage and phase of disarmament should be established by having an effective method of inspection and control over its operation and maintenance. Although there may be some difference between us as to what constitutes effective inspection and control, I am heartened that we seem not to differ over the need for it.

Document No. 20 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Conversion of Arms Expenditure for Peaceful Purposes (General Policy Statement in the United Nations)*
27 September 1962 Mr. [G.P.] Malalasekera (Ceylon): Finally, there is the question of disarmament. Here too, we have unanimity at least on basic principles and even on diagnosis. It is interesting to note that in each of the major statements made before this Assembly, by the United States and the Soviet Union, we have a leitmotif which stresses that the current runaway arms race is folly and madness, and yet the solution appears to evade these two great countries. In this effort the ordinary resolutions of the past, enunciating and re-enunciating already accepted principles on disarmament, will fall short of what is needed. There is, in fact, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Howard Green, stated, little left for this Assembly to do than to admonish, with some prodding, the Committee of Eighteen in Geneva to continue its deliberations. But I suspect that the wise Minister of Canada had some doubt in his own mind about leaving it entirely to the negotiators, and it is probably for this reason that he added : This Assembly should bring to bear the full force of world opinion to ensure more rapid progress in disarmament. [1130th meeting, para 61]. In this connexion, my delegation feels that the proposed Soviet declaration [A/5233] on the conversion of arms expenditure to peaceful purposes commands considerable merit. The economics of siphoning such savings for reconstruction are not new and were first proposed by the late representative of India, Sir Benggal Rao. But the grand dimensions in which it is now formulated are new and carry great impact within the context of the current picture in the arms situation. The proposal commands attention

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 17th Session, 1135th Pl. Mtg. , Paras 121-124.

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because it states the re-conversion of military to civilian uses, not in mere negative terms, but in positive terms of realizable achievements. It is basically sound because it is built on the findings of the United Nations Committee on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament, which was itself the outcome of the initiative of the Pakistani delegation, be it said to its glory. Not only does it appeal to the depressed masses of the world, but it also allays the fears of those millions of workers whose livelihood , civilian and military is so closely tied to the world productive forces which now, alas, are too closely harnessed to engines of destruction. It can, therefore, be a psychological break-through of the greatest impact at this auspicious juncture of events and, in the light of the unanimous approval the proposal received at the 150th meeting of the General Committee only yesterday, my delegation would express the hope that the Soviet delegation would invite all great industrial and military Powers to cosponsor this declaration so that it might completely escape the taint of propaganda and become a document worthy of unanimous acclaim by this Assembly.

Document No. 21 Sri Lankas Response to the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of 1963*
Statement of 27th July, 1963 The following is the text of a statement issued by Honble Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon, regarding the initialing of a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by the three powers in Moscow: On behalf of the Government and the people of Ceylon, I welcome the news that Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States have initialed a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, following the recent tripartite talks in Moscow. This is indeed an important first step on the road to world peace. We sincerely hope that the Treaty will soon be signed and ratified by the respective governments. Although the present Treaty does not cover all underground tests, what is heartening is that three great powers have found it possible to reach common understanding on a vital issue that has so far confronted mankinds progress. If the present Treaty, as we genuinely hope, could lead to a total ban on nuclear tests, it would indeed be hailed as the most significant act of peace since the second world war. Ceylon hopes that the present achievement of the three powers will usher a new era of international confidence and pave the way for even greater achievements towards general and complete disarmament.

* Source : Hansard (HR), Vol. 53, August 30, 1963 , Cols. 1167-1168.

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Statement of 21st August 1963 The Government of Ceylon has decided today to sign the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Heads of Ceylon Missions in London, Moscow and Washington have been sent instructions today to sign the Treaty. The full text of a statement issued by the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs on the signing of the Test Ban Treaty is reproduced below : The Government of Ceylon has decided today to sign the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under-water. Ceylons attitude to the banning of nuclear weapons and to the question of complete and general disarmament has been stated in the United Nations, at the Belgrade Conference in 1961 and at the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in 1961 and 1962. Ceylons position has always been that it would be satisfied only with an agreement on total disarmament. However, the Government of Ceylon feels that the present Treaty is an important first step to the ultimate wider goal, since it creates the psychological climate necessary for a wider agreement. Consistent with its stand on this issue, therefore, the government of Ceylon in its statement of 27th July 1963, welcomed the Treaty as a first step which could lead to a total ban on nuclear weapon tests and pave the way for even greater achievements towards general and complete disarmament. The Government of Ceylon feels, however, that in excepting nuclear weapon tests underground from the immediate operation of this treaty, the present Treaty does not go far enough. While signing the Treaty, therefore, the Government of Ceylon urges the original parties to the Treaty to abandon underground explosions as well, and also urges all Governments to work to achieve this end and for a Treaty on total disarmament. The Ceylon Missions in London, Moscow and Washington have been asked to give publicity to this statement.

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Document No. 22 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Statement in the Senate on the Ban on Entry into Sri Lanka Airports, Seaports and Territorial Waters of Naval Vessels and Aircraft carrying Nuclear Weapons*
23 January 1964 The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty marked a significant step forward in the relaxation of international tensions and the Government of Ceylon has subscribed to that Treaty with the hope that it will be a first step towards further developing the dtente between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Our government will continue to support every constructive effort to achieve these ends in every possible way in future. It is difficult at this time to state clearly what further steps will be possible in the immediate future. But it may be possible that treaties towards the renunciation of force or the establishment of atom-free regions will be negotiated in the days to come, and I should like to assure hon. Senators that every effort in these directions will have our constructive support. I have, in this connection, to state that it was with dismay that I read in the newspapers of the intention on the part of the United States Government to move some units of its 7th Fleet to the Indian Ocean for operational purposes. Our Government had, on 16th December, 1963, expressed its concern to the United States over the report that a Nuclear Task Force was to be sent to the Indian Ocean. Our Government has received a reply that the Government of the United States is at a loss to understand the concern of the Government of Ceylon in this matter and that no port calls at Colombo would be scheduled if there were any objections on the part of the Government of Ceylon. That reply also refers to the calls periodically made by vessels of the United States Navy at ports in the Indian Ocean area, including Colombo. The purpose of such visits has been stated to be to familiarize the United States Navy with this part of the world and to show their continuing interest in the peace and stability of the area. The signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by three Nuclear Powers was greeted by the Government and the people of this country with hope and confidence. We rejoiced at the intention expressed by the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. We would now appeal to the U.S.A. not to give effect to its intention to send naval vessels with nuclear capability to the Indian Ocean.

* Source : Hansard (Senate), 1964, Vol. 19, Cols. 24022403

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In pursuance of the policy of the Government of Ceylon to oppose the further spread of nuclear weapons and to support the creation of atom-free zones, my Government will, in future, deny entry into our seaports, airports and territorial waters of naval vessels and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons as well as those equipped for nuclear warfare.

Document No. 23 Sri Lanka Delegate on Nuclear Free Zones (General Policy Statement in the United Nations)*
21 December 1964 Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): In regard to the concept of nuclear-free zones, we welcomed the declaration made at the first session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its meeting in Cairo in July 1964. One of the key points in that declaration was the concept of Africa as a nuclearfree zone so as to eliminate from the African continent the hazards of nuclear war and nuclear contamination. We regard the declaration of the African continent as a nuclearfree zone as a first step towards a wider application of the concept of nuclear-free zones which would cover other areas and zones, particularly those that have hitherto been free of nuclear weapons. Our view was that this concept should be extended to cover not only land masses but oceans as well, for the limits of territorial waters were determined in pre-nuclear times according to the limited range of conventional maritime weapons. My government has already taken action to give effect to these principles. In order to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the Indian Ocean, we closed our ports and airfields to ships and aircraft which either carry nuclear weapons or are equipped for nuclear warfare. We felt that action was a practical first step in the direction of ensuring that, at least, a large area of Asia would be free from the dangers of nuclear warfare. We also felt that, if this principle were to be adopted , not merely by individual countries unilaterally, but collectively by the non-aligned nations, to a large extent the continent of Africa, the Indian Ocean, and even possibly the South Atlantic would be free of nuclear weapons. At the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries held in Cairo in October, 1964, my Prime Minister accordingly made three proposals on this subject.

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 19th Session, 1308th Pl. Mtg., paras 64-66

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The three proposals were : (a) (b) The concept of nuclear-free zones should be extended to cover areas and oceans that have hitherto been free of nuclear weapons; All non-aligned nations should take immediate action to close their ports and airfield to ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons or which are equipped to carry nuclear weapons ;

(c ) Colonial Powers should not only undertake to liquidate existing bases in colonial territories, but they should also refrain from establishing in colonial territories new bases capable of being used for aggressive purposes. These three proposals were accepted unanimously by the non-aligned countries and incorporated in the final Declaration of the Conference. . . .

Document No. 24 The Statement of the Government of Sri Lanka on Chinas Second Nuclear Explosion*
20 May 1965 It will be recalled that when the Peoples Republic of China exploded their first nuclear device on October 16th , 1964, the previous Government, in a letter addressed by the then Prime Minister to Prime Minister Chou En-lai, stated that it was a matter of regret to us that still another country, whichever it might have been, should have found it necessary or desirable to explode a nuclear device. The present Government, while it was in opposition, agreed with this position and continues to entertain the hope that the provisions of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty will be extended to cover all tests and that all countries which have hitherto not subscribed to this Treaty will do so soon. The Government of Ceylon has also supported every move directed towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, the Government of Ceylon notes with regret that the Peoples Republic of China has found it necessary or desirable to explode a second nuclear device and continues to entertain the hope that the Government will direct its technological achievements into fields devoted to the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

* Source : Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, Colombo.

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Document No. 25 Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaikes Speech at the Plenary Session of the Asian Conference on Indonesia Convened in New Delhi*
20 January 1949 The invitation which you, Mr. Chairman, extended to the Government of my country to participate in this Conference, we accepted most readily and gladly. This is the second occasion on which India has afforded us, the countries of Asia and of this particular region, the opportunity of meeting and discussing problems of a common interest. In 1947 we assembled at Delhi at the Asian Relations Conference to discuss in a friendly way matters of common interest to us. That process has today taken a step further. We owe to the hospitality of yourself, Mr. Chairman, and of India, the opportunity of again meeting and discussing here on an Asiatic, as well as a Regional, basis, a specific issue of great importance, may I say of almost crucial importance, to us all. We are not met here today to decide whether or not a wrong has been done. We are met here as those who, convinced that a wrong has been done, wish to discuss amongst ourselves the ways and means of helping in a satisfactory and happy solution of the problem that has arisen. May I say, in passing, that my own country of Ceylon had the privilege of taking the first practical and concrete step in dealing, as far as we were concerned, with the situation that had arisen. We banned from our harbours and airports Dutch ships and planes bearing to Indonesia military or warlike personnel or material in their conflict with the people of Indonesia. We were the first country to take that step. The happenings in Indonesia, in my opinion, have far reaching implications beyond the question of the struggle for liberty on the part of the people of Indonesia. These implications have been referred to by you, Mr. Chairman, as well as other speakers. I wish to draw attention to a few of them myself. They are implications, in one aspect, of world importance. Those of us who believe in the democratic way of life and who would wish therefore to establish close and friendly collaboration and co-operation with other democratic countries, particularly of the West - I should like to say and say quite frankly - have suffered a grievous disappointment in the action which the Government of the Netherlands has taken in Indonesia. I know of no single happening since the conclusion of the last war, which has dealt a more grievous blow to the cooperation and friendly relations of all democratic countries engaged in the common task of defending one way of life, than what has happened in Indonesia. In the context of the United Nations Organization the world instrument for the preservation of

* Source: S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Speeches and Writings, Colombo: the Government Press, 1963, PP. 355-358.

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peace and security - there are also serious implications. One more item has been added to a long and melancholy list of failures or partial failures on the part of the United Nations Organization to deal, with reasonable effectiveness, with serious problems that have faced that organization in recent times. As far as we are concerned and I am speaking as one who is still waiting in the ante chamber of the United Nations Organization for admission - may I say still that we all recognize the immense and incalculable value of the United Nations Organisation, that whatever may be its present shortcomings, it still continues to be the only life line of mankind for the preservation of peace, and that it is certainly not the intention of any one of us in any way to weaken that Organisation but really to assist it and to support it by whatever deliberations we may have here. With regard to many of our own countries asked here, the Indonesian incident has also serious implications. This action, which cannot be characterized in any other terms than a flagrant and provocative attempt to reintroduce a principle, an evil thing which we thought was dead the principle of imperialism and colonialism is a situation that can have most unfortunate repercussions in the countries of a good many of us. May I say here and now that once and for all, without any question of doubt, imperialism and colonialism must be considered to be dead and that, as far as we are concerned, on no pretext or excuse whatsoever can we permit any attempt at a recrudescence of those principles? I do not intend on this occasion to enter into any detailed discussion of the problem that we are met to discuss The more appropriate occasion to do so will when we meet later on to discuss those details. But with your permission, Mr. Chairman, there is only one point that I would like to stress here, which I think is one of very great fundamental and primary importance to a consideration of all other details - one indeed which has not escaped attention; attention has been drawn to it. I wish to reemphasize it and it is this; Beyond the general question of helping the people of Indonesia to regain their freedom, is the important question of the position of the Republican Government of Indonesia. It is not possible to proceed to any discussion of this matter without recognizing the fundamental importance of that position. The Republican Government, recognized de facto by the world in general, by the UNO, and by the Government of the Netherlands itself, has suffered an entirely unjustifiable assault. That government must be restored in whatever way is practicable, and the procedure of negotiation between, in effect, two sovereign states must be reinstated before any satisfactory solution can be reached. I stress this point for this reason, that everything else depends upon this first issue. All the steps that may be suggested also flow from the attitude one adopts with regard to this matter. Is the Government to be restored in whatever practical way possible, or are we to proceed on the basis that no such Government now exists, that the situation for negotiations is past, and all that remains is for the government of the Netherlands, in the exercise of its sovereignty of the whole of Indonesia, and in whatever spirit of liberality the Netherlands choose to exercise, to form some provisional interim Government or make some other arrangement? I stress therefore the primary importance of that point of view in considering the entire problem.

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Let us finally proceed to the task that faces us with a clear understanding of the important general issues involved, without forgetting at the same time the stark realities of the case and what steps are in effect likely to be practicable and what steps are not likely to be practicable. Let us also bear in mind the obligations which we have in our relations to the international organization which, I repeat, is not our intention to weaken but to strengthen. Within the ambit of such considerations and without, as some of the honourable delegates have said, any bitterness or recrimination - the issues involved, believe me, are too important for the indulgence of mere recrimination in this matter let us proceed to consider what action we can take that is really effective in giving assistance to the sorely tried people of Indonesia and their Republican Government. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my country may I assure you and all honourable delegates here that we shall give our wholehearted co-operation to you in the endeavour to achieve those high objectives.

Document No. 26 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on Colonialism (Extract from his speech to the Political Committee of the AsianAfrican Conference, Bandung, Indonesia)*
21 April 1955 All of us here, I take it, are against colonialism. And this certainly is a matter for congratulation. But let us be equally unanimous and equally positive in declaring to the world that we are unanimous in our opposition to all forms of Colonialism and in our determination to take decisive and expeditious action to wipe out all forms of Colonialism throughout the entire world. You may say that Colonialism is a term generally understood, and capable of, only one meaning. I cannot agree. Colonialism takes many forms. The first and most obvious form is Western Colonialism, which has kept large areas of Asia and Africa in subjection for generations, and has not yet relaxed its hold in the remaining colonies of the European powers in both continents. We all know this form of Colonialism. We are all against it. We all know it all too well. In the world of today it is an anachronism. Wherever it threatens to appear it must be scotched. Wherever it exists already, its progressive extirpation must be speeded up by every method we can command.

* Source : Bandung 1955: Addresses to the Asian African Conference and Statements to the Press by the Rt. Hon. Sir John Kotelawela, Prime Minister of Ceylon, Colombo: Government Press, 1955, PP. 18-19.

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There is another form of colonialism, however, about which many of us represented here are perhaps less clear in our minds and to which some of us would perhaps not agree to apply the term Colonialism at all. Think, for example, of those satellite states under Communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland. Are not these colonies, as much as any of the colonial territories in Africa and Asia ? And if we are united in our opposition to Colonialism, should it not be our duty openly to declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as Western imperialism ? Finally, if we are against both these forms of Colonialism we must also make it clear that we are opposed to any form of colonial exploitation by any power in this region, now or in the future. Unless our own conscience be clear in this respect and our own hands clean, how can we expect the world at large to heed us when we pronounce against colonialist abuses elsewhere ? Any such pronouncements by us cannot but sound hollow unless we are prepared to practice ourselves what we preach to others. Before we can expect to be taken seriously, we must ourselves give solemn pledges and undertakings which will make it clear to the world that we have no extra-territorial ambitions of our own. . .. Specifically, I think it is our clear duty to emphasize, by our declared policies and in our actual conduct of external affairs, that we have no designs upon our neighbours and no intention or desire at any time to impose our own institutions and way of life upon peoples of a different language, or race, or religion. And we must give this undertaking here and now, so clearly and unequivocally that any breach of it by any one of us can be instantly and uncompromisingly branded as dishonourable and deserving of nothing but odium and contempt at the tribunal of world opinion. This necessary preliminary completed, I urge that we call on all the Colonial powers still possessing dependencies in this region to set a definite target for the granting of full independence to all their colonies. Such a declaration will have meaning only if the target is reasonably close. Though I am aware that ten years is a very brief period in terms of human history and constitutional development, I say in all seriousness that, with exceptions in only very special circumstances, the general rule should be that every colony in the Afro-Asian region should be given its autonomy within the next decade.

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Document No. 27 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on Colonialism (Statement in the House of Representatives)*
24 July 1957 This word colonialism, Mr. Speaker, is another of these terms that have become somewhat nebulous today. The old classic sense of colonialism which still persists but is fast dying has been superseded apparently by various other direct and indirect forms of what might be called colonialism within inverted commas. Now, what is the definition that today we should attach to this word colonialism. I diffidently suggest this: the attempt on the part of any powerful country to obtain influence over and to restrict the freedom of thought and action of a less powerful country by various methods, direct or indirect. I suppose that may be as good a definition of modern colonialism as anything else. We are strongly opposed to any big power trying to bully any small power in the context of such a definition and we shall always express our views, which I trust again will not be misunderstood, in what we consider right or wrong in actions connected with such powers dealing with weaker powers.

Document No. 28 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Liberation Struggles in Algeria, Cyprus, and West Irian (General Policy Statement in the United Nations)**
20 October 1957 Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): The recent past has witnessed the emergence into independence and freedom of many of the countries of the Arab world. The vestiges of colonialism have been swept away by the tide of Arab nationalism. This trend will be welcomed by all those who believe in the right of self-determination and in the principles of freedom and justice. We in Ceylon, who have just emerged from colonialism, are dedicated to the task of working for the independence and freedom of the colonies. I should like here to pay a tribute to the United Kingdom for its foresight in recognizing the principle of self -determination and in granting freedom to millions of people in Asia and Africa. This action has transformed an empire into a free and equal association
* Source : Hansard (HR), July 24, 1957, Vol.28, Cols. 1779-80. ** Source : U. N.G.A.O.R., 12th Session, 698th Pl. Mtg.

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of independent sovereign states, an association which is progressively expanding. We welcomed the independence of Ghana last year and of Malaya this year, and supported their admission to the United Nations. We look forward to the time when we can similarly welcome the independence of the other non-self-governing territories. This policy of the United Kingdom should serve as an example to other Metropolitan Powers. It is a policy which sets a nation, irrespective of race, creed or colour. We are sad to witness the situation in Algeria today. We refuse to accept the French thesis that Algeria is an integral part of France. We do not recognize the right of a colonial power to declare any of its colonies an integral part of its metropolitan territory. The people of Algeria have given ample proof of their determination to be free. The spirit of independence and freedom of the Algerian people is as strong as the spirit of their Arab brothers elsewhere, whose struggle for liberation from colonial rule has been successfully completed. The French would do well to recognize the Algerian claim to independence and to put an end to the needless destruction and slaughter in that territory. A prolongation of the conflict cannot but lead to a further embitterment of relations between the two racial groups in Algeria and also to an increase in tension in the North African region as a whole, to the detriment of harmonious relations with the West. It is our hope that France, a country which has stood for the ideals of human liberty and freedom, will have the statesmanship and courage to save the situation before it is too late. We are happy to note that there has been some improvement in the situation in Cyprus. We welcome the truce which has put an end to the reign of terror and counter-terror. Conditions appear to be favourable now for a settlement which will be in accord with the wishes of the people of Cyprus. We strongly believe in the principle of selfdetermination for peoples, and we cannot forget that the United Kingdom has applied this very principle to many former parts of its empire, and with such happy results. We find it difficult to believe that the problem of a minority is insoluble. Minority problems have been successfully solved by the statesmen of the United Kingdom before, and we have no doubt that in this instance, too, the United Kingdom will rise to the occasion. We look forward to the time when Cyprus will have the right of selfdetermination. The question of West Irian has been the subject of acute debate at this Assembly before. We consider this a colonial issue. It has affected the good relations of Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. We sincerely hope that through the United Nations it will be possible to negotiate a solution of this vexed problem in a spirit of conciliation.

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Document No. 29 Sri Lankas Attitude Towards the Issue of SelfGovernment in Cyprus (Sri Lanka Delegate in the First Committee of the U.N.)*
1 December 1958 Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon) expressed regret that a solution of the Cyprus question had not yet been achieved, but pointed out that much had been done to prepare the ground for such a solution during the past year. The negotiations contemplated by the General Assembly at its eleventh session [resolution 1013 (XI)] had actually begun and had resulted in a certain measure of agreement between some of the parties concerned. The hope that further negotiations would prove successful was strengthened also by a number of other factors; the fact that the three countries concerned were close allies and shared a responsibility , as members of NATO, for preserving the good relations between them which were so important for the maintenance of world peace and security ; the manifest goodwill of the United Kingdom and its undoubted readiness to support a settlement of the problem which would lead to independence or selfgovernment for Cyprus ; and the Greek Governments renunciation of the goal of enosis (union with Greece ) for the island. Moreover, although the Turkish government has a legitimate security interest in Cyprus, it would undoubtedly realize that an independent or self governing Cyprus guaranteed by the United Nations or the Members of the United Nations would provide it with the security it considered necessary. In the past, one of the obstacles to agreement on a solution of the question had been the importance attached to the interest of the Greek and the Turkish Governments. Undoubtedly, both Governments did have a legitimate interest in the problem; they should, however, look upon the people of Cyprus , not as Greek or Turkish citizens, but as independent people living in a separate country. His delegation considered that it would be far better to make an effort to bring the two communities in Cyprus closer together than to solve the problem of territorial partition, which had so often brought disastrous consequences elsewhere. For that reason, it welcomed the statement by the United Kingdom representative at the 996th meeting making it clear that his Government rejected the idea of partition. It was also necessary, however, to guard against a functional partition of the island, although it might be necessary at the outset to separate some administrative functions in order to minimize friction between the two communities. The great objective should be to provide a unitary Government in which all the people of Cyprus could participate that is to promote a partnership, not between three outside Powers, but between the two communities of Cyprus.

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., Thirteenth Session, First Committee, 1002nd Mtg., Paras 7 12.

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Future negotiations must also take into account the need to provide the minority with strong guarantees that its rights would be preserved. A fundamental condition for peaceful negotiation was the restoration of calm on the island. His delegation condemned terrorism, but felt that it could be best attacked by removing its causes. In the case of Cyprus, one of its causes was the frustrated desire of the people for independence. The recognition by the three Governments concerned that independence or self-government must be the final objective in Cyprus would do much to bring it to an end. Those were his delegations views on the lines along which a settlement should be worked out. But it must be left to the people of Cyprus, together with its friends the Governments of the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece, to decide the matter in any way it chooses. In order to assist it to do so, his delegation supported the view that the United Nations should take no other action at present than to call for further negotiations.

Document No. 30 Sri Lankas Attitude Towards the Algerian Quest for Self-Government (Sri Lanka Delegate in the First Committee of the U.N.)*
12 December 1958 Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon) said that two significant events have taken place since the twelfth session of the General Assembly which might make a solution easier. One was the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. The recent elections to the French National Assembly had shown that the Algerians were not willing to accept the proposed settlement, and hence that the Provisional Government had the support of a large section of the Algerian people. The existence of a single unit which demonstrably represented the Algerian people should facilitate negotiations. The other significant development was the establishment of a new Government in France under General de Gaulle. Although he had not taken any positive step to solve the Algerian problem, there had been an encouraging event that related to the problem. France had conceded the right of option with regard to freedom to the peoples within its colonial empire, and the fact that the new independent country of Guinea was now being admitted as a Member of the United Nations was proof that France has stood by its offer of freedom. Clearly there was a liberal process going on in France, and it was now led by a man who was prepared to entertain and undertake liberal measures

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., Thirteenth Session, First Committee, 1021st Mtg., Paras 41-47.

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regarding the political rights of peoples in the French Empire. There were difficulties in his path. He could not take action without the support of a large section of his people, and it was not known whether or not delay in adopting a more liberal approach to the Algerian problem would contribute to winning that support. The problem could be solved only through goodwill and understanding. The United Nations could not enforce independence for Algeria, which must be brought about either by the goodwill of France or by the strength of the Algerian people, in other words, by peaceful means or by force of arms. It was not in the true interests of France to attempt to settle the question the second way, since not all the might of France could subjugate a people dedicated to the cause of winning their own freedom. Therefore, both France and the United Nations must seek a peaceful settlement in accordance with the principles of the Charter. That was the reasoning underlying the seventeen-Power draft resolution [A/C 1/L. 232] of which Ceylon was a sponsor. The draft resolution did more than state the position as it was: it said that independence was a right, a Provisional Government had been formed, much distress had been caused and there was grave danger to international peace and security, and it urged negotiations between the parties concerned. He thought that the difficulties that some representatives had in accepting certain parts of the draft resolution were based on misunderstanding. The fourth paragraph of the preamble, which recognized the right of the Algerian people to independence, had been criticized on the grounds that that right should be discussed in the course of negotiations. But that paragraph merely stated a fact to which all Members of the United Nations were dedicated because it was recognized by the Charter. All members of the Committee represented countries which enjoyed independence, and therefore had no moral right to deny to the people of Algeria one of the fundamental human rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The last paragraph of the preamble, which referred to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, had been objected to on the grounds that, whereas many countries had not yet recognized that Government, the adoption of that paragraph might constitute such a recognition. Ceylon, being one of the countries that had not recognized the Provisional Government, had considered that paragraph very closely , and had come to the conclusion that its acceptance would in no way commit anyone to recognition of the Provisional Government. That Government existed and would continue to exist whether or not it was recognized by any other country. The paragraph therefore did no more than to record and undeniable fact. He did not believe that France, the home of the spirit of patriotism and revolt, would remain deaf to the appeal of the resolution. The United Kingdom had performed a great act of statesmanship not long ago in granting independence to Ceylon, although it would have been fully capable of holding Ceylon in subjection for many more years by pure strength of arms. By that act, the spirit of independence in others had been

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recognized by those who had won and established their own freedom. In the past the French people had asserted their own rights, and he believed that they would heed the appeal to allow others to follow their example. In that belief he commended the draft resolution to the Committee, hoping that it would help to bring to an end an unsatisfactory chapter in the lives of two countries and two peoples, and a chapter which was also a reflection on the United Nations itself.

Document No. 31 Algeria and Independence for all Colonial and Dependent Countries (General Policy Statements in the UN)*
12 October 1960 Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): The position of my Government in regard to the situation in Algeria does not permit for any ambiguity or equivocation. Its policy has been clearly stated on several occasions. We have always maintained the right of peoples to self-determination. If such selfdetermination can be realized by peaceful methods based on negotiation and the principles of pacific settlement of disputes, none will be happier than ourselves. Unfortunately, the struggle of the Algerian people has dragged on over the last six years in a manner which can only be described as tragic in the suffering which it has caused to a people fighting against heavy odds for their freedom and independence. The General Assembly has had the Algerian question on its agenda at each of its regular sessions since 1955. At its eleventh and twelfth sessions, the Assembly unanimously adopted resolutions [A/4075, para 4] recognizing the right of the Algerian people to independence and expressing concern at the continuance of the war in Algeria as a situation endangering international peace and security, and urging negotiations between the two parties concerned with a view to reaching a solution in conformity without Charter, failed to be adopted by the Assembly only by a single vote. The memories of what happened at the fourteenth session on this matter are too fresh to require repetition here. The tragic events in Algeria continue to cause deep concern to my Government. The armed conflict in that country, which has necessitated almost the entire French army being maintained in combat strength in Algeria, and has displaced over a million Algerian civilians, continues to embitter international relations and to increase international tensions. In our view, in the context of the vast fermentation going on at present in the African continent, any further delay in a settlement of this problem is fraught with grave danger to the peace of the world. When General de Gaulle came to power in 1958, it

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 15th Session, 901st Pl. Mtg.

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was under circumstances which led us to believe that a speedy and satisfactory solution of the Algerian question was at hand. We welcomed the statements he made and we looked towards an implementation of his promises. Two years have passed, and the fighting in Algeria goes on with unmitigated vigour. . . .: It was in that same speech that the French President said: There is no policy which is worthwhile apart from realities. What are these realities ? It is a war which will not, and cannot, end except with the triumph of the aspirations of the Algerian people for political freedom. That is one reality. The inexorable will of a people for freedom cannot be destroyed by arms. This is a reality. France has to take account of the realities of the mid-twentieth century, particularly the realities of the happenings of the continent of Africa, and to fashion its policy on Algeria in a manner worthy not only of the ideals which the French Revolution gave to the world, but also worthy of the realities of political liberation of today. Most French people, especially the intellectuals, have recognized these realities. These are not people who love France less, but whose passion for freedom and right conduct has been more. They have been strong enough to try to save France the country they love, the country which had such a glorious past and which can look forward to a great future - from pursuing a path which involves the denial of freedom and the infliction of injustice to a people whose only crime is their love of their native land, a people who were and still are prepared to discuss and negotiate an hounourable settlement. If France is unable or unwilling to do so, we sincerely hope that the Assembly, at this session, will finally face its responsibilities and act in such a way as to put an end to the futile, tragic and meaningless loss of life which the Algerian war has caused over the last five years. The time has now come for a final settlement of this problem. We cannot, and we should not, procrastinate any longer. My delegation will support any measure the United Nations may deem fit to take to put an end to the bloodshed in Algeria and to ensure to the people of that land a free and untrammeled opportunity to decide for themselves the kind of Government they wish to set up and live under. This is the right of selfdetermination as we understand it, and this must indeed be the meaning of the selfdetermination that was promised to them by General de Gaulle himself. If these people decide for independence, let them have it. It is their right which no one can deny. Now I should like to say a few words on an item of considerable importance on the agenda which my delegation would like to examine more fully when it comes up for consideration in a plenary meeting or in a committee. I refer to the question of the independence of all colonial and dependent countries. At this stage, I need only say that my Government is wholly opposed to the continuation of colonialism, which is an anachronism in the mid-twentieth century and has to be ended. It is a system which is repugnant to our conceptions of freedom and the fundamental rights of human beings. No doubt, there are some Colonial Powers which do a great deal for the improvement of the conditions of dependent peoples. Such humane considerations we applaud and we do hope that they are only steps in preparation for the total emancipation of these peoples. We urge, therefore, that urgent steps be taken to make the whole world free, so that, when we refer to the free world, we shall be referring to a reality.

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However good a colonial Government may be and however much it may do to improve the lot of the dependent peoples, there is no justification for the continuance of a system of colonial domination. Good Government can never be a substitute for selfGovernment. We are glad to note in this connexion that very recently no less than fifteen countries have advanced from colonialism to freedom and independence and have been admitted into the United Nations as sovereign and independent States. We have all felicitated them and wished them success. The present Assembly which the President rightly termed as the Assembly of Humanity will always be remembered for this unique event. When the history of the United Nations come to be written, there will be a chapter regarding this unique event which recognized the freedom of so many countries, most of whom come from the one continent of Africa. We therefore fully support the declaration [ A/4502] calling for the abolition of colonialism and ask that all dependent peoples should be freed from any form of colonial domination.

Document No. 32 Situation in Tunisia (General Policy Statement in the U.N.)*

21 August 1961 Mr. [G.P] Malalasekera (Ceylon) : . . . In an era when it is no longer possible for politics to hinder the independence of countries which have been the victims of colonialism, the retention of bases in foreign countries, against the wishes of the people of those countries, would be a perpetuation of colonialism and a serious infringement of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of such countries. France itself has already agreed in principle that French troops and bases must ultimately be withdrawn from Tunisian territory. The Quai dOrsay has repeatedly and openly acknowledged that there must at some time be discussions on the future of the Bizerta military establishment. We say that that time is now and that the question can no longer be postponed. The Fifth Republic, under its distinguished leader, President de Gaulle, is now being called upon to face the facts of present -day life in Africa. How long can Tunisia be expected to tolerate the blatant violation of its territory and air space ? Tunisia has referred to the possibility of taking defensive action under Article 51 of the Charter. This Article, it will be noticed, refers not only to individual defensive action but also to collective action. We do not want Bizerta to provoke a general conflagration in North Africa. In the cause of international peace, we appeal to France to desist from provocative action. France can by no means be called an

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., Third Special Session,

997TH Pl. Mtg., Paras 73-82.

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aggrieved party. It is in possession of territory which does not belong to it and its continued stay is a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of Tunisia. I think I am right in saying that all of us here, in our efforts to bring the moral pressure of the world to bear upon this question, are acting as friends of that great country, France, whose culture we admire so deeply. Many of the States here assembled have been and are its allies and cannot possibly wish it harm. They certainly would not want to add to Frances difficulties. President Bourguiba himself has declared very clearly that he does not wish to witness the development of conditions which will encourage a deterioration in the internal political situation of France. But even the friends and allies of France must bear in mind that if chaos and conflict in the world are to be avoided, the principles of international obligations must be put above traditional policies and loyalties. ...

Document No. 33 Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike on Colonialism in Africa (General Policy Statements in the United Nations)*
27 September 1961 Mr. [F.R.D.] Bandaranaike (Ceylon): Recently we have often heard expressed the theory that colonialism has ceased to be a real problem as more and more dependent territories have advanced to the stage of independence. We are happy to be reassured by the British Foreign Secretary that the United Kingdom is taking positive steps which we know from our own experience it has always taken where colonial territories have been concerned; that it is even prepared voluntarily to place before the General Assembly the details of those positive processes. We welcome the fact that Sierra Leone, a former British territory, has risen to its full stature and become a member of the Commonwealth. However, the theory that, because the percentage of people living under colonialism has continued to shrink, colonialism is no longer a real problem, is simply not true. Mr. Hammamrskjolds death, in itself, is proof that colonialism is still not dead. Indeed, it has a knack of taking new shapes and forms in the face of evolving realities. Implementation of the resolution [1514 (XV)] containing the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, which the General Assembly adopted with not a single dissentient vote at its last session, is a matter of urgency. I would invite Members to look at the recent happenings in Angola, the new developments in the Congo, the continuing bloodshed in Algeria and the peculiar problem of South West Africa. To take just one

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R. 16th session, 1017th Pl. Mtg., Paras 175-177.

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example Angola : the whole world knows that the metropolitan state is waging a war of extermination, without precedent in recent times, in that country. The resolutions of the United Nations have been treated with contempt. In the face of this intransigence, this cynical and calculated indifference to world opinion, it is in our view a matter directly concerning the Organization that Portugal should not be permitted to continue its willful policies in Angola with impunity. Other countries have suggested that nations such as South Africa and Portugal, which follow such policies, should be excluded from membership of the Assembly. I cannot accept that view as correct, or regard it as a positive step in the light of present international thinking. We are not here as members of a common club, people with one way of thinking and no other. We are not here to act as a kind of superior body, a holy alliance, an elite which alone is capable of enlightened thinking. That is not the position; we do disagree with one another; we do have differences of policy. It is surely no solution to say that because we disapprove radically of a policy followed by a country such as Portugal or South Africa, we should exclude it from membership of this community of nations. What would happed if we carried that argument to its logical conclusion ? We might reach a position in which the policies followed by any one of us might not find general acceptance. To take an absurd example, the United States might actually disapprove of the policies followed by the Soviet Union, or vice versa; one would not suggest that those two great counties should leave the Assembly as a result. We are here in a spirit of compromise and understanding. We must seek other means of making world opinion felt by the Government and peoples of Portugal and South Africa.

Document No. 34 Liberation of Goa (Speech of Sri Lanka Delegate in the U.N. Security Council)*
18 December 1961 Mr. [G.P.] Malalasekara (Ceylon): We are confronted with a very important problem, a problem of the utmost complexity, one in which the issues before us must be properly and clearly distinguished so as to avoid confusion in our own minds. Indian forces have gone into Goa and other Portuguese enclaves. The question we have to consider is whether this action of the Indian Government constitutes aggression, a threat to international peace and security, or whether it is an act of liberation of territories belonging to the Indian Union. In either case, the basic issue is the status of these territories.
* Source: U.N. S.C.O.R ., 16th Year (1961), 987th Mtg., Paras 130-49.

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In the view of my delegation, Goa, Daman and Diu are colonial territories which had no raison detre for existence a single day after the Indian Union took its place in the international community of States as a sovereign and free State. After a free India came into existence, the enclaves on the subcontinent which were held by foreign states were portions of Indian territory unlawfully held by these States. In a historical sense and in a historical sense only is the case of the Portuguese enclaves in India a colonial question. After free India became a juridical and actual fact, the issue was supervened and displayed by the other question, namely, the fact that a foreign country was unlawfully clinging to territory which belonged to the Indian people. I do not need here to go into the historic, political, and other reasons which make Goa and these other territories an inalienable part of India. Except for the Portuguese and some of their die-hard supporters, there are not many people in the world today who would deny to India its indisputable right to these territories. It is not a question of Portuguese sovereignty being extinguished to give place to Indian sovereignty. It is simply a question of the liberation of the national territory of India held over by the Portuguese in complete indifference to the historic facts which led to the emergence and growth of a free India. One can never regard that a country dismembered or severed because two or more different colonial Powers held portions of it by force loses its entity; the territorial integrity of a country is essential and indivisible. The Indian Union could not have been complete and self-consistent until it finally and irrevocably contained all the territories on the subcontinent which are held by Colonial Powers, despite the establishment of a State in which full sovereignty over all India inevitably and ineluctably rests. Nationality is a unifying process. Self-determination is not disintegration. Only the Colonial Powers have interest in breaking nations down, creating and perpetuating enclaves and building up states like Katanga out of the struggling unity of new nations. A great deal has been made by the Portuguese representative about the action taken by the Indian Government. Appeals have been made to moral and spiritual values and to the fact that India has used force against little Goa. Fair, in this case, is foul; the human values we all understand and subscribe to have been made curious use of by a country which has shown little regard for the undefended peoples of Angola. I do not wish here to speak long on the reasons why we think that scruples and principles on the lips of the inhuman perpetrators of notable barbarism in Angola are sickening. But all who consider the Portuguese arraignment against India should bear in mind as a very relevant and material element the fact that Portugal has not felt the least compunction about the use of very brutal force against the national movement of Angolan peoples. The use of force has not so far been abjured by any nation represented here. Indeed, many nations in this Council maintain today vast armies and great inventories of weapons as testimony to the fact that force is a distinct and accepted element of

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international life. India has undoubtedly used force in this case - minimum force as the representative of India described it - the same necessary force which the United Nations is using in Katanga to the discomfiture of the Colonial Powers. Force has been used after fourteen years of patient waiting in the hope that Portugal would see reason and accept reality. The representative of the United States who spoke here today made a fervent and appealing statement about the use of force by India. We were moved by his statement, but we are not quite sure of its relevance. He claimed that the Portuguese have been in occupation for over 400 years. This occupation was unjust when it began, as everyone acknowledges now, the injustice perpetrated. If Portugal conquered Goa, then the people of Goa have the right of rebellion. The right of conquest carries with it the right of rebellion by the conquered. The action taken by India is not action taken against another State for territorial aggrandizement, such as was envisaged in the Charter. It is not an invasion of a Portuguese population, for neither the land nor the people of Goa is Portuguese by any stretch of the imagination. Indias action is to liberate Indian national territory. The Portuguese build-up of Portuguese forces in Goa cannot be reconciled with peaceful intentions towards India. The Security Council cannot but also note that such a buildup was inconsistent with the desire to seek settlement of the issue on peaceful lines. The public statements of Mr. Salazar, the President of Portugal, that he would adopt a scorched earth policy - policy which I understand is already being put into effect in Goa - reveals an inherent fanaticism and intransigence that is not consistent with Article 33 of the Charter, which enjoins parties to any dispute to seek solution by various peaceful means, and not by recourse to scorched earth policies. India is a country dedicated to peace. It has shown this by the fact that India is not a member of any military alliance. Portugal, however, is a member of a military alliance. Indias attitude to the use of force is exemplified by its deliberate policy of not being a member of a military alliance. This does not, however, imply that it should not use force to defend its vital interests or its territory or its national integrity. It is incumbent upon India to see that the possibility of the threatened scorched earth policy is not carried out and that, therefore, it should be forestalled. We have heard here some caustic remarks on what sounds like a dethronement of Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister of India. For my own part, I cannot accept this dethronement, least of all at the hands of a colonial empire. Mr. Nehru has never pretended to be a pacific disciple of Gandhi. His greatness lies in his ability to cross-breed the spirit of Gandhis teachings with the practical responsibilities of a Head of State. The redemption of Goa is not the antithesis of Mr. Nehru; it is the fulfillment of his lifelong struggle against colonial occupation, from the days of his struggle in the Congress to his days in gaol and the final liberation of India. His march into Goa is part of that process and if his

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latest step is more like the act of a policeman than a saint, the fault is not his, but of those who, while preaching saintliness to Nehru, reserve the right to worship Machiavelli. The delegation of the United States and the United Kingdom have asked for a cease-fire. There can be no cease-fire in this case as a cease-fire can only be applicable as between belligerents. There is no state of belligerency here. We do not see, therefore, how a cease-fire can be called by this Council. To the representative of the United States I should like to say, in conclusion, that the least the friends of Portugal can do to help in the present situation is to ask the Portuguese to change their attitude - indeed to warn them that the world will not be patient any longer in the face of their intransigence and obscurantism. Instead of asking for a ceasefire, they should first obtain from Portugal an unequivocal declaration that Portugal is prepared to give freedom immediately to these enclaves which they hold by force. There is a necessary correlation of forces in the world; things tie up, and the attitudes of nations in one region are consistent with their attitudes in other regions. There is a basic identity of views between Colonial Powers, and their views and attitudes cohere in a natural and inescapable pattern. We are not, therefore, surprised that one group of Powers is today demanding a cease-fire in Goa and that the same group is demanding a cease-fire in Katanga. It would appear that when a military action undertaken for a legitimate purpose seems to have a chance of success, a cease-fire is called for in the name of international morality and a whole host of generous principles. But these same Powers see no inconsistency between this attitude and the attitude of mind which creates a military alliance, increase armaments, weapons, and stockpiles of mass destruction. On 8 November 1961 the representative of Portugal, in the fourth Committee spoke of the atrocities of the Angolan people against the Portuguese in Angola. It would appear as if violence, the right to use force to defend themselves, to vindicate their rights, is not to be allowed to defenceless people or to peoples whose arms are sufficient only for defensive wars. Indias action has been branded as aggression. My delegation cannot accept this since what we have here in Goa is not a mere civilian enclave where Portuguese merchants are happily plying their trade while their families are enjoying the fruits thereof. What we have here, according to information, is not only merchants and civilians but also 12,000 Portuguese troops. This is thus a cancer planted in the body of India, a fifth column fully armed, today with machine-guns and cannon, tomorrow perhaps to be used as a nuclear base since NATO is talking of developing its nuclear deterrent. My country cannot call on India to negotiate because India has all this while offered nothing but negotiations. Nor can Ceylon call upon India to withdraw from Goa because that would be to ask it to withdraw from its own territory. We cannot censure India for invading its own land because that would be a contradiction in terms. My delegation, therefore, would be compelled to vote against any draft resolution which embodied these three concepts.

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Document No. 35 Sri Lanka Delegate on Colonialism: (General Policy Statement in the United Nations)*
27 September 1962 Mr. [G.P.] Malalasekera (Ceylon): For example, there is no longer any difference of opinion that colonialism must go. By its historic Declaration [resolution 1514 (XV)], this Assembly has already decreed the complete liquidation of this festering anachronism. The problems before us now are those of ways and means, of methods and procedures. Views may differ on tempo, but we all know where we are going. As for my delegation, we favour a stepped- up pace, a double tempo. We have heard many excuses for delays but not a single good reason, and we find that the excuses are mostly evasions of one kind or another of the principles of the Declaration. But even if we are inclined to temporize, is the choice completely ours? Every morning a newspaper tells us that the peoples in the colonies are on the march, many of them under the banners of militant political parties, behind leaders whose precious qualities and undoubted genius, now dissipated in political gaols and police persecutions, could well be used and should be used in the building of new nations, and, as our new Members have so ably demonstrated here in this Assembly, can be used for the veritable strengthening of our own Organization. Either this Assembly will grasp the historical meaning of this struggle against colonialism and direct its forces to constructive goals, or it must be prepared to face another crop of Congos and Angolas, with their potential threat to regional peace, international security and even the very existence of the United Nations itself. . . .

Documents No. 36 Sri Lanka Delegate on Portuguese Colonialism (General Policy statement in the United Nations)**
21 December 1964, Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): It is a matter for great regret that the same enlightenment and political wisdom has not been shown by Portugal in its colonial policies. Portugal has disregarded the irresistible advance of colonial peoples towards independence and is attempting blindly to cling to its colonial possessions. Despite appeals by the United Nations and the weight of African and world opinion, Portugal remains obdurate. It is attempting to continue its domination over Angola, Mozambique
* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 17th Session, 1135th Pl. Mtg., Paras 111-112. ** Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 19th Session, 1308th Pl. Mtg., Paras 52-54.

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and the so-called Portuguese Guinea by armed might, in callous disregard of the rights of the inhabitants of these territories to freedom and independence, the rising tide of African and world opinion, and the suffering and damage inflicted on the peoples and territories concerned. We condemn unreservedly the colonial policies of the Portuguese Government. In 1960, this Assembly adopted its historic Declaration [resolution 1514(XV)] calling for the termination of the system of colonialism and grant of freedom to all dependent territories. It is necessary that we maintain the pressure for the liquidation of all vestiges of colonialism that still remain. Neither economic nor strategic considerations can justify the continuation of colonial bondage, and the transfer of power to colonial peoples and territories should no longer be delayed. The principles of self-determination enshrined in the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of democracy, dictate that peoples still under subjection should emerge into freedom and independence. It is equally important that we take every possible measure to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the new nations that have joined the world community. Their freedom and independence are in danger of being compromised by the policies of new colonial Powers who wish to retain or extend their influence over these territories. These neo-colonial Powers exploit disputes left over from colonial times or elements of internal dissension in order to exercise, in their own interests, political , economic, and military control over the newly independent nations. A particular cause of concern at the present time is the perpetuation of colonialist and neo-colonialist situations through military assistance or intervention. . . .

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Document No. 37 Apartheid (General Policy statement in the United Nations)*

30 September 1958 Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): Regarding apartheid, the Colombo Powers, of which Ceylon is one, expressed at Colombo in 1954, and later on at Bogor, Indonesia, their great concern over this situation. In 1955, the Bandung Conference of Asian-African nations deplored the policies and practices of racial segregation and reaffirmed the determination of the Asian-African peoples to eradicate every trace of racialism. The Government of Ceylon is, therefore, pledged to uphold this policy which is in keeping with the principles of the United Nations Charter. We regret, however, to note that there are certain delegations which still put forth the argument that the Assembly is not competent to deal with this question when, at every previous session, it has, by its resolutions, maintained that this was an item coming within the competence of the United Nations.

Document No. 38 Sri Lanka Delegate on Apartheid in South Africa (Statement in the U.N. Security Council)**
30 March 1960 Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): It is indeed a painful duty to have to take part in this meeting of the Security Council the first time I exercise the privilege of representing my country as a member of this august body, but it is an occasion when we shall have to consider very carefully the heavy responsibility which rests on us as members of the Security Council. Before I proceed to express our views with regard to the problem before us, I should like to take this opportunity to inform my colleagues that today our Prime Minister drew attention to the situation that has arisen in South Africa. I should like to read his short statement on that subject in order to indicate the depth of feeling that prevails in my country too over the unfortunate events of the recent past. This is what he said : We cannot help but express our deep concern at the recent incidents in South Africa. Consequent upon demonstrations by African crowds against the obnoxious Pass Laws which are part and parcel of the policy of apartheid

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 13th Session, 764th Pl. Mtg. Para 38. ** Source: U.N. S.C.O. R., 15th Year (1960), 852nd Mtg., Paras 1-36.

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and racial discrimination, the South African police opened fire on demonstrators. Reports indicate that over 70 people have been killed and 200 injured. The circumstances of the shootings indicate a denial of human rights and of elementary justice. Many nations have therefore raised their voices in sorrow as well as in anger. We for our part, extend our sympathy to the African people and express our dismay at these unfortunate shootings. We have rejected and continue to reject and condemn the policies of racial supremacy and racial segregation. . . . If I may now, for a brief moment, try to look at the substantive problem which is engaging our attention, I should like to begin by drawing the attention of the Council to the fact that segregation as a racial policy of the government of the Union of South Africa is not a new one but has been in existence for many years. It has been the subject of bitter criticism, and not only within that country. Fortunately, we have to recognize the fact that there are some white South Africans of very liberal views, and men of goodwill, who, despite very grave difficulty, have not failed to dispute the activities of the Nationalist Government of the Union of South Africa. These men and women have been an honour to all democratically-minded and freedom-loving peoples all over the world. With great difficulty they have espoused the cause of the downtrodden and inarticulate Africans and all honour to them. But it is clear that, in spite of the criticism within that country and outside it, and, in fact, throughout the rest of the world, this policy has continued within South Africa for a long time. It has also evoked condemnation from all men of goodwill as something which is ugly, almost indecent and contrary to the liberal concepts of Christian civilization. We cannot overlook that. The injustices and hardships of segregation had existed long before the coming into power of the Nationalist Government in 1948, but it is to be noted that it is the Government that has tightened this policy and intensified the grave injustices. Ever since the United Nations came into existence it has, year after year, condemned the policy of apartheid and racial segregation adopted in the Union of South Africa, and it is significant also that South Africa enjoys the unique distinction, if one may use that word in this context of being the only country in the world which has an official and government policy of racial discrimination and racial segregation. But in spite of all the action of the United Nations in the past, the Organization has not been able to make the Union Government halt its policy, or even modify it. On the contrary, that Government applies the policy more rigorously, ignoring completely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and denying all fundamental freedoms. The vicious doctrines of race superiority and apartheid have been practiced in a cruel and callous way, and human beings are treated as no more than mere chattels who are deprived of freedom and the enjoyment of all those rights and privileges which we have come to regard as basic and fundamental privileges of a civilized democratic society, just simply because of a difference in race and colour.

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The United Nations has been patient and has treated the Union of South Africa with great restraint in the hope that its Government would be influenced by repeated requests for the abandonment of this obnoxious policy. It had been hoped that good sense and good judgement would be applied in the consideration of this matter, and that moral and Christian principles would stir the conscience of the leaders of the Government of the Union of South Africa, but, alas, they have treated the United Nations over the years with scant courtesy; they have continued to disregard the principles and purposes of the Charter, and they have spurned, almost haughtily, the recommendations made by our General Assembly. In the meantime there has been growing in South Africa, among the African people, a sense of frustration and deep resentment. This has been accompanied by a mounting consciousness of African nationalism, a desire to shake off the shackles which now bind them and which make them second-class citizens, or even worse. Outside South Africa, too, the conscience of the world has been troubled by the atrocities perpetrated in the name of apartheid and by the denial of human rights by a State member of what is called known and accepted as the free world. Strong criticism of the South African Government has come from many parts of the world, including Europe and the North American continent. Wise and discerning men read accurately the writing on the wall and, in their friendship for South Africa, they have come out into the open and warned the Government of the Union of South Africa the danger to themselves and to international peace if they continued to pursue their policies. . . . Now this is the situation which we have before us, and, as I said before, it is idle to consider solely the actual result of the attempt to protest against these repressive laws and which resulted in bloodshed and in a massacre of men, women and children, most of them probably innocent, even if some others were armed, and there is very little evidence of this. In any case, we all deplore what happened, but we have to go beyond that. We have to consider this violence as a symptom and a manifestation of a deep malaise which had afflicted the body politic of the Union of South Africa. This, as I have said before, is a complete denial of what we all accept as a democratic way of life, of what we all accept as the fundamental human rights to which we are entitled. It is for us to see that there is no continuation of this denial of human rights and freedom. Today, the African people, if I may, say, the native or black African people of the Union of South Africa, may be powerless. It may be possible to use the authority and the power of the Government of the Union, aided by all the military force which it has at its command, to enforce these repressive laws, to give effect to these unreasonable practices and to deny these peoples the rights to which they are entitled, to deny them the right to own property, for instance, and to introduce laws such as the Group Areas Act and other laws which make a distinction between one member of the territory and another with regard to certain rights, such as where to live, how to live and what to do.

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These repressive measures undoubtedly can be enforced for a limited period by the use of force which is at the command of any Government, but the question is whether the force of this newborn nation consciousness, not only in South Africa but in all parts of Africa, can be for long resisted, whether it will not become a tide which will roll on with unabated force and energy, carrying away all resistance in its path. We have heard recently of the wind of change that is blowing, but if we do not beware, that wind of change will very soon become a hurricane of great force, a hurricane that will leave nothing but desolation, destruction and disaster in its wake. Our appeal at this juncture, when this is the picture we have before us, is that there should be an attempt first, to make the Government of the Union of South Africa pause and consider the situation and, secondly, to help the Union of South Africa to formulate some proposal that might be a means of bringing about a solution. We wish to take more effective measures than were taken in the past year by the General Assembly. I do not wish at this stage to indicate what shape such proposals might take, but it may well be possible that our approach should be not so much to condemn as to reconstruct. Could we, while expressing our views and undoubtedly deploring the incidents that have taken place and condemning the government for allowing such things to happen, ask the Government of the Union of South Africa to reverse its policy. To abandon this denial of human rights, this policy of segregation and apartheid, and to find out, in consultation with other people, whether some way is not still open to prevent this avalanche which is threatening and which is likely to overwhelm not only South Africa, but the peoples of the whole world. That is the way we would like this problem to be considered, in a constructive attempt to bring about a reversal of South African policy. It may be urged that there can be no hope for that. Certainly we see no silver lining in the dark cloud. Only this morning, as I said earlier, we had an indication of a lack of desire to join with us in pursuing this aim. But, after all, it is not asking too much. As I said before, among the people in the Union of South Africa there are liberal-minded people. After all, it is a Christian civilization which we have there, and the people cannot forget one of the greatest commandments given to them. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. In these days no doubt. a reference to such matters needs an apology. But we must not forget that these are vital forces that still exist and that South Africa, if it remembers this, will be able to join with us in finding a way in which charity will take the place of hatred and trust and co-operation will take the place of fear and suspicion. We quite understand, in one way, South Africas difficulty in creating one supreme, superior society, so that South Africa should be under the complete control, politically and economically, of the white African minority. Obviously that minority fears that if they do recognize fundamental human rights and give freedom and the right to vote to all the people, and take them into one community, there is a danger of 10 million people swamping a small group of 3 million. Undoubtedly they have that fear, but it is not possible, because of that fear, to deny what are recognized as basic human rights. One cannot be allowed to revert to the days of slavery or to create in the reserves a different set of human beings with a different value placed upon them,

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whether by restricting certain areas to certain types of work or by limiting the amenities of life to which human beings are entitled. One cannot be allowed to do that kind of thing, but if that is the way in which South Africa wants to preserve its identity at the risk of denying to a majority the rights of which those people should have then neither this Council nor any democratic body could tolerate such conduct. . . .

Document No. 39 Apartheid : Prime Minister Dudley Senanayakes Statement to the Press*
31 March 1960 We cannot help but express our deep concern at the recent incidents in South Africa. Consequent upon demonstrations by African crowds against the obnoxious Pass Laws which are part and parcel of apartheid and racial discrimination, the South African Police opened fire on demonstrators at Sharpaville and Langa. Reports indicate that over 70 people have been killed and over 200 injured. The circumstances of the shootings indicate a denial of human rights and of elementary justice. Many nations have therefore raised their voices in sorrow as well as in anger. We for our part extend our sympathy to the African people and express our dismay at these unbridled shootings. We have rejected and continue to reject and condemn the policies of racial supremacy and racial segregation.

Document No. 40 Apartheid : Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Statement in the Senate**
23 January 1964 We have expressed our attitude in regard to apartheid in South Africa in no uncertain terms on several occasions, and we have subscribed to the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa, although we have said that for such sanctions to be effective all nations of the world must unite in the applying of these sanctions and it would be futile for small countries such as ours to seek to impose such sanctions unilaterally merely as a gesture but without effect.

* Source : Ceylon Daily News, 31 March 1960. ** Source: Hansard (Senate), Vol. 19, cols. 2402.

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Documents No. 41 Racialism in South Africa and Rhodesia (General Policy Statement in the United Nations)*
21 December 1964 Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon) : The racial policies of the Government of South Africa have been the subject of discussion here since the founding of the United Nations. The General Assembly and the Security Council have passed numerous resolutions condemning these policies. Nation after nation has raised its voice in condemnation of apartheid in this forum and elsewhere, but nevertheless the Government of the Republic of South Africa has persisted in its policy of apartheid which we, too, unreservedly condemn. In fact, in the recent past, these policies of racial segregation have been intensified and measures to enforce them have been stepped up. Acts of repression against African nationalism can only make a solution more complicated, an understanding between the races more difficult, and the prospect for the future far less promising. This is indeed a great tragedy for South Africa, no less than for the African continent and the whole world. We are sorry to note that the situation in South Africa had deteriorated considerably in recent months. The reports of the Special Committee have drawn attention to this worsening situation. Further measures have been taken against the non-white elements of the population; the countrys military and police forces have been steadily built up; and laws upholding the policies of apartheid have been enforced without mitigation. It is our earnest hope that the Government of the Republic of South Africa will cease its defiance of world opinion and abandon its policy of racial segregation. We trust that South Africa, in its own interest, will realize the dangers of its policies and seek a solution which will be acceptable to all its people and to the world community represented in the United Nations. The United Nations should continue its efforts, despite the lack of response up to now, to guide South Africa on the correct path. This Organization should continue to explore every means to convince the Government of South Africa that it must cease its defiance of world opinion and abandon its policy of racial segregation. I should now like to express the views of my Government on the situation in Rhodesia. We find there a situation which is full of tension and a source of danger to peace and security of the African continent. This situation has arisen because a racial monitory of

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 19th Session, 1308th Pl. Mtg., Paras 67-76.

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white settlers has chosen to pursue policies designed to ensure their domination over an overwhelming majority of indigenous African peoples. It is a most unrealistic attitude. It is surely a travesty of all the principles of justice, equality and freedom that a minority of 220,000 whites should be in a position of privilege and dominance over an African population of 3 million. It is surely a travesty of the principles of democracy when we find this racist minority attempting to continue its domination by every conceivable means. It is a great pity that the group now in power in Rhodesia has failed to recognize the new realities of Africa. The white settler government has so far turned a blind eye to the winds of change that have swept across Africa in the last two decades. What has to be recognized is that these white settler minorities cannot expect to continue their domination and exploitation. It is surely common sense to recognize that these minorities can, and must, exist with the goodwill and confidence of their African partners. Goodwill and confidence can be won only by genuine partnership. Unfortunately, the racist group now holding power in Rhodesia has not shown this realism of common sense. Its policies seem to be guided in a direction opposite to that which progress, common sense and the tide of events in Africa would dictate. This is indeed a great tragedy. These retrograde policies can only bring chaos, racial violence and a bitterness between Whites and Africans that will take a great deal of time to erase. The whole position of the white settlers in Rhodesia is perhaps being endangered by the short-sighted, futile and narrow policies of the group now in power. We have consistently held the view that the United Kingdom has a special responsibility for exercising authority in the Rhodesian situation. The United Kingdom, as the metropolitan Power, is responsible for constitutional change and for progress in the march of its dependent territories towards independence. We trust that the United Kingdom will need the resolutions of the United Nations in regard to the constitutional rights of the indigenous population. We consider it desirable that the United Kingdom Government convene a constitutional conference to which all political groups in Rhodesia will be invited with a view to drafting a new constitution based on the principle of one man, one vote, universal suffrage and majority rule. I should like to express our support for the attitude taken by the United Kingdom in the face of threats by the Rhodesian regime of a unilateral declaration of independence. My Government is fully in agreement with the United Kingdom Government that such a unilateral declaration would be unacceptable and that independence for Rhodesia must be in accordance with the wishes of all the peoples of the territory. We are for Rhodesian independence at as early a date as possible, but independence must be given on the basis of a constitution with equal rights for all. We hope that rapid progress will be made towards this goal.

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Document No. 42 Sri Lanka Delegate on South Africas Disregard of UN Resolutions (General Policy Statement in the United Nations)*
1 October 1965 Mr. [G.G.] Ponnambalam (Ceylon): The peace-building operations of the United Nations should not, I respectfully submit, be confined to the resolution of actual conflicts between States but extended to cover conflicts that are known to exist even within national boundaries, where large numbers of people, differing in some respects from the governing authority, are being subjected to what I may describe as barbarous and inhuman treatment, and are thus denied the conditions essential to reaching fulfillment. In this connexion, I feel that it is tragic that South Africa, a Member State of this Assembly, pledged to observe and honour the principles of the Charter, among whose objectives is the encouragement and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, is almost inexorably committed to a policy of racial discrimination, intolerance and oppression. What is worse is that its Government should openly flout the resolutions and appeals of the United Nations. What is unfortunate here is that the authority, influence and prestige of the United Nations is being undermined, and this is affecting even the very foundations on which it rests. Appeals and resolutions have failed. Indeed, it would appear that South Africa has increased the tempo of its repressive policies. I should not like to suggest that the conditions are yet ripe for such a State to be excluded from this Organization, but I do feel that this World Assembly may, in this situation, take such action as would bring home to South Africa that it cannot conduct affairs, even within its own national boundaries, in such a way as to earn the eternal abhorrence and condemnation of world opinion. The conduct of South Africa is regrettably serving as an example to the minority section now in command in Southern Rhodesia. I find that, with a very restricted franchise, the Prime Minister of that territory proposes unilaterally to declare his countrys independence and has even taken a step towards asserting his intentions by exchanging so-called diplomatic representatives with Portugal, a country which has by no means an exemplary record in the pursuit of its colonial policy. Whilst we note with pleasure that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has expressed his disapproval of the intentions and objectives of Mr. Smith and of his government, I think that I am voicing the sentiments of a large majority of those States represented here if I venture to hope that he will bring the entire authority of Her Majestys Government to bear in creating a situation in Southern Rhodesia where the final arbiters of its destiny will be the permanent indigenous majority of that area.

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 20th Session, 1345th Pl. Mtg.

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Document No. 43 Sri Lanka Governments Statement on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Southern Rhodesia*
12 November 1965 The Government of Southern Rhodesia declared its independence from Britain unilaterally yesterday. The Government of Ceylon had always been of the view that such a precipitous step would be harmful to international peace and security and the cause of good relations between different racial groups represented in Southern Rhodesia. The Government of Ceylon regrets the action taken by the Government of Southern Rhodesia in declaring its independence unilaterally. It finds itself unable to extend any recognition of the present regime in Southern Rhodesia. The Government of Ceylon is committed to the principle of one man, one vote and will only accept the emergence to independence of Southern Rhodesia under a Constitution which has that principle as a basic ingredient. The Government of Ceylon will act in concert with the other countries of the Commonwealth and the United Nations in seeking a solution to the continued problem of Southern Rhodesia.

* Source : Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, Colombo.

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Document No. 44 Defence Agreement between His Majestys Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon*
11 November 1947 WHEREAS Ceylon has reached the stage in constitutional development at which she is ready to assume the status of a fully responsible member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, in no way subordinate in any aspect of domestic or external affairs, freely associated and united by common allegiance to the Crown; AND WHEREAS it is in the mutual interest of Ceylon and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the necessary measures should be taken for the effectual protection and defence of the territories of both and that the necessary facilities should be afforded for this purpose; THEREFORE the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon have agreed as follows :1. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon will give to each other such military assistance for the security of their territories, for defence against external aggression and for the protection of essential communications as it may be in their mutual interest to provide. The Government of the United Kingdom may base such naval and air forces and maintain such land forces in Ceylon as may be required for these purposes, and as may be mutually agreed. The Government of Ceylon will grant to the Government of the United Kingdom all the necessary facilities for the objects mentioned in Article 1 as may be mutually agreed. These facilities will include the use of naval and air bases and ports and military establishments and the use of telecommunications facilities, and the right of service courts and authorities to exercise such control and jurisdiction over members of the said Forces as they exercise at present. The Government of the United Kingdom will furnish the Government of Ceylon with such military assistance as may from time to time be required towards the training and development of Ceylonese armed forces.

2.

3.

* Source: Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs (1931-1952), Vol. II (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1953), PP. 749-750; Also see, Sir Ivor Jennings, The Constitution of Ceylon (Third Edition), London, 1953, Appendx V.

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4.

The two Governments will establish such administrative machinery as they may agree to be desirable for the purpose of co-operation in regard to defence matters, and to co-ordinate and determine the defence requirements of both Governments. This Agreement will take effect on the day when the constitutional measures necessary for conferring on Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations shall come into force.

5.

Done in Duplicate, at Colombo, this 11th day of November, 1947. Signed on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Henry Moore Signed on behalf of the Government of Ceylon D.S. Senanayake

Document No. 45 External Affairs Agreement between His Majesty Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon*
11 November 1947 WHEREAS Ceylon has reached the stage in constitutional development at which she is ready to assume the status of a fully responsible member of the British Commonwealth of Nations in no way subordinate in any aspect of domestic or external affairs, freely associated and united by common allegiance to the Crown; AND WHEREAS the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ceylon are desirous of entering into an agreement to provide for certain matters relating to external affairs; THEREFORE the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon have agreed as follows :1. The Government of Ceylon declares the readiness of Ceylon to adopt and follow the resolutions of past Imperial Conferences.

* Source: Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs (1931-1952), Vol. II (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1953), PP. 750-751; Also see, Sir Ivor Jennings, The Constitution of Ceylon (Third Edition), London, 1953, Appendix V.

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2.

In regard to external affairs generally, and in particular to the communication of information and consultation, the Government of the United Kingdom will, in relation to Ceylon observe the principles and practice now observed by the Members of the Commonwealth, and the Ceylon Government will for its part observe these same principles and practice. The Ceylon Government will be represented in London by a High Commissioner for Ceylon, and the Government of the United Kingdom will be represented in Colombo by a High Commissioner for the United Kingdom. If the Government of Ceylon so requests, the Government of the United Kingdom will communicate to the Governments of the foreign countries with which Ceylon wishes to exchange diplomatic representatives, proposals for such exchange. In any foreign country where Ceylon has no diplomatic representative the Government of the United Kingdom will, if so requested by the Government of Ceylon, arrange for its representatives to act on behalf of Ceylon. The Government of the United Kingdom will lend its full support to any application by Ceylon for membership of the United Nations, or of any specialized international agency as described in Article 57 of the United Nations Charter. All obligations and responsibilities heretofore devolving on the Government of the United Kingdom which arise from any valid international instrument shall henceforth insofar as such instrument may be held to have application to Ceylon devolve upon the Government of Ceylon. The reciprocal rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the United Kingdom in virtue of the application of any such international instrument to Ceylon shall henceforth be enjoyed by the Government of Ceylon. This Agreement will take effect on the day when the constitutional measures necessary for conferring on Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations shall come into force.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Done in Duplicate, at Colombo, this 11th day of November, 1947. Signed on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Henry Moore Signed on behalf of the Government of Ceylon D.S. Senanayake

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Document No. 46 Prime Minister D. S. Senanayakes speech in the House of Representatives on the Motion on the Independence of Ceylon)*
1 December 1947 I beg to move, That this house rejoices that after many years of subjection to foreign rule the struggle of the people of Ceylon for freedom has culminated in the attainment of independence. It is with very great pleasure that I move the Motion standing in my name. I believe that there is none in this House, not even among the hon. Members seated opposite, who will not rejoice at the prospect of achieving once again the freedom of this country. Long and resolutely, through many a change of fortune, did our ancestors hold on to their freedom. But for 442 years the maritime provinces of this Island have been under European occupation. 132 years ago the last bastion of our independence, the Kandyan Kingdom, was lost. Now, however, we regain our lost sovereignty. We are no longer a subject race and everyone assembled here, every patriotic citizen has reason to rejoice. But, Mr. Speaker, some of my Friends opposite, some who feel that they have to be critics of the Government, even at the cost of truth, sense and good-will, say that they cannot see that we are fully through. Sir, none are so blind as those who will not see. All the relevant documents have now been published or summarized in Sessional Paper XXII of 1947. It should be obvious to anyone who has perused them that our freedom is neither limited nor qualified and we will have no limitations or qualifications except what we, as prudent men, choose to attach to it ourselves. Let me consider some of the statements that have been made. It has been suggested that the Ceylon Independence Bill only camouflages our subjection. When this Bill was published the critics were hard put to it to find even a comma wrong. Some of them, however, said that the Bill did not specifically confer Dominion Status. But, Sir, no Act of Parliament has ever specifically conferred Dominion Status on any country. Dominion Status is not a legal phrase and, I am advised, is never used by lawyers in formal documents. We asked for all the powers of an independent country within the British Commonwealth and these, the lawyers have given us in this Bill. The Statute of Westminster is generally regarded as a Statute which gives or recognizes all such powers, and all the provisions of that Statute have been incorporated in the Ceylon Independence Bill as they were in the Indian Independence Act.

* Source : Hansard, (HR), Vol. 1, 1947, Cols. 437-446.

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The critics also say that this Island is not being called the Dominion of Ceylon. They make a point of the fact that the Indian Independence Act set up the Dominions of India and Pakistan. Sir, there had to be a Dominion of India and a Dominion of Pakistan because the lawyers had to divide British India into two and a descriptive designation had to be assigned to each of the two parts. Our critics surely have overlooked the fact that this Parliament has been given the power to call this Island anything it pleases. If hon. Members on the other side would wish to call it the Dominion of Ceylon, I suggest that they put down a Motion. Indeed, in point of fact, wherever in the law of the United Kingdom it was necessary to distinguish Dominions from Colonies, Ceylon has been included by this Bill among the Dominions. This Bill gives us all the powers that the United Kingdom Parliament is capable of giving us. It hands Ceylon over to the people of Ceylon. It deprives the British Parliament and the British Government of their power over us. I feel certain that no hon. Member of this House disagrees with this statement. If my Friends opposite do not like the long title of the Bill, all they have to do is to introduce a Bill to remove the long title, for the Ceylon Independence Act will be part of the law of Ceylon which can be changed by the Parliament of Ceylon, and my Friends have only to secure the requisite majority in the House to realize their wishes. In the meantime, however, I suggest that they use the short title The Ceylon Independence Act which is good enough for me. I suppose that, before I pass on, I should refer to the right of secession, though I have already explained the position fully in Seasonal Paper XXII of 1947. There is nothing in the Bill about the right to secede because it is unnecessary. It is not in the Statute of Westminster, nor is it in the Indian Independence Act. An Independent State within the Commonwealth can, if it pleases, become an Independent State outside the Commonwealth. That follows from independence. As a Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs is reported to have said once, the right to secede is just as much inherent in the constitutional status of a Dominion as the right to suicide is inherent in the personal status of an individual We are within the Commonwealth because of the common law of England and Acts of Parliament of the United Kingdom. If we want to get outside the Commonwealth we must change that part of the law of Ceylon, and this we should be able to do under paragraph 1 of the First Schedule to the Ceylon Independence Act. But we must also remove the preface the King and the Governor-General from our Constitution by means of a Constitutional amendment which would require the support of two thirds of the Members of the House of Representatives. For a lawyer that seems to be an unusually plain statement. It confirms the assertion in my Memorandum that we have the same right to secede as any of the other Dominions.

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Hon. Members may have followed with interest the speeches made in the United Kingdom Parliament on the Ceylon Independence Bill. They would no doubt, have noted the categorical statement on this particular point made by the spokesman of His Majestys Opposition. That statement was not contradicted. Indeed, all Parties in the House of Commons seem to have agreed with it. It cannot indeed be otherwise. So, I would say to such of my hon. Friends as want to secede, the remedy, gentlemen, is in your own hands. Sir, I am happy, and I believe the great majority of hon. Members of this House are also happy, that we are able to attain our freedom without the long delay inevitable in the passage of legislation for Constitutional amendments through Parliament. This Government of which I am the Head appreciate the action of the Government of the United Kingdom in effecting these amendments by Order in Council. If legislation was proposed in this Parliament, it would have taken months and perhaps years to see it through. The number of the amendments required is very large and everyone of them would have had to be debated both in this House and in another place. I am not at all sure that what proved acceptable in this House would have proved equally acceptable in another place. If there was any difference of opinion, the Bill would have had to be re-introduced a second Session and debated at length again. Even then the Bill would not have become law for it would have had to be reserved under our present Constitution for Royal Assent. Then perhaps we would have been obliged to begin arguments with the British Government; nor do I know what sort of British Government it would be. Although the circumstances that all parties in the United Kingdom have agreed with the present proposal leads me to think that it would not have adopted a different attitude from that taken up by the Labour Government of today, yet another Government might not be as helpful as the present one which has done all that we asked it to do, though lawyers still send telegrams to each other about the exact phrasing. Sir, I have no doubt whatever that we have taken the right course in seeking to get freedom now while the going is good. Then, if anybody wants further Constitutional amendments, let him introduce a Bill which will not have to be reserved. Our critics really are a little inconsistent. They attack the limitations in our Constitution and then they attack us for getting them removed. Sir, we are not gerrymandering the Constitution to suit the U.N.P. We are rather removing the limitations on our freedom as quickly as the lawyers and the Parliament of the United Kingdom will let us, so that the people of Ceylon may be free to govern themselves as they and they alone deem fit.. Now, Sir, what are the limitations under the present Constitution in respect of internal affairs? You know what they are. If anybody wishes to know how they are being removed, let him look at the preambles to the Defence and External Affairs Agreements. . . . They are a shortened form of the famous Balfour Declaration of 1926 which defines Dominion Status. They are intended to tell the nations of the world that we have as

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much right to membership of the United Nations Organization as Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India and Pakistan. Let us look at Clause 6 of the External Affairs Agreement which transfers to us the rights and obligations of the United Kingdom in relation to Ceylon. This is the document which gives us full international status, and I am sure that no hon. Member wishes to vote against that. In the past, the United Kingdom has conducted our foreign policy, without consulting us. In future we shall conduct it ourselves. But from this Agreement we obtain an even greater advantage: We require the United Kingdom to consult us about its own foreign policy. If the Soviet Union or any other country would like to do the same, I am sure that the Cabinet will be happy to agree. It is British policy that affects us most, because by making arrangements with other countries they could, if they wanted to, destroy our trade and our security. Suppose, for instance, they give bases in the Maldives or Malaya to somebody not well disposed towards us, where shall we be? Under Clauses 1 and 2 we get the right to be consulted. Naturally we give them the same right, but we give up nothing else. We formulate our own policy, tell the United Kingdom about it, and if we receive any representations, consider them, but do in the end just as we please. For the United Kingdom will have no power to veto our action. An hon. Member opposite is reported to have said that Clause 1 bound us to accept the policy of the Imperial Conferences. No doubt he spoke hurriedly, for the Imperial Conferences have laid down no policy. Each member of the Commonwealth has its own policy. Hon. Members who read their newspapers know that Great Britain and the Dominions often vote on different sides. The Imperial Conferences have agreed on consultation and where possible on co-operation. In view of the hon. members statement, however, I asked for a precise statement of the rights and obligations under Clauses 1 and 2. The following decision of the Imperial Conference of 1930 summarizes the whole position : (1) Any of His Majestys Governments conducting negotiations should inform the other Governments of His Majesty, in case they should be interested, and give them the opportunity of expressing their views if they think that their interests may be affected; (II)Any of His Majestys Governments on receiving such information should, if it desires to express any views, do so with reasonable promptitude; (III)None of His Majestys Governments can take any steps which might involve the other Governments of His Majesty in any active obligations without their definite consent. Is there anything in that statement to which we can possibly object? What it really means is that the External Affairs Department of this Government will receive a constant stream of information from London which it will check carefully to see that our interests are not affected adversely in any way. If they are, the Prime Minister can

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cable direct to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom or cable to our High Commissioner to call on the Foreign Secretary and make representations. Naturally, we accept the same obligation to send information, but it seems to me that we get 99 percent of the bargain. This is an Agreement with the United Kingdom because Britain is surrendering power to us. But it does not in any way stop us from making Agreements with other countries inside or outside the Commonwealth. In particular, there is our great and friendly neighbour, the Dominion of India, with whom we ought to collaborate closely. It will be very much easier for us to do so when we know that they are getting the same documents in New Delhi as we are getting in Colombo. Finally, I move to the subject of Defence. I fear that hon. Members must begin not merely to think about this subject but also to vote large sums of money. The defence of its country is one of the primary obligations of an independent State, and this is not the sort of world in which small nations can be secure without large and expensive armed forces. We are in a specially dangerous position, because we are in one of the strategic highways of the world. The country which captures Ceylon could dominate the Indian Ocean. Nor is it only a question of protecting ourselves against invasion and air attack. If we had no imports for three months, we should starve, and we have therefore to protect our sea and air communications. I was in charge of food supplies and rice during the war and I know how much we relied on the British Navy and the British Air Force for our food supplies. Frankly, I cannot accept the responsibility of being Minister of Defence unless I am provided with the means of Defence. And for this purpose, I do not need only an enlarged Ceylon Light Infantry, Ceylon Garrison Artillery, or the Ceylon Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. I require guns and tanks, fighter and bomber aircraft; aircraft-carriers, cruisers, destroyers, escort vessels and submarines, and so on. . . . We cannot produce any of these armaments in this Island, and if we bought even onetenth of what we need we should not merely exhaust our sterling balances but also put ourselves under the thumbs of the City of London or Wall Street. I do not think that the hon. Members opposite would welcome that prospect. I ask the hon. Members to be honest with themselves and their constituents. They know as well as I do that we cannot defend ourselves. What is the good of freedom if it is liable to be destroyed at any moment by any country that finds our wealth and strategic position attractive? Let us confess that our freedom depends on somebody or other undertaking to help us defend ourselves. Nor can we afford to pay anybody to defend us. As I look round the countries of the world, I see at the moment only one country with sufficient interest in us to defend us at their expense, and that country is Great Britain. . . . Surely, so long as disarmament is not universal, so long as independent sovereign States maintain their own armies, navies and air forces, so long will we too in Ceylon need the aid of such forces to preserve our newly-won sovereignty. We cannot do so unaided. Therefore, the only question for us is whether Britain will help us defend ourselves on terms which we can accept. Fortunately our security is involved in her security. She must keep the Indian Ocean open to her ships and aircraft. These ships and aircraft

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carry the great mass of supplies which feed and clothe us. Consequently we are in a position to bargain, and I believe we have bargained to good purpose. The Defence Agreements give us what we want. There are no secret agreements or informal undertakings. The details will be settled from time to time by the machinery to be set up by mutual agreement under Clause 4. Hon. Members will see that every clause provides for Agreement. We shall provide what Defence Forces we can, and Britain will provide them with such training and equipment we require. We shall decide what bases, forces and facilities it will be in our interests to authorize, so that our country may be secure, so that it may be defended against external aggression, so that essential communications may be safeguarded. Indeed, what I fear is not that the United Kingdom will want to base too many forces here, but that they will base too few for our security, as they did in 1942. We escaped then by Providential grace. I would not like that experience repeated. I need say nothing about the Public Officers Agreement, as I do not believe any Member will question its equity. I would now ask the House to take a view of the whole picture. We are given independence, and every Member of the House knows it. The only doubt in my mind is whether every hon. Member will have the courage of his personal conviction to admit it. Sir, what are the requisites of a sovereign, independent, State? Legislative autonomy? We have it. Freedom to order our external relations as we wish? We have it. Freedom to take such measures as we want to ensure our defence and security? We have it. . . .

Document No. 47 Mr. P.G.B. Keunemans (Communist Party) Speech in the House of Representatives on the Motion on the Independence of Ceylon*
1 December 1947. We are being asked to rejoice that independence has been bestowed upon us even before the so-called Independence Bill has been passed by the British Parliament even before the Order in Council is issued by His Majesty the King. We have not been told what it is to contain. Apart from the short description in the documents published by the Government, all that we have before us for this Debate are the Agreements entered into between our Government and His Majestys Government in the United Kingdom.

* Source : Hansard (HR), Vol. I, 1947, Cols. 448-456;465.

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The Government Motion asks us to rejoice because, after a long struggle for freedom, the people of this country have attained independence. The Hon. Prime Minister suggested that we on these Benches are opposing this Motion, or speaking against it, not out of conviction, not because we believe in our cause, but because we wish to oppose merely for the sake of opposition. Let me assure the Hon. Prime Minister that we on this side of the House are very deeply interested in the question of the independence of the country. There are many members here who have suffered in the struggle for the independence of this country, and if independence had been achieved, then, I say, there would be no division in this House. We would go right up to the Hon. Prime Minister and shake him by the hand and say we rejoice with him on our independence. But Mr. Speaker, what we see in this Motion is not the conferment of independence on the people of this country but a tremendous bluff on the part of the Government, a bluff that is meant to persuade us that we have got something more than we have actually received. It is a bluff which is intended to cover up the reality of what is taking place. That is the first charge I make in this Debate against the Government. I certainly concede, no sensible man would fail to concede, that the Bill gives us far greater legislative powers than we have enjoyed so far. To that extent, I do agree with the Hon. Prime Minister. I am prepared to concede that the Bill gives us what the long title states it gives - fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations. But I think there is a difference, not a hair-splitting difference, but a real difference, between stating that and asking us to throw up our hats and rejoice that the struggle of the people for freedom has culminated in the attainment of independence. What we are witnessing today is the culmination, not of the struggle for freedom, but of an elaborate process by which Great Britain, particularly British Imperialism, is passing from the direct to indirect forms of rule in this country. There is a song, favourite among the hillbillies of America, to this effect :The old grey mare, she aint what she used to be many long years ago. . . . I think that old grey mare reminds us, to some extent, of the position of Britain today, of British Imperialism. Like the old grey mare, she aint what she used to be. The country which was the money-lender, the creditor, of the world has, as our Finance Minister told us today, become a debtor to the whole world. From being the workshop of the world, she is finding her basic industries declining. The tribute which she received from the colonies is dwindling, because the colonial people are getting more and more free. As a result of the tremendous advances made during the war by the progressive movements in every country, particularly by the national and socialist movements in the different countries of the world, Great Britain finds it impossible to continue her rule in the old way.

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That is why we see an elaborate attempt to change over from direct to indirect methods of rule. Mr. E. W. Perera, speaking about the three Officers of State under the Donoughmore Constitution, once referred to them as three policemen in plain clothes in the State Council. What is happening today is not that the Police Force of Imperialism is being abolished, but that it is being reorganized and Ceylonized: Instead of three European policemen, we are getting Ceylonese policemen in the form of the Cabinet. That is what is happening in this country, Mr. Speaker. The Government, in proposing this Motion, has made many statements to us. The Government informs us that we have been granted the status of a self-governing Dominion, within the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Prime Minister went to great pains to insist that we have the right to secede at any time we like, at any time a Motion for secession gets a majority in our Parliament. It is also suggested that we have the same rights as those enjoyed by the other Dominions and by the new Dominions of India and Pakistan. I believe I am correctly interpreting the point of view of the Prime Minister. It is true, of course, Mr. Speaker that certain Agreements have been entered into, but we are informed by Government Spokesmen that these Agreements are agreements between equals, that these Agreements can be repudiated at any moment, if we do not want them. I do not say that that was the statement made by the Prime Minister. It was stated by other Members of the Government. It was also stated that we could enter into agreements with other Powers relating to Defence. All this is reason why we are asked to accept the Resolution introduced by the Hon. Prime Minister. Now, all this is very well. But is all this so? It seems to me that the Hon. Prime Minister is the author of a very remarkable and new theory of freedom. We have heard of a great deal of freedom by bloody revolution. We have heard of a great deal of freedom by peaceful negotiation and non-violent struggle. I believe the Governors Address setting out the policy of the Government talked about the fact that we have achieved freedom without any bloodshed. I am not here to advocate bloodshed or violence. I am only here drawing attention to the fact that the Hon. Prime Minister has evolved a new school of freedom and that is, freedom through interpretation. Whenever the British Government makes a Statement, the Hon. Prime Minister and his legal advisers, to whom he referred, sit down and interpret all possible meanings which may be contained in that Statement. It is on the basis of these interpretations, on the basis of these understandings, and not on the basis of clear declarations by the British Government itself that we are asked to accept whatever proposals are put forward by the Hon. Prime Minister. I would remind the Hon. Prime Minster that his theory of freedom by interpretation does not always work out. You will recall, Mr. Speaker, that in 1943 a Reforms Declaration was made by the British Government. The Hon. Prime Minister and the then Board of Ministers gave it a certain interpretation and proceeded to act on that

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interpretation. Subsequently, they were informed that the British Government did not agree with them. The British Government put a different interpretation on the Declaration, and the result was the sending out to this country of the Soulbury Commission. I should like to remind the House that the freedom by interpretation theory of the Hon. Prime Minister is by no means an infallible theory. Let us for a moment examine this freedom. The Hon. Prime Minister has asked us to examine what we have got and test it in the light of freedom as we understand it. Let us test it in terms, not of the interpretations made by the Government, but let us test it with the actual documents that are available to us. It is extremely significant, in studying the whole process of negotiation or that part of it which we have been allowed to study because all the documents are not yet available - it is very significant that right throughout these negotiations the British Government has been most careful and cautious not to mention anything about Dominion Status for Ceylon. The Hon. Prime Minister said that Dominion Status is a term which lawyers do not like. I believe that that is so. But, at the same time, Dominion Status and the word status as such have certain definite legal meanings. If one attains the status of a major, that means that there are certain rights and certain obligations attaching to that particular status. And, therefore, when we find this very studied neglect even to make mention of Dominion Status by the British Government, are we then unreasonable in being a little suspicious, Mr. Speaker? I would remind the Hon. Prime Minister of the lengthy process of what happened. I believe it was on June 18th of this year that there was a statement by the British Government. The Statement was that they were prepared to co-operate with us in our advance towards Dominion Status. But when it came to actually what we were going to get, it was Fully Responsible Status within the British Commonwealth of Nations. Then, Mr. Speaker, there was recently a Debate in the British House of Commons. It was remarkable how the Right Hon. Mr. Arthur Creech Jones, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, avoided the words Dominion Status as if they were something frightful and used the words Dominion Stature . There is a great deal of difference between stature and status. I am not splitting hairs, Mr. Speaker. One can reach the stature of a major; one can have the physical attainments of a major; but if one does not have the status of a major, one does not get all the rights and obligations which attach to that position. His Excellency the Governor in his broadcast also used this very convenient phrase, Dominion Stature. Apparently we are ripe to become a Dominion. Apparently we are on the threshold of becoming a Dominion. Apparently we have all the physical aspects of becoming a Dominion. We are told by Members that we have a Prime Minister worthy of being the Prime Minister of a Dominion. But none of these means that we are a Dominion.

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The Government asks us to rejoice at the attainment of freedom. The Hon. Prime Minister referred in his speech to the right to secede, which is indeed an important right, an important test of whether sovereignty has been conferred. And I fully appreciate the fact that the Hon. Prime Minister has raised this issue fairly and squarely. I think in his study of Constitutional Law, or in the summaries given to him by his legal advisers, the Hon. Prime Minister would have realized that there is a considerable difference of opinion among legal men about whether any Dominion has the right to secede. But, be that as it may, the important question is that if such a right exists in the case of Dominions, if it exists in the case of India and Pakistan, it exists as a result of the equality of status between Britain and the Dominions. This issue was recognized by Imperial Conferences and set out later on in the Preamble to the Statute of Westminster which gave sanction to these particular decisions taken earlier. Is this the case in Ceylon? Is there that equality of status which is the touch-stone of our right to secede? The Hon. Prime Minister referred me and the hon. Members on the Opposition benches to the recitals to the Agreements. I am glad he mentioned this because certainly we have no Preamble in the Ceylon Independence Bill saying that there is equality of status. But in the recitals to the Agreements, certainly there are references. Let me draw your attention to these very questions. First of all, may I say that recital to an Agreement has no legal validity whatsoever. You and I, Mr. Speaker, might come to an agreement. We might have a recital to the Agreement describing what excellent persons we are. But the operative part of that Agreement consists of the Clauses in which we agree, not how we describe ourselves. Be that as it may. Let me now take up the Hon. Prime Minister on what he said. The Hon. Prime Minister said that what is stated in the recitals, is a shortened form of what was contained in the Balfour Declaration. I agree with the Hon. Prime Minister that it is shortened but it is shortened on the most significant points, Mr. Speaker. Let me read the recital to the Agreement on Defence: Whereas Ceylon has reached the stage in Constitutional development at which she is ready to assume the status of a fully responsible member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, in no way subordinate in any aspect of domestic or external affairs, freely associated and united by common allegiance to the Crown. .... The relevant clause of the Balfour Declaration states that Great Britain and the Dominions are: autonomous in themselves within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external

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affairs, though united by common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Certainly, the recitals to our Agreements are a shortened form of the Balfour Declaration, but I submit that they are a significantly shortened form, a shortened form which has dis-embowelled all that is stated in the Balfour Declaration. The recitals to our Agreements say that Ceylon is in no way subordinate - but subordinate to whom, Mr. Speaker? There is a significant silence on this matter. The Balfour Declaration says subordinate one to another. Our recitals speak of freely associated - but with whom Mr. Speaker? And when we come to the all-important words equal in status, Mr. Speaker, by some significant coincidence these are dropped altogether in the shortened form, that is in the recitals of our Agreements. I think that the Hon. Prime Minister, when he reads these recitals again should allow these questions to exercise his mind. From what we have heard and from what we know of the negotiations which have led to the drawing up of these particular documents that have been placed before us, I wish to state that the independence which we are asked to celebrate is not even equal to Dominion Status as enjoyed by the Dominions of India and Pakistan. I wish also to say that that independence is contrary to what the Hon. Prime Minister says we have got. It does not include the right to secede. The only way in which, I believe, we can legally secede is by persuading the British Government to pass an Act of Secession for us. No Conventions are established - as they are established in the case of the Dominions whereby any Act passed by us will automatically be introduced in the British Parliament. That is the type of freedom which we are given, and that is the type of freedom which I think the Hon. Prime Minister should fairly and squarely place before this House for its approval not something which has not been given. I say that we have no right to repudiate these Agreements, whatever may be said on the other side. I say that these Agreements do not give us the right for an independent policy in Defence or External Affairs. We have also, Mr. Speaker, no guarantee whatsoever that the British troops which we are going to allow to reside in this Island will not be used against the people of this country if we attempt, for instance, to nationalize British interests in this country, if there is a revolt against the Government of this country, if there is the development of a Radical movement in this country. These questions were specifically asked in the British House of Commons by Mr. Piratin, and there was significant silence by the Government. . . . I, for one, am perfectly convinced that this country must be and will be an independent country. I am convinced, as the Hon. Prime Minister stressed, that this country must construct an effective organization of defence, that one of the jobs we have to do when we get freedom is to protect that freedom. There is no quarrel upon those particular points. But I cannot subscribe to the theory that

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the best method of defence, the only method of defence, is an exclusive alliance with a country 7,000 miles away. The Hon. Prime Minister referred to the fact that we are a small country and as a small country we cannot protect ourselves by ourselves. That is an undeniable fact. But I would also suggest to the Hon. Prime Minister that today it is not only small countries that cannot protect themselves by themselves. Even the very biggest and strongest countries in the world today cannot protect themselves by themselves. The United States of America is a very big and strong country. The Soviet Union is a very big and strong country. These two countries are perhaps the biggest and the strongest countries in the world today. If they can protect themselves by themselves, why is it necessary for them to enter the U.N.O. to ensure a system of collective security ? Sir, the Hon. Prime Minister stated that I had said that we need not have a Defence Force because the U.N.O. will look after us. What I said was that I advocated a defence policy based on a regional alliance with the other South East Asian countries under the authority of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. I have not said that we should not have an Army or Navy or Air force. In doing so, I was advocating a different type of Defence policy, a Defence policy which will not be based on the continuation of Imperial control in this country, which will not be based on giving imperialism bases from which to attack Asia. That was what I intended to convey in my speech.

Document No. 48 Dr. N.M Perera (LSSP) on the Motion on the Independence of Ceylon (Extract)*
2 December 1947. Anyway, the Ceylon Independence Bill falls short of the Indian Independence Act, (1) by not referring to the concept of Dominion at all; (2) insofar as it does not provide for the amendment of the Act itself for which, in the Indian Independence Bill, we find special provision made therein. You find, Sir, that the words, provision of this or any existing or future act of parliament. In the Indian Independence Bill, specifically provide that this act itself can be amended by the respective Dominions in India. That is a provision that does not obtain in the Ceylon Independence Bill. Then (3), a provision has also been made in the Indian Independence Act for the complete disallowance of the British Parliament to legislate at all for the Indian Governments.
* Source: Hansard (HR), Vol. I, 1947, Col. 610.

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Those three things make it quite clear that there is behind this Ceylon Independence Bill something much lower in status than has been conceded to India. There can be no doubt about it. The various Irish Free States established their constitution by virtue of a Constituent Assembly. The Indian Government hopes to establish its constitution by virtue of a Constituent Assembly. The Burmese people hope to establish a \constitution by virtue of a Constituent Assembly. That, Sir, is an essential ingredient in the modern concept of independence, even Dominion Status within the British Empire. We have only three examples of the establishment of new constitutions after the Imperial Conferences and following on the last Great War. In every case the Constitutions of those Dominions have been set up by virtue of Constituent Assemblies. Is that not plain to hon. Members?

Document No. 49 Defence and External Affairs Agreements, 1947. Comment by Mr. W. Dahanayake, (Independent) M.P.*
1 December 1947. It was on the 18th of June this year that the Governor made an announcement to the State Council, and simultaneously the same announcement was made in the House of Commons. And this is the relevant portion of that announcement: His Majestys Government recognized that the people of Ceylon are anxious to see their aim realized. Elections are now being arranged under the Constitution and a new Parliament will assemble in October. Clearly no further constitutional changes can take place before a new Ceylon Government is in office and fully functioning. Agreements will then have to be negotiated on a number of subjects. When such Agreements have been concluded on terms satisfactory to His Majestys Government and the Ceylon Government, immediate steps will be taken to amend the Constitution so as to confer upon Ceylon fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations. am sure the Hon. Prime Minister understands the significance of conjunctions and adverbs. Let us take two important sentences : Agreements will then have to be negotiated on a number of subjects.

* Source : Hansard (HR), 1947, Vol. I, Cols. 477 78.

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And, When such agreements have been concluded on terms satisfactory to his Majestys Government and the Ceylon Government, immediate steps would be taken to amend the constitution. . . . Note the use of the words then and when. The Hon. Prime Minister will agree that on the face of it, according to the plain language used in this Declaration, there would have been no Independence whatever if the Agreements had not been concluded. The British Parliament which the Hon. Prime Minister thinks has been generous would never have dreamt of putting the Ceylon Independence Bill on the Statute Book, if the Hon. Prime Minister in his generosity had not signed certain agreements. I think no Government spokesman can challenge that position. The basis of our newly - won status are the Agreements, and anybody who forgets the Agreements forgets the substance and chases, in my view, after the shadow. . . .

Document No. 50 Prime Minister D.S. Senanayakes Reply to the Motion on Independence*
3 December 1947. As a matter of fact, I went to England at a time when we were not expecting the final result of our efforts. I must say that there were demands made at different times and I was trying my very best to get them together as far as we possibly could. During that time not only was a request made for our full rights but the statement was also made that we might come to these Agreements. I believe I had stated then that within three years we would get Dominion Status. I can tell hon. Members that at those conferences with Lord Hall, then Mr. Hall, he promised us full Dominion Status within three years. I am glad that they have not only given it but given it in 2 years instead of keeping us waiting for 3 years. Not only that, even during the negotiations there was this personal promise made to me, and that, I believe was made in a statement by Sir Fredrick Burrows who, speaking about Ceylon, said that we would, within three years, be getting Dominion Status. In fact when this matter was being discussed, they promised to give us Dominion Status, and we were making

* Source : Hansard (HR), 1947, Vol. 1, Cols. 729-733.

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all the necessary arrangements possible to get it. I have, therefore, not the slightest fear that Britain will try to deceive us. I am sure the conferment of Dominion Status was not due mainly to the efforts made by the people of Ceylon; it was due partly to the change of policy in England. Now under that policy they want to have a Commonwealth of Free Nations having equal rights with each other. My good friend the hon. Third Member for Colombo Central [Mr. P.G. B. Keuneman] speaking about this Agreement wanted to know with whom we were to have equal rights. I might tell him that this Agreement is one between Great Britain and ourselves, and as such if he reads the Preamble to this Agreement, he will see it stated there that we are in no way subordinate to Britain. I think we should be satisfied if we get a status which is in no way subordinate to Britain and that should also be sufficient for our Friends opposite. It has been stated that we are not so much concerned with the grant of Dominion Status as with the Agreement itself. It has been stated that the Agreements were a prerequisite to the grant of Dominion Status. I admit that. It must be realized, Sir, that Britain has undertaken certain responsibilities and she has to discharge certain obligations. Now one of the responsibilities is with regard to the Public Servants who were appointed by the Secretary of State. They have come out here on agreement and it is, therefore, necessary for Britain, in the case of those Public Officers who have come out here on agreement, to see that the agreements Ceylon entered into with them are observed by us. Then there are other responsibilities she has undertaken on our behalf; as long as those responsibilities are there, they must be discharged by her. It is therefore, for the purpose of discharging those responsibilities that we have been given full power to enter in to any agreement we like. Now take, for instance, the case of loans that we have raised in England. They are the trustees for us. Now if we want to keep those loans going we shall have to agree to honour the conditions that had been agreed to by Britain on our behalf . But if we do not want to honour those conditions, we can pay off those loans and enter in to fresh agreements. The agreements become necessary for no other reason but because of the obligations that Britain had undertaken on our behalf. There was, therefore, this necessity for an agreement to be reached before Dominion Status was granted. Besides that, it was necessary in our own interest to have an agreement to provide for our defense. My good Friends have always said that I like to keep my connexions with Britain. That is absolutely true. As far as I am concerned, I cannot think of a better and a safer friend for Ceylon than Britain. I would ask my Friends to look round the world and see for themselves whether there is anyone else who can be of better use to us and of greater help to us than Britain. It has also been claimed by my Friends that because they happened to shout at Galle Face or to hoot at Price Park, Britain became frightened and handed over

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Ceylon to us. However much they may like to feel that they were responsible for obtaining this freedom, I can assure the House that it was not the hooting or the shouting of the Communists that helped us to get this freedom. I ask you, Sir, if England on her own, without hearing the hoots of these people, without being frightened of them, had agreed to give us independence, whether that was not done in good faith and in pursuance of a policy that she had adopted. I do not want to go into whatever policies the British people may have pursued in the past or whatever good or bad they may have done, but I can say this, that it is they who are helping us to become a free nation once again, and it is they who can, I feel, keep us free even from the intrusion of this Russian menace. So when I knew of all these things, should I not have desired and wished to try and come to some agreement with Britain ? If my good Friends feel that we must sever our connexions with Britain and if they feel that they can have no better protection than from Russia, well, they are quite welcome to try and get that alliance. But I, for my part, will do all I can to prevent them from succeeding in such an alliance. But if they succeed, it would have to be with the will of the people. At the same time they should be only too willing to accept this Agreement for no other reason than that they could, with the will of the people, change our laws. Under this Bill we have the right even to change any allegiance or contacts or friends. We have been given this right. So why should they object to it if they are so confident that the masses will be with them ? Now, according to this agreement we know that Britain cannot enact any law affecting Ceylon. All the power that Britain had in that respect has been transferred to Ceylon, and when the power to change our constitution is exercised by the Ceylon Parliament, you would need a twothirds majority to get the change affected. If my hon. Friends feel that their attitude is the right attitude, and if they get this opportunity of amending the laws in such a way as to attach this country to Russia, well, let them make the attempt. But I will certainly do all I can to frustrate that attempt. Now with regard to this Agreement my good Friend was not quite logical when he said that we would be prevented from terminating this agreement by virtue of the fact that it did not stipulate a definite period, and that therefore we have no other remedy. But these are mutual agreements to be entered into at different times. There is no question of giving bases to anyone. There was a question of bases being found in Ceylon , but I was certainly not prepared to grant any. What I felt was that if at any time was wanted the assistance of England for purposes of defense we should be able to get that assistance by agreement, and if it became necessary for that purpose to get their aeroplanes we should give them aerodromes. There is no question of any bases being given to her. They were only to be given when it became necessary, in our own interests, and after entering into an agreement.

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Document No. 51 Dr. N.M. Pereras Comments on the Defence and External Affairs Agreements, 1947*
2 December 1947. Now, Sir, if I may refer for a moment to the various Agreements that have been negotiated, first of all there is the Defence Agreement. Hon. Members, on this side of the House, I think have made the position clear that it means, in point of fact, granting Trincomalee to the British and granting all the facilities that they enjoy at the present moment. There are two Agreements, and the first Agreement has already been entered into. The Hon. Prime Minister has agreed to give military assistance for the security of their territories. This is what the agreement says: The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon will give to each other such military assistance for the security of their territories. That means that we are also prepared, and the Hon. Prime Minister has agreed, to provide the necessary military personnel to send across to safeguard Great Britain. . . . The Agreement has been signed. The Agreement is between the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon to provide each other with such military assistance for the security of their territories, for defence against external aggression and for the protection of essential communications as it may be in their mutual interests to provide. What they will have to provide will be settled by a subsequent agreement which will denote the extent of that provision. Then, Sir, the agreement goes on: The Government of the United Kingdom may base such naval and air forces and maintain such land forces in Ceylon as may be required for these purposes, and as may be mutually agreed. ....

* Source : Hansard (House of Representatives), 1947, Vol. I, Cols. 601 604.

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What I would like to impress on Hon. members is that we have already committed this country by these Agreements to provide military assistance, and all that has yet to be agreed upon is merely the extent of the naval and air forces that are going to be stationed here. The Hon. Prime Minister wanted to know why I said, such as they already enjoyed. That is found in paragraph 2 of the Agreement , where it is said : Such control and jurisdiction over members of the said forces as they exercise at present. That is the first Agreement, and I do think that this Agreement, taken in conjunction with the statements made by the Right Hon. Gentleman in the House of Commons, cannot but make us feel diffident about accepting these Agreements without a fear that it would seriously impinge on the concepts of independence such as the Hon. Members on this side of the House have. Secondly, with regard to the Agreement on External Affairs, I should like to say one thing. Paragraph 1 is as follows : The Government of Ceylon declares the readiness of Ceylon to adopt and follow the resolutions of past Imperial Conferences. The words are to adopt and follow. What are these terms ? What are those resolutions that we are bound to adopt or that we have already adopted ? The Hon. Prime Minister has not indicated to any Hon. Member of this House what those terms are. He was very shrewd and very clever. He referred to the methods of consultation between the various members of the Common Wealth but he has not told us that he has bound this country to imperial preferences for good. What are those Imperial Conferences and resolutions ? The Hon. Prime Minister would not tell us that we are tied to the Sterling Bloc as a result of those resolutions. Sir, the Hon. Prime Minister shakes his head not so vigorously as he used to do, but, nevertheless, a little halfheartedly. No, the Hon. Prime Minister is not prepared to state that we are not bound to Imperial preferences as a result of these Agreements. . . . The Hon. Ministers are obsessed with this idea, that they are going into this socalled British family. They have an identity of interests that you do not get in Ceylon. . . . . We have not that same identity of interest. Surely, the Hon. Prime Minister must concede that point ? Here is a copy of the proceedings of the Imperial Economic Conference which took place at Ottawa in 1932. What are the resolutions that were passed at that Economic Conference ? They accepted resolutions and

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statements regarding monetary and financial questions. You find at page 11 a statement of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer on that occasion that was accepted. It is as follows : His Majestys Government desire to see wholesale sterling prices rise. The best condition for this would be a rise in gold prices, and the absence of a rise in gold prices inevitably imposes limitations on what can be done for sterling. To that you are bound. The Hon. Prime Minister laughs, but those are the resolutions of the Imperial Conference which he has adopted. If he has specified what resolutions he was prepared to accept, or if he was bold enough to say that the Government of Ceylon desires to adopt and follow the resolutions of past Imperial Conferences, what would have been the position? In point of fact, we are now, at the present moment, tied to the Sterling Bloc. We shall come to that during the Debate on the Budget. Did hon. Members seriously think that that Agreement gives them the latitude that independence ought to give them ? Did they not think that the Agreement seriously impinges upon the real concept of independence?

Document No. 52 Defence Agreement with Britain (Statement of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Minister of Health and Local Government, in the House of Representatives)*
28 November 1947 It is a new world we are living in. All things are changing. A change is taking place in this little country of ours. Politically our status is being changed. We will have the opportunity of discussing in detail what precisely are the implications and what precisely is the meaning of the status we are obtaining. I am myself at present quite sincerely and reasonably satisfied that the status we are attaining is what is ordinarily understood as Dominion Status with all that it implies. Even if we have not the fullest freedom today, we are having the freedom to be free politically. That is my belief. We shall discuss whether I am justified or not in that belief when we take up that particular Motion on that question. I do not want unduly to labour that point because there is a substantive Motion on it, but I refer to it in passing.

* Source : Hansard (HR), 1947, Vol. 1, Cols. 384-86.

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I feel that those Agreements which have been reached are not going to cast an obligation on us that will operate detrimentally, that those agreements are not going to prevent us from having the freedom to do what we consider desirable and necessary in the interests of our country. That is the interpretation the Government has given to those Agreements and to that Act of Parliament. May I say, Mr. Speaker, that it does not matter very much whether some people accept that interpretation or not. I accept it and I intend to act on it, as the whole Government intends to do. On any and every occasion we are going to act on that assumption. I do not think those actions are likely to be challenged. The references are there from the political point of view in the Governors Speech; I mean the relevant references to that status. What is that status to be followed up with? I am dealing at the moment only with the political aspect and not with the economic aspect. We have to have friendly relations with the countries of the Commonwealth and live in peace with other countries. Obviously that is the first consequence of this new political status. We must get into line with international corporations in whatever way, through whatever machinery and agencies that are available to us. Take membership of the UNO: I do not think that we will fail to obtain that membership. I think we have reasonable hopes that we will obtain it. Not only that. We should also have close connections with countries in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia. That is quite as important as membership of a World Organization such as the UNO. It is referred to here as the great sub-continent of India which is our closest neighbour. It is a country with which we propose to enter into discussions. Mark you, Mr. Speaker, it is not merely a question of the status of certain Indian residents here with which we are concerned, which is a small item in those relationships. On questions of defence, on questions of trade and tariffs, on all those matters we hope to enter, as early as we are able, into negotiations with India. On the question of defence, this Defence Agreement which we have entered into with England is only a part of the defence agreements which we need. England is interested in the Indian Ocean. There is no question about that, and, in the defence measures contemplated by Ceylon or India or Burma or Indonesia or Malaya, we will have to take that factor into consideration. England is also a great sea-power. . . . Sir, let it be remembered that the defence of the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean is primarily sea-defence. Even the great sub-continent of India is only a tongue of land jutting out into the sea from the Himalayas. As for the threat of a land invasion, it is not very serious in India. Perhaps Russia may think otherwise. That I do not know. That is my general view of the matter. England is interested; so is India; so is Burma and so are the other countries, and we will have to consider entering into defence agreements with them. Do hon. Members think that there is anything in this Defence Agreement with England that is going to stand in the

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way of complete freedom ? It has been said that we have had nothing in these Agreements that is in the interest of our country. I just do not think so, Mr. Speaker. I may be wrong, but I would be extremely surprised if that were so, because that is not my opinion or the opinion of the Government. Even in the case of defence, it is mentioned here in the Address that it is our intention to set up the nucleus of a Defence Force comprising of a permanent army, navy and air force as far as we are able to. It is going to be very rudimentary; obviously it must be so. We do not want, Mr. Speaker, a British force in our country. We do not want a British navy, nor harbours for any other purpose than to defend ourselves. The suggestions of my hon. Friends, of course, are different. They must oppose. What is the value of the opposition if it does not oppose. I do not get angry with them or blame them, but I can assure them quite sincerely that what they suggest is not the intention of this Government.

Document No. 53 Press Note of Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake on his Return from Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference*
January 1951 I am aware that there is some public concern about the discussions I had, outside the Prime Ministers meeting, with the United Kingdom Ministers and Chiefs of Staff regarding the raising of defence forces of Ceylon. Those talks did not relate to any new agreement, as imagined by some, which is under consideration between the United Kingdom and Ceylon. The Defence Agreement of 1947 between our two countries still stands and I wish that those who criticize that agreement or draw imaginary pictures of Ceylon being tied to the chariot wheels of some imperialist machine will read carefully that document which has been published. It is a simple arrangement by which the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon agreed to give each other such military assistance for the security of their respective territories as it may be in their mutual interest to provide. The nature of the assistance which one party may render to the other and the procedure of rendering it have also to be agreed to mutually.

* Source: Ceylon Daily News, 23 January 1951.

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The public is aware that we have taken certain steps to form a regular Army, Navy and Air Force for Ceylon. The Army, which is still in the process of being developed, has already taken over the defence functions which the United Kingdom land forces were doing in Ceylon for a time even after our Independence. The Navy has replaced, for all practical purposes, the United Kingdom Navy in Colombo, and has, under our new Navy Act, taken formal and legal control of Trincomalee Naval harbour. Our Air Force is just coming into being. A minimum strength of all three services is essential not only to form the nucleus of a strong and efficient defence force to meet any small scale danger from an international emergency or aggression but also to conduct in peace-time the operational administration of our defence establishments and bases, in association with our friends. Since the raising and equipping of the Ceylon Forces has reached the stage when we are able to visualize a long-term plan and forecast the cost involved, I thought it desirable to have personal discussions bilaterally with the United Kingdom Ministers and Chiefs of Staff to mention the assistance which Ceylon may expect from them and also to give them an opportunity to state to me the assistance which they expect from Ceylon, all within the full meaning and implication of the Independence which Ceylon enjoys. We have discussed many aspects of the principles of these problems in a most friendly manner and mutually accommodating spirit. The talks will now be continued at official level. If and when any conclusions of any major importance are reached, I shall make a statement to Parliament. Meanwhile, I can only assure the public that our independence of action in regard to our relations with other nations of the world will not be jeopardized. Finally, I must say a word about the need of some armed forces for Ceylon, though small and ineffective against a major attack. Ceylon is not suspended in mid-air or located in the Antarctic; we cannot afford to forget history or our strategic geographic position. . . .

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Document No. 54 Mr. P.G.B. Keunemans (Communist Party ) Speech on Proposed SouthEast Asia Treaty Organization and its implications for British Bases in Ceylon*
7 September 1954 There has been a great deal of speculation not only in Ceylon, in the newspapers and elsewhere, but also in other countries including the United Kingdom, on the exact meaning and purpose of the visit of Mr. Dodds-Parker [the Parliamentary UnderSecretary to the British Minister of Commonwealth Relations]. I remember reading in the journals published in the United Kingdom that he was coming out on a fact-finding mission, but as to what facts he was trying to find no one was informed. It was, however, a significant fact that his visit here coincided with the undoubted interest of the British Government in seeking to persuade the Asian members of the Commonwealth to show a more favourable attitude towards SEATO. We all know that subsequent to the meeting of the Prime Minister of Great Britain with the President of the United States recently in Washington it was agreed that Britain should give its weight to the formation of this SEATO and try to persuade the Asian members of the Commonwealth to come into it. Persuasion is one thing, but trying to press-gang them into it is another. I do not know which Mr. Dodds- Parker intended to do, but it is generally being alleged that he was here for the purpose of trying to put it to the Government and the people of Ceylon that they should enter SEATO. He gave an interview to the local papers here which was clearly a commendation of SEATO, and I want to know from the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement on the official conversations which were held between Mr. Dodd-Parker and himself, and the purpose of his visit. The second question is about Ceylons position in view of the discussions now going on in Manila on the question of SEATO. The proposed American draft of the SEATO Pact has been released, apparently prematurely, but nevertheless it has now been confirmed as being accurate. And those who studied the geographical orbit of SEATO as set out in the draft would have found that the Island of Ceylon falls within that geographical orbit. In other words, the umbrella of SEATO is going to spread over the shores of Ceylon as well as its territorial waters. Now this raises certain rather important questions for us. The Cabinet has issued a communiqu to the effect that Ceylon does not intend to take part in these discussions at Manila, and they apparently have an open mind on this question. The right hon. Gentleman is reported to have made a speech to the effect that he does not wish to be, directly or indirectly, associated with any power alignment in the world. It is equally

* Source: Hansard (HR), 1954, Vol. 20, Cols. 35-36.

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true that Great Britain is now taking part in the SEATO talks and is one of the countries pledged to play a part in setting up SEATO. Here, a very dangerous position arises, because as long as Great Britain is a member of SEATO, whatever the formal position of the Government of Ceylon may be, Trincomalee and Katunayake which are British bases in this country will be part of SEATO and, ipso facto, Ceylon will be part of SEATO. If the whole area of Ceylon falls within the orbit of SEATO and if Great Britain is a member of SEATO pledged to action in terms of the SEATO Pact, what assurance can the Government give us that the territory of Ceylon will not be used for purposes of implementation of any arrangements under SEATO if the Government of Ceylon stays out of it ? I want an assurance from the right hon. Gentleman on this matter, because even if the Government rejects as I hope it rejects the idea of a military alliance like SEATO, its rejection will be nullified by the existence of British bases in this country. Those British bases will drag us into SEATO whatever the position of our Government may be. I should be glad if the Prime Minister would make a statement, giving us an assurance that the Government will not permit bases in this country to be used for any purpose which it does not approve or associate itself with.

Document No. 55 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on British Bases in Sri Lanka (Extract from his Address to the Commonwealth Press Association, London)*
5 July 1956 In pursuit of this policy [Neutralism] not motivated by any dislike or hatred of this country, of which people we have all, my country and myself personally, a high regard the present Government of Ceylon has expressed its intention that the bases in Ceylon of Britain should cease to exist. As you may know, it is entirely left to us, a matter completely within our discretion, whether we shall permit these bases to continue or not. We have expressed not merely a wish or desire but a definite intention that the bases shall cease, but we wish to do it in a friendly way and we wish to discuss, as indeed we are doing now, with the British Government the method of doing without causing dislocation, inconvenience or

* Source: S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Speeches and Writings (Colombo: the Government Press, 1963 ), PP. 375-376.

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embarrassment to the British Government, or indeed to ourselves. We are discussing other matters such as certain facilities that the British Government might like to have in our country, but we wish to take this step as it is one which is very fundamental to our thinking, but we also wish to do it while preserving the friendship and the close relations which exist, and I hope will continue to exist, between Britain and ourselves.

Document No. 56 Main Points in the UK-Ceylon Agreement on the Withdrawal of British Bases in Ceylon*
7 June 1957 1. In accordance with the declared policy of the Ceylon Government that United Kingdom bases in the Island (hereafter referred to as the Bases) should be closed down, the naval base at Trincomalee and the Royal Air Force station at Katunayake will be formally transferred to the Ceylon Government on 15th October, 1957, and 1st November, 1957, respectively. Subject to sub-paragraphs 3 and 4 below the United Kingdom Government will continue to use certain facilities for a limited time hereafter referred to as the rundown. Such use of some of the facilities will cease within two to three years and of all will cease by 1st March 1962, provided that, if the process of rundown is interrupted by causes outside the control of the United Kingdom Government, the period of rundown may be increased as may be mutually agreed. During the rundown the use of these facilities will be subject to the general control of the Ceylon Government and the Ceylon Government reserves to itself the right to deny such use to the United Kingdom Government if any situation arises where, in pursuance of its general international policy, the Ceylon Government finds it necessary to do so. Subject to this condition the Ceylon Government will grant the United Kingdom Government the free and uninterrupted use and operation of these facilities and the right to administer their establishments as at present. The United Kingdom Government for its part will not, in the use of the facilities, interfere with such plans of development as the Ceylon Government might undertake in the areas concerned. If any difficulties should arise in this connection the two Governments will consult together in order to arrive at a satisfactory solution.

2.

3.

* Source : Treaty Series (Ceylon), No. 4 of 1957 (Exchange of letters between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the United Kingdom regarding United Kingdom Service Establishments in Ceylon).

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4.

Detailed arrangements regarding the facilities which it is intended the United Kingdom may continue to use, and arrangements which it is intended to put into operation to implement sub-paragraphs 1 to 3 above in other respects, will be made. In addition to the grant of facilities under sub-paragraph 3 above, the Ceylon Government will give to the United Kingdom Forces all necessary facilities and assistance in connection with (i) the withdrawal of the Forces (ii) the removal or disposal by the Forces of all their stores, equipment and other movable property. The Government of Ceylon shall pay to the United Kingdom Government the sum of Rs. 22 million in five equal installments of Rs. 4,400,000 in each of the Ceylon Government financial years 1957-58 to 1961-62 inclusive. This payment will be made in respect of the installations to be transferred to the Ceylon Government and the cancellation of certain claims between the two Governments arising out of the occupation or disposal of the bases by United Kingdom Forces. Detailed provisions regarding financial matters are contained in the Annex to this letter, which Annex shall be regarded as an integral part thereof. In each year payment will be made in Rupees within the total of United Kingdom estimated governmental expenditure in Ceylon, any balance being paid in sterling at the rate of Rs. 13.3102 to 1. Installations to be transferred to the Ceylon Government in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the said annex shall be handed over as and when vacated by the United Kingdom Forces. The United Kingdom Forces and the members thereof will continue to enjoy during the period of rundown all the immunities and privileges hitherto enjoyed by them. During the period of rundown and after its completion the Ceylon Government , in accordance with normal Commonwealth practice but subject to the requirements of the general policy of the Ceylon Government, will continue to allow (a) United Kingdom naval vessels to refuel at Colombo; and (b) aircraft of the United Kingdom Forces, and on charter to those Forces, to overfly and stage through Ceylon. The United Kingdom Delegation supplied to the Ceylon Delegation a programme of the numbers of locally recruited employees of the United Kingdom Forces who it was intended would, as a consequence of the rundown, cease to be employed by the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom authorities will furnish at regular intervals both forecasts of future redundancies and particulars of impending discharges.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

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Document No. 57 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on British Bases in Sri Lanka (Extract from his Address to the Commonwealth Press Association, London)*
24 July 1957 The last remnants of colonialism in this country have been removed; the bases will no longer exist. On October 15th, this year, the base at Trincomalee will be handed over to Ceylon by the British Government. The date itself has been fixed, and I trust my hon. Friends will be there on that occasion. That will be one more step towards full freedom the removal of rather stubborn remnants of colonialism. I hope Katunayake too will be taken over. Regarding this transaction, it was carried out in a friendly way, concluded in a friendly way. . . .

Document No. 58 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes Speech on handing over of the Royal Naval Base at a Ceremony in Trincomalee**
15 October 1957 The ceremony today marks another milestone in the long and not uninteresting history of Trincomalee to which briefly but happily His Excellency [the Acting U.K. High Commissioner] has just made reference. The relationship between the United Kingdom and Ceylon goes back to a period of over 140 years. It is a somewhat chequered history, but may I say one that, on the whole, can be considered a happy one. Nearly ten years ago, an important step was taken in the relationship between our two countries when Ceylon demanded and was granted Dominion status, a position of equality in the Commonwealth of Nations and, as His Excellency has mentioned, the Navel Base of Trincomalee which was used during the last war continued to be used thereafter. When my Government assumed office a little over a year ago, in pursuance of our foreign policy, we requested the Government of the United Kingdom to hand over the Naval Base of Trincomalee to us. This step was not taken in spirit of hostility.

* Source : Hansard (HR), 1957, Vol. 28, col. 1778. ** Source : S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Speeches and Writings (Colombo, the Government Press, 1963 ), pp. 39899.

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Our foreign policy which is based on friendship, co-operation with all nations and nonalignment with any of the power blocs of the world, necessitated such a step if such a policy was in fact to be effective. I am very happy to say that the negotiations which were carried on between us and the Government of the United Kingdom for this purpose were conducted in a spirit of cordiality and in an atmosphere of friendship, and a very satisfactory settlement of this matter in that spirit has been achieved which is a further tribute to the manner in which those countries which are associated with each other in the Commonwealth of Nations can settle a difference of opinion that may arise between them in a spirit of friendship without impairing that relationship which exists among the members of the Commonwealth of Nations. This further step which was taken will in no way impair friendly relations between the United Kingdom and my own country but indeed will have the effect of strengthening that friendship. . . . You have witnessed today a simple but, I venture to think, a very impressive ceremony, a ceremony which will further strengthen the freedom of our country and equally strengthen those bonds of friendship between the United Kingdom and ourselves which we hope as members of the Commonwealth will play a not unimportant part in helping ourselves as well as the world to obtain that understanding , peace and prosperity for which the whole world is yearning today.

Document No. 59 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandarnaikes Speech on the Handing over of the Katunayake Air Base*
1 November 1957 Today another landmark in the history of our country has been achieved. As you are aware, the United Kingdom, throughout its connection with dependent territories, has always stated its intention and desire to hand over control of their own affairs to territories over which it ruled. When the history of this period comes to be recorded, one of the outstanding features in such a record will be the dignity, cordiality and friendship and the good grace with which the Government of the U.K. has handed back the control of their own affairs to peoples of far-flung territories over which it ruled earlier. The process of handing over, in our case, has proceeded in stages, from the time of the Legislative Council of 1910, until on February 4, 1948, free and independent status was handed to the people of Ceylon. Today our independence is complete.
* Source : S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Speeches and Writings (Colombo, the Government Press, 1963 ), P. 400.

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When my Government came into power, we had agreed that the two bases should be handed over to Ceylon with certain facilities which would continue for a period not exceeding five years. In pursuance of that decision, two weeks ago at a simple but historic ceremony, the Trincomalee navel base was handed over to Ceylon. Today we have taken that agreement a step further. It is good sign that these things can be done by friendly arrangement and agreement, and in an atmosphere of dignity. We, as members of the Commonwealth of Nations, discuss among ourselves any problems of importance in an atmosphere of independence and freedom, and are able thereby to add our share in world efforts for the increase of mutual understanding and friendship, for the preservation of peace and the furthering of the cause of happiness and prosperity of us all.

Document No. 60 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on What the Commonwealth Means to Us (Address to the Canadian Club, Niagara Falls)*
4 December 1954 It is not necessary for me to recount to you the history of this development. It is as well known to you as it is to me. But in this period of strain and flux; which saw the annihilation of empires and the negation of pacts and treaties, only one form of international political organization survived, and that was the Commonwealth of Nations to which you and I are, together, proud to belong. When the history of our stirring times is someday written, the historian will pay a great tribute to the political sagacity of those British Statesmen who rose above their age; saw the shadows that the present cast on the murky road of the future, and without the selfish struggles which other great empires made in their death-throes, gave into the compulsions of history without demur. Thanks to them, we have today an organization which can be described in no better words than are found in the Statute of Westminster autonomous communities, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another, though united by a common allegiance and freely associated as members of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth of Nations is not a mere collection of free States, in name only. Binding them together, quite apart from the common political and parliamentary traditions, exists a warm spirit of comradeship, born of mutual trust and confidence that is unknown in any other similar association of States in any other period of history. This spirit of friendship is a tribute to the genius of the peoples of the

* Source: Between Two worlds (the Collected Speeches of the Right Honourable Sir John Kotelawala (Colombo: Government Press, 1954), PP. 2326.

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Commonwealth, and to their quality of adaptability to ever changing situations. It is, for example, a remarkable fact of history that, especially in the East, where our several movements for national liberation were once characterized by frustration, bitterness and, often, anger, there now exists, instead, a feeling of trust and friendliness towards our erstwhile rulers. It is also significant that there has not been the slightest tremor in the structure of the stability of the Commonwealth, with the admission to it of the three Asian Dominions, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, although the 400 million odd people that comprise these Dominions have nothing in common with the older non-Asian Dominions, either ethnically of culturally. The Commonwealth took on its new look, as if it was a perfectly natural process, and the 400 million Asians were assimilated with the greatest ease into what was, once, exclusively a non-Asian family. India became a Republic, owing no allegiance to the Queen, but even this problem, which was a profoundly fundamental one, was solved as if it was no problem at all. It would be pertinent to ask how and why these Asian peoples, who were once subject races and who might have been expected to break away from their old masters at the first opportunity, did not do so, but voluntarily elected to remain in association with them. I think the answer to this question would be that the spirit of adaptability shown by the Commonwealth has a special appeal to us in the East. The fact that we have been received into the Commonwealth family on equal terms, and with no reservations, convinces us, more than anything else, of the genuine opportunities the Commonwealth offers of international co-operation on a truly democratic basis. That, if I may say, is the essence of our comradeship. To us in the Asian Dominions, the Commonwealth, naturally, does not mean exactly the same as it does to you. We have different ethnic origins, different cultures and traditions, different problems, and consequently, a different outlook on things in general. In the context of all these differences, we may be pardoned if we look at the Commonwealth with less sentiment and idealism than you do, but in a more practical way. It is not that we in the East are less sentimental or emotional than you are. It is only that our association with the Commonwealth has come about in rather different circumstances, and, to this extent, we have a different approach to it. In certain aspects, however, our people are as sentimental as you are in their reactions to things symbolic. Their age-old traditions of royalty, for instance, have instilled in them a personal love for the Sovereign, which still endures. The warmth and loyalty with which our Queen, Elizabeth II, was received in Ceylon was no less spontaneous and sincere than the reception accorded to her in any non-Asian Dominion. We are as proud as you are to acknowledge this charming and gracious lady as our Queen, and when she was with us, we gave her all the homage and love we would have given a sovereign of our own blood. But, as I said earlier, in our preoccupation with our immediate and peculiar problems, we are inclined, perhaps more so than you are, to take a more realistic view of our membership of the Commonwealth and to expect more assistance, possibly more than you do from the Commonwealth in solving these problems.

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I refer to the grave economic problems we, in Asia, are faced with. The poverty of the East is something that is often spoken about, but what it means to us in terms of human suffering is something that no words can measure. If freedom is to mean anything to those millions in our villages and towns who have hardly an adequate standard of life, it must take a concrete form, a form which would translate it into material well-being and relieve the horrible distress which prevails among our people. It is in the possibility of a common sharing of the human and material resources of our Commonwealth that the greatest promise of future co-operation among our member States lies. The economic aid that we so gratefully receive from you under the Colombo Plan, for example, is in the nature of a gift within a family, and in this sense, differs from aid we may receive from a country outside the Commonwealth. It does not consist of mere goods and services which Canada may export abroad, but wealth and good will that moves from one part of our great Commonwealth to another, in order to develop our common wealth for the common good of all those who participate in it. In short, the Commonwealth offers an excelled opportunity of bridging the economic gap between the East and West, in a spirit of friendly co-operation, rather than in an atmosphere of mutual obligation. But I may be pardoned if I went one step further. Time was, when the East was only a convenient market for the goods produced by the West. But if economic recessions that might affect both the East as well as the West are to be avoided, some means must be found to dovetail the advanced economies of the West with the pattern of development of the East; and what better means could there be than that in which your technical skill and superior productive mechanism could help the economic development of the east and relieve the misery and poverty in which millions of your fellow Commonwealth citizens exist. A developed and industrialized East can be an asset to the West, if at the level of Commonwealth co-operation we could devise a scheme, a planned development of our Commonwealth relations, to the best advantage of all. We have, within our Commonwealth of Nations, sufficient resources, human and material, even to make the Commonwealth a unit sufficient in itself. The road is open to us, and it is a road of hope which, if followed, will, I am sure, lead our peoples to prosperity and happiness, when nation with nation and man with man can live unhampered by fear of want or famine. It is by the eradication of this ever-present fear of want and famine that the Eastern world can be preserved from falling a prey to the temptations of Marxist communism. We, in Ceylon, are proud that firmly rooted in our ways of political behaviour are those essentially valuable constituents of British political practice, which form part of our common heritage of British institutions. Not least among these constituents is our belief that social progress, in the sense of political and economic adjustments to new situations can be achieved, not by the bullet, but by the ballot. Six and a half years of independence in my country have proved how effective British parliamentary institutions can be. But the mere existence of these political institutions cannot, alone, be regarded as being a safeguard or guarantee against the emergence of totalitarianism of either kind. It is here that close political co-operation among member States of the Commonwealth becomes important. We, in Ceylon, cherish democracy just as much as

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you in Canada do. As a matter of fact, we have, for centuries, believed in sacredness of the individual, of the family, and in those higher spiritual values of life which underlie material affairs. The people of the East have an instinctive hatred for violence and would not embrace communism, unless they are compelled to. But closer and more frequent consultation among ourselves will, I am sure, introduce a spirit of enlightenment in our attitudes to each other and cement even closer together those bonds of friendship that we already enjoy. We need to go hand in hand together, and with the support and encouragement of older Dominions, like Canada, we cannot falter, and we cannot fail. In these times, when it is common to think of international relationships in terms of camps and blocs, few people, perhaps, pause to consider that there is a body of nations bound together by bonds of greater strength than a mere political convenience. We, in the Commonwealth, have neither a Charter, nor the other devices normally found in modern political organizations; and we have never been identified as a bloc. But in this very flexibility and in the absence of rigid procedures lies our real strength, as two world wars have shown. It is true we have our problems, and some very fundamental ones, too; but we have the faith and the conviction that within the Commonwealth there exists the atmosphere in which all these problems can be solved in a spirit of sincerity and goodwill. Many tests lie ahead of us, but I think we are all certain that we shall not be found wanting. History will record the tremendous contribution the Commonwealth has made, and will continue to make, in the promotion of peace and understanding in the world. In this contribution, each and every one of us within the Commonwealth has a part to play - a part which will depend, not on our size or our material wealth, but on our honesty and sincerity of purpose in dealing with our fellow men.

Document No. 61 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes Views on the Commonwealth (Extract from his address to the Commonwealth Press Association, London)*
5 July 1956 I have, on behalf of my Government, informed the Conference [Prime Ministers conference] that we intend to take steps to make our country a Republic within the Commonwealth, though this does not stem from any personal hostility. The Queen of England is indeed a very gracious lady. We in our country have no feeling of dislike or hostility either towards Britain or Herself, but we prefer a Republican form of Government which we consider most suited to our country, and the Queen herself is too

Source : S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Speeches and Writings (Colombo, the Government Press, 1963 ), pp. 376-377.

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far away with too few personal contacts to stimulate that feeling of personal attachment which you have for Her a feeling, believe me, that I can understand very well. I said we wished to continue within the Commonwealth. What are my feelings towards the Commonwealth? I do not think we ought to indulge in mere sloppy sentimentality over the Commonwealth. I have heard it said that there is something indefinable about the Commonwealth which keeps us together, which others do not understand. I do not think we have much to gain by that type of sentimental statement over the Commonwealth. There are, of course, certain obvious advantages of the Commonwealth belonging economically to the sterling bloc, the advantage we gain from mutual consultations and discussions on a friendly basis on various problems and so on. But is that all there is to it ? I do feel that there is something more than that makes the Commonwealth worthwhile. What is it ? Many of us who are in the Commonwealth cannot claim, as some other members can, the hereditary bond of a relationship with Britain. But if we are not bound together by the common bond of belonging to the same stock, we can at least claim to possess something more valuable a common tradition which the Commonwealth countries share with Britain. If I may call it so a way of life; democratic Parliamentary form of Government, independence of the judiciary, an administration free from undue political influence, free from corruption. There is no distinction or discrimination between the State and the citizen. All these freedoms, freedoms of democracy that valuable tradition are all possessed by members of the Commonwealth. Other democratic countries outside the Commonwealth do not possess these traditions. In the context of this changing world, I think there is a definite substantial value in that way of life which we all share, whatever may be our race or our other differences of opinion on different subjects. We have these, of course, amongst us. I feel that we ought to make a deliberate effort to foster this way of life, to strengthen it, for in that way alone has the Commonwealth any chance of surviving for long. Otherwise, I can well see the Commonwealth shrinking gradually in the present world situation, shrinking gradually to a few countries bound to Britain by those ties of blood that I mentioned earlier, and the others falling away. I think this is a line of thought that is worthwhile considering. I know, of course, that certain countries may find it difficult to adopt a direct course of action from the angle which I mention, but subject even to these conditions, I think there is great scope for the Commonwealth in the world today. For instance, at the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, Sir Anthony Eden played a most difficult and valuable part when he prevented perhaps a great catastrophe. The world was trembling on the brink of war at that time and it was probably Sir Anthony Eden, assisted by countries such as India, who resolved that problem with some measure of success. I know that there is a place for a third force. Not, of course, as a military bloc, but as a middle way of life between two extremes, on the right and on the left, which I think the Commonwealth is well suited to play, and in which Britain, with her long traditions and service to the world, is well qualified to take the lead, if she so wishes. . . .

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Document No. 62 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes address to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference held at New Delhi in 1957*
2 December 1957 It gives me the greatest pleasure to associate myself with the Prime Minister of India and the Representative of Pakistan, joint hosts, in welcoming the delegates from the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association of Commonwealth countries, assembled here at Delhi, for this conference. This is the first occasion when such a Conference has been held in an Asian country and it is only fitting that this Conference should be held in this ancient city of Delhi with all its inspiring memories of the past and glorious hopes for the future. I am also very glad that although there were many pressing problems facing me in my own country, I have been able to come here myself in order to associate myself with the other hosts in welcoming you to this conference. The question has been asked and answered by both the President and the Prime Minister of India as to what constitutes the content of democracy and also what are the benefits that this association of nations in the Commonwealth confers. I too might like to add a word or two to what has been said. As the Prime Minister of India stated, there are various interpretations of democracy, various meanings given to that word, particularly, of late. But to me, democracy implies, in fact, an agglomeration of freedoms, individual and collective. Individually, the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, freedom from arbitrary arrests, freedom of the vote, in short, freedom of human thought. Collectively, the freedom of democracy, although always inherent in the concept of modern democracy, I think, an attempt was made to define this freedom in the Atlantic Charter: freedom from want, freedom from ignorance, freedom from fear, freedom to choose the Government that the people wish to have. All these freedoms, individual and collective, really go to form that conception of democracy which, I think, we in the Commonwealth accept. The idea of the Commonwealth, this extraordinary association of nations in this manner, is perhaps unique in the history of Commonwealth associations. The nations or people that were brought together involuntarily by colonization and conquest by Britain gradually developed into the Dominion idea. The dominions were restricted at the start to those who were bound together by common blood, common traditions. The Statute of Westminster conferred on these Dominions not only equality of status, but complete freedom of action in both internal and external affairs. The Commonwealth has now enlarged its borders to include other peoples with different traditions, of

Source : S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Speeches and Writings (Colombo, the Government Press, 1963 ), pp. 401-404.

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different races, of different ways of thought. One wonders what, then, keeps this Commonwealth together today, or what are, if any, the benefits that this association of nations in this way can confer. I have thought of these questions myself. There are no legal bonds. Even the one and only legal bond that existed earlier of allegiance to a common Sovereign does not now exist in the case of certain Members of the Commonwealth. There are no formal treaties or agreements, no formal rules whereby a majority decision is binding on the minority; they are entirely free in internal and external affairs, without any legal bonds whatsoever, without any decisions arrived at which it is attempted to enforce on all Members of the Commonwealth, whether they like it or not. What, then, remains of value in this association ? There are, of course, certain benefits, economic and otherwise, of this association. But I do think that the most important bond of the Commonwealth today is this, that even if we are not bound together by the crimson thread of a common blood, we certainly are bound together by the golden thread of a common tradition. What is that tradition? I feel, when history sums up the contribution of the British people to civilization and to human welfare, it will say that their chief contribution has been the development of the spirit of democracy, as I have explained it, through the broad forms and machinery which they have devised for the purpose of the parliamentary system of Government. I am not saying that all the forms of the parliamentary democratic ideal of Government which have been developed in Britain according to the genius of their own people need necessarily continue in those particular forms, either for themselves or for others, in this changing world. But, however, the forms may be amended to suit developing conditions, the spirit remains the same. The British idea of free elections, the idea of the independence of the Judiciary, the idea of an administration that is efficient and impartial and which is not unduly hampered by interference by the executive, are all ideas that have made valuable contributions to human institutions in the modern world. That, I venture to think, will be the verdict of history on the chief contribution that Britain has made to human welfare. We in the Commonwealth different peoples with different policies internally and externally, sometimes agreeing with each other, sometimes disagreeing with each other are still held together by this common tradition. It is a tradition that is well worth preserving. In this age of transition it is obviously an age of transition in which we are living today with all kinds of experiments in the world, ideological, political, economic and so on, it is well worth preserving, in a manner that is in keeping with the needs of today, this tradition of democratic parliamentary Government which, if we do not share many other concepts, certainly I think it can be said substantially all members of the Commonwealth do share. It is, in fact, almost a way of life. It is in reality the true middle way today between the extremes that we see both of the right and of the left. The Commonwealth has various meetings. As the Prime Minister of India said, the Prime Ministers meet. The Finance Ministers discussed economic questions recently

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in Canada at Mont Tremblant. Now, this is an assembly where Members of Parliament of the Commonwealth meet to discuss and exchange views regarding many matters of common interest. I think, therefore, it can be said that remaining in the Commonwealth causes no embarrassment to any of us. The fact that we differ from each other need not in the context I mentioned make us sever connections with each other. We still have certain things of common interest that in my opinion can make a valuable contribution in shaping the civilization of this new age. The old civilization is crumbling, the new is not yet stable. Various experiments have been tried everywhere. The world has not yet achieved stability. I do think that we can make a valuable contribution by preserving things that are valuable to mankind, things that are valuable to ensure the freedom of the human spirit while still being in line with the requirements and needs of this new age. I have great pleasure, as I stated, in associating myself with the Prime Minister of India and the representative of Pakistan in welcoming all the delegates assembled here today. I observe that in your agenda there are many subjects for discussion of a valuable and important nature, and I trust that this conference here in Delhi on this occasion will add to mutual understanding, and thereby also add to what I also feel very strongly about, the need for peaceful co-existence whether it be in the Commonwealth or outside it, which alone can prevent man from proceeding on a course of mutual hatred, the end of which is the destruction of all mankind and of civilization too. We have to live together, or surely, we shall perish together. We may not agree with each other, but let us at least understand each other and help all mankind to achieve, let us hope, a better, happier and more prosperous life for all of us in this brave new world. I hesitate to use that term, but I use it for I do believe that with all our difficulties it is indeed a brave new world. I wish the delegates all success in their deliberations, and trust that although you may not come to decisions or pass resolutions, your discussions will contribute towards that mutual understanding which is so necessary for us all to have. . . .

Document No. 63 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike on Sri Lankas Relationship with the Commonwealth*
23 January 1964 Our relationship with the Commonwealth has been maintained and strengthened over the years by our participation at several Commonwealth Conferences, one of which I was privileged to attend. The new prevailing concept of the Commonwealth allows for

* Source : Hansard (Senate), 1964, Vol. 19, cols. 2397 2398.

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free and independent nations, whether aligned or non-aligned, to exchange views freely and frankly and to help one another without in anyway surrendering their sovereignty or subordinating themselves. For instance, the old idea of domination on the basis of colour was dealt with in no uncertain manner by the rejection of South Africa as a member of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth contribution as well as the AfroAsian contribution within the United Nations helped significantly to alter the very basis of disarmament negotiations towards one of general and complete disarmament through the Geneva negotiations. It is true there are some questions on which we have had our differences with the Government of the United Kingdom, particularly in regard to the nationalization of certain British interests in Ceylon; but these problems have been approached in a spirit of mutual understanding and I have every confidence that the relationships between our countries within the Commonwealth will in no way become strained. Indeed, our common membership of the Commonwealth will help considerably towards the settlement of the few remaining issues with the United Kingdom, particularly in regard to questions of compensation.

Document No. 64 Mr. J.R. Jayewardenes Account of the Birth of the Colombo Plan (An Article Written on the Occasion of its Tenth Anniversary)*
January 1960 Birth of the Plan It may interest my readers if I give an account of the birth of the Colombo Plan. At the Foreign Ministers Conference held in Colombo in 1950, while addressing the delegates I emphasized the similarity of the conditions prevailing in all the South East Asian countries that had recently gained freedom. They needed both capital and cadre from outside if rapid progress was to be achieved in economic development. The new democracies of Asia could not keep the people on their side unless they delivered the goods, and that too early. As I thought of Ceylons economy and its future development in this context, I was struck by the rapid progress West Europe had made during the years she received aid under the Marshall Plan. I remembered a conversation I had with a leading industrialist in Brussels, during my visit there in April 1948: If Stalin marches through Europe today, within 24 hours he will be at the British channel; there is nothing to stop him.

* Source : Ceylon Today, Vol. IX, No. 2 (February 1960 ), PP. 7-11.

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West Europe had no armies or any other defences, and her industries were still lying paralyzed after the war. I recalled also the tremendous changes I found in Europe during my visits a few years later; how, apart from purely military defences which came through N.A.T.O., Europes wheels of industry were humming once again, and there was new life and hope in the minds and hearts of the people. The aid given under the Marshall Plan was largely responsible for this recovery. Of course, the problem was not the same here. Europe was a highly industrialized region. She only needed the machinery to replace her damaged ones or the money to make or buy them. She had the skilled personnel to man them and the markets to sell the goods produced. South-East Asia was under-developed. Money alone was insufficient. She did not have the men to develop her resources nor did she know exactly what her resources were. Evolution of a Plan The Marshall plan was aid given by one country, America, to several. A plan on similar lines for South-East Asia could not find such a generous giver. Such problems as these ought to be solved on a wider basis, and I suggested to the Conference three methods by which a solution of this problem could be reached:(1) The under-developed areas of the Commonwealth should be developed. Each country should have its own field of national development, whether agricultural or industrial. The other countries of the Commonwealth should then indicate what capital goods they could provide since the under-developed countries were finding it difficult to get the necessary equipment in the Sterling Area. The other Commonwealth countries should guarantee a market at fixed prices for the production of the less developed countries. A start should be made in building up the Commonwealth as a single trading area.

(2) (3)

In order to achieve this object, I suggested to the Conference the following draft Resolution: To ensure a high and stable level of employment and to raise the standard of living of under-developed countries in South and South-East Asia, whether within the Commonwealth or outside it, is necessary to develop their agricultural and industrial economies. This Conference, therefore, agrees to appoint a Committee of officials of the countries concerned to obtain information and to prepare a Ten Year Plan for the development of these countries. The other members of the Commonwealth should consider means of providing such assistance as may be necessary for the implementation of this Plan with money, guaranteed prices, technical skill and machinery.

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The Plan should be examined by a Committee of Experts who, after visiting the countries, concerned, shall make recommendations with regard to the help which the Commonwealth countries can give in carrying out this Programme. AustraliaCeylon Proposal The Australian Delegation, through Mr. P.G. (now Sir Percy) Spender, then made certain proposals on similar lines. The Ceylon and Australian proposals were combined into a single whole and the two delegations produced, in consultation with the New Zealand delegation, a joint recommendation. With a few amendments these recommendations were accepted for transmission to the Governments concerned. The Press Communique, issued at the instance of the Foreign Ministers at the close of their deliberations on the 14th January had the following reference to the question of the economic development of South and South-East Asia: Executive decisions are not taken at Commonwealth meetings of this kind, but as a result of the valuable exchange of views which has taken place, recommendations will be submitted to Commonwealth governments for the furtherance of economic development in South and South-East Asia. These include a proposal for the establishment of a Consultative Committee representing the Commonwealth governments interested in this area. It is contemplated that this Committee would hold its first meeting in Australia. Sydney Conference THE Sydney Conference convened by Australia was held in May of the same year. As Ceylons delegate, I took part in that conference and the press statement issued at its conclusion summarizes the decisions arrived at: (1) THE Sydney Conference took us a step beyond the stage we reached at Colombo when, for the first time, the Commonwealth countries decided that the raising of the standard of living of the peoples of South and southeast Asia was of prime importance for the peace of the world and should be accomplished according to a plan within a definite period of time. The Colombo recommendations have now assumed the importance of a plan of development, countries in this area have been invited to prepare plans for national development; agricultural, industrial and social, covering a period of six years and these plans will be considered at another Commonwealth Conference to be held in London in late September. The fulfillment of these plans and the providing of external assistance either form the Commonwealth or from outside it will be finalized at this Conference.

(2)

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(3)

A Commonwealth Bureau is to be established at Colombo for the purpose of co-ordinating the work in connection with the providing of technical and other assistance to the countries that seek such assistance in the development of their plans.

A Conference of Commonwealth officials will be held in Colombo at an early date to consider the setting up of the Bureau and to carry out such tasks as may be entrusted to them until the rules governing the Bureau and its proper functions are finally settled at the next Commonwealth Conference. This Conference of officials will be a permanent one ultimately merging in the Bureau. London Conference The London Conference was held in September 1950. By this time the recommendations of the Sydney Conference had been implemented by the Governments concerned. Here again important decisions were taken. Rt. Hon. Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the British delegation who acted as Chairman, in the course of his press statement, said:. . . . I think I ought to mention the names of two of the Ministers there who played a particularly large part in the conceiving of this idea. They are Mr. Jayewardene, the Finance Minister of Ceylon, and Mr. Spender, the Foreign Minister of Australia. . . . Consider, if you will, for a moment the immense size of this area, stretching right across from the South China Sea on the one side, to virtually the Persian gulf, one might almost say the Arabian Deserts, on the other, stretching from the Himalayas in the north right down to the shores of Australia and New Zealand in the south. It contains within it no less than 570 million people, that is to say, one-quarter of the worlds population, and I do not think I need emphasize to you its immense importance both to world trade and also to world stability. Yet if one considers its importance, one cannot help being struck, I am afraid, by the low state of economic development, which has so far been attained in these areas. It is indeed as low as anywhere else in the world. This is the region, this is the part of the world, in which the Colombo Plan, as we like to call it, is designed to operate. . . . It was unanimously decided to call the report The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia. The idea that was conceived in Colombo, nurtured in Australia. And born in London, was named the Colombo Plan. The fruits of ten years of selfless labour and generous giving can be seen by anyone who visits the countries of the area, and though the economic benefits may not have kept pace with the ever-increasing problem of the growth of populations, yet the Colombo Plan has not been without benefit to the millions in this area who lead their daily lives in toil and hunger.

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Document No. 65 Prime Minister W. Dahanayake on the Colombo Plan (His Special Message Given on the Occasion of its Tenth Anniversary)*
January 1960 International co-operation for the economic development of under-developed countries is a post-war concept. The principle of international economic co-operation came to be considered for the first time, in the Asian context, when the idea of co-operative economic development was conceived at a meeting of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers held here in Colombo, in January 1950, under the chairmanship of Ceylons first Prime Minister. Ceylon played a prominent role on that occasion. Within a years time, the idea took concrete shape and emerged into what is now known throughout the world as The Colombo Plan. The 10th Anniversary of the concept of the Colombo Plan is being marked today in all its member countries. The Government and the people of Ceylon have more than a mere sentimental attachment and interest in the Colombo Plan. The Colombo Conference was a far-reaching event in contemporary history. It was the first post-war conference, which came to grips with the problems of Asia, which looked at these problems through the eyes of Asia, and in the atmosphere of Asia. The Colombo plan partnership has grown in stature as the years have sped by. What was originally a Commonwealth Concept has today become more wide-spread with a membership of 21 countries, of whom ten are non-Commonwealth countries. This is as it should be. All the countries of the region are now members while the countries outside the region assisting in this great co-operative effort are Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Throughout the last ten years the Colombo Plan has been a valuable instrument towards human welfare in this part of the world. The Government of Ceylon is deeply appreciative of the member countries who have provided very useful and valuable assistance, both technical and capital. In this great co-operative Plan it is important to remember, however, that the main effort is made by the 15 member countries of South and South-East Asia themselves and that most of these countries also extend mutual aid to one another. Ceylon has played her part in however small a measure, in the mutual co-operation scheme in offering technical assistance to a number of neighbouring countries of the Colombo Plan.
* Source: Ceylon Today, Vol. IX, No. 2 (February 1960), PP 2-3.

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There is no pretence that the Colombo Plan has found the solution to all the economic ills: but it can be boldly assured that this co-operative venture of faith and friendship has created a tremendous measure of goodwill and desire to work out problems together in the hope that we may bring about conditions of economic and social welfare for the benefit of the many millions in South and South-East Asia. The achievements of the Colombo Plan so far are impressive but the tasks ahead are many. Let us re-dedicate ourselves to these tasks on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary.

Document No. 66 Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaikes (Parlimentary Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs and Defence) Statement in Parliament on the Defence Policy of Sri Lanka*
30 August 1963. The hon. First Member for Colombo South [Mr.J.R. Jayewardene] raised a number of questions of a general character. The first one was the question of defence policy. He raised with us the question as to what our defence policy is. As I see it I am not talking on the basis of any theoretical agreements or theoretical documents or theoretical plans; let us face the facts the first line of defence - I rather think, whether it was in the U.N.P. days or in our own days our foreign policy is not a question just like defence policy on which we can have two different views. Our first line of defence is ultimately diplomacy, friendliness with all nations and a determination to secure ourselves not by means of pacts and alliances of the non-aggression sort or of positive military aid pacts, contemplated by the hon. Member for Dambadeniya [Mr. R.G. Senanayake] with all the four corners of the world against a possible threat of Indian imperialism of the type he contemplated. On the other hand, nor does it depend merely upon goodwill towards India and friendliness towards India and an assumption that we will never get into difficulties with India, as contemplated by the hon. Member for Avissawella [Mr. D.P.R. Gunawardena]. We must be alive to the danger of attack by different types of countries under different circumstances. Circumstances may change. India is not the only potential neighbour we have. The world is shortening all the time. We can have enemies both near and far. Indeed, it is in an imperialist age that we were party to a war against Germany. I do not know why we should consider it so unlikely that we have got to look at it only from the point of view of our immediate neighbours and try to talk in terms of friendliness with those around us. Of course, we must be friendly with

* Source: Hansard (HR), 1963, Vol. 53, cols. 1011 - 1015

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those around us. No one wants to be angry with them. It must be completely incorrect, as very rightly stated by the hon. Member for Avissawella, not to foster friendships and friendly relations with all the countries around us. Indeed, it is one of the cornerstones of Ceylons foreign policy and will remain so, I hope, for all time. But meanwhile let us examine the position, logically. Supposing we were to be attacked by one of the major powers in the world. I rather think it is trite to say that there is no effective way in which we can possibly hope to defend ourselves against modern armaments, modern weapons, even with all the forces of the army, navy and the police force combined, even with the air forces thrown in. I rather think it would be an act of stupidity for us to seek to defend ourselves with the strength which the hon. First Member for Colombo South described as being equivalent to one division. He is correct. At the same time with the army we have we must decide what we are going to do. Now, the traditional approach adopted in the days of the United National Party, when the hon. Member for Weligama [Mr. Montague Jayawickreme] was Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence and External Affairs, was to line up a Commonwealth defence. They started with the assumption that all enemies of the Commonwealth were our enemies and all friends of the Commonwealth were our friends and that the objective of our army was to form part of an integrated defence chain, in which the Ceylon Army, Navy and Air force would form a very small part, and would be able to put up a good show until such time as the rest of the Commonwealth came to the rescue. As far as that is concerned, the primary basis of their defence was, we will defend our beaches, we will defend our airstrips, we will fight to the last man, and while the Ceylon Army goes down may be reinforcements will come and save the day so far as we are concerned. It seems to us that in these days with the kind of weapons we have and the kind of weapons we will be called upon to meet, unless it is the type of enemy whose forces are comparable to ours where it were possible for us to contain and deal with them on the beaches, in the airstrips and to meet them at the point of invasion, we rather think it would be a wrong policy on our part to throw away the flower of our manhood in the army, the navy and the air force in suicidal ventures of that type in trying to attempt to combat with an enemy who is vastly superior in forces and in strength even for the sake of Commonwealth prestige or anything else. In other words, depending on the nature of the enemy we have to meet, we must be in a position to vary the deployment of our armed forces. If with our 25,000 men we cannot do very much against 25 divisions then let us not pretend that we are going to die like heroes defending beaches which we are not in a position to defend. It seems to us that the more appropriate approach must be to consider from terms of practical warfare the method by which we can defend our country sufficiently and the emphasis must be on it effectively for the longest possible period of time. We know that dealing with situations like that our ancestors had these problems before us when they fought foreigners in this country at different times in different ages.

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Indeed, the tradition has always been that if you cannot fight the enemy at the point of invasion you must be willing to retreat into the jungle, retire if necessary without being defeated, know how to retire and withdraw and how to fight back from mountain retreats and from within the jungles , and if one turns round and does not use words for the sake of using words, This guerilla warfare is not a concept that was introduced into this country the day before yesterday ; it is a concept with which indeed practically all the Sinhalese Kings of this country have dealt with such enemies as they were called upon to meet. I do not know whether they did so effectively or ineffectively, but certainly their resources were limited against the forces they were called upon to meet at that time and yet they acquitted themselves as well as they could. And, what is more, they kept the Sinhalese flag flying and maintained national independence for a very long time. Indeed over a course of two or three centuries, which after all must be our objective too until such time as our friends are in a position to help us and depending on the circumstances maybe to rally round us. But it is ultimately a type of warfare for which we have to be prepared. It is a type of warfare we cannot ignore. We cannot assume that we are merely going to combat forces at manoeuvre standards on the beaches whom we can deal with on level terms if we mean to regard the defence of our country seriously. If we can maintain our independence even in perhaps a limited extent of territory in the heart of Ceylon, is that not after all a necessary objective and a part of our warfare experience and training ? The hon. Member wanted to know whether we had abandoned military agreements, particularly with the Commonwealth. The answer is : No, certainly not. But we cannot depend only on military agreements with the Commonwealth. That is our position. In other words, we do not think that the question of abandoning military agreements or otherwise comes into play in this business. As far as we are concerned the agreements that are there will remain and our friendship with nations will be built independently. We shall seek to keep on friendly terms with all countries. . . . know why our military officers are going to Belgrade and Malaya. The simple answer is, if the techniques of guerilla war such as there are of it, of retiring into the jungles, of keeping the flag flying, of maintaining our national independence even if the enemy is established on our own land, is a technique which has got to be adopted, may be in future circumstances we too should be trained and be ready to meet it. No, Sir. The military training as far as we are concerned is a question of how to fight back from the jungles.

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Document No. 67 Statement by Mr. J.R. Jayewardene, Minister of Finance, on Sri Lankas Foreign Policy (Extract)*
4 July 1950 As I said before, in foreign policy, a Government like that of Ceylon or any other Government, must take a stand with regard to the connection there must be between that Government and the Governments around it and its attitude to foreign affairs. In this world today there are really two powerful factors, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. We have to follow either the one or the other. There can be no halfway house in the matter. We have decided, and we intend as long as we are in power, to follow the United States of America and its democratic principles.

Document No. 68 Granting of Port Facilities to United States Navy: Questions raised in Parliament and the Reply given by Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake**
7 August 1950 Dr. N.M. Perera (LSSP) : There is an important matter connected with the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister. It is a very serious matter from our point of view. Perhaps you are aware that we have maintained in this House that this Government should have nothing to do with the Korean affair, that we should not take sides at all. Today, we unfortunately find an American flotilla in our harbour. I am told that one light cruiser, four battleships, and so on, have come into our harbour on the way to Korea. Just as much as on the Indonesian question we refused to grant any facilities to the belligerents, I do not see any reason why we should not follow the same procedure and not grant any facilities to any of these ships. The Government has, I think, taken the stand that it is its policy to keep clear of all these involvements by refusing to support either side. If they are really adopting an attitude of neutrality, then they might as well refuse to grant any facilities to these American ships which are obviously going across to help one particular side. It is not fair by this Government. And as far as the Opposition is concerned, we must strongly protest against the Government not following the same procedure as it did before.
* Source : Hansard (HR), 1950, Vol. 8. Col. 293. ** Source: Hansard (HR), 1950, Vol. 8, Cols. 1856-57 and 1860.

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Mr. P.G.B. Keuneman (CP): In addition to what was stated by the hon. Member for Ruwanwella [Dr. Perera], may I also point out that giving facilities to these American naval vessels which are operating in these areas may very well involve us in acts of hostility against the new Chinese Government which we have recognized ? The Right Hon. Prime Minister must know that the American Government has already stated that it intends sending naval vessels and other forces for the purpose of protecting the rebel administration of Chiang-Kai-Shek in Formosa. That administration is in military conflict with the Government we have recognized. If any of these vessels are going to be utilized in Formosa, that would be an unfriendly act by this Government against the Government which it has already recognized, and I would certainly support the earlier plea that has been made that the Government should not give any such facilities in any port or aerodrome of Ceylon. It is not only a violation of the declared policy of this Government but it is also an action which will greatly endanger the peace of this region and also the people of our country. . . . The Right Hon. D.S. Senanayake: With regard to the question which has been asked me, I can inform my good Friends of the Opposition that I do not see any reason why facilities which were available to the Americans in the past should not be made available now.

Document No. 69 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes Attitude Towards the United States*
18 December 1956 Another point relates to something I am supposed to have said in the U.S.A. that I did not believe that the U.S.A. really wanted to impose colonialism. The hon. Member for Welimada [Mr. K.M.P. Rajaratna] referred to a report that appeared in the American papers of a speech I made. The report is perfectly correct. It was to the effect that I said that I did believe that colonialism or imperialism, as we understood it earlier, is not really what the U.S.A. has in mind. The U.S.A. is so enormously rich, with still further potentialities of development, that the colonial, or imperialist, urge of other countries did not, in my view, to a great extent actuate the U.S.A. I had a full discussion with President Eisenhower, although some people said that it lasted only seven minutes or is it seven seconds? I cannot understand this pettiness. I was able to discuss with the President fully, satisfactorily and leisurely all the points I wished to discuss with him.

Source: Towards a New Era (Selected Speeches of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike made in the Legislature of Ceylon, 1931-1959), Colombo: Government Press, 1961, PP. 847-850.

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The position as I see it is this. This is where my reference to the Monroe Doctrine comes in. The U.S.A. have been so completely isolating themselves from the rest of the world that they really do not understand, appreciate, other points of view. This is what is in their minds, as far as I can see. They wish to obtain some kind of influence over other countries in what they imagine is a tremendous fight against communism. You can say that that is colonialism in a sense, that their efforts to obtain that influence is in itself a form of colonialism, but really the position is that it is not for the exploitation of those countries and their resources that that move is directed. It is with the idea of getting into their sphere of influence, getting into their bloc, various countries in what the U.S.A. imagines to be a big fight against communism. I tried my best, I do not know with what success. At least, my point of view was appreciated, that that our attitude towards the communist countries was not wrong. We were with the other countries of Asia for preserving friendly relations and having mutual exchanges, cultural exchanges, and so on. We felt that was really the right attitude to adopt. It was very right, I thought, for this reason. That today we have to think in terms of mankind. That was the point of view I have expressed for a long time, even in a speech I made in 1947 when I was in the Government. I do believe we are living in a period of transition today between one form of society and another. All kinds of differences, ideological differences, religious differences, national differences and so forth arise during this period of transition. The world has not yet reached a point of stabilization. . . . I pressed upon the Americans this point of view and as I explained to the House the other day, I personally do not believe really that they have this colonial idea in the way that word has been used in the past. But they do create a certain indirect position like that flowing from the desire to range round themselves as many countries as they can in opposition to communism, a point of view which I tried to stress as far as I could was wrong and was one calculated to lead to war. And I must say that there is a greater and growing understanding of our point of view in that country than there was in the past when they were prepared to dub anybody who was not with them as a fellow traveler or as a stooge of the communist countries. I see that point of view is now changing. If it changes, well and good. If it does, then our position is clearly understood.

Document No 70 Text of the Agreement between the Government of Ceylon and the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe, Inc. (CARE)*
15 March 1950 Whereas, as members of a common humanity, the peoples of the Western Hemisphere regard with sympathy the unhappy plight of victims of war overseas; and
* Source : Treaty Series (Ceylon), No. 5, 1950.

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Whereas, spared by the accident of geography many of the horrors of the war, they are anxious to share their resources with those less fortunate than themselves; and Whereas, Co-operative for American Remittances to Europe, Inc., (hereinafter sometimes referred to as CARE) has been organized to enable individuals and organizations in the Western Hemisphere to assist individuals and organizations overseas with gifts from aboard of urgently needed commodities; and Whereas, the Government of Ceylon (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Government ) welcomes the assistance which it is proposed to extend through CARE to individuals and organizations in Ceylon; The Government of Ceylon, represented by Mr. K. Vaithianathan, Permanent Secretary , Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, and Co-operative for American Remittances to Europe, Inc., represented by Mr. William J. Cholko have agreed as follows : 1. The primary purpose of this agreement is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts of food, books and other urgently needed commodities by individuals and organizations outside Ceylon to individuals of lawfully existing organizations in Ceylon designated by or on behalf of the donors. Gifts of various commodities may be included under this agreement by mutual consent of the parties, but the term commodities shall refer to standard gift packages, packed by CARE, the components of which shall be approved by the Government; Provided that : i. In the case of books the categories and titles of books to be made available by CARE under this agreement shall be subject to settlement by mutual consent of the parties. In the case of food, the components of gift packages shall be determined by mutual consent of the parties.

ii 2.

CARE will: (a) Issue, against payments made by individuals and organizations, but only outside Ceylon, gift remittances representing commodities to be delivered to individuals, groups and lawfully existing organizations in Ceylon designated by or on behalf of the donor; Forward such gift remittances for delivery to recipients in Ceylon in whose favor such gift remittances are drawn; Procure commodities from sources outside Ceylon, principally in the United States of America, and arrange for their delivery in Ceylon in amounts sufficient to effect deliveries in accordance with the gift remittances transmitted to Ceylon and outstanding ;

(b) (c)

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(d)

Ultimately appropriate for relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction or other charitable purposes for the benefit of Ceylon a share of the balance of funds remaining with CARE after deduction of its costs and liabilities wherever incurred, the share for the benefit of Ceylon to be determined by CARE on the basis of that proportion of the balance from its remittance deliveries which will have accrued from deliveries in Ceylon. CARE will consult Governments concerning the proposed use of any amounts so appropriated.

(3)

The Government, recognizing the beneficial character of CAREs operations, authorizes CARE to contract for, or to employ, the services of an organization possessing facilities in Ceylon for the handling and distribution of gift remittances addressed to recipients in Ceylon and the gifts of commodities contributed for them through CARE. The selection of the organization by CARE and any change in the selection which may be made by CARE from time to time will follow consultation with the Government. CARE however is authorized to undertake itself such handling and distribution if arrangements satisfactory to it cannot otherwise be made. The term the distributing organization, as used in this agreement, will be understood to refer to the organization selected by CARE and approved by the Government of Ceylon or to CARE itself if CARE undertakes the handling of distribution. The Government will: (a) Admit free of all duties gift commodities furnished by CARE under this agreement, supplies and equipment furnished to the distributing organization for the purpose of carrying out the operations contemplated by this agreement and supplies and equipment imported by CARE for its own official use in any such operation, provided that such supplies and equipment shall be exported out of Ceylon when no longer required for the purpose for which they were imported;

(4)

Provided also that this concession does not extend to supplies and equipment imported for the personal use of the individuals concerned with CARE or its distributing organizations, and provided further that if any of the articles pass out of the possession of CARE or its distributing organizations, by sale or otherwise, to any third party in Ceylon, Care will become liable for payment of duties on such articles; (b) Levy no duties, tolls or taxes on gift commodities furnished by CARE, either in the hands of CARE, the distributing organization, or the recipients; Undertake that no gifts, commodities, furnished by CARE shall be subject to requisitioning, misappropriation or diversion to use other than the intended by the donors before or after delivery to the ultimate recipient in Ceylon;

(c)

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(d) (e)

Treat such commodities as supplementary and outside all ration regulations; According to the unloading, handling, warehousing and transportation of food, supplies and equipment furnished by CARE, under this agreement the same priority as is accorded to other imported relief of rehabilitation supplies, and provide all possible unloading, handling, warehousing and transportation services at Government rates and all possible assistance in obtaining and facilitating such services by other sources where necessary and available; Provide, wherever possible and without charge, effective protection against, theft, including Police protection, for all gift commodities, and for supplies and equipment furnished under this agreement and authorize and assist CARE and the distributing organization to provide such protection wherever it cannot be provided by the Government. Authorize CARE to label the gift commodities furnished by it in such a way as it may wish in order to indicate their source and method used, and assure that such labels will not be removed or replaced; Provide that CARE may obtain in exchange for United States currency such Ceylon currency as it may need at a rate as favorable as that accorded to representatives of Governments or public organizations; Facilitate the operations of both CARE and the distributing organization under this agreement in every way possible, including the issuance of appropriate credentials to personnel engaged in such operations, assistance in providing accommodation and travel services, and provision of priorities and facilities for communication, both internally and with offices of CARE outside Ceylon; Permit CARE to effect, free of all export restrictions and duties the export from Ceylon of any gift commodities supplies or equipment furnished by it from abroad, and to which it has retained title; Authorize CARE and the distributing organization to inform the public in Ceylon and elsewhere that the Government approves the purpose of this agreement and the operations to be under it; Admit to Ceylon such number of American liaison officers as CARE may deem necessary for its operations under this Agreement.

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

(j)

(k)

(l)

(5) Where the purchasers of any remittance so authorized, CARE will be free to specify the particular recipients to whom food, books or other commodities covered by the remittances are to be delivered. A remittance drawn in blank or in favor of general relief, or in favor of a group, will be regarded as authorizing CARE to specify the particular recipients. CARE

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will welcome the recommendations of the Government as to the recipients to be specified by CARE in such cases. (6) This agreement shall be effective on and from March 15, 1950. (7) Either party may terminate this agreement upon 120 days written notice to the other.

Document No. 71 Point Four General Agreement for Technical Co-operation between Ceylon and the United States of America*
7 November 1950 The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I Assistance and Co-operation 1. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon undertake to co-operate with each other in the interchange of technical knowledge and skills and in related activities designed to contribute to the balanced and integrated development of the economic resources and productive capacities of Ceylon. Particular technical co-operation programs and projects will be carried out pursuant to the provisions of such separate written agreements or understandings as may later be reached by the duly designated representatives of Ceylon and the Technical Co-operation Administration of the United States of America, or by other persons, agencies, or organizations designated by the governments. The Government of Ceylon through its duly designated representatives in cooperation with representatives of the Technical Co-operation Administration of the United States of America and representatives of appropriate international organizations will endeavor to co-ordinate and integrate all technical co-operation programs being carried on in Ceylon. The Government of Ceylon will co-operate in the mutual exchange of technical knowledge and skills with other countries participating in technical co-operation programs associated with that carried on under this Agreement.

2.

3.

* Source : Treaty Series (Ceylon) , No. 12, 1950; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. I, 1950, TIAS 2138.

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4.

The Government of Ceylon will endeavor to make effective use of the results of technical projects carried on in Ceylon in co-operation with the United States of America. The two governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult with regard to any matter relating to the application of this agreement to project agreements heretofore or hereafter concluded between them, or to operations or arrangements carried out pursuant to such agreements. ARTICLE II Information and Publicity

5.

1.

The Government of Ceylon will communicate to the Government of the United States of America in a form and at intervals to be mutually agreed upon:(a) Information concerning projects, programs, measures and operations carried on under this Agreement, including a statement of the use of funds, materials, equipment, and services provided thereunder; (b) Information regarding technical assistance which has been or is being requested of other countries or of international organizations.

2.

Not less frequently than once a year, the Government of Ceylon and of the United States of America will make public in their respective countries periodic reports on the technical cooperation programs carried on pursuant to this Agreement. Such reports shall include information as to the use of funds, materials, equipment and services. The Governments of the United States of America and Ceylon will endeavor to give full publicity to the objectives and progress of the technical cooperation program carried on under this Agreement. ARTICLE III Program and Project Agreements

3.

1.

The program and project agreements referred to in Article I, Paragraph 1 above will include provisions relating to policies, administrative procedures, the disbursement of and accounting for funds, the contribution of each party to the cost of the program or project, and the furnishing of detailed information of the character set forth in article II, Paragraph I above. Any funds, materials and equipment introduced into Ceylon by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to such program and project agreements shall be exempt from taxes, service charges, investment or deposit requirements, and currency controls. The Government of Ceylon agrees to bear a fair share of the cost of technical assistance programs and projects.

2.

3.

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ARTICLE IV Personnel All employees of the Government of the United States of America assigned to duties in Ceylon in connection with co-operative technical assistance programs and projects and accompanying members of their families shall be exempt from all Ceylon income taxes and social security taxes with respect to income upon which they are obligated to pay income or social security taxes to the Government of the United States of America, and from property taxes on personal property intended for their own use. Such employees and accompanying members of their facilities shall receive the same treatment with respect to the payment of customs and import duties on personal effects, equipment and supplies imported into Ceylon for their own use, as is accorded by the Government of Ceylon to diplomatic personnel of the United States Embassy in Ceylon. ARTICLE V Entry into Force, Amendment, Duration 1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the day on which it is signed. It shall remain in force until three months after either Government shall have given notice in writing to the other of intention to terminate the Agreement. If, during the life of this agreement, either Government should consider that there should be an amendment thereof, it shall so notify the other Government in writing and the two Governments will thereupon consult with a view to agreeing upon the amendment. Subsidiary project and other agreements and arrangements which may be concluded may remain in force beyond any termination of this Agreement, in accordance with such arrangements as the two governments may make. This Agreement is complementary to and does not supersede existing agreements between the two governments except insofar as other agreements are inconsistent herewith.

2.

3.

4.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Government of United States of America and the Government of Ceylon have signed this General Agreement for Technical Co-operation between Ceylon and the United States of America at Colombo this Seventh day of November, one thousand nine hundred and fifty, in three copies in English. K. Vaithianathan For the Government of Ceylon Joseph C. Satterthwaite For the Government of the United States of America

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Document No. 72 Agreement between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the United State of America Concerning the Installation by U.S.A. of Certain Radio Transmission and Associated Equipment for Use by Radio Ceylon in Return for Certain Facilities to be Accorded by Ceylon for the Broadcast of Voice of America Programs over Radio Ceylon*
14 May 1951 .... 1. The Department of State of the United States of America (hereafter called the Department ) will furnish and install three shortwave broadcasting transmitters with a power of not less than 35 KW and associated transmitting, studio and receiving facilities, at its own expense and shall transfer title to such facilities upon completion to the Government of Ceylon for one rupee. Such facilities shall remain personalties and may, subject to what is provided in paragraph (12) below, be removed notwithstanding the fact they may be affixed to realty.

The scope of the installation work involved is substantially the following :(a) (b) (c) (d) The construction of any additional building necessary to house such transmitters. The installation of the transmitters and their associated equipment at the transmitting site. The installation and provision of any additional antennae required for the operation. The purchase or lease through the Government of Ceylon of the additional ten acres approximately required for the erection of the additional antennae. The installation of VHF link between the Studio center and transmitting site. The construction, including wiring, of any additional Studio facilities required. The provision of two tape recorders and similar miscellaneous equipment.

(e) (f) (g)

* Source : Treaty Series (Ceylon), No. 3 of 1951; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , Vol. I, 1950, TIAS 2259.

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2.

The Department will be responsible for the administration of the installation of the above described facilities after consultation with, and with the agreement of the Government of Ceylon to assure the most efficient modification of the existing plant. (a) It is understood that where it is necessary for the Department to import into Ceylon staff, equipment and material for the purpose of the installation of these facilities, the equipment and material shall be duty free and the staff shall be exempted from payment of Ceylon Income Tax.

3.

On completion of the modification and satisfactory test operations the Government of Ceylon shall be responsible thereafter for the administration, operation and maintenance of these facilities. The Department shall maintain a resident engineer in Colombo for the purpose of consultation with the Government of Ceylon to assure the maximum operating efficiency of these facilities. The Government of Ceylon shall have priority use of one of the three transmitters and associated facilities and secondary use of the other two transmitters and associated facilities. Reciprocally, the Department shall have priority use of two of the three transmitters and associated facilities and secondary use of all other transmitters and associated facilities. Pending completion of the installation of the above described facilities the Department shall have priority of use of such time as the Department mutually agrees upon with the Government of Ceylon. The Department shall pay rates for the services rendered to them by the Government of Ceylon predicated on its pro rata share of the running expenses of the station. Such rates shall be negotiated prior to inauguration of service and thereafter annually beginning with July 1st of each year. The services rendered by the Government of Ceylon to the Department shall consist of : (a) Instantaneous or delayed relays of programs in various languages of the Department.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

(b) Broadcasts of programs initiated and originated by the United States Information Service in Ceylon. 9. The Department shall be responsible for the provisions of frequencies necessary for the transmission of its programs. It is furthermore agreed that the Department and the Government of Ceylon will cooperate closely in assisting each other in providing additional frequencies as and when required.

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10.

The Department recognizes the right reserved by the Government of Ceylon to give approval to the schedule and contents of its broadcasts from Radio Ceylon. The Department may terminate this agreement in the initial ten-year period by giving the government of Ceylon one years notice. Upon final termination or expiration of this agreement the parties agree, at the option of the Government of Ceylon, to enter into negotiations for the purpose of vesting entire ownership and use of the facilities in Ceylon. In the event of this option is not exercised, or in the event agreement as to terms is not reached, the Government of Ceylon agrees, at the request of the Department to retransfer title to such facilities to the Department, upon payment by the Department of one rupee, and in this event the Department shall have the right to remove the facilities and export them from Ceylon duty free. It is understood and agreed that such removal would be undertaken within six months of the date of termination or expiration of the Agreement. In the event of removal, the Department agrees to pay the Government of Ceylon the reasonable cost of restoring to its former condition any of the Government of Ceylons property which may have been modified in order to carry out the purposes of this Agreement. Where the Department has erected buildings or parts of buildings the Government of Ceylon will have the right, if it so desires, to take them over at a disposal value to be mutually agreed. Except as provided here, this agreement shall be for ten years from date of signing, unless before the expiration of such terms a notice of intention to renew is communicated by either party to the other six months prior to the date of expiration, in which case an extension in accordance with such terms as are to be agreed upon, shall be entered into. The Department agrees not to sublet time on Radio Ceylon transmitters.

11. 12.

13.

14.

Document No. 73 Press Communiqu Issued by the Ministry of External Affairs on Release of Natural Rubber from the United States Strategic Stockpile*
February 1962. In November 1961, the U.S. Government introduced certain important changes in the policy governing the release of natural rubber from its strategic stockpile. The effect of these changes was to increase the rate at which rubber was sold from the stockpile particularly at the lower price-levels.
* Source : Ceylon Today, Vol. XI, No. 2, February 1962, pp. 31-32.

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Strong representations were made by the Ceylon Government and the Governments of other rubber-producing countries against this new disposals policy. These representations were made through normal diplomatic channels as well as through representatives of the rubber-producing countries who attended a Conference convened by the U.S. Government in December, 1961, to discuss this question. In addition, the Prime Minister addressed a personal letter to President Kennedy on this subject, in which she stressed the great importance of the rubber industry to Ceylon, and the serious consequences which the decline in rubber prices was having on Ceylons economy. In this letter, the Prime Minister urged the President to abandon the new disposals policy. The Presidents reply to the Prime Ministers letter has now been received and reads as follows : Dear Madame Prime Minister, I thank you for your letter of December twelfth which I have just received through your Ambassador in Washington. The United States Government shares your deep concern over the world market situation for natural rubber, and we were pleased to have your representative take part in the recent informal consultations in Washington concerning our program for the disposal of surplus rubber from our strategic stockpile. The consultations, I am informed, did much to increase mutual understanding on these important problems. In accordance with a suggestion made by some of the participants in the consultations, we have been pleased to modify our program in a manner which we trust will be helpful. I am sure your Government has had full reports on these matters from your rubber experts and from Ambassador Willis in Colombo. The problem of market instability in primary commodities is one in which my Government is deeply interested, and we share your concern regarding natural rubber. I understand that in the course of the recent consultations there was a general consensus that the new types of synthetic rubber constitute the major long-term problem, that the long term trend of rubber prices is downward, and that the best hope of the rubbergrowing countries lies in lowering their costs of production through replanting programs. I am fully aware of the seriousness of this situation for Ceylon, which depends heavily on its exports of rubber for foreign exchange earnings and for state revenues. I assure you that the United States will conduct its disposal sales of surplus rubber with great care and that we wish to take all possible steps to minimize any adverse effects which these sales may have on the world market, be they psychological or real. Sincerely, [Sgd.] John Kennedy. The modifications in the disposals program referred to in President Kenndeys letter were brought into effect about 3 weeks ago. While the Ceylon Government appreciates

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these modifications, it does not consider that they provide fully the degree of relief which countries like Ceylon need in the present circumstances, particularly in view of the adverse trend in our terms of trade. It has been agreed that there should be further consultations on this question about June 1962, and the Ceylon Government hopes that, after these consultations, the U.S. Government will find it possible to make further modifications in its disposals program.

Document No. 74 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon for Financing Certain Educational Exchange Programs*
(Agreement signed at Colombo August 29, 1964; Entered into force August 29, 1964) The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon: Desiring to promote further mutual understanding between the peoples of the United States of America and Ceylon by a wider exchange of knowledge and professional talents through educational contacts, have agreed as follows: ARTICLE 1 There shall be established a foundation to be known as the United States Educational Foundation in Ceylon (hereinafter designated the Foundation), which shall be recognized by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon as an organization created and established to facilitate the administration of an educational program to be financed by funds made available to the Foundation by the Government of the United States of America from funds held or available for expenditure by the United States for such purpose. Except as provided in Article 3 hereof, the Foundation shall be exempt from the domestic and local laws of the United States of America and of Ceylon as they relate to the use and expenditure of currencies and credits for currencies for the purposes set forth in the present Agreement. The funds as well as the office equipment and supplies acquired for the furtherance of the Agreement shall be regarded in Ceylon as property of a foreign government. The funds made available under the present Agreement, within the condition and limitations hereinafter set forth shall be used by the Foundation or such other instrumentality as may be agreed upon by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon for the purposes of:

* Source: Treaties and other International Acts Series (TIAS) 5645.

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(1)

financing studies, research, instruction, and other educational activities (i) of or for citizens and nationals of the United States of America in Ceylon, and (ii) of or for citizens and nationals of Ceylon in the United States of America schools and institutions of learning located in or outside the United States of America; financing visits and interchanges between the United States of America and Ceylon of students, trainees, teachers, instructors, and professors; and financing such other related educational and cultural programs and activities as are provided for in budgets approved in accordance with Article 3 hereof. ARTICLE 2

(2) (3)

In furtherance of the aforementioned purposes, the Foundation may, subject to the provisions of the present Agreement, exercise all powers necessary to the carrying out of the purposes of the present Agreement, including the following: (1) (2) Plan, adopt and carry out programs in accordance with the purposes of the present Agreement. Recommend to the Board of Foreign Scholarships of the United States of America, students, trainees, professors, research scholars, teachers, instructors, resident in Ceylon, and institutions of Ceylon to participate in the program. Recommend to the aforesaid Board of Foreign Scholarships such qualifications for the selection of participants in the program as it may deem necessary for achieving the purpose and objectives of the present Agreement Acquire, hold, and dispose of property (other than real estate) in the name of the Foundation as the Foundation may consider necessary or desirable, provided, however, that the leasing of adequate housing and facilities for the activities of the Foundation will be assured. Authorize the Treasurer of the Foundation or such other person as the Foundation may designate to receive funds to be deposited in bank accounts in the name of the Treasurer of the Foundation or such other person as may be designated. The appointment of the Treasurer or such designee shall be approved by the Secretary of State and the Treasurer or such designee shall deposit funds received in a depository or depositaries designated by the Secretary of State. Authorize the disbursement of funds and the making of grants and advances of funds for the authorized purposes of the present Agreement, including payment for transportation, tuition, maintenance and other expenses incident there to.

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

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(7) (8)

Provide for periodic audits of the accounts of the Treasurer of the Foundation as directed by auditors selected by the Secretary of State. Engage an Executive Officer, and administrative and clerical staff and fix and pay the salaries and wages thereof, and incur other administrative expenses as may be deemed necessary out of funds made available under the present Agreement.

(9) Administer or assist in administering or otherwise facilitate educational and cultural programs and activities that further the purposes of the present Agreement but are not financed by funds made available under this Agreement, provided, however, that such programs and activities and the Foundations role therein shall be fully described in annual or special reports made to the Government of Ceylon and to the Secretary of State as provided in Article 6 hereof, and provided that no objection is interposed by either the Government of Ceylon or the Secretary of State to the Foundations actual or proposed role therein. ARTICLE 3 All commitments, obligations, and expenditures authorized by the Foundation shall be made pursuant to an annual budget to be approved by the Secretary of State. ARTICLE 4 The management and direction of the affairs of the Foundation shall be vested in a Board of Directors consisting of six members (hereinafter designated the Board), three of whom shall be citizens of the United States of America and three of whom shall be citizens of Ceylon. In addition, the principal officer in charge of the Diplomatic Mission of the United States of America to Ceylon (hereinafter designated Chief of Mission) shall be Honorary Chairman of the Board. He shall cast the deciding vote in the event of a tie vote by the Board and shall appoint the Chairman of the Board. The Chairman as a regular member of the Board shall have the right to vote. The Chief of Mission shall have the power to appoint and remove the citizens of the United States of America on the Board, at least two of whom shall be officers of the United States Foreign Service establishment in Ceylon. The Government of Ceylon shall have the power to appoint and remove the citizens of Ceylon on the Board. The members shall serve from the time of their appointment until the following December 31 and shall be eligible for reappointment. Vacancies by reason of resignation, transfer of residence outside Ceylon, expiration of service, or otherwise, shall be filled in accordance with the appointment procedure set forth in this article. The members shall serve without compensation, but the Board may authorize the payment of the necessary expenses of the members in attending the meetings of the Board and in performing other official duties assigned by the Board.

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ARTICLE 5 The Board shall adopt such by-laws, and appoint such committees as it shall deem necessary for the conduct of the affairs of the Foundation. ARTICLE 6 Reports acceptable in form and content to the Secretary of State shall be made annually on the activities of the Foundation to the Secretary of State and the Government of Ceylon. Special reports may be made more often at the discretion of the Foundation or at the request of either the Government of Ceylon or the Secretary of State. ARTICLE 7 The principal office of the Foundation shall be in the capital city of Ceylon, but meetings of the Board and any of its committees may be held in such other places as the Board may from time to time determine, and the activities of any of the Foundations officers or staff may be carried on at such places as may be approved by the Board. ARTICLE 8 The Executive Officer shall be responsible for the direction and supervision of the Boards programs and activities in accordance with the Boards resolutions and directives and the provisions of this Agreement. In his absence or disability, the Board may appoint a substitute for such time as it deems necessary or desirable. In the event that it is found to be impracticable for the Board to engage an Executive Officer, the Government of the United States of America may provide an Executive Officer and such assistants as may be deemed necessary to ensure the effective operation of the program. ARTICLE 9 The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon agree that there may be used for the purposes of this Agreement any funds held or available for expenditure by the Government of the United States of America for such purposes. The Secretary of State will make available for expenditure as authorized by the Foundation funds in such amounts as may be required for the purposes of this Agreement, but in no event may amount in excess of the budgetary limitations established pursuant to Article 3 of the present Agreement be expended by the Foundation. The performance of the Agreement shall be subject to the availability of appropriations to the Secretary of State when required by the laws of the United States of America. ARTICLE 10 The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon shall make every effort to facilitate the exchange-of-persons programs authorized in this Agreement and to resolve problems which may arise in the operations thereof.

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Furniture, equipment, supplies, and any other articles intended for official use of the Foundation shall be exempt in Ceylon from customs duties, excises and surtaxes, and every other form of taxation. All funds and other property used for the purposes of the Foundation, and all official acts of the Foundation within the scope of its purposes shall likewise be exempt in Ceylon from taxation of every kind and from currency controls. United States citizens employed by the Foundation and United States grantees engaged in educational or cultural activities in Ceylon under the auspices of the Foundation, and accompanying members of their families, shall be exempt from all Ceylonese taxes, including the tax levied under the Temporary Residence Tax Act. No. 36 of 1961, income taxes and customs duties, excises and surtaxes on personal property intended for their own use. Such persons shall also be relieved of restrictions in Ceylon affecting their entry, travel, residence and exit as may be necessary for the effective operation of the program envisioned by this Agreement. ARTICLE 11 Wherever, in the present Agreement, the terms Secretary of State is used, it shall be understood to mean the Secretary of State of the United States of America or any officer or employee of the Government of the United States of America designated by him to act in his behalf. ARTICLE 12 The present Agreement may be amended by the exchange of diplomatic notes between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon. ARTICLE 13 The present Agreement supersedes the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon signed at Colombo on November 17, 1952, as amended. The present Agreement shall come into force upon the date of signature. IN WITNESS WHERE OF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement. Done at Colombo in duplicate, this twenty-ninth day of August, 1964. FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FRANCES E. WILLIS Ambassador of the United States Of America FOR THE GOVERNBMENT OF CEYLON N.M. PERERA Minister of Finance

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Document No.75 Finance Minister Mr. P.B.G. Kalugallas Statement on the Suspension of U.S. Aid to Ceylon*
20 February 1963. Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I am taking the first opportunity to inform hon. Members of the House about the stoppage of American aid and its possible effects on the Budget. In April and May, 1962, some of the assets and other facilities belonging to three oil companies, two of which Esso Standard Eastern Inc. and Caltex (Ceylon) Ltd. were American companies, were acquired in pursuance of the Ceylon Governments decision to establish a State Oil Corporation for the importation and distribution of petroleum products. The Ceylon Governments decision gave rise to severe criticism in the foreign press, notably in the United States. The main burden of this criticism was that the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation was taking over facilities belonging to the oil companies not merely to enter the business in competition with them but also to utilize those facilities for the distribution of oil imported from the U.S.S.R. The provisions of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Act relating to the assessment of compensation were also the subject of adverse comment. The Government of Ceylon, however, was not prepared to be deflected from a course of action which it was convinced was in the national interest. The three oil companies had together enjoyed a monopoly in the importation and distribution of oil, an inheritance from the days when this country did not have control over its own affairs and its destinies. The Government was obliged to take power to acquire a portion of the assets and facilities of the three oil companies, and which were used by them for the importation and distribution of oil because the assumption by the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation of responsibility for the distribution of a certain percentage of the petroleum products consumed within the country would have rendered a corresponding proportion of the assets and facilities of the three foreign oil companies redundant. At a time when there was an imperative need for putting all capital assets within the country to the most economical and beneficial use, the Government would have been failing in its duty to the people of this country if it had required the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation to provide itself with entirely new equipment and facilities such as petrol pumps and petroleum stations. It was not considered unreasonable that the oil companies which

* Source: Hansard (HR), 1963, Vol. 50, Cols. 1635-43.

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had enjoyed the goodwill of the Government and the people of this country for several years should be required to co-operate with the Government in the realization of its legitimate aspirations so far as an important sector of the economy of the country was concerned. The Government had for its part expressed through the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Act its intention and its determination to pay compensation for the assets that were acquired. Apart from the adverse criticism abroad of the acquisition of some of the assets of the foreign oil companies for the use of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, there was also criticism of the delay in the assessment and payment of compensation. The Ministry of Commerce, Trade, Food and Shipping issued prompt and precise instructions to the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation for the assessment of compensation. Some delay was, however, inevitable as there had to be agreement between the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation and the oil companies in regard to the inventory of the assets that had been acquired. An agreed inventory would have contributed to a speedy settlement, whereas any other procedure would have resulted in protracted argument and discussion over the details of the inventory. It was also expected that if there could be agreement between the parties with regard to the conditions of the assets at the time they were taken over, the assessment of compensation could be expedited. The principles governing the assessment of compensation are contained in Section 47 of the Act. In brief, it provides for the payment of the actual price paid by the owners of the property together with an additional amount for the value of improvements, but less the deduction of a reasonable amount for depreciation. If the purchase price paid by the owner is not ascertainable, the law provides for the payment of the market price. The first step in the procedure for the assessment of compensation was a direction to the interested parties to submit their claims in writing. In reply to representations made by the U.S. Embassy, the Government of Ceylon had given an assurance in July 1962 that compensation would be paid and that steps were being taken to expedite the assessment of compensation and its payment. On October 29, 1962, a note was received from the U.S. Embassy drawing attention to certain provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act which had become effective from August 1, 1962. These provisions empowered the President of the United States to suspend aid to any country which expropriated the property of a United States national and failed to take appropriate steps within a period of six months for the payment of effective, adequate and prompt compensation. The Government of Ceylon had also been informed earlier, about June-July 1962, that the signature to a proposed PL 480 agreement for the sale of 50,000 tons of flour to Ceylon was to be postponed until the Foreign Aid Bill, which included the amendment relating to suspension of aid, had been passed by Congress.

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The Government of Ceylon, had therefore, agreed as an earnest of its good faith to make special arrangements for negotiations between the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation and the oil companies in regard to the assessment of compensation. In December, 1962, the oil companies inquired whether the Government would be prepared to negotiate with them for payment of lump sum compensation. This suggestion was acceptable to the Government, but the Governments negotiator had first to have before him the oil companies claims for compensation for different types of property taken over. The Statutory notice under Section 44 was, therefore, published giving the companies a months time to submit their claims. The negotiations could not, therefore, commence much before the end of January, 1963. The U.S. Embassy, however, presented a note dated December 24, 1962, in which for the first time it indicated that for the Government of Ceylon to discharge its obligations to the oil companies it would be necessary for it to take action which would permit the compensation tribunal to evaluate all properties and rights, both tangible and intangible, of the oil companies in accordance with accepted principles of international law or provide for the fair evaluation of such rights by other internal procedures or by arbitration. In reply to that note, the government of Ceylon replied by its note of January 11, 1963, that it accepted the position that the basis of assessment of compensation should be equitable and the compensation should be paid as speedily as possible. The Government of Ceylons note further added that the guiding as possible. The government of Ceylons note further added that the guiding principles of assessment as set out in Section 47 and 48 of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Act were not inconsistent with the requirements of international law on the subject of compensation for properties acquired from foreign nationals. In regard to the U.S. Governments view that, in the assessment of compensation, intangible rights and interests of value should also be taken into account, the Government of Ceylon stated that, if this implied that the oil companies should be compensated for business goodwill or that the facilities taken over should be evaluated as going concerns, such a concept was foreign to the Ceylon Governments thinking in regard to the assessment of compensation for private property which was nationalized in the pursuance of Governments social and economic policies. The note also stated that the Government of Ceylon, having considered a suggestion made by the oil companies, had decided that negotiations for a lump sum or lump sums as compensation for all properties taken over would commence as soon as the companies presented their claims in pursuance of the notice published under Section 44 of the Act. The note expressed the hope that the government of the United States would consider this definite step as an appropriate step within the meaning of the United States Foreign Assistance Act. The U.S. Embassy, in its reply of January 20, 1963, while acknowledging its satisfaction at the Government of Ceylons assurance of its intention to pay compensation and to

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negotiate with the oil companies regarding the amount of compensation as soon as their claims were received, stated that the U.S. Government could not agree that the criteria for assessment set out in Sections 47 and 48 of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Act were necessarily consistent with established principles of international law, and therefore, that such criteria met the standard prescribed by Section 620(e) of the United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended on August 1, 1962. The Embassys note added that the Government of the United States adhered to (and here I quote the text of the note itself ) the established principle of international law that in evaluating expropriated property all elements or interests of value which make up the total worth of the property must be evaluated and compensated. Finally, the Embassys note suggested that, if the Government of Ceylon prefers to arbitrate, it would be satisfying the requirements of the United States legislation if it agreed by February the First (1) to submit the matter to an independent arbitrator, and (2) to initiate the selection of arbiters, the procedure for arbitration and the procurement of Parliamentary approval. As it was impossible for action of this nature to be taken between January 20, the date of the embassys note, and February 1, it was clear to the Ceylon Government that the U.S. Government was not prepared to give the interested parties, namely the oil companies and the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, Food and Shipping, a fair and reasonable opportunity of arriving at a settlement, and that even if the oil companies were willing to accept an offer made by the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, Food and shipping, the Government of the United States would oppose such a settlement in order to vindicate what the United States Government considered to be the principles of international law applicable to the case. The Government of Ceylon has always been of the view that the attainment of a settlement between the two parties immediately concerned, namely the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, Food and Shipping on the one hand and the oil companies on the other, was of much more vital concern than the discussion of any principles which may or may not be applicable to the case, and that once the negotiations had been commenced the Governments concerned should give the interested parties a reasonable opportunity of reaching a settlement. The exercise of Government pressure on either party could only hamper successful negotiation. Although the United States legislation required aid to be cut off by February 1, no decision to that effect was taken on that day and the Government of Ceylon was entitled to presume that the arrangements that had already been made had proved satisfactory to the U.S. Government. On February 8, 1963, the Embassy of the United States informed the Government of Ceylon that sanctions under the Foreign Assistance Act had been imposed on Ceylon and that aid had been suspended.

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The Government of Ceylon in turn felt that as the negotiation of lump sum compensation was specially designed to meet the difficulties created for the U.S. Government by the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act, the imposition of sanctions under the Act released the Government of Ceylon from any obligation to take special measures for the negotiation of compensation. The Government of Ceylon, therefore, decided to call off the negotiations and to allow the assessment of compensation to proceed strictly in accordance with the procedure set out in the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Act. I should now like to deal with the implications of the suspension of U.S. aid. The following types of aid have been granted to us by the United States Government: (1) (2) Development grants for the training of Ceylon technical and other personnel abroad and the cost of equipment and services of American personnel required for special programmes; Loans through the Development Loan Fund. In the first category the most important projects are the following : Agricultural extension programme Irrigation and Land Development Industrial Productivity Highway Development Highway and Rail Traffic Survey Labour Education Malaria Eradication University of Ceylon Science Education Management Training

Under these programmes Ceylon has had apportioned to it since 1959 a total of $ 16.25 million or Rs. 77.2 million of which $ 14.74 million or Rs. 70.0 million has already been spent. The remainder as at June 30, 1962, was $ 1.51 million or Rs. 7.15 million yet to be spent. A portion of this would have gone towards the financing of Ceylonese personnel already abroad on training. The U.S. Government will continue to finance these persons until their courses terminate or until the end of a semester or school term so as to avoid hardship to them. In the second category, loans through the Development Loan Fund, there was only one loan which had been negotiated, viz. a sum of $ 3.2 million (Rs. 15.23 million) for the development of Katunayake Airport. The withdrawal of aid means that the Government of Ceylon has now to find other sources of finance if it wishes to proceed with this project. There are two forms of U.S. aid which do not come within the ambit of the Foreign Assistance Act and which the U.S. Government does not necessarily have to withdraw, viz: Supply of Flour under PL. 480, and the CARE programme for the supply of flour and milk.

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So far as supplies already received under PL. 480 and the rupee funds which are available for Ceylons use are concerned, no problem will arise. They will continue to be available. As regards the CARE programme for the rest of the financial year also, no problem arises. It would be for the Government to decide whether it should continue to seek assistance for the future under PL 480 and enter into fresh agreements with CARE for the future. If we choose to forego the aid for these two items, it will be necessary for the Government, assuming that our development programme and the proramme for the supply of the midday meal are not to be diminished in any way, to find a sum of Rs. 15 million to purchase the flour previously obtained under PL 480 and a sum of approximately Rs. 12 million to meet our requirements of flour and milk which had hitherto been supplied under PL 480 against rupees to meet the cost of the midday meal. This will also entail an additional Rs. 12 million in foreign exchange, which we have hitherto not had to find.

Document No. 76 Mr. W. Dahanayaka on the Suspension of U.S. Aid*

22 February 1963 I want to say, in conclusion, that I wish that this unpleasant row that has arisen between the Ceylon Government and the United States Government should be concluded in a happy manner, let there be a spirit of give and take between the two countries. First of all, I would like that our Government should resume the negotiations that have been broken off since it is very clear to all thinking people that the Government of Ceylon, in this particular instance, is not in the wrong. It is possible for us to resume negotiations with the United States Government with dignity. Therefore, I beg of the Hon. Prime Minister and her Cabinet to resume negotiations with the American Government. We need the aid that they give us. We should not spurn such aid. There are certain public utility undertakings and certain very essential projects for which we need the aid of those who are in a position to help us. At the same time we are not prepared, a small nation though we may be, to sell our birthright for a mess of pottage. The American Government should realize that the question of oil which looms so large in this dispute is not one on which we can yield to vested interests or big business, however powerful they may be. Therefore while I beg of this Government to resume the talks that have been broken off. I would request the American Government to withdraw the suspension of aid that they have made.

* Source: Hansard (HR), 1963, Vol. 50, PP. 2034-2035.

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In conclusion, allow me to quote a sentence from Harvey OConnor which describes exactly what has happened in the relations between the Americans and ourselves. He states: In hard times and good, the dominant oil corporations preserved their profitability. All petty risks have been erased. There remains one shadow which they cannot exorcise - the rise of peoples, nations and ideas. The rise of the Ceylonese people has taken place during the last few years. A nation proud of its past now looks forward to a free and prosperous future. We hope, Mr. Deputy Chairman, that the American Government will help us in this very brave task that we have undertaken.

Document No. 77 Mr. J. R. Jayewardene on the Suspension of US Aid to Ceylon*

22 February 1963 Permit me, sir, to express the views of the party [U.N.P.] to which I belong, on this rather important question that is being debated today. There are two broad principles, which I should like to outline at the outset, principles which govern any decision our party takes. The first one is that we will not permit any attempt to deprive us of our sovereignty. It is our party that helped in the last stage in the movement for freedom, and before this present dispute too, when the United States of America requested us - the U.N.P. was in office then - not to trade with China and told us that if we did she would refuse to give us aid, we ignored that request and traded with China as a free country was entitled to do. Mr. P.G.B. Keuneman [Second Member, Colombo Central]: You opposed it. Mr. J.R. Jayewardene: We do not act as individuals; we act as a party. And in the Cabinet collective decisions are taken which every Member of the Cabinet, in our time, carried out faithfully. Inside the Cabinet there are, of course, differences of opinion, and I had my own opinion about that Ceylon - China Pact. I was saying that, when that opposition to our trading with China was made by the U.S.A., we did not agree, because our sovereignty was involved. That is the first principle. As far as the independence of our country is concerned, I am sure that not only our party but all parties would consider the safeguarding of that independence as a national issue and look upon it apart from party affiliations. We speak on such an occasion for Lanka, not for our individual parties.

* Source: Hansard ( HR), 1963, Vol. 50, cols. 2035 2061.

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The second principle is the one of payment of prompt, effective and adequate compensation when the property of private individuals is acquired. Our party is opposed to expropriation, to taking of private property without payment of compensation. We have said that quite publicly. I think in the Indian Constitution too it is embedded as a principle of human rights that no property should be taken for public purposes without the payment of adequate compensation. Therefore the second principle which governs us is that, when the property of a citizen of this country or of a non-citizen, is taken for public purposes, there should be, in the words used by the hon. Member for Galle [Mr. W. Dahanayake] prompt, effective and adequate compensation paid. This speech and the previous one of the Hon. Prime Minister was made after the suspension of aid. Therefore taking what the Hon. Prime Minister and the Hon. Minister of Finance has said and his reasoned and dignified statement in this House a few days ago, I take it that the Governments point of view is that they do not blame the United States Government. They say that there is a United States law which is in operation and that the Government will not be dictated to by anybody with regard to the quantum of compensation. They do not wish to break off with the United States of America and its Government and the Hon. Minister of Finance in his statement which we listened to carefully and read carefully puts no blame on anybody but merely relates the facts as they occurred from his point of view. That is our point of view too, but the only difference is that we go a bit further and say that the United States, as far as we can see, was too hasty. It should have considered more carefully before taking such a serious step as stopping aid which it gives all over the world and creating a situation which could very well be misunderstood in this country, misused in this country, creating ill-feeling between a democratic people and the people of another powerful democratic country. Therefore, I say, with all responsibility, we think we do not know who is to blame: whether the Government of the United States or its Embassy here whoever it is - there was ample room under the Petroleum Act, on the statement of Finance Minister we do not know the view of the United States Government and the Embassy here, but there seems to have been plenty of room for negotiations without taking such a drastic step as the suspension of aid so abruptly and the manner in which it was done. . . . Then our point of view, the point of view we are putting before the public is, apart from the main principles I have outlined, that this Government and its predecessor the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna were the Governments that received American Aid, not only received American Aid, but made foreign aid part and parcel of their Budgets. That is what I wish to emphasize. We are for receiving of foreign aid. As a matter of fact, the first agreement to receive U.S. aid was signed by the United National Party Government in 1950, but note that we received no financial benefits whatsoever, as borne out by the Hon. Minister without Portfolio in a speech in his electorate. It may be that we did not receive aid because we

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entered into a pact with China. The so-called Battle Act, like the Hickenlooper Amendment, came into operation then. It may also be that the question of foreign aid was a new thing. I think America began to aid the world about 1948 1949. We had just become a free country and the late Mr. D.S. Senanayakes point of view was: Do not get aid. He preferred trade to aid. So, there were conflicting views in our own minds about this question of aid, and the first occasion on which aid to under developed countries in our part of the world was given with any consequence was the operation of the Colombo Plan for development of under-developed countries south and South-East Asia. America joined the Colombo Plan much later. She was giving aid under Trumans Four Point decisions. So, From 1950 to 1955 Ceylon received no financial benefits from the United States of America. There were some technical experts we received under the 1950 Act. I think about Rs. 200,000 to Rs. 300,000 were spent on them. My hon. Friend here says that they were used in Gal Oya. But, apart from that, not one cent was received by the U.N.P. Government. In 1955 I think the Battle Act was amended by America- just as the Hickenlooper Amendment may be amended in the course of time by the Kem Amendment and the U.S. Government and our Government entered into negotiations with the idea of receiving aid. We had a document all drafted but unfortunately the elections came along and the people thought that somebody else should govern this country other than ourselves. Those who were elected to govern this country took office in April and within a few weeks, without changing one word of the document that we had drafted, signed the document and began to get massive American aid. In April 1956 the late Mr. Bandaranaike was Prime Minister and I think he was chief signatory to the document negotiated with the United States of America. From that period, from 1956, till today this Government has received almost Rs. 360 million worth of aid from the United States of America. Now that is how this question of the United States Aid came to the forefront. I would like to say that it seems impossible, as far as I can see, for an under-developed country to develop economically at a rapid rate unless it does get aid - maybe from a foreign country or maybe form foreign organizations because the rate of growth of the population is so great that, unless the rate of growth of capital development is backed by an amount of finance which you cannot obtain from the normal savings of the people, unless you are able to invest such an amount of money for your capital development to keep pace with the population growth, it looks practically impossible for an under-developed country to develop at the rate it should to give its people a fair and prosperous life. That had been accepted throughout the world. . . . The principle on which our Government looked at aid was that it was necessary if we want to have a rapid pace of economic development: but we never made foreign aid a part of our Budget. That is an important divergence from our budgeting and this Governments budgeting. We had budgetary deficits; if the country wished to advance

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economically; but we did not want to make foreign aid, something given by somebody else, as part of our Budget, particularly to finance a deficit. Not only is it wrong, it is dangerous as you see today. This Government, therefore, has put us in this position, and that is the matter we outlined in our communiqu and our statement. You not only received United States Aid first; you went further and did a dangerous thing. You made it an essential part of your Budget, and in every Budget speech, - not the first, the M.E.P. Budget from the time of one of the Budgets of the previous Minister of Finance, Mr. Stanley de Zoysa, you said; This is a component of our deficit. We are meeting our deficit this way local savings and foreign aid. Aid is a portion of the component which goes to meet the budgetary deficit. That is the position this Government is in today. In other words foreign aid - not only American Aid - is part of your Budget. And you have put yourselves in a position to lose a portion of your budgetary revenue. I say this Petroleum Corporation Act has laid down a very fair and just method for the assessment of compensation. I cannot see anything wrong in the law as it stand today. I was pointing out that our Act, to my mind, lays down the law which should govern compensation; but it is not rigid. If one examines it carefully, there is plenty of room for negotiation between the two parties. I am not talking of the American Government. You have a law which permits of negotiation between the Petroleum Corporation and the oil companies whose properties have been acquired and I cannot see what there is in this Act which prevents them from getting together and coming to some agreed settlement. According to the information we have, the difference seems to be small now - comparatively small. . . . Our party is with you if you are fighting for the independence of this country and for the preservation of its self-respect. We have no inhibitions about America or Russia or China. We believe that the culture and civilization of the East is far superior to the materialistic civilization of the west. We have no inhibitions about that at all and we feel that we can advice them that the attitude they adopt towards this country and many other Eastern countries is quite wrong. We say it is wrong. Therefore, we are with you, I said, in any matter which involves the preservation of the independence of this country. We are with you and support you in any matter which in any way diminishes our self-respect, and if there is a principle of compensation involved outside this Act we are with you, but if it is a question of quantum, if it is within this Act and you can negotiate, I do plead with you, Do not let this go beyond your control; do not let the people of this country lose the benefits which they can get from foreign and U.S. Aid or other aid - and do not throw your budget completely out of gear and put yourselves in such a position that not you but the people of this country have to suffer severe hardships. That is the principle, sir which guides our party and I am sure in the course of the Debate the leader of my party and other speakers will outline any other matters that need consideration.

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Document No.78 Mr. Dudley Senanayake on the Suspension of US Aid*

22 February 1963 At the outset, I want to make it clear that we as a party will always fight for the sovereignty of the laws of this Parliament. In this particular case, we may have supported this particular law. I will go so far as to say that even if we had strenuously opposed the law but as long as that has been passed by a majority of the elected Members of this Parliament, we will resent any endeavour by threat or force to alter that decision. That position of ours as regards the sovereignty of Parliament I want to make perfectly clear. Now, this incident has fortunately given us the opportunity of removing one of the accusations leveled against us throughout the past, that is, that we had as a Government, by taking aid from America, sold this country to America. Through this discussion and in the course of the speeches made earlier, together with the facts that have come out, it is perfectly clear that when we were in office, for whatever reason - I shall give one of the reasons during the course of my speech - we did not get one cent of foreign aid from any country. As a matter of fact, Ministers who were in the first U.N.P. Cabinet will bear testimony to the fact that the then Prime Minister was totally opposed to foreign aid. I did not agree with it. For various development and construction work, some of the Ministers wanted to get foreign aid, but the policy of the first Prime Minister, which he over and over again emphasized to Members of the Cabinet, was, We do not want aid, we cannot risk our independence. I want trade, not aid. Now, Sir that may have been a reason why during the early years in office of the U.N.P., there was no question of aid. Later, it is true negotiations were made for aid but there was one deterrent as far as we were concerned. Mr. Deputy-Speaker, there was the Battle Act that was referred to earlier. Under the Battle Act, any country shipping strategic raw materials to a country at war with America was denied foreign aid. There was a time when we were totally unsatisfied with the prices we were receiving for our rubber. We felt that we were being exploited with regard to the price we had to pay for rice and we found our rubber going to China anyway - first to England, then to Russia and then to China. We did not see why the rubber should not go direct from us to China instead of through that circuitous route and we entered into the Rubber-Rice Agreement. As a matter of fact I happened to be the Prime Minister when that agreement. was entered into. By that act of ours we were faced there again with the choice between American aid or trade on favourable terms for

* Source: Hansard (HR), 1963, Vol. 50, cols. 2151-2156.

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us. We preferred the Rubber-Rice Agreement as development of trade on favourable terms would have been better for us in the circumstances. I do not propose to hold a brief for the U.S.A. and I think they will be well advised to take some lessons in the manner of dealing with these questions from other nations in the world who have done so for a much longer time and who would, I think, certainly not have rushed in this hasty manner to take the action that they have taken.

Document No.79 Dr. N.M. Perera on the Stoppage of American Aid*

22 February 1963

I want to urge only one or two points. I disagree with the hon. Leader of the Opposition in most of what he said. I agree with him to this extent, that the key to our development, the key to our problems, lies in the rapidity of our development. But I disagree with him that that can be done without sacrifice on the part of all of us. Even with massive aid, we will still have to incur sacrifices. Every country has had to go through a period of development because, in the very nature of things, you have to make a choice between capital development and consumption goods. If you do embark upon consumption goods, then you are upsetting the capital development programme. You cannot avoid it; even with massive aid, that is not possible. There is a third alternative which he has refused to face, and that is the alternative we have put forward, namely that genuine social measures alone will enable us to have the rapidity of development we wish to have in this country. Connected with this is the question of aid. So far as we are concerned, we do not want to make aid the objective. That is the position taken up by our party. It should not be part and parcel of the whole purpose of development but, if it can be obtained without strings, nobody is going to object. As for getting machinery and equipment and so on, from which ever country we are able to get, there is no question about that. That is not part of the whole budgetary system. That is what we are objecting to. That is where the main trouble lies. If you remember, during the last discussion of the Budget, I pointed out that one of the worst things, that we can do is to be so dependent upon foreign aid as to ruin the morale of this country. I said one of the worst things that can happen to a country is to depend upon foreign aid in that way, because by this concept of getting easy aid, by way of massive loans and so on, you are eating into the very morale of the people of this country, when the major concentration must be on the question of the development of our country, on the use of our resources by our own efforts, which is

* Source: Hansard (HR), 1963, Vol. 50, cols. 2157-2160.

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fundamental for the whole development of the economy of a country. That is where I think my good Friend the hon. Leader of the Opposition went wrong in saying that we did not want aid. It is not that we want aid, but we certainly are prepared to use it whenever we can. That is not the main basis of the development that we have in mind. One other point. The mistake made by the United National Party lies in this. It is true in their professions they say, we stand for the independence of this country, we stand for the sovereignty of the laws which have been passed in this country, the supremacy of the laws passed in this country, but objectively by the stand taken by them, they are creating the impression both in the country and outside this country that they are prepared to condone the action of the United States Government at this particular moment. Objectively, that is the result of the position taken up by you, whatever subjective attitude you express, whatever the pronouncements you make. Mr. J.R. Jayewardene: That is propaganda Dr. N.M. Perera: Quite apart from the propaganda, the result is, I think, it has a tendency to strengthen the United States of America in its fight against this small country. Experience has shown that America will try various other measures of trying to browbeat this country. If we show fight I am almost certain that we will get the backing of the rest of the world. In point of fact, the evening papers, todays Observer, pointed out that already even in the British Parliament, a Member of the Labour Party in England, has been constrained to ask the Government whether it is prepared to stand aside and watch while Ceylon was going to be treated like another Cuba. That question has been asked, and no less a person than the Deputy Minister with regard to Commonwealth Relations has said that he is quite prepared to intervene in this matter. We do not want the intervention of either side, but it shows that a certain amount of public feeling throughout the world can be gained if we take a bold stand. But if we show cowardice, if we show that we have not made up our minds, that we are not prepared to stand up and fight in this issue, then nobody is going to come to our assistance or be on our side throughout the world. We got at least public opinion throughout the world by the boldness and the courage of our actions. That is what is important in this issue. And I do want to urge upon this Government even at this late stage not to hesitate, not to vacillate. Please take positive action and show that we intend to carry these things through. In point of fact if we have any complaint it is that, this Government has been much too lenient in this matter. Very fair compensation has been offered and the whole principle has been laid down, and nobody can seriously have any grouse. In fact we have provided what the American Constitution provides, the due process of law for the taking over of property. That is provided in our own Acts; so what are the American companies grousing about? I do want, therefore, to appeal once again to the Government not to stand still in this issue.

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Document No. 80 The Cuban Crisis: Support for the Draft Resolution Submitted to the U.N. Security Council by Argentina and Ecuador*
18 July 1960 Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): It is a matter of deep regret and much concern that the friendly relations that have existed for many years between two neighbouring States, both Members of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States, have become strained and disturbed during recent times. Situations of this kind do arise in relations between Governments, regrettable as that may be, but the path of wisdom appear to us to be to seek a way out and find a sensible solution. It is the policy of my Government, as a member of the Security Council, to do all we can to promote conciliation and to help in the mutual adjustment of differences by peaceful negotiation. This is also the policy indicated in the Charter of the United Nations. We are all familiar with Article 1 of the Charter, but least we forget, I should like to quote a short extract from Article 1. It enjoins us: To maintain international peace and security and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to breach of the peace. The Security Council has a special responsibility regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, and as members of this Council it is our duty, in a situation such as we are faced with, to give effect to the purposes and principles of the Charter. The Foreign Minister of Cuba, in his letter which is before the Security Council [S/ 4378], has asked for an urgent meeting of the Council and has set out the reasons which he considers have led to the grave situation which now exists, with manifest danger to international peace and security, as a consequence of the repeated threats, harassments, intrigues, reprisals and aggressive acts to which my country has been subjected by the Government of the United States of America. Today, in the course of his moderate and detailed statement to this Council, he has set out the acts which, according to his letter, have brought about a situation which seriously affects international peace and heightens the tensions. . . . The representative of the United States, in his statement, which was characterized by much moderation and restraint, endeavoured to refute the charges that have been by the
* Source: U.N.S.C.O.R., Fifteenth Year (1960), 875th Mtg., Paras 23-36.

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Foreign Minister of Cuba, and has publicly given two important assurances. In the first place, he has stated categorically, in reply to the Foreign Minister of Cuba that the United States plans no aggression against Cuba. This is a clear statement made by a responsible official of the United States Government, and must be taken at face value. In the second place, he expressed his desire for the restoration of friendly relations with Cuba. In these circumstances, my delegation is strongly of the opinion that the way is open to a mutually satisfactory adjustment of the differences that have recently arisen and for the restoration of mutual goodwill and understanding which will enable the two countries to co-exist on a peaceful basis. The Charter of the United Nations points out the way for us to establish peace. Article 33, paragraph 1, refers to the pacific settlement of disputes. But is it clear that such attempts as were made in this sense have in this case failed? Very likely, these attempts have not been made as vigorously as they might have been; or, under emotional and other stresses which strained their relationships, the two countries concerned could not use any or all of the means prescribed in that paragraph. It was in these circumstances that the Government of Cuba decided, undoubtedly, to bring the dispute before the Security Council. The Foreign Minister of Cuba argued at length on the right of his Government to come directly to the Security Council without first going to the regional organization. There can be no doubt that he has the right to choose whether he should put his case before the Security Council or before the regional organization. The articles of the Charter amply support his contention, with which my delegation fully agrees. It is not necessary to go into this matter at length, as it must be presumed that, when the agenda was adopted without objection, the jurisdiction of the Security Council and the right of Cuba were both admitted. No one has contested this point of view in the course of this discussion. Cuba has, therefore, the right not only to bring its dispute directly before the Security Council, but also to ask that its case be fully examined. That is what the Council is now doing. We are engaged in the discussion on the substantive question which has been raised, namely, the acts alleged against the United States which are likely, so it is said, to create tension and endanger world peace and security. At the end of discussion the Council will reach a decision. The representatives of Argentina and Ecuador have at this stage suggested what the Councils decision should be, in the draft resolution which they have submitted. The purpose of this draft resolution obviously is, according to its preamble, to make an attempt to employ the peaceful method of negotiation. The draft resolution states that the situation between Cuba and the United States is now under consideration by the Organization of American States, of which Cuba and the United States are members; and it is the view of my delegation that it is not wrong for this Council, in these circumstances, to utilize that organization for the free and full negotiations that are necessary to dispel misunderstanding and create mutual confidence between the parties. Such a course seems to my delegation to be a far more desirable way to bring about conciliation and mutual goodwill than for the Council to proceed to reach a

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decision here and now on the basis of the statements that have been made by the two parties concerned. It is the restoration of goodwill that is most required. This can be achieved, better, especially in the light of the statement made by the representative of the United States on behalf of his Government, by a meeting of the two parties along with the other members of the Organization. In the Organization of American States Cuba enjoys equality of rights, and it is difficult to believe that in that Organization there is anyone who will interfere with its right to build up its economy in the way best suited to its people, or to deny it the right to maintain good and friendly relations economically, politically and socially with any country it chooses. On the other hand, all the other member countries will realize, as I am sure Cuba does, how important it is to restore good relations, both in the interests of hemispheric co-operation and development and for the promotion of international goodwill and peace. The proposal is that we adjourn our further consideration here in the Security Council in order to provide a better opportunity for the restoration of good understanding. This is to be only an interruption of the discussion that is now proceeding in this Council, and in no way can it be interpreted as an attempt to deny to Cuba the right to have its case fully discussed here. As I said before, it must be considered only as an interruption for a purpose, and the purpose, to which I referred earlier, is to make possible the use of a better method for re-creating the understanding and goodwill which prevailed between these two countries in the past. It cannot be construed as an attempt to deny Cuba the right to have its case heard and decided here. It is not in any sense, therefore, a kind of manoeuvre to put off consideration. The proposal is made only because there exists a forum where an attempt at reconciliation should be tried, with the assurance that if no settlement is reached the issue will be brought back to his Council for a final adjudication. That is implicit in the draft resolution; the wording leaves no doubt on this point. In operative paragraph 1, these important words are used: Decides to adjourn the consideration of this question - and the word adjourn is important in this context - pending the receipt of a report from the Organization of American States. If to that we add the further consideration, to which I have already referred, that the case is before the Organization of American States at this time, then there can be no denying the conclusion that what is proposed here is an interruption of the debate for the purpose specified. It is in the interest of all the members of the Organization of American States, including the two parties immediately concerned, to bring about a reasonable settlement and the restoration of goodwill. My delegation is therefore convinced that, having established her undoubted right to come to the Security Council, Cuba should now agree to make use of the good offices of the Organization of American States to obtain a satisfactory settlement; and if Cuba fails to do so she can, as she is quite free to do, once again come to this Council to raise the issue in this Council if she is dissatisfied with the efforts made by the Organization of American States.

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Cuba is entitled to the sympathy and support of all freedom-loving countries of the world in its attempt to throw off the yoke of a dictatorial and corrupt Government and its endeavour to give to its people a better standard of living by bringing about revolution - any changes in its economic life. In the pursuit of this aim it is inevitable that many measures of reform that are introduced to achieve it will be disliked by those whose personal interests are interfered with. Such interests are often powerful and they will often seek to create ill will and prejudice against a Government. It is our feeling that it is, perhaps, these interests that have used their powerful influence to create misunderstanding between the two Governments. Especially in this situation, it would serve a useful purpose if such misunderstandings were discussed round the table. Men of goodwill in such circumstances can hardly fail to reach mutual understanding, which is the basis of goodwill and friendly co-existence and good-neighbourly relations. We must, therefore, be most grateful to the representatives of Argentina and Ecuador for the draft resolution they have introduced. They can be assured that if it is accepted by this Council they will be helping both Cuba and the United States, with the assistance of all the other member States of the Organization, to re-establish their friendly relations. Such a result will be beneficial not only to Cuba and the United States, not only to the other Latin American countries, but also to the whole world. My delegation, therefore, supports the draft resolution submitted by Argentina and Ecuador.

Document No. 81 The Cuban Crisis: Statement of Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike, Minister of Finance and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence and External Affairs*
20 April 1961, The Government of Ceylon is distressed to note the recent outbreak of fighting in Cuba. That country has been for the last few years the scene of much unrest. The Cuban people are going through a period of turmoil and it is our hope that peace and stability will soon be restored in that land and the people of Cuba given the right and the opportunity to work out their destiny as they deem fit. Whatever differences the Cuban people may have they should be allowed to settle them without outside interference. Individual countries should not take upon themselves the task of restoring order or of establishing a particular form of Government in that place.

* Source: Hansard (HR), Vol. 42, Cols. 4433-34.

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Differences which other countries may have with Cuba have to be settled by peaceful negotiations and there are many avenues and institutions open for this purpose, and the countries concerned could make use of these means in bringing about a settlement. I would like to mention in particular the United Nations Organization which stands, among other things, for the maintenance of peace and security in this world. Countries which are not satisfied in bilateral negotiations could resort to the United Nations to help in the solution of their disputes. The Government of Ceylon is closely watching the developments in Cuba and shall endeavour, through the United Nations, to prevent the spread of fighting there and help in the restoration of peace and order. We would appeal to all countries to use their good offices to prevent the fighting, the spreading of which may happen if countries intervene individually.

Document No. 82 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Support for Cubas Independence*
23 January 1964 We have always supported the independence of Cuba against all attempts by imperialist forces to limit or contain Cubas right to follow the ideology of her choice. We have always maintained that the unfortunate division of several countries of the world on a North-South or East-West basis as a result of cold war tensions should be settled by their unification ultimately, but that meanwhile the realities of divided nations cannot be ignored on idealist principles.

Source: Hansard (Senate), Vol. 19, 1964, Col. 2399.

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Document No. 83 Mr. J. R. Jayewardenes Account of Prime Minister D.S. Senanayakes Attitude Towards Communism*
His attitude towards Communism, both at home and abroad, left no doubt in the minds of people. He had several times expressed the view that even at his advanced age he was in politics to protect Ceylon from Communism, that he believed in rebirth and felt that he would be born over and over again to help in the fight against Communism. His attitude to International Communism was governed by the knowledge that he felt that International Communism did not seek peace, but sought to bring about trouble in other countries. This, he thought, tended to war. He openly stated that he did not approve of these methods. He identified International Communism with the policy of the Soviet Union. He did not think this policy would tend to peace.

Document No. 84 D.S. Senanayakes Attitude Towards the Soviet Union and China**
7 July 1950 The ambition and desire of the Commonwealth is to maintain peace in this world. We have joined the Commonwealth, and with them we will certainly endeavour to maintain peace in this world. We do not, however, share in any way the views that have been expressed by my Friend the hon. Third Member for Colombo Central [Keuneman], namely, that the policy of Soviet Russia is to bring about peace. Enslavement of the world is what we believe to be their attitude. Our view is quite the contrary. Since it is the freedom of this world that we are concerned with, we will never be with Russia until she gives up her policy. As far as we are concerned, we shall do our best to maintain our independence and try to make our contribution to the worlds peace whenever it is possible to make a contribution. He wanted to know why we had recognized the Government in China. It is not that we have any love for the Chinese Government or anything of that sort. We had no partiality in the matter. We recognized the Chinese Government as an existing government. As far as they are concerned, they can have any form of Government they like, and it is not for us to interfere. We do not adopt the Russian method of penetrating into other countries and disturbing the good relations that exist in those countries and trying by force or insidious methods to bring trouble to those countries. We do not adopt those methods, and we do not approve of those methods.
* Source : J.R. Jayewardene, D.S. Senanayake, A Study of His Foreign Policy, Ceylon Historical Journal, Vol. 5 (July & Oct. 1955 and January & April 1956), P. 54. ** Source: Hansard (HR), 1950, Vol. 8, Col. 486.

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Document No. 85 Mr. R.G. Senanayake on the Issue of Diplomatic Representation in the Soviet Union*
7 July 1950 But may I ask this one question: how could we send an ambassador to Russia when she does not accept the fact that we are an independent country? Up to now Russia has maintained that she will not permit Ceylon to be a member of the U.N.O. because she questions our independent status. The hon. Third Member for Colombo Central [Mr. Keuneman] maintained that her objection was on the ground that the democracies had objected to the claim of Russias satellite countries to membership of the U.N.O. But membership in such organizations cannot be given in blocs by saying, You bring twelve countries of your own, and I will bring twelve countries of mine. Membership must be actually tested on the merits of each application, and that is the request that the democracies made to Russia. They said, Test the applications one by one, and, if they are independent, admit them. Russias position is not that. She says, You admit so many, and we shall admit so many; the independent status of these countries is not a matter which we need go into. The original objection to our admission was that we were not independent, but Russia sponsored countries which were no more than Russian colonies for membership of the U.N.O. Hence, the position is that we cannot send ambassadors to countries which will not receive them as ambassadors. . . .

Document No. 86 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawalas Attitude Towards Communism (Extract from his Address to the Overseas Press Club, New York)**
1 December 1954 I feel I have a lot to learn from America. You are one of the great democracies of the world in fact the greatest bastion of democracy the world has today. Your way of life the American way of life, as it has come to be called has yielded benefits not only to yourselves but to the rest of humanity, and I want you to let me into the secrets of your success.

* Source: Hansard (HR), 1950, Vol. 8, Col. 462. ** Source : Between the Two worlds (The Collected Speeches of the Right Honourable Sir John Kotelawala (Colombo: The Government Press, 1954), P. 18.

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We are ourselves lovers of democracy and liberty in our part of the world. I do not tolerate what is totalitarian, and you may perhaps have heard me described as the most active and uncompromising opponent of communism in Asia. I do not know whether I should glory in the description, but I think the description is fair enough. I have no truck with this creed, and I shall do everything in my power not only to check Communism in my country but anywhere else where my influence may be of any avail. But what can we do to save the world from further Communism? I am, of course, principally concerned with Asia. There are two great countries of the world today that are Communist. They fell to Communism for two reasons; because their masses had to be rescued from the grinding poverty they were in and because they had no democracy, which could teach them that there can be no short cut to prosperity and that the only way is the democratic way. We must profit by these examples. Communism does not flourish on a full stomach. In the first place, we must bend all our energies, quickly and forcefully, to the tasks of amelioration so long awaiting us in the under-developed countries, and next we must dedicate democracy, and democracy alone, to the performance of the tasks. This is what confronts us in Asia and we want everyones help in doing the job. We want economic help in abundance, and we want it in the right place and in the right manner and at the right time. If America appreciates this and acts accordingly, she would have done a truly great service to Asia, and I am very happy to see from the latest reports that she is beginning to appreciate it. I am indeed more than happy that opinion in America is veering round to our point of view, which we think to be the correct one. It is no use in these times of ours singing of arms and the man: we have to think of aid and the man, especially the man in Asia. We want financial aid, and this is the right time to give it. It must also be given in the right manner and the right spirit, without being tied up in strings. We want aid in the technological field, and we want you, for instance, to come and help us to build up our industries. If America will give us this aid, as others are doing, she can safely leave to Asia the job of defending herself against Communism. Incidentally, I might say at this point that Ceylon has not received a cent of American aid, although Ceylon is the stoutest adversary of Communism in Asia. I say this in no spirit of cavil.

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Document No. 87 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on What Can We Do to Check Communism in Asia? (From his Address to the National Press Club, Washington)*
7 December, 1954 You are, above everything else, a great democracy. You are, in fact, one of the greatest democracies in the world today, and, if I may say so, the greatest champion of democracy, and that is what is of significance to us in Asia. And that is why I though that I might make use of this occasion mainly to say something about the needs of Asia in respect of democracy because, while you are doing so much to keep the world free, there is yet very much you can do to help freedom in Asia. We too in Asia value democracy and prize freedom highly. We detest anything that savours of tyranny, especially tyranny of the mind and the spirit, and we are determined to do all in our power to prevent anything that is totalitarian, whatever the brand, from invading our liberties and enslaving our peoples. And that, shortly, is why I am so notoriously anti-Communist in my part of the world. Some people call me the Hammer of the Hammer and Sickle, but whether that description of myself as the arch-adversary of Communism in Asia be true or not, I have all my life been opposed to this lamentable creed. And if there is any thing I can do, whether in my own country or anywhere else, to stop the further advance of Communism, I shall certainly do it. There are many reasons why you in the United States and we in Ceylon should cherish democracy so much. To you democracy has a very special significance, for without the free enterprise and the individual liberty guaranteed by democracy, your pioneering forefathers could not have made your country what it is today, one of the greatest in the world, politically, economically and morally. To us in Ceylon, too, despite the fact that our history and our pattern of material progress have been widely different, the democratic way of life is not something new. It was known to our earliest civilization, which, I may observe, is 2,500 years old and dates back to over a thousand years before the dawn of the civilization of the West. Democracy is inherent in the Buddhist Jatakas, or legendary stories, of old there is, for instance, this instructive story. Two neighbouring states of India, both very powerful, were at war, but the one that fancied itself the superior in arms and military organization did not seem to be winning. At last its King came and sought audience of the Buddha. The Buddha replied: Thy rivals, O King, are not worsted because they are strong in the arts of good government. They elect their leaders, after deliberation, by popular vote, and having elected them respect them. The leaders in turn do not fail to consult those that elected them whenever the need arises.

* Source : Between the Two worlds (The Collected Speeches of the Right Honourable Sir John Kotelawala (Colombo: The Government Press, 1954), PP. 28-30.

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The people of that country thus think as one and act as one and are strong and may not be conquered. In more recent times, that is since the sixteenth century, Ceylon was occupied by foreign powers, Portugal, Holland and Great Britain in succession, but, fortunately, the democratic outlook of our people survived and has, in fact, been strengthened. What then can we do to check Communism in Asia? As your Bishop Bernard Shiel said not long ago the problem is no longer one of alerting people to the dangers of Communism. We are all aware of that danger. The problem we are facing is what do we do about it?. You cannot just create fear and panic regarding Communism and expect to save democracy. That can only beget mass hysteria and a tendency in the very people who are anxious to fight for the cause of democracy to become undemocratic themselves. We want something more practical than that. I am, of course, concerned with Asia chiefly, and I suggest we might profit by the example of the two great countries of the world that are Communist today. They fell victims to Communism for two reasons, because they had to rescue themselves from the grinding poverty their masses were in and because they had no one to tell them that, so to speak, there can be no short cut to prosperity in the long run and that the only way is the democratic way. I must repeat what I have so often said, that Communism does not flourish on a full stomach. The cure for Communism is therefore obvious. We must set about, here and now, raising the living conditions of the people of the under-developed countries. I say here and now because I want to remind you of something, which may have escaped your attention. China has improved her economic standards considerably in a few years of Communism, while her neighbours are yet lagging behind. If therefore the poorer countries of Asia are not assisted to their feet by the richer countries of the world, and assisted with the least possible delay, the spectacle and the example of China would simply be disastrous. There would be many defections from the free world and democracy would have met its Waterloo in Asia. This is what you and I must specially remember, and that is why economic development in Asia should be speeded up with almost super-sonic speed. This is the job that confronts us in Asia, namely, that of the immediate improvement of living conditions, and it is a front-line job in the battle against Communism. We cannot do the job alone and we want everyones help in doing it. We want economic help in plenty and this is the time to give it. I trust that America will take the cue and act accordingly, and I am happy to see from recent reports that America is coming round to our point of view, which we think to be the right one. And this aid, whoever gives it, must be given in the right spirit and manner. It should not be smothered with conditions and clauses, nor should it be given in the manner that gifts are distributed at Christmas time. It should be given as a contribution to a great co-operative effort which is to benefit the giver as much as the receiver; for, remember, by helping Asia to save herself from Communism you are saving yourselves and the world from Communism. And it might be as well to remember too that what we want is not just money. We want aid in

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skills. We want aid in the technological field and we want people to come and help us build up our industries. If America will give us this aid, as others are doing, she can safely leave to Asia the job of defending herself against Communism. I have tried to make it clear that the first defence of Asia must be an economic defence. The military aspect is secondary. This is the reason why we have not found it possible to agree with S.E.A.T.O., although we are still prepared to maintain an open mind on the subject. We in Asia do not believe that our first need is a defensive pact against aggression. We certainly want peace in Asia in fact it is the one thing we want but we believe that peace in Asia should primarily be the responsibility of Asians themselves and that others must not intervene unasked in the professed interests of world peace. As you will remember, several of our countries and they are amongst the most important in Asia regained their independence only the other day. They are naturally jealous of their independence and will brook nothing that is likely to endanger their status: the burnt child, as you know, dreads the fire. But, quite apart from that, we are convinced that in Asia our first object should be to prepare for peace and not for possible aggression. Our countries want to live together in peace, and we are willing to overlook ideological differences as long as they are strictly kept within the boundaries of the countries concerned. The machinery we need in our part of the world is machinery for ensuring peace and not machinery for anticipating war. Much of what I have said today was said by me just the other day to another great section of your Press in New York. The repetition today is deliberate, and I am not apologizing. I could have spoken to you on another theme, but I want to impress on everyone in America over and over again our attitude to Communism and what we would like America to do for us in our fight against Communism. I trust I shall be successful.

Document No. 88 Agreement between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the U.S.S.R. for the Promotion of Cultural Co-operation*
15 January 1958 The Government of Ceylon and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to conclude an agreement for the promotion of cultural co-operation between the two countries on the basis of mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and peaceful co-existence, have agreed as follows :-

* Source : Treaty Series (Ceylon), No. 1 of 1958.

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ARTICLE I The Contracting Parties will, in every way possible, strengthen and develop cultural co-operation between the two countries. ARTICLE 2 The Contracting Parties will promote the exchange of experience and achievements in the fields of literature, art, science, radio broadcasting, education, public health, physical health and sport. ARTICLE 3 The Contracting Parties agree to render mutual assistance in training national, technical, scientific and cultural personnel. ARTICLE 4 The Contracting Parties will, on a mutually acceptable basis, encourage co-operation in the exchange of films, slides and transparencies. ARTICLE 5 The Contracting Parties will facilitate visits to each others territory by cultural delegations (including sport) and by citizens of their respective. Countries. ARTICLE 6 In order to implement the provisions of this Agreement, a Joint Commission on cultural co-operation, to which each of the Contracting Parties will appoint three members, will be established. The Joint Commission will meet at least once a year in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or in Ceylon, the expenditure involved in the convening of such sessions being met by the country in which such Sessions are held. Proposals formulated by the Joint Commission will be submitted to the Governments of the Contracting Parties for approval. It will be the task of the Commission to co-ordinate annual plans on cultural cooperation, including questions relating to finances if the latter are not covered by corresponding agreements. ARTICLE 7 This Agreement shall become effective from the date on which it is signed. It may be terminated at anytime at the request of either Government upon six months notice in writing.

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Done at Colombo on this fifteenth day of January One thousand nine hundred and fifty eight in the Sinhalese and Russian languages both texts being equally authentic. Jayaweera Kuruppu Signed on behalf of the Government of Ceylon M. Yakolev Signed on behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Document No. 89 Agreement Between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Economic and Technical Cooperation*
25th February, 1958 With the common intention of further promoting friendly relations and developing economic and technical co-operation on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and noninterference in the internal affairs of each country, the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have entered into the following Agreement: Article 1 The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, responding to the request of the Government of Ceylon, has agreed to co-operate with the Government of Ceylon in the implementation of its economic development programme and to this end, shall render technical assistance in carrying out investigation, preparation of designs and the construction of some irrigation and hydropower projects, in land development and expansion of some agricultural crops, in the development of fisheries as well as in the establishment of some industrial enterprises. Projects and works for technical assistance to be rendered to the Ceylon state organizations by the Soviet organizations are listed in the Schedule which constitutes an integral part of this Agreement. Article 2 In pursuance of the co-operation set out in Article I of this Agreement the Government of the Union Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide for:

* Source: Treaty Series (Ceylon), No. 3 of 1958

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carrying out designs, surveys and investigations by the Soviet organizations in cooperation with the Ceylon state organizations; supply of some materials necessary for the construction which are not available in Ceylon, equipment and machinery for the construction of projects and implementation of works scheduled to this Agreement; rendering technical assistance by Soviet experts at construction sites (technical advice and supervision), in erection, adjustment and commissioning of projects to be effected with the help of the Soviet organizations; sending Soviet specialists to Ceylon on mission for rendering technical assistance in training Ceylon nationals in maintenance and operation of the projects to be established with the help of the USSR; as well as for shop-floor training of Ceylon specialists at corresponding Soviet enterprises. Article 3 In pursuance of the co-operation set out in Article I of this Agreement the Government of Ceylon will implement, through the Ceylon organizations the construction and erection work for the projects to be undertaken under the provisions of the present Agreement; will ensure the organization of all works involved in the construction, including employment of labour, supply of building materials available in Ceylon, construction of subsidiary enterprises and establishment of municipal services, as well as financing local costs incurred by the construction of projects and carrying out of works provided for under this Agreement. The Ceylon organizations shall hand over to the Soviet organizations on dates to be mutually agreed upon all the initial data necessary for preparation of designs for the projects listed in the Schedule to this Agreement. Article 4 The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to extend credit to the Government of Ceylon of 120,000,000 (one hundred and twenty million) roubles ( one rouble equals to 0.222168 grammes of fine gold) at 2.5 per cent interest per annum for the period of five years beginning with the date of entry into force of this Agreement to cover: the costs borne by the Soviet organizations in the preparation of designs, surveys and investigations; the costs of equipment , machinery and some materials necessary for the construction which are not available in Ceylon and are to be supplied from the USSR on C.I.F. Ceylon Ports basis; the traveling expenses of Soviet specialists sent to Ceylon for rendering technical assistance as well as the costs of shop-floor training of Ceylon specialists in the USSR.

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The period for the use of credit stated in this Article may be prolonged upon mutual agreement of the Parties. Article 5 The Government of Ceylon shall repay the amounts of credit used for each project, the credit being stipulated in Article 4 of this agreement, in twelve equal annual installments. The first installment shall be made upon completion of deliveries of equipment from the USSR and upon completion of designs, surveys and investigations provided for in the corresponding Contracts for each projects. The date of the use of credit for the payments of equipment, machinery and materials will be considered the date of the Bill of Lading and for the payments to cover designing and other costs for rendering technical assistance the date of Contractors invoice. Interest will accrue from the date of the use of the corresponding part of the credit and shall be paid within the first quarter of the year following the year in which it has accrued. Article 6 Payments of amounts to cover credit and interest accrued thereon shall be credited in POUNDS STERLING to an account which will be opened with the Central Bank of Ceylon in favour of the State Bank of the USSR. The amounts credited to this account may be used by Soviet organizations for the purchase of Ceylon goods on the terms and conditions of the Ceylon-Soviet Trade and Payments Agreements in force and /or will be available for transfer in POUNDS STERLING or in other convertible currency agreed upon by the Central Bank of Ceylon and the State Bank of the USSR. Where payments to cover credit and interest accrued thereon are to be made by deliveries of Ceylon goods, authorized Ceylon and Soviet organizations, three months before each next year of payments to cover credit and interest thereon, shall agree upon provisional lists of goods scheduled for deliveries during the next calendar year; their prices on the level of world market prices, as well as their quantities and dates of delivery. Where payments to cover credit and interest accrued thereon are to be made in POUNDS STERLING or other convertible currency, the conversion of such currency into roubles shall be effected on the gold parity of such currency to the rouble on the date of payment. Article 7 For the purpose of keeping records of the credit used and repaid, which is extended under this Agreement, as well as the payment of interest accruing thereon, the Central Bank of Ceylon and the State Bank of the USSR shall open special credit accounts in roubles in favour of each other and shall establish by mutual agreement the procedure for setting these accounts.

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Article 8 The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall hand over to the government of Ceylon technical documentation and information necessary for the organization of production at the projects to be established under this Agreement. The transfer of the above documentation and information shall be effected free of charge, while Ceylon Party shall bear only the actual costs of the Soviet organizations connected with the preparation and transfer of such documentation. The above documentation and information is to be used exclusively in Ceylon and is not to be transferred to foreign natural or juridical persons. Article 9 The Government of Ceylon shall repay to the Soviet Party all expenses borne by the Soviet organizations in connection with the sending of Soviet specialists on mission to Ceylon in pursuance of this Agreement, except for the traveling expenses of Soviet specialists to Ceylon and back, as well as costs borne by the Soviet organizations stipulated in Article 8 of this Agreement, by crediting the amounts in Ceylon rupees, provided for under the Contracts, to a special account which will be opened with the Central Bank of Ceylon in favour of the State Bank of the USSR. The amounts credited to this account may be used by the Soviet organizations for covering their operating costs in Ceylon and any balance unused may be transferred under the provisions of the Ceylon-Soviet payments Agreement in force in POUNDS STERLINGS or other convertible currency agreed upon by the Central Bank of Ceylon and the State Bank of the USSR. Article 10 The execution of designs, surveys and investigations supplies of equipments, machinery and materials from the USSR, deputing Soviet specialists to Ceylon and rendering any other technical Assistance by the Soviet Party under this Agreement shall be effected on the basis of contracts to be entered into by the Ceylon and Soviet organizations duly authorized by the Governments of the two countries. The Contracts will specify, in particular, the volume, dates, costs and other terms and conditions connected with the implementation of designs, surveys and investigations, supplies of equipment, machinery and materials, deputing Soviet specialists to Ceylon and Ceylon nationals to the USSR for the purpose of training as well as rendering any other technical assistance to be effected under the present Agreement. The prices of equipment , machinery and materials to be supplied from the USSR to Ceylon will be fixed on the basis of the world market prices. Should the costs of designs, surveys and investigations, supplies of equipment , machinery and materials and other services to be rendered by the Soviet Party under

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Article 4 of this Agreement exceed the amount of the credit, i.e. 120,000,000 (one hundred and twenty million) roubles the amount in excess shall be paid by the Ceylon Party by deliveries of Ceylon goods to the USSR on the terms and conditions of the Ceylon-Soviet Trade and Payments Agreement in force and/or in POUNDS STERLING or other convertible currency to be agreed upon between the Central Bank of Ceylon and the State Bank of the USSR. Article 11 The present agreement is subject to ratification in the shortest possible period by each Contracting Party in conformity with its law and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification which will take place in Moscow. Done in the City of Colombo , this twenty fifth day of February 1958, in duplicate, in the English and Russian Languages, both texts being equally authentic. (Sgd.) STANLEY DE ZOYSA on behalf of the Government of Ceylon. (Sgd.) P.A. MALETIN on behalf of the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics

Document No.90 Joint Sri Lanka-Soviet Communique*

28 October, 1963 In the course of the meetings and conversations between the leaders of Ceylon and the Soviet Union, which passed in an atmosphere of cordial friendship and complete mutual understanding, an exchange of opinion took place on a number of important international problems of common interest as well as on the problems of the further strengthening and development of Ceylonese-Soviet relations. Both sides noted with great satisfaction that the policy of peaceful coexistence, pursued by Ceylon and the Soviet Union, serves the cause of peace and the lessening of international tension. It was also noted that the adherence of Ceylon to the policy of neutrality and non-alignment meets the national interests of the country and facilitates the strengthening of world peace. The Governments of Ceylon and the Soviet Union note that relations between Ceylon and the Soviet Union founded on the principles of peaceful coexistence are of a genuinely friendly nature. The sides declared their determination to continue to be
* Source : The Ministry of Defence and External Affairs.

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guided in their relations with each other by these noble principles. In the course of the exchange of views it was found that the sides share a common stand on such major problems of our time as general and complete disarmament, the struggle for the complete and prompt elimination of colonialism, and the settlement of questions under dispute through negotiation. Both sides are of the opinion that the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, though of a limited nature, is a document of great international significance, and they express the hope that the conclusion of this Treaty will positively influence the international atmosphere and relations among States; and that it will generate more favourable conditions for the efforts of peaceloving States to achieve agreement on the complete banning of nuclear weapons and on general disarmament. The sides hail the resolution adopted unanimously by the eighteenth session of the UN General Assembly not to place in space orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, and they consider it a new and useful step made after the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests. Both sides recognized fully the necessity to seek peaceful solutions of other urgent international problems. In their opinion such problems include the strengthening of European security together with the elimination of the remnants of the Second World War, the conclusion of non-aggression pacts individually between States and between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons, and a number of other problems. In the opinion of both Governments the implementation of these measures would facilitate the further easing of the international situation, and the creation of conditions favourable for the solution of the problems of general and complete disarmament and for the strengthening of peace. The Ceylonese Government supports the proposal submitted by the Soviet Government at the eighteenth session of the UN General Assembly to convene in the first quarter or in the first half of 1964 a conference of the States members of the 18-Nations Disarmament Committee with the participation of leading statesmen at the highest level. Both countries consider that the convening of such a meeting would promote the solution of the disarmament problem which is the most vital problem of the day. The Soviet Government highly appreciated the contribution made by the Government of Ceylon, and personally by the Prime Minister Sirimavo R.D. Bandaranaike towards the settlement of international disputes and declares its support for the efforts of the Ceylonese Government to preserve peace in Asia and throughout the world. The Soviet side considers, in particular, that the convening, on the invitation of Ceylon, of the Colombo Conference for the peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute has played a positive role in the cause of consolidating peace in Asia. Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo R.D. Bandaranaike expressed the Ceylon Governments sincere appreciation of the signal contribution made by the Soviet Government and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, N.S. Khrushchev, personally to the cause of

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lessening tension, settlement of international disputes by peaceful negotiation and to safeguard world peace. The Government of Ceylon and the USSR declare that they resolutely condemn colonialism in all its forms and manifestations and express their confidence that at the present time there exist real grounds to eliminate forever the system of colonial oppression and exploitation. They stress their determination to struggle for the prompt implementation of the provisions of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Governments of Ceylon and the Soviet Union declare that they fully support the peoples fighting for national liberation and resolutely condemn all attempts to prevent the countries which have won political independence from following the road of free national development. The sides stressed that the remnants of colonial domination are a source of increasing tensions and conflicts, which create a permanent menace for the peace and security of the people. The Soviet Government positively appreciates the initiative of Ceylon in submitting to the UN the proposal to condemn the persecution of Buddhists in South Vietnam. The Ceylonese and Soviet Governments resolutely condemn the action of the Portuguese Colonialists who are waging a sanguinary war in Angola and declare that they support the people of Angola who are fighting for their independence. The Governments of Ceylon and the USSR express their indignation over the inhuman policy of apartheid and racial discrimination pursued by the Government of the South African Republic. They consider that such actions of the Government of the South African Republic are a grave violation of elementary human rights and of the UN Charter. The Soviet Government informed the Government of Ceylon about the stand of the USSR Government on the question of the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Germany and of the necessity for the settlement on its basis of the question of West Berlin. The Government of Ceylon holds the view that at present the fact of the existence of two German States cannot be ignored and regards with understanding the efforts of the Soviet Government directed towards the peaceful settlement of the German problem through negotiations between all the parties concerned. During the talks between the Ceylonese and Soviet Statesmen, questions of CeyloneseSoviet relations were comprehensively discussed. Both Governments confirmed their desire to take all steps to further the development of Ceylonese-Soviet relations on the basis of friendship, equality, cooperation and mutual understanding. Questions of Ceylonese-Soviet economic and technical cooperation were also discussed. It was stated by the Ceylonese Government that the friendly assistance of the Soviet Union in the development of an independent economy and in the training of Ceylonese specialists was highly appreciated by Ceylon. A mutual desire was expressed to promote every possible way the fulfillment of the previously concluded Ceylonese-

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Soviet Agreements on trade, economic cooperation and cultural relations and the further development of fruitful economic cooperation between the two countries. Both Governments have noted with satisfaction the successful development of trade relations between Ceylon and the Soviet Union and expressed their wish to further increase Ceylonese-Soviet trade on the basis of mutual benefit. The two sides stressed the usefulness of the expansion of cultural relations, the exchange of scientific information, the strengthening of the contacts between specialists, working in the field of science, culture, education and health of both countries and considered it necessary to continue the efforts in this direction on the basis of the existing Ceylonese Soviet Agreement on cultural cooperation. The Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mrs. Sirimavo R.D. Bandaranaike, extended an invitation to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Madame N.P. Khrushchev to pay a visit to Ceylon. The invitation has been thankfully accepted. The time of the visit will be arranged at a later date. The Governments of Ceylon and the USSR attach great importance to the development of personal contacts between leading Statesmen of both countries. The parties are confident that the successful visit of the Prime Ministers of Ceylon, Mrs. Sirimavo R.D. Bandaranike, to the Soviet Union is a great contribution to the development and strengthening of friendly relations between Ceylon and the USSR. (Sgd): Sirima R.D. Bandaranaike Prime Minister of Ceylon (Sgd.): N.S. Khrushchev Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Document No.91 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Senate Speech on RussianAssisted Iron And Steel Plant*
23 January 1964 I would like to touch on some of the questions that he [Senator Wijemanne] had raised. One is with regard to the iron and steel plant that is being built in this country by the U.S.S.R. Government. Senator Wijemanne had made the charge that this iron and steel plant could have been got from Western countries at much lower cost and better rates. This factory, which is being built in this country by the U.S.S.R. Government, is really

* Source: Hansard (Senate), Vol. 19, Cols. 2417-2418.

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given to us under the Economic Aid Agreement which was signed during the late Prime Ministers Government. It is really under the Economic Aid Agreement that both the iron and steel Factory and the Tyres and Tubes Factory have been promised to us. The loan that we are getting from the U.S.S.R. Government is at a very low rate of interest, namely, 2 percent per annum. It is a along term rupee loan repayable in kind by the sale of Ceylon produce. It does not involve any foreign exchange problem in repaying this loan. There was no question of calling for tenders from any other country. Senator Wijemanne has said that other Western countries were prepared to give it much cheaper, but there was no question of calling for tenders because this was given under the Economic Aid Agreement. Before we accepted this steel plant, we requested the Indian Government to loan us a team of Indian experts to evaluate this scheme, because India too has a steel plant which has been put up by the Soviet Government. The Indian Government very kindly sent us the Indian experts who evaluated the proposals and recommended the scheme. It was thereafter that the Ceylon Government accepted this factory. Senator Wijemanne had also alleged and challenged me to deny it that the equipment provided by the Soviet Government for a steel mill is second-hand and that it has been obtained from the United Kingdom. The Ceylon Government has had an assurance from the Soviet Government that the equipment provided for our mill is all brand new , manufactured in the U.S.S.R. Crates containing forty per cent of the equipment have already arrived , and to the best of our knowledge our engineers would be more competent than hon. Senators in this field - all the equipment opened out so far is both brand new and obviously manufactured in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union is not providing steel mill equipment for the first time. Together with our mill, which has a capacity of 60,000 tons, we understand that the U.S.S.R. is providing a mill of 50,000 tons for Indonesia. Surely we have heard of the Birla Steel Mill of India which has a capacity of two million tones and which produces more than what is expected of it. All this could not have come from the United Kingdom? Obviously, in his allegation he has confused it with our tyre plant, in which case the Soviet Government made it clear to us that a few items of equipment would be provided from countries which produce the best quality in those particular items. These were to be provided obviously from East Germany, Czechoslovakia and even a few from the United Kingdom. I would challenge Senator Wijemanne to prove his allegation.

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Document No. 92 Text of the Trade Agreement between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the Peoples Republic of China*
4 October 1952 MOVED by the desire to promote and enlarge to the greatest possible extent commerce and trade between the two countries, the Government of Ceylon and the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I The trade between the two countries is expected to reach the annual volume of approximately 250 million Ceylon Rupees of exportation on each side. ARTICLE II The annexed Schedules A and B show the commodities and the estimated quantities of them available for export by each country, but the quantities in respect of rubber and rice will form the subject matter of special proposals. ARTICLE III For the export and import of those commodities listed in the above- mentioned schedules and any other commodities not mentioned in these schedules, the Contracting Parties shall render all facilities including the issue wherever necessary of export and import licenses in accordance with the laws and regulations in force in each country. ARTICLE IV This Agreement aims at fixing targets for imports and exports whether by private traders or by Government and is not a contractual agreement binding either party to supply the stated quantities of commodities mentioned in Schedules A and B. The Contracting Parties intend however that the flow of trade between the two countries shall be stimulated to the greatest possible extent. ARTICLE V All the payments for the trade between the two countries shall be conducted in Ceylon rupees. On the balancing of the account at the end of each year, the surplus, if any, accumulating to the credit of either party shall be settled by merchandise or by conversion into a third currency or carried forward to the succeeding year, as may be agreed between the two parties.
* Source: Treaty Series (Ceylon), No. 1 of 1953

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ARTICLE VI This Agreement shall become effective from the date it is ratified by the two Governments for a period of one year and may be extended for such further periods as may be agreed upon between the two parties. Done in Peking on October 4th, 1952, in two copies, each in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally valid. (Sgd.) Yeh Chi-Chuang Representative of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China (Sgd.) R.G. Senanayake Representative of the Government of Ceylon

SCHEDULE A List of commodities Exportable from China to Ceylon Name of Commodity Quantity Rice Green Peas (Small) Wheat flour Green Beans (large) Dry ginger Preserved foods (dry foods and canned foods) Porcelain wares Coal Garlic Sesame seeds Sulphur Newsprints Paper, miscellaneous Tobacco leaf Resins Cotton piece goods and cotton goods Silk piece goods and silk goods Glass and glasswares Toys Torch lights Dry cells and batteries Thermos flasks Carpets Floor tiles 5,000 metric tons 10,000 1,000 50 300,000 500 1,000 2,000 10,000 500 500 -

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SCHEDULE B List of Commodities Exportable from Ceylon to China Commodity Rubber Coconut Oil Cocoa Cloves Mace Cardamoms Cow and buffalo skins and hides Pepper Beche-de-mer Arecanuts Citronella Oil Cinnamon leaf oil Coir Yarns Quantity 10,000 metric tons 1,000 30 750 20 50 60 -

Document No. 93 Commerce Minister R.G. Senanayakes Statement on Trade Agreement with China*
7 November 1952 In view of various criticisms which have recently appeared in the Press regarding certain aspects of the proposals brought back by the Trade Mission to China, which I had the honour of leading, I feel that it is time that I made a few observations on them myself. At the outset it might be useful to indicate the background of the situation in Ceylon when the Prime Minister announced the decision to send a mission to China. We were in a desperate situation in regard to our stocks of rice in the country and the prospects of immediate supplies. Our normal suppliers were either asking dollars, which we hadnt; and our tenders for what sterling rice was available had failed, as we had been out-bid by other buyers.
* Source: U.N.P. Journal, 7 November 1952, PP.1-2.

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In spite of every endeavour made by the Food Minister in the course of his visit to London and Washington especially undertaken for this very purpose, it was found impossible to procure all the rice that was immediately necessary. Although limited quantities of American rice were available in the open market, prices began to skyrocket the moment Ceylon started making its purchase, so much so that after making one or two purchases the Food Commissioner had to withdraw from the American market. The dollar earning for Ceylon had for some time been dwindling consequent on the withdrawal of American buying, and the purchases of American rice at high prices had almost wiped out our dollar balances. There was a critical period of three to four months between October to December, 1952, when our requirements to meet the ration, which had already been cut down, were not covered either by stocks or incoming shipments. It was in this context that I was asked to proceed to China to explore, firstly, the possibility of obtaining sufficient rice from China to meet Ceylons immediate requirements to maintain the ration; and, secondly, to explore the possibilities of expanding trade between the two countries. So far as the first part of my mission was concerned, I believe that there is no controversy about it. Arrangements were made for the immediate delivery of 80,000 tons of rice, which would enable Ceylon to tide over the critical period between October, 1952, and January, 1953. In actual fact, what the mission did in Peking was to conclude a provisional trade agreement (subject to ratification by the two Governments) covering a wide range of commodities and to bring back certain proposals in regard to rubber and rice for submission to my Government. Both these matters were strictly in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the written instructions given to me by the Prime Minister. The General Trade Agreement has already been approved by the Ceylon Government and the proposals for rubber and rice are now under active consideration. In place of harping on my assuming authority in excess of instructions, the attack seems now to concentrate on the political implications of a trade agreement - of any kind of trade agreement for that matter - with Communist China. One would have thought that reference to political implications of trade with China would be quite irrelevant at this stage, as it must be assumed that the Government fully considered this aspect of the question when it deliberately announced its intention to send a mission to China with the object not merely of just procuring a casual consignment of rice but also of exploring the possibilities of establishing closer commercial relations between the two countries. In this connection, the following question and answer between Mr. Keuneman and the Prime Minister in Parliament on September 23rd 1952, is not without interest: Mr. Keuneman Will the Hon. Prime Minister let us know whether his Government will be prepared to enter into direct trade agreement with the Government of China ?

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Prime Minister : It depends on the proposals. Otherwise, it would have been farcical on our part to have sent a mission. This interchange of question and answer in Parliament should leave no doubt as to the attitude of our Government on the question of trade with a Communist country. This attitude was shared not by the Prime Minister and his Government only, but even by the very publicists who now think fit to condemn it . I have always held the view that political ideologies should not stand in the way of countries trading with each other; if that trade is to their mutual benefit, I am quite unrepentant about it. It is bad enough to see a world divided on political grounds, but to divide it still further economically, cannot surely conduce to the peace and prosperity of the people. To maintain a non discriminatory market is a measure of special significance to a small country such as ours. I am encouraged to entertain and persist in this view by the reflection that even the late Prime Minister insisted that there should be no destinational restrictions or bans on the export of our commodities. I know personally that the late Prime Minister even went so far as to protest against the imposing of bans on the export of rubber from Malaya to China. Talking of China in particular, it would be unrealistic to ignore a nation of 500,000,000 in our own continent of Asia, with a united and cohesive Government for the first time in many centuries. She is bound to be a major factor in world trade; and as I indicated in the course of certain observations during the Budget Debate, I foresee the ingredients of a minor boom once China enters into international trade in a big way. Already the announcement of the Trade Agreement with China has stimulated both the rubber and the coconut markets. It is reasonable to envisage that the emergence of a new buyer of the proportions such as China, will materially counter the monopolistic buying operations, international raw material allocations, destinational controls, etc. which contribute so much in the depression of prices of raw materials which we produce. If these countries really want to finance Communist activities through these channels it is perfectly open for them to do so now. The conclusion of a trade agreement with China is not going to make the slightest difference on that score. Logically, if it is thought that this risk does exist in trading with Communist countries, the proper thing to do would be to ban the trade altogether with any Communist country whatsoever. This is not proposed here in this country nor has it been proposed in any other democratic country. Besides, if the Communist countries really want to send money here for political activities so far as I am aware, there is no law to prevent the coming of that money into Ceylon quite openly and without going through the devious procedures of trade. If there are any serious grounds for apprehension on this score there should be no difficulty in devising measures for counteracting such undesirable developments.

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It would also seem that some people entertain apprehensions in regard to the possible consequences of a trade agreement with the Chinese in the event of a war breaking out both with regard to the agreement itself as well as the maintenance of shipping services, etc., which are of such vital consequence to an island country. A major war is a cataclysm of the first magnitude and it would be idle to speculate about its course and consequences. I do not believe that any amount of planning by us can provide for contingencies arising out of such an eventuality. That would be entirely a new situation which would have to be dealt entirely with new methods. In any case why talk only of war when the more immediate prospect is that of peace. If there is peace in Korea there is every prospect of commodity prices slumping. Ceylon would then be in the happy position of having secured a stable commodity market and established a cordial relationship with a very powerful buyer.

Document No. 94 Prime Minister Dudley Senanaykes Statement on Trade Agreement with China*
14th November 1952, On an invitation from the Government of the Peoples Republic of China through their Ambassador in Rangoon, a Trade Mission led by Mr. R.G. Senanayake, Minister of Commerce and Trade, proceeded to Peking in September to conduct negotiations for the purchase of rice and discuss other trade matters. The Mission returned to Ceylon in October after negotiations with the following results :(1) A short-term contract for the delivery by the Government of China to Ceylon of 80,000 metric tons of rice between October 1952, and January 1953, at a price of Rs. 720 (54) per metric ton f.o.b. China Ports. A long-term trade Agreement between the two Governments under which the two Governments agreed to facilitate trade in certain commodities not including rubber and rice.

(2)

This agreement did not contain commitments regarding either purchases or supplies but only an undertaking by the two governments to issue necessary permits and licenses for facilitating the offer of trade. This agreement would be effective for one year in the first instance but may be extended subsequently.

* Source: U.N.P.Journal , 21 November 1952.

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(3)

Certain proposals regarding the supply of rice to Ceylon by the Government of China and the purchase by them of rubber in this country. The Government of China was prepared to agree to sell 200,000 metric tons of rice a year for a period of five years, the price being settled between the two Governments for one year at a time immediately before the commencement of that year. The price suggested for that year is 56 per ton f.o.b. China ports. This price is open to negotiations.

The Government of China agreed to purchase 50,000 tons of sheet rubber every year for a period of five years, agreeing to pay a price in excess of the average Singapore price. The price for the first year would be 32 pence per pound f.o.b. Colombo and price for subsequent years will be negotiated every year. The Government of Ceylon has approved the contract for the purchase of 80,000 tons of rice and has approved in principle the long-term trade agreements. The Government has also approved in principle the proposals regarding rubber and rice, subject to settlement of certain outstanding issues in regard to this trade. It is proposed to send an official delegation to Peking within the next two weeks to discuss and settle the outstanding issues and conclude an agreement. The first consignment of rice under the short-term contract have already left China ports and are expected in Colombo about the 17th of the month.

Document No. 95 China-Ceylon Rubber-Rice Trade Agreement*

18 December 1952 For the purpose of strengthening the friendship between the Governments and the peoples of Ceylon and China and of promoting long-term collaboration in trade between the two countries, the Government of Ceylon and the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Government of China) have, on a basis of equality and mutual benefits, reached agreement as follows : ARTICLE I (1) The Government of Ceylon agrees to sell and the Government of China agrees to purchase sheet rubber in Ceylon for exportation to China during the period of five years commencing on the date of ratification of this agreement by both Governments at the rate of 50,000 (Fifty Thousand) metric tons each year.

* Source : Treaty Series (Ceylon), No. 1 of 1953.

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(2)

The Government of China agrees to sell and the Government of Ceylon agrees to purchase rice in China for exportation to Ceylon during the period of five years commencing on the date of ratification of this Agreement by both Governments at the rate of 270,000 (Two Hundred Seventy Thousands) metric tons each year. ARTICLE II

(1)

(a)

The price per pound for all purchases of sheet rubber of Grades 1, 2 and 3 and the price per pound for all purchases of sheet rubber of Grades 4 and 5 made by the government of China in terms of this Agreement shall be fixed respectively by mutual agreement between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of China, having regard to paragraph (2) of this Article, and shall be applicable to all purchases of sheet rubber made during the period of one year commencing on a date to be determined at the time of fixation. The price per metric ton for all purchases of rice made by the Government of Ceylon in terms of this Agreement shall be fixed by mutual agreement between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of China at the same time that the aforementioned prices of sheet rubber are fixed and shall be applicable for the same period of one year. The prices for sheet rubber and rice shall be fixed in accordance with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, once each year for a period of one year during the validity of this agreement, and shall be fixed at least one month before the end of the preceding period of one year referred to in sub- paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

(b)

(c)

(2)

The Government of China agrees to pay for Grades 1, 2 and 3 and for Grades 4 and 5 of sheet rubber purchased in Ceylon in terms of this Agreement, a price in excess of the average Singapore F.O.B. market price for Grades 1,2 and 3 and for Grades 4 and 5 sheet rubber respectively. The average Singapore F.O.B. market price for Grades 1,2 and 3 sheet rubber referred to throughout this Article shall be the weighted average over one calendar month, using as weights the percentages of Grades 1,2 and 3 sheet rubber to be supplied under the rubber contract which is signed under Article V and which is in force at the time. The average Singapore F.O.B. market price for Grades 4 and 5 sheet rubber shall be calculated in the same way. (a) whenever the average Singapore F.O.B. market price for sheet rubber of Grades 1,2 and 3 over any one calendar month in the period of one year for which the price has been fixed under sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of paragraph (1) of this Article, exceeds the current price for sheet rubber of Grades 1,2 and 3 fixed under the provisions of this Article,

(3)

(4)

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the Government of China agrees that new prices for Grades 1,2 and 3 sheet rubber and Grades 4 and 5 sheet rubber shall be negotiated, having regard to paragraph (2) of this Article, if a request for the revision of prices is made by the Government of Ceylon in the month following the calendar month in which the average Singapore F.O.B. market price for sheet rubber of Grades 1,2 and 3 exceeds the current price for sheet rubber of Grades 1,2 and 3 fixed under the provisions of this Article. (b) If the Government of Ceylon makes a request as provided for in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph for revision of the prices fixed for sheet rubber, the Government of China is entitled at the same time to make a request for the revision of the price of rice, whereupon the Government of Ceylon agrees that new prices for rice shall be negotiated simultaneously. Any new prices fixed under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph shall be applicable to all purchases of sheet rubber and rice made in terms of this Agreement during the period commencing from a date to be determined at the time of fixation of the new prices to the end of the period of one year for which the prices were originally fixed under paragraph (1) of this Article. Any such new prices may also be revised under the preceding provisions of this paragraph. Any prices for sheet rubber and rice fixed under paragraph (1) of this Article , or any revised prices for sheet rubber and rice fixed under paragraph (4) of this Article, shall remain in force at least for a period of three months. Within such period of three months, both Governments shall have the right under paragraph (4) of this Article to seek negotiations for the revision of prices, but any new prices resulting from such negotiations will not be effective until the expiry of the period of three months from the date on which the prices last fixed became effective. Until any new price that might be fixed under the preceding provisions of this paragraph becomes effective, purchase and sale of sheet rubber and rice under this Agreement shall be carried out by the two governments in compliance with all provisions of the contracts signed under Article V which are in force at the time. In terms of paragraph (1) of this Article and having regard to paragraph (2) of this Article, the Government of Ceylon and the Government of China agree, subject to paragraph (4) of this Article, that the price per pound for all sheet rubber of Grades 1,2 and 3 purchased under this Agreement shall be 32d. (Thirty-two pence) F.O.B. Colombo and the price per pound for all sheet rubber of Grades 4 and 5 shall be 29 d. (Twenty-nine pence) F.O.B. Colombo during the first one year period commencing from the date of ratification of this Agreement.

(c)

(d)

(5)

(a)

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(b)

In terms of paragraph (1) of this Article, the Government of Ceylon and the Government of China agree subject to paragraph (4) of this Article, that the price fixed for all rice purchased under this Agreement shall be 54 (Pounds sterling Fifty-four) per metric ton F.O.B. China ports, during the same period of one year referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph. ARTICLE III

(1)

The sale of sheet rubber under this Agreement by the Government of Ceylon shall be made on a F.O.B. basis, and the Government of China shall be responsible for making all arrangements with respect to ocean freight for the exportation of all sheet rubber purchased in terms of this Agreement. The sale of rice under this Agreement by the Government of China shall be made on a F.O.B. basis, and the Government of Ceylon shall be responsible for making all arrangements with respect to ocean freight for the exportation of all rice purchased in terms of this Agreement. ARTICLE IV

(2)

(1)

The Government of Ceylon will open an account in the Bank of China, Peking, and the Government of China will open an account in the Bank of Ceylon, Colombo, both accounts to be used solely for the purposes of financing the trade in sheet rubber and rice provided for in this Agreement. Notwithstanding that the price for sheet rubber is fixed under this Agreement in terms of Sterling the full value of every shipment of sheet rubber exported from Ceylon to China in pursuance of this Agreement shall, upon presentation of the shipping and other necessary documents, be paid by the Government of China into the account of the Government of Ceylon in the Bank of China, Peking, in Ceylon Rupees at the exchange rate current for the time being. The Bank of Ceylon, Colombo, will thereupon debit the account of the Government of China, in the Bank of Ceylon, Colombo, by the same amount. Notwithstanding that the price for rice is fixed under this Agreement in terms of Sterling, the full value of every shipment of rice exported from China to Ceylon in pursuance of this Agreement shall, upon presentation of the shipping and other necessary documents, be paid by the Government of Ceylon into the account of the Government of China, in the Bank of Ceylon, Colombo, in Ceylon Rupees at the exchange rate current for the time being. The Bank of China, Peking, will thereupon debit the account of the Government of Ceylon in the Bank of China, Peking, by the same amount. The exchange rate referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article shall be the average of the official buying and selling rates of exchange of the

(2)

(3)

(4)

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Ceylon Rupee as against the Pound Sterling at the time of presentation of shipping and other necessary documents referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3). (5) The accounts established respectively by the Government of Ceylon and the Government of China under paragraph (1) of this Article, shall be settled once every three months by the Bank of China, Peking, and the Bank of Ceylon, Colombo, who shall also arrange between themselves all procedural matters arising there from. Any credit balance then outstanding may be carried forward or settled by payment in Sterling, or in any other manner as may be mutually agreed upon between the two Governments. ARTICLE V (1) For the implementation of the trade in sheet rubber and rice in terms of this Agreement, contracts for sheet rubber and rice each covering a period of one year and including such items as specifications, unit prices, shipping, time of delivery, ports of delivery, arbitration, method of payment, quality and weight inspection, shipping documents, and any other necessary terms and conditions, shall be signed by the two Governments each year. In order to assure the implementation of this Agreement, the annual contracts for sheet rubber and rice shall be negotiated and signed simultaneously. During the period of validity of the contracts, if one of the two Governments should fail to carry out its obligations under either contract, the other government shall be automatically released from all its obligations under the other contract. ARTICLE VI The contracts for the first year for sheet rubber and rice signed between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of China under Article V of this Agreement shall be regarded as the execution of a part of the General Trade Agreement signed between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of China in Peking, on the 4th October 1952. ARTICLE VII During the period of validity of this Agreement, any revision, if proposed by either of the two Governments, shall be made only upon agreement by the other Government. ARTICLE VIII This Agreement may be extended through further negotiations, if a suggestion to that effect is made at least two months prior to the date of its expiry by either Government and is agreed to by the other Government. ARTICLE IX This Agreement shall become effective for a period of five years upon ratification by both Governments.

(2)

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Signed in Peking on December 18th, 1952, in two copies, each copy written in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally valid. (Sgd.) Susantha De Fonseka Representative for the Government of Ceylon (Sgd.) Lei Jenmin Representative for the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China

Document No. 96 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on the Trade Agreement with China (Extract from his Address to the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council, Honolulu)*
14 December 1954 This might also be an appropriate opportunity to try to explain to you our Trade Agreement in Rubber with China, which has been the subject of some controversy. There are really two aspects to this Agreement, which need to be appreciated, if our action in entering into it is to be understood. When we decided to enter into this Agreement, we were desperately in need of rice, which is the basic food of our people. Rice, at that time, was at a premium in world markets and the prices, which our traditional suppliers, as well as other sources, demanded was far more than we could afford to pay from our dwindling foreign assets. At the same time, our rubber industry was faced with dire consequences, because rubber no longer had its wartime importance, and our traditional customers were indifferent and unsympathetic towards us in our efforts to stabilize it. All our efforts to persuade them that the guarantee of a satisfactory price for our rubber was not merely an economic necessity, but a vital political consideration, went unheeded. In this impasse, China offered us our requirements of rice at reasonable prices and was also ready to purchase our rubber at prices well above those prevailing in the world market. Any Government, which refused to deal with the Chinese in these circumstances, purely for extraneous political reasons, would have failed in its duty to the people, and would not have survived long. We understand the reactions of the American people towards our decision to trade rubber for rice with China. But, as I said, it was not a decision out of choice; it was a decision to which there was no alternative, in the circumstances in which we were placed. The alternative might have been the prospect of a discontented and hungry people falling into the hands of the extremist elements. It might also be mentioned here that Ceylon is not a member of the United Nations.
* Source : Between the Two worlds (The Collected Speeches of the Right Honourable Sir John Kotelawala), Colombo: The Government Press, 1954, PP. 39-40.

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This Agreement with China was quite foreign to the traditional pattern of our trade, which, as you perhaps know, is confined almost entirely to the countries of the Commonwealth, your own country, and a few countries in Western Europe. The mistake that has been made, however, in America as well as elsewhere, is to think that our Agreement with China is indicative of our political thinking; that we are either proCommunist or are particularly receptive to Communist teachings. Nothing can be further from the truth. In the first, place, Communism and its totalitarian methods are diametrically opposed to the religious and moral outlook of our people and they have no attractions for them. Buddhism, which is the religion of the majority of Ceylonese, abhors all forms of violence and regimentation which are inherent in the Communist creed-and cannot, therefore, co-exist with Communism. Furthermore, two thousand years and more of civilization have instilled in our people a deep-seated appreciation of democracy, which cannot be easily replaced by totalitarianism. Our outlook towards Communism is, therefore, one of the most positive opposition. Communism may have its attractions for some people, but we have no illusion at all that it will be good for us.

Document No. 97 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawalas Statement in Parliament on the Outcome of the South-East Asian Prime Ministers Conference held in Ceylon in 1954 (The Issue of the Admission of China to the U.N)*
May 1954 Hon. Members will have seen the reference in the communiqu to the admission of China to the United Nations. I need not go into the history of this because, I am sure, everyone is aware of the present state of affairs in the United Nations where the representative of Chiang Kai Shek from Formosa takes his seat as the legal representative of the whole China. I was in a rather difficult position in regard to this matter because, as Ceylon is not a member of the United Nations, I felt that I could hardly take up the case of the admission of some other country. I decided, however, to agree to the inclusion of this item in the communiqu only for the reason that the admission of Chinas representative to the United Nations in place of the representative from Formosa would be nothing more than the recognition of a fact the fact that the communist regime in China controls the whole of the mainland of China and is the established Government of that country. It does not mean that we have any sympathy with or accept the ideals of communism. I do not need to repeat my own views on the subject of communism. Hon. Members of this House are already well aware of these views.

* Source: Hansard (HR), 1954, Vol. 17, Col. 524.

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Document No. 98 Sri Lanka Delegate on Admission of China to the UN*

15 November 1956 Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): I regret that I find myself unable to accept the recommendation which the General Committee, in its wisdom, has made to the Assembly on the proposal of the United States delegation. And here I would say that I have the greatest respect and regard for the United States representative. The Assembly must consider the present proposition dispassionately; it must not bring emotion into the picture. I regret that one-fourth of the human race, representing one of the oldest civilizations in the world, a people with a glorious history, should be denied admission to this august Assembly. I cannot understand how the United Nations can discuss problems relating to the maintenance of peace with one fourth of the population of the world shut out of its deliberations. I cannot understand how this august Assembly can think of peace when it is not prepared to harken to the voice of two-thirds of the people of the world. The fact that a few powerful governments keep on repeating that the island of Formosa is China and that the Government of Taipei continues to be the Government of China does not necessarily make that so. Of course, we can be overcome by an obsession when the same magic formula is repeated time and again. But let us face the facts as they are. We must not try to deceive ourselves. The whole world knows that the Communist regime of China is firmly entrenched there. That Government has been in existence for years. It has a record of progress. Independent observers from all parts of the world have gone to China and have found, to their satisfaction, that tremendous progress has been made. For the first time on that mainland there is peace. For the first time, there is no internecine warfare between one warlord and another. For the first time, bribery and corruption have been removed. For the first time, there is freedom from dirt and squalor, even from flies. These are the facts of which the Assembly must take cognizance. I represent a country which believes in and is pledged to democracy. I represent a country which believes in the exercise of the ballot. My country has universal suffrage, and every man and woman is entitled to vote. Nearly 80 per cent of the people go to the polls. We believe in free elections, but there are many countries here that do not have free elections. There are, in the estimate of some of us, States which can hardly be called democratic. Nevertheless, those States have Governments which we have to recognize. We do not think that the United Nations is an exclusive club. We do not

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 11th Session, 579th Pl. Mtg., Paras 108-30

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think that admission should be restricted to those whom we like or for whose ideologies we care. The Organization should reflect the world as it is. It must reflect the various systems of government that exist in the world; otherwise there is no purpose in meeting here to discuss the problems of the world. If we confine ourselves to our friends, then we can have an exclusive club. There are various types of political ideologies represented here, including probably military States, feudal States and, of course, States like those of the Soviet group. I carefully followed the lengthy speech made by the representative of the Soviet Union [578th meeting] , and I also listened with a great deal of sympathy and understanding to the emotional appeal made by the representative of Nationalist China [578th meeting] , but this is not a case for emotion in that way. The point was made a while ago by the representative of Iraq that we simply cannot recognize a country where there are no free elections. I should like to ask the question: how many of the countries whom we call our friends and colleagues have free elections ? The fact that the Soviet Union has no free elections has not deprived it of the privilege of sitting in the Security Council, since it is one of the five great Powers. The fact that Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries have no free elections has not militated against their being present here. That is hardly an argument that can be raised. Only last year we admitted into the United Nations four countries which do no hold free elections - Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. What is the nice distinction when it comes to China and Outer Mongolia ? Is it that white countries that do not believe in free elections can enter the portals of this Assembly, but the privilege is denied to brown China and other Mongolia ? That is a question I ask in all seriousness. These are the reactions of a nation; why, in the name of goodness, should there be that nice discrimination ? If it is a question of free elections or the lack of privileges or the lack of freedom, it is a question of not recognizing a political system then that distinction must be applicable to all around. You cannot on the one hand say that Outer Mongolia and China are the only countries that lack freedom or are the countries whose political systems you do not like, while having, on the other hand, admitted all others. To me, to exclude only Outer Mongolia passes my comprehension. I should like some kind of explanation to be offered. The only qualification for membership in the United Nations is a willingness on the part of a government to observe the provisions of the Charter and to be prepared and willing to discharge those responsibilities and duties. I think that in all cases one must presume, when an application is made, that it has been made in good faith. One must also ask the question whether a Government can adequately discharge the functions of a government and the obligations required of a Member State. I do not think for a moment that one can dispute the fact that Communist regime in China is the de facto Government of China. I have heard the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. John Foster Dulles, enunciate the theory that a de facto government must be recognized, but when it comes to China or Outer Mongolia, the de facto Government is not recognized.

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I have not the slightest quarrel or grievance if the United States does not recognize China. That is its sovereign right which it can exercise according to its likes or dislikes. We are not called upon to have diplomatic relations with all countries. But, mark you, the United States of American has diplomatic relations with Hungary and with Romania, and so far as I know, had such relations with Bulgaria at one time. I cannot see the nice distinction in that matter. What circumstances enter into diplomatic relations and what circumstances do not is not a subject for comment by me. Each country has that sovereign right and is free to exercise it in the way it desired. But it is a different matter if the leaders of the free world, if the United States comes to this rostrum and says: Do not admit the Peoples Republic of China. That is a different proposition altogether. I only ask that one standard should be applied. The point has also been made that certain atrocities were committed by that Government some six or seven years ago and that a resolution against China was adopted. I ask, in all sincerity: are there not many nations which cannot come here with clean hands, against which there are resolutions of that type? That is hardly an argument. Were there not atrocities during the Second World War in very important countries with which we now have the closest ties? These things have happened, but that is hardly a reason to be repeated here. There is more that one country against which there are resolutions of this type. Although I am quite a newcomer to this assembly, I have had the privilege of examining these resolutions. There are many countries against which there are similar resolutions; but why is it that particular stress is placed on China, and China alone ? Those are the questions that trouble me. Those are the problems that worry Ceylon. We have absolutely no quarrel with Nationalist China. We trade with Nationalist China. We have the friendliest relations with Nationalist China, because it is a Government which, so far as we are concerned, exists in Formosa. My country recognizes Communist China and trades with Communist China, and very soon it will establish diplomatic relations. I ask the question: how many countries trade with China? Some of the Great Powers which now come to this rostrum say this is not the time to admit Communist China - and these are things I cannot understand- trade with Communist China, have long-established friendship with Communist China, and for all practical purposes, declare in public that they recognize Communist China. But when it comes to the admission of Communist China, they say: Let it be another day. I ask in all sincerity, why? Sixty-two nations of this world trade with China and are in very close touch with them, and among them are some of the great Powers. Thirty-three nations - Ceylon will be included next year - have diplomatic relations with China. If China is not to be touched, how is it that Communist China is not good enough to be admitted, when, for all practical purposes, these nations recognize China ? I also assure the Assembly that two-thirds of the world wants the Government of Communist China to be recognized. I know it is quite possible to obtain a majority of votes in the Assembly. But how long is this process going to go on ? That kind of steamrolling cannot go on forever. There comes a time when one must answer for his

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acts, and the responsibility lies with the Great Powers involved, in the Assembly, to account to public opinion. I owe an expression to the representative of Ireland: This Assembly has a responsibility to world opinion [578th meeting para. 187]. That is the responsibility I warn this august Assembly to discharge. What is world public opinion ? What greater test of world public opinion could there be than that at the African-Asian Conference at Bandung in April 19545 at which twenty-nine nations were represented. There, the voice of two thirds of the world was heard. And strange it is that some of those who took part in that historic Conference come to this rostrum and say, China is dirt. We shall not touch it. They sat together, deliberated together, raised no voice of protest and included China in the charmed circle; then they come here today and say, We dare not admit Communist China. These are mysteries that a plain simple man like me cannot understand. Ceylon at one time did not recognize and had nothing to do with Communist China. We recognized Nationalist China. But practical wisdom sometimes comes, and we see facts as they are. I represent a Government that believes in friendship with all countries in the world, that makes no distinction between one nation and another on the grounds of friendship and that does not discriminate against a country because it does not believe in that countrys political ideology. I assure you that we disagree very strongly with the political ideology of the Soviet Union, of Communist China, of all Communist countries. We believe in a different political ideology. We believe in the government that is best for us, and each country has a right to decide what government suits it. The United Nations is not going to influence its choice. The United Nations is not going to determine what government each country should have. If the Soviet Union is content with its government, it has its own way. However much we may shout for free elections, they do not come unless they come from the feeling within. If Communist China wants to have a certain system of government, it is welcome to have it. There are other countries who believe in installing a government by a military coup. If they are content with that system, we have no quarrel over it. How is it that whenever a revolution occurs in a certain part of the world, then the Assembly takes note of it, while revolutions elsewhere pass unnoticed ? These are some of the questions that certainly worry me. Ceylon believes in treating all nations equally. We shall preserve all that is best in us. We shall certainly preserve our nationhood, our culture and our civilization. We shall certainly uphold the democratic way of life. But democracy also means the rule of the majority, although that rule does not seem to apply when it comes to admission of countries to the United Nations. That two-thirds of the population of the world recognizes China is not a significant fact here in the Assembly. I do not think that we can solve any problem, whether it is disarmament, peace or atomic energy or any such question, on the basis of a fair decision when we ignore the views of one -fourth of the human race. A conference of the Colombo Powers was called in 1954 at the initiative of the Prime Minister of my country, who was certainly the greatest enemy of communism. At that Conference the Colombo Powers consist of India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and

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Indonesia - a resolution was adopted unanimously to the effect that the non-recognition of Communist China increased the tension in the Far East and was a constant threat to peace. That view was expressed again in the same form at the Bandung Conference, which consisted of twenty-nine nations, constituting two-thirds of the population of the world. And we verily believe, as a nation that is not aligned with any power bloc, that is not guided by any pacts or alliances of that type, as free agents of free people, that peace in the Far East can never be ensured except by the recognition of Communist China and by bringing it into the United Nations. When Communist China is admitted, it becomes answerable for its acts. Six years have passed and we do not know of any atrocious deeds that have been done during this time. There is peace in the Formosa Straits at the moment, and if Communist China offered a threat to Nationalist China, that is their lookout and their friends. I do not say that this question does not affect the whole area. There may be some reasons on one side or the other side. But that is not a point to be urged. I understand also that this is not an opportune time. Why ? Because the Soviet Union has done something diabolical in Hungary. Is the present question, then, a case of guilt by association ? I know that this principle is accepted in certain quarters of the world. But of course my country does not believe in guilt by association. We believe in treating a person or a nation for what he is or for what it is. The fact that the Soviet Union committed some grave deeds in some quarter of the world does not implicate China. We have heard nothing over Radio Free Europe telling us that Communist China was there, perpetrating those dark deeds. Surely if the United Kingdom commits an act of which we disapprove in Egypt, does that mean that we, the members of the Commonwealth, should be tarred with the same brush ? If a friend of the Soviet Union, a country which has the same political concept, has not done any deeds to talk about at the present moment, is that a reason why it should be drawn along with the Soviet Union ? If any one of those countries commits something of which any one or all of us disapprove, are we all branded with the same crime because we are fellow Members of the United Nations ? I cannot understand this line of argument. The only point that matters is: Is the Communist regime of China the Government of China ? If it is, is it able and willing to discharge the responsibilities of membership. One has to presume that it will. Is it able and competent to discharge its duties ? Definitely so; there can be not doubt about it. I am sure that Communist China does not have to pay subscriptions to other sources. The Chinese will always manage their own affairs. Communist China can look after the affairs of that country - that is patent, since so many people have seen it. The fact that we admit China or support the admission of China to the United Nations does not for a moment mean that we approve of its system of government. I shall say, with all the emphasis at my command, that Ceylon heartily disapproves of the system of government that obtains in those regions. But that is not our concern. That is not

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a matter which is within our cognizance. The fact that we disapprove of that system of government is not a reason why a Government should be denied membership. In all the reason of the world I cannot understand why we should say : We shall postpone the evil day. Let us have a straight issue. This body is competent to vote against the admission of Communist China. It can do so; that is democracy; that is the rule of the majority. But I simply cannot understand: Wait for better times. I do not see any reason for it. And it is also not right to connect with the question of admission some subjects which are not relevant to it. Let us confine ourselves to the issue and answer that issue straight. It is the strong belief and understanding of my Government that Communist China is entitled to membership. My delegation will gladly vote for the admission of Communist China.

Document No. 99 Text of the Joint Statement by the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and the Prime Minister of the Peoples Republic of China, Mr. Chou En-lai*
5 February 1957 We, the Prime Ministers of Ceylon and of the Peoples Republic of China have taken the opportunity, on the occasion of the visit of the Prime Minister of China to Ceylon, to discuss many matters of mutual interest to our two countries. Our talks were full and frank, and conducted in an atmosphere of the greatest cordiality and friendship. We re-affirm our adherence to the principles accepted by the Asian- African nations that met in conference at Bandung in 1955, which were an extension of the five principles of international co-existence and co-operation, popularly known as Pancha Sila. We are of opinion that active steps should be taken to further the implementation of these principles and that another Asian-African Conference should be convened at the earliest opportune moment for this purpose. This is a transitional period in world history. In eras such as these, it is not unusual to find divergent outlooks and varying conceptions of societies. But we believe that nations can live in peace with each other despite these divergences and different social

* The Foreign Policy of Ceylon (Extracts from Statements by the Late Prime Minister, Mr S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike) , Colombo: the Government Press, 1963), pp. 103-105.

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systems. World Wars or the creation or continuance of conditions leading to the occurrence of such wars cannot be permitted. International disputes should be settled by mutual understanding and peaceful negotiation. We, therefore, record our disapproval of antagonistic military blocs, our support of disarmament, and we stress the need for prohibition of nuclear weapons and the cessation of tests of such weapons. At the same time, it is necessary to strengthen solidarity of Asian-African nations to oppose, in this area, the aggression and the expansion of the imperialistic and colonial forces that are still trying desperately to thwart the freedom and progress which the peoples of the world are striving to achieve in keeping with the spirit of the new age. With regard to the situation in Egypt and Western Asia, we are of opinion that the continuance of power politics or the substitution of one power for some other in the name of filling up a so-called vacuum will not help to solve the problems of this area whose people must be free to work out their own destiny in accordance with their own wishes. Only in this way, can a collective peace be ensured and international disputes be settled in this area. We are deeply distressed by the unfortunate situation that has arisen in the dispute between Pakistan and India in regard to Kashmir. We appeal to both parties concerned, in their own as well as the wider interests of Asian-African solidarity, to strive further for a peaceful settlement of this problem. Our two countries have been bound by ties of friendship for many centuries. While recognizing and respecting differences of outlook that may exist between us, we are determined to strengthen those ties, develop our economic co-operation and cultural exchanges and foster co-operation to our mutual benefit and in the cause of AsianAfrican solidarity and world peace.

Document No. 100 Text of Agreement on Economic Aid between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the Peoples Republic of China*
19 September 1957 For the purpose of promoting friendly co-operation between Ceylon and China and of strengthening the friendship between the two peoples, on the basis of the Resolution on Economic Co-operation adopted at the Bandung Conference, and the five principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, noninterference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co* Source: Treaty Series (Ceylon), No. 9 of 1957.

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existence, and animated by the lofty desire of the two countries to give each other mutual support and assistance, the Government of the Peoples Republic of China has decided, after negotiations between the two Contracting Parties, to grant economic aid without repayment and without any attached conditions to the Government of Ceylon for its Rubber Replanting Subsidy Program. For this purpose, the two Parties have reached agreement as follows:ARTICLE I The Government of the Peoples Republic of China agrees to grant economic aid to the Government of Ceylon for a period of five years from the date on which this agreement comes into force of 15,000,000 Ceylon Rupees annually, and with a total value of 75,000,000 Ceylon Rupees for the period of five years. ARTICLE II The assistance granted to the Government of Ceylon by the Government of China in accordance with the provisions of Article I of this Agreement shall be made in commodities; the specific commodities shall be negotiated separately by representatives of the two Governments. ARTICLE III The prices of all commodities supplied to Ceylon by China under this Agreement shall be quoted in Ceylon Rupees at international market price levels (F.O.B. prices). ARTICLE IV The organs to carry out this Agreement shall be the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Peoples Republic of China and the Ministry of Finance of Ceylon. ARTICLE V Technical details regarding the maintenance of accounts in connection with the implementation of this Agreement shall be worked out by the Peoples Bank of China and the Central Bank of Ceylon ARTICLE VI This Agreement shall come into force on 1st January 1958, and remain effective for a period of five years. Done and signed in Peking this 19th day of September, 1957, in two copies each in the Chinese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic. (Sgd.) Wilmot A. Perera for the Government of Ceylon (Sgd.) Yeh Chi-Chuang for the Government of the Peoples Republic of China

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Document No. 101 Exchange of Notes between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the Peoples Republic of China on the Grant of a Loan to the Government of Ceylon as a Support in its Flood Relief and Rehabilitation Work*
17 September 1958 (No. 1) From: His Excellency Mr. Chan Tsan-ming , Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Peoples Republic of China to Ceylon. To: The Honourable S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon, Colombo. Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China. Colombo (Translation ) September 17, 1958 Excellency, At the request of the Ceylon Government, the Government of the Peoples Republic of China has decided to grant a loan to the Ceylon Government, as a support to the Ceylon Government in its flood relief and rehabilitation work. Regarding this matter I have had talks with your Excellency and full agreement has been reached on the following points: 1. The Government of the Peoples Republic of China is in deep sympathy with and concerned about the serious flood distress the Ceylon Government and people experienced at the end of 1957. On the basis of the traditional friendship between the peoples of China and Ceylon, and in the spirit of strengthening the co-operation among Asian and African countries in accordance with the Fives Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the resolutions of the Bandung Conference, the Chinese Government is prepared to grant the Ceylon Government a loan not exceeding the total sum of 50,000,000/- Ceylon rupees, as a friendly support of the Ceylon Government in its flood relief and rehabilitation work. Within the limit stated it is agreed that the loan will be made use of according to the needs of the Ceylon Government.

* Source: Treaty Series (Ceylon), No.11 of 1958.

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2.

This loan is to be paid by the Government of the Peoples Republic of China in four annual installments beginning from 1958 in the form of complete-set equipments, materials or other supplies required by the Ceylon Government and can be supplied by the Chinese Government. The amount of loan installment for each year and the specific kind and quantity of the supplies will be decided upon yearly by a joint committee to be appointed by the two Governments. The total loan is to be repaid in ten equal annual installments from 1961 in the currency of a third country agreed upon by both sides or with the export goods of Ceylon acceptable to China. The annual rate of interests of the loan is 2.5% and should be paid once a year. Questions concerning the opening of accounts of the loan and the counting of interests, etc. will be discussed by the national banks of the two countries and specific technical details will be fixed up.

3.

4.

I, on behalf of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China, agree on the abovementioned points. If they receive Your Excellencys confirmation, the present note and your reply shall be the agreement between the Government of China and the Government of Ceylon and shall come into effect on the day of exchanging notes. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration. Sgd. CHANG TSAN-MING Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Peoples Republic of China to Ceylon From : The Honourable S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon, Colombo To : His Excellency Mr. Chang Tsan-ming, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Peoples Republic of China to Ceylon. Colombo. 17th September 1958. Your Excellency, I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 17th September, 1958, which reads as follows: ( As in No. 1)

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I confirm that the arrangements set forth in your letter are acceptable to the Government of Ceylon and that your letter and this reply will constitute an agreement between our two Governments. Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. Sgd. S.W.R.D BANDARANAIKE Prime Minister

Document No. 102 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on the Situation in Tibet*
22 April 1959 I have been asked, or rather I have been criticized by a certain section of the press for what they consider to be the undue delay on my part in making some statement on a problem that has created a certain amount of feeling, internationally, in many countries. I delayed for no other reason but this. It was very difficult to obtain anything approaching a clear picture of what had happened, and a clear picture of the position for various reasons. With regard to Tibet, material is not easily available to us. It was necessary to understand the entire problem or as much of it as would be desirable before I, as Minister of Defence and External Affairs and Prime Minister of Ceylon, was entitled to make a statement on it. That data is fairly available to me now; indeed, some of the data I only received a couple of days ago. . . . The first point is to have fairly in ones own mind the precise status of Tibet vis-vis China. It would appear that for some centuries now, from about the year 1700, China has asserted and has exercised, sometimes to a greater and sometimes lesser degree, suzerainty over Tibet. The degree depended upon the actual difficulties and problems of China itself, which arose from time to time, and the strength of the particular Government which at the time happened to be ruling over China. But there is no question at all that Tibet has been looked upon as a part of China. I will come in a moment to the question of autonomy or degree of autonomy that Tibet has claimed or has exercised; but it was not, at least during the period that I mentioned roughly about 1700 A.D. looked upon as an independent country; it has been looked upon as part of China with a certain amount of autonomy. The Chinese Government exercised, as I said, sometimes more, sometimes less according to their own difficulties
* Source: Hansard (HR), 22 April 1959, Cols. 2738- 2747.

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in China, authority over this region. That is important to be borne in mind because subsequent happenings must of course be viewed against this status of Tibet.. In the British period this suzerainty which China has over Tibet was admitted by the British. . . . After India became independent that is somewhere about 1947-48, the same time we got our independence even then the Indian Government recognized and admitted Chinas suzerainty over Tibet. . . . I now come to 1914 when there was a conference at Simla between British India and China in respect of Tibet. Out of those discussions seem to have arisen this position. First, an area known as Outer Tibet was granted autonomous status under Chinese suzerainty; second there was Inner Tibet roughly comprising the Chando area in the east, inhabited by the nomadic warlike Kambas. The Kambas have come into this picture here where the Chinese had the right of Government, not autonomy, for a certain region, but the Dalai Lama enjoyed some measure of spiritual jurisdiction. In the Simla Conference of 1914, that would appear to be the position that emerged. This area of Outer Tibet had a certain autonomous status under the Chinese Government, and Inner Tibet, the area which I just mentioned, where the Chinese had the right of Government, the Dalai Lama exercised and enjoyed a certain measure of spiritual jurisdiction there. Although Chiang Kai-shek did not sign the Convention drawn up at the Simla Conference they would appear to have accepted the principle of this position. That was in 1914 when India was under British rule. . . . In 1951 the Chinese Peoples Government and the Tibetan Government, led of course by the Dalai Lama, the Panchan Lama and the other dignitaries of the Tibetan Government, after discussion, came to an agreement, I do not want to use the word treaty here. It was really in a sense an agreement, because the word treaty connotes a transaction between two independent countries. I, therefore, do not use the word treaty here; I use the word agreement. . . . . This Agreement was signed by the delegates who were vested with full powers on behalf of China and on behalf of the Government of Tibet that is, on behalf of the Dalai Lama; delegates who had full powers signed this Agreement on behalf of China as well as on behalf of Tibet. What is to be noted from this is a recognition that Tibet is part of the motherland of a big family, the motherland being the Peoples Republic of China . . . . It also says that the Tibetan people have the right to exercise national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Peoples Republic of China. In 1956 the Chinese Government set up what was known as a preparatory committee for the autonomous region of Tibet. This body was designed to develop Tibet

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economically, politically and culturally, the Chairman of which was the Dalai Lama, the Vice-Chairman the Panchan Lama, and it contained personnel both Chinese and Tibetan. There were various purposes contemplated by them. That was in 1956. Now we get some sort of picture of the status of Tibet vis--vis China as well as the terms of this Agreement of 1951. These terms are really of importance. Then of course this revolt broke out. We do not know yet, even from the statement made by the Dalai Lama recently at Tezpur as to at least what happened except that the Chinese apparently did not follow the terms of this Agreement. Certainly opinion differs. On the Tibetan side, they say the Chinese were not following the spirit or letter apparently of this Agreement. On the side of the Chinese they say that certain interests of a vital nature, vested interests are there. These interests were being eroded naturally by steps apparently being taken to modernize the State in various ways culturally, industrially, motor transport and so on. This has caused these elements, with prompting from others that is the Chinese version promptings from outside, to start off a revolt against the existing situation. These are divergent stories on which, the House will understand, I am not capable of passing any judgment, I just do not know what exactly happened there. . . . We do not know then whether a breach of this Agreement, as alleged by the Dalai Lama has in fact taken place and if so what the breach was; or, whether as the Chinese say, it was really some of these old feudal interests and so on who were going to suffer under certain modernizing that was taking place there, who started the revolt. We just do not know It is a domestic affair fundamentally, in the sense that it is an internal affair of China. It is difficult to resist that conclusion, and that is the reason why the Prime Minister of India instructed his Permanent Representative in the United Nations at New York to say that India accepted the position that it is an internal affair of China. . . . It would appear, at least on these documents we are not familiar with all these detailed arrangement as far as they are available to us, that the position adopted by the Prime Minister of India, who knows all these facts much more intimately than we do here, is not unjustified, namely, that it is in fact an internal affair of China. . . . Naturally, we in this country as well as in India and other countries, particularly those who are Buddhists and a large number who are not have viewed with perturbation the fact that a country that is looked upon as one devoted to the spiritual life, in a sense that no other nation has devoted itself through the centuries, in the almost inaccessible mountain recesses if I may use the phrase of Tibet, should find itself in this position, that the way of life they had been following in that way particularly devoted to a certain type of Buddhism which may not necessarily be ours, should suffer; and that, in the course of that suffering, a person in the very holy position of the Dalai Lama has had to leave the country and seek refuge elsewhere and so on. These are naturally matters that cause a certain amount of feeling and a certain amount of perturbation in our minds. Those are the facts of the matter. . . .

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I do not use the world domestic but I cannot resist the conclusion I have explained it that it must be looked upon fundamentally as an internal question of China. The reason why I say so is that position of Tibet, with this degree of autonomy contemplated, as a part of China has been admitted by the Tibetans themselves in this Agreement that they concluded with the Chinese Government in 1951, and it would appear to be the position accepted and followed for at least the last three centuries. That is the only reason why I say so. Juridically it is so. This is the position as Dalai Lama claims, on which we have no details, or whether in fact they did not so exceed is not a matter in respect of which I am in possession of sufficient data to answer. Though we do not like, I repeat we naturally do not like any set of people, shall I say, suffering under what in the circumstances whatever precisely they were that arose of this case these people have suffered. That is the position. . . . Now it is certainly, I think, the hope and wish of a good many of us in Asia as well as outside that some satisfactory solution of this problem will be found whereby, with the continuance of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, the Tibetans are allowed to follow reasonably their own way of life. The Prime Minister of India who is intimately connected with this matter expressed views more or less on those lines. Even a very pious Buddhist, U Nu - who was Prime Minister of Burma and who has also , I think, perhaps more knowledge of Tibet than perhaps many of us here have seems to have made a statement in New York as I said he was the Ex-prime Minister of Burma and indeed is a very pious Buddhist that there was no question in his mind if I remember his statement correctly of Chinas suzerainty over Tibet. He made a suggestion of his own that a committee or a commission be appointed by the Chinese Government consisting of suitable Chinese personnel to go to Tibet, discuss those matters, go into the question and come to some suitable and satisfactory solution of this problem. That is his suggestion That is the position about Tibet. So that all we from our point of view naturally our sympathies go out to the Tibetans, particularly as Buddhists and, may I say, a large number of those who are not Buddhists can do is to wish that some satisfactory settlement should arise permitting the Tibetans to follow their own way of life, what they conceive to be their way of life under the suzerainty of China, which does not appear to be seriously disputed by anybody. That is the position as far as I can see it. I do not think it is possible for me to say any more on this question at this stage except to say this, that if in our own small way as one of the chief countries particularly a country where there are so many Buddhists and therefore perhaps having a greater interest in Tibet than others who may not share that particular community of interests as far as we are able, certainly if or when the need for it arises or the occasion for it arises, I shall be quite ready on behalf of the people and the Government of Ceylon to lend whatever good offices we can in every way to bring about a satisfactory settlement of this trouble and thereby enhance what we as well as so many others stand for, namely, greater understanding amongst the peoples of the world, particularly peoples in this region in Asia. . . .

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Document No. 103 Speech made by Ceylons Ambassador in China, Mr. A.B. Perera, on the Occasion of the 14th Anniversary of Ceylons Independence (Extract)*
4 February 1962 This evening, it appears incumbent on me to refer to some of the important factors which motivate the foreign policy of Ceylon. Our present foreign policy was first enunciated by the late Premier Bandaranaike. This policy has been defined as Dynamic Neutralism, Non-Alignment and Peaceful Co-Existence of States with different political and social systems. This policy was worked out within the framework of the doctrine of Panch Sheela and the declarations of Bandung. It was in conformity with these fundamental principles that the Joint Statement between Prime Minister Chou En-lai and the late Premier Bandaranaike was signed on the 15th of February, 1957. The validity of that document has not for a moment been questioned by the Government and the people of Ceylon. The Government of the present Prime Minister, Madame Sirimavo Bandaranaike, has not only emphasized the principles embodied in the Joint Statement but, at every possible opportunity and in every forum of the world, has also done its utmost to put these principles into practice. In this connection, I refer in particular to the not inconsiderable role Ceylon played in the formulation and adoption of Resolution 1514 of the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Resolution titled Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. A cardinal feature of our foreign policy, since the assumption of power by the late Premier Bandaranaike, has been the consistent support we have given to the restoration of the lawful rights of the Peoples Republic of China in the United Nations. At the first part of the Sixteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, recently concluded, Ceylon was in the vanguard of that group of States which fought for the restoration of the lawful rights of the Peoples Republic of China in that world forum. The Government of Ceylon are firm in their belief that only the representatives of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China are competent to occupy Chinas place in the United Nations and its Organizations. We oppose and we shall continue to oppose all attempts to create two-Chinas or any other variation of the two-China theory. In the stand already taken and the stand it will take in the future, Government of Ceylon is fortified by the fact that international law. International practice and the high principles embodied in the United Nations Charter are all on its side.
* Source : Ceylon Today, Vol. XI, No.3, March 1962, pp. 22-23.

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Many Binding Links The bilateral relations between the Peoples Republic of China and Ceylon in the past year have been marked by great manifestations of goodwill, friendly co-operation and solidarity. The Trade Agreement between our two countries is only one of many binding links. Last summer we witnessed a very friendly gesture on the part of the Government and the peoples of China. It was also a historic gesture a gesture which pleased the many millions who profess the Buddhist faith in Ceylon. The Government of the Peoples Republic of China was pleased to permit a delegation to go out to Ceylon carrying with it the Sacred Tooth Relic of the Buddha. The demonstrations of goodwill and friendship shown by the Government and the people of Ceylon during the exposition of the Sacred Relic in Ceylon, are an eternal guarantee of the good faith which exists between our two peoples. It is with profound admiration that we in Ceylon have witnessed and are continuing to witness the great achievements of the Peoples Republic of China. In our view, the Peoples Republic of China is highly developed industrially, agriculturally, socially and scientifically. It is a country whose people and whose leaders are consumed with an unceasing ambition to build a nation, from the remnants of the colonialist fragmentization, seeking at the same time a social order based on equality and justice. Many nations are now receiving aid from the Peoples Republic of China, bilaterally, and we have no doubt that in the years to come these benefits will flow in abundance. Our admiration for the Government and the people of China is heightened by the fact that in spite of certain natural calamities, the vast social experiment ushered in by the Revolution of 1949, continues to advance. We, therefore, congratulate the People and the Leaders of the Peoples Republic of China and wish them continued success.

Document No. 104 Joint Communiqu Issued on Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Visit to China*
8 January 1963 The Prime Minister of Ceylon, Madame Sirimavo Bandaranaike visited the Peoples Republic of China as Head of the Government of Ceylon and on behalf of the six Asian-African countries which met in Colombo from 10th to 12th December 1962, and was warmly welcomed by the Chinese Government and people.

* Source : China Today , No. 15, February 1963.

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During the visit, the Prime Minster of Ceylon was received by Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and by Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the Peoples Republic of China. 1. In fulfillment of the mandate entrusted to her by the Colombo conference, the Prime Minister of Ceylon who had earlier communicated the unanimous proposals of the conference by her special envoy, held talks with Chou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, with a view to bringing about negotiations between China and India for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. Marshal Chen Yi, Vice Premier of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China and Foreign Minister, and Dr. Subandrio, Deputy First Minister and Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia took part in the talks between the two Prime Ministers.

The discussions which took place from 1st to 4th January 1963 were held in a friendly and cordial atmosphere and it is the view of both Prime Ministers that these discussions will be helpful towards negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. The Prime Minister of Ceylon was of the opinion that the measures of cease-fire and withdrawal unilaterally taken by China indicated Chinas sincerity for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. The Chinese Premier expressed the gratitude of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China to Ceylons Prime Minister for her initiative in convening the conference and thereby helping to promote a peaceful settlement. He also expressed the Chinese Governments appreciation of the joint efforts of the six Asian-African countries, which were indicative of the sincere desire of these countries to be of assistance to both parties and which were in the interests of Asian-African solidarity and in accordance with the spirit of Bandung. The Chinese Government gave a positive response to the proposals of the Colombo Conference. Both Prime Ministers agreed that in the interests of Asian-African solidarity it was imperative that a solution to the Sino-Indian boundary question be found without delay in keeping with the spirit of the Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference. They agreed also that the application of these principles and the observance of the spirit of Bandung not only in so far as this problem was concerned but also in the case of all other problems which arose in this area would assist in their expeditious and peaceful solution. Since it had already been decided by the Colombo Conference that its proposals should not be published for the time being, the reactions of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China to these proposals would also not be made public before the Prime Minister of Ceylon discusses the conference proposals with the Prime Minister of India and until the results of the talks in Peking and New Delhi are communicated to all six participating countries.

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2.

The Prime Minister of Ceylon took the opportunity to visit various places of historical and cultural interest and to see the economic industrial and agricultural achievements of the Peoples Republic of China.

The Premier of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China and the Prime Minister of Ceylon also exchanged views in a spirit of friendship and cordiality on current international problems of interest to the two countries and on bilateral relations between Ceylon and China. They re-affirmed their adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference. They are of the opinion that these principles are playing an increasingly important role in guiding the relations between nations and that the continued development of these principles would have an important bearing on the promotion of solidarity of Asian and African countries and the defence of peace in Asia and the world. More than ever before, it is necessary to strengthen the solidarity of Asian African nations and particularly in Asia to oppose the aggressive and expansionist aims of the imperialist, colonialist and neo-colonialist forces that are still seeking to thwart the freedom, independence and progress of the peoples of Asia and Africa. China and Ceylon are bound by many ties of friendship, economic co-operation and cultural and religious exchanges. The two Prime Ministers are determined to strengthen these ties, further develop economic cooperation between the two countries and to work together in international relations in the cause of Asian-African solidarity and world peace.

Document No. 105 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Banquet Speech in Peking*
January 1963 Your Excellency Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the Peoples Republic of China; Excellencies; Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you for the kind words with which you have greeted me here tonight, and the honour you have done me and my party and through us our country.

* Source : China Today , No. 15, February 1963.

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The friendship between our two countries is a long standing one. Our historical records contain evidence that the first visitor from China to Ceylon was the Buddhist monk, Fa Hsein, who came to our country 1,500 years ago, and that close cultural contact has continued since then. The nations that have newly emerged in Asia and Africa must stand together in their struggle or must run the risk of succumbing once more to the rapacious designs of the West. The old saying that united we stand divided we fall applies with equal force to nations as it does to individuals. The spirit of Bandung is in part a crystallization of this thought. The seven years that have elapsed since that historic conference have seen the birth of nations which like ourselves shook of the shackles of colonialism and enjoy once more the sovereignty that is rightly theirs. We are now increasingly conscious of the fact that we in Asia must turn to Asia again and re-establish the close contacts with our neighbours which were denied to us when we were mere colonies of foreign powers. My late husband had this in mind when soon after he assumed the reins of Government he welcomed your Prime Minister His Excellency Chou-En-lai to Ceylon and established diplomatic relations with your great nation. Since then cultural exchange too have increased and are increasing steadily between our two countries. May I take this opportunity to thank you and your Government for so readily responding to my request that the sacred Tooth Relic of the Buddha which is preserved in the Kwangchi Temple here, should be sent to Ceylon in order to enable the people of Ceylon to pay homage to it after their custom. This was an act of friendship which is appreciated by the Ceylonese people and it gives me the greatest pleasure to be able to express their thanks to you personally. Our two countries may have different systems of Government ; but they have the same ultimate ideals in view - the betterment of the life of our respective peoples, of achievement of economic victories by developing our agriculture and industry and the consolidation of our independence. It is with a sense of astonishment that we see what a country can achieve when the Government and the people are motivated by a common desire. In the short space of 13 years you have achieved your targets in industrialization and industrial development to the bewilderment of foreign critics who claimed that such success was not possible. I am confident and all of us in Ceylon are confident that these successes will be continued and that great nation of China will overcome the difficulties that beset a country which is unified and free from colonialism after several centuries.

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Document No. 106 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Speech at Peking Rally*
January 1963 Your Excellency Prime Minister Chou En-lai, Your Excellency Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking; Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, May I first of all extend to you and through you to the people and Government of the Peoples Republic of China the warmest greetings and sincere good wishes of the people and Government of Ceylon. May I also thank you for the kind reception I have been accorded here in China and for the lavish hospitality that has been showered upon me and my party during my stay here. 15 years ago after almost 5 centuries of foreign domination, we in Ceylon attained our independence and were at last free to decide our own destinies and work in our own way for the betterment of our people. These 15 years have been years of struggle in which we had to adapt our thinking and our way of life to suit not only a culture which though submerged for 500 years had retained its strength and vitality but also to suit the context of the modern world where a colonial outlook has no place. The task has not been easy. It was 8 years before our country was able to break loose from the shackles of colonialism. It was then that the people of Ceylon chose my late husband to lead them in their struggle against the many forces which had suppressed them through centuries. His assumption of office as Prime Minister of Ceylon marked the victory of the people in achieving a peaceful transformation towards a socialist society. His efforts were cut short cruelly by the hand of reaction. But the late Prime Minister Bandarnaike had succeeded in firmly placing the people of his country on the path to socialism. This he achieved in several ways. Firstly, he controlled the concentration of economic power in the hands of a privileged few by abolishing monopolies. Road passenger transport throughout Ceylon was nationalized and made the property of the people. The port of Colombo, the life line of our economy was taken over by the state and run for the benefit of the people. In agriculture from which over 80% of our people derive their livelihood, sweeping changes in the old feudal land tenurial system opened a new life of opportunity for our peasants. His Government also paid a great deal of attention to the arousing of national consciousness and national sentiment so vitally necessary to rouse our people to action after long years under

* Source : China Today , No. 15, February 1963.

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foreign domination. A ministry of Cultural Affairs was set up and entrusted with the task of promoting an appreciation of the national history and culture of our people . For the first time, May Day was made a national holiday in recognition of dignity and esteem which the workers were to receive in the new society. Indeed the workers of Ceylon were proud to have Premier Chou En-lai address them at the first anniversary of their May Day national holiday. The labour laws were changed to give the workers considerable advantages and compulsory provident fund benefits were assured to all by law. In all these ways, through agrarian reform, through breaking of economic monopolies, through industrialization and by recognizing the paramount position that the workers should have in our society, my late husband consolidated the political independence which we had achieved in 1948. It is now my duty to carry on the work that he began and to ensure the onward march of progress towards socialism in our country. My Government has in the two years of its existence put into effect several progressive measures. By a country-wide system of peoples banks, credit has been made more easily available to the rural farmer. This has naturally weakened the influence of rapacious landlords and money lenders, to whose clutches the peasant had often fallen victim. Life insurance which had been largely in the hands of a few foreign companies, was nationalized and the resulting wealth diverted profitably to national development. Perhaps one of our biggest achievements was the setting up in our country of a system of importing and distributing petroleum products for industrial and other purposes. We had here to face the combined opposition of powerful foreign vested interests, but my Government went ahead resolutely and has achieved its objective. We have initiated several changes in our educational system which are calculated to remove privilege and ensure a truly national system of education. The transformation of our country from a feudal, colonial one to a society based on equality and true freedom has not been without its difficulties. Internally we had to contend with several reactionary forces and from our side we have had to face the possibility of the imposition of economic sanction against us. I am however convinced that it is only by a progressive movement along the road we are now placed on that a life of contentment and prosperity can be assured for my people. Only then will they achieve what the late Prime Minister Bandaranaike characterized as true freedom freedom from ignorance, freedom from want, freedom from disease and freedom from fear. These changes in society are both necessary and inevitable whatever social system or kind of Government a country may choose for itself. Our social systems may differ but nonetheless there are remarkable similarities in the patterns of development that have occurred in our two countries. The growth of political consciousness has not been restricted to urban areas alone indeed in my country the peasants and workers in the rural areas have emerged as perhaps the most significant political force today. In both our countries agriculture is the base on which industry has to be built and a great responsibility therefore rests on our rural workers and peasants. It is only in recent years that we had rid ourselves of colonialism and its consequences and our two

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countries are now striving to enjoy the fruits of that victory. Although we have taken different roads, I cannot help feeling that the peoples of our countries will in the end achieve much the same objectives. Ceylon is a small country. It has a population of 10 million people and an area of 25,000 sq. miles, but notwithstanding our small size and the lack of military might, we are conscious of our responsibilities in international affairs. We feel that every nation regardless of its size, has a right as well as a moral duty to concern itself with problems which affect mankind as a whole. Like everyone else what we want most today is peace. We are aware that with modern weapons, war could well mean the destruction of all mankind. If there is nuclear war there will be no victors nor vanquished. We shall all perish together. The maintenance of peace then must be the keystone of our policies. We believe that we can make a positive contribution to the cause of peace and that dedication to this cause gives us the right to raise our voices whenever any possibility of world wide conflagration threatens. We do not however profess to be the guardians of international morality nor do we wish to stand back and pass moral judgments on policies of other nations. We are only too well aware that it is in the nature of international politics just as in any other field of human endeavour that conflicts will arise which cannot be resolved by any appeal to principles alone. It would be positively dangerous in most instances to allow such conflicts to remain unresolved. In the contributions we can make we firmly believe that the policy of neutralism to which we adhere, places us in the best position to try to provide a bridge between any two radically opposed points of view and to support the peaceful co-existence of states with different political systems. The significant feature of the immediate post war period has been the emergence of new independent nations in Asia and Africa. The birth of new nations in Africa alone is a phenomenon unparalleled in history. But as we have found and as other new nations have found the attainment of independence though an end in itself, is also a new beginning for new efforts at reconstruction in the economic, cultural and political fields. Often enough the burden that is imposed on a new nation could easily vitiate its new found independence unless it receives help and encouragement from its fellow Afro-Asian neighbours. The old saying united we stand divided we fall has as much cogency in the international sphere as it does amongst individuals. We in Asia and Africa must look increasingly to our Asian and African neighbours for assistance and support in the task of reconstruction. This is the key to Afro-Asian solidarity which was born at Bandung at the Conference co-sponsored by us. The Ten Declarations of Bandung, the five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, positive neutralism, Afro-Asian solidarity and a sincere desire for world peace chart the course of our foreign policy.

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Guided by these principles we have sought to promote a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary problem. We feel that this is the greatest challenge so far offered to Afro Asian solidarity. Any conflict between the two great Afro-Asian nations can only cause sadness and deep concern and endanger Afro-Asian solidarity. As friends of both sides therefore we have offered our good offices in an attempt to create an atmosphere in which the problem created by the border dispute could be settled amicably. We do so in all sincerity and with confidence. We hope that soon some solution is found before the situation deteriorates even further and endangers what we all stand for. May I once again express my appreciation, the appreciation of the Conference of Six Nations in Colombo and that of the vast majority of the people of the world of the concrete step that the Government of China has taken by declaring unilaterally a ceasefire along the entire front. We believe that this is a great step forward towards the ultimate solution of the problem. We have also consistently advocated the eradication of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. We hold the view that colonialism is morally unjust and politically outdated. Though many countries in Asia and Africa have emerged as full fledged sovereign states a few vestiges of colonialism still remain. These remnants can only cause human suffering and create bitterness and hatred. But already the strongholds of colonialism are crumbling and the oppressed peoples of the world by their own efforts and with the assistance of others have already freed themselves from colonialism and will surely attain the freedom that is justly theirs. These are some of the principles that have guided our foreign policy and our actions in the United Nations Organization. We have always been deeply concerned that this great nation of the Peoples Republic of China has remained unrepresented in that body for the last 13 years. Ever since we gained membership of the United Nations Organization we have consistently advocated the cause of the Peoples Republic of China and we are firmly convinced that the Peoples Republic of China should be represented in that body. You have my assurance that we shall continue to do so till such time as international realities are accepted and the Peoples Republic of China is admitted to its rightful place. The stand we have taken and the stand we will take in the future on this question is fortified by the fact that international law, International practice and the high principles embodied in the United Nations Charter support it. The friendship between our two countries is a longstanding one. The first contact between our two countries began over 1,500 years ago when Fa Hsien visited Ceylon and led the way to exchange of visits of both Buddhist monks and laymen. These ties were disrupted with the coming of European invaders. In 1956 my late husband was quick to strengthen the ties of friendship by the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries. Cultural exchanges between our two countries are increasing as a result of the joint efforts of our Governments. Last year a delegation from China brought with them the sacred tooth of

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the Buddha. Millions of Ceylonese welcomed the sacred relic with reverence and devotion and will forever remember with gratitude the kind act of your Government which made this possible. During my stay here it has been my privilege to visit the Kwangchi Temple and to pay once again my homage to the sacred relic. Trade between our two countries has also developed satisfactorily. In 1952 we signed a trade agreement with you which was significant for more reasons than one. By doing so we were not only the first Asian nation to enter into a long term trade agreement with the Peoples Republic of China but we also defied an embargo by supplying rubber to China. This agreement was renewed in 1957 for a further five years. The smooth operation of this trade agreement over a period of ten years and its renewal for a further five years, stand as living proof of the close friendship that exists between our two countries. On your part you have displayed that same spirit of friendship by extending to us generous technical assistance and aid by providing us with rolling stock for our railways and a textile mill which we hope will be constructed in the near future. May I take this opportunity to thank the Government and people of China for this assistance which we as a small country need and which we as an Asian country are happy to receive from an Asian neighbour. These evidences of friendship and the close economic co-operation that have developed between our two countries reflect our desire to abide by the spirit of the Bandung Conference and with the Five Principles of peaceful Co-existence which are entirely in conformity with the interests of the two peoples. We in Ceylon have seen with admiration the achievements of your Government and people since liberation. The successes you have scored in building your country can well be emulated by countries who have as much headway to make in development as you did at the time of liberation. We are happy to note that you have fulfilled your targets in industrialization and despite three successive years of natural calamities you have been able by your own efforts to maintain your progress in the agricultural sphere and ensure that the people of your country were free from famine conditions which would certainly have been their lot in the deep past when they were subjected to such disasters. These are achievements of which any nation and any Government can rightfully be proud. Finally I should like to say that it has given me quite a pleasure an d satisfaction to see for myself the outstanding contribution which the women of China have made and are making in building your country. As a woman and as Prime Minister of my country, I salute you. May I conclude by expressing the wish that the friendship between China and Ceylon will continue to develop and grow closer, that Afro-Asian solidarity be strengthened, that world peace be pursued, that your great country progresses and to all of you here I wish a most happy and prosperous new year.

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Document No. 107 Press Communiqu issued by the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, Government of Ceylon, on Alleged Offer of Naval Base to China*
8 February 1963. The following is the text of the statement :A report originating from London dated February 6th through the Times of India News Service has appeared in the Times of India on February 7, 1963, under the caption: Naval base in return for long-term aid - Pekings deal with Ceylon. The report states that Soviet bloc diplomats here have a report that China wants to acquire a naval base in Ceylon in return for substantial long-term economic assistance. Discreet inquiries being made by them led to their belief that the subject was discussed during Mrs. Bandaranaikes recent visit to Peking. The report goes on to say that these sources agree that there is no reason at all why Ceylon should consider a proposal which will have the greatest implications for the security not only of India but for the whole of South East Asia. Still they are unable to dismiss it. They argue that China has stepped up its activities in Africa and need some staging posts in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet bloc as a whole appears concerned over the Chinese activities in Africa. The report concludes by stating that These diplomats are unwilling to accept that Mrs. Bandaranaikes visit was solely related to the Proposals of the Colombo Powers for reducing the tension between India and China. In this connection , the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs wishes to state that this report is absolutely false and without foundation. The Prime Minister of Ceylon deplores the fact that responsible foreign News Services have acted in such an irresponsible and malicious manner. She has directed the Ceylon High Commissioner in London and the Ceylon High Commissioner in India to take immediate steps to issue a denial of this report in the newspapers of those countries. The Ceylon Ambassador in the USSR has been instructed to bring this matter to the notice of the Government of the USSR for necessary action. The Ambassador for China in Ceylon is being requested to convey to the Government of China Ceylons concern over this report.

* Source : Ceylon Today, Vol. XII, March 1963, pp. 25-26

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Document No. 108 Sri Lanka-China Maritime Agreement*

25 July 1963 The Government of Ceylon and the Government of the Peoples Republic of China, with a view to developing friendship and strengthening economic relations between the two countries, and having regard to the principle of equality and mutual benefit, have resolved to sign the following agreement :ARTICLE I The contracting parties agree to permit vessels flying the national flag of Ceylon and the national flag of the Peoples Republic of China, and vessels under charter to any Ceylonese or Chinese organizations, to sail to and from the ports of Ceylon and to and from the ports of China which are open to foreign trade and to engage in cargo and passenger services to and from the two countries, including cargo and passenger services to and from a third country. ARTICLE 2 The contracting parties shall give most favoured nation treatment to each other when vessels referred to in Article I, together with their crew are engaged in sailing in the territorial waters or in entering, leaving or berthing in the harbours of the other party. Such treatment shall apply to the collection of various taxes, dues and charges in respect of vessels, performance of customs formalities, quarantine orders and the enforcement of harbour regulations, also the mooring alongside wharf or anchoring, shifting, loading/discharging, transshipment and supplies to, vessels, crew and passengers. ARTICLE 3 Port facilities including loading, discharging facilities and storage on wharf, shore, and water as well as navigational aids and pilotage services of one party shall be provided for vessels of the other party under the terms of most favoured nation treatment irrespective of whether the above-mentioned facilities are State or private properties. ARTICLE 4 The provisions of this Agreement shall not be applicable to coast-wise traffic. However, when vessels of one of the parties sail from one port to another of the other party for discharging inward cargo and/or passengers or loading outward cargo and/or passengers same shall not be regarded as coast-wise traffic.

* Source : Ceylon Daily News, 6 March 1965.

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ARTICLE 5 Should the vessels of one party be involved in maritime perils or other dangers or accidents in the territorial waters or ports of the other party, the latter shall render all possible assistance within its power, including salvage subject to the laws or regulations relating to wrecks and salvage in force in its country. ARTICLE 6 The nationalities of the vessels of both parties shall be recognized by each other on the basis of the Certificate of Registry lawfully issued by the competent authorities of the country whose flag the vessel flies. All certificates and other technical documents issued to vessels by one party shall be recognized by other Party. The two Parties shall exchange forms of vessels documents issued by each other. ARTICLE 7 Disbursements at the ports of, and fare and freight of passengers and goods carried by vessels of both parties between the two contracting countries shall be settled in accordance with the Trade and Payments Agreement signed between the two Parties. ARTICLE 8 Should any dispute arise in regard to the interpretation of this Agreement or performance of any of its provisions, same shall be settled through negotiation between the competent authorities of both parties. ARTICLE 9 This Agreement shall come into force provisionally on the date of signing and, finally, on its approval by, an exchange of notification of such approval between both Governments, and shall continue to be effective indefinitely, unless either party gives to the other party notice of termination six months in advance. Provided, however, nothing aforesaid shall be deemed to preclude the Agreement being amended, altered or added to at any time by mutual consent of the two Parties.

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Document No. 109 Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Defence and External Affairs, Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaikes Statement on Maritime Agreement with China*
30 August 1963 I now propose, with your permission, to deal with some of the other points. A question was asked in regard to the Maritime Treaty that has been entered into between Ceylon and the Government of China. The document itself was tabled some days ago before this House. You will find that this is a purely commercial agreement dealing with commercial vessels engaged in cargo and passenger services to and from the two countries or a third country. Most favoured nation treatment is granted by the agreement to the contracting parties. This means nothing more nor less than that we would grant to China the same treatment that we grant to other nations in respect of taxes, dues and charges on vessels and other customs and quarantine formalities. In the event of war the terms of the agreement like that of any other will be subject to review depending on the circumstances then prevailing. I find that we have signed a similar agreement with the Government of the U.S.S.R. on 22nd February, 1962. As far as the Government of Ceylon is concerned we are prepared to sign similar agreements with any country with whom we have diplomatic relations and who wish to conclude such agreements. There is nothing sinister or circumspect or peculiar in these agreements. As far as we can see no one raised any objection when this Government signed that agreement with the U.S.S.R. I do not know whether it is the ideological conflicts which are creating these problems between these two Governments and whether there are sections of their counterparts in this House. As far as we are concerned, the Ceylon Government has no such problem. If any Government in the world requests such an agreement, notwithstanding that we have no shipping fleet with which we can take advantage of the terms of the agreement - we hope soon to have our won fleet, and if and when we do so it will be certainly helpful to have an agreement of that sort already concluded.

* Source: Hansard (HR), Vol 53, 1963, col. 986.

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Document No. 110 Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Statement on the Maritime Agreement with China*
11 March 1965 This Maritime Agreement with the Peoples Republic of China is no secret agreement and it would need either a fertile imagination or a prejudiced mind to read into that agreement the idea that Ceylon had, through this Agreement, handed over Trincomalee harbour to the Chinese. This Maritime Agreement with China was not merely made public, but it was actually tabled in Parliament in August, 1963, and discussed during the budget debate of that year. On that occasion, on August 30th, 1963, Mr. Felix Dias Bandaranaike, the then Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence and External Affairs, replying to a question raised by Mr. Philip Gunawardena, spoke of the maritime treaty that had been entered into between Ceylon and China. I think it will be useful to repeat what he said on that occasion, he said: This document itself was tabled some days ago before this House. You will find that this is a purely commercial agreement dealing with commercial vessels engaged in cargo and passenger services to and from the two countries or a third country. Most favoured nation treatment is granted by this agreement to the contracting parties. This means nothing more nor less than that we would grant to China the same treatment that we grant to other nations in respect of taxes, dues and charges on vessels and other customs and quarantine formalities. He added: in the event of war, the terms of the agreement, like that of any other , will be subject to review depending on the circumstances then prevailing. Mr. Bandaranaike, on that occasion, continued to say that Ceylon had signed a similar agreement with the Government of the USSR on February 22nd , 1962, and that as far as the Government of Ceylon was concerned, we were prepared to sign similar agreements with any country with whom we had diplomatic relations and who wished to conclude such agreements. There was nothing sinister or circumspect or peculiar in these agreements. He concluded by remarking that as far as we could see no one raised any objection when this Government signed a similar agreement with the USSR. I myself made a statement about this agreement in the Senate on January 23rd, 1964. Senator Wijemanne had stated in the Senate that I entered into a shipping agreement

* Source : Times of Ceylon , 11 March 1965.

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while I was in Peking to negotiate on the Sino-Indian border dispute. I categorically denied this and I challenged Mr. Wijemanne to prove that I had negotiated a shipping agreement when I was in Peking. I stated on that occasion that the agreement was negotiated through the usual diplomatic channels and was not discussed or referred to while I was in Peking. I added that the agreement, which was concluded in July 1963, was to our advantage because it confers benefits on us in the transport of rice, textiles and other imports from China. I said that with the formation of our own shipping lines, we would get an advantage in the Chinese ports which we could otherwise not have.

Document No. 111 Mr. D.P.R. Gunawardenas (MEP) Criticism of Sri Lankas Pro-Chinese Foreign Policy Orientation (Extract from his Speech in the House of Representatives)*
30 August 1963 I was under the impression that from 1956 our foreign policy was one of dynamic neutralism or a policy of non-alignment and that we were not committed to any group. The late Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike when he was Prime Minister established free relations - both trade and diplomatic - with countries in the world which were prevented by the United National Party Government from sending even visitors to this country. After his Government was established in 1956, the late Mr. Bandaranaike enunciated a new foreign policy, a policy of dynamic neutralism and non-alignment. He refused to be a member of any group. As a matter of fact in order to implement that policy he was responsible for getting us released from the so-called Defence Agreement with the United Kingdom for which the UNP was responsible. They thought that they got independence for the country but they did not look at the strings that were attached. That is the reason why Mr. Bandaranaike negotiated to get the naval base at Trincomalee and the air base at Katunayake back into our hands. After those bases were obtained I think, our independence was complete and our non-alignment foreign policy was implemented after that. The late Mr. Bandaranaike established trade and diplomatic relations with a number of countries including the Peoples Republic of China, the Soviet Union and a number of East European democratic countries. But after the Sirimavo Bandaranaike Government was established a change has come about. . . .

Source : Hansard (HR), 1963, Vol. 53, Cols. 877-881.

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She attempted to bring about peace between the Peoples Republic of China and the Republic of India. She tried to solve the insoluble Chinese puzzle. She thought she was acting independently. In order to bring about peace between the Republic of India and the Peoples Republic of China, she thought that it was better to visit the Peoples Republic of China first. She found, although it is not stated, that the Colombo proposals for bringing about peace between India and China were given a different interpretation, by the Peoples Republic of China. As a matter of fact, President Nasser himself did not give the interpretation that Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike wanted to give. As a result, we have moved from dynamic neutralism, without knowing, without understanding the full implications, into becoming unwittingly a tool of the warlords of Peking. I say that categorically. People may differ with me but that is the truth. I have the highest admiration for the people of China and for the Peoples Republic of China, but I have nothing to say in favour of the warlords of Peking. I am not mincing words. When an army crosses a border, that is an invasion. Let us be honest enough to admit that India was invaded by the armies of the Peoples Republic of China. Let us be honest about it. Fortunately, the pressure of other countries in the socialist camp, the pressure of world opinion, prevented China from marching forward into the plains of India. After her visit to Peking and after making a statement in the Peoples Republic of China which favoured China, it was a foregone conclusion that the Hon. Prime Ministers visit to New Delhi was going to be a failure. Dynamic neutralism had been abandoned. There cannot be any doubt about it. I am an admirer of the Chinese people, their achievement and their culture. At the same time I have nothing but condemnation for the warlike acts of the warlords of Peking. I did not hesitate to say so when other socialist countries did the same, when those socialist countries were wrong. I do not hesitate to say so today. You have unwittingly moved into a camp where you no longer have the freedom to say that you are fully neutral, that you follow a policy of non-alignment, that you are for peace and co-existence. As a matter of fact, the treaty that was signed , the maritime agreement which was tabled yesterday, looks harmless on the surface. What was the necessity for signing that agreement ? where is your shipping fleet ? where is your mercantile marine ? You have not yet bought a single ship. The Government shipping corporation has not yet been set up. It is absolutely necessary that Ceylon should live in peace with surrounding friendly nations; and India is one of our foremost friendly nations. That must be admitted despite the fact that we have local differences here over the problem of the stateless. The position was stated with regard to the stateless by the hon. Member for Panadura [Mr. Leslie Goonewardena] yesterday. That is a question which we must settle with the Government of India and the Indians who are here and who are stateless. The number will not exceed 750,000. That question has to be settled sooner or later, and it can only be settled with India. This is not a time when it is advisable for you to

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follow the advice of even officials in the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs. It is necessary to be pro-Ceylonese, not anti-Indian. You have to be Pro-Ceylonese. Simply because you are anti-Indian, it does not mean that you will solve the problem. As the hon. Member for Panaduara stated, this problem has to be solved before Mr. Nehru leaves office. He is 75 years old today. He is the only person who can convince the people of India when a just settlement is arrived at between this country and India. And we have to come to terms with India as a friendly country. After the invasion of India by the Chinese army last year, the atmosphere is a little different. India is very nervous, she is suspicious. Unnecessarily and without any reason India sometimes has suspicions that Ceylon may not be neutral. India sometimes suspects that Ceylon may not be neutral. We must not do anything at all in any way to undermine our neutrality. In the old days we had friends in England and America, sponsored by the hon. first Member for Colombo South [Mr. J.R. Jayewardene]. We do not want to go to those friends; an independent Ceylon will never go to them for help. We must live in peace and harmony with the surrounding countries of South-East Asia - India, Burma, Indonesia, and others. . . .

Document No. 112 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Admission of China to the U.N. (General Policy Statement in the United Nations)*
21 December 1964. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): In the solution of the problems concerning SouthEast Asia, and indeed of all the major problems facing the world, the co-operation and active participation of the Peoples Republic of China is essential. Unfortunately, these realities are ignored by certain Powers which, out of considerations arising from the politics of the cold war, prefer to ignore the existence of the Peoples Republic of China and to deny its rightful place in the councils of the world. This brings me to the question of restoring to the Peoples Republic of China its lawful rights in the United Nations. My Government recognized the Peoples Republic of China as the only legitimate Government of China. Many other States Members of the United Nations have taken the same position and their number is steadily increasing. The Peoples Republic of China is physically in control of the great land mass of the mainland of China; it has behind it overwhelming support of the 700 million Chinese people who compose one fourth of the human race.
* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 19th Session, 1308th Pl. Mtg., Paras 83-86.

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How can the United Nations be fully representative of mankind if one fourth of the human race has no voice in the councils of the world ? Is this not a negation of the principle of universality to which this Organization is committed ? Are we not shutting our eyes to the realities of the world situation as it exists if we impose barriers to just and equitable representation for a people who constitute a major segment of the human race on grounds which appear to be based on power politics and pressures of the cold war ? If we are interested in strengthening this Organization and in making it truly representative, I submit that we should, without further delay, accord the Peoples Republic of China its legitimate rights in the United Nations. We know that the policies of the Peoples Republic of China are not palatable to certain Powers here and that its presence in this Organization might even be embarrassing to them. But this is not an Organization where some Members should be permitted to exclude others merely because they do not agree with their policies. This is an Organization which has been created to represent mankind, to represent all the countries of the world, irrespective of their political and social systems, so that they may collectively advance towards the common goal of peace and progress. We trust that the question of the representation of the Peoples Republic of China will be viewed in this spirit.

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Document No. 113 Mr. J.R. Jayewardenes Speech at the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, San Francisco, U.S.A.*
6 September 1951 Mr. Vice-President and Friends, I consider it a great privilege to be afforded the opportunity of placing before this assembly of fifty-one nations the views of the Government of Ceylon on the draft Treaty of Peace which we have been invited to approve. My statement will consist of the reasons for our acceptance of this treaty, and I shall also attempt to meet some of the criticisms that have been leveled against it. It is true that I can speak only on behalf of my Government, but I claim that I can voice the sentiments of the people of Asia in their general attitude towards the future of Japan. I need not deal with the events that led to the formulation of the final draft of the treaty which we are considering. Mr. Dulles, the American representative, and Mr. Kenneth Younger, the British representative, have given us a full and fair account of those events, beginning with the capitulation of Japan in August 1945. It may, however, be mentioned that there was a serious conflict of opinion between the four major powers as to the procedure that should be adopted to draft this treaty. The Soviet Union insisted that the four major powers alone - that is, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the USA., UK., China and the USSR. - should alone undertake it, and that the power of veto should be reserved to them if any others were admitted for the purpose of drafting the treaty . The United Kingdom insisted that the Dominions should be consulted and the United States of America agreed with this. They also supported consultation with all the countries that took part in the war against Japan. Among these countries, too, there was a difference of opinion as to the actual terms of the treaty actuated by various considerations, some by a fear of the raising of a new militaristic Japan, and others yet unable to forget the damage and the horrors caused by the Japanese invasions. I venture to submit that it was at the Colombo conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers held in January, 1950, that for the first time the case for a completely independent Japan was proposed and considered. The Colombo Conference considered Japan not as an isolated case, but as part of the region known as South and South-East Asia, containing a large proportion of the worlds wealth and population, and consisting of countries which have only recently regained their freedom, whose people were still suffering as a result of centuries of neglect. Two ideas emerged from that Conference

* Source: J.R. Jayewardene, Selected Speeches, 1944-1973 (Colombo, 1974), PP. 21-24.

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- one, that of an Independent Japan, and the other, the necessity for the economic and social development of the peoples of South and South-East Asia, to ensure which, what is now known as the Colombo Plan was launched. Mr. Kenneth Younger has explained how, after that Conference, a Working Committee of Commonwealth High Commissioners worked on a draft treaty, and later had consultations with the American representative, Mr. Dulles. The treaty now before us is the result of those consultations and negotiations. It represents some of the views that my Government had, and some of them which it did not have. I claim that at the present moment it represents the largest common measure of agreement that could be attained among the countries that were willing to discuss peace with Japan. The main idea that animated the Asian countries, Ceylon, India and Pakistan, in their attitude to Japan was that Japan should be free. I claim that this treaty embodies that idea in its entirety. There are other matters which are external to the question of Japans freedom - namely, should that freedom be limited to the main islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku, or should it extend to several minor islands in the neighbourhood? If not, what should we do with those islands ? Should Formosa be returned to China in accordance with the Cairo Declaration of 1945? If so, to which Government of China ? Should China be invited to the Peace Treaty Conference? If so, which Government ? Should reparations be exacted from Japan ? If so, the amount? How is Japan to defend herself until she organizes her own defence ? On the main question of the freedom of Japan, we were able to agree ultimately, and the treaty embodies that agreement. On the other matters, there were sharp differences of opinion, and the treaty embodies the majority views. My Government would have preferred it if some of those questions were answered in a different way, but the fact that the majority dont agree with us is no reason why we should abstain from signing the treaty, which contains the central concept of a free and independent Japan. We feel that the allied matters I mentioned earlier are not insoluble if Japan is free, that they are insoluble if Japan is not free. A free Japan, through, let us say, the United Nations Organization, can discuss these problems with the other free nations of the world and arrive at early and satisfactory decisions. By signing this treaty we are enabling Japan to be in a position to do so, to enter into a treaty of friendship with the Government of China if she decides to recognize her, and I am happy to state, enabling her to enter into a treaty of peace and friendship with India. If we do not sign this treaty, none of these eventualities can take place. Why is it that the peoples of Asia are anxious that Japan should be free ? It is because of our age-long connections with her, and because of the high regard the subject peoples of Asia have for Japan when she alone, among the Asian nations, was strong and free

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and we looked up to her as a guardian and friend. I can recall incidents that occurred during the last war, when the co-prosperity slogan for Asia had its appeal to subject peoples, and some of the leaders of Burma, India and Indonesia joined the Japanese in the hope that thereby their beloved countries may be liberated. We in Ceylon were fortunate that we were not invaded, but the damage caused by air raids, by the stationing of enormous armies under the South-East Asian Command, and by the slaughter-tapping of one of our main commodities, rubber, when we were the only producers of natural rubber for the Allies, entitle us to ask that the damage so caused should be repaired. We do not intend to do so, for we believe in the words of the Great Teacher whose message has ennobled the lives of countless millions in Asia, that hatred ceases not by hatred, but by love. It is the message of the Buddha, the Great Teacher, the Founder of Buddhism, which spread a wave of humanism through South Asia, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Siam, Indonesia and Ceylon and also northwards through the Himalayas into Tibet, China, and finally, Japan, which bound us together for hundreds of years with a common culture and heritage. This common culture still exists, as I found on my visit to Japan last week on my way to attend this Conference; and from the leaders of Japan, Ministers of State as well as private citizens, from their priests in the temples, I gathered the impression that the common people of Japan are still influenced by the shadow of that Great Teacher of peace, and wish to follow it. We must give them that opportunity. That is why I cannot subscribe to the view of the delegate of the Soviet Union when he proposes that the freedom of Japan should be limited. The restrictions he wishes to impose, such as the limitation of the right of Japan to maintain such defence forces as a free nation is entitled to, and other limitations he proposes, would make this treaty not acceptable not only to the vast majority of the delegates present here, but even to some of the countries that have not attended this Conference, particularly India, who wished to go even further than this treaty visualizes. If again the Soviet Union wishes the islands of Ryukyu and Bonin returned to Japan, contrary to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, why should then South Sakhalin, as well as the Kuriles be not also returned to Japan ? It is also interesting to note that the amendments of the Soviet Union seek to ensure to the people of Japan the fundamental freedoms of expression, of press and publication of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting - freedoms which the people of the Soviet Union themselves would dearly love to possess and enjoy. The reason why, therefore, we cannot agree to the amendments proposed by the Soviet delegate, is that this treaty proposes to return to Japan sovereignty, equality and dignity, and we cannot do so if we give them with qualifications. The purpose of the treaty then is to make Japan free, to impose no restrictions on Japans recovery, to see to it that she organizes her own military defence against external aggression and internal subversion, and that until she does so, she invites the aid of a friendly power to protect her, and that no reparations be exacted from her that harm her economy.

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This treaty is as magnanimous as it is just to a defeated foe. We extend to Japan a hand of friendship, and trust that with the closing of this chapter in the history of man, the last page of which we write today, and with the beginning of the new one, the first page of which we dictate tomorrow, her people and ours may march together to enjoy the full dignity of human life in peace and prosperity.

Document No. 114 Conference of South-East Asian Prime Ministers held in Ceylon, 1954: Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawalas Statement in Parliament*
7 May 1954 As agreed with the hon. leader of the Opposition, I will make a statement to this House so that the Debate could be commenced. Hon. Members of the House will, I am sure, have awaited with interest the outcome of the South-East Asian Prime Ministers Conference, which commenced in Colombo on the 28th April and was concluded in Kandy on Sunday. The communiqu issued by me to the press on the conclusion of the Conference outlined in brief the matters discussed by the Prime Ministers. This communiqu has already been tabled before the House. I should like to start by explaining the circumstances in which the five Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan happened to meet in Ceylon in this way. It occurred to me somewhere in January this year that it might be a good thing if the Prime Ministers of these countries, which are close neighbours and have much in common, could meet and have informal talks on matters which were of interest to them all. I felt that there was a great deal to be gained if these countries could, in the present context of the world situation, come closer together and I therefore decided to put forward the proposal to the Prime Ministers of Burma, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. My suggestion was warmly welcomed by all the Prime Ministers, and after some correspondence, it was decided that we should all meet in Ceylon and that the meeting should be as informal as possible. It was decided that the meeting should be as informal as possible. It was accordingly agreed that there should be no formal agenda for our discussions, but that each Prime Minister should be free to suggest for discussion any topic which he thought was of particular interest or concern to the countries as a group. The meeting took place on this basis and the communiqu that was issued represents the greatest common measure of agreement between the Prime Ministers on the various topics that came up for discussion.

* Source : Hansard (HR), 1954, Vol. 17, cols. 521-27.

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I think it is my duty, however, to give hon. Members of this House a more detailed picture of the discussions that took place and, in particular, of the views I put forward on the various subjects. Our meeting took place at a time when major events of international importance were taking place around us. The Geneva Conference was due to meet in a few days to discuss the problem of Indo-China, and the test explosions of the hydrogen bomb had raised an out-cry among peoples all over the world against the uncontrolled development of these weapons of mass destruction. It was inevitable, therefore, that these matters should have received the consideration of the meeting of Prime Ministers, besides such other matters as they themselves wished to raise individually. The problem of Indo-China was one of the main items of discussion, because, in IndoChina, there exist all the elements of a situation which can provoke a third world war, unless something is done very urgently to bring about a settlement. As hon. Members will be aware, there has been a civil war in Indo-China, which has raged for over seven years, causing much suffering and destruction in that country. In itself, a civil war would not ordinarily have international implications. But the threat to world peace arises from the fact that foreign powers such as France, the United States and the Peoples Republic of China are involved in the conflict. . . . Now, the first step towards any solution in Indo-China must be an immediate cease-fire and hon. Members will see from the communiqu that the Prime Ministers have emphasized this requirement. But a ceasefire, by itself, will provide no solution unless effective steps are taken to prevent a recurrence of hostilities and to leave it to the belligerent parties themselves to work out a political settlement. The Prime Ministers considered that an essential requirement for stabilizing the situation in Indo-China was that France should without any further delay transfer complete sovereignty to the people of Indo - China, who would then be in a position to work out their own problem by themselves. Prime Ministers also considered that an agreement on the part of the foreign powers, who have interested themselves in the conflict, on the steps necessary to prevent a recurrence of hostilities, would greatly help in achieving the eventual solutions of the problem in Indo-China. . . . The subject of colonialism was discussed at our meeting at the request of several Prime Ministers in the light of what is going on in colonial territories in various parts of the world. We have read, in recent times, of the difficulties, the strife and the unrest that exist in several dependent territories, where for one reason or another the right to selfdetermination of the people of those countries is being delayed or denied. The views of the Prime Ministers on this issue were summed up by condemning the continuance of colonialism as a violation of fundamental human rights and a threat to peace. A most enlightening discussion took place on the subject of communism in its national and international aspects. I was the prime mover in that. While it was generally felt that it was quite open to the people of any country to adopt any political or economic

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doctrine or form of government they by themselves chose, the thing to be opposed was any attempt by external agencies, whether communist, anticommunist or of any other description, to interfere in the affairs of others. The Prime Ministers affirmed their firm determination to resist any interference from outside in the affairs of their own countries. They regarded such interference as being most undemocratic and a threat to the sovereignty and security of their countries, in that it attempted to dictate to their peoples the way in which they should live their lives. Recent trends on the part of external agencies to interfere in the affairs of other countries were analyzed by the Prime Ministers and views were expressed on the extent and dangers of this interference. The subjects of economic cooperation and mutual aid were also discussed on the basis of certain proposals put forward by individual Prime Ministers. As it was not possible within the short space of time available to work out any definite principles, the Prime Ministers decided to refer this proposal to their respective governments for further examination. . . .

Document No. 115 Indo-China War: Speech of Mr. V. Nalliah, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence and External Affairs)*
4 May 1954 The position taken up by our Government in this situation is that we are not prepared to allow communism to infiltrate into South-East Asia to that extent, thereby endangering the national sovereignty of the neighbouring states. That is the position we have taken up. We are not only anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist, we are also anti-communist, and in our anti-communism our Government is taking a stronger, a much more aggressive, attitude than perhaps some neighbouring States of South-East Asia. That is the position of our government. And that being the position, our government, being aware of the fact that there was a conference going on at Geneva and another at Colombo, both for the purpose deciding how best peace could be brought about in this unfortunate land, was not in favour of one party getting an undue overall advantage over the other. We do not want a vacuum. Even India is not prepared to ask the French to clear out immediately. They too do not like a vacuum to be created.

* Source : Hansard (HR), 1954, Vol. 17, cols. 189-190.

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We want the people of Indo-China to be given the chance of electing their own Government. But no country in South-East Asia is prepared to allow communist forces to capture the area and present the world with a fait accompli. While our Government sympathizes with all the peoples who are yearning for national independence, it is not unmindful of the new colonialism in the shape of international communism that is spreading in the world. Colonialism is a dying force, while communism is a developing one. Between the two, we do not want to make any differentiation. We are opposed to both. While we support the legitimate interests of people demanding national independence, we are also of the opinion that we should not be a party to intensifying and bringing nearer the world conflict which we want to avoid at all costs.

Document No. 116 Indo-China War: Question by Communist Party Member P. Keuneman to Elicit information on Sri Lanka Governments Attitude*
6 May 1954 Mr. Keuneman : I want to ask a question by private notice from the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister. In view of his association with the appeal made by the Conference of Five Asian Premiers for a cease-fire in Vietnam, will he prohibit any port, airfield or other part of the territory of Ceylon being used for the passage of troops and munitions to assist any party to continue the fighting in Vietnam? The Rt. Hon. Sir J. Kotelawala : This is a matter in which I must use my discretion, and I shall use it in the way the occasion demands. I must also point out that the appeal made by the Conference of Asian Prime Ministers contemplated a cease-fire between the parties fighting in Indo-China and was not related to the status quo. It was only after a cease-fire had been declared that other outside parties were to desist from actions which might lead to recurrence of the fighting. At the present moment it would be unreasonable to deter one outside party from giving aid to the belligerents, without any guarantee that the other party will do the same. To do that would be to increase the advantage for one side as against the other. I might add that I do not anticipate the parties behind Viet Minh approaching me for permission to use ports, air-fields or other parts of the territory of Ceylon for the conveyance of military aid to Indo-China. There is no purpose in asking me to stand neutral for the benefit of the wrong side.

* Source : Hansard ( HR), 1954, Vol. 17, Cols. 368-70.

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Mr. Suntharalingam : Does my good Friend the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister say by that that at the present moment he is not neutral to either side ? The Rt. Hon. Sir J. Kotelawala: To make it simple, I might tell the hon. Member this. Even if the devil wants my help to fight Communism I am on his side. Mr. Keuneman: Does the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister realize that in view of the fact that the Governments of India and Burma, which have also associated themselves with the same appeal for Cease-fire at the Colombo Conference have prohibited the use of any part of their territories being used for the passage of any troops and munitions being sent to Viet Nam, his answer lays him and his Government open to the charge of hypocrisy? The Rt. Hon. Sir J.Kotelawala: I hope that when they see my answer they too will follow my example.

Document No. 117 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on Bandung Conference*
28 April 1955 Mr. Speaker, I have just returned from Bandung and I thought I should give hon. Members of this House straightway a chance of having my impressions of the Bandung Conference. I am therefore very glad that you have given me this opportunity of making this statement. Twenty-nine countries participated in the Conference and the majority of them were represented by their Prime Ministers. It was the first time that many of these national leaders has met one another and, for this reason, if for no other, the Asian-African Conference was an outstanding achievement. It was also the first time that Communists and non-Communist leaders in Asia and Africa had come together to seek ways and means of co-operation with one another. The experience was, I think, the most valuable to us all. Many of us met Premier Chou En-Lai for the first time, and I must say that although we do not share his political views, he discovered himself to be a reasonable man who was prepared to respect the view of others. . . . We also had the privilege of meeting many other leaders, particularly those of the African and Middle-Eastern Regions, whom we might not otherwise have met. The whole atmosphere of the Conference was one of the cordiality of a family gathering. We had our disagreements and differences of opinion but the spirit of compromise and community of interests prevailed.
* Source: Hansard (HR), 1955, Vol. 20, Cols. 4180-83.

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Hon. Members would have seen reports of the final communiqu of the Bandung Conference. That statement represents the greatest common measure of agreement amongst 29 nations of Asia and Africa on issues that are vital not only to our regions but to the peace of the world as a whole. Every word in that statement has been carefully thought out and many words have been the subject of several hours of keenest debate. The important thing is that our nations in Asia and Africa were able to find an acceptable formulation to express their concern over common problems and their determination to co-operate with one another in the promotion of their security and well-being. I need not go over the contents of the joint communiqu in detail but I will briefly draw attention to the more important conclusions of the Conference embodied in it. Economic and cultural co-operation was discussed and the recommendations of the two Committees appointed to go into these matters were adopted. Economic co-operation amongst the countries of Asia and Africa can of necessity take place only within a limited sphere. It is in the political sphere that the more significant conclusions were reached. The conference declared its full support of the fundamental principles of Human Rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. It denounced the practice of racialism and declared its support of the principles of self-determination of peoples and nations. The subject of colonialism was discussed at great length, specially in view of the point I made that in the modern world we had to contend with not only what is known as classical colonialism but with certain forms of communist colonialism, overt and covert. . . . The conference condemned colonialism in all its manifestations as an evil to be speedily ended. The Chinese Prime Ministers views on colonialism were somewhat different but he subscribed to the condemnation. The declaration on world peace and co-operation is perhaps the most important part of the joint communiqu. Here the question of how to maintain the peace of the world was thoroughly discussed, including the subject of co-existence. Everyone agreed that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations must be respected, that disputes must be settled by peaceful means and not by force, that no one must engage in power politics and that no one must interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. . . . It is on such a basis that co-existence is possible, and China has subscribed to the ten principles laid down in that joint declaration. Another significant point is that recognition was given to the right of nations to defend themselves through collective pacts. . . . A very great achievement of the conference was the mutual understanding of view points reached between Communist China and the non-communist countries. This is a notable contribution to peace, and I feel that both sides can now get along amicably

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together without treading on each others toes. Of course, the sincere of purpose on both sides has yet to be seen in action. . . . A most interesting feature of the Conference was the eagerness shown by everybody, including China, to uphold the authority and prestige of the United Nations. This again is a very healthy sign for peace. The Conference also recognized the part that the Colombo Powers are playing in international politics. As hon. Members are aware, it is the five Colombo Powers that sponsored the Asian-African Conference, and the 29 countries were unanimous that the Conference should be an annual feature and that it should be convened through the medium of the Colombo Powers. The success of the Asian-African conference can be gauged from the fact that 29 countries out of a possible 30 attended the Conference. The Conference marks the consolidation of Asia, and of Asia with Africa. Two continents which have hitherto not had much say in international affairs will now work as a united force, together with others, for the peace and progress of the world.

Document No. 118 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaikes Call for an Asian Economic Conference (His Address at the Chinese Commodity Exhibition in Colombo)*
18 March 1958 The idea has been developing in my mind for sometime that the time has come to pursue one of the important decisions of Bandung in greater detail in the realm of economics. It is my intention, if the countries concerned agree, to suggest the holding of an economic conference, if necessary of all the Bandung powers, perhaps the restriction at the beginning being to Asian countries, for this purpose. We are all developing our economies, our national economies, in industries, in agriculture and so on. It strikes me that it may be desirable to consider certain common problems of planning not merely on a national basis now but at least, as a beginning, on a regional basis. It is a very important suggestion, which I am making. We are developing our industries; we are developing our agriculture for purposes of our local consumption, for purposes of export, but we are doing that in isolation from one another. Certainly I think in Asia it is very desirable to consider at least the outlines of a regional development plan.

* Source : Ceylon Today, Vol. VII, No. 4 (April 1958), pp 1-3.

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I am only too well aware that there may be national interests that will have to be considered and naturally given full attention to; but I certainly think that it is undesirable for us to continue isolated planning without any reference to some regional plan of how each countrys industries might fit into the industrial development of another without conflict, and similarly, with regard to agricultural development. Even if full agreement is not possible I think quite a desirable advance can be made by the holding of such a conference. If I may mention one important matter on which a discussion like that would be very useful, it is the question of food in our region. As you know most of us are rice-eating peoples in Asia. The whole problem of the production and distribution of rice to meet our minimum needs is becoming urgent and important today. I am quite sure that the general question of industrial and agricultural planning on some pattern without undue duplication of conflict amongst ourselves will be most useful to us. This question of food will provide a valuable, urgent and necessary item for discussion amongst our countries without delay. I have discussed this matter with our planning authorities here. I have also had the opportunity of having a discussion on this subject with an expert on planning who has been with us, Professor Myrdal of Sweden, and he is in full agreement with me that such a conference would be very valuable. It will all the more, I think, have a chance of success because except in a very indirect way we will not be discussing political troubles and difficulties amongst ourselves but something which is of common interest to us all in the realm of economic development. I intend to pursue this suggestion and address the countries concerned, and if there is a sufficiently satisfactory response, I will suggest the holding of such a conference at an early date, if they all agree, in our own country. I take this opportunity, on this occasion, of mentioning this important matter, although not directly concerned with the exhibition, but as one that is indirectly concerned with the development of trade as well as economic development of our countries.

Document No. 119 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on Asian Economic Cooperation (Address to the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce)*
27th March 1958 I wish to draw your attention to a matter of some importance. That is the suggestion to hold a Conference to deal with economic problems of our (Asian) countries in

* Source: Ceylon Today, Vol. VII , No. 4 (April 1958), PP. 3-4.

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pursuance of certain conferences already held in the past: the Conference of the Colombo Powers held here, followed by the Bandung Conference in 1954. As you know, it was contemplated at Bandung that another Conference should be held two years thereafter and I believe it was suggested at that time that Cairo should be the venue. For various reasons that Conference had to be postponed, one of the chief reasons being that some of us felt that the time was not opportune to hold a conference on the lines of Bandung again, owing to certain political trouble. But I now see that the time is most opportune to deal with economic questions, not political issues, following the resolution that has already been passed at the Colombo Powers Conference and then at Bandung. There are many problems which we can discuss usefully at such a Conference. Take the whole question of food production. The whole question is one of extreme urgency. The demand is outstripping the supply. That is a question to which we should address our attention most usefully and without undue delay. There are other bodies that deal with problems of this sort, e.g. the ECAFE. But they do so excluding the Peoples Republic of China. I do not know how you can discuss these matters without China. And also, if I may say so, while China is excluded, some of the old imperial powers are members of that body. Let them do what they can; I wish them well. But the question of the kind I suggest is to consider the production of food, primarily agricultural, tea, rubber, coconut. We are, no doubt, some of the most important producers in this region. We are very much in the hands of the consumers, as the Chairman very rightly mentioned. We are entirely in their hands to the extent that our entire economic life is dependent on the price trend. Further, we are all countries which are engaged in economic development, agriculture and industry. I certainly have always felt that isolated economic planning of a country by itself, is perhaps, not likely to be so fruitful today. I would like to see a certain amount of regional planning, particularly in the industrial sphere. As you know, it is going on. But certainly, I think, to consider a certain degree of regional planning, without conflicting with the needs of national planning - I think the two are not necessarily opposed to each other - without, in any way, having hostility towards any other country, where all are our friends, would be very desirable. In passing, I would mention the question of shipping. What are the countries in our region that have any sort of shipping today ? To a very small extent, India , Japan. How much are we at the mercy of others? I do feel that a move such as the one I have in mind would be very useful. I am not expecting hundred per cent success in discussions of this sort, but I would say that a certain amount, say, twenty-five per cent of value may emerge from these discussions. However, it is my own view , and I intend to pursue it with the others concerned. If they share my views, I trust that such a conference will materialize before the end of this year.

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Document No. 120 The Task Before Newly Independent Nations: Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bnadaranaikes Speech in the UN. General Assembly (Extract)*
22 November 1956 Mr. [S.W.R.D.] Bandaranaike (Ceylon ) : Many of our countries in Asia have reemerged into freedom after three or four hundred years of colonial imperialist rule. In this epoch of newly gained freedom, we find ourselves faced with a dual problem - a problem within a problem. First, there is the problem of converting a colonial society - politically, socially and economically - into a free society, and then there is the problem of effecting that conversion against a background of changing world conditions. The world is in a state of change and flux today. The world is going through one of those rare occasions - they happen at certain intervals - of a change-over from one society to another , from one civilization to another. We are living today, in fact, in a period of transition between two civilizations, the old and the new. During a period like this, all kinds of conflicts arise - ideological, national, economic, political. That has happened in the past, and in the past those conflicts were settled by some nice little war here or there. Today, we cannot afford the luxury of war, for we all know what it means. Therefore, the task for us today is far more difficult one than ever faced mankind before: to effect this transition to some form of stable human society, and to do it amid a welter of conflicts, with reasonable peace and with the avoidance of conflicts that burst out into war, for war is unthinkable today. This is an age when we have to live and let live, when we cannot afford to hate each other so much that we are prepared to sacrifice all mankind in the name of peace or for some other reason. We cannot afford to do that today. Within the limits of honour, of course, and those principles which we hold dear, we have to live and let live.

Document No. 121 Algeria: A Summary of Sri Lanka Delegates Speech in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly**
8 February 1957 Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon) said that a grave conflict had been raging for over two years between the Algerian population and French troops now numbering over
* Source : U.N.G . A.O.R ., 11th Session, 1956, 590th pl. Mtg. Paras 36-37. ** Source : U.N.G. A.O.R ., 11th Session, First Committee, 839th meeting, Paras. 1-23.

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500,000 men. According to the estimate given by the Algerian nationalists, 100,000 Algerians had been killed since the commencement of the insurrection and up to June 1956. According to French estimates, during the year 1956 some 20,000 people had been killed. In spite of the disparity of those figures, they showed the seriousness of a conflict which was causing some $ 4 million in damages every day. No one could remain indifferent to such a state of affairs. Efforts had, of course, been made to bring the fighting to a halt. Thus, in June 1956, France had offered certain terms: an immediate cease-fire followed by free elections on the basis of universal suffrage three months later. The nationalists had not accepted those terms because a cease-fire and pacification would not bring them any closer to their objectives. The elections would have been for the French National Assembly, and would have been a legal confirmation of the attachment to France. What the Algerian nationalists were asking was the right of self-determination. Mr. Robert Lacoste, Minister residing in Algeria , had stated that by September 1956 pacification would be achieved. It was now apparent, however, that France, in spite of efforts of its best fighting troops and the equipment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] which was available to them, had met with nothing but failure. And the carnage was continuing unabated. It had been thought that the uprising would be quelled if the leaders were captured, and five of those leaders had been arrested in circumstances which were known to all, but the fighting still continued. There could be no doubt, therefore, that the people of Algeria were determined to gain their legitimate rights. All credit was due to France for the far-seeing action taken in restoring freedom to Morocco and Tunisia, but that had only increased the desire of the Algerians to obtain their independence. Libya and the Sudan were free; Ghana and Nigeria were on the road to freedom. The leaders of an insurrection could be incarcerated, but the spirit of a people could not be controlled in that way. Repression only made people more ready to make sacrifices, and the fire continued to spread. He asked how long France was going to continue a campaign in which the French civilian population was itself the victim of terrorism; and whether it was not clear that the Algerians were not going to yield until they had obtained their freedom. Attempts had been made to blacken the Algerian nationalists by describing them as Communists. It was, however, a fact that in all countries which had struggled for their independence, political parties had buried their ideological differences, and had joined forces in a common effort to obtain a freedom which was a necessary prerequisite to the attainment of the other freedoms. There could be no doubt that Algeria was a separate entity. It had definite boundaries and a population, the overwhelming majority of which was united in its common aim. It could not be seriously claimed that there was any antagonism or any profound

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differences between the two great Algerian races, the Arab and the Berber. They were united in their language, religion and civilization. Algeria could not be assimilated, for it was a proud Arab land having a Moslem civilization which had proved its worth. In their attempt to turn Algerians into French citizens the French had, in fact, only created a legal fiction. The French people were not by nature a colonial Power: they were too civilized to keep any people in bondage and had therefore found that intellectual device by which Algeria had been made a French province. Just as they had been unable to assimilate the Indo-Chinese, so they had failed to assimilate a people belonging to the ancient and sturdy Moslem civilization. No one would think of belittling the considerable efforts made by France, particularly in recent times, to improve conditions for the Algerians. Prime Minister Guy Mollet had, in particular, announced important reforms, but as the Ceylonese people themselves had found, good government was no substitute for self-government. Every nation had a right to be free, and the first to concede that had been the French people. It was a strange fact that that very French people should deny a small nation its right to self-determination. Not many years had elapsed since France had stood alone among the great nations as an example of a country without colour prejudices which received Asian students among the many others in its universities. The French people would certainly arrive at a different opinion if they were given a chance to examine the position free from emotionalism and from the influence and pressure of the settlers, in Algeria. The presence of a minority, however, deserving of respect, was no argument to prevent the development of a country which was ready for independence. Ceylon itself had been freed in spite of the existence of a minority problem. The situation in Algeria was difficult, but human intelligence could surely devise a system of government in which the legitimate rights of the French settlers would be protected. Ceylon, India and Burma, which had been in the forefront of the independence movement, were now turning to the United Kingdom as their best friend and were proud of the British heritage on which they were building their future. The same would be true of the Algerians in their relations with France. But France must distinguish between patronage and friendly partnership: the countries associated in the Commonwealth, for example, had the right to disagree. Nations striving for independence were over-sensitive to any suggestion of intolerance or supremacy. However, childish such an attitude might seem, it was nevertheless a natural one and no doubt constitute the deep cause of terrorism. People behaved in an insane way because of an insane desire for freedom. The statement of the United States representative ( 835th meeting ) had been somewhat surprising. It was understandable that he should speak as the apostle of Western

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solidarity, but that was not enough. Pious hopes that, if external intervention did not occur, a settlement might be reached in a conflict which involved the independence of people sounded somewhat strange when coming from the representative of the country which had been one of the first to struggle for its freedom and which, on that occasion, asked for, and received, the help of the French nation itself. He could not imagine a situation in which no external assistance would be forthcoming. Such a situation would condemn the Algerians to being crushed, which was unthinkable. The Algerians could hope not only to receive support from Morocco and Tunisia, with which they shared common aspirations, but they could also count on the help of other neighbours, near and far, such as Sudan and Libya. In those circumstances, it was untenable to say that a conflict of that kind was a French conflict of purely domestic character. If that theory were accepted that would sound the death-knell of all liberation from colonial bondage. The United States could repeat that Algeria was a part of France, but that did not change the real position, for a technical argument could not be opposed to a popular movement. As for the Cuban representative, who had upheld the same argument in his statement [836th meeting], it might be asked whether he would accept that his country should be considered as a province of Spain, even though it was Spanish in language, culture and traditions. If Algeria was not an exclusively French Problem, it was not an exclusively Arab problem either. It was a world problem as had been stated by the Prime Minister of Ceylon. Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India, had enlarged on the view thus expressed by the Prime Minister of Ceylon, and he too had made a personal appeal on 5 June 1956 to the French Government urging a speedy solution of the conflict. Those were not the only official appeals which had been made to France, a country whose influence was felt and admired throughout the East. The Colombo Powers and the Members of the African-Asian conference at Bandung in 1955 had declared themselves in favour of Algerian independence. If due weight was to be given to world opinion, it had to be remembered that two-thirds of the population of the world were represented by the signatories to those appeals. In 1956, the African-Asian group had appealed to the United Nations and had brought the Algerian situation to the attention of the Security Council [ S/3589 and Add.1}. The Ceylonese delegation had refused to sign that request for a Security Council meeting [S/3609] because it had believed that all doors had not been closed and that France, faithful to its traditions, would be able to create improved conditions. Unfortunately, the situation had continued to deteriorate. The Cuban delegation had referred [836th meeting] to the question of Hungary and had spoken of double standards. In fact, when people in Hungary fought for freedom they were called heroes, whereas in Algeria they were described as incendiaries and terrorists. When the Hungarians executed their oppressors, they were acclaimed, but when Algerians did the same they were branded as criminals. That was where the

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system of double standards lay; it could not be said that the carnage was any worse in Hungary, because the number of persons killed wad certainly greater in Algeria. Furthermore, the unrest in Algeria could start a third world war, while it was improbable that the same risk existed with respect to Hungary. The charge made by the Cuban delegation that special treatment was being claimed was baseless. In fact, people throughout the world desired freedom and were striving towards the same ends. The Algerian people had as much right as any other to make progress towards independence. It was easy to call the nationalists rebels. In that sense, rebels were very numerous throughout the world and included some outstanding personalities. Mr. Nehru had spent part of his life in prison. The Prime Minister of Ceylon had been imprisoned, and many others like him. The ruling Power had arrested them on the grounds that they represented nobody, but had been obliged later to acknowledge that those prisoners did in fact represent something. The fact that they were rebels was not a satisfactory excuse to refuse to negotiate with the Algerian nationalists. A plebiscite had to be urgently organized on the question of independence, if it was considered that such a plebiscite was necessary. In any event, it was essential that the two opposing parties should make contact. The French people would then see that those who now call themselves their friends were in fact leading towards worse difficulties. They would then understand that their true friends were not those they thought. It was only by adopting such an attitude that the United Nations could help France. In Ceylon, the transfer of power had been made progressively, If the same were done in the case of Algeria, that country would one day form with Morocco and Tunisia a kind of North African federation which would become Frances closest friend . Such a policy would certainly have more advantageous results than one leading to a total loss such as had occurred in Indo-China. France was meant to have an empire, but an empire in the hearts of men, rather than a colonial empire.

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Document No. 122 Algeria: A Summary of Sri Lanka Delegates Speech in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly*
12 February 1957 Mr. [A.B.] PERERA (Ceylon) said that the Eighteen-Power Draft Resolution [A/C.1/ L.165] was based essentially on the principle that the Algerian question was an international question. In the connexion, it was regrettable that the representatives of the United Kingdom [834th meeting] and of the United States [835th meeting] should have stated that the question of Algeria was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of France. It was because France had failed to solve the Algerian problem that it should now seek the assistance of the United Nations. Such action would not diminish its prestige, but would on the contrary, increase it. Algeria had been for France a field for experiments in colonial rule. The Organic Statute of Algeria of September 1947, like the laws which had preceded it, was a manifestation of that French colonial policy. The representative of France claimed that his country had instituted social reforms and had raised the status of the under-privileged [830th meeting] but he might be reminded that on 1 July 1955 he himself had submitted a report to a committee of the French National Assembly, in which he had mentioned the extreme poverty and want of the people of Algeria, which was in contrast to the vast wealth of the colonial settlers. That certainly was a confession of failure after 125 years of rule. In the circumstances, it was not possible to agree with those who wished to give France a few more years to solve the problem. The representative of New Zealand had claimed [841st meeting] that the second paragraph of the preamble and the first operative paragraph of the Eighteen-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/L. 165] were untenable, because the United Nations Charter did not mention the right of peoples to self-determination. However, Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter dealt with the sovereign equality of Members, and although sub-paragraph b and c of Article 76 did not specifically mention the right of peoples to self- determination, they nevertheless referred to them by implication. The principle of national self-determination and the sovereign equality of States had now become a generally accepted rule of international law, and any deviation from that principle must be regarded as an infringement of international law. Furthermore, the Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs gave numerous instances of acceptance of the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. Article 1, para 2, moreover, was

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 11th Session, First Committee, 844th Mtg., Paras 30-40

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explicit, it obviously referred to relations between nations in general, and not only to relations between Sovereign States which were Members of the United Nations. Article 73b was completely applicable to the situation: it referred to nations which were on the road to self-government, assisted by a Power which had a certain interest in them. Finally, pursuant to Article 78, the Trusteeship System did not apply to countries which had become Members of the United Nations. Taken together , all those Articles clearly emphasized the right of peoples to self-determination. The representative of France had objected to that argument on the ground that there were no Algerians but only Frenchmen and had claimed that under Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter, the United Nations was not competent in the matter. Many delegations appeared to have forgotten the last part of that paragraph, which provided that a plea of domestic jurisdiction was without prejudice to the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, Since the world order was disturbed in Algeira, the United Nations was competent to restore it. President Eisenhowers statement that the United Nations Charter represented mans best hope of substituting the conference table for the battle field should not be forgotten. He wondered , therefore, why it should be considered unreasonable to recognize the inalienable right of the people of Algeria to self-determination and to suggest negotiations between the two parties concerned, with the assistance of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, if they so desired. Were the First Committee to decide that the question of Algeria was not within its competence, the United Nations might as well close its doors and end its existence ? The very purpose of the Charter was to lay down rules for a way of life which would ensure peaceful co-existence with the peoples of colonial countries and there was no necessity for a special provision dealing with that principle since it was inherent in the philosophy of any people struggling for freedom. The Algerian people were struggling for independence. If France did not assist them along that road, it was not surprising that the Algerians should have revolted. The United Nations Charter provided that sovereignty and the right of peoples to selfdetermination could be limited only when the rights of other equal nations or the requirements of international security were infringed: there was no such infringement in respect of Algeria and France. Consequently, the eighteen-Power draft resolution was fully in conformity with the provisions of the Charter. Replying to the representative of Cuba, he said that his delegation had never accepted the position that different policies could be followed according to circumstances. Whatever the States involved, Ceylon would always defend any nation which might be subject to foreign domination, despite any plea of domestic jurisdiction. The sponsors of the Eighteen-Power Draft Resolution hoped that it would be adopted. Whether it was accepted or rejected, however, Algeria would survive.

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Document No. 123 Cyprus: A summary of Sri Lanka Delegates Speech in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly*
19 February 1957 Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon) stated that the question of Cyprus had caused grave anxiety to the Government and people of Ceylon, who had a long and treasured connexion with the United Kingdom, great admiration for Greece and great friendship with Turkey. He appreciated the restraint and moderation with which the parties immediately concerned in the question had presented their respective cases before the Committee. At the same time, he could not help feeling that an atmosphere had been created which was not very helpful to the solution of the problem. He realized that the question had been brought before the United Nations in an effort to place the case of Cyprus before world public opinion. He did not think that alone would help in finding a solution of the problem. The undeniable fact remained that Cyprus was a colony of the United Kingdom and was going through an experience which had been able to achieve selfgovernment. The United Kingdom Government had shown its adherence to the principle of self-government through its extension of that right to countries formerly under its control. He could not for a moment deny the fact that the United Kingdom Government had always been responsive to public opinion. It was therefore a matter for regret that, instead of following the well-known beaten track of constitutional agitation, terrorism should have been conceived as the means by which self-government should be attained in Cyprus. Regardless of the respective claims made by Greece and Turkey, the people of Cyprus had a right to self-determination, a right which he thought the United Kingdom Government had conceded. He could understand the great anxiety on the part of Greece to make the Cypriots feel to have them within its Kingdom. That did not, however, provide an argument against Cyprus. The Government of Ceylon was not concerned with the annexation of Cyprus by Greece, nor would it for a moment countenance ENOSIS. The representative of Greece himself had freely granted that annexation was not the aim of his Government [847th meeting]. With regard to the position of Turkey, he could not see how Turkey could establish any kind of claim on Cyprus in the matter of annexation. It was true that Cyprus had been under the control of Turkey at one time, but that did not establish the grounds for any claim by Turkey. The proximity of Cyprus to Turkey also had nothing to do with the matter. The presence of a Turkish minority in Cyprus did not militate against the granting of self-determination to the people of Cyprus. He could understand Turkeys

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 11th Session, First Committee, 849th Mtg., Paras. 34-42.

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concern in the interest that there should be peace and good government in Cyprus, which was only fifty miles from its coast. But he could not countenance Turkeys having a voice in the government of Cyprus. Nor could be accept the argument that Cyprus could affect the security of Turkey, in view of the fact that Turkey was a member of the Balkan Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and considering the size of the population of Cyprus. Thus, just as Greece had no right to claim annexation of Cyprus, just as ENOSIS must be dismissed as something which the United Nations, the United Kingdom, or the Commonwealth for that matter, could not accept, so must be dismissed, with equal strength, any suggestion that Turkey should have a claim on Cyprus. The question of Cyprus was a matter for negotiation in an atmosphere of calm and peace between the Cypriots and the Government of the United Kingdom. Responsible leaders in Cyprus no doubt realized that only a calmer atmosphere could produce the results they wanted, and if, they decided to open negotiations, possibly some good could come of them. That was the message he would like to give to the Cypriot people. The time had come for them to stop acts of terrorism, which could not be condoned in any part of the world. He appealed to the Government of Greece to exercise such moral influence as it had on Cyprus to put down the terrorism that existed and to advance the idea that the part of self government lay in peaceful conduct. The course of events amply demonstrated that the Cypriots desired to attain the right of self-determination. That was a matter which the United Kingdom Government should note. The existence of such a desire on the part of the Cypriot people could be ascertained either in plebiscite or through a royal commission. Such a Commission could also develop a constitution for Cyprus which would confer on the Cypriots that vestige of self-government which was absent in the proposals submitted by Lord Radcliffe. The royal commission would be in a better position to discover the kind of government that the people of Cyprus desired and would also be able to study the relationship between the Turkish minority and the Greek majority. It was not impossible to conceive of a constitution that would work out the proper relationship between the two ethnic groups of Cyprus. If the presence of a minority were to be the reason to deny self-government, no colony would ever be free, or at least it would take many years to achieve freedom. He was not in a position to take any stand on the draft resolutions which had been submitted to the Committee on the question of Cyprus. He only wished that none of the draft resolutions existed and that the United Kingdom and Greece would find a way to settle their own differences according to their high sense of integrity and justice.

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Document No. 124 The Question of Cyprus: Comments of the Sri Lanka Delegate on the Indian Draft Resolution*
22 February 1957 Mr. [A.B.] Perera (Ceylon ) believed that the draft resolutions before the Committee were all motivated by the idea of ending the conflict now raging in Cyprus. It could not be forgotten that the conflict has led to bloodshed and that it was continuing. In such a situation all must exercise self-restraint. There could be no return, as had been implicitly suggested by the representative of Turkey, to the rule of Congresses such as those of Vienna and Berlin. A solution must be worked out within the framework of the Charter. The matter was essentially one between the United Kingdom and the Cypriots, and the basis of the solution must surely lie in the terms of General Assembly Resolution 637 A(VII) which he quoted, and which he was sure the representative of India had in mind in submitting the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.172]. Accusations and counter-accusations were hardly relevant. Issues revived from the past were also inappropriate. It might be contended that the Cypriots could not wait, but he would submit that policy was evolved and that the door was open to negotiation. He trusted that negotiations would be continued between the Cypriots and the United Kingdom in the spirit expressed in the Indian draft resolution. His country, no doubt like other members of the Organization, hoped that a solution would be worked out on the basis of freedom of expression and in an atmosphere of peace.

Document No. 125 Cyprus : Sri Lanka Delegate Votes for the Indian Draft Resolution**
22 February 1957 Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewadene (Ceylon) explained that he had voted for the Indian draft resolution because he had hoped that its adoption would create the necessary atmosphere for the rightful solution of the question. As far as his Government was concerned, there were only two parties to the situation, the United Kingdom Government and the people of Cyprus. The other two parties which had intervened in the dispute had waived their claims. He had no doubt that in solving the problem, the United Kingdom would show the same wisdom it had displayed in other countries where minorities existed. He was confident that British statesmen would find a solution that would do

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R ., 11th Session, First Committee, 855th Mtg., Para 50. ** Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 11th Session, First Committee, 856th Mtg., Para 60.

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justice to both sections of the population. He hoped that the United Kingdom Government would follow its normal method, and in consultation with the people of Cyprus, evolve a constitution that would guarantee peace and prosperity for Cyprus and would give it a lawful place in the community of nations.

Document No. 126 Admission of Ghana to the U.N.: Sri Lanka Delegates Speech in the U.N. General Assembly (Extract)*
8 March 1957 MR. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): The Government of Ceylon considers it a great privilege to be associated with the other members of the Commonwealth in sponsoring a draft resolution which would admit Ghana to membership in the United Nations. In doing so, I am particularly privileged to be able to state that my country has been associated with the great country of Ghana for a number of years. We had the same experience as Crown Colonies; we walked along the same path of constitutional development; and it is therefore doubly a pleasure for us to see that Ghana has already - on the heels of Ceylon - blossomed forth as a full self-governing unit within the Commonwealth of Nations. Ceylon and Ghana have been together in many matters pertaining to the welfare of the world in economic development and in other spheres. We have sometimes shared the same Governors, and we have therefore watched Ghanas historical rise with great attention. It was a Ceylonese who established the first secondary school in that area. I refer to the Rev. A.G. Frazer, who had laboured for many years in Ceylon as head of a famous institution, Trinity College, and who established the secondary school in the Gold Coast which blossomed out into the University of Achimota, which has played a vital role in the training of young men in that part of the world. Ceylonese staff also followed and amongst them I remember particularly a Ceylonese who was in charge of sports and coached the young African boys of that area in cricket. It has also been my privilege, in Ceylons short period of membership in the United Nations during the tenth session of the General Assembly, to cast my vote for a plebiscite in Togoland and to express my pleasure that my first act in the Assembly would be to make some contribution towards the development of the Gold Coast and Togoland under British Administration as a self governing unit of the Commonwealth. It was also the privilege of Ceylon to be associated with the observation team which conducted the plebiscite.

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 11th Session. 668th Pl. Mtg.,

Paras 45-52.

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Our association with Ghana has been long, and we therefore take particular delight in welcoming it to this great assembly of nations. We also welcome Ghana to that great family known as Commonwealth of Nations. I have not the slightest doubt that Ghana will play a leading role in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations. Over the years it has acquired administrative training and has produced men of intellect and of outstanding ability who are prepared to play an important role in the affairs of the country. In those circumstances I feel that Ghana provides an object lesson for other countries on the African continent; they, too, may follow the same part of constitutional development and they, too, may develop along the same economic lines and, in the nottoo-distant future, achieve self-Government themselves. Ceylon and Ghana are proud to have been able to achieve self-Government without any undue hardship caused by leaving the beaten track of constitutional education, and to have achieved it by proving our fitness to undertake and manage the affairs of our countries. I take this opportunity to congratulate the Government of the United Kingdom on the great statesmanship it has displayed in giving the right of full self-Government to Ghana. Ghana will enrich the Commonwealth and will also bring to the discussions in Commonwealth conference a new light; it will present a new face; it will present a picture of Africa as it should be. And to the United Nations, Ghana, with its ripe experience, will bring a knowledge of affairs in the great African continent about which, I think all of us have a great deal to learn. I do not think many people know that Ghana is a very progressive country. Its per capita income is higher than that of India, Ceylon or Pakistan. Ghana is the biggest coco-producing country in the world. Thus it does not come merely as a new member to this team, trying to get on its feet; it has been on its feet for some time and has now attained full maturity and is able to play a vital role in the affairs of this great Assembly. On behalf of the African-Asian group, I have been asked to convey the felicitations of all the African and Asian countries to the great country of Ghana. We hope that Ghana will have a bright and prosperous future and will make no small contribution to the maintenance of the standards in which we of this world all believe.

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Document No. 127 Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala on the Importance of Japanese Economic Assistance (Extract from his speech at Luncheon given by the Governor of Tokyo)*
22 December 1954 The return of Japan to the family of nations has taken place under conditions very different from those, which existed when she entered the War. In Asia, in particular, several countries have shaken off their colonial fetters and have emerged as independent nations. They are now in control of their own destinies after several centuries, but all of them find that they have inherited, from their colonial masters, problems and difficulties which well nigh threaten their very survival. While some have had to contend with political upheavals and unrest, all of them, without exception, have found themselves in varying stages of economic backwardness. In addition, the world is now a much more complex place than it was before World War II, and in the shadow of World War III, cast by the ideological conflicts between the Democratic and Communist worlds, these Asian countries find themselves in the position of fighting for their very existence. In the short space of nearly seven years during which we have been independent, we have made considerable progress in building up the resources of our country. Unaided, we cannot make much headway, and we must, therefore, frankly look to other countries which are in a more fortunate position than ourselves to assist us in converting our economy from an unbalanced agricultural economy into a diversified one, which would be less dependent on the vagaries of world markets. With the entry of Japan into the Colombo Plan, we, in Ceylon, as well as other countries in Asia, look forward to a new era of economic co-operation with Japan. Certain discussions have already taken place between the Governments of Japan and Ceylon in selecting fields in which this co-operation can be most beneficial to both countries. I have no doubt that in a very short space of time we shall come into closer contact with Japan in the fields of agriculture, fisheries and industry. Through such closer association, both our peoples can derive not merely mutual economic advantages, but a deeper friendship and understanding with each other, which I am sure we both desire. This, then, is the message I have for you, industrialists and businessmen of Japan. I want you to come to Ceylon and help my country. You can discuss with my Government

* Source : Between the Two worlds (The Collected Speeches of the Right Honourable Sir John Kotelawala (Colombo: The Government Press, 1954), PP. 39-40.

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the projects in which you might be interested and the terms on which you are prepared to undertake them. Your capital will not only be safe, but it will be enabled to earn its due reward. And you will be permitted, when the time comes, to take both your capital and your dividends back home. I hope we may be able to count upon you to help Ceylon, and I thank you once again from the bottom of my heart for your kindness to me today. This is also my last public appearance, so to say, in Japan, before I leave your shores tomorrow. May I, therefore, take this opportunity to say what a most wonderful time I have had in your beautiful country, how much I have come to understand and appreciate your people and what delightful memories I am carrying away with me of my stay in your midst. It has been a great privilege to visit you and may you all enjoy a most Happy and Prosperous New Year in 1955.

Document No. 128 The Joint Statement Issued on the Visit of the Prime Minister of Japan to Ceylon*
28 May 1957 The Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Nobsuke Kishi, visited Ceylon from the 28th May to the 31st May, 1957, as the guest of the Government of Ceylon. During his stay he took the opportunity of discussing with the Prime Minister of Ceylon matters of mutual interest to their two countries. These discussions were conducted in a spirit of great friendliness and the two Prime Ministers are confident that their meeting will further strengthen the cordial and happy relations that already exist between Ceylon and Japan. The Prime Ministers reiterate the desire of their two countries to work together for the peace of the world and they affirm their faith in negotiation based on goodwill and understanding as the only effective means of settling the disputes of nations. They express their belief in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and they recognize the importance of the United Nations as an instrument for securing the ends of world peace. In expressing this belief they also recall the adherence of their two counties to the principles embodied in the resolution of the Bandung Conference. Among the matters discussed by the Prime Ministers were ways and means of further fostering economic co-operation between their countries. They attach much importance to this subject and they believe that even closer collaboration than now in the fields of economic development and trade and commerce will greatly conduce to the mutual benefit of their two countries.

* Source : Ceylon Today, Vol. VI, No. 7 (July 1957), PP. 19-20.

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The Prime Ministers agree that effective disarmament is indispensable for peace and they are strongly of the view that, in the interests of the future of all humanity, the nuclear and thermo-nuclear test explosions that are being undertaken by certain nations should be abandoned without delay. Japan and Ceylon share a common religion, Buddhism, and are linked together by the ties and traditions of a common Buddhist culture. These bonds enable their countries to make a special contribution to the peace and welfare of humanity in the spirit of the Buddha Dhamma and the two Prime Ministers affirm the resolve of their countries to collaborate in this spirit for the common good.

Document No. 129 Prime Minister S.W.R.D Bandaranaike on the Middle East Problem*
14 August 1958. I do not want to be drawn in here, Mr. Chairman, into a discussion of Israel versus Arab neighbors. However that is, I should like just to say this. I was asked some questions about our representation in Israel, and here I might say the position is that the previous Government had agreed to diplomatic representation by Israel here, of course, I presume, with the implication of our representation there. When I assumed office the Israel Government, naturally, very kindly kept on pressing us to find out whether they could send their representative here as the previous Government had decided. Well, Sir, I said, Yes, you may do so. Then the question of appointing a representative of ours at Israel arose, and I have just laid it by for further consideration**. I must say here that I did not come to that decision owing to various pressures that were brought to bear on me. But certainly they were entitled to do it. In fact, a number of Arab countries and Egypt did make certain representations for my consideration and

* Source: Hansard (HR) Vol. 32, 1958, Cols. 317-22. ** [Editor Note] Diplomatic relations between Ceylon and Israel were established on September 18, 1957, with the appointment of Israels representative in Burma concurrently as its envoy to Ceylon. Israel posted its Charge d Affaires in Colombo. Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike later decided to accredit Ceylons ambassador to Rome concurrently as its representative to Israel; however, this decision was not implemented. Mr. Bandaranaike explained: We are friendly with Israel but there were difficulties in the way, but very early we will be appointing a representative. (Hansard, HR, Vol. 36, 5 August 1959, Col. 344). Under the Caretaker Government of Prime Minister W. Dahanayake, Ceylons Ambassador in Rome, Mr. H.A.J. Hulugalla, was appointed concurrently as Ceylons first envoy to Israel. Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike decided to withdraw the accreditation of Ceylons Representative to Israel (see, document 130).

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I explained the position to them too. But I think, it would be wrong to say that owing to pressure from this country or that it will not be fair to those countries that certain action was taken or was not taken. Certainly, they made certain representations to me, which received my consideration. That is the position about it. As to the position of Israel in this area, you are all aware no doubt of the long and somewhat unhappy history of those people - the Israelites, the Hebrews, the Jews. Ever since the time when a great religious teacher, whose religion is professed by a very large number of people in the world as well as even by certain hon. Members of this House, had said that not one stone shall be left on another, and which has been so amply borne out when the Roman General Titus sacked and destroyed Jerusalem in the first century A. D. the Jews have been scattered all over the world. How long ago was it? From the 1st century A.D. 1,800 years ago, the Jews ceased to be a nation. It is interesting to note in passing that Titus remarked after his Palestine campaign that the Gods themselves seemed to be on his side in that campaign. It was so complete and so successful that the prophesy was fulfilled. However, they suffered in various countries of the world, in Europe, in England, in Germany, in Russia; wherever these unfortunate people were, they were subjected to immense sufferings, through the ages. We can appreciate, can we not, that such a people would want to say well, we have at last got a home of our own. I mean we understand it. Personally, if you ask me, the much wiser course should have been, with the increasing liberalism in the world, that the Jews, who had in spite of all the sufferings and discriminations against them made such important and valuable contributions, whether in finance or art or music or science or politics, to the countries in which they were settled and of which they had become citizens, should have been absorbed into those countries as citizens of those countries and treated fairly and justly so that they would have been able to make their great contributions to the national lives of those countries. But, however, the Balfour Declaration recognized publicly this sentimental claim of theirs to return to their homeland after nearly 2,000 years; hence the tears, Mr. Chairman. Now, let us understand the position of the Arab countries, too, where their countries are undeveloped, the people ignorant and ill-equipped as most of the inhabitants are, as to what they feel about this Jewish state established in a narrow, barren strip of land containing about roughly less than a million people. Mr. Keuneman: A little over a million; it is getting on to two millions. The Hon. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike: Are there as many as that? Mr.Keuneman: Yes, a little over a million. The Hon. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike: Anyway, about a million and half supported by international Jewry with finance, with the political power wielded in those great countries

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where the people of their race are still filling important and distinguished places, with brains, with industry, with money and most modern equipment. The Jews feel that this small country is not sufficient for them, for 1 1\2 million people. At the same time, it must be remembered there are about a million Arabs who are refugees, and we are also making our little contribution to the United Nations Fund that is dealing with these refugees, about a million of them driven out of their homeland. They feel that this Jewish state planted in this way in their midst would prove of great danger to their independence and their freedom because Israel is bound to expand; she just cannot help herself. The inevitable and inexorable circumstances of the case would make it necessary for the present Israelites to expand, with the powers they have and their ability, backed by all these international forces. This makes the Arabs fear not unjustifiably that Israel would prove a great danger, if not now, at least 10 years hence or 20 years hence or 30 years hence. That is the Arab point of view which might be given due consideration. The Israelis point of view is that they have no such intention; in fact, I had the pleasure of having a long talk with Mrs. Golda Myres, a very charming and able lady, when she was the Foreign Secretary at the United Nations. I told her this is the position but, of course, she said, oh, no. We can get on very peacefully if we are only allowed to do so. We have no such intentions, and so on and so forth. Obviously that is what the Jews say when they get their head into the tent till the rest of the body in due course follows into the tent, if I may quote an Arab saying. Well, that is the position. We have the highest regard for the Jews. Surely, we do not want to treat these unfortunate people as pariahs of the human race. Nobody wants that. They are very able and all honour to them. But this is the position of the newly planted state of Israel. Of course, they were there over 2,000 years ago, it is true, but they have not been there for the last 1,800 years at least. If we look at it in that way, I dread to think how many of us would dare to go back and find out who inhabited this country 2,000 years ago and another country 1,500 years ago and ask, Have they not got the right to return to their original homeland? I dread to think what would be the position of many countries in the world.

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Document No. 130 Diplomatic Relations with Israel and Arab Countries: Press Communiqu issued by the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, Government of Ceylon*
20 August 1960 The following statement has been made by the Hon. Prime Minister: My Government has for some time had under review the accreditation of our Ambassador in Rome to Israel and the circumstances under which this decision was taken by the Caretaker Government of Mr. Dahanayake. My Government feels that the accreditation was carried through without adequate regard to the special difficulties of the situation in the Middle East or proper consideration of the possible effects the action would have on our relations with Arab countries with whom we have close bounds of friendship. My Government recalls that when the question of sending a diplomatic representative to Israel came up during the life time of the late Prime Minister, he decided to refrain from doing so in recognition of the complexities of the situation in the Middle East. It is the view of my Government that the action of the Caretaker Government of Mr. Dahanayake reversed these basic policies.** My Government now proposes to take certain urgent remedial measures with a view to strengthening and fostering our relations with the Arab countries.

Document No. 131 Visit of Pakistan President to Sri Lanka : Joint Communiqu***
14 December 1963. On the invitation of the Government of Ceylon, His Excellency Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan, President of the Republic of Pakistan, paid an official visit to

* Source: Ceylon Daily News, 20 August 1960. ** [Editors Note] For Mr. W. Dahanayakes refutation of these charges, see, Hansard, Vol. 41, 3 November 1960, Col. 432-439; For. Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaikes reply, ibid., 4 November 1960, Col.543-550. *** Source: Ceylon Today, Vol. XII, No. 12 (Dec. 1963), PP. 2-8.

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Ceylon from December 8th to 15th, 1963. He was accompanied by the Honourable Z.A. Bhuto, Minister for External Affairs and high officials of the Pakistan Government. During his stay in Ceylon, the President of Pakistan visited Kandy, Polonnaruwa, Trincomalee, and other places of interest. He had the opportunity of seeing various aspects of the programme of development and progress initiated by the Governemnt of Ceylon aimed at the betterment of the common man. The President was accorded a civic reception by the city of Colombo. The President addressed a meeting of Members of both Houses of Parliament. He was feted by representatives of the Ceylon Muslim community. At a Special Convocation of the University of Ceylon in Peradeniya, an Honorary degree of Doctor of Laws was conferred on him. Throughout his stay in Ceylon, the President and members of his party were received with warmth and friendship by the people of Ceylon. It was a manifestation of the close ties of friendship and goodwill which exist between the Governments and peoples of Ceylon and Pakistan. The Prime Minister of Ceylon had talks with the President of Pakistan on a wide range of subjects of mutual interest. These talks were held in a very cordial and friendly atmosphere. The Prime Minister of Ceylon and the President of Pakistan noted with satisfaction the growing ties of friendship and goodwill between the Governments and peoples of their two countries. They expressed their confidence that the current visit of the President of Pakistan to Ceylon would help to strengthen these ties further to the benefit of both countries. The Prime Minister and the President considered that settlement of the Disarmament problem is of crucial importance to mankind. They welcomed the recent Agreement on the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and expressed the hope that it would pave the way towards complete and universal disarmament. The two leaders condemned the policies of racial discrimination practiced by the Government of South Africa which they consider as a grave violation of elementary human rights and of the U.N. Charter. They agreed that all remaining vestiges of colonialism must be eliminated so as to bring the blessings of freedom to all peoples and to remove international inequities. The two leaders considered that the U.N. Organization has played a prominent part in the solution of international problems, and reiterated their whole-hearted support for the principles and objectives of the U.N. Charter.

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Subscribing to the belief that all international disputes should be settled expeditiously and by peaceful means, the two leaders agreed that the disputes among countries in this region should be settled in a fair and equitable manner in order to promote harmonious and friendly relations between neighbouring countries and to strengthen the solidarity of the Afro-Asian countries in the interest of world peace. In this respect they recalled with regret the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and agreed that its expeditious solution in accordance with U.N. Resolutions or by other peaceful means would be in the interest of peace in the sub-continent and in the region. Reviewing the situation in Asia, the two leaders voiced their concern at the existence of certain areas of tension and hoped that in the interests of Asian solidarity all outstanding problems would be solved in a peaceful manner. The President appreciated the efforts made by Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, along with the other countries which participated at the Colombo Conference, to bring about a peaceful solution of the Sino-Indian border conflict. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that regular consultations among leaders of various nations to discuss matters of common concern can make an useful contribution towards a better understanding of world problems. The President noted the initiative that has been taken by Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike to hold another Conference of non-aligned countries. Recalling the contribution made by the first Afro-Asian Conference and considering the fast changing pattern of the international situation and the attainment of Independence by many new States since the last Conference of Afro-Asian nations, the President was of the view that a second Conference of Afro-Asian leaders should be held at an opportune time as early as possible in order to strive in a concerted manner towards the reduction of international tensions and the promotion of greater understanding and co-operation in a wider area. The Prime Minister agreed that such a Conference would serve a useful purpose. The Prime Minister and the President welcomed the new spirit of resurgent Africa which found expression in the Meeting of Heads of States at Addis Ababa. They noted with appreciation the machinery created at that Conference for greater co-operation among the States concerned and for the resolution of disputes by peaceful means. The two Governments also decided to explore the possibilities of regional economic co-operation as a means of achieving economic stability and better living standards not only in Pakistan and Ceylon but throughout Asia. The trade, economic and cultural relations between Ceylon and Pakistan were discussed by the two leaders, and it was agreed that there should be more frequent exchanges of visits between the leaders and peoples of the two countries. They expressed satisfaction

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at the signing of a Trade Agreement between Ceylon and Pakistan earlier this year and felt confident that these economic relations could be further strengthened by an increase in the volume of trade between the two countries to their mutual advantage. The position regarding the persons of Pakistani origin resident in Ceylon was discussed by the two leaders. They expressed confidence that a speedy settlement could be arrived at on this matter in the mutual interest of their two countries and in the context of the close and friendly relations existing between them. The President of Pakistan extended an invitation to the Prime Minister of Ceylon to Visit Pakistan. This invitation has been accepted with thanks. The time of the visit will be arranged at a later date.

Document No. 132 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranike on Katanga*

23 January 1964. In July 1960, soon after our Government assumed office, events in Congo were moving with a tragic inevitability towards the fragmentation of the newly emerging nation-state. The secession of Mr. Tshombe in Katanga had led to the United Nations intervention and the Ceylon Government, as a member of the Security Council at that time, fully endorsed and supported the resolution for the use of the United Nations forces as a means of preserving the territorial integrity of Congo and of preventing the perpetuation of colonialism and neo-colonialism through Belgian and other para-military forces in any part of Congo. Towards this objective Ceylon also contributed a token contingent to support the United Nations Operation in Congo. Unfortunately, however, the Security Council resolution was not implemented and there followed soon after the assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba. Although many countries thought that Mr. Lumumbas successor should be a member of his own political party from Stanlyville, our Government thought that the more correct course would be to allow the Deputies in their newly elected parliament to determine the question of succession. It is now a matter of history that this view prevailed and Mr. Adoula, who was duly elected Prime Minister by the Deputies in Parliament according to their fundamental law, has been able to achieve the unification of his country by putting an end to the secession of Katanga province.

* Source : Hansard (Senate), 1964, Vol. 19, cols. 2396 97.

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Document No. 133 Speech made by Mr. T.B. Illangaratne, the Minister of Commerce, Trade, Food and Shipping, in Welcoming the Burmese Trade Delegation*
September 27, 1960 My first duty is to offer you, Mr. Deputy Minister, and the Burmese delegation a very cordial welcome to this little Island of ours. I believe that some of you have already visited our country in the past, but there may be others who may be visiting it for the first time, and I am sure that they will find many things to interest them and we hope to make the stay of the Burmese delegation as pleasant as possible. I need hardly recall the ties of neighbourliness and friendship that have bound our two countries and the two peoples together from the hoary past. Our religious and cultural links come down from ancient times, as well as our mutual helpfulness through trade. Even during the period in which both our countries came under the yoke of foreign domination, cultural and commercial relations were continued as best as was possible under the circumstances. About the same time we both emerged as free countries - free to co-operate in every sphere for the upliftment of our peoples. We have now had more than twelve years of such co-operation and the assistance given to our country by Burma during the immediate post-war years to relieve the food shortage here is always gratefully remembered. For many years Burma has been our largest supplier in the most important food commodity for Ceylon, and this tradition was broken only in 1953 when we had to go to other sources for larger supplies of rice, and that too because Burmese rice production was slow in recovering and she found it somewhat difficult to supply the greater part of our requirements. I am glad to say that, with the signing of the Four-Year Trade Agreement last year, we have again come to look to Burma for the greater part of our import needs in respect of rice. In this connection, I must not fail to mention that we ourselves have launched upon a policy of increased rice production in order that we may not trouble others so much in regard to our future imports. Nevertheless, Burma rice, being the rice which the Ceylon consumer has been accustomed to for a long time, will be on our import programme for many years to come; perhaps even after we become self-sufficient. With our population increasing at a heavy rate, as well as the population in other countries of South-East Asia, I have no doubt that the demand for rice will increase year by year and the further recovery of rice production in Burma would help the economy not only of Burma but also of the importing countries as well. I dont want at this stage to enter into a controversy on a theory that rice eating itself promotes a higher birth rate.

* Source : Ceylon Toda (Oct. 1960 ),Vol. IX, No. 10, PP. 30 32.

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The negotiations which commence today will be carried on between the officials on both sides. But there are one or two matters which I would wish to refer to in a general way. The Government of Burma is, I am sure, aware of the importance we attach to the price of rice, for the reason that rice is a heavily subsidized commodity in this country. Much of our internal economy is tied up with the consumer price of rice and this has made the Government to confer upon the consumer a larger subsidy benefit. In order to avoid our incurring too large a commitment on subsidies, which is bound to cripple our development activities, it is natural for us to expect to buy rice at the cheapest possible price, as well as to buy the least expensive qualities of rice. We should of course be very happy if there is a possibility of our buying your best quality rice at the lowest quality price. We do not forget that the rice industry has always loomed large in the export economy of Burma and it would be natural for Burma to expect the best possible income form her rice. However, I must say that Burma has been helpful to us in the past and I hope that in the forthcoming negotiations the Burmese Delegation will endeavour to extend the same helpfulness. Security of Supply The other matter is in relation to the question of security of supply. Ceylon has seldom had any occasion to complain in regard to the prompt implementation of past contracts for the supply of rice. In fact, we have always preferred a Government to Government contract, not only because we thought that we could get favourable terms but also that there would be security of supply. I understand that this year there have been some difficulties in arranging the regular delivery of rice, and I hope that they were due to some unforeseen factors. Whatever may have been the reason for delays in shipments, my Governments faith in dealings on a Government to Government basis is unshaken. The vast majority of the people of this country, and I have no doubt that it is the same with the Burmese people, believe in a socialist programme for the amelioration of their conditions and it is, therefore, my Governments policy to conduct trade in the basic items of necessity on a socialist basis. I am sure the Government of Burma also share this view. I hope that the appropriate Ministry in Burma would, in future, do its best to smooth out any little difficulties that might arise from time to time in the implementation of contracts. I have been told by my officials that the completion of the balance outstanding on the contracts from 1960 has become very urgent, and that this matter will be taken up first in these discussions. The other matter which may also be discussed in detail by the two Delegations is the question of mutuality in our trade. As you will observe, the importation of Ceylon products into Burma has been very little for a long time. This point, I understand, was raised last year between my predecessor in office and the then Minister of Trade Development. As a result of the discussion, Burma agreed to buy Ceylon tea on a small scale and also a sizeable quantity of Ceylon coconut oil. I would very much like the two delegations to go a little deeper into this question of future trade expansion in order to ensure greater facilities for Ceylon products in the Burmese market.

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Document No. 134 Nehru - Kotelawala Agreement on Persons of Indian Origin in Ceylon*
18 January 1954 The Prime Ministers of Ceylon and India, accompanied by some of their colleagues, met in conference, in New Delhi on January 16, 17 and 18, 1954, and considered fully the problems of people of Indian origin in Ceylon. As a result of these discussions, certain proposals were framed by them, which will now be placed before their respective Governments. These proposals are :ILLICIT IMMIGRATION 1. Both Governments are determined to suppress illicit immigration traffic between the two countries and will take all possible steps, in close cooperation with each other, towards that end. Periodical meetings between high Police authorities on either side of the Palk Strait may be held and information relating to illicit movements exchanged. The Government of Ceylon propose to undertake the preparation of a register of all adult residents who are not already on the electoral register and will maintain such registers up-to-date. When this registration is completed, any person not so registered will, if his mother tongue is an Indian language, be presumed to be an illicit immigrant from India and liable to deportation and the Indian High Commissioner will extend all facilities for implementation of such deportation. The Government of Ceylon may proceed with the Immigrants and Emigrants Amendment Bill which throws on the accused the onus of proof that he is not an illicit immigrant; but before any person is prosecuted in accordance with this provision, the Government of Ceylon will give an opportunity to the Indian High Commissioner to satisfy himself that a pima facie case exists for such prosecution, the final decision being that of the Government of Ceylon.

2.

3.

CITIZENSHIP 4. The registration of citizens under the Indian and Pakistani (Citizenship) Act will be expedited and every endeavour will be made to complete the disposal of pending applications within two years.

* Source : Treaty Series (India), No. 1 of 1954.

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5.

All persons registered under this Act may be placed by the Government of Ceylon on a separate electoral register, particular in view of the fact that the bulk of the citizens do not speak the language of the area in which they reside. This arrangement will last for period of only ten years. The Government of Ceylon agree that in certain constituencies where the number of registered citizen voters is not likely to exceed 250, they shall be put on the national register. Citizens whose names are placed in the separate electoral register will be entitled to elect a certain number of members to the House of Representatives, the number being determined after consultation with the Prime Minister of India. The Government of Ceylon expect to complete their action in this respect before the present Parliament is dissolved in 1957. In regard to those persons who are not so registered, it would be open to them to register themselves as Indian citizens, if they so choose, at the office of the Indian High Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of the Constitution of India. It is noted that Ceylon proposes to offer special inducements to encourage such registration and that these inducements will be announced from time to time. The Government of India will offer administrative and similar facilities to all persons of Indian origin to register themselves as Indian citizens under the Constitution of India, if they so choose, and will also give publicity to the availability of such facilities. Both Prime Ministers are desirous of continuing the present practice of close consultation between the two Governments in matters affecting their mutual interests. [Sgd]: Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India.

6.

7.

8.

[Sgd]: J.L. Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon

Document No. 135 Persons of Indian Origin in Ceylon: Text of the Joint Statement of the Prime Ministers of India and Ceylon**
10 October 1954. 1. A conference was held on October 9th and 10th , 1954, in New Delhi, to consider certain problems relating to persons of Indian origin resident in Ceylon. The Conference was attended by a Delegation from Ceylon led by the Prime Minister of Ceylon and a Delegation led by the Prime Minister

Source : Hansard (HR), 1954, Vol. 20, Cols. 887-90.

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of India. The Conference discussed these problems fully and frankly and in a spirit of friendly and co-operative endeavour to overcome the difficulties that had arisen. 2. There was a basic difference of opinion between the two delegations in regard to the status of people of Indian origin in Ceylon. The Ceylon Delegation stated that it has always been the position of Ceylon, as it still is, that such persons continue to be citizens or nationals of India unless and until they are accepted as Ceylon citizens. The Ceylon delegation could not therefore accept the position that any of these persons are stateless. The Indian delegation stated that only those persons of Indian origin who are already in possession of Indian passports and passes or who have been registered at the Indian High Commission under Article 8 of the Constitution of India are Indian citizens. Other persons of Indian origin who are not either Ceylon citizens or Indian citizens are therefore at present stateless. It was further stated that there could be no automatic conferment of Indian nationality on persons belonging to this category. The Conference also considered the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of January 18, 1954, and the misunderstandings that had arisen in regard to its implementation. In that Agreement it was provided that the registration of citizens under the Indian and Pakistani (Citizenship) Act would be expedited and every endeavour would be made to complete the disposal of pending applications within two years. It was further stated that in regard to persons not so registered it would be open to them to register themselves as Indian citizens, if they so chose, at the Office of the Indian High Commissioner in Ceylon in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of the Constitution of India. It was further provided that the Government of India would offer administrative and similar facilities to all persons of Indian origin to register themselves as Indian citizens under the Constitution of India, if they so chose, and would also give publicity to the availability of such facilities. While these two processes of registration have continued, the pace of such registration has been slow and certain difficulties have arisen. Complaints have been made by both sides about certain procedures which came in the way of full implementation of the Agreement and have created misunderstandings. As there appeared to be a basic difference in the approach of the two countries to the problem of the status of persons of Indian origin resident in Ceylon it was decided that the practical course was to recognize this difference and to proceed as rapidly as possible with the two processes of registration as Ceylon citizens or as Indian citizens, and thus to reduce the number of those persons who at present were not accepted either as Ceylon citizens or as Indian citizens. In this way the number of such persons would be progressively reduced and would be more amenable to further

3.

4.

5.

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consideration at a later stage. It was recognized by both Governments that it was undesirable to have a large group of persons who could not be accepted as citizens of either country. It was agreed, therefore, that these processes of registration should be expedited. 6. It was agreed that in regard to those persons who are not registered as Ceylon citizens, it would be open to them to register themselves as Indian citizens if they so chose. The Indian High Commissioner will entertain all applications made to him for registration as Indian citizens under Article 8 of the Constitution of India and will grant every facility for this purpose, subject to satisfying himself that the applicants have the prescribed qualifications under the Indian law. Applications will not be refused on the ground that an applicant had earlier applied to the authorities in Ceylon for registration as citizen under the law of Ceylon. The procedure for registration as citizens of Ceylon will be simplified as far as possible, within the terms of the law, so as to complete, as far as may be practicable, the disposal of applications within the time mentioned in the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of 1954. The Ceylon Government will examine, with a view to their withdrawal, any executive instructions of a restrictive nature, issued by the Ceylon authorities, which result in the rejection of such applications on purely technical grounds. The Ceylon Government will resume the practice of issuing Identity Certificates for travel abroad to all persons of Indian origin resident in Ceylon whose applications for Ceylon citizenship are pending. The issue of such certificates will be governed by the rules and conditions which apply to Ceylon citizens. Exchange facilities for remittances of money out of Ceylon by such persons will be the same as those available to Ceylon citizens. The Indian High Commissioner will issue Identity Certificates for purposes of travel to persons of Indian origin whose applications for registration as Indian citizens are pending before him. The Indian authorities will provide travel facilities to Indian citizens and the Ceylon Government will give such persons remittance facilities, as before. 9. The Governments of the two countries earnestly hope that the steps mentioned above will in the time contemplated, i.e., 2 years, resolve to a substantial degree the problem of persons of Indian origin resident in Ceylon by their registration either as Ceylon citizens or as Indian citizens. At the end of this period and when the registrations under the Indian and Pakistani (Citizenship) Act are completed, the position will be reviewed with a view to deciding what further steps may be needed to deal with the problem of the residue that may be left. The Ceylon Government for its part states that it will in addition have to consider what steps may be necessary at that

7.

8.

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stage to safeguard the interests of its own citizens in regard to such matters as employment. It was stated on behalf of the Government of India that while every effort should be made to promote employment, as stated by the Ceylon Government, this should not involve, in their opinion, any coercion or victimization of those persons of Indian origin who may still remain unregistered either as Ceylon citizens or Indian citizens. The measure of success attained in dealing with this problem will depend largely on a friendly and co-operative approach of all parties and every effort should be made to encourage this friendly approach. 10. It was stated on behalf of the Ceylon Government that it intends in the meanwhile to introduce a scheme enabling persons of Indian origin now in employment in Ceylon who may hereafter acquire Indian citizenship to continue in such employment till the age of 55 years when they may be required to leave the country and that it has under consideration a scheme for the payment under such conditions as may be prescribed of gratuities to such persons when they leave the country. Such persons will also be given social and medical benefits no less favourable than those which may be provided for workers of the same category who are Ceylon citizens. 11. The two Governments will exchange information regarding lists of registration etc. from time to time to ensure effective co-operation in carrying out these arrangements.

Document No. 136 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehrus Visit to Sri Lanka: Text of Joint Communiqu*
20 May 1957 On the invitation of the Prime Minister of Ceylon, the Prime Minister of India visited Ceylon from May 17 to 20 May, to participate in the Buddha Jayanti celebrations in Ceylon. The Prime Minister of India visited Anuradhapura on May 18 in the company of the Prime Minister of Ceylon and was privileged to participate in the Buddha Jayanti celebrations there. The Prime Minister of India desires to express on his behalf and that of his daughter his deep appreciation of the hospitality offered to them and of the kind and cordial welcome they have received in Ceylon.

* Source: Foreign Policy of India (Published by the Lok Sabha Secretariat), New Delhi, 1958, PP. 283-285.

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The Prime Ministers availed themselves of the opportunity of their meeting together to exchange views on international issues and Indo-Ceylon relations. The Prime Ministers feel satisfied that their talks, have resulted in further appreciation of each others views of the problems of their respective countries and helped them in their appraisal of international issues generally and as they concern their two countries. Their talks have once again borne evidence of the great measure of agreement in their approach to the problems of peace and world co-operation and their relations within the Commonwealth. They have served to clarify further and strengthen their understanding of these problems and the determination of their two countries to continue to adhere to and pursue the principles on which their approach is based. They reaffirm their faith in the Five Principles of international relations known as Panchsheel , which were embodied in and extended by the principles adopted by the Bandung Conference. It is their conviction that the spirit of these principles, if acted upon, affords an opportunity for the establishment of cooperation, understanding and friendship amongst countries, many of which have ideological and other differences. This approach will also lessen the tensions of the world and help to avoid the grave conflicts which threaten the world today. The Prime Ministers congratulated the people of Ghana on the attainment of independence and look forward to the people of Malaya also achieving independence. They appreciate the action of the United Kingdom in acceding to the wishes of the peoples of these countries. They trust that the area of freedom will be enlarged and nations still under colonial domination will soon achieve their freedom. They disapprove strongly of every kind of aggression and attempt to re-impose colonialism or imperialism in any form. The Prime Ministers express their relief and satisfaction at the opening of the Suez Canal for normal functioning. They view, however, with deep concern the developments in some parts of Western Asia. The problems of this region can only be solved by the peoples of the countries within that region being left free to work out their own destiny in accordance with their own wishes. Any imposition of an outside authority can only lead to continuing tension and an intensification of these problems. The Prime Ministers recognize the importance of the United Nations as an instrument for securing world peace, and in particular, trust that the basic aims stated in the Charter of the United Nations for securing political freedom, social equality and racial harmony should be the guiding principles of that great organization as well as of the member-nations. In order to function effectively, the United Nations must become fully representative of the world community. The failure by the United Nations to recognize the Peoples Republic of China is not only opposed to the basic principles of the Charter, but also impairs the utility of the United Nations. The Prime Ministers gave their anxious and particular consideration to the present state of the development of nuclear and thermo-nuclear power for forging weapons of

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mass destruction, and to the ominous catastrophe that threatens humanity if their development and production continued and their use were not prohibited. While, in the event of their use in war, humanity would in all probability face well-nigh total extinction, the Prime Ministers were immediately concerned about the present and immediate consequences of the harmful and unpredictable effects of radiation on mankind caused by the continuing explosions of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for test purposes carried out by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. The Prime Ministers regret that, despite the declared intentions of all nations not to embark upon war, and the mounting opinion and anxiety in the world in regard to the grave and growing menace of these tests to the present and future of mankind, the Great Powers concerned have not yet decided to refrain from their hazardous ventures in this field which have already proved injurious to populations in lands near to the location of such tests, dangerously polluted the worlds air and water, and threatened the present and future generations with both known and unknown risks and consequences. The Prime Ministers, therefore, make an earnest and urgent appeal for the immediate suspension of these nuclear and thermonuclear test explosions, pending their abandonment. Such suspension would not only limit dangers that have already arisen and help in easing international tension, but would also lead to an effective consideration of the problems of disarmament. There are certain outstanding problems between India and Ceylon that yet await satisfactory solution. The Prime Ministers feel confident, particularly in view of the cordial relations that exist between the two countries and their co-operation in so many spheres, that these problems can and should be solved satisfactorily to both countries. The Prime Ministers are conscious of the great and wholesome interest aroused in both their countries by their present meeting which is a token of their existing friendship and of the earnest and widespread desire to promote and strengthen the ties that bind them. To this end, the Prime Ministers reaffirm their desire to devote their energies.

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Document No. 137 Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranike on Indo-Ceylon Problem (Statement in the Senate)*
23 January 1964 During the course of the debate, I have noted a curious trend in the arguments of some Opposition Senators that our foreign policy is decidedly anti-Indian. It would be more correct to say that our foreign policy is Ceylons foreign policy and not the foreign policy of India or any other country. It is not our purpose to seek to further foreign policies of other countries. It is our objective to further our own foreign policy without in anyway being unfriendly to any other countries, be it India or any other country. India herself has appreciated our attitude on more than one occasion. India was deeply moved when as an expression of our support on the stand taken by them over Goa, the Government of Ceylon ordered the closure of all our sea-ports and air-ports. As I indicated earlier, Prime Minister Nehru gratefully acknowledged our stand in regard to the question of Goa. . . . At the very outset, it is necessary for me to make it clear that my Government has in no way made any departure from the position that had been taken up by the late Prime Minister and before him by the late Rt. Hon. D.S. Senanayake. Talks took place in December, 1947, in New Delhi between our own Prime Minister, the late Rt. Hon. D.S. Senanayake, and the Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru. It is pertinent to mention here that both Pandit Nehrus and the late Rt. Hon. D.S. Senanayakes interest in this problem goes back to a much earlier date. We hear much talk these days - and it was stressed by Senator Nadesan yesterday - that the Indo-Ceylon problem is a legacy of British rule. He went so far as to state that the Indian Prime Ministers interest in it is purely to assist us in settling what was essentially a domestic matter of ours. No doubt the Indo-Ceylon problem is, as it is the case with many other problems, a hangover from British days. But there is no denying that all along the national leaders of both India and Ceylon have been vitally interested in it and have discussed matters pertaining to the problem even prior to independence. Fortunately for me. I have been able to lay my hands on some papers of my late husband which contain a record of discussions that took place between representatives of the Ceylon Government and Pandit Nehru himself when he came here in 1939. It might interest hon. Senators to know that Pandit Nehrus visit to this country in July, 1939, was in consequence of a resolution which had been passed by the Committee of the All - India National Congress which, as we all know, successfully challenged and liquidated the

* Source : Hansard (Senate), Vol. 19, cols. 2410-2414.

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British Empire in India. These records show that a telegram was sent by the late revered President of India, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, them President of the Indian National Congress, to the Hon. Sir D.B. Jayatillake. In a letter dated 27th June 1939, Pandit Nehru himself wrote to Sir D.B. Jayatillaka that the All-India Congress committee had directed him to proceed to Ceylon and try to help in finding a just and honourable settlement of the problems affecting Indians here. Fortunately, the great Indian Prime Minister is still with us. That is why we pin our hope on his sense of fair play to arrive at a speedy and just settlement of this problem. So much for the talk that the problem of the so-called stateless Indians in Ceylon is one that concerns us only. On the basis of talks held in Delhi in December, 1947, and the subsequent correspondence that took place, Ceylon enacted what is known as the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act and then proceeded to implement it. As a matter of fact, when the bill became law, the late Rt. Hon. D.S. Senanayake even went to the extent of saying that there would no longer be an Indo-Ceylon problem because at the completion of the process of registration under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act there was expected to be only two categories of citizens among Indian nationals in Ceylon - (1) Ceylon citizens by registration, i.e. those Indians who had been admitted to Ceylon citizenship; (2) Indian citizens, namely, those who had not been so admitted and those who did not wish to be so admitted. It was at this stage that the then High Commissioner for India in Ceylon, Mr. C.C. Desai, had , at an interview he had sought with Mr. Dudly Senanayake, intimated to Ceylon for the first time that India considered almost the entire Indian estate population as Ceylon citizens and not as Indian nationals whom she was bound to take back; and that if these were not considered by Ceylon as Ceylon citizens, they would be stateless. Mr. Dudley Senanayake had also had talks with the Indian Prime Minister in London in the same year where they had both gone for the Coronation of the Queen, but the negotiations did not yield any significant results. The next stage was the well-known talks in Delhi in January and October of 1954, between the Ceylon Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Sir John Kotelawala and Mr. Nehru. Hon. Senators will remember that in the October talks of 1954, both Mr. Dudley Senanayake and the late Mr. Bandaranaike too participated. I should like to stress here that at no stage have we accepted the view that these Indians, who have not been registered as Ceylon citizens, would be a stateless community. The views of my Government on this matter are the same as those of the late Mr. Bandaranaike. It would be sufficient for me to quote what late Prime Minister said in his speech in the House of Representatives after his return from Delhi with the then Prime Minister the Rt. Hon. Sir. John Kotelawala in November 1954 :We have made it clear that as far as we are concerned, we do not look upon these people as stateless - a phrase and a conception coined for the

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convenience, through experience, of India only within the last 18 months or two years, on their own admission. We do not accept it and we have made that position clear with all the consequences that flow from the clarification of this issue. My own Parliamentary Secretary has stated our position well in the House of Representatives during the Budget Debates in August, 1962 and 1963. It was stated on behalf of Ceylon in 1954, that at the completion of the process of registration under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, the Government of Ceylon would take steps to provide employment for Ceylonese. It was Mr. D.S. Senanayakes intention that after the registration of citizens under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act was over, quota legislation governing employment on estates, in business and in various other forms of employment should be introduced. Speaking in House of Representative in November 1954, the late Mr. Bandaranaike too emphasized that :When those applications are disposed of, we have indicated that we will take certain steps, as we are in duty bound to do, to safeguard the interests of our own nationals and citizens in such matters as employment. It is not solely restricted to employment but employment is just one of many other matters. The registration of citizens under the Indian and Pakistan Residents (Citizenship) Act is now complete. Over 134,000 Indians have been registered as Ceylon citizens. The Indian High Commissioner has in the meantime only registered 50,969 persons as Indian citizens. The course that my Government has adopted is to implement fully the continuous line of policy of all Governments since Independence, to ensure employment to our own nationals in preference to others. And the estimates for this Financial Year provide for inducements to be paid to Indian nationals who would take out Indian passports and leave the country. There have been during the last two years discussions and correspondence between the two Governments regarding this problem. Hon. Senators will appreciate that the resolution of this problem is one that transcends party politics and I, therefore, seek the co-operation and assistance of all parties in my endeavour to arrive at a negotiated settlement consonant with our national aspirations. . . .

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Document No. 138 Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike on Indias Liberation of Goa (Statement in the Senate)*
23 January 1964 I would particularly refer to Prime Minister Nehrus letter in which he expresses gratitude to us for the contribution made in the Security Council supporting India in regard to Goa,** at a time when many countries sought to condemn the action on the basis that it amounted to aggression. Although we abhor violence and deprecate the use of force in the settlement of disputes between nations, we supported the stand taken by India over Goa. We did so because we did not recognize the sovereign right of Portugal over Goa. We saw it as the liberation of part of Indias territory from domination by the last vestiges of Portuguese colonialism. I shall read for the information of hon. Senators the message I received on that occasion from Prime Minister Nehru: I am deeply grateful to you, to your Government and to your Representative in the U.N. for the full support given by your Representative in the discussions in the Security Council over the Goan issue. His speeches in the Security Council have been greatly appreciated here and have put our case more strongly than we could have done. This whole-hearted support will, I am sure, further strengthen the close bond between Ceylon and India.

Document No. 139 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike on the Death of Shri Jawaharlal Nehru (Vote of Condolence in the Senate)***
2 July 1964 Mr. President, since the last meeting of this House the world has been saddened by the passing away of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, and one of the greatest statesman of our times. His death is a loss not only to India and to Asia but also to the whole world.

* Source : Hansard (Senate), 1964, Vol. 19, cols. 2398 2399. ** Editors Note: See, document no. 34 for the Sri Lanka delegates speech in the Security Council. *** Source : Hansard (Senate), 1964, Vol. 20, 1964, cols. 42-44.

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Few men in our time and few in any age have made the glorious passage across history that Jawaharlal Nehru has made. In a way, the history of modern India is to be found in miniature in his own life. He provided the link between the years of promise and the years of fulfillment, the years of agitation and struggle with the years of construction, and he did this without in any manner violating those essential graces of democracy, non-violence, personal liberty, tolerance, an so on. Jawaharlal Nehru kept faith with his people by lifting the Indian nation, almost single- handed as it were, into the twentieth century. As the President of India, in a tribute he paid to the Prime Minister, remarked, the greatest monument that Nehru built for himself was modern India. When I went to Delhi last month to pay my countrys and my own homage to this leader, it was difficult to believe that I was in an India without Jawaharlal Nehru. The scenes I witnessed on that sad occasion stand out in my memory as poignant testimony to the reverence, the faith, and the love of the masses of India for this great leader whose simple yet vibrant personality pervaded the heart and soul of India. His service knew no barriers of race or religion, caste or creed. We of Asia have one important lesson to learn from the life and work of the late Prime Minister of India, namely, the spirit of his service and sacrifice for his country which was undimmed by either the complexity of the countrys problems or personal considerations of age or health. At a time when most public men are on the verge of retirement, he assumed the most exacting responsibility of life that had already been marked by strenuous endeavour. The horizon of the late Shri Nehrus political philosophy went beyond the confines of his own country. He lent his leadership and support to the advancement of the cause of world peace and everything that contributed to its attainment. His devotion to the cause of peace, the liberation of subject peoples and the well-being of the common man is only too well known. I need only say that in many moments of crises in international affairs, it was the voice of Shri Nehru for which the world waited in the certain conviction that it would be the voice of sanity and of wisdom. We of Ceylon have always held the late Shri Nehru in the highest esteem and affection. During his many visits to Ceylon he won the hearts our people, both young and old, by his serene and gentle personality, his simplicity and sincerity. We mourn his death not only because he was the Prime Minister of a friendly and neighbouring country, but as a true friend of Ceylon. Mr. President, with the permission of the House, I move: That this House desires to place on record an expression of the profound sorrow felt by this House and the people of Ceylon at the passing away of Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, late Prime Minister of India.

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Document No. 140 Indo-Ceylon (Sirima - Shastri ) Agreement of 30 October 1964*

30 October 1964 The main heads of Agreement are as follows: 1. The declared objective of this agreement is that all persons of Indian origin in Ceylon who have not been recognized either as citizens of Ceylon or citizens of India should become citizens either of Ceylon or of India. The number of such persons is approximately 975,000 as of date. This figure does not include illicit immigrants and Indian passport holders. 300,000 of these persons together with the natural increase in that number will be granted Ceylon citizenship by the Government of Ceylon; the Government of India will accept repatriation to India of 525,000 of these persons together with the natural increase in that number. The Government of India will confer citizenship on these persons. The status and future of the remaining 150,000 of these persons will be the subject matter of a separate agreement between the two governments. The Government of India will accept repatriation of the persons to be repatriated within a period of 15 years from the date of this Agreement according to a programme as evenly phased as possible. The grant of Ceylon citizenship under paragraph 3 and the process of repatriation under paragraph 5 shall both be phased over the period of 15 years and shall, as far as possible, keep pace with each other in proportion to the relative numbers to be granted citizenship and to be repatriated respectively. The Government of Ceylon will grant to the persons to be repatriated to India during the period of their residence in Ceylon the same facilities as are enjoyed by citizens of other states (except facilities for remittances) and normal facilities for their continued residence, including free visas. The Government of Ceylon agrees that such of these persons as are gainfully employed on the date of this Agreement shall continue in their employment until the date of their repatriation in accordance with the requirements of the phased programme or until they attain the age of 55 years, whichever is earlier.

2. 3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

* Source : Treaty Series (Ceylon) , No. 5 of 1964.

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8.

Subject to the Exchange Control Regulations for the time being in force which will not be discriminatory against the persons to be repatriated to India, the Government of Ceylon agrees to permit these persons to repatriate, at the time of their final departure for India, all their assets including their Provident Fund and gratuity amounts. The Government of Ceylon agrees that the maximum amount of assets which any family shall be permitted to repatriate shall not be reduced to less than Rs. 4,000. Two registers will be prepared as early as possible, one containing the names of persons who will be granted Ceylon citizenship, the other containing the names of persons to be repatriated to India. The completion of these registers, however, is not a condition precedent to the commencement of the grant of Ceylon citizenship and the process of repatriation. This Agreement shall come into force with effect from the date hereof and the two Governments shall proceed with all dispatch to implement this Agreement and, to that end, the officials of the two governments shall meet as soon as possible to establish joint machinery and to formulate the appropriate procedures for the implementation of this Agreement.

9.

10.

Document No. 141 Indo-Ceylon Agreement of 30 October 1964 (Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Statement in the Senate)*
10 November 1964. I. Historical Background The Agreement signed between the Prime Minister of India and the Prime Minister of Ceylon relating to the status and future of persons of Indian origin in Ceylon has been tabled before Parliament. The Agreement was approved by the Cabinet on November 2nd, 1964. The discussions that took place in New Delhi between the two Prime Ministers from the 24th to the 30th October, 1964, over this matter were conducted with the utmost cordiality and goodwill. It will be relevant to give a brief account of the history of this problem which started with the opening up of estates in the Kandyan areas in the 1830s. After the national uprisings of 1815 and 1848, all forest and chena land in the Kanyan Provinces was confiscated and vested in the Crown under the Waste Lands Ordinance, except where

Source : Hansard, (Senate), 1964, Vol. 20, cols. 2072-86.

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the occupier proved conclusively that the land was his. These lands were sold to British capitalists at nominal prices for the purpose of opening of coffee and tea estates. To work these estates the British utilized immigrant labour from South India. To recruit Indian Labourers to work on estates, special agencies were set up and special facilities guaranteed to them by statute. A special officer called the Controller of Indian Immigrant Labour was appointed in 1923 to look after the interests of the immigrant labour. This department was subsequently converted in 1931 to a general Labour Department which was and still is in charge of the administration of special statutes applicable to Indian immigrant labour. There was also another stream of Indian immigrants, who came into this country, to work in Government Departments like the Railway, P.W.D., Port of Colombo and also to work in urban areas as shop assistants, conservancy labourers and domestic servants. They did not enjoy special concession under the law of Ceylon as did the immigrant estate worker who comprised the main stream. Due to the expropriation of their ancestral lands under the Waster Lands Ordinance, the Kandyan peasants had very little land to live on and they were deprived of the right to continue cultivating their ancestral lands. As a result they were compelled to live in the valleys which were surrounded on all sides by estates. Today we find in the Kandyan Districts an alien population of South Indian workers who follow the social traditions of South India while the Kandyans who occupy the valleys observe their ancient customs. There has been hardly any intermingling between these two sections of the population with their differences in religion, language, social customs and occupations. Statistics compiled by various departments, over a long period of time, had demonstrated the fluidity of Indian labour, their numbers in Ceylon fluctuating in direct proportion to the opportunities available for employment. The Agent of the Government of India in Kandy argued in 1933 against the extension of the village committee franchise to Indian labourers on the ground that they have absolutely nothing in common with the people of the country. As there has been no community of interest, Ceylon has always been most cautious in making concession which would place Indians on a par with the indigenous population in so far as political and citizenship rights were concerned. II - THE PROBLEM The Indian problem in Ceylon right from the very beginning resolved itself into the question of how many of the Indians resident in this country can be said to have become permanently settled here to the extent that they could be absorbed as citizens and a guarantee of full political and civil rights as are available to the indigenous population granted to them without damaging the interests of the country.

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The growing unemployment among Ceylonese, the pathetic conditions of the Kandyan peasantry, the strong communal ties among the Indians and the absence of any indication on the part of these people during a period of over a century to intermingle with the indigenous population, their continued loyalty towards their mother country and the creation of another minority in addition to the numerous minorities which already exist, which could wield political power far in excess of that which their numbers would entitle them to, the question of who, if any, should be absorbed have been the matters which influenced the Ceylon Government in the talks which have taken place between representatives of the two countries from 1939 to the present day. III - ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM Discussions for the settlement of this problem may be said to have started in 1939 when the Indian National Congress sent out a special emissary, the late Pandit Nehru, to negotiate with the political leaders of Ceylon a settlement of certain questions relating to the Indian residents. That mission was of an unofficial nature. The first of the formal conferences took place in Delhi in November, 1940, between the delegates of the two countries. In 1941, delegates of the two Governments met for the first time to continue discussions that had been initiated in 1940. Those discussions failed to produce any agreement and with the intervention of the second world war, the question was kept in abeyance. The results of the elections held under the Soulbury Constitution in 1947 brought home to all the need for an early settlement of the problem. The election results had shown how close were the communal ties among the Indians in that they always voted in a bloc. Where the Indians had a majority, they selected one of the members of their communal organization and thereby virtually disenfranchised the Kandyans in seven constituencies; where they were not in a majority, they had more or less carried out the instructions of their communal organization to vote for a particular Sinhalese candidate. In 13 or 14 constituencies the Indians secured, by these means, the election of a candidate who owed his election primarily to the Indian bloc vote. An alien population was thus able to effect the result in one fifth of all the constituencies of Ceylon thereby creating a serious political problem in the Kandyan Provinces. It was against this background that the late Mr. D.S. Senanayake, Prime Minister of Ceylon, resumed negotiations with the late Pandit Nehru, Prime Minister of India. These negotiations were conducted on the footing that all persons of Indian origin in Ceylon were Indian nationals or Indian citizens. The Prime Minister of Ceylon has stated during these discussions that while Ceylon would certainly find it difficult to absorb in her economy a large number of Indians resident in Ceylon, it was his desire to absorb all those whom Ceylon was able to absorb. In the correspondence between the two governments, the qualifications and procedure for registration of Indians resident in Ceylon under special legislation were considered in detail. Maximum consultation took place between the two Prime Ministers. But this consultation failed to yield complete agreement particularly on the residence qualifications required for Ceylon

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citizenship. The correspondence between the two Governments was concluded by two letters dated 8th September, 1948, and 12th October, 1948, sent by the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Ceylon and the letter dated 21st September, 1948, sent by the Prime Minister of Ceylon to the Prime Minister of India. In the letter of 8th September, 1948, after indicating that there had been disagreement, the Prime Minister of India requested that immediate steps be taken to enact legislation for the acquisition by Indians resident in Ceylon of the citizenship of your country. The Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act was passed and came into operation on 5th August, 1949, in spite of protests particularly from the Kandyan areas, against the grant of citizenship to an alien population, on political and economic grounds. It was thought that the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act had finally settled the Indian problem. However, in 1953, the Indian High Commissioner in Ceylon, Mr. C.C. Desai, queried for the first time, in discussions with the then Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mr. Dudley Senanayake, the question of the status of Indians who had not been admitted to Ceylon citizenship. The Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act had been passed and implemented on the basis that all Indians in Ceylon were Indian nationals. As far as Ceylon was concerned, there was no doubt regarding their status. However, Mr. Desai, for the first time, put forward a theory, at a conference held in April, 1953, at which the Governor-General, Sir O.E. Goonetilleke, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Dudley Senanayake, were present, that all the Indian estate population of approximately 766,000 persons in Ceylon were regarded by the Government of India as Ceylon citizens and not as Indian nationals. Later Mr. Desai referred to these persons as stateless persons a term coined to suit the convenience of India. In the following year, the Indian Government imposed a ban on the travel of Indian estate labourers to India. Thereafter, Mr. Dudley Senanayake held discussions with the Indian Prime Minister in London when they were both there for the Coronation in June, 1953. the following points constituted the basis of the discussions between the two Prime Ministers :(a) Four hundred thousand (400,000) Indians now resident in Ceylon were expected to be registered as Ceylon citizens. This figure was not a guaranteed figure but an estimate, the actual figure depending on the results of the impartial administration of the Citizenship Act; The number of citizens registered under the Act plus the number of persons granted permanent resident permits should be six hundred and fifty thousand ( 650,000). This was not to be a minimum figure but a maximum; Persons granted permanent resident permits would have their future status determined at the end of ten years, during which period if any of them desired to go back to India and take up citizenship of that country, the Government of India was not to object to their proposal;

(b)

(c)

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(d)

The balance of Indian residents in Ceylon, approximately three hundred thousand (300,000) or more, were to be accepted as Indian citizens by the Government of India and to be compulsorily repatriated, the operation being phased over a definite period of years; All these steps were to be a part of a single scheme of settlement of the Indo-Ceylon problem. There was to be no question of settling any one point without at the same time coming to an arrangement with regard to the others.

(e)

These talks proved inconclusive because the Prime Minister of India wanted the total number to be granted Ceylon citizenship and permanent resident permits to be increased to 700,000 and would not in any event agree to the compulsory repatriation of Indians to India. On the invitation of the Government of India, Sir John Kotelawala, who succeeded Mr. Dudley Senanayake, visited New Delhi in January, 1954, for the resumption of the talks. The outcome of these talks were the proposals of 18th January, 1954. At these talks the question of what would happen to the balance after the registration of citizens under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act was over was for the first time reduced to writing. Persons of Indian origin who were not registered as Ceylon citizens under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act were to register as Indian citizens if they so chose at the office of the Indian high Commissioner in Ceylon, under Article 8 of the Indian Constitution. Ceylon, for her part, agreed to draw up a scheme of inducements to encourage such registration. Hardly had the ink on the draft proposals run dry, when charges and counter-charges began to be made by both governments that the agreement was not being properly implemented. The gravamen of the Indian complaint was that the registration of Indians under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (citizenship) Act was not being speeded up and that the applications were being rejected on flimsy grounds. Ceylon, for her part, complained that the Indian High Commission was not registering Indians under Article 8 of their Constitution. To iron out the difficulties that had arisen, the Prime Minister took out in October of the same year another delegation to Delhi, which included the late Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and Mr. Dudley Senanayake. The results of these talks were embodied in the Statement of 10th October, 1954. The Ceylon delegation reiterated that it always has been and still is Ceylons position that persons of Indian origin in Ceylon were Indian citizens and Indian nationals until they were accepted as Ceylon citizens. The Ceylon delegation did not accept the position that any of these persons are stateless. Secondly, an assertion was made that after registration under the Indian and Pakistani (Citizenship) Act was completed, the Ceylon Government would have to consider what may be necessary steps to safeguard the interests of her own citizens in such matters as employment.

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In 1957 , the later Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who succeeded Sir John Kotelawala, had informal discussions with the Indian Prime Minister when he visited Delhi to address the Commonwealth Inter- Parliamentary Conference. The talks were intended principally to get an idea of the thinking at the time of each side on the subject. However, since the process of registration of Ceylon citizens was not yet complete, no advance was made on the position that was reached in 1954. Registrations under the Indian Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act were completed in 1962. 237,034 applications for citizenship were received covering approximately 775,000 persons. Of these 31,409 applications covering 134,188 persons have been allowed and these persons have been registered as citizens of Ceylon. 205,625 applications covering approximately 675,000 persons were refused. Since the agreement of 1954, the Indian High Commission has registered 53,085 persons as Indian citizens. The 1954 Agreement failed because it left too much to the discretion of the individual. An arrangement which left it open to a person of Indian origin, who failed to obtain Ceylon citizenship, to choose whether or not he should apply for Indian citizenship, and which permitted the exercise of official discretion in regard to the grant of Indian citizenship, had very little chance of success. After the process of registration under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act was completed, I reopened negotiations with the late Pandit Nehru. I made it quite clear that it was Ceylons position that persons of Indian origin in Ceylon who had not acquired Ceylon citizenship were Indian nationals or Indian citizens. The Indian Government did not accept this position and negotiations came to a deadlock. At that stage, I considered it advisable to have direct talks with the Prime Minister of India. He agreed. As you are aware, Prime Minister Nehru died in May this year and I had to reopen the subject with his successor, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri. On the initiative of the Indian Prime Minister, an official delegation was sent to Colombo in September to have discussions at an official level on this problem. Though the Indian delegation did not accept the point of view urged by Ceylon about the citizenship status of these persons, it suggested a compromise solution under which a certain number of persons of Indian origin were to be repatriated to India while the rest were to be granted Ceylon citizenship. IV. CONSULTATIONS WITH LEADERS OF THE OPPOSITION I have always been of the view that the Indian problem was one of such grave national importance that it should be dealt with and settled outside the pale of party politics I have discussed this subject on a number of occasions with the Hon. Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Dudley Senanayake who had been in close touch with this problem from the time that Ceylon gained independence. I should like to pay a tribute to his co-operation in all the discussions. I have had with him on this subject. Before I left the Island, we had reached agreement on the course of action that should be pursued by Ceylon at these talks and the limits we should go particularly in determining the

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number of persons of Indian origin that could be absorbed as citizens of this country. I extended to Mr. Dudley Senanayake an invitation to be a member of the delegation, which he accepted. I also sought the co-operation of the leaders of all the other political parties. Before I left the Island in October, I invited them to meet me in order that I may obtain their views on this problem. I had the opportunity of meeting and holding discussions with most of them. The views expressed by these leaders ranged from those who took the view that the whole body of persons of Indian origin in Ceylon should be sent back to India to those who took the view that all of them should be granted Ceylon citizenship. The view was also expressed that while Ceylon might retain as many as may be economically absorbable the balance may be sent back to India. The Udarata Jatika Peramuna were consulted by my Ministry, and I know that their views conform to the line of action that I had taken at New Delhi. V. TALK AT NEW DELHI My talks at New Delhi with the Indian Prime Minister which commenced on the 24th of October lasted for six full days. I wish to express my gratitude to the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, the other Ministers who associated with him in the talks and the Indian officials who made it possible to complete these talks within a short space of six days by their willingness to meet our delegation at any time of the day or late at night and sometimes even during the small hours of the morning. Hon. Senators would have read the agreement that had been entered into between the two Governments. I shall comment briefly on its salient features :(1) Under this Agreement the future and the status of all persons of Indian origin in Ceylon is to be finally determined. A settlement was not reached in respect of 150,000 of these persons. Their status too will be finally determined soon. The Agreement relates to approximately 975,000 persons of Indian origin resident in Ceylon. This figure does not include illicit immigrants, overstays and Indian passport holders, all of whom are liable to be repatriated irrespective of their wishes. The number of 975,000 covered by the agreement was computed by adding the natural increase to the number of Indian nationals enumerated in the 1953 census after making allowance for those obtaining Ceylon citizenship, those leaving the Island for good and deducting Indian passport holders. I am tabling a Statement which will explain how the Indian population in Ceylon as at 20th September, 1964, was computed. When the number of Indian passport holders is deducted from the figure of 1,003,269 the balance 975,000 remained to form the subject matter of the discussions.

(2)

(3)

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(4)

Leaving aside the 150,000 whose future is to be determined shortly, 525,000 with the natural increase of these persons are to be compulsorily repatriated to India over a period of 15 years and 300,000 with the natural increase are to be granted citizenship over the same period. The grant of citizenship will keep pace with the number repatriated in the proportion of 3: 5.25. Two registers are to be prepared, one containing the names of those to be granted Ceylon citizenship and the other containing the names of those who are to be repatriated to India. The Indian official delegation which was in Ceylon in September this year considered the basis of selection of persons of Indian origin, who are to be granted Ceylon citizenship and Indian citizenship. Due to the complete information available at my Ministry, I do not expect any delay or difficulty in preparing registers for the 825,000 persons whose status has been settled. Those who are to be repatriated will be allowed to continue in employment until their repatriation falls due or until they attain the age of 55 years, whichever is earlier. When leaving, a family will be permitted to take all their assets subject to exchange control regulations and the maximum amount of assets which a family will be allowed to take will not be reduced to less than Rs. 4,000. Officials of the two Governments will be meeting at an early date to establish joint machinery and to formulate the appropriate procedures to implement this Agreement. From 1949 to 1964, a period of 15 years, 184,771 persons of Indian origin left Ceylon for good voluntarily and under the repatriation scheme which has been in operation since 1954. Under the repatriation scheme which will come into operation from the beginning of 1965, in terms of this agreement, over 600,000 persons will be repatriated during the next 15 years. The annual exodus of nearly 40,000 persons of Indian origin will create new employment opportunities for our people both on estates and in other areas.

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10) This Agreement marks an advance on the 1954 Agreements in the following respects :(a) The Indian Government has recognized its obligations to persons of Indian origin in Ceylon by undertaking to confer Indian citizenship on those who are to be repatriated and by accepting the principle of compulsory repatriation; No inducements are to be paid nor need repatriation be necessarily held up until a person attains the age of 55; The concept o statelessness will not bedevil the solution of this problem.

(b) (c)

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VI - MEASURES INTENDED FOR THE BENEFIT OF CEYLONESE A Bill to control the acquisition of land by non-Ceylonese has already been introduced in Parliament. A Bill to control the employment of non-Ceylonese will also be introduced shortly. A third Bill which will enable the Government to eliminate the menace of illicit immigrants by the issue of identity cards to all persons over 18 years of age will also be submitted to Parliament. Anti-illicit immigration measures are being intensified and the coastal area which will come under the control of the Army and the Navy for this purpose will have Trincomalee and Puttalam as its Eastern and Western limits. VII - CULTURAL ASSIMILATION AND SEPARATE ELECTROAL REGISTER I have stated in the earlier part of my statement that persons of Indian origin in Ceylon form a separate community which hardly intermingles with the indigenous population. It is our hope and desire that in the course of time those granted Ceylon citizenship will get culturally assimilated with the people of the area in whose midst they live. During my discussions with the Hon. Leader of the Opposition it was agreed that all persons of Indian origin who have obtained Ceylon citizenship under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act as well as those others who will be acquiring citizenship under the present Agreement, should be placed on a separate electoral register. When they are on a separate register, it will be possible for them to select their representatives. This arrangement will also safeguard the political interests of the indigenous population. The question of a separate electoral register for persons of Indian origin who are registered as citizens of Ceylon was not discussed at New Delhi as this is a matter solely for determination by our sovereign Parliament. VIII CO-OPERATION The signing of an Agreement does not mean that the problem has been solved. The Indian Government extended the greatest cooperation in the attempt to find a solution. The closest co-operation and collaboration between the two Governments is essential for the successful implementing of the Agreement. Equally essential, since this is a national problem which transcends party politics, is the co-operation and support of all political parties and the people.

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Document No. 142 Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka on Sri Lankas Suggestion for a Separate Electoral Register*
22 November 1964 My dear Prime Minister, 1. I take this opportunity of addressing you in connection with your recent statement in the Ceylons Senate in which you have, inter alia, indicated your Governments intention of placing on a separate electoral register those persons of Indian origin, who have already acquired Ceylon citizenship and are at present on a common electoral roll, and others who may in future be admitted to Ceylonese citizenship in terms of the letters exchanged between us on October 30, 1964. It would further appear that this step is contemplated because persons of Indian origin, even though admitted to Ceylon citizenship, are regarded as different from and unassimilable with the indigenous population. I have felt impelled to write to you because of the concern felt in India at your announcement. During our recent talks in Delhi in which we sincerely tried to understand each others difficulties, we applied our minds to reaching an amicable settlement of the problem of the status and future of persons of Indian origin in Ceylon. We laid aside our respective points of view, which had been reiterated in the past by both our Governments and reached an agreement which, though not wholly satisfactory to either of us, amounted to an honourable solution of the problem.

2.

3.

Despite the heavy burden falling on us under the agreement, the agreements main attraction for us was the consideration that those accepted as Ceylon citizens would become full-fledged Ceylon citizens and join the mainstream of Ceylons civic life. The announcement of Ceylon Governments intention would, however, mean that Ceylon citizens of Indian origin would be unassimilable with the rest of the population, and unlike other Ceylon citizens, entitled to influence only a very limited spectrum of Ceylons political life. You have, of course, given expression to the hope that in time Ceylonese citizens of Indian origin will be assimilated with the indigenous elements of the population. The lesson of history in many lands is that where a religious or ethnic group has been placed apart from the rest of the people and brought on to a separate electoral roll, not only has assimilation

* Source : Hansard (HR), 1967, Vol. 71, cols. 978-980.

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become so difficult but separatism has been intensified giving rise to disunity and conflict. We ourselves have had a said experience of this in the past. 4. During the talks in Delhi, the question as to whether persons accepted as Ceylon citizens would be placed on a separate or common electoral roll was not discussed. This was so because there was no reason for us to think that the Government of Ceylon had any intention of treating Ceylons citizens of Indian origin in future in a manner different from those who had been granted Ceylon citizenship so far and who have been placed on the general register. As a matter of fact, one of the reasons advanced for Ceylons inability to absorb more than 300,000 and of the need for phasing out the grant of Ceylon citizenship was the political effect of a change in the composition of the electorate in areas where persons of Indian origin would become eligible to vote by reason of acquisition of Ceylon citizenship in large numbers. Your statement has created a new situation for us. It has a bearing on the attitude towards the Agreement of our Parliament and public opinion as indeed of the persons whose future we tried to settle in the course of our talks. We both have tried to solve a very difficult and delicate problem, if I may say so, a bold and courageous way. The Agreement itself is of a unique nature and requires the greatest harmony and understanding for its implementation. It has been suggested that the proposal to place persons of Indian origin who may become Ceylon citizens on a separate register is by no means novel and that a separate register had been agreed upon for such persons in the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of 1954. You will recall, Madame Prime Minister, that at the beginning of our negotiations, we both agreed to start with a clean slate, uninhibited by the past. Your yourself were pleased to say in the opening statement that the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of 1954 had failed. Indeed my approach to the whole problem during our recent talks, which I believe was shared by you was to consider it afresh without relying on the agreement of 1954 which had failed to solve the problem. It does not seem to me, therefore, that one particular provision of the Indo-Ceylon Agreement 1954, in isolation should be cited to justify the proposal to place persons of Indian origin on a separate electoral register. In any case the arrangement under 1954 Agreement was to be temporary and that too for the reason that the bulk of the citizens did not speak the language of the area in which they resided. After ten years Ceylon citizens of Indian origin were to revert to the general register. The Ceylon Government also agreed that where the registered voters in any constituency were not likely to exceed 250, they would be placed on the general register. In this background I do hope that you will consider the whole matter in the spirit of the latest agreement reached between us. It would be very appropriate if persons of Indian origin in Ceylon who are accepted as Ceylon citizens, are given the chance of complete assimilation by continued enrolment on the common electoral register as at present.

6.

7.

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8.

I apologize for writing to you at length, You will, I hope, appreciate my anxiety to ensure that the structure of the Agreement that you and I reached in Delhi and which, as you know, has been generally hailed, should not, be undermined. I would be grateful, Madame Prime Minister, if you would give earnest consideration to this matter. I would hope that the idea of placing Ceylon citizens of Indian origin on a separate electoral register is not pursued and that both our Governments should now concentrate on working out the modalities of effective implementation of our Agreement in letter and in spirit.

Assuring you of my highest esteem and with warm regards, Yours sincerely, [Sgd.] LAL BAHADUR

Document No. 143 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaikes Reply to Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India*
9 January 1965. My Dear Prime Minister, Thank you very much for your letter of 22nd November 1964. I have no doubt that having heard of the events that have taken place in my country during the last month, you would understand the delay in my sending you a reply. All the same, please accept my apologies. At the time I received your letter, I had already been informed by my High Commissioner of your concern over my proposal to place on a separate electoral register persons of Indian origin, who had obtained Ceylon citizenship under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, as well as those who would acquire citizenship under the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of October 30th, 1964. This proposal has also been widely described as an act of bad faith, which would relegate to the status of second-class Ceylonese citizens, subject to discrimination and denied the enjoyment of complete equality of rights with the rest of the population, persons who were expected to benefit under the Indo-Ceylon Agreement. Let me assure you that the concern and criticism that have been expressed in regard to this proposal are due to a misunderstanding. The use of the term separate electoral

* Source: Hansard (Senate), Vol. 23, 18 June 1967, cols. 5262-66.

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register has created a wrong impression in the minds of many people. What was intended was that persons of Indian origin, who had obtained Ceylon citizenship under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, and those who would acquire citizenship under the recent Agreement, be constituted to form separate electorates to enable them to elect members to the House of Representatives. The Indo-Ceylon proposals of January 18, 1954, provided for a separate electoral register for persons of Indian origin registered as Ceylon citizens under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, as these persons had little or no community of interest with the rest of the people and particularly in view of the fact that the bulk of them did not speak the language of the areas in which they resided. As you are well aware, this is true even today. I fully appreciate your desire to see that persons of Indian origin abroad, who acquire the citizenship of a country in which they have resided, become assimilated with the indigenous population. That is my wish too as regards the persons of Indian origin in Ceylon. But we know that for some time longer these people will continue to think, act and vote as a well-knit community, with little or no identity of interests with the indigenous population. It is mainly for this reason that we thought of having separate electorates for them. Once the assimilation has taken place, this arrangement will not longer be necessary. There was another reason that made us think of having separate electorates for these people. You are perhaps not aware that so far not a single person, who has been registered as a citizen of Ceylon under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, has succeeded in getting himself elected to the House of Representatives. When I formed my Government in July, 1960, I had one of them nominated as a member of the House of Representatives to represent their interest as they were completely unrepresented in Parliament. This form of representation is to my mind., however, much less democratic than the form of representation which I have proposed to ensure through the separate electoral register. Even with the new registrations under the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of October 30, 1964, which are to be spread over a period of 15 years, persons of Indian origin are unlikely to secure election of members of their groups in sufficient numbers if they are included in the general register. Their formation in to separate electorates, far from being discriminatory, would fulfill the purpose I have in mind of providing them with adequate representation in Parliament. I assure you that the arrangement of having separate electorates will not entail any discrimination whatsoever against persons of Indian origin, registered as citizens of Ceylon. They will not be subject to any disability whatever and will enjoy the same rights and privileges as other citizens.

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I had no intention of rushing legislation through Parliament for a separate electoral register. It will be necessary for Government to consult the political parties in Ceylon as well as representatives of persons of Indian origin already registered under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, and also give full consideration to your own views before proceeding further with the proposal. In fact, as soon as your High Commissioner conveyed to me your concern over this question, I informed him that I would not take a final decision until after your visit to Ceylon when we would have had an opportunity of discussing the matter further. I have no doubt that he would have conveyed this information to you. Later, I reiterated this assurance through my High Commissioner in New Delhi who had, in your absence, seen Mr. Nanda. I should be grateful if you would kindly communicate with me if there are any developments at your end which , in your opinion, militate against the letter or the spirit of the Agreement. Timely consultation between ourselves could avert subsequent misunderstanding and controversy. The first meeting between official delegations of our two countries in pursuance of Clause 10 of the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of October 30, 1964 has just ended in Colombo. Certain agreed conclusions on the establishment of joint machinery and the formulation of procedures for the implementation of the Agreement were reached between the two delegations and now await the approval of our two Governments. I must state here that the agreed conclusions have our approval; we await your approval, in order to implement them without delay. There were certain questions, which were deferred for further consideration, as the two delegations either could not reach agreement on them or considered them more appropriate for reference to higher authority. I should like to mention here only one of them, as it is of special importance and significance. The Ceylon delegation proposed that a list of persons falling within the compass of the Agreement be prepared and that this list be treated as the primary source for the purpose of selecting and identifying the persons who are to be placed in the two registers, viz. the register of persons to be granted Ceylon citizenship and the register of persons to be granted Ceylon citizenship and the register of persons to be granted Indian citizenship and repatriated to India. The Agreement deals with 825,000 of these persons and leaves the future of the balance, amounting to approximately 150,000 to be determined after further consideration between us. Before the two Governments can proceed to separate one set of persons into two groups, it is logical that they should identify the entire body of persons with whom they have to deal. Numbers alone have no meaning in these circumstances.

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The preparation of a list of more than 825,000 such persons by the Government of Ceylon would preclude Ceylon from challenging the applicability of the Agreement to the persons included in the list. The Ceylon delegation in advancing this proposal, stated unequivocally that the omission of a persons name from this list would not be regarded as creating the presumption that such a person is an illicit immigrant. I was surprised, therefore, to find that the Indian delegation could not agree to accept this list as the primary source of material for the purposes of the Agreement and was prepared merely to treat it as a useful source of information. In the absence of such a list, disputes over the applicability of the Agreement to any person who seeks Ceylon citizenship or Indian citizenship are bound to arise at the very start of the process of implementation. It was with the object of eliminating such disputes as far as possible, or at least of postponing them to the last stages in the implementation of the Agreement, that the Ceylon delegation made its proposal. I have chosen this question alone for comment from the many that were deterred for consideration, because this is, in my opinion, cardinal to the effective and smooth implementation of the Agreement. This list will be compiled from the information available in the registers maintained on estates under the estate Labour (Indian) Ordinance, in the applications made for Ceylon citizenship under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act and in the householders lists prepared under the Food Control Ordinance. I trust that you will, on further consideration, be able to see your way to accepting our proposal. I hope that the New Year will be for you personally and for your Government and for the people of your country one of achievement and prosperity. We extend to you and the people of India our warmest wishes for your happiness and well-being in the New Year. With kind regards, Yours sincerely, [Sgd.] Sirima R.D. Bandaranaike.

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Document No. 144 Sino-Indian Border Dispute: Proposals Formulated by Conference of Six Non-Aligned Countries that met in Colombo Between 10th and 12th December, 1962*
1. 2. The Conference considers that the existing de facto cease-fire period is a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese conflict. (a) With regard to the Western Sector, the Conference would like to make an appeal to the Chinese Government to carry out their 20 kilometers withdrawal of their military posts as has been proposed in the letter of Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru of November 21 and November 28, 1962; (b) The Conference would make an appeal to the Indian Government to keep their existing military position; (c) Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawal will be a demilitarized zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon, without prejudice to the rights of the previous presence of both India and China in that area.

3.

With regard to the Eastern Sector, the Conference considers that the line of actual control in the areas recognized by both the Governments could serve as a ceasefire line to their respective positions. Remaining areas in this sector can be settled in their future discussions. With regard to the problems of the Middle Sector, the Conference suggests that they will be solved by peaceful means, without resorting to force. The Conference believes that these proposals, which could help in consolidating the ceasefire, once implemented, should pave the way for discussions between representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entailed in the ceasefire position. The Conference would like to make it clear that a positive response for the proposed appeal will not prejudice the position of either of the two Governments as regards its conception of the final alignment of the boundaries.

4. 5.

6.

* Source: Hansard (HR), Vol. 53, August 30, 1963, Col. 1163.

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Document No. 145 Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the Colombo Conference Proposals: Memoranda from the Chinese Government, dated January 6, 1963 & January 8, 1963*
(1) Memorandum from the Chinese Government, January 6, 1963 1. The Chinese Government welcomes and supports the effort made by the Conference of Six Asian-African nations held in Colombo from December 10 to 12, 1962, for promoting a peaceful settlement of the boundary question by China and India. The Chinese Government appreciates the following points of guiding spirit demonstrated by the participating nations: (a) (b) They consider that their role is to mediate and make appeal, but not to arbitrate and intervene. They oppose imperialist attempts to meddle in the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, to interfere in Asian-African affairs and to undermine Asian-African solidarity; they stand for promoting a peaceful settlement of the boundary dispute by China and India through direct negotiations. They oppose acquisition of any territory by use of force; they stand for stabilization of the ceasefire and disengagement so as to pave the way for direct Sino-Indian negotiations. They hold that the positive measures of ceasefire, withdrawal and establishment of demilitarized zones will not prejudice the position of either of the two Governments as regards its conception of the final alignment of the boundary. They call on China and India to respond to the appeal for peace and request for co-operation made by the Conference, and do not regard the proposals of the Conference as the final basis. They decide not to make public the text of the proposals, but entrust the Prime Minister of Ceylon, accompanied by representatives of the other nations with the task of conveying the results of the deliberations of the Conference to China and India in order to conduct consultations with China and India respectively.

2.

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

* Source: Hansard (HR), Vol. 53, August 30, 1963, Col. 1163-1167.

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The Chinese Government considers that the six concrete proposals put forward by the Conference, particularly proposal No. 1, express the sincere desire of the participating nations to stabilize the ceasefire, promote SinoIndian reconciliation and strengthen Asian-African solidarity. Proposals Nos. 5 and 6 are positive, whereas proposals Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are not precise and consistent in certain respects. The entire Sino-Indian boundary under dispute and armed conflicts occurred in both the Western and Eastern sectors. Any arrangement for stabilizing the ceasefire and for disengagement should embody a principle being equitable to both China and India and a consistent principle applicable to all sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary. If there is to be withdrawal, both sides should do so; in no case should one side be called upon to withdraw, while the other side be allowed to advance. If there is to be disengagement, this should be done along the entire Sino-Indian boundary, and not just in one of the sectors.

4.

China has consistently been seeking direct negotiations with India in order to settle the boundary question. The Chinese Government put forward three proposals on October 24, 1962, but unfortunately they were not accepted by the Indian Government. Later, on November 21, 1962, the Chinese Government announced its decision to take three measures on its own initiative, thus providing the necessary basis and creating a favourable atmosphere for Sino-Indian negotiations; the Indian Government, apart from stating that it will not do anything to impede the implementation of these measures, has thus far taken no corresponding measures. Recently, on December 30, 1962, the Chinese Government further proposed that while China continues to withdraw along the entire border, India for the time being may not do the same, but shall not advance either, so that the officials of the two sides may immediately meet. Unfortunately, this proposal too was not given serious consideration by the Indian Government. In spite of all this, the Chinese Government still maintains the cease-fire effected on its own initiative, continues to withdraw along the entire border and actively responds to the appeal and proposals of the Colombo Conference. The Chinese Government earnestly hopes that with the assistance of the participating nations of the Colombo Conference, China and India reopen negotiations. In view of what has been stated above in Sections 3 and 4, and after having had useful exchange of views with Madame Sirimavo Bandaranike, Prime Minister of Ceylon, and Dr. Subandrio, Deputy First Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, the Chinese Government is prepared to accept the proposals of the Six-Nation Conference as a preliminary basis for the meeting of the officials of the two sides subject to an understanding on the following two points of interpretations:

5.

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(a)

The Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometers along the entire Sino-Indian border on Chinas own initiative, in accordance with the plan announced in the Statement of the Chinese Government dated November 21, 1962; the stipulation in the proposals of the Conference regarding the Indian troops keeping their existing military position should be applicable to the entire Sino-Indian border, and not to the Western sector alone. It is the understanding of the Chinese Government that in the eastern sector, India will continue to refrain from sending its troops to reenter the areas south of the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959, vacated by the Chinese frontier guards, and will send there only civilian personnel, as India says it has done up till now. After withdrawing on Chinas own initiative to positions twenty kilometers from the line of actual control of November 7, 1959, in accordance with the statement of the Chinese Government, the Chinese frontier guards will be far behind their positions on September 8, 1962. Thus no Chinese frontier guards will be stationed in the Che Dong area and Longju in the eastern sector, Wuji in the middle sector and the areas in the western sector where India once set up 43 strongpoints. Since all these places are on the Chinese side of the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959, it is a matter of course for China to set up civilian check posts there. However, with a view to responding to the peace call of the Conference and promoting direct negotiations between China and India, China is willing to move another step forward on the road of reconciliation by refraining from setting up civilian check posts in these places, provided Indian troops or civilian personnel do not re-enter these places.

(b)

The above-mentioned two points will be effective only before and during the meeting of the officials of China and India, and will not prejudice any other proposals raised or the final decision made by the officials of the two sides in their meeting. (2) Memorandum from the Chinese Government, January 8, 1963 H.E. Madame Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon Your Excellency, At the request of Your Excellency, I would like to make the following clarification. Subject to an understanding on the two points of interpretation referred to in section 5 of the memorandum dated January 6, 1963, China will, in accordance with point (b) of the interpretation, refrain from setting up civilian points in the western sector. After the twenty-kilometer-withdrawal by the Chinese frontier guards from the line of actual control of November 7, 1969, in the western sector, China will establish only seven civilian check posts on the Chinese side of the line of actual control. None of

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these seven civilian check posts will be located in the areas where India once set up 43 strongpoints; they will be located at Shenhsienwan, Tienwentian, Hot Springs, Kongka Pass, Nyagzu, Khurnak Fort and Spanggur where China had border defence posts prior to November 7, 1959. The specific locations of these seven civilian check posts have been shown on the map handed over to Your Excellency. I have already stated the above to Your Excellency, in the talks , and now I would like to affirm it in writing. With kind regards, (Signed) Chen Yi for Chou En-lai Premier of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China

Document No. 146 Statement Setting out Attitude of Indian Government to the Colombo Conference Proposals*
12 January 1963 Clarifications of paragraphs 2,3 and 4 of the Ceylon Conference proposals given to the Government of India by the delegations of Ceylon, UAR and Ghana headed respectively by the Honourable Sirimavo R.D. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon, His Excellency Mr. Ali Sabry, President of the Executive Council of U.A.R., and His Excellency Mr. Kofi Asante Ofori-Atta, Minister of Justice of Ghana. Western Sector : (i) The withdrawal of Chinese forces proposed by the Ceylon Conference will be 20 kilometers as proposed by Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru in the statement of the Chinese Government dated 21st November, and in Prime Minister Chou En-lais letter of 28th November, 1962, i.e. from the line of actual control between the two sides as of November 7, 1959, as defined in maps III and V circulated by the Government of China. (ii) The existing military posts which the forces of the Government of India will be on and upto the line indicated in (i) above. (iii) The demilitarized Zone of 20 kilometers created by Chinese military withdrawals will be administered by civilian posts of

* Source: Hansard (HR), Vol. 53, August 30, 1963, Col. 1167-1168.

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both sides. This is a substantive part of the Ceylon Conference proposals. It is only the details as to the location, the number of posts and their compensation that has to be agreed upon by the two Governments of India and China. Eastern Sector : The Indian forces can in accordance with the Ceylon Conference proposals move right upto the south of the line of actual control i.e. the McMahon Line except for the two areas on which there is difference of opinion between the Governments of India and China. The Chinese forces similarly can move right upto the north of the McMahon Line except for these two areas. The two areas referred to as the remaining areas in the Ceylon Conference proposals arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Governments of India and China according to the Ceylon Conference proposals are Chedong or the Thagla ridge area and the Longju area in which cases there is a difference of opinion as to the line of actual control between the two Governments. The Ceylon Conference desired that the status quo in this sector should be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the status quo.

Middle Sector :

New Delhi, 12th January, 1963

Document No. 147 Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the Colombo Conference Proposals: Statement in Parliament by Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike* 30 August 1963.
Then if I may be permitted to proceed to the next point, the hon. First Member for Colombo South [Mr. J.R. Jayewardene] stated that we have not so far made any statement on the Floor of this House in relation to the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. I agree with him that no statement has been made, but I do not think it is also correct to say that hon. Members of this House are completely unaware or uninformed as to what has taken place although they are entitled to make that legitimate complaint that they have not had an opportunity of debating this matter and that a formal statement was not made by the Government. I do not think it is necessary for me to read the documents

* Source : Hansard (HR), Vol. 53, 1963, Cols. 980-987.

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here. I propose to table them so that they will form part of HANSARD and be taken as constituting official intimation to the hon. Members of what took place in relation to the Sino-Indian dispute in which the Prime Minister took part. I hope they will go into HANSARD.* I first wish to table a copy of the proposals which were formulated by the Conference of the Six Non-aligned Countries that met in Colombo between the 10th and 12th of December, 1962. Secondly, I should like to table two documents constituting Memoranda dated 6th January and 8th January 1963, from the Chinese Government, after Mrs. Bandaranaikes visit to China, setting out their position in regard to the Colombo Conference proposals. Thirdly, I should like to table for the information of hon. Members a statement dated 12th January 1963, setting out the attitude of the Indian Government to the Colombo Conference proposals after the discussions with Mrs. Bandaranaike and such members of the Colombo Conference as accompanied her on those two missions. . . . I do not want to waste time by reading all these documents but I would like to deal with one or two questions arising out of the documents and I may be permitted to have the liberty of taking the documents as read and make the remarks that I propose to make thereafter on the basis that the contents are generally known. . . . The proposals themselves were stated manifestly to be proposals put forward by a mediator proposals of mediators. They were not in any sense a judgment. They were not in any sense intended to be a conclusion which ought to be regarded as binding or to be regarded as an arbitral award by the six countries that met in Colombo. The intention was that these should be the basis on which discussions might be held between the Governments of India and China if both countries accepted the proposals in that spirit and were prepared to meet and discuss on these terms. The terms with which the document starts make it quite clear : The Conference considers the existing de facto cease fire period is a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese conflict. . . . The Conference believes that these proposals, which could help in consolidating the ceasefire, once implemented, should pave the way for discussions between representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entailed in the ceasefire position. The Conference would like to make it clear that a positive response for the proposed appeal will not prejudice the position of either of the two Governments as regards its conception of the final alignment of the boundaries.
* For this material, see documents nos. 144, 145, & 146.

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In relation to the actual dispute itself, the Chinese Government made two points of interpretation, as they called it, in regard to this which they wanted communicated to the Indian Government. That is stated in the Memorandum of 6th January 1963, which I have just tabled. The two points for clarifications were these : (a) The Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometers along the entire Sino-Indian border on Chinas own initiative, in accordance with the plan announced in the Statement of the Chinese Government dated November 21, 1962; the stipulation in the proposals of the Conference regarding the Indian troops keeping their existing military position should be applicable to the entire Sino-Indian border, and not to the western sector alone. It is the understanding of the Chinese Government that in the eastern sector, India will continue to refrain from sending its troops to re-enter the areas south of the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959, vacated by the Chinese frontier guards and will send there only civilian personnel, as India says it has done up till now.

The first point of interpretation is that the Chinese Government says, We understand the proposals to mean that the Indian Government will refrain from bringing their troops forward from wherever they are on the eastern sector. (b) After withdrawing on Chinas own initiative to positions twenty kilometers from the line of actual control of November 7, 1959, in accordance with the statement of the Chinese Government, the Chinese frontier guards will be far behind their positions on September 8, 1962. Thus no Chinese frontier guards will be stationed in the Che Dong area and Longju in the eastern sector, Wuji in the middle sector and the areas in the western sector where India once set up 43 strong points. Since all these places are on the Chinese side of the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959, it is a matter of course for China to set up civilian check posts there. However, with a view to responding to the peace call of the Conference and promoting direct negotiations between China and India, China is willing to move another step forward on the road of reconciliation by refraining from setting up civilian check posts in these places, provided Indian troops or civilian personnel do not re-enter these places.

Now, these two points put forward by the Chinese Government as points of interpretation were not accepted by the Indian Government. They were communicated by the Chinese Government not as a pre-condition for negotiation but merely in order to ascertain what the views of the Indian Government were in regard to them.

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The Indian Government stated their position in the Clarification, as they called them, of 12 January, 1963, which I have also tabled for the information of hon. Members. Here the question is this. The Indian Government has stated that their understanding of it is that it is a substantive part of the Ceylon Conference proposals that the demilitarized zone in the western sector should be administered by the civilian posts of both sides. It is there in the Conference document itself. The proposals are quite clear as to what constitutes the substantive proposals and what do not. The net result of this is that the Indian Government had accepted these proposals in toto. The Chinese Government have already expressed their willingness to negotiate and said the required acceptance in toto of the proposals first would not be tantamount to regarding the Colombo Conference proposals as though they were something in the nature of a judicial or arbitrary award and not in the nature of any mediation. . . . As I said the Indian Government did not accept the two points of interpretation put forward by the Chinese side. The Indian Government themselves regarded the militarized zone being administered by civilian posts on both sides as substantive part of the Ceylon Conference proposals. The Indian Government have taken up the position and said that they accept these proposals in toto and regret the fact that the Chinese Government did not accept the proposals in toto . The Chinese Governments position is this. They say: What is the Colombo Conference proposal ? If you regard it as a binding judgment or as a conclusion which both sides to the dispute must accept unreservedly in the spirit of a judgment, then we have not accepted in in toto in that sense. They say then that the Colombo Conference proposals never had been intended in that way; they were intended as a medium of approach to create the groundwork on which two conflicting sides could come together at a round table for discussion. That is basically the difference in approach and attitude. It has led to, on the positive side, a cessation of hostilities, notwithstanding that it was achieved on the unilateral withdrawal and initiative on the Chinese side. Notwithstanding that, at the time the Chinese announced their withdrawal in November the Indian Government was still talking about the question of retaking the territory that had been lost and of reoccupying the territory and of driving every single Chinaman out of what they considered to be Indian soil. Still for all that since November now it is August 1963 we certainly have come a long way. We have avoided the question of restarting of hostilities on the scale on which they did operate earlier. It is a positive achievement, perhaps, of the mediation by Mrs. Bandaranaike at the Colombo Conference. That we have been able to achieve so much will alone show that, sometimes problems which appear to be insoluble at one stage do sometimes solves themselves later on. It might still be that the approach adopted by the Colombo Conference countries will prove helpful, perhaps, to achieve a permanent settlement of the boundary dispute. A lasting settlement, however, can only be reached if both sides will come to a Conference table and will start discussions together. It is not a question of now consolidating a cease-fire which has automatically become consolidated. What is important is to examine the merits of the dispute and come to conclusions on it.

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Hon. Members of the House entered into debates and discussions on whether Ceylon should have taken a different attitude in regard to the conflict in the first place. Some hon. Members suggested that India has been a traditional friend, that she is our neighbour and that it would be wrong policy to take sides in these matters so as to create complications in the relationships which we have with the Government of India and that it might even lead to complicating the ultimate settlement of the Indo-Ceylon question. I can assure you that it was not the intention of the Government at any stage to take sides in these matters. Indeed, the function of a mediator is not to take sides, but to bring the parties together. I do not think that when we were called upon to assist we could have made a useful contribution, by seeking to assist the parties through mediation, if we had made the mistake of taking sides and making declarations, calling one side or the other aggressors, and seeking to arrive at conclusions. Indeed some hon. Members have said that that was what we should have done. But that was not the position of the Ceylon Government. We remain firm friends of the Government of India and we remain firm friends of the Government of China. We do not seek to draw distinctions between the people of a country and its Government, to seek to say we are on the side of the peoples but not of the Government, or that we cannot understand the relationship between them. We prefer to say this: We are sorry to see a difference we very much deplore it. We certainly do not wish to see two Asian nations in a state of conflict, one against the other, in the interests of peace, particularly peace in Asia, in our area. It is vital to us that all these conflicts should be resolved as early as possible. We certainly think that mediation by Mrs. Bandaranaike, initiated by the Government of Ceylon and welcomed by other Afro-Asian nations has helped in some measure towards stabilizing the situation.

Document 148 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike on the Colombo Conference Proposals (Statement in the Senate)*
23 January 1964 Perhaps the highest of Ceylons efforts in seeking to achieve its foreign policy aims occurred when our Government sought, with the collaboration of five other non-aligned Afro-Asian states, to bring about peaceful negotiations between China and India in regard to the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. I know that my Government has been criticized a great deal about our intervention in this matter and on many different grounds. So, I should like to deal with them in some detail for the information of hon. Senators.

* Source: Hansard (Senate), 1964, Vol. 19, cols. 2404 2408.

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Firstly, we have been criticized in regard to the choice of the six non-aligned Afro-Asian countries which participated in the Colombo Conference. I should like to point out that in the issuing of the original invitations I sought to bring to the Conference table only those countries which would be acceptable both to China and India in the role of mediators. It may be that there were other countries which could have helped us a great deal, and in extending the invitation to these five countries I requested them to suggest any other countries which they would like to have as participants. It is only after careful consultation on all these questions that the six countries decided that it was better to restrict the Conference to those six countries alone. Another criticism has been that Ceylon failed to condemn Chinese aggression and to take the side of India. I am glad that the hon. Leader of the Opposition and Senator Nadesan expressed their full appreciation of the attitude taken by us and explained our position in that regard. As I have explained already, non-alignment does not mean an alliance or identity of interests between such countries as call themselves non-aligned. Secondly, it would not have been possible for Ceylon to have sought to mediate in the dispute had she taken sides in advance. Thirdly, the problem of the border between China and India is itself so vexed a question that no simple, rough and ready solutions can be found. Then again, it has been said, quite wrongly in my opinion, that the Colombo Proposals were weighted in favour of one side or other. I recall that soon after the Colombo proposals were first formulated, the criticism was made that the proposals favoured China. So much so that the Indian Press as well as the local Press spared no efforts in decrying the efforts of the Colombo Powers. Later on, after the Indian Government had decided to accept the Colombo Conference proposals, the Press reactions were that the Colombo Conference Powers had given inconsistent interpretations in Peking and New Delhi. The Chinese Government expressed the view that the Colombo Conference countries had gone beyond the position of mediators and would be functioning as arbitrators or judges if the Chinese Government were called upon to accept the proposals in toto as a pre-condition for direct negotiations between India and China. Surely these criticisms alone are sufficient to demonstrate the good faith of the Colombo Conference Powers and their impartiality in approaching the difficult questions of the China-India frontier. Inasmuch as India and China have still to come to the Conference table, it may be argued that the Colombo Conference has achieved little. To the extent, however, that the cease-fire of November 1962 has in fact become stabilized, it is perhaps an even better measure of judging the value of the Colombo Conference intervention. At this stage I would like to refer to certain remarks made by Senator Nadesan in the course of his speech yesterday. He said that China has rejected the Colombo Conference proposals and that she had said it was impertinent on the part of the Colombo Powers

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to put forward proposals. At no stage did China say, as far as I know, that it was impertinence on the part of the Colombo Powers to put forward proposals, and neither has she rejected the proposals in toto. In fact, I must state that China was very glad when we summoned that Conference. I would like at this stage to read out the message which I received from Premier Chou En-lai. I will read to you the relevant extracts from his letter which he sent me when we informed him of our intentions to hold this Conference to show how he appreciated what we were trying to do: Your Excellency, I have received your Excellencys message transmitted to me by Ceylons Embassy in China on November 21, which contained the text of Your Excellencys message to the Heads of States or Governments of five Asian and African countries. I sincerely admire and thank Your Excellency for your repeated efforts to seek a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. At this moment, Your Excellencys proposal that the leaders of six friendly Asian and African countries meet for discussions on ways to promote reconciliation between India and China is indeed a constructive initiative step. I ardently hope that the meeting proposed by Your Excellency will urge the Indian Government to respond positively to the Chinese Governments initiative measures of cease-fire and withdrawal and agree to sit down with China at a Conference table to seek together a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. That was the message sent to me when he heard of our intentions. He sent us another message on the day of the inauguration of the Conference to be read at the Conference. The message was delivered to us by the Chinese Ambassador here, and reads as follows: Premier Chou En-lai warmly welcomed the Conference of six Asian and African countries which opened in Colombo on December 10 and expressed the hope that it would contribute to promoting direct negotiations between China and India. On the eve of the Colombo Conference Premier Chou Enlai sent a message of greetings to the Ceylonese Prime Minister and the Conference participants which stated: The Chinese Government has always adhered to the five principles of peaceful co-existence and the Bandung spirit which had persevered in safeguarding the solidarity of the Asian African nations. The Chinese Government has always held that it is desirable and entirely possible to secure a fair and reasonable settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question through peaceful negotiations between China and India. The outbreak of the armed conflict on the border situation between China and India was something that the Chinese Government and people were most unwilling to see. The Chinese Government has, on its own initiative, carried out the wishes of

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cease-fire withdrawal; has begun to release wounded and sick captured Indian personnel. This wish was taken by India on its own initiative for a halt of the border conflict and ease the situation to a certain extent. At this moment the Chinese Government is prepared to see that the six friendly Asian and African countries holding a Conference there would have consultations with a view to promoting and re-opening of negotiation between China and India. The Chinese Government sincerely wishes the Conference all success. So, Senator Nadesans reference that the Chinese Government has rejected our proposals in toto and that she though it was impertinent on our part to put forward proposals is really incorrect. Senator Nadesan: Have they not rejected the proposals? Senator the Hon. Sirimavo Bandaranaike: No, not in toto. They have accepted the proposals in principle as a basis to start negotiations, but unfortunately they have not accepted them in toto as India has. Senator Nadesan: I would not say in toto. They have not accepted your proposals. If they accepted and India accepted, then both countries would have reopened negotiations Senator the Hon. Sirimavo Bandaranaike: India has accepted the proposals in toto. But China has not accepted in toto. . . .

Document No. 149 Prime Minister Dudley Senanaike on the Indo-Pakistan Conflict*
5 May 1965 The Prime Minister Mr. Dudley Senanayake has sent messages to President Ayub Khan and Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri on the current dispute between the two countries. The text of the message to the Indian Prime Minister is given below. The message addressed to the President of Pakistan is phrased in identical terms: My colleagues and I have been deeply distressed and troubled by the present dispute between your Government and the Government of Pakistan over the issue of the Indian-West Pakistan border. We have been particularly perturbed by the eruption of armed clashes in this area. We are deeply concerned that such developments should

* Source: Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, Colombo.

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take place between two countries in our region of the world, and with both of whom we maintain the closest ties of friendship. I need hardly emphasize how important it is, both with regard to regional as well as global stability and well-being, that peaceful and friendly relations should exist between your country and Pakistan. It is in the spirit of sincere concern that I wish now to appeal to you that your country should seek every means and opportunity available for the very early and peaceful settlement of this dispute, and that your country should desist from the use of military means as soon as and as fully and effectively as possible. I would like, in this situation to convey to you the assurance that my country stands ready and willing to render whatever assistance as may be possible and desired by you, towards such a peaceful settlement. I am availing myself of this opportunity to address a similar appeal to the President of Pakistan.

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Document No. 150 Persecution of Buddhists in South Vietnam: Communiqu of the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs*
19 June 1963. The Prime Minister has addressed a letter to President Kennedy regarding the persecution of Buddhists in South Vietnam. In this letter, the Prime Minister has appealed to President Kennedy to use his good offices with the Government of South Vietnam to ensure the grant of freedom of worship and religious equality to the Buddhist community in South Vietnam. The letter to President Kennedy is the latest move by the Government regarding the question of the persecution of Buddhists in South Vietnam. A brief resume of the action taken by the Government on this question is enumerated below:(a) On receipt of press reports regarding the persecution of Buddhists in South Vietnam, the Government approached certain friendly Governments to provide full and authentic information regarding the situation in South Vietnam. This step was necessary as Ceylon does not recognize South Vietnam and does not maintain diplomatic relations with her. On receipt of information sought, the Government directed Ceylons Permanent Representative at the UN to request the Secretary-General to take suitable action to alleviate the suffering of the Buddhists in Vietnam. At the same time, an approach was made to several Asian Buddhist countries through our diplomatic envoys to enlist their support to our efforts. Press reports regarding the martyrdom of the Buddhist priest who burnt himself to death demonstrated the alarming nature of the situation in South Vietnam . The Government felt that stronger action was necessary to stop further deterioration of the position of the Buddhists in South Vietnam. Therefore, the Prime Minister made personnel appeals to the Heads of States and Governments of several Buddhist countries of Asia who are represented at the UN, requesting them to support our moves at the UN. In this connection, the Prime Minister wrote to Pandit Nehru, Prime Minister of India; General Ne Win, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Burma; Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos; Prince Sihanouk, Head of State of Cambodia; Mr. Ikeda, Prime Minister of Japan; and Mr. Thanarat, Prime Minister of Thailand, and King Mahendra of Nepal.

(b)

(c)

It will we observed that Ceylon was the first country to have taken the initiative to mobilize world public opinion against the persecution of the Buddhist community in
* Source: Ceylon Today, Vol. XII, No7 (July 1963), PP. 30-31.

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South Vietnam. It is hoped that the pressure from the Buddhist countries of Asia and the moral force of world public opinion will result in the speedy redress of the grievances of the Buddhists in South Vietnam. In a communiqu issued later , the Ministry of External Affairs stated that the Prime Minister of India, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, had informed the Ceylon Premier that he shared her concern over the recent events in South Vietnam. The following is the text of the communiqu :The Indian Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, has informed the Ceylon Prime Minister that he shares her concern over the recent events in South Vietnam. This is contained in his reply to the Ceylon Prime Ministers personal massage to him regarding the discrimination against the Buddhist community in South Vietnam. Shri Jawaharlal Nehru has instructed the Indian Permanent Representative at the UN to raise this matter with the SecretaryGeneral. This would certainly help the moves already initiated by Ceylon at the UN. The Indian Prime Minister has also sent a personal massage to President Diem.

Document No. 151 Vietnam: Communiqu issued by the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs*
6 August 1964 An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said that the Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike has expressed grave anxiety over the recent developments in the Vietnam crisis. He recalled that at the recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in London, the Prime Minister had observed that the U.S. Forces were being committed on behalf of South Vietnam to a point which could provoke open war with North Vietnam and had drawn attention to the danger that the conflict in Vietnam could escalate into a major war between the Great Powers themselves. The spokesman also recalled that the Ceylon Governments position, as explained by the Prime Minister in a foreign policy speech in the Senate early this year was that the maintenance of peace and security in the S.E. Asian area could best be served by the withdrawal of foreign troops as provided for in the Geneva Agreement.
* Source: Hansard (Senate), Vol.20, 1964, Cols. 593-94.

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Document No. 152 Sri Lanka Delegate on Vietnam (General Policy Statement in the UN)*
21 December 1964. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon) : The situation in the Indo- Chinese region, particularly in Vietnam, poses a grave danger to peace and security. As an Asian country, we are particularly anxious that a peaceful settlement should be found to the problems facing the countries of this region. The danger to peace and security arises primarily from the interference of foreign powers in the affairs of these countries. Internal dissensions and sources of friction in the area have been exploited by neo colonialist powers in their attempt to continue or extend their influence. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 sought to insulate the region from the pressures of the cold war and to bring about stability and peace. Unfortunately, the provisions of the Geneva agreements have not been respected. In South Vietnam the situation has been aggravated by the introduction of foreign troops and massive military aid in an attempt to forge a solution by military means. There have even been reports of plans to extend the conflict through retaliatory measures against neighbouring countries. We consider any such attempt as dangerous in the extreme. The problems of South Vietnam are political in nature and there can be no lasting settlement except by political means. I wish in this connexion also to emphasize the fact that no lasting solution is possible in South Vietnam unless the legitimate aspirations of the Buddhists, who form 80 per cent of the population, are respected and satisfied. Attempts to impose a settlement by force should be discarded and the futility of continuing a war of suppression realized. The alternative is a continuation of the civil war, involving further destruction and suffering, and posing the threat of an expansion of the conflict beyond the confines of Vietnam. No one who has the interests of the territory and people of Vietnam at heart, no one who is sincerely interested in the course of peace, can accept such an alternative. We do not raise our voice in a partisan spirit. As a nonaligned country, our aim is to steer clear of great power groupings. We are concerned as Asians that our part of the world, no less than any other, should be free from dangerous conflicts. Our purpose is to insulate such conflicts from the pressures of cold war and in Vietnam we see clearly the risks of such involvement unless a speedy and
* Source: U. N. G. A. O. R., 19th Session , 1308th Pl. Mtg., Paras 77-82.

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equitable solution is attained. Delay in arriving at a settlement only increases the risk of an escalation of the conflict with all its grave consequences to the world. We repeat, therefore, let there be an end to the fighting; let there be a recognition that the problem is a political one, requiring a settlement by negotiation; let the powers concerned return to the conference table with a view to implementing sincerely the terms of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. This is the only way out. We earnestly hope that path of moderation and restraint will be followed before it is too late.

Document No. 153 Plea for Peace in Vietnam: Joint Statement of Seventeen Non Aligned countries on Vietnam*
April 1965 Mr. Dudley Senanayake has signed a joint appeal for peace in Vietnam, made by 17 heads of state and government of non - aligned countries. The appeal was handed over on Thursday [April 1st ] to the US, the USSR, Great Britain, France, Republic of China, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, to members of the International Control Commission for Vietnam - Canada and Poland and the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, U. Thant. Here is the text of the appeal: Pursuant to the Final Declaration of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cairo in October 1964, we, the undersigned heads of state or government, have noted with great concern the aggravation of existing tensions and conflicts in SouthEast Asia and in certain regions of Africa, Middle East, and Latin America, arising from oppression and foreign intervention, and regret the present deadlock in the United Nations which prevents it from exercising fully its responsibility in maintaining and safeguarding peace . SELF-DETERMINERTION We solemnly reaffirm the rights of people to selfdetermination and the principle that all states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force.
* Source: Times of Ceylon, 3 April 1965.

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We reaffirm our dedication to the principle of the inviolability of and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. We express our conviction that recourse to force and pressure in various forms is contrary to the right of the people of Vietnam to peace freedom and independence and can only lead to the aggravation of the conflict in that area and to its transformation into a more generalized war with catastrophic consequences. We are deeply concerned at the aggravation of this situation in Vietnam and are convinced that it is the consequences of foreign intervention in various forms, including military intervention, which impedes the implementation of the Geneva agreements on Vietnam. NEGOTIATIONS We are firmly convinced that irrespective of possible differences in appraising various elements in the existing situation in Vietnam, the only way leading to the termination of the conflict consists in seeking a peaceful solution through negotiations. We, therefore, make an urgent appeal to the parties concerned to start such negotiations, as soon as possible, without posing any pre-conditions, so that a political solution to the problems of Vietnam may be found in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people and in the spirit of the Geneva agreements on Vietnam and of the Declaration of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cairo. We invite the Governments of all countries concerned for the maintenance of world peace to associate themselves, as soon as possible, with this appeal. The following are the signatories: Dr. Mohammad Yousuf, Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Afghanistan; Mr. Dudley Senanayake, Prime Minister of Ceylon; Haile Sellassie 1, Emperor of Ethiopia; Mr. Sekou Toure, President of the Republic of Guinea; Marshal Abdul Salam Mohammad Aref, President of the Republic of Iraq; Mahendra Bir Bikram, Shah Deva King of Nepal; Mr. Habib Bourguiba, President of the Republic of Tunisia; Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic; Mr. Ahmed Ben Bela, President of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Algeria; Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus; Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana; Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India; Mr. Jomo Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya; General Mohammad Amin Al- Hafez, President of the Presidential Council of the Syrian Arab Republic; Dr. Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda; Mr. Josip Broz Tito; President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and Dr. Kenneth Kaunda , President of the Republic of Zambia.

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Document No. 154 Statement by the Government of Sri Lanka on Vietnam*

10 April 1965

The appeal delivered by Nonaligned countries on April 1st to the parties directly concerned with the situation as it exists in Vietnam urged these parties to start negotiations as soon as possible, without posing any preconditions so that a political solution to the problem of Vietnam may be found. The Government of Ceylon welcomes the statement of President Johnson, made on April 7th, 1965, that the United States of America remains ready for unconditional discussions in the search for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. The Government also welcomes the pledge of the President, that until peace is achieved the United States of America will try to keep the conflict from spreading. The Government of Ceylon earnestly hopes that the other parties that are chiefly concerned will be of the same mind, and that it will now be possible for discussions to commence with the least possible delay, and that these discussions will take place in an atmosphere conducive to a successful outcome, namely, in the absence of all hostilities and without a further aggravation of tension in the region. The Government hopes, moreover, that these discussions will pave the way for the establishment of a reunified, independent Vietnam, whose peoples will be enabled to exercise unfettered freedom without any outside interference. It is in this hope that the Government welcomes both the suggestion for regional economic development proposed by U. S. A. and Canada, as well as the pledge of substantial United States aid made by the President. It is the view of Government of Ceylon that such regional economic development can most usefully occur in the setting of the peaceful and permanent resolution of the regional political problems.

Document No. 155 Sri Lanka Delegate on Vietnam (General Policy Statement in the UN)*
1st October 1965 . Mr. [G.G.] Ponnambalam (Ceylon): I can hardly conclude the observations I have made on the political aspects of the functions of this organization without
* Source: Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, Colombo. * Source: U. N. G. A. O. R., 20TH Session, 1965, 1345th Pl . Mtg.

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referring to a matter of very grave concern, particularly to us in Asia, namely, Viet Nam. Speaking as a member of the community of nations dedicated to the preservation of international peace, and purely on this motivation, I should like to observe that the United States, however understandable its motives may be in regard to its commitments in Viet Nam, may wish , as a first step , to reconsider its military commitment purely on the grounds that an increase in the scale of operations in this area would necessarily increase the terrible suffering of the vast majority of the people of that unfortunate land. Their own views and loyalties appear to be somewhat indeterminate and nebulous. But the final political objective that must commend itself to most of us is the emergence of a healthy and indigenous national movement, independent of foreign arms and of foreign political support. One fears that the achievement of this objective may be compromised by a mere reliance on armed action from without. But here I must not be understood as either condoning or excusing the contribution in arms and material China is reported to be making to extend the conflict. May I suggest in these circumstances that the United Nations should explore the possibilities of utilizing its machinery and resources to throw a cordon sanitaire round South Viet Nam, thus insulating it from foreign pressures and helping indigenous population to give expression to their true wishes and inclinations in regard to their future.

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Document No. 156 Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike on Admission to the United Nations*
22 November 1956. Mr. [S.W.R.D.] Bandaranaike (Ceylon): My country, together with many others, languished in the anterooms of this Organization for many years until, by a signal stroke of statesmanship last year, sixteen countries were admitted to membership of the United Nations. I regret that there are still countries which are awaiting admission, countries whose claims to such admission appear to many of us to be unquestioned, and whose admission will undoubtedly make more fully representative the membership of this great world Organization for peace. I hope that before long their claims will receive the consideration which is their due. Amongst them, I wish to mention in particular such countries as the Peoples Republic of China and Japan.

Document No. 157 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Issue of Continental Shelf (Comment on the Report submitted by the International Law Commission)**
12 December 1956.

Mr.[A.B.] PERERA (Ceylon) paid a tribute to the international Law Commission, whose report was the fruit of eight years sustained work. The discussion had brought out the following points: the inadequacy of the threemile rule; the changing criteria applied in determining sovereignty and jurisdiction over territorial waters; the need to minimize, if not eliminate, the divergences existing between maritime and non-maritime States; and the need to frame a convention capable of stilling controversy for all time. International practice in the matter of the high seas and the territorial sea had throughout history varied considerably. The 1930 Conference, which had been called to compose differences of opinion, had failed to settle the question of territorial waters. There seemed to be agreement among States that the breadth
* Source: U. N. G. A. O. R., 11th Session, 1956, 590th P1. Mtg. ** Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 11th Session, 1956, 6th Committee, 496th Mtg., Paras 58 - 66.

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of the territorial sea could not be less than three miles. Some of them regarded that minimum as a maximum, while others stipulated a breadth of four or six miles. Fulton, in 1911, had argued that just as the three-mile rule was obsolete in time of war, so it was inadequate in the matter of the protection and conservation of marine resources. It was strange that jurists should not have reexamined the original grounds on which the three-mile rule had been accepted. The position seemed to be that the following principles could be taken as a basis for codification: the breadth of the territorial sea was normally measured from the law-water line along the coast; the baseline on coasts which were deeply indented or had islands in their immediate vicinity consisted of straight lines drawn in accordance with the doubleradius rule; the tendency was to accept the normal breadth of the territorial sea as three nautical miles from the baseline; claims by particular states to a breadth of more than three miles could be admitted where they had acquired rights based on long usage and provided that the other States were in agreement ; all States had sovereign rights over their territorial waters; no States could exercise jurisdiction over foreign ships on the basis of those rights outside territorial waters, any State was entitled, up to a reasonable distance outside its territorial waters; such distance to be defined and notified, to adopt the necessary security measures with respect to foreign ships approaching its coast for unlawful purposes. The Ceylonese delegation attached particular weight to the question of the continental shelf, first mentioned in 1916 in a note communicated by Russia to the other powers. The Ceylonese Government had referred to it indirectly in 1925 in its pearl fisheries ordinance. The distinction drawn by legal authorities between the seabed and the subsoil of the continental shelf was completely artificial. On the other hand, it would be wrong to depart from generally accepted rules on the pretext of promoting the development of international law for that would be a retrograde step, not progressive development. Historical and scientific developments had to be taken in to account. State practice had varied on the question of the continental shelf. The Treaty of 1942 between the United Kingdom and Venezuela was a precedent, but the real starting point had been President Trumans Proclamation of 1945. It could be deduced from everything that had happened since, that the key problem raised by all States was that of the freedom of the high seas. Some of the Latin American countries had claimed that their enactments concerning the continental shelf were based on a rule of customary law flowing from the Presidential Proclamation of 1945, but the United States itself had not admitted that contention. It was difficult to talk of custom when the measures adopted by certain States departed from established practice. There was admittedly a conflict between the right to occupy the seabed and exploit its resources and the right to freedom of the seas. The question in each

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particular case was whether those rights were complementary or mutually exclusive. A state urging observance of the freedom of the seas was pleading an established right, and hence the onus of proof rested on the State seeking to exploit the resources of the continental shelf. That was the view taken by the International Law Association at its Brussels Conference in 1950. The title to the continental shelf with its resources depended, as in the case of land, on effective occupation. Mere proclamations or unilateral declarations were not enough; there must also be effective occupation or exploitation. The International Law Commission, however, recognized the coastal States right to exploit mineral resources regardless of the existence of the continental shelf. Certain States might take advantage of that concept to claim vast areas for themselves. Seldens Mare Clauxum was no longer valid in the modern world. The terms of draft article 28 of the draft could be accepted without reservation. The Ceylonese delegation, one of the sponsors of the draft resolution [A/C. 6/ L. 385], hoped that the proposed conference would meet next year. The preparatory committee should start work immediately, concentrating on the International Law Commissions draft and leaving other points to be worked out on the basis of a questionnaire to be sent to the participating countries. The Conference, which should also be attended by non member states, should not rest content with discussing broad principles: the states should be able to agree on a general convention, accompanied by reservation if necessary.

Document No. 158 Sri Lanka Delegate on Membership of the Security Council (On the Increase in Number and the Equitable Territorial Representation)*
14 December 1956. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): The question of increasing the membership of the Security Council is a very important one, particularly in the light of the fact that at the time the Charter was framed the membership of the United Nations was about fifty. Next week, the membership will be eighty, and I am sure that in the course of the year there will be two or more additions. With this change in membership, the composition of one of the most important components of the United Nations, the Security Council, must undergo some change. In effecting that change, we must think not of the membership for today or for next year; we must visualize the changes that may come about during the

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 11th Session, 1956, 620th Pl. Mtg., Paras 103-115.

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next five or six years. We hope that at that time there will not be the slightest vestige of colonialism in the world. I have no doubt that within the next few years the world will have sufficiently progressed so that a good many of the colonial powers themselves will feel that it is time to give independence to those whom they have looked after all these years. The world does not remain static, and it is obvious that these changes will take place. Therefore, in deciding upon the composition of the Security Council, this important factor must be borne in mind. I do not think that immediately after the Second World War, during the aftermath of the war, when the membership of the United Nations was confined to about fifty, it was realized how rapidly changes would come about during the following ten years. Therefore, the question of the increase in membership is not one that should be undertaken lightly. I have not come to this rostrum to say what the composition of the Security Council should be or of how many members it should consist, but it is quite clear that an increase is called for; there is not the slightest doubt about that. Of courses, there are abound to be differences of opinion as to the number, and I believe that this matter has been constantly postponed for the reason. Originally, it was felt that there should be five permanent members of the Security Council, and that is quite understandable. The United Kingdom could look after so many other countries including India, Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan; France could look after so many other countries in Indo-China; and the Soviet Union was considered to be good enough to look after many other countries. But let us face the fact that the position has changed. At the present moment, the question of permanent members does not arise, and therefore I shall not discuss that problem. What I do want to point out is that if there was a limitation in the number of members, possibly in view of the fact that the permanent members themselves could look after so many states, that situation does not exist today. Looking at the question from that point of view, an increase in membership is called for. There should be some principle to guide us with regard to the composition of the Security Council. Whether on a territorial or population basis, some principle should be adopted. As I said, when this question was considered originally, the principle was adopted that the great powers were able to represent the world. However, that picture has now changed, and we must recognize that change. Whether viewed in the light of territorial representation or population representation, I do not see how the Security Council now represents large populations and large territories, particularly Asia and Africa. As I have said, earlier it was quite enough to look upon Asia and Africa as were suppliers of raw materials and as markets for the manufactured goods of the Western powers. Today, we recognize the fact that the Asian and African countries are selfgoverning units and independent, and due consideration must be given to that fact.

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What do we find in the composition of the Security Council in respect of Asia? We are told that the mighty power of China was representing Asia , but is that true today? I have not the slightest doubt that there is a Government in Formosa, which some people recognize and which others do not recognize, but to say that Government represents a good proportion of Asia, as was earlier thought, is certainly not true in fact. Then the whole Middle East is represented by one member; while Africa is unrepresentative altogether. Africa is also on the march, and there is a number of self-governing, independent units Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and the number is increasing. The whole of South East Asia is unrepresented. The only part of Asia that is represented today is the Far East, and that is represented by the Nationalist Government if you like of China. From next year it will also be represented by the Philippines. Is that a satisfactory state of affairs? What percentage of the population do they represent? What percentage of Asian territories do they represent? What percentage of Asian potential do they represent? These are matters that must be taken into account. The maintenance of peace requires the consideration of many factors, and those charged with that task must be able to make lasting contribution to the maintenance of peace by reason at least of the positions they occupy in the various regions. But do we have that situation so far as the Asian and African countries are concerned? And what kind of peace can one think of when two thirds of the world is inadequately represented from the point of view of population, or unrepresented? I have said that there was a time when the Western powers were able to claim that representation. I do not complain about it and I do not blame them. That is how the world was at that time. But is the world the same today? These are important matters for consideration. I do not say I have the answer now or could give the answer from this rostrum; I am merely setting forth certain questions which require very careful consideration. So far as Asia and Africa are concerned, we might as well say that they have hardly any representation. But, even so far as Europe is concerned, it is divided into two parts Eastern Europe and Western Europe - and there is no denying that proportionally Western Europe has the largest number of members. In the status of affairs that obtained at one time, that was only natural; it was to be expected. But is the position same today? According to the gentlemans agreement, one region was to be represented by the USSR and one Eastern European country. Starting next year, there will be no Eastern European country. That is also a matter for consideration, whether one looks at it from the point of view of population or of territory or of the potential of Eastern Europe. Whatever our political ideologies, that must be taken into consideration. It is not a question of trying to get a majority of members who embrace a certain political ideology. We are concerned with the maintenance of peace. All types of people go to make up the world and all types of political ideologies demand representation. If it happens

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that a certain political ideology is followed by a large number of people making up a large section of Europe with a vast potential, surely they demand representation. Fairness and justice require it. There must be some way in which these matters can be set right . If we have regional representation, let us really have regional representation, and not so called regional representation by countries that should not represent the region but that are decided upon by powerful nations. For instance, in the case of the Asian African region, it is no good to let the Western powers decide who should represent them. There must be a gentlemans agreement according to which the Asian or African countries will decide the matter. There is an agreement with regard to the Eastern European countries today. I am not blaming anyone; I am simply putting before you the state of affairs that exist. Probably the blame lies with the Asians or the Africans themselves. But there must be some means of ensuring adequate representation of the various regions of the world. If peace is the objective, you want the co-operation of all sections of the world and not merely of those nations that are powerful and those nations that have all the good things of the world. The world consists of many others, too. Their co-operation is also necessary, and it is necessary to hear their point of view. It is no good to say: it is a difficult question; we will postpone it and think about it again tomorrow. We have worked on this system for ten years; the world has gone on, and we are all right. There is peace in the world however uneasy it may be. Why worry? That will certainly not do. I think the Assembly must face this issue. The membership of Security Council should be increased in the light of events that have taken place in the recent past if only on the basis of fifty to eighty, and perhaps next years to eighty - five. The question should also be looked at in the light of representation, whether from the point of view of population, territory or potential. It is well to consider this matter carefully so that justice may be done and so that it will not be left to fate to decide the representation of each region, as has already happened. I am happy that the Philippines has a seat on the Security Council ; but Eastern Europe is left without representation. I am very proud and glad that the Philippines will be on the Council. I am not criticizing that selection at all . But a lesson should be drawn from it: that it may be left to fate to decide which country should represent region. I am afraid that this Assembly must not leave things to fate. There must be a demarcation of territories, or some other principle to guide us. In the past, there was the overriding principle of the five great powers; and they were really able to look after the affairs of many other countries. But that assumption can no longer be made today. The situation is different. All I am asking is that the Assembly look at the situation as it is today and arrive at some satisfactory, fair and just method of representation in connexion with the most important task that we have before us, the maintenance of peace in the world.

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Document No. 159 Sri Lanka Delegate on the United Nations and World Peace*
20 October 1957. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon) : The United Nations is not a world government. Its Charter embodies the moral and legal principles by which alone its sovereign and independent Members can live in peace, mutual trust and benefit. If a nation chooses to flout these principles for its own ends, for reasons of narrow national interest, it is doing an incalculable disservice to all that the United Nations stands for. I cannot think of any nation wishing to weaken this organization, which stands as a symbol of the hopes and aspirations of mankind today. It is perhaps easy to miscalculate and underestimate the strength and enduring qualities of the moral voice of mankind. It may seem weak and powerless in the short run, but in the context of modern international relationships there can be little doubt that it must ultimately prevail. It is our earnest hope that the moral voice of this Assembly, reflecting the spirit of the Charter, will be heeded and respected. Indeed, no nation can afford today to do otherwise. A country may think it can gain a temporary advantage by acting in its own selfish interests and disregarding the overwhelming sentiments of this Assembly. But against this it must inevitably count the cost in shattered confidence and in increased international tension. In the final analysis there is little doubt that such a national will find that the seeming advantage has actually turned out to be nothing but a tragic liability. We should like to pay a tribute to those Member States which, in response to the resolutions of this Assembly, ceased hostilities and withdrew their forces from Egyptian soil. Their actions no doubt strengthened this great Organization and was a fitting recognition of the strength of world opinion.

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 12th Session, 698th Pl. Mtg.

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Document No. 160 Sri Lanka Delegate on Strengthening of the United Nations*
20 October 1957. Mr. [R.S.S] Gunewardene (Ceylon): As Members of the United Nations, we are all committed to work for the strengthening of this Organization. If this Organization is to be fully represented, it is essential that we accept the principle of Universality of membership. We feel that a sovereign State, whatever its ideology and its political, economic or social system, should have the right of representation. We recall the handicaps and difficulties we had to surmount in securing our membership in 1955. We are proud that we were able to be of some assistance in obtaining the agreement of all groups to the admission of the fifteen other nations. We were a victim at that time of a stalemate arising from great -power rivalries, and it is not surprising that we feel distressed that such rivalries should operate against the admission of the sixteen nations in 1955, and three others subsequently. It has enhanced the prestige of the organization and the character of its representation. Today, only Outer Mongolia is excluded. We support the admission of Outer Mongolia, and we hope that, in accordance with the principle of universality, the membership of Outer Mongolia will be secured. We are also concerned about the representation of the Peoples Republic of China. Whatever may be the legalistic and technical considerations, we cannot be blind to the fact that almost a quarter of the human race is not represented here. We recognize that in some quarters this question is an emotional one, but surely it is now time for emotion to give place to reason. It is our hope that, when we meet at the next session, both Outer Mongolia and the Peoples Republic of China will be counted as Members of the United Nations.

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 12th Session, 698th Pl. Mtg.

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Document No. 161 Sri Lanka Delegate on Peaceful Co-existence (Support for the Soviet Sponsored Declaration on Peaceful Co-existence [A\3673])*
14 December 1957. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon) said that in the twelve years of its existence the United Nations had achieved positive results. It had presided at the birth of many new States and had enabled them to take their rightful place in the community of nations. . . . Yet, when all that had been said, it should be asked to what extent the United Nations had achieved the noble objectives set forth in the Preamble of its Charter. That Preamble, which had stirred the hearts and minds of so many people and so many nations when it had been drawn up, could not be read without bitterness today, not because the ideals enshrined in it had lost their validity but because at the close of each session one began to wonder whether their realization was not further and further away. For example, the peoples of the United Nations had declared in the Charter that they were determined to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors. Yet not a day passed without some border incidents or other events which marked the worsening of international relations. The peoples of the United Nations had declared their determination to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security; and yet many nations were diverting their strength to channels which could lead only to the disruption of international peace and security. The peoples of the United Nations had declared their determination to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force should not be used, save in the common interest. And yet they had often compromised on principles and set those methods aside; it was all too true today that armed force was being used not in the common interest but in the interest of a particular nation or group of nations. The people of the United Nations had declared their determination to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples. And yet, while more than half of humanity lived in woeful poverty, the technical skill, the resources and the money which could be used to better humanitys lot were being dissipated in the manufacture of arms and equipment which could lead only to wholesale destruction.

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 12th Session, First Committee , 939th Mtg. , Paras 15-33.

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It was not his intention to apportion the responsibility for the existing situation; in a sense, all nations, large and small, were responsible for it . Although many of them had not taken part in the senseless arms race or in the equally senseless formation of military blocs, they should perhaps have united more determinedly to prevent the events which had set those developments in motion. Peaceful co-existence had long ago ceased to be a slogan. Today it was a vital necessity. There was no choice. If the states wished humanity to continue to exist they must devote all their energies to peaceful co-existence. All the nations represented in the Committee no doubt believed in the need for peaceful co-existence, especially since today man, by his ingenuity, had succeeded in creating armaments and devices capable of destroying not only whole cities but whole nations, and continents. It should be possible to avoid the creation of the atmosphere of suspicion, distrust and, above all, fear, which apparently stimulated the striving nations to outdo each other in the creation of ever more powerful means of destruction. As the President of a great nation had once pointed out, the only thing to be feared was fear itself. It was fear which was at the basis of the armament race, and the establishment of military blocs. Yet the nations of the world should not devote their time and energy to expressing their fear and justifying their suspicions, as they had been doing since the Second World War - a procedure which had itself prevented the elimination of the cause of that fear. Too often the United Nations had been a forum in which nations aired their grievances, and justified their actions and their policies. It had too rarely fulfilled its original purpose. He wondered if it was not too late to reverse the trend and return to those basic principles of the Charter to which the Governments had subscribed. Certainly, that was a difficult task. Nations must of course, defend their interests, and Governments could remain in power only if they did not subordinate national interests to other considerations. It would also be futile to expect every nation to consider all problems with the objectivity and impartiality they deserved. Traditional alliances as well as traditional rivalries were long lived. Every nation had commitments to its people, its friends and to the group to which it belonged, and those commitments engendered others. There were no easy solutions, but all the nations represented in the General Assembly should strive ceaselessly to find solutions and should devote as much energy to that task as they devoted to pleading their causes or justifying their policies. The declaration on the peaceful co-existence of States proposed by the Soviet Union (A /3673) was, in his delegations opinion, a commentary on what had so far occurred and an indication of what might be accomplished in the future; above all, it was a warning that very little time remained. The declaration did not provide all the solutions the world desired but it might create an atmosphere of mutual confidence which would make their attainment easier. The principles it contained were not new; they appeared in the Charter of the United Nations in more or less the same form; they had been enunciated in the final communiqu of the Bandung Conference, and they had since

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served as a foundation for relations between many countries. The foreign policy of Ceylon was firmly based on the Bandung Declaration. His delegation was convinced that if it adopted those principles the General Assembly would make a great contribution to the reduction of international tension and the enlargement of the area of international co-operation. It wished to make it clear, however, that it did not subscribe to the explanatory memorandum attached to the Soviet draft resolution, with which it disagreed on many points. The memorandum was essentially out of keeping with the draft resolution which it was intended to explain; he deeply regretted that the Soviet delegation had thought fit to submit an explanation which smacked of cold war politics. . . .

Document No. 162 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Convention on Genocide*

30 September 1958. Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): May I make a brief reference to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which is a great achievement of the United Nations and which I am glad to say has been ratified by no fewer than fifty eight nations, including Ceylon. It is a pleasure to refer to it as this year marks its tenth anniversary. The Convention safeguards human beings against the danger of being wiped out of existence, as has happened in the past. The adoption by the United Nations of this Convention has helped to increase the Organizations stature in the world because of its great moral significance. My delegation hopes that those who have still failed to ratify it will delay their ratification no longer.

Document No. 163 Sri Lanka Delegate on Troika Proposal**

12 October 1960. Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): We cannot ignore the fact that, in the implementation by him [the Secretary-General] of the Councils resolutions, he had to take actions on which there could be honest differences of opinion. Some might consider that a certain situation that existed, or suddenly arose, in the course of these operations should have

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 13th Session, 764th Pl. Mtg., Para 36. ** Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 15th Session, 901st Pl. Mtg.

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been dealt with in one way, while others might have thought that the action should have been different. Some may even go to the length of considering that the course adopted by him disclosed a partisan or prejudiced attitude. I myself stated in the Security Council that some actions of the Secretary-General, in my view, would appear to be due to errors of judgment, but we do not think that these were due to any partisan attitude. We also have to recognize that mistakes of this kind are inevitable in a situation of such magnitude and complexity, as the Congo situation has turned out to be. I might even state that the Security Council resolutions themselves might well have been much clearer and more precise. We do hope that the Soviet Union will be prepared to appreciate this point and continue to retain the confidence which it had in the Secretary-General. It was no doubt the Soviet Unions loss of confidence which prompted its Chairman of the Council of Ministers to suggest the abolition of the office of the Secretary-General and to replace it by a triumvirate or collegium of three persons representing the Western Powers, the Eastern Powers and the Neutralist Powers. We regret that we cannot accept this suggestion. First, its acceptance would require an amendment of the United Nations Charter and we ourselves know how strongly opposed the Soviet Union is to a revision of the Charter. Last year, when my delegation proposed the revision of the Charter to deal with what might be considered a merely technical matter - to permit an increase in the number of the members of the Economic and Social Council - in the course of a debate in the special Political Committee, the representative of the Soviet Union objected to it for the reason stated by him. I quote from the official record of the proceedings of that Committee on 14 October 1959: Mr. Sobolev noted with regret that the area of agreement essential to a revision of the Charter was still lacking in the General Assembly. The chief reason for that state of affairs was the absence from the United Nations of the lawful representatives of the Chinese people. . . . The same reason still holds good. How then can the Soviet Union expect its proposal to be implemented without a revision of the Charter, especially when the proposal deals with an important aspect affecting the structure of the Organization as laid down in the Charter? Quite apart from this, it is our view that the establishment of a triumvirate to take the place of the Secretary-General will not contribute in any positive way to the better working of the United Nations. The collegium or triumvirate - call it what you will - composed as suggested, would not, if it is at the same time hamstrung by giving the right of veto to each member, be capable of effective or prompt action or of discharging the responsibilities which, as successor to the Secretary-General, it would be called upon to assume under Charter. The Secretariat, if it is to be able to maintain the impartiality of the United Nations in the cold war and to further the interests of peace, should remain an act independently of cold war pressures and also serve as a kind of buffer, as well as a bridge, between the cold war groups. The body envisaged in the Soviet proposal would be too much of a product of the cold war to function with any independence, even if it could function at all.

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Abolition of the post of SecretaryGeneral would, in our view, weaken considerably the position of the United Nations and impair its future. We are, of course, not unaware of the damage that could ensure from the loss of confidence in the SecretaryGeneral by any major Power group or by any other substantial section of opinion. We trust, therefore, that, in the interests of the United Nations itself, further consideration will be given to this matter.

Document No. 164 Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike on Troika Proposal (General Policy Statement in the UN)*
27 September 1961. Mr. [F.R.D.] Bandaranaike (Ceylon): When the issue was raised of our attitude with regard to the proposal formulated by the Government of the Soviet Union in relation to the creation of a troika, which would require the amendment of the United Nations Charter, the Government of Ceylon expressed the view categorically - and it sees no reason to change it now - that it does not stand for any principle of a troika. We see in the principle of a troika a grave danger, a danger that the United Nations may lose its capacity for effective executive action, and executive action we must have if the United Nations General Assembly and its other institutions are to become a true vehicle to establish a world order and international peace. With that firm conviction in mind we have expressed our view. By that view we stand to date, and we would earnestly appeal to the Government of the Soviet Union to consider the question, within the realities of such divisions as exist in the world today, of making a choice of a person capable of interpreting correctly the collective view of the Assembly and of giving executive force to the decisions which we make here. The realities are there. There is no doubt that the world is divided. The argument has been presented on the floor of this Assembly that the world is divided into two groups of nations, nations which want to preserve the United Nations and its Charter, and nations, which want to destroy the United Nations and its Charter. The analysis does not seem to us to be quite so simple. It is not a question of saying: we want to establish the Charter, while you do not. Both sides say just that. The truth of the matter is that there are three groups of nations. There is a group of nations that stand by the ideologies of the Western world and free world, as it is sometimes called; there is a group of nations that stand solidly behind the ideology of communism; but there is a very significant group, a group of persons who constitute - although it is some time

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R ., 16th Session, 1017th Pl. Mtg. , Paras 148-161.

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disregarded - the rest of the world, and we represent in that sense a small constituent element of that third group, the rest of the world. The rest of the world does not get together and establish itself as a bloc or say to itself, we have a group of principles which we formulate and which we adopt on every occasion. We do not exist according to a code of rules; we exist merely because there are countries which are not concerned with these Great Power conflicts and which wish to be left alone and to stand aside without involvement and that is where we belong. It is not sufficient for any country to say, we stand by the United Nations Charter, the other side does not and by implication, to suggest here, then, is a group of neutrals who also stand by the United Nations Charter, and therefore, we are on their side. It just is not as simple as that. On every particular constructive question that arises for a decision of this Assembly, we are compelled to take position. We cannot stand aside and say that we are going to behave like the ostrich to which the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary referred a moment ago. We are vulnerable, and we know it. But, being vulnerable, we are not afraid to speak our mind, to take our head out of the sand unlike the proverbial ostrich, and to face the realities. During the last few days there had been a certain amount of discussion in the lobbies of the United Nations General Assembly to which, I must confess, I did not pay any particular attention. I did not pay any particular attention to it because, as the representative of a country which is a member of the Security Council, I found that what was being discussed was a proposition which I did not think would ever see the light of day or emerge in the form of any concrete resolution. I did not intend to refer to it here at all, but in view of something that was said by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary. I think that it is clearly my duty to make a statement with regard to it. Owing to a fear that there will be a deadlock with regard to the finding of an executive arm to carry out the resolutions of this international body, because of the difficulty that the Security Council might become deadlocked over the proposition put forward by the representative of the Soviet Union for a troika and the equally firm decision on the part of other countries not to yield to it but to maintain a single person as Secretary General a view which I personally accept on behalf of the Government of Ceylon, there is a proposal now beign talked about in a rather shadowy form with regard to the presentation of a draft resolution to the General Assembly whereby it would consider the appointment of some distinguished person, I suppose from one of the countries represented in the Assembly, who would function as a temporary SecretaryGeneral and interim officer, pending the resolution of the permanent dispute, a person who would be determined by the force of a majority vote. I thought the suggestion was so fantastic that I did not even give it any serious consideration earlier. But, with regard to the statement by the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, that where the Security Council is paralyzed by the possibility of vetoes, it then becomes necessary for us to consider action by the General Assembly according to the wishes of the majority of the world - I consider that an extremely

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dangerous statement, though uttered no doubt in perfect good faith and without perhaps a realization of some of the dangerous consequences it can entail for the whole of this Assembly. We are here, all of us whether we believe it or not, to carry out the principles of the Charter . Now, the Charter did not provide for decisions by a majority rule. There are some things in regard to which this Assembly however significant it is as an international body, is incapable of deciding by a majority rule. Visualized to yourselves that if all the representatives assembled here in this conference room were to get together and say, We will determine the pattern of life for the United States of America and the Soviet Union to follow. Supposing all of us vote on this barring of course, the representatives of the Soviet Union and of the United States. It is suggested that the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States should be bound by that majority decision. If one accepts a principle of that sort, then one has got to go the whole way and accept it as a general principle of subordinating ones own decisions to resolutions determined by majority rule. To start with, there is the weakness that we are not completely represented there. The most significant omission perhaps is still the Peoples Republic of China. And so long as that stands we cannot set ourselves up in that way. Besides, in the assembly we all stand as independent countries, whatever our size may be. We have only 10 million people, but we still count for one vote in this Assembly. I would still hesitate to take decisions, which could influence the life of the people of the United States of America or of the Soviet Union, based on majorities here. The proof of the matter is this: the Charter contemplated decisions to be taken by the Security Council in a sprit of compromise and co-operation. And that sprit of compromise and co-operation must be established between the United States and the Soviet Union if our decisions are really to mean anything. If we are not going to do that, and if we are going to look at this thing as a deadlock, a situation into which we have been forced where one country or the other is going to say, we cannot solve the problem in the Security Council, therefore, let us take a decision based on majority votes. All I can say is, that would be the first step towards the disintegration of the entire Organization and all that it stands for. The country, which puts forward a proposal of that kind, will be just as responsible for destroying the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter under cover of seeking to find a practical solution to a very real problem that is there. I do agree that the principle of the troika cannot be accepted. There is a very large body of opinion, I believe, represented in this hall which cannot agree with that point of view submitted by the Soviet Union. It certainly does not go to show that the nonaligned nations are adopting two codes of behavior. But may I say this: the fact that they are opposed to a troika, the fact that we realize that there is a need for some person to replace the late Mr. Hammarskjold , that cannot mean that we are going to decide these things on a majority vote, on a rail-roaded decision taken before the Assembly, mainly because the majority of us are opposed to an idea set up by the Soviet Union.

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The argument against the point of view I hold seems to be this: the Government of the Soviet Union, by presenting the argument of the troika has in effect negated the principles of the Charter by making impossible the election of a single person as SecretaryGeneral. That is the argument. Therefore, if the Government of the Soviet Union is going against the principles of the Charter, we have to find a solution outside the principles of the Charter. In other words, we are getting back to the age-old argument: at some time somebody else does wrong, let us do wrong too. But I do not agree that the point of view expressed by the Government of the Soviet Union necessarily amounts to a rejection of the principles of the Charter. The Government of the Soviet Union as it sees things within realities of the existing situation takes the line - I think quite wrongly - that the Charter requires amendments, that the Charter requires changes, at any rate in regard to the constitution of the office of the Secretary General. Now, they may be right or they may be wrong, but it must surely be open to any one of us in this Assembly to consider ways and means of improving the institutions of this Assembly as we think best. The best we can do is to put forward a proposal. Whether the proposal is going to find acceptance or not is a matter that must be decided by the entire body. At the moment it does not seem to me that the troika proposal of the Soviet Union meets with any general acceptance. But here is the point: one cannot regard a suggestion made for amendment, prejudge it and decide that it is a clear attempt to sabotage the Organization itself. If you make that assumption and start with a position that you are going to meet with the veto even before a proposal is submitted, if you start with an assumption that one cannot arrive at a satisfactory settlement among the Great Powers, then the United Nations has reached a very sorry stage indeed. In these circumstances, I do submit that it would be completely wrong and contrary to the principles of the Charter to take the argument: The Charter is silent in regard to acting appointments or temporary appointments. Let us create a procedure and let us use the technique of majority decisions before this Assembly to achieve that object. I do submit for the earnest consideration of a number of small countries like my own, the seriousness and the implications that any such proposal will have if it is seriously presented in the Assembly at any time. The late Mr. Hammarskjold himself expressed the point of view once that the United Nations exists for the protection of the small nations. If the United Nations is to serve a useful purpose within that context and to serve the small countries of this world well, it is surely a matter of great importance that merely because there is a need to find some replacement for the late Mr. Hammarskjold, we should not allow the sanctity of the institutions established in the Charter, which we respect, to be set aside and brought to naught by the result of hasty thought . The late Mr. Hammarskjold has now been dead, unfortunately, for some days, and yet we are here and the Assembly is functioning, the work of the United Nations has not been paralyzed yet. We are able to carry on, at least during these few days. Does it

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matter if this question is given a little further carefully considered thought? In other words, should we not endeavour to recall to our mind the lofty principles that inspired the United Nations in its thinking in San Francisco sixteen years ago, the principles of compromise, of trying to find solutions between the Great Powers. That surely must be the standard, which we must adopt in regard to our thinking.

Document No. 165 Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike on Non-representative Character of the United Nations (General Policy Statement in the UN)*
27 September 1961. Mr. [F.R.D.] Bandaranaike (Ceylon): I have already referred to the principles embodied in the troika and shall say nothing more concerning them. However it is fitting that I should here express the grief of Ceylon at the death of the Secretary-General Mr. Dag Hammarskjold. We have, on occasion, had compelling reasons to disagree with him, but we have never doubted his integrity or his single-minded dedication to the cause of world peace. Whatever mistakes he may have made, we feel that people of his calibre acting with such dedication in the cause of international peace, are very hard to replace. To find another person with the qualities of Mr. Hammarskjold will be difficult, and we should not confuse our attitude to that question with our attitude to the separate one of whether we should retain one single individual as Secretary General or amend the Charter to establish troikas. Many of these ideological problems and questions of amendment would cease to exist if we could agree upon a person in whom all the countries of this world could have confidence, and I am certain that I am not being unrealistic when I express the hope, on behalf of the Government and people of Ceylon, that there are still such people left in the world. The structure of the United Nations apart from the specific question of the Secretary General is a matter of increasing importance to this Organization. The membership of the United Nations today is almost double what it was at its inception. The change has not been merely a numerical change, for the addition of countries from Asia and Africa has no doubt had its very strong impact upon the character of the Organization. The time has therefore come to move the structure of the Organization itself into line with these changes, so that the Organization may become a body representative of the significant changes in world opinion brought about by the accession of Asian and African countries to the United Nations. I think it is a matter of general agreement that

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 16th Session, 1017th Pl. Mtg., Paras 181-184.

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the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, as they are constituted today, are under-representative. The important thing, however, is not the mere under representation, but the fact that, as a result of it, the capacity of these councils to play their full role as organs of the United Nations has been drastically limited. It is in the interests of the United Nations that these bodies should be expanded to express within themselves at any time the broad spectrum of world opinion. In the case of the Secretariat there has been continuing agitation, particularly on the part of African-Asian countries, that it should reflect in their due proportion the increased membership of Asian and African countries. We fully appreciate that this is a matter solely within the discretion of whoever becomes the Secretary- General and that it can be only one of many considerations to be borne in mind in the selection of personnel for the Secretariat. We would, however, commend to the consideration of whoever is chosen, without in any way prejudicing the independent character of the Secretariat itself, the suggestion that every endeavour be made to give the Secretariat more balanced representation of Member countries in the United Nations.

Document No. 166 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Role of the United Nations*
27 June 1963. Mr. [G.P.] Malalasekera (Ceylon): I have asked for your permission, Mr. President, to make a very brief statement to express the views of my delegation on the achievements of this special session. I believe that our most important achievement is that we have supplied our Secretary-General, U Thant, with the financial means for continuing the operation of the Organization, and his own remarkable work for peace, through the final six months of 1963. I know that the representatives who voted for the appropriations did so for varying reasons and with different reservations. However, they all did so with the common, strong conviction that the constructive decisions and important initiatives which U Thant has taken on behalf of peace in his comparatively brief tenure of office deserved unconditional support. Now we have given him that support. Apart from this achievement, all else will be a matter of dispute, especially among the commentators. And here I would venture to say that what we have failed to achieve is perhaps more constructive than what we have in fact achieved. We failed, for instance, to devise a final formula and a unanimous agreement on ways and means of implementing the peace keeping machinery which falls to this Organization; and that we failed to do so is indeed, in our view, fortunate. For had we succumbed to final and irrevocable

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., Fourth Special Session, 1205th Pl. Mtg., Paras 130-131, 133-139.

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decisions on definitive principles in an atmosphere of discord, we might perhaps have split and even wrecked, this world Organization. In this case, to have further considerations was better, in our view, than to have locked the door and thrown away the key. The various resolutions adopted to continue the work of the Working Group, to continue to seek further solutions in the hope that the chasms which now divide us may be closed, these are also achievements worthy of record. My delegation hopes that these deliberations preceding the regular Assembly will enable the eighteenth session to achieve and accord of all members on ways to implement the peace. We must always remember that real peace cannot be a solution by the majority. Even the smallest minority dissenter breaks that indivisibility which is the true measure of sound and constructive peace. . . . In the brief period that I have had the privilege of serving here, I have learned many lessons about international co-operation. Of these lessons, to my mind, the most important one is that the United Nations is not, as it is often said, the last hope for peace; it is the first hope, and perhaps even the sole hope. We are aware of various regional organizations, specially the military organizations which assert their claim to being the first hope. The extravagant budgets never put them under the label of nearbankruptcy which has plagued the United Nations. But these military Organizations are falling apart before our very eyes. The nuclear bombs, which are also invoked as the first defense line of peace certainly bring no peace, nor peace of mind to any body, and least of all to those who possess the nuclear bombs. But here we have the United Nations, with no armies, no bombs and almost no money, and it still towers above all pretentious rival organizations. The explanation for this paradox, to us, is eloquently simple. There is no force in the world, be it a military alliance or the most destructive magic weapon, which can equal the sum force of the collective effort for peace established here through this universal authority. The magnitude of this force, in which all the peoples of the world are represented not only physically and politically, but also even more so morally and spiritually, is something beyond all calculation. Because the United Nations, its family and its Charter, its hopes and its aspirations are the sole embodiment of this incalculable force, it remains, I say, the first, last and sole hope for universal peace. This is its unfathomable potential. This is the true nature of power in our time. The second lesson that I have learned is that the peoples of the world are the chief and unfailing supporters of this Organization, that they want the Organization to have the strength to bring their hopes and prayers for a peaceful world to complete fruition. The third lesson I have learned is that now we have gone beyond the stage when the United Nations has to solicit the support of peoples and nations, as it did in its first years. Today, on the other hand, the United Nations could well reverse the admonition to be out ward looking, it could become inward looking, it could search its own inner

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soul. And when it does so, at that moment of introspection, it will be seen that it is within itself that the United Nations must seek and find the support and strength it must have for the task that lies before it. The United Nations itself must purge those divisions which now bedevil it: The big-power divisions; the ideological divisions; and now, unhappily, the divisions between the three peacekeeping organs, the General Assembly, the Security Council and the office of the SecretaryGeneral. It is not in the dogma of false nationalism, in the fallacies of extremist moments, in the heresies of gun-toting alliances, nor in the skepticisms of peoples, where lies the main obstacles to our labour. It is within ourselves that these obstacles exist. This is the situation with which we are faced, and this is the situation, which must be changed. What representative here would be brave enough to go back to his country and tell his people that the United Nations cannot function because of rivalry for power among the peace keeping organs? No one can do that. The General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat must not be permitted to become involved in the brawlings of an unhappy family. The needs of the time and majesty of the panoramic vista of the future that spreads itself before us require that these three organs the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat must form a solid phalanx in the course of peace and human happiness. To effect this consolidation is the task that awaits this Organization after this session is adjourned.

Document No. 167 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike on the United Nations*
23 January 1964 In the United Nations our Government has supported the principles of wider and more complete representation in all the Councils of that assembly, particularly in the Security Council and in the Economic and Social Council, and this year our efforts have yielded some degree of success. The world has advanced substantially over last few years towards eliminating the few remaining pockets of colonialism in Africa and Asia, and Ceylon is proud to feel that by her contributions in the Security Council and in the United Nations she has won the regard of many nations.

* Source: Hansard (Senate), Vol.19, Col. 2398.

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Document No.168 Text of Prime Minister Dudley Senanayakes Message to the U.N. SecretaryGeneral on the 20th Anniversary of the Signing of the UN Charter*
25 June 1965. Two decades of international co-operation through the United Nations Organization is an achievement of which all mankind could justly be proud. The 20th anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter is thus a memorable occasion not only for those countries which were represented at the signing ceremony in San Francisco on 26th June, 1945, but also for countries like Ceylon which re-emerged into freedom within this period. What we commemorate today represents something more than the collective will of those nations, which made this memorable event possible. The UN Charter - as with all great documents of human history belongs to mankind as a whole. The ideals embodied in the inspiring preamble to the Charter represent all that is decent and civilized in human aspirations, and the Charter itself provides the machinery through which the differences which divide nation from nation can be resolved. Above all, the United Nations still represents mankinds best hope for survival in a world which is in constant danger of extinction. Since that historic day in June, twenty years ago, the United Nations Organization has shown a capacity for survival and growth. It has demonstrated its ability to keep the peace in many areas and its capacity to serve the cause of economic progress throughout the world. It has known and survived many crises because it has tried conscientiously to satisfy mankinds aspirations. Therefore, on the 20th anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter, I am happy to declare my countrys continued faith in and support for the United Nations and our adherence to the purposes and principles of its Charter.

* Source : Ministry of Defence and External Affairs , Colombo.

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Document No. 169 Sri Lanka Delegate on the U.N. as an Organization for the Promotion of World Peace*
1st October 1965. Mr. [G.G] Ponnaambalam (Ceylon): History records and demonstrates that, whilst rulers and governments may have been concerned and preoccupied with the extension of national boundaries and have been ready to have recourse to war as and instrument and means of expanding their powers, mankind on the other hand, both collectively and individually, in all territories and all climes, has been wedded to the idea of peace. This was manifested after the First World War with the desire to form a collective comity of nations as a means by which war could be outlawed. It was a singular historical irony that the illustrious author of the concept behind the League of Nations could not persuade his own countrys legislature actively to participate in the work of the league. It was an even greater irony that the league became, in the ensuing years, a cul-de-sac of good intentions. And in the world at large, the collective will for peace had not yet gathered sufficient momentum or strength to prevent an even more devastating world conflict. On the termination of the Second World War, however, the war-weary peoples of the world manifested a determination to fashion an Organization to put an end to war as an instrument for the solution of international problems. This collective will of the people for peace was given coherent shape by the founding fathers of the United Nations when they fashioned an Organization that would, by means of negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration, prevent international conflicts and differences from reaching the point of war. I venture to think, however, that the most optimistic of the founders of the United Nations could hardly have visualized in 1945 that the body that they were then creating could, in the course of the ensuing twenty years, not only prevent regional conflicts from escalating into global wars, but also extend the areas of freedom and national sovereignty to a very large number of subject nations, so as to enable them to become active advocates of a stable world order. One is, of course, conscious of the fact that there is a certain degree of disappointment, amounting in some cases even to disillusionment, that this Organization has not achieved more than it actually has. But even its severest critics must, on sober reflection, concede for it a not unenviable record of achievement in both the political and economic spheres of activity. To the vast majority, if not all, of the smaller and recently independent nations of the world, this Organization is the repository of the ultimate hopes for their salvation and

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 20TH Session, 1965, 1345th Pl. Mtg.

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survival. If I may strike an individual note, I am proud to be able state that I stand here representing the only one of the newly independent countries which has been able, by free exercise of the free votes of a free people wedded to a democratic way of life, to change its Government on to occasions within in last ten years, and still remain pledged to uphold the principles of the Charter of this Organization. We have little or no differences with our neighbours, and what differences there are we have always sought to resolve by friendly negotiations. I am happy to state that, in the assertion of our independence, we have assiduously refrained from entering in to any regional or other alliances as a means of ensuring our national security and territorial integrity. We look to you, fellow member states, collectively, to assure us of both and to ensure that degree of international stability which alone will enable all nations to reach fulfillment. It is my fervent hope that in the not too distant future, every country will actively eschew alliances, particularly of a military nature, in the supreme confidence that this world Assembly will render such alliances not merely superfluous but actually meaningless. How then is this Organization to be fashioned and its machinery to be strengthened to make it the ultimate and potent instrument for the establishment of a civilized world order? Here I would venture to suggest that, whilst the existing machinery for negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration is further built up and reinforced, the Member States of this body should manifest their determined and collective will for peace by investing the Organization with such further powers as will prevent any two countries from even contemplating a resort to arms as a possible means of resolving their disputes. It would be my submission that for the achievement of this objective an emergency force, got together in haste, ad hoc, and after the occurrence of an event in some part of the world which calls for active intervention of the United Nations, will not suffice. In this context, I feel sure that all of us will welcome the definitive steps taken by the Canadian Government, and announced by its distinguished Foreign Minister, and similar steps taken by the Scandinavian and other countries. But what I contemplate, and would like to commend to Member States, is the creation of an integrated standing force to which every Member State, regardless of its size, importance, strength or affluence, would contribute in men and material, to be placed at the exclusive disposal and command of the United Nations. To ensure avoidance of any criticism or misgiving that the larger countries are likely to exercise an undue influence, care may be taken that no major power either is over- represented by the extent of its military participation or has a preponderant voice by reason of its financial contribution. It is my earnest hope that every small and medium sized country will, without exception, actively contribute and participate in this venture, and that all mediumsize countries will not hesitate to throw in their weight in ample measure. And if my proposal, which I humbly tender, were to find ready and willing acceptance among fellow Member States, I should be happy to pledge the support of my Government as a token of our faith and earnestness. One may well inquire, at this stage, what is to be the function of such a task force and when it should begin to operate. To this I would tentatively answer that the force

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would move in and interpose itself in an area where there was, in the view of the United Nations, a very grave and imminent danger of an armed conflict, and it would create the necessary conditions and climate for the peaceful resolution of the impending conflict by negotiation and/or mediation. An example of such a situation would be where there was a massing of troops along an international frontier by one country leading to a real apprehension on the part of the other country of an invasion. The force would also move in and interpose itself between the armies of two countries engaged in hostilities and bring about a separation of the combatants by the use, if necessary, of minimum coercive measures, and would thereafter create the conditions necessary for negotiation and/or mediation. The entire civilized world has heaved a sigh of immeasurable relief that the two great nations of India and Pakistan have acceded to the demand of the United Nations to bring about a ceasefire. Had the demand for the cease-fire not been agreed to by the two states, it would be difficult to imagine the extent of the suffering of the people of the two countries during what would have been in the circumstances, an inordinate delay before this Assembly could have decided upon the next step and gathered the wherewithal to take effective measures to enforce a ceasefire. May God forbid the recurrence of such an event in the foreseeable future, but if it were to happen, should not this Organization be fully prepared to intervene effectively and promptly on its own independent initiative? In this context, I should not like to be understood directly or by implication as wanting to minimize what I consider to be the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council to preserve world peace. But I would respectfully like to observe that it should not remain their exclusive responsibility. It has been something of a tragedy that the built-in weaknesses of the structure of the Security Council have made it difficult for it to act effectively on occasion for lack of unanimity. And, without attempting to detract from the powers and functions of that body, I should like to reassert that it is the inescapable duty of the General Assembly in the last resort, having regard to the near universality of its membership, to preserve world peace and a stable international order. It would be nothing short of a disaster if these two limbs of the United Nations, which were intended by the Charter to be complementary to one another, should become competing organs of the world Organization. Here, I should like to observe that I also feel that the crisis from which this body has recently emerged, by a display of statesmanship by all concerned, was not basically a crisis due to the distribution of the financial responsibilities involved in peacekeeping operations, but, in fact, a crisis involving the ultimate determination of the extent to which the international community is prepared actively to ensure the maintenance of world peace and the prevention of armed conflicts. I conceive the activities of the United Nations for the achievement of the objectives of world peace broadly under two heads: peace building, on the one-hand, and peace keeping and enforcement on the other.

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I sincerely regret the necessity that has impelled me to place in the forefront of my observation the need for setting up machinery for peacekeeping and enforcement of the peace. Perhaps I have been influenced consciously or unconsciously - by the state of international relations in the world today. My Government, however, attaches the deepest significance and importance to the peacebuilding activities of the United Nations. Here I would like to welcome the initiative taken by the United Kingdom in placing this matter on the agenda of this assembly, and while, no doubt, we shall all benefit by the studies to contemplate therein, a sense of urgency impels me to suggest that early steps should be taken to utilize machinery that is already available to the United Nations in this regard. When civilized society has come so readily to accept the observance of the rule of law as indispensable for the orderly and equitable conduct of national affairs, is it too much for this Assembly to set as its goal the evolution of a rule of international law to which Member States could have recourse for the governance of their relations with one another? We have already available to us under the Charter, as a primary organ, the International Court of Justice, whose judgments are binding on parties who, by agreement, take their disputes before it. In order to achieve the growth of a body of international law adequate to meet current international problems, should we not devise ways of bringing justiciable disputes before that Court? Could we not persuade ourselves to increase the number of legal issues that we may agree to consider justifiable? Is it too much to expect, in this nuclear age, that our collective will for peace should enable us not only to accept as binding judgments in contentious litigation which have been referred to the Court, but also to elevate to the status of binding judicial decisions advisory opinions that have been sought from the Court? If, as I earnestly hope, this suggestion of mine becomes acceptable to the vast majority of our fellow Member States, then one of the primary organs of this Organization would achieve its highest stature and become one of the most potent instruments in our armoury for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Here, I should like to make a fervent appeal to the big and powerful nations, which so far either have not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court or, in accepting it, have made such wide reservations as to render a such acceptance almost nugatory, to accept compulsory jurisdiction without reserve in the highest interest of international goodwill, peace and solidarity, such a move on their part, I feel confident, will find willing and ready response among some smaller nations which may have so far been lukewarm about accepting and acknowledging the authority of the Court, and I sincerely look forward to an international climate in the comparatively near future when the judicial settlement of international disputes will be considered the norm rather than the exception. Another item of machinery that should be available to the United Nations for the furtherance of peace-building activities is a political task force which can step in and intervene even before a dispute has had time to crystallize in to a justiciable one. Recent experience has shown that the United Nations has, happily, been successful in bringing about a cessation of hostilities and a cease-fire in a number of situations, but in most of these areas the United Nations has been unable to resolve the basic causes underlying

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the conflicts. It has had to content itself with the maintenance of a mission merely to enforce the continuance of the cease-fire. This, as recent history has shown, has led to a feeling of frustration and of disillusionment among the contending parties and a loss of faith among a large number of other nations that have looked forward to a final resolution of the courses of conflict in the areas of tension. It appears to me, therefore, that there should be made available to the United Nations, immediately, a body of distinguished and highly respected men of representative status and character who could, as a committee of the United Nations move in to the area of conflict and there confer with the leaders and Government of the contending parties, devise the best means of eliminating the causes of tension, and endeavor to negotiate a political settlement of the outstanding differences. Where such efforts succeeded, these would then be reported to the General Assembly or the Security Council as a final settlement of the dispute. In the event of any margin of difference which could not be resolved by the agreement, this could be reported together with that, in the opinion of the committee, would be a just, fair and honorable settlement for adopting settlement for adoption and enforcement by the United Nations. I should also venture to suggest that this political task committee could move into areas where political differences exist which might, even though not immediately, lead to hostilities. It could make observations, hold conferences, assess the nature and extent of the dispute and devise means of a settlement between the contending parties. Here again, any margin of difference could be reported back with what, in their view, would be a fair and just settlement for enforcement. A third means of strengthening the peacebuilding capacity of the United Nations, and its powers and prestige, would be by further increasing its representative character by inviting into its fold countries like China and Indonesia. Our membership covers states with every type of political organization and every shade of political philosophy, and yet, on matters of universal interest like peace and the economic development of developing nations, the last twenty years have shown that it has not merely been desirable but actually possible for this heterogeneous group of countries, big and small, to get round a conference table and jointly try to solve these problems. . ..

Document No. 170 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Establishment of a World Food Reserve*
11 January 1957. Mr. [D.W.] Rajapathirana (Ceylon) wondered whether it was wise to consider the question of a world food reserve apart from the wider background of economic development as a whole. Many countries had insufficient food to maintain satisfactory

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 11th Session , Second Committee, 415th Mtg., Para 20.

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standards of nutrition because per capita income was too low for the population to afford the necessities of life and so they did not maintain a steady demand for food from the areas which could supply them. Economic development must therefore precede the establishment of a world food reserve and create a demand for the food, which was available in the more fortunate parts of the world. At the same time, no steps should be taken which would result in the food surpluses of highcost producers lowering the prices which were reasonable for foodstuffs grown in other areas. While welcoming the United States contribution to the discussion, he emphasized the primary importance of establishing organizations like SUNFED which would promote economic development.

Document No. 171 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Establishment of a World Food Reserve*
15 January 1957. Mr. [D.W] Rajarapathirana (Ceylon) recalled that, in a statement to the 415th meeting, his delegation had expressed the fear that the establishment of a world food reserve would not of itself remedy the ills of the world, half the population of which was suffering from serious under-nourishment. Although his delegation had expressed its readiness to support the idea of a world food reserve, it had emphasized that the only lasting solution was to be found in economic development and a higher level of real income. He realized that economic development, if not wisely planned, could cause a deficit of food resources in the under developed countries; in such an event the value of a world reserve would be unquestionable. Planning mistakes were not, however, inevitable. In that connexion, he was very impressed by the example of the Peoples Republic of China which, apart from any political considerations, had achieved remarkable economic results enabling it, among other things, to exchange rice for Ceylonese rubber; such trade, which was of benefit to both countries, was something new. It was nevertheless true that countries like Ceylon could not achieve rapid and balanced economic development unless they had the means of laying a sound social infrastructure. The financing of economic development should therefore be the first concern of the United Nations. Turning to the United States draft resolution [A/C.2/L.297 and corr.1], he noted that it began by referring to the desirability of achieving the objectives set forth in General Assembly resolution 827(ix). The first two of those objectives to raise the levels of production and standards of consumption of food in the under-developed countries

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 11th Session , Second Committee, 417th Mtg. , Paras 7-14.

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and to relieve famine and other emergency situations called for resolute action, for many obstacles had yet to be overcome, the most important in the case of the second objective being the financing of food purchases and the transport of foodstuffs. So far as the third objective to prevent short-term fluctuations in agricultural prices - was concerned, the United Nations had been considering the problem for some years but had not yet succeeded in finding a rational solution. He considered, however, that the Economic and Social Council was more qualified than the Second Committee to deal with the matter; the Committee would do well to endorse the conclusions the Council had reached after exhaustive examination. The General Assembly had recommended that the agricultural surpluses that appeared from time to time should be used to counteract longterm fluctuations. In that connexion the amendment proposed by the Danish delegation [A\C.2\L.299] rightly emphasized the FAO principles and for that reason was welcomed by the Ceylonese delegation. There was no longer any need to dwell on the generosity with which the United States of America distributed the large reserves of agricultural produce it had accumulated; it was assured of the gratitude of the under-developed countries. It remained to be seen, however, whether high-cost food could compete on the world market with lowcost food. Indeed, many countries could not dispose of their normal production below a certain price without making great sacrifices. The problem was a difficult one. His delegation would be very happy if all countries which had surpluses were prepared to assist the under-developed countries, as the United States was doing, and if they endorsed the idea of the establishment of a world food reserve to promote economic development. It was in the hope that surpluses would be useful in that respect that his delegation would consider voting in favor of the United States draft resolution.

Document No. 172 Special U.N. Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED): Sri Lankas Plea for its Establishment*
4 February 1957. Mr. [D.W.] Rajapathirana (Ceylon) said that his country had found that such institutions as the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, though admirable in their work and international in their scope, were incapable, by reason of their structure,

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 11th Session , Second Committee, 433rd Mtg., Paras 7-10.

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articles and mode of operation, of meeting the pressing financial needs of the underdeveloped countries. Ceylon had also found that bilateral aid, welcome and useful though it might be, tended to bring with it tensions and misunderstandings both in the beneficiary countries and in their neighbors. It was therefore clear that the two types of financial assistance available to the under-developed countries were inadequate for the purpose. Yet the problem was one for the United Nations as a whole to solve, as article 55 of the Charter made clear. The report of the Economic and Social Council [A/3154] and the World Economic Survey, 1955 [E/2864] revealed that, on the one hand, there was a long term tendency in the world economic situation for the gap between the levels of living and the levels of development of the advanced and the less advanced countries to widen and that, on the other hand, the economic development of the less developed areas could bring benefits not only to such areas but also to the world as a whole. In the light of such considerations it was reasonable to ask whether the United Nations was doing enough in its present programmers for the under-developed countries. The besetting ills of those countries were low per capita income, with all its concomitants, including a slow rate of economic development, and conditions of economic instability. For countries not prepared to adopt drastic methods, financial assistance from outside was the only solution. Present resources, however, were insufficient. The United Nations had recognized that fact as long ago as 1949, and the idea of SUNFED had crystallized in 1952. Since that time many studies had been made which had pointed to the desirability of establishing SUNFED. It was to be wondered, therefore, why the industrialized countries were now slow to respond to a concrete proposal. The ostensible reason was the heavy burden on their budgets of the cost of armaments production necessitated by world political tensions. It was a fact, however, that world tensions were in part due to the arms race and to economic instability. Furthermore, the cost of setting up SUNFED would be negligible compared with the cost of defense measures, and his delegation was convinced that the highly developed countries could contribute to SUNFED without detriment to their defense programmes. It was in that conviction that his delegation had supported the thirty-nine-power draft resolution, which was designed to facilitate the ultimate establishment of SUNFED; there was no question of trying to bring pressure to bear on the countries whose support was vital for its success. Certain delegations had expressed the view that it was inopportune either to establish SUNFED now or to draft its statute or even to consider what further steps were necessary to permit its establishment. They had argued that some countries had not replied to the questionnaire addressed to them by the SecretaryGeneral. But the failure of Governments to reply to a questionnaire was, he submitted, no good reason for halting the actions of the United Nations. A second argument was that there was a great divergence of views among the forty-six Governments, which had replied. Such a divergence of views was, however, only to be expected, given the natural economic and political differences between those countries. In any case, all the replies had agreed upon the necessity of establishing SUNFED. His delegation therefore believed that a draft statute should be prepared for consideration by the Economic and Social Council and, later, by the General Assembly at its twelfth session. There was no lack of

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material on which the ad hoc committee could base its work. United Nations bodies had been producing material for the past four years and more. The report of the Committee of Nine [E/2381] was an excellent source of information. Moreover, the Ad Hoc Committee was asked to prepare only a draft; there would be ample opportunity for comment and amendment before it was adopted. It had also been urged that since the United States, which would be the main contributor, was opposed to the proposal, no action should be taken. But that was, in his view, a misrepresentation of the United States attitude. What its representatives had said was that it could not agree to the drafting of a statute at the present time and could not contemplate contributing to a new fund in existing circumstances. He had, however, assured the Committee that his delegation was ready to consider any suggestion for further study by the Ad Hoc Committee. Ceylon had great faith in the policies of the United States and was sure that the attitude of the latter was not so inflexible that the Committee could not find a way of engaging its active support and assistance towards an objective of which it manifestly approved and which, moreover, all countries were under an obligation to seek, under articles 55 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Document No. 173 Sri Lanka Delegates Support for the Special U.N. Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED)*
20 October 1957. MR. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): The world today is facing in addition to serious political problems, an economic crisis, which no one nation can tackle but which has to be tackled internationally. On the whole, the world is passing through a phase of shortage of private capital for development. In this situation, countries like Ceylon have to put their faith in the fulfillment of ideals such as the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, the seeds of which were sown in the United Nations about five years ago but the fruition of which has been delayed by lack of agreement among the big powers. This is the time when the big-powers must act and divert at least a fraction of the energies and expenses of cold wars and armaments to a special fund. Indeed, it has been said that a quarter of 1 percent of defense expenditure will be sufficient to support SUNFED and put it into operation.

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 12th Session, 698th Pl. Mtg., Para 94.

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Document No. 174 Sri Lankas Support for the Establishment of SUNFED*
28 November 1957. Mr. [D.W.] Rajapathirana (Ceylon) observed that from the time of the battle of Waterloo to the First World War, most of the investment in the under-developed countries had come from the United Kingdom, not so much for balanced development of the underdeveloped countries themselves, but rather as part of that countrys thriving commercial enterprise which resulted in a growing balance of international account. After the First World War, however, with the awakening of the under-developed areas to political and economic consciousness, the direction and purpose of such investments by industrial countries came under examination. The industrially developed countries had also come to see the need to foster a balanced and integrated world economy. The authors of the United Nations Charter had no doubt been guided by that consideration in requiring signatories to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples and to create the conditions of stability and wellbeing which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations through the promotion of higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development. In pursuance of those aims, the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (TAA) had been founded and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance launched, while the various specialized agencies had served, each in its own sphere. But all that had been felt to be not enough, and the General Assembly had adopted successive resolutions - Resolution 520 (VI), Resolution 822 (IX), and Resolution 1030 (XI) - favoring the establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. The Economic and Social Council in turn, in its Resolution 662 (XXXIV), had urged the General Assembly to decide to establish the fund and to take the steps necessary to that end. The elevenpower draft resolution now before the Committee was the natural outcome of all the past works in that direction. It was very disappointing therefore to find that the United States was not now prepared to support the establishment of a capital financing fund especially as the very idea of such a fund had emanated from United States economists and sociologists and was still widely supported in that country. He deplored the notion that establishment of the fund should be contingent upon the attainment of agreement on disarmament, for that in effect was subordinating the cause of peace to the cause of war. He was glad, however, to note that certain important European countries such as France and the Netherlands did not share the United States view on that point.

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 12th Session, 2nd Committee. , 497th Mtg., Paras 21-24.

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It was a matter of observation that in spite of the greatly increased rate of production of the industrial countries, there was a considerable weakening internationally or internal erosion in the value of their currencies. But there was evidence that that symptom could be allayed if the economic growth of the industrial countries could be matched by an equal rate of economic growth among the under-developed countries. For that, however, the latter countries needed capital funds. The United States proposal did not, he submitted, hold out any hope in that direction. An enlarged Expanded Programme would of course, be very welcome, and the proposed Special Projects Fund would be a helpful addition to the present technical assistance work, but even assuming that contributors other than the United States would rally round and provide the $ 66 million necessary to make up the total $ 100 million fund and that, he considered, was highly unlikely in view of the expressed reservations made by many delegations in giving their support to the resolution [A/C 2/L 347] adopted by the Second Committee at its 489th meeting appealing to participating Governments to consider increasing the financial resources of the Expanded Programme there was no indication that any real economic development would succeed the proliferation of studies which was all that the proposal had immediately in view. The proposed Special Projects Fund would do no more, in fact, if anything, somewhat less, than was already being done under the Expanded Programme; indeed, it had been stated quite categorically that it was not intended to function as an international capital fund. It was unrealistic to suppose that private capital would come into play when the preliminary surveys had been completed. In many countries domestic investment required merely to maintain existing standards of living. Moreover, there was no guarantee that a form of economic development, which had proved successful in one country or area, would be equally successful when transplanted elsewhere. Furthermore, the building of the economic and social infrastructure, which was the essential basis for any increase in productivity, could not be financed out of private capital or by existing international financing institutions such as the Bank. It was for that reason that the under-developed countries clung to the idea of a United Nations Economic Development Fund, an idea which had been endorsed at the AsianAfrican Conference at Bandung by a great many States, members of the United Nations from Asia, Africa and the Middle East. His delegation had been acutely disappointed to hear the United Kingdom, too, a country long in the forefront in the financing of economic development, opposed the immediate establishment of an Economic Development Fund. It was not that such countries as the United Kingdom and the United States had not devoted large sums to the financing of economic development in the under-developed countries, but simply that the problem was so vast that all that had been done so far was no more than a drop in the bucket. He earnestly hoped, therefore, that the United Nations would awake to its responsibilities in that field, that it would not let the great idea of SUNFED wither and die, and that it would see to it that the help given to the under-developed countries in their urgent need was neither too little nor too late.

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Document No. 175 Sri Lankas Support for the Creation of a Regional Economic Commission for Africa*
22 October 1957. Mr. [D.W.] Rajapathirana (Ceylon) said that the three regional economic commissions in Europe, Latin America, and the Far East had won the lively interest and support of Member states in their areas. There was ample evidence that they had been of great value to those countries and had fully justified their existence. There would, therefore, seem to be no good reason for delay in setting up a similar commission in Africa. The underdeveloped countries of Africa were now awakening to a new sense of life, politically and economically. The present, therefore, was the moment at which the United Nations should help them find a rallying point for their ideas and a pool of experience and knowledge from which they could draw. In fact, most delegations appeared to share that view; there had, however, been one speaker who had cast doubts on the advisability of adopting the resolution and his main objection had been the differences between the northern and southern parts of Africa. But such differences were to be found every where, in Europe, the Far East and Latin America. The problem, therefore, was purely an imaginary one. It would be better to tackle the real ones. That certain real problems did exist was not denied, but when the Committee, and after it the General Assembly, approved the draft resolution, the Secretariat could begin studying the problems and, thereafter, the Economic and Social Council could seek solutions to them in consultation with countries in the region. He hoped that the commission would be established in the very near future.

Document No. 176 Sri Lanka Delegate on Disarmament and Economic Development**
12 October 1960. Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): It seems to my delegation that there are two ways in which we can fruitfully continue our effort. I have in mind the two most important issues which vitally affect the question of word security and peace. I refer to the need to stop the arms race and to stop the discontent and dissatisfaction which exist and spread rapidly through the world, particularly in the under-developed areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America, caused by the presence of hunger and want, ignorance and disease, and

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R ., 12th Session , 2nd Committee., 469th Mtg., Paras 25. ** Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 15th Session , 1960, 901 st Pl. Mtg.

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by so many of the other social ills of our modern society. These two problems, which are usually referred to as the problems of disarmament and of economic development, are the main problems we have to deal with. If I were cynical, which, of course, would be inexcusable in view of the gravity of the present situation, I might be inclined to ask myself whether there is any use in thinking of economic development, however important that may be, when the prospect of the complete destruction of all humanity is not too remote a possibility. Of course, we cannot allow this defeatist attitude to take possession of us. We have to go on hoping and praying and actively working for a speedy settlement of the disarmament problem. The question of economic development is closely connected with disarmament, because the financial resources of countries involved in the arms race are committed, almost to the maximum of their capacity, to the building up and maintaining of the best and most modern weapons of destruction. Economic development, to be effective, must be tackled in a large and comprehensive manner, not in little efforts. It must be an attack on all fronts, conceived and prepared with greater imagination and larger resources than were devoted to the Marshall plan for the recovery of Europe. Are not Asia, Africa and Latin America of at least equal importance? In fact , more people live in these regions. They are poorer and more handicapped by the lack of technology and capital than more the people of Europe. We are glad of the assistance that was provided for the people of Europe, but we hope that the needs of these other countries will be kept in mind. This can be done only if we put an end to the arms race and transfer a major part of what is so lavishly spent on weapons of destruction built solely with the object of destroying humanity on mass scale - to the constructive humanitarian purpose of improving the standards of living of all people so that they may live in dignity and contentment. I must not fail to recognize that some effort is being made by the United Nations and by individual countries to aid economic development. This is good and is welcome, but how meager is this effort and how totally out of proportion to the great need. In the United Nations, we have the scheme of technical aid. We have the scheme of expanded technical aid. We have the special fund. We know how limited are the financial resources available to these schemes. Take the proposal to set up a capital development. It has been received with so little warmth or enthusiasm that one wonders whether the whole objective of the world is to destroy and incidentally, to be destroyed in the process, and not build. Last year, I discussed this question fully, but, for want of time, I do not propose to do so this occasion. I only wish to draw the attention of this Assembly once again to the need for comprehensive and large scale action for the sake of humanity.

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Document No. 177 Sri Lanka Delegate on Economic Assistance for Under-Developed Countries*
30 September 1958. Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): I would now like briefly to turn my attention to some vital economic problems affecting more than half the human race. These were recognized as early as 1945 when the founding fathers of the United Nations wrote into the Charter the obligations of Member States in the following words: to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples. I would like to emphasize the words international machinery. And, proceeding further, it was stated that: condition of stability and well-being . . . are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations . And to that end they enjoined the United Nations to work towards: higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development. Thus, it was that at the sixth session of the General Assembly a resolution was passed [Resolution 520-A (vi)] requesting the Economic and Social Council to submit to the General Assembly at its seventh session a detailed plan for establishing as soon as circumstances permitted, a special fund for grants-in-aid and for low-interest long-term loans to under-developed countries for the purpose of helping them to accelerate their economic development. My delegation regrets that a fund for such assistance on any considerable scale is yet to be established. Meanwhile, the less developed countries have been put under considerable economic and financial strain. It is, however, a fact that some effort has been made both in the United Nations and by some of the more advanced and industrially great countries to act in fulfillment of their Charter obligations. My delegation wishes to give expression to our appreciation, and indeed our gratitude, to these countries for the help they have so far given. We would like also to express our appreciation of the efforts made by the Secretary General in this direction. Unfortunately he is unable to act on his own. He can put forward suggestions and proposals but it is for Member States to act on such proposals, and it is our unfortunate experience that his initiative has been dampened and even thwarted by lack of enthusiasm and even opposition from those countries which alone can supply the essential financial aid necessary. However, one can see a great realization on the part of strong countries of the needs for economic development. I would refer to the great and generous step taken by the United States soon after the end of the Second World War when Marshall plan aid was given to the war-ravaged countries of Europe. This statesmanlike action saved Europe from total economic

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 13th Session, 764th Pl. Mtg., paras 41-51.

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collapse. The need in Europe at that time was great and the help most opportune. The United States will always be remembered with gratitude by millions of people in Europe. No such largescale economic operation took place in other parts of the world. The under-developed countries of the world, whether in Asia, Africa or Latin America, have as much, if not greater, need of help. We are well aware of the existence of hunger and want, of illiteracy and disease, of abnormally low standards of living in these areas where more than half of the human race lives. As a result, there is growing discontent and dissatisfaction among these peoples, many of whom have adopted the democratic way of life. The peoples of Asia are in an economic ferment. There is a revolution fortunately, still a revolution of expectancy. The people are still upward and forward and are stretching forth their hands in expectancy that the good things of life to which they know they are entitled will soon be forthcoming. In this connexion we cannot delay much longer the help that they need and it is up to us in the United Nations to do everything possible to help. The underdeveloped countries have many handicaps, but the most important of them is the lack of adequate technical skill and financial resources. A great deal has already been done through the United Nations technical assistance scheme, the Colombo Plan and the technical aid programmes of the United States, the USSR and other countries. Regarding the former - that is, technical skill - grants and loans by many countries under bilateral arrangements, loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the limited financial resources of underdeveloped countries themselves have been of some help, but the sum total of all these efforts has been far below the need. Some good has been done, but a great deal more remains to be done. Recognizing this need, the United Nations attempted two years ago to obtain the support of member states for a fairly comprehensive scheme of economic assistance, which came to be described and known as the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). This move lacked adequate support from those whose support was necessary. We are sorry that this miniature Marshal Plan idea for assistance to under-developed countries therefore had to be abandoned. My delegation is, however, glad that a scheme is now before this Assembly, even through it is much more limited. On the principle that we must be thankful for small mercies, my delegation welcomes this proposal and hopes that it will be adopted and that its execution will be made free of political maneuvers. In the Governing Council, which will administer the aid scheme, representation should be such as will ensure its activities on a purely economic and non-political basis. My delegation is glad that the Economic Commission for Africa has been established. Asia already has such a commission, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. These two organizations will be of great benefit to the people of these two underdeveloped continents. But they will fail if their work is not fully supported by financial aid to enable beneficial schemes of development to be undertaken.

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It is with great pleasure that my delegation has seen a new trend developing. I refer to the recognition by the United States and other countries of the absolute need for large scale financial assistance. My delegation would like to say that it was with the keenest appreciation that we heard the President of the United States [733rd meeting] speaking to the third emergency special session, advocating the creation of a financial institution for the benefit of the Middle East countries, to which he pledged American support. We note with pleasure that the Soviet Union has likewise pledged its support. The other development in the same direction, which also was hailed with delight, is the information received recently that, at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the United States and Latin American countries, held in Washington, a decision was reached to set up a banking institution with United States support to help in the economic developments of the Latin American countries. These are two great developments and we hope for the speedy establishment of these institutions and their unhampered success in the future. It is the hope of my delegation that similar action will be considered in regard to the great area of South and South-East Asia where poverty, hunger and want are rampant among a people who number a quarter of the whole human race. The danger to peace and the challenge to democracy implicit in the low standards of living of Asian people must be a matter of serious concern to the United Nations and to all democratic countries, and I may extend the sense of what I have just said not only to Asian peoples, but also to the peoples of all the under-developed countries of the world. No effort should therefore be spared to deal effectively and speedily with this important matter. I have tried to show how important is the aspect of financial assistance from advanced countries to less developed countries. There is, however, another aspect, which is no less important. It, is the aspect of selfhelp. Under-developed countries are now engaged in the utilization of all their resources to build for themselves a better world in their own countries through their own efforts. They would prefer to do this to the utmost limit within their means and to look for help from outside only when their limited resources are exhausted. In this endeavor, help not involving immediate financial grants or loans is still necessary. Most of the under-developed countries are agricultural, raw material producers. They depend on the sale of their products in the world markets. The frequent and oft-times sudden fluctuations affect seriously and adversely the economies of these countries. The lack of price stability is one of the dangers to which they are exposed. Moreover a fair and reasonable price for their products is also important. It is imperative, therefore, that measures should be taken to prevent such sharp fluctuations and to ensure that world market prices are fair and reasonable both to producer and consumer. It is possible to take suitable measures towards this end. Indeed, this aspect of the question has been discussed frequently in the Economic and Social Council, in the Commission on International Commodity Trade and by the parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); in fact, measures have been taken with good results in respect of some commodities such as wheat, sugar, and tin and, more recently, coffee . In the view of my delegation, commodity arrangements are essential for economic development, and I would urge at this time the immediate need to press forward in this direction.

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Economic development can also be helped without financial aid if international trade can be expanded. Such expansion, however, is retarded by the non-liberal trade policies, which some countries adopt. This becomes more serious when such policies are followed by the larger importing countries. Protective measures, high tariffs and quotas are inimical to the expansion of world trade and certainly have a deleterious effect on the economies of smaller and less developed countries. Thus, the latter are prevented by action over which they have no control from helping themselves through their own resources to build a better standard of living. Such measures also have harmful effects even on the more advanced countries because of the reduction of purchasing power among the millions who live in the under developed countries The other matter I wish to touch upon before I conclude is the need for private investment capital in under developed countries. There is very little flow of such capital at the present time. This matter, however, has been discussed so often in so many places that I do not wish to take up time to examine the reasons for this situationthey are only too well known, what is lacking is action - but I do wish to urge that something be done to facilitate the flow of such capital to those areas which are completely dry of investment possibilities and are in urgent need of a quick flow of financial aid.

Document No. 178 Sri Lanka Delegate on Disarmament and Economic Development of the Under-Developed Countries*
5 October 1959. Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): Apart from disarmament, it is our view that the other vital matter of importance which we should face and put our minds to is that of the economic development of the less developed countries of the world. This is a matter which is of crucial interest to countries such as my own, which has been struggling, since they regained independence during the last fifteen years, to give their people a better and higher standard of living and more of the material advantages of life which are available to their fellow human beings in the more developed areas of the world. Much has already been said on this subject, but we think it is imperative to call the attention of the Assembly once again to what we consider to be a vital matter. Be believe that the forms of government which we in our countries have voluntarily chosen as the political framework of our governmental system would be jeopardized if the economic and social fabric, on which forms of government are necessarily based, fails to give to that political framework the substantial support it must have. The solution of the economic problems of the less developed areas of the world has been, in our humble opinion, not only a challenge but an opportunity to the richer and materially advanced nations of the world. We look to the United Nations as the appropriate source for a solution of these difficult problems.
* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 14th Session , 821st Pl. Mtg., Paras 151-171.

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I have dealt at some length with disarmament because of its importance, but even total disarmament will not guarantee world peace or the happiness of all mankind unless at the same time we seek the eradication of hunger, poverty and want. There is too much of this in many part of the world today. In consequence, there is much suffering and misery. These conditions create discontent and dissatisfaction and ultimately lead to revolution. We may disarm, but that alone will not lead to peace. No doubt the world will then be safe from destructive wars, but misery and happiness will remain and there will be very little security for anyone if we allow revolution to be bred of economic insufficiency. Therefore, I should now like to examine the question of economic development. It is alarming that more than half of the worlds population belongs to what are called under-developed areas. This is a danger to themselves and to the rest of the world, even to those who are highly developed and who enjoy a high standard of living. With the alarming increase of population, particularly in the under-developed areas, the people in these areas are getting poorer and the standards of living are declining at the time when in some other areas standards are improving. There is an unhealthy imbalance. We have read with considerable satisfaction the statement Mr. Ludwig Erhard, West Germanys Minister of Economy, is reported to have made only few days ago. Addressing himself to his countrymen, he advised that they should ask themselves whether we have the right to enjoy all to ourselves the steady annual increase of 6 percent in our national product. He thought that a part of this increase could well be diverted to aid to under-developed nations. In the course of the same statement, Mr. Erhard described such aid as the greatest task of the twentieth country. These are weighty words, coming as they do from so great an authority. Reference to this dangerous situation has been made by many other eminent and responsible persons over the years, on different occasions, notably by our own SecretaryGeneral. In the introduction to his annual report to the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General stated, in the course of his observations on economic stability and growth: Though we live in an era of unprecedented gains in material well- being, most of mankind is yet condemned to a life of extreme poverty. The task of ameliorating the conditions of life under-developed countries demands a sense of urgency, which, I believe, the nations of the world have not yet sufficiently realized. What the Secretary-General said in his report to the thirteenth session is equally true at the present time. The reports of the Economic and Social Council and the discussion in this Assembly have highlighted the importance of this matter and drawn attention to the urgent need to deal effectively with it. Some international action has been taken in diverse ways and in different fields. Individual Governments of many countries have increasingly grappled with it, but very little good can result without action on a wide front, with

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very large financial resources. Economic development affects the life of a people at many points and, unless we attack it at all these points, very little good will accrue. . . . We all know of the great success achieved by the Marshal Plan in Europe. There was great war damage and much reconstruction work was needed, caused by the ravages of war, there were still skilled scientists and technicians available in these countries. Thus the work of reconstruction was not so difficult, owing to the advanced conditions prevailing in Europe at the time. What was needed was financial help and capital equipment. The merit of the Marshall Plan, apart from its exemplification of United States generosity and the high sense of responsibility of the American people and the inspired act of statesmanship of General Marshall, was that it was conceived in big terms, big enough to deal with the total need and provide all the money that was needed to reconstruct Europe all along the line. If the figures available to me are correct, they illustrate the point I am making, that we need a unified, concentrated approach, with adequate financial resources spread over a limited but definite period of time. In the period from 1948 to 1952, the total amount spent under the plan amounted to $13,600 million, while the total cost of the plan to date is said to be about $ 24,000 million. The economic development of the under-developed parts of the world is a much bigger job. There are, of course, other aspects of economic development than the financial aspects. I do not propose to take up the time of the Assembly, as these can be dealt with at a later stage, particularly the very important problems of price stabilization. I had hoped to go fully in to some aspects of the problems connected with economic development, but, owing to the lateness of the hour, I shall not at this stage refer to them, expect to draw the attention of the Assembly to the great importance and absolute need of action on matters connected with price stabilization in regard to primary agricultural commodities. This is an issue, which has been with us for over thirteen years. It has been discussed in many places, particularly by the members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and we are very regretful that no definite action has been taken to deal with this important problem. Before I conclude these very general remarks on this important matter, I should like to invite attention to the close connexion which it has to the other matter I discussed earlier, namely, disarmament. The following points briefly set out are worth some consideration. First, disarmament and economic development are both basic and fundamental factors in the accomplishment of the aim of the United Nations Charter to achieve world peace and improve living standards. Secondly, both are essentially human problems, the solutions of which require the united effort of all peoples, based on good will, understanding and confidence. Thirdly, there is the extreme difficulty of providing for economic development adequately without reducing or abolishing the financial burden of armaments. One of

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the strongest objections raised against the provision of more money for economic development by the great Powers is the already crushing burden of defense expenditure. Therefore, there is a very close connexion between these two and, if an era of peace and plenty is to begin, we must hasten disarmament. President Eisenhower has said that his Government is ready to ask its people to join with all nations in directing a substantial percentage of the savings, which would be achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid. The Soviet Union has urged a percentage cut on armament expenditure, to be used for economic development. Disarmament has got to be brought about if only to enable adequate support of economic development of under-developed countries. . . .

Document No. 179 Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike on U.N. Role in Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries*
27 September 1961 Mr. [F.R.D] Bandaranaike (Ceylon): No address by a representative of an economically developing country is ever complete without some reference, I think, to the needs for economic assistance and technical cooperation. Being the Finance Minister of my country, in addition to the other functions I perform in foreign affairs, I think my address would not be complete, at least for home consumption, if I did not refer to it. There is the emphatic and urgent need to realize that under-developed countries must have an accelerated rate of growth to keep pace with growing populations and their growing demands, and for this purpose, massive foreign aid is essential. It is necessary also to realize that the problems of sufficient aid will be with us until self-sustained growth is realized, and , while that day is near for some countries, it is very far away indeed for others. We belong to the latter group. Development programmes must not therefore be retarded by shortages of external finance. It is clear that in future years, with the growing development plans of all newly developed countries, the shortage of external finance will assume an increasingly greater significance in the world payments picture. Even a minimum rate of economic growth may be jeopardized by the inadequacy of finance. In the last decade the terms of trade of primary producing countries vis-a-vis industrial countries have deteriorated almost continuously. And, what is more, there is a growing awareness on the part of these under-developed countries that the losses we sustain in the falling prices, the change of the terms of trade, are in excess of the benefits which we have received from foreign aid.
* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 16th Session, 1017th Pl. Mtg., Paras 185-189.

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There is therefore an urgent need for United Nations financial agencies, either existing or proposed, to find a process to help offset the unavoidable balance of payment crises of the underdeveloped countries insofar as they stem from development programmes, commodity price fluctuations and short-term capital outflow. There is a very grave need for urgent consideration by the Assembly of some form of automatic access to reserves and some form of insurance against commodity price fluctuations.

Document No. 180 Sri Lanka Delegate on the European Common Market*
27 September 1962. Mr. [G.P.] Malalasekara(Ceylon): Our problem in this respect can be summed up as one of correcting the danger of imbalances imbalances in the price of primary and manufactured commodities, in development, in the flow of development capital, in the techniques of administration and most dangerous of all, imbalances in standards of living. And now, when the world needs balance most, there arise new hazards in the growth of the Common Markets. My Government, as a member of the Commonwealth, shares the anxiety of all our sister dominions in regard to the Common Market as we see it shaping up in West Europe. Much of the economy of my own country of Ceylon rests, as with most developing countries, on foreign trade. Our economies are in a formative period. We still depend largely on the export of a limited number of products, mainly agricultural, to pay for our essential imports of capital and consumption goods. Not too infrequently we have suffered from the fluctuation of the prices of our products, over which we have no control. Will the dividing of the World into economic blocs corresponding to the political blocs aggravate our difficulties? Shall we be left entirely at the mercy of economic giants? Will these internationally coordinated economic plans result in indirect political penetration and neo-colonialism in our small countries? These are genuine apprehensions, and due notice must be taken of them. It would be a gross misrepresentation to portray the European Common Market as a headache of the Commonwealth only. The anxieties which the proposal has aroused have been expressed also by the Latin American States, by most African States, by the European non-aligned states, by states of the Middle-East, by the socialist states, even by many circles in Britain, and, I might add, also by many American statesmen who, while seeing virtue in the rise of the European Common Market, never fail to express, with a detectable note of mis giving , the hope that the market will not be inward looking but outward looking. But it is not America so much as the Six who will have the power to decide how they will deal with world trade, and indeed they have laid down the rules by which others must bargain with them.
* Source: U. N. G. A. O. R., 17th Session, 1135 th Pl. Mtg., Paras 113-120.

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My delegation would like to make itself very clear on this issue. We are not against common markets. They are probably an inevitable chapter in the growing regionalism of the world, as the next step in history beyond the unicellular sovereign state, and we might welcome this development. In some areas of the world the grouping of the states, as also seen in Africa, may be the only solution accelerating the rate of economic development. But, as regard the European Common Market, there is nothing common about it. How can there be any such thing when six of the most developed countries in the world have pooled their resources in a combination that has not only economic implications but also political and perhaps even military implications? This Common Market may well presage the rise of a new empire since it reaches out far beyond the economic components of a marketing organization. Last year I had the opportunity to express from this rostrum some thought on the regional political organizations and the danger that they may gradually evolve beyond the control of the United Nations Charter. The same warning might be raised also with regard to regional economic organizations. It is for us to ponder whether the trade of the world which involves the livelihood of peoples should become a war of regions. It is in this light that my delegation welcomes the recommendation of the Economic and Social Council for the holding of a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1963, which is none too soon. When the agenda of that Conference comes up, my Government will support those principles of economic development which have been so ably formulated this year in the Cairo Conference on the Problems of the Economic Development in which Ceylon was privileged to participate. It will also support giving the broadest possible scope to deal with the problems arising from Common Market practices. This important development, if it is not to deteriorate into bitter economic warfare, must be brought within the principles of the Charter and, we hope eventually within the United Nations itself possibly under a special agency.

Document No. 181 Sri Lanka Delegate on UNCTAD*

21 December 1964. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene {Ceylon}: It was with very great interest that my Government participated in the deliberations of the historic United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which was hailed as one of the most important events since the establishment of the United Nations. We cannot truly say that we are satisfied

* Source: U. N. G. A. O. R., 19th Session , 1308th Mtg., Paras 87-94.

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with the results of that Conference or that we are convinced that the developed countries have shown themselves adequately prepared and ready to meet the challenge of our times. Nevertheless, it is our belief that they could not have been left unimpressed by the efforts of the seventy-five developing nations to demonstrate to them that the problems of the world are the common concern of the community of nations, and that there can be no stability and lasting peace in a world where the disparities between affluence and poverty are not only so marked by where the tendency is further to widen the gap in living standards between the developed and developing countries. The Conference gave expression to the aspirations of millions of men and women, more than two thirds of the worlds population, for a richer and fuller life, the realization of which is now long overdue. It must be appreciated that the decline in export earnings of the developing countries, the deterioration in terms of trade and the increasing burden of servicing debts are factors beyond the control of developing countries and lead to the frustration of their economic policies. We must, therefore, be dominated by a sense of urgency and take practical steps for accelerating an increasing flow of capital and for liberalizing trade relationships in favor of the developing countries. As pointed out in the joint declaration of the developing countries which forms the annex to General Assembly resolution 18897{xviii}: The fundamental trade problems of developing countries are well identified. What the world lacks today is, therefore not the awareness of the problem, but the readiness to act. While there was general agreement at the Conference on the need to assist the developing countries, there was much less agreement on the manner of doing it. Nevertheless, though a number of countries expressed reservations, yet there was a very wide measure of support for the principles, which are to guide the future of international trade policy. These principles represent a substantial advance on the traditional concepts of free trade which determined the recommendations that came out of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment held at Havana in 1947-1948. The principles, which have now been formulated, recognized very definitely the need for special assistance for the developing countries to expand their international trade and through this means to develop their economies. The principle that developed countries should not require reciprocity in trade liberalization measure from developing countries is also embodied in the recommendations of the Conference, and the developed countries have been called upon to avoid domestic policies that stimulate uneconomic production of primary products and thereby deprive developing countries of a fair share of world market. As regards the subject of new institutional arrangements, it must be said to the credit of the Conference that unanimity was reached with all group of countries - the developing countries, the industrialized countries and the centrally planned countries - on account

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of the firm determination of most countries to resolve the deadlock which was reached at one stage on the question of new machinery. The Conference would have been a complete failure if it had not secured agreement on future institutional arrangements through which the work of the Conference could be continued. . . .

Document No. 182 Sri Lanka Delegate on the UN Role in Economic Development*
1 October 1965. Mr.[G.G.] Ponnambalam (Ceylon): If, as we hope, political and cold-war problems which have accumulated in recent years tend to be solved in the near future by an increasing consciousness of the need for international solidarity and friendship as a basis for a stable world order, we feel that economic problems will in like measure have to receive the increasing attention of the United Nations. In any event I do sincerely feel that true international amity cannot ultimately be built on secure foundations except upon the basis of growing economic equality among the nations and peoples of the world. It is sad to contemplate that in an age of plenty and of spectacular scientific advance there is a growing inequality among the countries of the world. Half the population of this earth suffers from under-nutrition or malnutrition and an appreciable portion of its adult population is still totally illiterate. In this context, it is a terrible commentary on our times that the governments of the world spends as much as $ 14 million every hour on armaments. In the effort to achieve equality, the underdeveloped nations not only start at disadvantage to combat the problem of a rate of increase in population, which is nearly twice that of the developed countries. The recent past has thus been characterized by a growing inequality and an increasing gap between the per capital incomes of the developing countries substantiality and of arresting the spread income of the developed countries, there is no prospect whatever of reducing international inequality and of arresting the spread internationally of those tensions with which we are familiar within national boundaries. And I do fear that if concerted action is not taken to remedy this imbalance the world may yet have to witness the confrontation of a small minority of well-to-do nations by a large majority of poor nations growing poorer. The United Nations, conscious of its responsibility in the economic sphere, has adopted a relatively modest, and, one would have hoped, a realizable objective. It has designated the present decade as a decade of developing nations that is of their collective national incomes is to be accelerated to reach a minimum of 5 per cent per annum. Having thus

* Source: U. N. G. A. O. R., 20th Session, 1345 th Pl. Mtg.

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stated its objective, the international community proceeded at the recent Conference on Trade and Development at Geneva to will the means to that end. The Conference recognized that the problem of accelerated development involves the problem of bridging the trade gap both by national policies and by international effort in the field of trade and aid. The report presented to the Conference by its Secretary-General, Mr. Prebish, estimated a trade gap for the developing nations of the magnitude of $20 billon in 1970, which will have to be bridged if the target of the decade is to be achieved. I regret to have to state that the mid-term appraisal of progress towards this target does not reveal encouraging results. A report of the Economic and Social Council casts doubts whether the progress achieved is an improvement even on the record of the second half of the 1950s. The report goes on to state that more intensive efforts will have to be made to accelerate production, to expand trade and to enlarge the flow of external funds and assistance if the targets are to be achieved by the end of the decade. May we examine the causes of this failure? It was the continuing theme of the Conference on Trade and Development that the developing countries themselves should mobilize the internal resources required for accelerated economic development. I shall readily concede that adequate progress has not been made in this regard by all developing countries, about one third of the total, in the opinion of Mr. George Woods, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development I quote now from his article in the Times of London of 16 September 1966 - appear, in spite of economic handicaps, to be pressing persistently forward. What is unquestionably checking progress in these countries appears to be not a lack of internal efforts but a lack of the necessary foreign exchange. If I may quote Mr. George Woods again: What is known about the development projects and programmes of the under-developed nations, in the experienced judgment of the World Bank staff, suggests that over the next five years the development effort could make highly productive use of $3,000 million to $4,000 million more annually than is being put in to it. One form in which the foreign exchange necessary may be made available to developing countries, is, of course, by direct financial aid by the developed nations. But the actual picture shows that the flow of economic assistance to the developing countries has remained unchanged since 1961. It is scarcely necessary to comment on the extent of the commitment undertaken at the Conference on Trade and Development by each of the developed nations to transfer I percent of their annual income to the developing countries. A preferable alternative to aid would, of course, be the expansion of trade. Here again, the developing countries depend on agricultural exports, in some cases, for example my own country, almost exclusively so. It is well known that, over a large period, prices of primary products tend to decline whilst the prices of manufactures, even when they do not rise, tend to remain stable. Indeed, the prices of capital goods necessary for a

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measure of industrialization of the developing countries have tended to increase over the years, resulting inevitably in serious difficulties in the balance of payment of the developing countries. Here, I should like to add that in a number of countries the efforts made to improve the output of agriculture by intensive cultivation has resulted in an appreciable increase in the volume of produce, but has had little or no effect on income from export earnings as such. I quote now from the Economist of 10 July: Vital exports of many tropical countries in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa are selling at lower price levels now, in real terms, than at the worst of the inter-war depression. Cocoa and sugar have been hard hit and the outlook for coconut and rubber, two of the basic crops on which the economy of my country rests, is gloomy and depressing. The price of copra has fallen precipitously recently and the International Rubber Study Group predicts a steady decline in the price of rubber. As a result, Ceylon and a number of other primary producers will see their valiant efforts in export agriculture dissipated through the working of forces entirely beyond their control. Some of the developing countries will be compelled, I fear, in the absence of a more rational price structure, to move towards a lower level of unproductive self-sufficiency with a consequent reduction in their standards of living. I am optimistic enough, however, to hope that this would not be considered desirable by the community of nations, and I should like to adopt and support in the strongest possible terms the plea made by Mr. Prebish, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at a recent meeting of the Trade and Development Board, for the kind of political goodwill needed to utilize the existing machinery of the United Nations for tackling the problem of depressed commodity prices by international commodity price arrangements for financing the accumulation of buffer stocks with a view to controlling the market.

Document No. 183 Sri Lanka Delegates Statement on the Korean Unification (Plea for Inviting both South and North Korea to the U.N Debate)*
7 January 1957. Mr. [A.B] Perera (Ceylon) stated that his delegation felt obliged to support in principle the United States draft resolution because it stood for the unification of Korea, though he associated himself with remarks of the representative of India in feeling that it did

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R. , 11th Session, First Committee, 818th Mtg., Paras 25-26.

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not go far enough. Referring to his delegations earlier support of the proposal to invite representatives of both South and North Korea to participate in the Committees debate (814th meeting), he declared that to consider the Korean question on an Ex Parte basis was both futile and fraught with peril for the Far East. His Government believed that the determination of the Korean people and the absence of a denunciation of the Armistice Agreement on the part of North Korea gave hope for the future of Korean independence. In that connexion, he cited paragraph 9 and 10 of UNCURKs report, which indicated the lines of a possible solution, and expressed the view that paragraph 3 of the United States draft resolution did not take into account the developments reported by UNCURK. He felt that paragraph 3 should be expanded to include concrete programmes, which would grant North Korea the same status as South Korea. Specifically, his delegation favoured the holding of a conference similar to the Conference of the Heads of Governments of the four great Powers held in Geneva in 1954 as a means of solving the Korean question. He added that it would be absurd to ignore the existence of the Peoples Republic of China in seeking a solution of the problem of Korea.

Document No. 184 The Korean Question: Sri Lankas Support for Organizing Free Elections Aimed at Unification*
10 November 1958. Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon) believed that the United Nations should continue its efforts to solve the problem of Korea and, like the representative of Canada, he felt that the Korean question could only be settled by the organization of free elections and by a process of conciliation and negotiation. The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea appeared to be in agreement on that point and the only thing that prevented the parties concerned from organizing such elections, was the question of the withdrawal of troops. The North Korean authorities had announced the withdrawal of the Chinese volunteers in which connexion it was regrettable that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission had refused to supervise that operation and had requested that the troops stationed in South Korea should be removed. In view of the small number of United Nations troops, it did not seem that their presence should constitute an insurmountable obstacle, if the election were held under the supervision of a neutral supervisory body. The delegation of Ceylon therefore appealed urgently to the Democratic Peoples Republic

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 13th Session , First Committee., 979 th Mtg., Paras 29-31.

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of Korea to agree to the holding of elections, even under the existing conditions. Similarly, it called on the Members of the United Nations to reconsider whether the withdrawal of troops from South Korea presented as many difficulties as certain representatives had asserted. The Republic of Korea had a well-trained and wellequipped army with which it could provide for its own security until the election were held in addition to which it was unlikely that the North Koreans would commit the error of repeating their aggression. It also had to be borne in mind that the United States was in a strong position in the Pacific region and in the nearby areas, and it would certainly not fail to respond, in case of necessity, to a new call of the United Nations. In any event, it was essential to continue the attempts at conciliation and negotiation and there should be no hesitation in organizing, if necessary, a meeting of representatives of the parties concerned. Unless the question could be settled by negotiation, elections could not take place the following year and the present situation was likely to be prolonged indefinitely with all the danger to world peace. For that reason the Committee must not be satisfied with merely adopting the draft resolution with which it was dealing; it must also urge the parties concerned to negotiate in regard to the holding of elections.

Document No. 185 Sri Lankas Position on the Korean Unification*

15 November 1957. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon) drew attention to the great progress achieved by South Korea in many different fields and stressed the part which the United Nations had played in that respect. The essential question remaining was that of unification. It was a tragic fact that the 3 million North Koreans were not willing, irrespective of whether they were free to do so, to throw in their lot with the 23 million inhabitants of South Korea. He wondered whether it was really necessary to reaffirm the same principles each year, as the Assembly had been doing for the last eleven years. Was the world so devoid of real statesmanship and was diplomacy so bankrupt that it was impossible to conceive of any method, which could bring the two parties together? Since the resolutions adopted previously had had no effect, another means of dealing with the problem must be sought, and in order to do so the Assembly must recognize the hard fact that there was a de facto Government behind the 38th parallel.

* Source: U. N. G. A. O. R., 12th Session , First Committee, 903rd Mtg., Paras 25-30.

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The United Nations could not seek Korean unification by force of arms. It must find a method which would enable the North Koreans and the South Koreans to meet as kinsmen and as equals. A rigid and intransigent attitude was no help; compromise was the essence of life, although there should, of course, be no compromise on principles. Nevertheless, those not prepared to observe those principles could not be convinced of their error by abuse, criticism, mutual recrimination or the repetition of platitudes. Ways and means must be devised for securing the evacuation of all foreign forces from the country so that the two sections of the population could meet to discuss their common future. The draft resolution before the committee was useless. It had been said that the morale of the South Koreans must be kept up, but the South Koreans had already demonstrated their determination to forge ahead as a free nation. It had also been said that the moral force of world opinion might have a vast influence, but a great part of world opinion had always recognized that Korea should be unified. It was not a question, therefore, of creating a moral force, which already existed, but rather of using it constructively. The Assembly had not heard any proposal which would bring the two peoples together, ease the tension and make possible free communication between North and South Korea. It was not good policy to try to solve the problem without the North Koreans. The first step should be to make it possible through the good offices of the United Nations for representatives of the two states to meet. It was the Koreans who should engage in an exchange of views, not the United Nations . Once that had been done, it might perhaps be possible to organize a withdrawal of troops on both sides. The brotherly spirit of the two peoples would then suffice to solve the problem. That might be called wishful thinking, but there seems to be no other solution.

Document No. 186 The Suez Crisis, 1956: Speech of Sri Lanka Delegate at the First Emergency Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly*
3 November 1956. Mr.[R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): According to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in the early hours of 2 November, the Assembly should remain in emergency session pending compliance with that resolution. Today, therefore, we are met to discuss that subject, that is, whether or not there has been compliance with the resolution

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., First Emergency Special Session, 563rd Pl. Mtg., Paras 206-19.

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and, if not, how we can secure that compliance. It is not for us today to pass a verdict on the actions of the United Kingdom, France or Israel. That verdict has already been passed. The question before us is how we can get the United Kingdom, France and Israel to comply with the resolution that has already been adopted. I am grateful that the representative of that great Government of Israel has come before this Assembly and stated that Israel is prepared to accept the ceasefire called for in the resolution. He did not, however, tell us that Israel was prepared to carry out the second part of the same resolution, which urges the parties to the armistice agreement: promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice line into neighboring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreement. Therefore, the statement made by the representative of Israel only gives us an assurance of partial compliance with the resolution, while the representatives of the United Kingdom and France positively refuse, except on conditions. The position taken up by them is that of a person who enters property that does not belong to him and then refuses to leave until certain conditions are complied with. I cannot understand the legal or the moral basis for the position. It is therefore a mater for regret that conditions are laid down, in spite of the moral judgment of the majority of the world, of sixty-four nations. The question before us is not whether it was justifiable invasion of the territory, whether it was police action or defensive action for the preservation of their own interests, because the verdict has been passed on that. The resolution states armed forces of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are conducting military operations against Egyptian territory. Those words against Egyptian territory are plain enough. That is what this Assembly accepted. If the objectives of the United Kingdom and France are against Egyptian territory, then the question of justification does not arise. The only question, therefore, now before us, in view of the rejection, or at least in view of the conditions that are imposed on this Assembly for acceptance by the United Kingdom and France, is to decide what this August body should do in these circumstances. In other words, the attitude of the United Kingdom in that matter only forces us to the conclusion that their objective is the settlement of the Suez Canal problem. Their scheme was unacceptable to Egypt, and so many other nations were not prepared to go along with them. We are forced to the conclusion that this invasion of Egyptian territory was due to disappointment and frustration. I am not prepared to say categorically that it was meant for that purpose, but whatever the purpose may be, it is an invasion of Egyptian territory, which, by the resolution we adopted, we are certainly not prepared to condone. France has taken up the same attitude; Israel is prepared for partial compliance, and the United Kingdom and France are not prepared for even a partial compliance unless certain conditions are satisfied.

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In those circumstances, we must now examine whether there are some ways and means by which compliance with this resolution can be secured from the United Kingdom, France and Israel. I think the draft resolutions before us give us some help in arriving at a conclusion about what we should do in these circumstances. We are truly grateful to the representative of the United States for his laudable objective in trying to secure an over-all settlement of the problem, but we do not normally think of the disposition of property when a patient is dying, is gasping for breath. Egypt is a patient for breath, and we cannot ask Egypt to sign its last will before we are satisfied that Egypt is in a sound condition and able to take a reasonable course of action. In the position in which Egypt is placed today, I say that our first duty is to see that Egypt is in a condition to exercise its sovereign rights. When that position has been created, then it will be time to consider how best the Suez Canal dispute should be decided and how best the Israel-Arab dispute should be disposed of. I freely grant that a solution may be found. This cannot go on for long, but at the same time the present moment certainly is not the occasion for the consideration of that problem. The problem before us is simply how we can secure a ceasefire, how we can secure a cessation of hostilities, and how we can put Egypt into a status quo ante. That is exactly the position in which we are placed. The draft resolution introduced by the representative of India [A/3275], which Ceylon and other countries of the Asian group had the privilege and honour of co-sponsoring, gives the Secretary-General at least some time-it may be twelve hours, it may be eighteen hours, just as the Secretary-General would require to see if something more can be achieved during that period to bring these nations to reason, at least reason as it is accepted by the rest of the world. Sometimes when people embark upon a course of action, they find it difficult to retreat, and obstinacy sometimes becomes a virtue. In the present circumstances, I think that these three nations should be guided by the weight of world public opinion and by the moral judgment passed by this August body only the other day. The Secretary-General, who is well known for his tact, impartiality, ability and experience in handling this kind of intricate problems will perhaps find time, a little breathing space, to see whether other methods are possible. I hope that this Assembly will find no difficulty in accepting the draft resolution sponsored by the nineteen countries. It merely requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Chief of Staff and members of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, to obtain compliance with the request for the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines. In other words, this Assembly would decide to give them a second chance to reconsider the position they have taken in the light of the discussions that are taking place this evening. I see no difficulty in accepting at the same time the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Canada [A/RS 3276]. One does not conflict with the other. Far from conflicting, this resolution would help the first resolution. The carrying out of the objectives of the draft resolution introduced by the Asian countries would be greatly

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helped by a draft resolution introduced by the representative of Canada. Therefore, I see no reason why this August assembly should not also accept that draft resolution; in that case, there would be the machinery by which the three nations that have so far not complied with the resolution of 2nd November could be compelled to comply with it. In other words, we would be creating machinery to produce the result, which we are aiming at. There is one remark I should like to make: I hope that this commission, this police force, I do not know how to describe it, will not include representatives from Israel or the United Kingdom or France. That goes without saying. Provided this task is undertaken by States which are not parties to the dispute, to this unfortunate situation, and then I think that this August assembly should also be able to accept the draft resolution introduced by the representative of Canada. With regard to the draft resolution introduced by the representative of the United States, for whom we have the greatest respect and regard, I think that they can wait for another day. We should first settle the point before us. We must bring peace and harmony and see that Egypt is again in a position to exercise its sovereign rights before we proceed to the next step. . . .

Document No. 187 The Suez Crisis, 1956: Sri Lanka Delegates Plea for Complete Withdrawal of Troops of U.K , France and Israel*
7 November 1956. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): The latest events in the Middle East have given us a sense of relief. It is gratifying to learn that the fighting has stopped and that the senseless killing and destruction has been brought to an end. I should like to express, on behalf of my delegation, appreciation of the fact that these three powers have displayed a sense of realism and practical common sense in their decision to cease all hostilities, and have partially responded to the call of the United Nations . The United Nations resolution, however, called for not only a cease-fire but for complete withdrawal of troops to their own territories. It is, therefore, a matter of regret that France, Israel and the United Kingdom, have not complied fully with that part of the United Nations resolution asking for the withdrawal of troops. Their continued presence on Egyptian soil must necessarily be a source of irritation to Egypt,

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., First Emergency Special Session, 566th Pl. Mtg., Paras 34-38.

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whose territorial integrity has been violated. It is the opinion of my Government that since neither France, Israel nor the United Kingdom had the slightest vestige of legal or moral ground to lay down any conditions whatsoever, inasmuch as they made an unlawful entry into the territory of a sovereign state their obvious duty is not only to stop forthwith military operations but also to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory immediately. Only thus can the resolution adopted so overwhelmingly by this Assembly on 2 November be honoured both in the spirit and in the letter. The United Kingdom has a long record of maintaining law and order, and it is its proud boast that it has always upheld both the form and the content of the United Nations Charter .It is earnestly hoped that it will display in this matter the same sense of realism and accede wholeheartedly to the resolution adopted by this Assembly. We have before us a draft resolution [A/3308], which will in great measure help us to rectify the state of affairs that exists today. My delegation is co-sponsoring this draft resolution which is before the Assembly because it feels that unless this action is taken immediately the situation is likely to deteriorate further. My delegation also believes that its implementation will restore faith in the United Nations as an effective organization for the preservation of peace. It is my understanding that in this draft resolution the same principle of non-participation of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council in the United Nations Emergency Command is enunciated as in the interim report [A/ 3289, Para 4] of the Secretary-General and that this will apply in determining the composition of the body of the international police force. My Government also appreciates the application of this same principle in the establishment of the Advisory Committee, as set forth in paragraph 6 of the draft resolution [A/3308] before the Assembly. May I further note my Governments deep appreciation of the choice of the Secretary-General as Chairman of this Committee, for we all know the extremely heavy burden he is already carrying. His impartiality, sincerity and selfless devotion to duty are a shining example to all. I would like also to state that, in order that the effects of the resolution which we adopted so overwhelming on 2 November may be fully implemented, it is necessary to adopt also, along which the present draft resolution another draft resolution [A /3309] which the Government of Ceylon has the honour to co-sponsor, together with a number of African-Asian nations. Since both draft resolutions would greatly help the cause of peace, I should like to place that other draft resolution also before the Assembly. It reads: The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions adopted by overwhelming majorities on 2,4 and 5 November 1956, Noting in particular that the General Assembly, by its resolution dated 5 November 1956, established a United Nations Command for an Emergency International

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Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of its resolution of 2 November 1956, 1. 2. Reaffirms the above-mentioned resolution; Calls upon Israel once again to withdraw immediately all its forces behind the armistice lines established by the Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949, Calls upon the United Kingdom and France once again immediately to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory, consistently with the above mentioned resolutions; Urges the Secretary-General to communicate the present resolution to the parties concerned and requests him promptly to report to the General Assembly on the compliance with this resolution.

3.

4.

Document No. 188 Suez Crisis: Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaikes Statement in the U. N. General Assembly*
22 November 1956. Mr. [S.W.R.D.] Bandaranaike (Ceylon): In the case of Suez, I wish briefly to recount certain facts that are important to the background of our thinking in this matter. The President of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company. I do not find in any quarter a disposition seriously to question his right to do so. Although the manner in which it was done, the time in which it was done may be considered expedient by some and incorrect by others, the basic fact of his right to do so has not been questioned. If that is correct, I consider that it follows as a corollary to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company that the power of operation of the canal should also be vested in Egypt. But that is not the whole story. There are important international interests in the Suez Canal that also need to be safeguarded. We are all agreed on that. These interests I feel could adequately have been safeguarded, while recognizing the right of nationalization and the right of control following thereon, by entering into a convention on somewhat similar lines to the Constantinople Convention of 1888, but with further provisions, if need be, to provide for some consultative or advisory committee whose advise Egypt would have been compelled to seek in dealing with important matters of an operational nature. If there was a disagreement between the two, surely some machinery for arbitration in such instances could have been devised.
* Source: U. N. G. A. O. R., 11th Session, 1956, 590 th Pl. Mtg.

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That would have been the most hopeful methods of procedure in order to obtain agreement, while satisfying what both sides claim to be certain fundamental needs. But the moment that a majority of the countries assembled at the London Conference decided on international control of the operation of the Canal, fundamental difficulties immediately arose. The Mission to Egypt, led by the Prime Minister of Australia, for discussions with Colonel Nasser, was bound, in the circumstances, to prove a failure. I cannot believe that anyone seriously contemplated that it could be otherwise. Thereafter, quite rightly, the Powers more immediately concerned referred this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations and an agreement on certain principles the six principles, no less - by the United Kingdom, France and Egypt was unanimously endorsed by the Security Council in a resolution [S /3675]. What we fail to understand is this: why were not negotiations proceeded with on the basis of those agreed six principles to see how far agreement could be reached? I have yet to understand why either one side concerned, or the other, or both, failed to requisition the good offices of the United Nations in order to carry on those negotiations. The matter was referred to the Security Council of the United Nations in order to pursue the method of negotiation as against that of force, which had been threatened earlier. It had reached the point when those negotiations could take place on an agreed basis for discussion. Why did they not take place? Why was it necessary to have the intrusion, before further discussion, of this unfortunate resort to force? Israel made an attack on Egyptian territory. Why, pray? Because it had grievances in the past? Because it feared Egypts aggression or attacks in the future? Why was this particular moment chosen? I never choose to condemn anyone until condemnation is based on proof. But is it not somewhat difficult to escape the belief that Israel action followed by that of Anglo-French forces, were not altogether unconnected with each other, and that Israel, at the very least, may have thought, in a moment of inspiration, that it was a good moment for it to move, and that an attack by it then would produce action on the part of the United Kingdom and France which would in fact amount to support? However, as I said, I prefer not to attach motives to anybody. Until something is definitely proved, I prefer not to condemn anyone. It is a mistake to do so. But it does seem to me at least rather a strange coincidence that those events, in that order, should have so taken place; it is a very unfortunate coincidence. I am glad that the United Nations immediately dealt with the matter and arrived at certain decisions and that those decisions are in now in the process of implementation. May I say here that I appreciate very much the fact that even in principle the United Kingdom, France and Israel have accepted the decisions of the United Nations for a cease-fire and for a withdrawal? I only hope that those steps will materialize very quickly. I must tell the Assembly that it is my view and the view of my colleagues, the other Asian prime ministers, that the position is still extremely delicate and dangerous. We do

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not feel that there is any occasion for undue complacence. I am glad that, substantially, a cease-fire has taken place. But the withdrawal has not yet taken place. A United Nations Emergency Force is already in the process of being established in Egypt in order to carry out the decisions of the United Nations in supervising a withdrawal of those forces. I say this, and I say it with all seriousness, that as long as foreign troops - be they Israel, United Kingdom or French - continued to remain on Egyptian territory, the position is one that is fraught with the greatest danger and one that may bring about results leading to a third world war. I wish to say that those forces must be withdrawn now, without any delay. I wish to say that I think it would be very unwise to follow some principle of a phased withdrawal, a withdrawing of those forces in numbers according to the numbers of the United Nations Emergency Force who enter: for example a hundred United Nations troops going into Egypt and a hundred being withdrawn; two hundred United Nations troops going in and two hundred being withdrawn. There can be no greater mistake than that. The moment that even a token United Nations Force is established on Egyptian territory, it will be sufficient occasion, in the interests of us all, for Israel forces to be withdrawn behind the armistice line, and United Kingdom and French forces to be withdrawn from Egyptian territory. I cannot conceive that either Egypt or Israel would make an assault upon forces of the United Nations , I just do not believe it. So that it is really not required for a large force of the United Nations to be present before those forces are withdrawn. The first and the most vital thing is a withdrawal of forces from Egyptian territory now, as early as possible. If that does not happen, even if under the guise of Volunteers - and we know what Volunteers mean other countries, in order to secure the observance of the decisions of the United Nations , take steps, I fear that the result may be very far-reaching and all our efforts so far be swept away in a moment. There is another important thing, of course: the early clearing of the Suez Canal. That is very important to all of us, particularly to my country. Most of the trade of Ceylon - 75 per cent of it passes through the Suez Canal. I take it that, not only for us, but also for other countries, Western as well as Asian, it is important that the Suez Canal be cleared as early as possible. I feel that it should be done under the auspices of the United Nations. . . .

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Document No. 189 The Suez Crisis: Sri Lanka Delegates Appeal for the Complete Withdrawal of Israeli troops*
17 January 1957. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): It is indeed a pity that the General Assembly should have this item before it once again. I am sure that many people in the world would like this chapter to be closed; there are enough questions to occupy the mind and the attention of this Assembly and of the nations of the world. More than two and a half months have elapsed since the General Assembly was seized of this question. A Special Emergency Session was called to consider the grave problem. It is; therefore, indeed unfortunate that such a long time should have been allowed to pass before the resolutions adopted by the Assembly were implemented . The sponsors of the draft resolution which I have the pleasure to submit on behalf of a number of countries [A/3501/Rev.1] have avoided acrimony and vindictiveness in the wording of the document. It is a reaffirmation of the policy which this Assembly had adopted in respect of the unfortunate aggression on Egyptian territory . Four resolutions were adopted during the month of November, calling upon the British, French and the Israelis to withdraw from Egyptian territory. It is to be said to the credit of two great world powers, the United Kingdom and France, that they bowed to the decision. In spite of their very strong conviction that what they did was right, they are prepared to accept the moral judgement of the world that it was in fact an attack on Egyptian territory. And it was only proper that they should accept that decision. It was only human to plead their cause, but we were not prepared to accept their position, and they carried out the wishes of the General Assembly. They even made an effort as rightly they might have to stage a phased movement of troops. Even that was not accepted by the General Assembly. In other words, the Assembly was not prepared to accept any conditions that would be imposed upon it by those who had entered Egyptian territory, in our opinion, without justification or reason . One would naturally expect the same to apply to Israel, and more strongly so. Israel is a small state, like mine, which must look to the United Nations, as the only salvation in moment of crisis, the one place, the one forum, before which small nations can effectively

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R, 11th Session , 638th Pl .Mtg., Paras 6-21.

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put their cases before the tribunal of world public opinion. Small nations like ours look to the United Nation with faith, and I would therefore expect that Israel, placed as many of us are, would co- operate in upholding the moral authority of the Assembly. It must be said to the credit of the Government of Israel that it does not seek to impose condition. It does not say, at least in official communication to the United Nations, that it will not withdraw its troops unless such and such a thing was done. It is a little more subtle than that. Its position is that it does not disclose what its intentions are at all with regard to the Gaza strip. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly are very specific in saying that Israel forces must withdraw behind the armistice line . Not one word is mentioned about this in the Israel communications, and the Secretary-General, in this report [A/3500 and Add.1] says that this is a matter for further discussion . May I submit, in all humility and with due respect, that this is not a subject for discussion. This is a mandate given by the Assembly, a mandate to the SecretaryGeneral to see that it is enforced, carried out, and a mandate to Israel that the other should be complied with. So that I would not accept the position that this is a matter for further discussion. Certainly the Secretary-General and the Government of Israel may have talks, as many as they like, but I am sure that the General Assembly is not in a mood to vary its findings, which have been repeated so many times. Then there is the other question - and it is also put in very subtle form that Israel is prepared to evacuate the whole of the Sinai peninsula, except Sharm E1 Sheikh, that little strip of the Western Coast of the Gulf of Aqaba. The Israelis say with the exception of [A/3500 /and Add.1,para 4]. That is also, I must say, very discreetly put in that form, because in those words one can read that Israel itself has realized and knows fully well the wishes of the General Assembly. And, with regard to this narrow strip, however narrow it may be and it is important in the eyes of Egypt and important to us in the Assembly - that would like to have discussion with the SecretaryGeneral. They are welcome to discussions. The Secretary-General can certainly hold discussions with the Government of Israel, and the Government of Israel has the fullest liberty of holding any talks it likes with the Secretary-General. But the mandate of the General Assembly is quite clear. The finding of the Assembly is that Israel must withdraw its troops from Egyptian territory. Surely, Sham E1 Sheikh is part of Egyptian territory. That is not contested, just as the islands on the opposite side constitute Egyptian territory. The fact is that there has been an invasion of Egyptian territory. Before any fruitful discussions can take place, therefore, the status quo ante must be restored. That is the first step that must be taken.

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I think that the Government of Israel might well take a lesson from the powerful and mighty governments of the United Kingdom and France. I have not the slightest doubt that this appeal to the Government of Israel will not be in vain. For - whatever its other difficulties may be the Government of Israel does realize, I have no doubt, that a correct atmosphere cannot be created for the sober discussion of any problem affecting Israel itself or that region of the world unless first things are done first. In this case, the elementary first thing is the withdrawal of all troops from Egyptian territory. The phrase Egyptian territory does not defy definition. This Assembly knows, and the Government of Israel knows fully well what Egyptian territory is - at least within the meaning of the resolution of the Assembly and from the point of view of the United Nations as a whole. . . .

Document No. 190 The Suez Crisis: Sri Lanka Delegates Plea for the Complete Withdrawal of Israeli Troops*
2 February 1957. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): It is useless going over history. We do know that a certain state of affairs exists in the region. It is a matter for great regret that the Government of Israel did not think it fit to withdraw its forces immediately. We know that, after nearly three months, action has not yet been completed. We are not unappreciative of the fact that a major part of Israels forces have been removed from Egyptian territory and that those that remain from Israels point of view - are there for Israels own safety. We appreciate that point of view on the part of Israel. But at the same time I say that the Government of Israel should have taken the clear indication given by this house by an overwhelming majority of the vote, almost a unanimous vote, that world public opinion has asserted itself in this matter in unambiguous terms. I am sure that Israel needs friends, just as all small countries do, as we do. It is therefore in the interest of Israel to hearken to the voice of the world. Whatever differences of opinion Israel may have with its neighbors, it will be proper that Israel should have listened to the call of all the nations of the world. Surely there was the duty at least cast on it to listen to the words of caution given by those it considers its friends. There are times when we are in difficulties when we like the opinion of our friends, of persons who are unconnected with the subject, who express dispassionate views. The world at large consists of those people who can express dispassionate views. The friends of Israel know that both sections are combined in this matter to make a united appeal to Israel to withdraw its forces.

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 11th Session, 651st Pl. Mtg., Paras 1-31.

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I certainly understand the attitude of my Arab friends when they say that an aggressor has no right to lay down anything in the nature of conditions. I do not interpret the statement made by the representative of Israel [645th meeting] as setting forth conditions for this Assembly. I look upon it as a statement of the difficulties of his own country. This Assembly has taken into account such difficulties as Israel may have in the matter, in order to make possible a peaceful settlement of this problem. Let us examine Israels position. Time and again the representative of Israel has stated in this Assembly, as well as outside it, that territorial expansion is not his countrys aim. Time and again he has stated that Israel is prepared to enter into non-aggression pacts with all its neighbours and that there is no intention to permit any act of hostility. In other words, if Israel did resort to force, it did so through mistrust or fear, that is to say, for its own preservation. That was the stand taken by the Government of Israel. If that was so, what is the difficulty now? This Assembly is seized of the problem. This Assembly has shown a sense of responsibility. This Assembly has indicated the viewpoint that the whole question will be gone into at an appropriate stage and that, for the purpose of fully investigating the position, it is necessary that there should be an atmosphere of peace. Our first duty is that we should make our contribution towards creating a peaceful atmosphere in the region. We are tired of hearing from our esteemed friends from Israel about the exploits of the Fedayeen. I am sure that this house will heave a sigh of relief on the day when that story is no longer repeated. On the other side, my Arab friends have also tired us by speaking all the time of Israels exploits and skirmishes across the border. This state of affairs has gone on long enough for this Assembly to have taken note of it. If, therefore, as envisaged in the second draft resolution, the United Nations forces are deployed on the Israel as well as the Egyptian side of the border, with the determination to see that the border raids cease, the passing of this draft resolution is, then, the expression of that determination. Surely Israel can accept the view that its position has been taken into account; surely, equally strongly, my Arab friends should feel that their position is equally secure, so long as the problem is to be handed over for settlement to the United Nations. . . . .

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Document No. 191 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Suez Crisis*

4 March 1957. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon) : For the last four months the eyes and ears of the world have been focused on the United Nations . Never before, perhaps, in the history of the United Nations have we had to face a problem of this magnitude. The State of Israel gripped the attention of the world. And everybody waited to have a sigh of relief that the crisis was over. We are grateful, in those circumstances, to have heard the official statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel that the Government of Israel has decided to withdraw its troops from Egyptian territory. That is welcome news indeed. The issue before us is the withdrawal of troops from Egyptian territory, not the plans that are to be adopted after that withdrawal. I dare say that governments are concerned about the future. But the future depends entirely on what we do today, and what the State of Israel will do in respect of a patent duty. As we all know, the United Kingdom and France have bowed to the decision of the General Assembly, bowed to its wishes. It is my opinion that the Assembly should not content itself with having received the statement of the Government of Israel. We are certainly happy that a meeting has taken place and that there has been full agreement with regard to the technical details of the transfer of troops from Egyptian territory to Israeli territory. We are very happy about that. But I think we should not rest content until we have heard that the final withdrawal of troops from Egyptian territory has taken place. Until then, in the opinion of my Government, the General Assembly should be in session to consider all aspects of the subject. The sooner Israels forces are withdrawn, the greater the relief will be to governments of Member States and to the United Nations. We are all concerned about the security of the world. We are all concerned about the future well- being of Israel and the Arab nations. I have no doubt that all Member States will co-operate to the utmost in order to solve those problems peacefully. This is hardly the occasion to go into these problems because the problem before us is the one that we are all aware of the withdrawal of troops, so that the last vestige of aggression may be removed. This is a necessary foundation for any good-will to be created in the region. It is an essential requirement for the co-operation of all the nations in the area. A successful solution of the problem can never be possible unless we receive the unstinted co-operation, not only of Israel, but also of all Arab nations.

* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 11th Session , 667th Mtg., Paras 22-36.

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An atmosphere of good-will can be created only when the results of aggression are removed. Once that elementary requirement is satisfied, then it is for all nations, all men of good-will in the world to unite in the common effort to bring peace to that much troubled area of the world. As we all know, the Middle East is a very inflammable area. It is an area from which trouble can arise at any time. It is necessary therefore that our attention should be focused on that area. But in order to do that, we must see that a set of circumstances obtained whereby the good will of both parties is made possible. Free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, the Gaza strip, the final settlement of the Palestine question - all these are questions of negotiation. The United Nations cannot impose its will on the nations concerned, nor can individual governments, however powerful they may be, impose their will on the parties affected. The United Nations can only render its good offices to make the solution possible. I have no doubt that at the right time it will accept the responsibility to see that the parties affected are brought together and matters discussed freely and openly as between friends. It is to be expected that, with the completion of the withdrawal of the troops, the goodneighbourliness and the friendliness that is required of all nations by the Charter will be practiced. Until then, we shall have to labour incessantly. We must see the last contingent of troops leaving Egypt before we can feel satisfied that the initial task is even complete. I have no doubt that there are many nations which will concede that there are certain equitable considerations which weigh heavily in trying to arrive at some just and peaceful solution with regard to the problems that affect both parties. We are only at the beginning of things. We must travel a long and tedious road before we reach the final goal of a peaceful solution of the problem. But a start has to be made, and made immediately. I must congratulate the Government of Israel on making this start by declaring before the world that it has decided on these initial steps and that a meeting concerning the withdrawal of troops has already taken place. In this connexion, I join with the representative of the United Kingdom in expressing our own humble appreciation of the efforts made by the United Nations as a whole, and in particular by the Secretary-General, whose dedication to the goal of peace is well known. In the same connexion, I also cannot help associating myself with the tribute paid to the United States Government. The United States as a member of the Security Council charged with the responsibility of maintaining peace has risen to the occasion. The world has reason to be grateful for the efforts made by the President Eisenhower and his worthy lieutenants -Secretary of State Dulles and our own colleague, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge - in the delicate task of negotiations in this connexion. It was unfortunate that there should have been some kind of criticism here and there of the conduct of the Government of the United States of America that it was striving to be a policeman in the area. I think that that Government was only discharging a legitimate responsibility for the peace of the world in making efforts to see that a condition of peace prevailed. In order to secure that condition, it was necessary to talk to the party

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that was in a position to create the first condition for peace, namely, the Government of Israel. Is it, then, a surprise that the United States Government, on its own initiative and in order to supplement the work in which we are engaged at the United Nations, should undertake that task? And if that Government has undertaken that task cheerfully in spite of the criticism, the difficulties and the embarrassment, surely we have reason to give a word of thanks for that action. It was also stated that there might have been arrangements between the United States and Israel. Does that matter? It is entirely the responsibility of the United States to make any arrangement it likes in respect of Israel or any other country. Is that a matter about which the United Nations or any other nation can complain? The foreign policy of the United States is a matter for its Government. If, in order to bring peace to the world, it conducts its foreign policy with some nation that is engaged in war, that is not a matter for criticism. I, as a humble representative of a small nation, would like to pay my tribute to the Government of the United States of America for creating a set of circumstances which have enabled Israel to withdraw its troops. It is , in my opinion , a very useful set of circumstances in the solution of the trouble before us. But we have heard the categorical statement that the United States has made no commitments binding the United Nations or any nations here. In those circumstances, we must be grateful for all that has been done in order to further the work, which the United Nations has undertaken. In this connexion, I would also like to pay a very deserved tribute to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt. I made this statement before the Advisory Committee on the United Nations Emergency Force and before the General Assembly. I cannot help admiring the moderation, the restraint and the sympathetic understanding that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt has consistently shown in these really painful days. His courage and his optimism were unbounded, and I think they helped us not a little in arriving at our decisions. He was always cautious, always moderate, and he always had a reasonable attitude toward these questions. When the troops are withdrawn from Egyptian territory, I do not anticipate that the Government of Israel will have any difficulty in meeting the Government of Egypt with regard to the solution of the problems that confront them, because I see such reasonableness in all matters affecting the welfare of the world. It is to be fervently hoped that the solution of the Palestine problem and the problems immediately connected with it - that of freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, and that of the Gaza strip - will be justly and peacefully settled. The Charter does not allow any nation to make use of force to solve any problem. I earnestly plead with both parties, not to use force even if there are temporary difficulties connected with the solution of the problem confronting them. The United Nations will be in a position to use its good offices. The day, I hope, will not be too far distant when there will be peace in the Middle East and that will ensure the peace of the world. . . .

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Document No. 192 Sri Lanka Delegate on Role of Great Powers in the Middle East*
20 October 1957 Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): One of the major causes of tension in the Middle East today is the rivalry of the two power blocs. It is our view that the alignment of countries in military pacts in any part of the world will create a climate of suspicion and distrust and consequently lead to an increase of international tension. The cause of peace, not only in the Middle East but elsewhere, would be considerably improved if the great Powers desisted from involving other countries in their rival power politics. The countries of the Middle East have great material resources, and they are eagerly availing themselves of the technical skills with which to exploit them. These countries have a great future before them, and they need peace and tranquility for the success of any long-term programme of development. Nationalism is a vital force today, and it can be a constructive force for the consolidation of the hard-won freedom of the Arab countries and for the rapid economic progress of their peoples. It is unfortunate that greatpower rivalries in the Middle East have sowed the seeds of dissension and created an atmosphere of suspicion and mutual distrust. The Middle East has too long been regarded as a sphere of influence for foreign powers. No Arab country today is prepared to submit to this view. The Arab countries are jealous of there newlywon freedom and they do not desire to be pawns in international power politics. All that they desire is to be left on their own to work out their destinies. This is not to say, however, that the great Powers have no role to play in the Middle East. On the contrary, their help will be invaluable in developing the economies of these countries. Large amounts of foreign capital are required for the development of oil resources, communications, transport and industries. The Great powers are in a position to furnish this aid. Rapid economic development in this region is urgently needed and cannot but lead to an improvement, not only in the economic and social conditions, but also in the general political situation.

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 12th Session, 698th Pl. Mtg.

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Document No. 193 Sri Lanka Delegate on the Armed Intervention in Lebanon and Jordan*
20 August 1958. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon): Ever since the United Nations came into existence, the people of the world, faced with grave problems, have turned towards it in hope and in the belief that it is the surest and the only way to find suitable solutions. Today, in a grave crisis, we seek in this Emergency Special Session such a solution. My delegation believes that this is the appropriate and perhaps the only forum where fruitful discussion leading to the settlement of crisis, which undoubtedly could disturb the peace of the world, can be undertaken. We, therefore, hope and believe that the member States assembled here will succeed. If we are to succeed we must view the situation realistically and courageously, and take whatever action we may deem necessary to secure a peaceful settlement. In order to achieve this end, we should be prepared to look at the problems of the situation objectively, and discarding self-interest as far as one could do so, attempt to find the right solution. This will be greatly facilitated if our approach is guided by those religious precepts which we hold dear, such for instance as the principle of good neighborliness and by spiritual as opposed to purely mundane considerations. Spiritual and moral values should always be kept in the forefront and should play an important part in practical politics, so that precept and practice may be in accord. The situation before us is certainly grave and dangerous and the corresponding responsibility on us is therefore heavy. It is all the more so, as the Security Council has not been successful in finding a solution. We therefore cannot fail. We must not fail. My delegation is optimistic that with a right and sincere approach we shall find a solution acceptable to us all. We on our part shall endeavour in our humble way to contribute to a settlement which we hope will bring stability, economic prosperity and peace to the peoples of the Middle East and to the rest of the world. We are aware and quite conscious of the fact that we are a small country. But there is one thing we would like to assure this Assembly and that is that we like to look at a problem objectively, to find out what is right and what is wrong, and adopt the course which we sincerely believe to be the right course, irrespective of whether our decision is pleasing to all countries or not. We wish, therefore, to be clearly understood that if we take a view on the present situation, it is a view which is animated by the desire to find the right course. This is sometimes, as my colleague of Burma observed the other day [740th meeting], inconvenient and sometimes difficult. But whatever the difficulties might be, and whatever the risk of being misunderstood might be, we would like to assure this Assembly that the decision which we take is a decision inspired by our desire to do what is the right thing.
* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., Third Emergency Special Session, 742nd Pl. Mtg., Paras 1-18

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With these ideas in mind we should like to offer a few brief comments on the important issue raised by the intervention of the armed forces of the United States in Lebanon and the intervention of the armed forces of the United Kingdom in Jordan. This is what we have met here in an Emergency Special Session to consider. It is undoubtedly the most immediate matter we have to consider and solve. We have noted the statements made both by the United States and the United Kingdom explaining the reasons for their action and giving an undertaking that their forces would be withdrawn on the fulfillment of two conditions. We do not doubt the sincerity of the motives, which impelled these two Governments to take the course of action they adopted. We have given our most earnest and careful consideration to the matter in its entirety and feel that we cannot agree with the action taken in all the circumstances of the case. It is quite clear to us that the action cannot be justified under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, and it is a moot question whether it can even be justified under the General Assembly resolutions of 1949 and 1950. It is important also to remember that at the time of the intervention, the Security Council was seized of the question of Lebanon. In fact, the Security Council had taken action on complaints of subversive activities and massive intervention in Lebanon and it had sent to Lebanon a United Nations Observation Group. Some reports from the Observation Group were already before the Security Council. These reports contained no evidence of massive intervention. It is a question whether in these circumstances, when the Security Council was actually seized of the problem, there was any justification for military interference, even under the General Assembly resolution of 1950. Moreover, it would appear that the intervention did not take place so much because of the subversive activities allegedly directed against Lebanon as because of the sudden events that took place in Iraq and the fear of repercussions as a result of that even in Jordan and Lebanon. In any case, the whole position as to the right of armed intervention is obscure and it is most desirable that the United Nations should have a study made of the considerations involved in armed interference outside the terms of article 51. We, and I know, a large number of other countries too, are disturbed by the intervention that has taken place. There is also a fear that, if the invention in this case is justified, unpopular governments in other places might seek the assistance of friendly countries to intervene with armed forces to support and maintain themselves in power against the wishes of a majority of their people and thus deny to the people the elementary right of freedom, namely, of selfdetermination. This is a matter, therefore, of great importance and is one that should be carefully considered by the United Nations. I do not suggest that it should or could be undertaken as a special purpose but I do wish to raise the question here so that attention may be paid to it at the earliest possible date after this session is concluded. Moreover, we need not really go into the question at this stage regarding it as a fait accompli. The troops are there in Lebanon and Jordan and the real question before us is the question of how best to get the troops out of the two countries.

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We have noted with great satisfaction the action of the United States in withdrawing some units of its forces from Lebanon. We have no doubt that this withdrawal, even without reference to the conditions it had indicated earlier, is an indication of the sincerity of the Government of the United States of America. We hope that this action will be followed by further action until there is a complete withdrawal of troops and that likewise the United Kingdom will consider the complete withdrawal of their forces also at an early date. We do recognize that the withdrawal of their forces from Jordan could leave an immediate vacuum and create some degree of political instability. It is our view, however, that all the United Nations can do is to prevent aggression against any country from outside. The United Nations should not interfere in any way with the internal affairs of any country. Therefore we do accept the position that if the troops are to be withdrawn, it will become necessary for the United Nations to take some kind of action to ensure so far as it is possible that no outside interference will take place. For this reason, it will be necessary immediately for this Assembly to call upon all member States to take note of the fact that they have already committed themselves to the principle of mutual respect for the sovereignty of and non interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It is our view that this principle should be reaffirmed. When this is done that would be, we think, a sufficient guarantee, as we hope that those countries who subscribe to that principle will refrain at all times from action which will be contrary to their affirmation. Furthermore, it is necessary, as has been emphasized both by the Secretary-General and by those who have spoken before me, that suitable United Nations action, which does not extend to the sending of an armed force - and I repeat the words armed force - should be taken. It is the view of my delegation that if these two steps are taken at the present time they will meet the needs of the present situation, and it should be possible for the United States and the United Kingdom, satisfied that the purpose they themselves had in view had been achieved, to complete the withdrawal of their troops. . . The presence of these troops in these two countries is now a potential danger to peace. It is true that tension has somewhat eased for the time being, but the continued presence of these troops may be like a keg of gun powder placed in an inflammable area where the smallest spark could touch off a big explosion. God grant it may not happen, but we would be prudent if we took early action to withdraw the troops. I should like now to pass on to the consideration of another aspect, which is perhaps not of such urgency but is nevertheless of great importance. I refer to what I might call the long-term aspect of the situation in the Middle East as a whole. This aspect is very closely related to what has happened in Lebanon and Jordan. In fact, the situation in Lebanon and Jordan could not be effectively and fully dealt with by the immediate action we have just been discussing, unless some attempt is made to get to grips with this long-term problem. What I mean is that it is essential than an immediate start should be made to consider the various factors which would lead to political and economic stability in the whole region of the Middle East.

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Undoubtedly, there is a revolution going on in the minds of people there - a revolution of expectancy it might be, but there has been going on a real Arab reawakening - and as a result there has grown up a very potent force, which is usually referred to as Arab nationalism. It is unwise to ignore or fail to recognize what is a natural growth of human society, and what in the twentieth century is a known phenomenon in all parts of the world. It is not a new manifestation. Throughout history this phenomenon has existed in varying degrees of fervour. It was well known in Europe and it arose on the American continent. It has returned to Asia and the Middle East and is now growing fast in Africa. It is a sentiment which has animated mankind from the dawn of history and is powerful and dynamic. Nationalism claims for a country the right to freedom and independence and the right to shape its destiny according to the genius of its people and to use the resources available to it for the betterment of its people. The Arab peoples too draw their inspiration from the sentiment: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness - words so dear to the hearts of the people of this great country, the United States. The emergence of this force in the Middle East could therefore be no surprise, but it has undoubtedly created difficulties. It has led to conflicts. People animated by this feeling are, naturally, not satisfied to let things remain as they were before and so in hope and expectancy they push forward and often come into conflict with people or countries having different ideas or other interests. This is one of the causes of the ferment one sees in the Middle East. Every possible step has to be taken to prevent such conflicts. For this purpose a recognition that the resources of the country belong to the people and that any exploitation of those resources must be done by the people themselves or by their consent is absolutely essential. There is another problem of recent growth in the Middle East which is important and should be taken care of. I refer to the extension of the struggle between the two great power groups into this region. This results in unrest and in conflicts between countries in that area. It should, therefore, be considered whether action could not be taken by the great Powers themselves to disengage themselves from such activities. Another serious problem affecting this area is the failure to deal with the Palestinian question, which has caused so much bitterness in the area and in which is also involved the problem of the Arab refugees. It is the view of my delegation that these two important and closelyrelated matters which affect the well-being of the peoples in this region, should be considered. That these two matters are highly complicated and that they raise emotional issues, I am very well aware. One other matter of great importance which affects the Middle East is the great need for economic development. This was admirably dealt with in President Eisenhowers address before this Assembly [733rd meeting]. Similar sentiments were expressed by both the Foreign Minister of the USSR [733rd meeting] and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom [734th meeting]. Here is an instance of agreement between the three great Powers on one of the vital issues affecting this area. We welcome it, and we express the sincere hope that this spirit of co-operation will be carried into other equally vital spheres of activity affecting the lives and well-being of the peoples of the Middle East. ...

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Document No. 194 The Hungary Crisis: Reasons for Sri Lankas abstention on the United States Draft Resolution*
8 November 1956. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): I have received numerous communications expressing real concern as to why Ceylon abstained on the occasion of the vote on the United States draft resolution communications from the Hungarian National Council, from the Action Committee of the AmericanHungarian Federation, from a large number of other associations, and also from numerous friends in distant places such as Seattle, Washington, and California. I, therefore, find it very necessary to place on record the reasons for my abstention. I am sure that the Assembly is aware of the fact that the 563rd Meeting on 3 November ended at 3 oclock in the morning of the 4th, and then the Security Council met until nearly 6 oclock in the morning. Later that day, the draft resolution was introduced, and representatives hardly had time to get in touch with their Governments. I did communicate the draft to my Government, but it was well-nigh impossible to obtain any kind of instructions, and, as the representative of a responsible Government, such as mine is, I felt that it was very necessary for me to have instructions on an issue of so grave and important a nature, particularly when new techniques and procedures which had not been followed before were being set out. Those instructions did not arrive, in the afternoon, while I was still trying to get into contact with my Government there is no telephone service possible from New York to Ceylon I was told that a vote was being pressed, and my delegation had no alternative but to abstain in those circumstances. I am sure that that is exactly how any responsible representative would have behaved in such circumstances. There are certain principles, which can always be agreed upon. I would have had no hesitation in voting for certain parts of that draft resolution without any prior consultation, but there were other parts of which I was not in a position to vote affirmatively or negatively without consulting my Government. Time and again it has been stated that the Bandung Conference stood for certain principles. We stand by those principles and shall continue to stand by them. It is sometimes conveniently forgotten that at the Bandung Conference itself the cry was raised for self- determination for the states of Eastern Europe. At the Bandung Conference itself the cry was raised that the Cominform should be disbanded, and that cry came also from the Government of Ceylon.

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., Second Emergency Special Session, 569th Pl. Mtg. Paras 92-101.

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Being what is described as a neutral country, Ceylon would not hesitate to pass its verdict on issues as and when they arise, without fear or favor. That right is one which we claim as a sovereign state, and that is exactly the reason why we are not aligned with any bloc, because no other considerations should guide us except what we think is important in the interests of humanity and for the preservation of peace in the world. We have not hesitated to register our disagreement with the United Kingdom, with which we have the closest possible ties. The United Kingdom may be described as the closest friend we have, but we have not hesitated to express our dissent from, and our disapproval of, its actions in Egypt. We have very close diplomatic relations with France. But we never hesitated to express our views with regard to its actions in Egypt or Algeria. We have also not hesitated to express our viewpoint with regard to another permanent member of the Security Council, China. We recognize the Communist regime of China; we trade with nationalist Chinese, too. We have also not hesitated at any moment in the past to dissent from the position taken by the Soviet Union Government. Nor have we hesitated to disagree with that great Republic, the United States, with regard to military pacts in our region. We have made our position quite clear in the past, and we find no difficulty in making our position quite clear on this occasion. But we need a little time to examine the situation carefully, to examine the evidence before us, and our Government needs a little time to arrive at a correct verdict. We stand by the principle of self-determination, certainly. As one who has been connected with the independence movement in my country, I certainly feel very strongly for those people who are struggling for independence, and all Asian countries similarly feel very strongly for people who are striving for independence. But self-determination can be realized only by the people of a given country. It is sometimes a long and arduous process. It all depends on how this selfdetermination is expressed. I am happy that Hungary has in some form or other expressed its desire for self-determination. We certainly deplore armed intervention on any account whatsoever. We certainly do not welcome foreign forces in a country under any pretext whatsoever, whether it be for the restoration of order or whether it be to uphold the law of the land. We certainly deplore armed intervention. We deplore aggression, whether it takes place in Algeria, in Kenya or Egypt or anywhere any aggression against any country in the world. I should like to assure the representative of Nationalist China that there is no question of our having one set of criteria for one country and another set for another country. The criteria are the same, but we must be given a chance to examine them. I have no doubt that my Government is fully in favor of a ceasefire, and certainly all Governments of Asian countries would welcome it. Certainly none of us believes in military intervention at all, we do not even believe in military pacts. A cease-fire then, is something to which we could agree. There is no Asian country that would not ask for the withdrawal of foreign forces, because we resent their presence anywhere in any part of our country or in any other country. Surely, the cry that foreign forces should

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be removed from Hungary is a legitimate cry and one in which we could join. My Government would like to go on record as welcoming it. I hope that the Soviet Government will withdraw its forces from Hungary. Those are things on which one can agree we certainly have every sympathy for the struggling Hungarians. There is nobody in this world, no nation, no human being so devoid of feeling as not to be moved by the struggles of a people who had enjoyed their independence for a thousand years and inheritors of a great tradition and culture. There is nobody who would not be moved by those struggles. But at the same time, when a draft resolution comes before the Assembly, we vote only after examining all the paragraphs and all the features of it. I have, personally, no objection whatsoever to sending a team of observers to Hungary if the SecretaryGeneral can arrange it, but no team can visit a country except with the express permission of the Government of that country, unless one wants to start another world war. These are questions, which we have to consider dispassionately. I can assure the Assembly that if Ceylon abstained from voting, it was not from want of sympathy for a struggling people or from lack of faith in the principle of selfdetermination. Nor does that abstention mean that we would ever tolerate armed aggression or the use of armed forces anywhere in any part of the world.

Document No. 195 The Hungary Crisis: On amendments (A/3325) to U.S. Draft Resolution (A/3319) Submitted by Ceylon, India , Indonesia and Burma*
9 November 1956. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): I stated yesterday [56th meeting] in categorical terms that as regards the Government of Ceylon, we would only be too prepared to accede to any request for a cease-fire. In point of fact, we are able to support very strongly the request made in the previous resolution [1004 (ES-11)], as well as in the draft resolution [A/3316] that has been placed before us, for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Hungary and also that no further military forces should be brought into Hungary for any purpose whatsoever. In the same way that we registered our protest against the United Kingdom and France for their armed intervention in Egypt, we certainly protest even in stronger language against the action of Soviet forces in Hungary. The point was made by Sir Pierson Dixon, my very esteemed friend and distinguished colleague from the United Kingdom, that the United Kingdom and France have accepted

* Source : U.N.G . A.O.R., Second Emergency Special Session, 571st Pl. Mtg., Paras 134-51.

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the cease-fire and have freely undertaken to withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory. We are certainly grateful for the statement . At the same time, although there was no reason for bringing up the Egyptian question in connection with this debate, the statement was also made that they were willing to do so and that Soviet Russia was not so willing. I should like to remind Sir Pierson Dixon that in spite of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, Anglo- French forces landed in Egypt in defiance of the resolution [997 (ES-11)]. I believe that such action may sometime set a bad example for others. Soviet Russia seems to be carrying out the same policy, at least for the time being, of retaining its forces in spite of the resolution adopted by the Assembly. I hope that Soviet Russia will have the same realism and practical wisdom, which were displayed by the United Kingdom and France, and agree to remove their forces from Hungary forthwith and promptly. As a rule, I do not like such qualifications: as soon as order is restored. It can take many years before order is restored. Also, of course, it depends on ones definition of order. In these circumstances, I would rather adopt the phraseology that was used in the case of the resolutions relating to the United Kingdom and France: promptly without delay immediately. I trust that Soviet forces will be withdrawn from Hungary so that the people of Hungary may be able to settle their own affairs. We certainly denounce armed intervention in the affairs of a country, whichever that country may be. I freely admit that there was a Warsaw Treaty, under which Soviet troops had the right to be in Hungary, a reason which certainly could not cover the action of the United Kingdom and France in Egypt. If comparisons are being made, however odious it may be, it is sometimes necessary to point out such facts. My Government holds the view that, whether for reasons of restoring order or in the name of peace, we do not want foreign forces to interfere in the internal affairs of a country, whatever pacts there may be. The Government of Ceylon does not believe in military pacts and has always denounced them. These actions are sometimes the results of military pacts. We do not believe in military pacts. I hope that Soviet Russia will not plead the Warsaw Pact in order to keep its forces in Hungary. An extremely unfortunately and tragic situation has taken place. I want to assure my Latin American friends, who stated that the lips of the Asian countries have been sealed on this question, that the lips of the Asian Prime Ministers have not been sealed. Prime Minister Nehru has in unmistakable terms expressed his point of view. My own Prime Minister, Mr. Bandaranaike, used strong language just the other day in connexion with the presence of foreign forces in Hungary. All political parties in Ceylon, except the Communist Party, have expressed similar sentiments. All the Asian countries and all their Prime Ministers have expressed their horror at the unfortunate happenings in Hungary. That does not mean, however, that we are here to make political capital out of other peoples sufferings.

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We in Asia believe in a philosophy of life, we do not believe in making political capital out of human suffering. In the name of humanity and in the furtherance of humanitarian causes we do not try to make use of such occasions for the expression of our political views, even for purposes that are supposed to be noble. Believing as we do in a philosophy of life, we deplore the fact that political considerations should be brought into humanitarian work. There is no denying the fact that Hungary needs assistance. Hungary needs aid, medical supplies and all the sympathy and good-will that people can give. However, let that be given in the spirit of humanitarian work, in the spirit of humanity, in the spirit of understanding. This is not the occasion for vindictiveness, for revenge or for the gospel of hatred. In the name of humanity, let there be no gospel of hatred. Whatever ones views may be, they have been expressed on the political issue. On the humanitarian issue, however, let us get rid of such considerations. In these circumstances, I have no alternative but to express my strong disapproval of the United States draft resolution [A/3319] in its present wording. I should certainly wish to applaud the United States for the noble objective which it has in view for the very real interest in its expressions of sympathy and support and for the declaration that the United States is prepared to spend so much money. However, even in a good cause, words sometimes matter, language counts. Therefore, together with the delegations of India and Indonesia, and with the support of the delegation of Burma, we conceded that the humanitarian objective should be the primary motive of the draft resolution. I hope that it will be possible, therefore, to accept unanimously the amendments that we have proposed. This question should not be a subject of debate, because the relief of human suffering is not a matter for debate. There is not one of us who is not moved by the suffering in Hungary. Let us therefore take a unanimous stand on this question. It is in order that we might be able to take a unanimous stand that our amendments [A/3325] have been placed before the Assembly and I hope that they will be received in that spirit. As regard the political issues, I state again in categorical language that we are pledged to the upholding of the democratic ideal. We who believe in democracy would like to see the right of the self-determination be given to every country of the world. We believe in the freedom of speech, we believe in the freedom of Assembly, we believe in the freedom of the people to vote a government out of office. We believe that it is the right of a people to determine what their future should be. Therefore, we would always welcome free elections. But in the name of free elections I would certainly not support the five-power draft resolution [A/3316] because it serves no practical purpose. I certainly would like to have free elections in the way I think they are free in Russia, in Poland, in Romania, in Eastern Germany, in Hungary, in all countries of the world, and even in some of those other democratic countries with different political ideologies There are also others with the name of democracy, with the

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name of freedom, who do not have the same concept of democracy as I have. There are countries in the world which believe that sometimes the bullet is superior to the ballot. But we who believe in the supremacy of the ballot would like to have seen free elections. The mere moving of a resolution to the effect that we should like to have free elections in Russia, in Poland, in Hungary and in these countries will not secure the result. It may have excellent propaganda value, but I am not party to that business. We are not aligned with any power politics. We are not aligned with any power blocs. We only deal with questions as and when they arise. With regard to the present occasion, the bringing into this resolution something in connexion with elections and asking the United Nations to interfere with the sovereign rights of peoples is a dangerous principle. On the present occasion it may sometimes suit the fancies and the wishes of several members. But they must visualize the time when such interference may be possible even in the domain of their own affairs. Therefore, on principle, I would not have the United Nations interfering in elections. How are elections to be held? Surely elections must be held on the basis of a constitution. Did it not take Pakistan eight years to draft a constitution? Are we going to say that elections are to be held pending a constitution? Are we going to wait for eight years for it? No, I certainly do not say so. Elections therefore must be based on a constitution and a constitution can be drafted only after peoples have expressed their wishes. It is a long process. The mere saying that elections must be held means nothing. Let us get down to practicalities. It is all very well to talk of free elections. I believe in free elections and all of us believe in free elections. But the mere adoption of a draft resolution in this from does not bring about free elections. Therefore, I have no alternative but to say that I cannot understand how this should be interposed in the draft resolution asking the United Nations to do something which is impossible of achievement. Of course, I have no doubt that it is also premature, because we have already assigned to the Secretary-General a task of first-class importance, of great magnitude, to survey the position and submit a report to us. It is only after the observers have gone in, if they do go there and that must be at the express permission of the Government of that country and it is only after the submission of a report that we can get down to the practical business of what we should do: whether elections are to be held, and what elections should be held and what should be done next. It is like putting the cart before the horse. I am not prepared, therefore, in the name of propaganda, or in the name of revenge, or in the name of anything else, to subscribe to something that is utterly futile. In those circumstances I have no alternative but to oppose that draft resolution with much regret. I have already commented on the two draft resolutions before the Assembly and I hope that we will be able to take a unanimous stand on this affair. Believe me, we feel very deeply about the suffering of the people of Hungary. All Asian countries feel very strongly about it, and it is pity that even the Hungarian sufferings should have brought to the political arena the injection of a discussion on the Egyptian issue, which is quite apart. I do deplore these tendencies. Let us discuss issues as and when they come and express our verdict on the issues before us.

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Document No. 196 Hungary Crisis: Plea for Adopting by the Assembly the Draft Resolution (A/3368) Sponsored by India, Indonesia and Ceylon*
21 November 1956 Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): The draft resolution, which is sponsored by Ceylon, together with India and Indonesia, has been ably placed before the Assembly by the representative of India. I shall be very brief. At the same time, I should like to place before the Assembly the point of view of my Government on this very important issue. I have been very pained on hearing here the statements that have been made by some representatives who, I think, should know better the attitude of countries such as Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Burma. One almost felt that Ceylon, along with the other countries, was guilty of gross callousness and was indifferent to the suffering of other in other parts of the world, and that we adopted other standards and had now principles to guide us merely because we are not prepared to climb on the bandwagon. As I have always said here in this Assembly we claim to exercise our privilege as a sovereign state by expressing views on subjects, as and when they arise, according to our own lights. I ask for tolerance. There are in this Assembly nations accepting political ideologies which are sharply different one from the other. We have come here so that we may, in this hall, be able to discuss freely and frankly and reach a common basis of understanding It is almost suggested that these countries have not paid any heed to the cry of the struggling Hungarians. That is far from the truth. So far as Ceylon is concerned, it is my duty to tell the Assembly that the public opinion has expressed itself very strongly in all quarters of Ceylon with regard to the situation, that in every newspaper Singhalese, Hindustani or English one finds very strong statements deploring the presence of foreign troops in Hungary and interference with the Hungarian peoples right of selfdetermination. All the political parties in my country have expressed similar views, and the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mr. Bandaranaike, who does not as a rule mince words, has been very categorical in stating that he resents the presence of foreign forces, that he deplores the meaningless killing that took place in that part of the world, and that he believes that every nation is entitled to self-determination and that Hungary should be allowed to work out its own destiny. . . .

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 11th Session, 586th Pl. Mtg., Paras 67-96.

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I turn now to the joint draft resolution A/3368 itself. It is agreed on all sides that there is an unsatisfactory situation in Hungary. How are we going to remedy that situation? It simply will not help to state, with all the emphasis and might at the Assemblys command, that we are going to force the Hungarians or the Soviet people to do what we like. Hungary is represented here by its foreign minister. I do not know in what capacity this gentleman is here if not as the representative of a Government. He has already expressed his viewpoint [582nd meeting]. It has been maintained, particularly by the representative of the United States [583rd meeting], that deportations from Hungary have been taking place for a certain amount of time. I have carefully analyzed the statement made by the United States representative. He said that there had been no absolute denial of the fact that deportations from Hungary were taking place. I do not know whether anything could be more categorical than the denial of the foreign minister of Hungary, who stated that not a single person had been deported. I do not know what Mr. Lodge meant by unqualified denial. It is a fact that there was a denial that deportations had taken place. The latter position has been supported by many other countries which are also Members of the United Nations. I do not for a moment wish to pass judgment in this respect. The position is this. The United States Government, supported by many other Governments, states that deportations have taken place. If I remember correctly, Mr. Lodge gave the Assembly a list of deportations which had taken place up to 14 November. We do not know whether deportations continued after that date or ceased. We have no information at all on this subject. Deportations may have taken place, and they may still be taking place, we simply do not know. How are we to proceed when a charge is leveled against a Member of the United Nations? Both the United States and the Soviet Union are permanent members of the Security Council. Thus, one permanent member of the Security Council makes an accusation, and another denies the accusation. We are faced with a case in which a charge is made and the accused denies the charge. According to all the concepts of law and reason with which I am familiar, the whole matter is at issue. The fact that fifty nations say, we accept the statement of the United States, does not lend further weight to the argument. A categorical statement of the facts has been made by the United States. We are grateful to the United States for giving us this information. Many other Nations immediately accept the statement that deportations have taken place, and all the arguments are based on that statement, despite the categorical denial which has been made. In other words, you are begging the question. That is a right, which cannot be denied to any nation or person. We sometimes come across the most despicable cases of crime. The whole world knows that a crime has taken place. The accused steps into the dock and pleads not guilty. The trial takes place and evidence which cannot be challenged is given. However the evidence given in this case by the Government of the United States is challenged. Those who challenge

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it even go to the lengths of saying that the radio broadcasts have not taken place, and that the films could have been faked. Once a doubt has been cast on the evidence, I think it is only fair that some independent inquiry should be held. It is in that spirit, in order to correct the procedure, and not to pass judgment on one side or the other, that we have introduced our draft resolution. We may all have our own doubts about the subject. Many of us may accept the assertions made by a number of nations, but it is in that spirit that we offer this draft resolution, and also in order to recognize the sovereign rights of the country. We ask the Hungarian Government to permit observers designated by the SecretaryGeneral to enter the territory of Hungary and to make such investigations as are necessary, on- the-spot investigations. We do not claim it as a right, because we cannot do so. Hungary has certain sovereign rights. All we can do is to appeal to Hungary, in the name of reason, to let the Secretary-General designate his officers for the purposes of that inquiry. If the Hungarian Government, as I hope it will, allows this, then we shall have the opportunity of having placed before us a report which certainly can be called untainted and unprejudiced. We shall have evidence on which we can act, because the Secretary-General is not a party to the dispute. If, on the other hand, Hungary refuses to accept the observers as suggested by us, then there is a presumption against Hungary, because if the Government of Hungary does not place the evidence it can give us before the observers designated by the SecretaryGeneral we can come to only one conclusion - that it is not in its best interests, it is not for its own safety. It would mean, therefore, that it had done something which it should not have done. In those circumstances, the best course we can adopt, which is only a rectification of procedure, is to call upon the Government of Hungary to place before the observers such evidence as is available. If that appeal is rejected, then we have the right to come back to the General Assembly, in special emergency session or in any manner desired, and say that we have exhausted all the possible resources and that we are now convinced that the evidence placed before us by the United States and other Nations is acceptable, is correct evidence, and we can proceed to a verdict that Hungary is a wrong-doer. I think it would further the cause a great deal if we gave them that right. If we deny the Hungarian Government that right, the right to say, we are just as good as any other Member, and we have made categorical denials of the charges, but our denials were brushed aside and, with no evidence placed before the Assembly, we have been convicted, and the finding is one we cannot accept. If the Hungarian Government turns round and says it is not prepared to accept that resolution, what then? Would you have helped in decreasing tension or in increasing tension? Would you have laid the foundations for a third world war, or would you have worked for peace? It is in that spirit that we have placed this draft resolution before this Assembly. . . .

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In those circumstances, in order to follow the normal standards of justice and fair play by giving every accused person or nation an opportunity of defense, giving the fullest latitude to them to place all the evidence they would like to place before us, we would be fully justified in unanimously adopting this draft resolution. I think it is advisable also to proceed step by step. It is no good to state categorically that they must cease to deport. In the first place, that implies that deportation has taken place, without examining any evidence that may be placed by the other side. It implies that we are presuming that deportations have taken place, and what we are asking that those deportations should cease. We shall not produce results if they have the feeling that they have been unjustly or unfairly treated by being condemned without any proper investigation. Therefore it would be much more useful for the cause which we have in mind, a cause that is dear to us the freedom of the Hungarian people - if we proceeded step by step. The first step should be an investigation by a team of observers designated by the Secretary-General. After that, we can think of the second step. If we try to solve all the problems of the world overnight, we shall never succeed. That would only make the problem even more difficult of solution. Therefore, I beg of you, I plead with you in all humility, to accept this draft resolution and to adopt it unanimously.

Document No. 197 Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandarnaikes Statement on Hungary in the U.N. General Assembly*
22 November1956. Mr. [S.W.R.D.] Bandaranaike (Ceylon): I wish to say a few words about Hungary. There seemed to be a feeling in the minds of some people that some of our countries were indifferent, or even lukewarm, about certain happenings in Hungary. I wish strongly to repudiate this charge. What happened? It will interest the Assembly to know that when the very first draft resolution [A/3286] regarding this Hungarian episode was introduced here, it was done in such a desperate hurry, it was sent from the Security Council to the General Assembly so quickly for a vote to be taken within a few hours, that some of us had no opportunity to bring our minds to bear on the problem or even to send instructions to our representatives here as to how they were to vote. I was fast asleep in Colombo when an urgent cablegram from our permanent representative here was received by the Permanent Secretary, asking for instructions as a vote was going to be taken. I had not all the facts or data before me. I could not even get my office open

* Source: U. N. G. A. O. R ., 11th Session, 1956, 590th Pl. Mtg., Paras 22-27.

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in order to get such papers as were available there at that hour of the night. We are rather respectable in Colombo. We go to bed fairly early and we remain there till morning. What could I do? I instructed my Permanent Secretary to send off immediately a cablegram to our representative here, making certain general suggestions and asking him to consult with other groups with which we associate in taking action. We abstained from voting. That is how that abstention came about. Is it really not possible, when this world Organization discusses subjects of paramount importance, to allow a certain reasonable measure of time for consideration and consultation before important decisions are arrived at? It seems to me a great pity if the urgency of the situation - if I may so call it - demands the taking of action in that horrid manner. That is what happened. I believe that in the case of some other Asian countries also they had no time to issue instructions to their representatives or even to consider the matter. There seemed such a desperate haste to get something through a desperate haste which I fail to understand. I do not think that the lapse of a few hours, twelve hours, would have such an overwhelming difference to the case. With regard to the second draft resolution on Hungary [A/3316] that was moved here, it was like the proverbial curates egg, good in parts and bad in parts. We agreed with the request that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Budapest and from Hungarian territory without any delay. We could not quite agree with that portion of the draft resolution that requested that free elections be held in Hungary under the vigilant eyes of United Nations observers. You will have noted what we said at Delhi. What we said there was that the USSR troops should be withdrawn and that Hungary should be left free to work out its own destiny. Why should we dictate to any country that it should have elections, as we want it to have them? Surely, whether it is a Soviet dictatorship in Hungary, an Anglo-French dictatorship in Egypt or even the dictatorship of the United Nations which militates against the sovereignty of a country, they are all, I think, equally unwise and undesirable. What were we to do with a draft resolution, part of which we agreed with and part of which we disagreed? I asked my representative here to secure a separate vote on the separate parts. When the draft resolution as a whole was put to the vote [571st meeting] we followed the only logical course; we abstained from voting, having expressed our views quite clearly and openly from this rostrum. The latest draft resolution [A/3357/Rev.2] that proposed by Cuba, the debate on which I had the privilege of listening to here yesterday, was passed by a majority vote. Another draft resolution introduced by India, Ceylon and Indonesia [A/3368/Rev.3] was also passed. I leave it to the ingenuity of the Secretary-General to reconcile the two decisions. However, I feel that the draft resolution introduced by us was more reasonable and logical than certain aspects of the wording of the other draft resolution. The Assembly has also passed a resolution [1007(ES-II)] calling for relief in Hungary. We decided to recommend that to other countries and to do it ourselves, at the Delhi

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Conference and our Governments are doing it. My Government has voted for this a few days ago. We are a poor country but we have decided to give what we could give towards relief, in Hungary as well as in Egypt. Budapest needs relief; does not Port Said? They all need relief. If I may be forgiven for using the phrase - and I do not say it disparagingly of anyone - there is no fundamental difference, to my mind, between the thug or rowdy who deals a man one blow and the thug or rowdy who deals a man two blows. Fundamentally, both are worthy of condemnation. That was our attitude regarding Egypt and Hungary.

Document No. 198 Hungary: Appeal to the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and Hungary to Accept UN Observers*
3 December 1956. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): The views of the Government of Ceylon on the Hungarian question have been expressed on previous occasions in the most unequivocal language. Representatives heard the Prime Minister of Ceylon himself, from this rostrum [590th meeting], clearly indicating the way the people of Ceylon looked at this question. We deplore senseless killings wherever they occur, whether it is in Hungary, Algeria or Egypt. We also deplore the presence of foreign forces in any country interfering with the internal affairs of any part of the world. We do not recognize military pacts as an excuse for the presence of foreign forces in order to interfere with the affairs of any country. Whether it is the South East Asia Treaty Organization forces interfering in the internal affairs of the Eastern region, or the Baghdad Pact forces interfering in the Middle East in order to prevent the people from exercising their will, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces engaged in warlike enterprises in Egypt or Algeria, we deplore it equally. We therefore do not for a moment accepts the explanation given by the representative of the USSR that the Soviet forces were in Hungary by reason of the Warsaw Pact. We recognize no pact as giving any kind of excuse for interfering in the internal affairs of any region or country. We also do not accept the contention that the Hungarian affair is purely an internal matter. Surely the tragic happenings in that country have engaged the attention of all the peoples of the world. Every corner of this earth has been agitated by those happenings, and we cannot, therefore, complacently agree with the representative of the USSR that it is purely an internal affair and should not disturb others.

* Source: U. N. G. A. O. R., 11th Session, 605th Pl. Mtg., Paras 133-168.

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If the same plea is used by many colonial powers, if they merely declare that any part of their colonial empire becomes a province of the colonial power, and if, when there is an out-break and the United Nations raises its voice, the plea is put forward that it is an internal affair, there will be no end to colonialism at all. We therefore reject the plea that this is an internal affair, and we think that it is up to every Member of the United Nations to give effect to the resolutions that have already been passed. Those resolutions clearly reject the plea that it is an internal affair. In this Assembly we have discussed many matters pertaining to the affairs of particular countries - the case of race discrimination in South Africa, or other happenings in other parts of the world which are of the world impact - and we have refused to accept the plea that they fall within the domestic jurisdiction of any particular country. That plea having once been rejected, I think that it is not proper for the USSR delegation to raise it again. The question of jurisdiction thus clearly does not obtain. Just as when the United Kingdom and France called it police action that they engaged in Egypt, this Assembly rejected that plea and called upon those two countries to abide by its decisions so we would ask the USSR also to act up to the spirit of the resolution that have been passed here to the effect that this Assembly as a whole does not recognize the Hungarian incident as a matter falling purely within domestic jurisdiction. That plea can no longer be raised. The moral judgment of the world has been cast. This body, as a tribunal, has passed judgment on that preliminary legal, technical issue. The technical issue is no longer before us. Then we proceed to the factual issue. The factual issue is that an incident has taken place, an incident which has roused the conscience of the world and which has disturbed everybody in the world. The tragic happenings in Hungary cannot be forgotten. Surely it is not enough for the leader of the USSR delegation to say that it is all a fabrication that it is all the work of enemies, of Radio Free Europe or some such organization, or subversive action on the part of the United States Government or some European agency. Something has happened, and it is that which requires investigation. It is not necessary to give reasons for the occurrence, but that thousands of lives have been lost is a fact. That is undeniable. The fact that the evidence is given by the United States, or some other country, makes no difference. There is abundant evidence that many persons have been killed. There is abundant evidence that the people, striving for their independence, have been crushed by foreign military forces. There is abundant evidence that there is an upsurge in that part of the world in the name of freedom, let us say. It may have been wrongly conceived, but the fact remains that, whoever started it, there was an upsurge in Hungary. Whether it was started by the Fascists or by any other faction makes no difference. Surely the fact that Fascists instigated it would afford no excuse for foreign military forces to take away the lives of thousands of persons. That does not make any difference at all.

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The reasons do not matter; at this stage what matters is whether something disastrous has taken place. If it has taken place, that is all the more reason why we should investigate whether there was justifiable reason for it and whether the lives of persons have been cruelly taken away. The burden is now on us as Members of the United Nations to decide for ourselves whether a cruel blow has been dealt at the unfortunate people of Hungary in their efforts to gain freedom for themselves or to set up their Government in the way they wanted it to be. Those are matters for us to decide. In order to investigate, it is necessary that we should have before us unvarnished evidence evidence that cannot be challenged particularly so because many millions of persons in the world believe that a tragedy has taken place. The press of the whole world has publicized it so much that in the most distant corners of the earth people believe that thousands of men women have been cruelly done to death. Surely, therefore, it is not just a matter of concern to the USSR, or the Hungarian Government or their friends. It has become a matter for the whole world, and we, therefore, are rightly seized of this question. The United Nations has rightly and properly passed a resolution [A/RES/408] asking that the Government of the USSR and Hungary be good enough to receive observers to make on- the-spot investigations. Ceylon, along with India and Indonesia, had the honor to sponsor a proposal to that effect. Despite the fact that millions of people believe that story, we say that the Assembly is a judicial tribunal; it acts in a semi-judicial capacity; and it must therefore have the best evidence. We must create the machinery necessary to obtain the best evidence. The Assembly has thought of what might be called fair and impartial machinery to obtain such evidence. The evidence given by the United States has been seriously challenged by the Soviet Union. It has even been suggested that the United States Government is the villain of the piece and has been mainly responsible for the events in Hungary. On the one hand, we have the statement of the United States Government that mass killings and mass deportations have taken place, that people have been ruthlessly killed by the Soviet army. On the other hand, the Soviet Union Government says, this is all the doing of the United States. How are we to proceed to make a judgment as to which statement represents the facts unless we have evidence one way or the other? Merely to say that this is the work of the United States Government, or the Cuban Government, or some other Government, will certainly not satisfy world public opinion. World public opinion must be satisfied on the basis of evidence, evidence which every fair-minded person could accept. I would therefore address the following appeal to the USSR and Hungarian Governments.

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If they are firmly convinced that the course they have followed has been the correct one, if they are firmly convinced that they have been acting according to their best lights, for the good of Hungary and the Hungarians, then it would be in their very best interests that independent investigators should examine the position. . . . An opportunity is now afforded to the USSR and Hungarian Governments to proceed as everyone should proceed. It is not enough for them to say that a red herring has been placed across the trail, that an attempt is being made to cloud the issue because the United Kingdom and France have forces in Egypt. The question of these latter forces is no longer a matter of debate here. We now have the welcome news that the United Kingdom and France are prepared to withdraw their forces, and negotiations are in process. Would it, then, be unreasonable for us to ask the USSR, in the same sprit and in the same way, to withdraw its forces from Hungary, so that negotiations might be started on that basis? The United Kingdom, French and Egyptian Governments did not even object to a United Nations police force; in fact, that force is already in the area concerned. As regards Hungary, however, such a step has not been taken. The minimum step has been taken: a request that observers should be admitted. . . .

Document No. 199 Hungary: Sri Lankas Position on Sending Independent U.N. Observers*
4 December 1956. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): In my previous intervention [605th meeting], I made categorical statements as to Ceylons attitude with regard to the Hungarian question. I categorically rejected the plea that the Hungarian question was purely a domestic matter that did not affect other countries of the world. In other words, the theme of domestic jurisdiction has been completely rejected by Ceylon. I also made the categorical statement that we disapproved of armed intervention anywhere, in any part of the world, in suppressing the expression of any peoples will. We also rejected the position taken by the USSR that foreign forces were there by reason of the Warsaw Pact. We do not accept the position that any country, any powerful country, has a right to be on foreign soil in order to exert its will in any manner or means.

* Source : U. N. G. A. O. R., 11th Session , 608th Pl. Mtg., Paras 234-247.

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So far as we are concerned, although we deplore the whole Hungarian incident, when we are called upon to vote on a draft resolution it must be clear that we examine its wording. We are meticulously careful with regard to the wording of resolutions. There are many Member States that may be prepared to vote for a draft resolution merely because they think a certain objective may be obtained by doing so, and that it helps to create pubic opinion. Of course, pubic opinion is created through speeches which are made, but a resolution must be so worded, with great care, that it is acceptable by the Member States. It is much to be deplored that, in introducing draft resolutions of this nature, controversial matters are not dropped, so that the maximum amount of agreement may be obtained. In this particular question it is simple to get the maximum amount of agreement, but sometimes the sponsors of motions rely on the fact that they have numbers behind them and that such motions must be carried as a test of strength. We do not belong to any power bloc and we refuse to be stampeded into any action by any power bloc. From this rostrum I have, on many occasions, declared that we are tired of mutual recriminations, tired of this display by one bloc or another which launches into a tirade against the opposite faction. We have come to the stage when we must have constructive action, and we believe in constructive action. If such action achieves a purpose which is desirable, we are prepared to make our contribution, but we are not prepared to be a party to any kind of recrimination on any side. I would also like to state, on this question of sending observers into Hungary, that we are in full agreement that this action should be taken; and we had the privilege of cosponsoring a motion to that effect. We therefore welcome the decision to send observers into Hungary, but at the same time I must point out that Ceylon is not prepared to provide sanction for a roving expedition of observers in all countries, without definition of the countries into which they are to be sent or for that what purpose they are to be sent. Who is to exercise discretion in this respect, since it must be noted that the wording is delightfully vague? Who will exercise the discretion, if the necessity arises, after investigation of Hungary, if, as a result of material discovered, observers are required to proceed to, say, Jamaica, Trinidad or any other place in the world? There must be in such a case a specific resolution before this Assembly, and the sanction of this Assembly must be obtained. I think it is a most dangerous precedent to authorize observers to go into any unspecified place, and it also raises a tremendous problem. It has been suggested that there may be some cause for investigation in Romania, there may be other causes found in Czechoslovakia, some others in Poland and some others even within the Soviet Union. Are observers going to be sent into those countries against the will of the people? Is it possible for this Assembly to send observers into a country against the will of the people? Such action would certainly infringe the sovereignty of those nations, without their express permission that it should be done. Provision for such an eventuality is not covered by the wording of this resolution that these observers are to be sent in provided the consent of the countries has been obtained.

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I am afraid that Ceylon is not prepared to support this kind of vague resolution, and we are not prepared to sanction, in the name of the Government of Ceylon, such action. Hungary constitutes one problem, but if we are considering sending observers on a roving expedition to Romania, Yugoslavia or the USSR, which have refused to allow observers on their territory, what then? Are we going to send military detachments afterwards, or do we want to declare war? We must look at this resolution in a reasonable way, and, as the resolution stands, Ceylon could not do other than abstain. A completely new situation has developed, and we cannot be parties to this dispute. We are here in a semi-judical capacity, merely to work upon the various resolutions. We are not to be stampeded into accepting orders from any bloc, and must therefore exercise our discretion. We would like to know whether the objectives of peace will be served, and we want to see the Hungarian question resolved in much the same way as the Egyptian question, that is to say the Suez Canal question was resolved. We did not have recourse in our resolutions on that question, but we cannot make judgments before investigation. In this particular case, on the one side a statement has been made and on the other there is a categorical denial. Therefore, there is a need for investigation. However, before investigation has been concluded, we have, in the words of the resolution, a judgment. Surely we cannot be parties to an investigation conducted after a judgment has already been made. That is no way to set about an investigation, and my knowledge of legal procedure would not permit me to agree to such a course. . . . We are people of peace, and we believe in peaceful methods and peaceful solutions. Peaceful solutions cannot be achieved by stampeding people into action in this way, and that is why the Government of Ceylon has abstained on this vote, although we feel strongly that the Hungarian question requires immediate investigation. We want impartial evidence upon which to act and, when that impartial evidence is before us, we will not hesitate to express our judgment either for or against.

Document No. 200 The Hungary Crisis: Sri Lanka Delegates speech on the Draft Resolution (A/3437) Co-Sponsored by Ceylon, India , Burma , and Indonesia*
11 December 1956. Mr. [R.S.S.] Gunewardene (Ceylon): We have been called upon to pronounce a moral judgment in respect of a fellow Member of this Organization, a member of the Security

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 11th Session , 616th Pl. Mtg., Paras 112-160.

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Council, undoubtedly a powerful member of this Organization, on which the peace of the world to a great extent rests. In such a situation we should proceed with caution, without passion, without an undue display of emotion, so that we may be able not only to be fair but also to seem to be fair. My country does not belong to any bloc, and I can therefore place the case as it strikes me, with a sense of detachment. Nearly eight weeks have elapsed since the Hungarian revolution began, and over one month has elapsed since the General Assembly was seized of this problem. Four resolutions have been passed by this body calling upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its armed forces, and three resolutions have been passed calling upon the Hungarian Government to accept observers. All these resolutions have been treated, if I may say so, with utter contempt. A question then has arisen as to how we should proceed in the face of these facts. It is contended that the Hungarian question is a limited question which should come within the purview of Hungary alone. We are also asked, if investigations are to be pursued in Hungary in this manner, why we should not pursue investigation in Cuba and other parts of the world. Surely the situation that has arisen in Hungary is not such a minor incident. It is a situation that has commanded the attention of the whole world. It is idle to state that it is only Hungary and the Soviet Union that are concerned with this question. Speaking as the representative of a country thousands of miles away from the Hungarian situation, I might say with a great deal of conviction that there is hardly a man or woman in my country who has not felt the gravity of the situation. The cry of anguish is heard thousands of miles away, in the most distant corners of Asia. World public opinion has been shocked to such an extent that we cannot simply remain idle. Speaking again, for my own country, there is hardly a day that has elapsed when all the journals in my country, whether in the Singhalese tongue or in English, have not had something to say with regard to the Hungarian situation. All political parties in my country have passed resolutions, and pubic meetings have been held, so that we are not so unconcerned about what is happening in Hungary. The same applies to many other countries in Asia. You heard only the other day the statement made by the four Prime Ministers of South-East Asian countries meeting in New Delhi, in which they condemned what has taken place in Hungary in unmistakable terms. Similar statements have been made by other Prime Ministers in other Asian countries. I mention the case of Asia because Asia is so far removed from Hungary. All countries of the world have felt that a grave situation arises which calls for the intervention of this Organization. In pronouncing a moral judgment, we must see clearly what the issues are. In the first place, there has been an upsurge in Hungary. There is no denying that. It is not denied by the Soviet Union or by its friends that carnage has taken place on a scale which must

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shock world pubic opinion. It is conceded that thousands of people have fled that country. It is conceded that there is turmoil in that country. It is conceded that people live under intolerable conditions there. It is conceded that the people have no opportunity of expressing their will. These are not things to be ignored. If these facts are conceded, then the question arises: who is responsible for this state of affairs? The Soviet Union and its friends would like to place the blame on one side: the United States and Radio free Europe. That is an ex parte statement. It is because we want the best evidence as to what is happening in Hungary that we want observers to be dispatched there so that they may conduct an on-the-spot investigation. If the Soviet Union or the Hungarian Government were able to establish a clear cut case that it was a revolution stirred up by foreign agents, mainly by the United States Government, then it would be a case on which it could very well present evidence. They do not want to place before us any evidence at all. Without placing any evidence, they want us to accept their statements. We are not disposed to accept the statements made by the Soviet Union and its friends or by the United States and its friends. All we want is the clearest evidence on which we can act. . . . In the first place, we refuse to accept the plea that it is a matter of domestic jurisdiction. That plea has been examined most carefully by this Assembly and rejected by and impressive majority. It is certainly within the powers of the Organization to deal with an issue as and when it comes up in that manner. This Assembly is its own master, and it therefore has perfect right to rule out the plea of domestic jurisdiction on consideration and examination of all the relevant facts. It can even amend its own Charter by a twothirds majority. Well, more than a two-thirds majority has expressed the opinion that this is not a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of Hungary or the Soviet Union. That plea is not tenable any more, and I am sorry that the Soviet Union ad its friends are tenaciously clinging to the plea of domestic jurisdiction. People who have a clear case or a fair case do not have to rely purely on technicalities of this nature. This is more than a technical matter. If there was a case to be made, I have not the slightest doubt that the Soviet Union and its friends would have made that case in the most convincing manner. I have only one conclusion to draw from the fact that they are clinging tenaciously to this argument of domestic jurisdiction, and that is that they have no case that is convincing enough to be placed before this Assembly. In any case, there was also a similar case when the United Kingdom and France pleaded that they were conducting a police action and that they were acting in defence of their interests. We rejected that plea and the United Kingdom and France bowed to that decision. I would have expected the same course of conduct from the Soviet Union. Such, unfortunately, has not been the case. Then there is another plea that has been raised, the Warsaw Pact. I have gone through this Pact most carefully, article by article, but I do not find the slightest justification for

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invoking it in connexion with the presence of Soviet troops and the intervention of the Soviet Union in the affairs of Hungary. The Warsaw Pact is a treaty concluded within the framework of the United Nations Charter. It cannot, therefore, militate against the fundamental requirements of the Charter. The Charter enjoins on nations not to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. That fundamental provision of the Charter cannot be violated by the invocation of any article of the Pact or of the Pact itself. The preamble of the Warsaw Pact itself sets out very clearly the objectives of the Pact. It was meant for defensive purposes against armed attack from the outside. If a foreign nation deemed it fit to attack Hungary or the Soviet Union or any of the allies, perhaps there would be a justification under the Warsaw Pact for all of them, singly or collectively, to meet that aggression. Such, however, is not the case. Also, if, you read the articles carefully you will find that the objective of that Pact is the encouragement and maintenance of friendly relations among themselves by cultural exchanges. Nothing is further from the truth than that the Warsaw Pact affords the slightest justification for the intervention in the affairs of Hungary. It is also maintained with a certain degree of emphasis that other nations have armed forces in other parts of the world. If there are armed forces in other parts of the world with the permission and authority of the countries in which they are stationed, it is not for us to question it. That is a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the countries themselves. Any country has the right to have any forces it wants, foreign forces or its own forces. The objection is not that Soviet forces are stationed in Hungary. The objection is that the foreign forces have intervened in the affairs of Hungary. I do not think that the South East Asia Treaty Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Baghdad Pact or any other Pact have intervened so far in the internal affairs of any of those countries where those forces are stationed. . . . It is certainly a very painful thing. I do not derive much pleasure in stating this point of view. Time was when we thought that the process of liberalization was taking place in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe, and we heaved a sigh of relief and thought that we could hope for better times, free from armed conflicts, free from revolutions, each country able to pursue its destiny according to its own likes. Time was when we felt that peaceful coexistence was not merely a possibility, and a vital necessity, but that it was a reality too. World opinion has been shocked by recent events. We even gave credit to the Soviet Union for creating the Geneva spirit, a spirit that we thought had come to stay. It is greatly to be regretted, therefore, that there has been a violation of the code of conduct by a nation, which we expected, believed in preserving peace, order and the well-being of the world.

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We are not here to impose on Hungary the kind of Government that we want. All we seek is that Hungary should be free to decide its own destiny, that it should be free to look out for its own salvation in the way it thinks best. We have no objection if Hungary chooses a socialist government, we have no objection if it chooses a socialist government, or even a fascist government, or a democratic government. Of course, believing as we do in democracy, we would like every country to be democratic. But nobody wants our will, or the will of this body, or the will of any Government, to be imposed on the people of Hungary. All that is asked for is that each country should be given the freedom to express its will in the most effective manner, in the traditional manner. In Hungary, the people are denied the chance of expressing their will. The theory of self-determination is something dear to us all. Self-determination is a plea which the Soviet Union and its friends also raise. Have the people of Hungary been given the right of self-determination? It is, I say, a violation of fundamental provision of the Charter. We cannot, therefore, look complacently at all these violations. The time has come, therefore, for us, however unpleasant it may be, to pronounce a judgment that is in accordance with law, morality and decency in the light of the facts before us. All we want is that decent standards should prevail in the world, that there should be a chance for justice, that there should be a chance for freedom, that there should be a chance for the expression of liberty in its fullest sense. If such a state of affairs does not exist, life is not worth living. This world would certainly not be a place to live in. If the law of the jungle is to prevail, if a mighty nation is to be able to impose its will on a weaker or smaller nation, then I think we can say goodbye to civilization and culture and all that we think is decent. . . . I say this because the strength of this Organization does not depend on armaments, nor does it depend on armed forces; it depends entirely on moral force and, if that moral force is of any value, I have not the slightest doubt that the Soviet Union will respond to that call. Even at this late stage, it is my earnest hope that the Government of the Soviet Union and the Hungarian Government will respond to the call of the duty, of decency and of humanity. In the name of all humanity, I appeal once again as I have on a previous occasion, to the Hungarian authorities that they admit observers and that they invite the SecretaryGeneral to negotiation. Then, perhaps, we can revise whatever judgment we may pass today in the light of any further evidence that is available to us, from investigations carried on by the Secretary-General and his officers. I do not wish to say anything further at this stage. I only hope and appeal to the Soviet Union to recognize that the time has come for it to take full responsibility to save the world from disaster, the responsibility rests with the USSR to preserve the world for peace, for freedom. Indeed, the prime responsibility for the maintenance of peace rests

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with the United States and the Soviet Union, and we do hope that some rapprochement will be possible and that these must cover the fundamental, namely the preservation of peace. In that spirit I commend this draft resolution.

Document No. 201 Crisis in Congo: on the Draft Resolution (S/4404) Sponsored by Tunisia and Ceylon*
21 July 1960. Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): In recent months, the Security Council has met frequently to consider very important matters dealing inter alia with the consideration of disputes between Member states. The Security Council has been called upon to do so as the primary organ of the United Nations and as the only forum that now exists where grievances can be discussed and where steps can be taken to ensure international peace and security. In all these cases, the action so far taken has been conciliatory and constructive, and, if the disputes have not been immediately settled, the groundwork has been prepared and a way indicated by which these disputes could be settled through peaceful negotiation. We must be grateful for this, and it should be our task, in these perilous times, to act soberly and with good judgment, conscious of the great responsibility we have to the present generation and to countless generations to come, and conscious also of our special responsibility. The Security Council has now met on four occasions regarding the Republic of the Congo, the first being on 7 July 1960 in happier circumstances. On that occasion, we recommended to the General Assembly the admission of that country as a sovereign territorial unit in the form in which it existed at that time. It was a happy moment when we recognized the emergence of another independent country. We rejoiced with the Congo and with Belgium, with the former on obtaining the status of a sovereign state and with the latter that, under its guidance and with its support, this new independent country arose. On that occasion, we extended our thanks to Belgium we still do so for the steps taken to give an independent and sovereign status to a country which was under its colonial administration for a long time. Scarcely a week had passed, however, before the young state was compelled to call on the Security Council for assistance. On 13 and 14 July 1960, the Security Council , as a result of the prompt action taken by the Secretary-General, considered the situation, and a resolution [S/4387] was passed calling on Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Republic of the Congo and, at the same time, authorizing the Secretary-General to take steps to send military aid to assist the Congolese Government.
* Source: U. N.S.C.O.R ., 15th Year (1960), 878 th Mtg., Paras 45-82.

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We are meeting once more on this occasion at the request of the Soviet Union to consider the first report of the Secretary-General [S/4389 and add.1-3] on the situation in the Congo. This is therefore an important and very interesting occasion. We have read the report of the Secretary - General no doubt all of us have studied the report very carefully and we were privileged also to hear the oral statement that he made to this Council [873rd meeting]. I think that anyone who read that report and heard his statement could not but express gratification not only at the speed and promptness of the action taken to implement the resolution of 14 July 1960, but also at the steps taken to establish the necessary military organization within this very brief period to deal with the grave situation that existed at the time the United Nations first went into the Congo. . . . It is in order to put forward a practical solution that the delegation of Tunisia and Ceylon has decided to submit to this Council a draft resolution [S/4404]. The draft resolution it will be observed, follows the same lines of thought which I have attempted to place before the Security Council - that is, to find, in the present situation, an effective means of assisting the people of the Congo to overcome the difficulties that they now experience. The preamble suggests that an urgent need still exists to continue and to increase such efforts. That is the principal point. In paragraph 2 of the preamble, we do pay tribute to those who have assisted in the situation, but apart from that, paragraph 4 says: Recognizing that an urgent need still exists to continue and to increase such efforts. That is a point which we must recognize and accept, and it is our intention to submit that in the first instance to the Security Council . No one can deny that need exists. Both those who have read the Secretary-Generals report and those who have listened to his words, and especially to the concluding words which I had the privilege of quoting today, will recognize that this need exists. Then, in paragraph 5 of the preamble, we say: Considering that the complete restoration of law and order in the Republic of the Congo would effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. In other words, the thought we should like to place before the Security Council is that here it is not merely a need to bring law and order back to the country. It is not merely a question of technical assistance in order to build up the economy. It is not merely technological training of the people of the country. This lack of law and order at the present time must be closely connected with the possibility of its extension into the international sphere, and that is the thought we should like to put before the Security Council as a matter of the greatest importance. The third point is in paragraph 6 of the preamble where we refer to the fact that the Security Council recommended the admission of the Republic of the Congo to

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membership in the United Nations as a unit. In the situation that exists in the Congo at the present time, it is well for us to bear in mind the fact that the Security Council agreed to recommend the Republic of the Congo for admission to the United Nations as the Congo that existed on 7 July 1960, as the Congo composed of the several provinces of which it is constituted, and the Congo for which was established a central government to which reference was made by the representative of Belgium himself in the course of that discussion. In other words, it is important that we should take into account the fact that, when we speak of the Congo the whole unit, including all its provinces and that is the only basis on which the Security Council can proceed. We took no notice of different provinces of the Congo, when we recommended the admission of the country. It was, so far as the Security Council was concerned, one definite unit, and every province of it was an integral part of that unit. Therefore, when we talk of the Congo today especially in the situation which exists there in the light of the talks of secession it is for the Security Council to maintain the position that we speak of the Congo as one unit. It might be suggested that we are dangerously near a contravention of some Charter principles that we are speaking of the internal affairs of the Congo - I want to deny emphatically that that is so. We are not dealing with the internal affairs of the Congo in this instance at all. We are dealing with certain matters connected with the internal administration of the Congo only because of the request made by the Republic of the Congo to the United Nations for its assistance. Our presence, the presence of the United Nations, in the Congo is entirely founded on the invitation given by the Government of the Republic of the Congo to the United Nations to come there and help, and when we refer to that here, it is not in any way an interference but a reminder to ourselves that, when we recommended the Republic of the Congo for admission, we had no idea of any separate parts of the Congo and that, therefore, this Council can take no cognizance of any position that the Congo is divided or that it is now no longer the same as the Congo which we, on 7 July 1960, recommended for admission to membership in the United Nations. I now come to the operative part of the draft resolution. Operative paragraph 1 has already been read out to the members of the Council, but I should like to make a few comments on it. It reads: Calls upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960. . . . At one time, it had been intended that the word immediately be used where the word speedily now appears. I should like to explain why it was decided to use the present wording. In the first place, it would be difficult in the present circumstances to make a call for immediate implementation effective. If we were to pass a resolution stating that a certain action should be taken immediately, and if that goal, as decided by so responsible

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a body as the Security Council, could not be attained, then the Security Council would find itself in a difficult position, that is, that its decision would be one to which effect could not be given. No one would deny that it would be difficult, or almost impossible, to withdraw the troops immediately. . . . There can be no doubt that we want the troops to withdraw. Whether we say immediately or as speedily as possible, or speedily, the idea is more or less the same, except for the matter of timing, and we have recognized the need to pay some attention to the timing. That is the reason for the word immediately. I note that, in the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union [S/ 4402], the word immediate is used. It is in view of that draft resolution particularly that I took the time of the Council to make this explanation. I do want to urge the representative of the Soviet Union to consider the plea that we are making; we want a resolution which can be supported by the members of this Council and we want a resolution that can be put into effect at once, and in an effective way, by the United Nations authority. No one would object, at least, my delegation would not object, to the use of some other stronger word. But I believe that the wording we have suggested is adequate to attain the objective that we all have in view, especially when it is considered in the light of the statement made by so responsible an official of the Belgian Government as its Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the effect that, as the United Nations is able to take control, the Belgian troops will be withdrawn. The idea is carried out in the whole of the paragraph, which we have set down here. . . .

Document No. 202 Congo: On the Seventeen-Power Draft Resolution (a/1 292/Rev.1) CoSponsored by Ceylon*
19 September 1960. Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): My delegation, as a member of the Security Council, the organ of the United Nations primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, has, since 13 July 1960, in association with the delegation of Tunisia and all the other delegations in the Security Council, given its most patient, serious and dedicated attention to devising ways and means of helping the Congolese people in the most unfortunate events that have taken place in their country in the short time since they gained their national independence .

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., Fourth Emergency Special Session, 863rd Pl. Mtg., Paras 152-83.

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I wish to state here firmly and very categorically before this August body that the only objective of the efforts of the Security Council has been the eventual welfare and the harmonious development of the Congolese people to a full realization of their political, social and economic aspirations. I do not need to repeat here, at this late hour, the policy of my own Government in relation to several problems that have arisen as a result of the unhappy events in the Republic of the Congo. It has been several times stated in the Security Council and the records of that body are open for all to see. My delegation has also supported several resolutions, which have indicated the principles and the purposes of the Security Council s action in response to the request of the Government of the Congo for assistance in their difficulty. Those resolutions have been referred to in the course of this debate with appreciation and approval. The representative of the Soviet Union and other representatives have accepted not only the usefulness of the action undertaken under those resolutions, but have acclaimed those resolutions as the best action that could have been taken for meeting the situation that had arisen in the Congo. So there is no dispute whatsoever with regard to either the objectives of the Security Council or the actual resolutions that were adopted by the Council. This is a significant and important point because of the criticism which has followed activities of the United Nations in the Congo. Let me here briefly summarize the general principles we have followed and continued to follow. First, we support unreservedly the political independence, territorial integrity and unity of the sovereign Republic of the Congo, which the Security Council recommended for admission to the United Nations. Second, we accepted with sympathetic understanding the appeal of the Government of the Republic of the Congo for assistance, the request that was addressed to the United Nations on 13 July 1960 [see S/4382]. Here it is important to emphasize that the presence of the United Nations in the Congo is by invitation, on request, that the United Nations did not force itself on the country but had been invited and requested to come there to render assistance. Third, we fully endorsed also the ready response of the United Nations to this appeal, and we appreciate the generosity and speed with which several countries answered the Secretary-Generals call, enabling him to assemble in the territory of the Congo a military force of almost 11,000 troops in a few days time. That figure has since risen to 18,000. In passing, let me observe that sometimes we are, in the march of events, inclined to forget the constructive work some people do, and here is an illustration of the dynamic energy and speed with which the Secretary-General carried out the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960 [S/4387] in bringing into the Congo a very large force able to undertake the task with which it was entrusted, namely, the restoration of law and order in the territory of the Congo, and making it possible for the Government of Congo to ask for the withdrawal of the Belgian troops. That is a point, which in our criticisms we should not fail to remember.

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Fourth, we are convinced that if international peace and security are to be maintained, it is absolutely essential that the Republic of the Congo be insulated from the direct or indirect effects of the cold war, for, if by our indifference we permit that conflict to enter into the situation in the Congo, we fear it will be difficult to prevent the rest of the African continent also from becoming involved. It is our belief that the only instrument at present available to us for such insulation is our own Organization, and we whole-heartedly welcome the Secretary-Generals decision to exclude from the whole field of the United Nations military forces those of any of the permanent members of the Security Council, thus ensuring the protection of the Congo from any direct or indirect influence by any of the great Powers. Now, this was one of the principles of the operation which was put before the Security Council by the SecretaryGeneral in one of his reports [S/4389] and the Security Council accepted this principle, which means that the permanent members of the Security Council accepted the principle of the exclusion of military forces coming from the permanent member countries. We similarly uphold the view that we recognize and can deal only with the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo. We cannot and will not encourage, recognize or tolerate any attempts, overt or covert, at dismemberment of the fledgling state, from whatever source or quarter such attempts may come. We are firmly of the opinion that, given the time and given the opportunity for untrammeled and dis-interested discussion between several Congolese leaders, the Congolese people will soon be able by themselves to overcome their present constitutional and political difficulties, but we are convinced that interference from outside, directly or indirectly, except in the capacity of helpers and advisers, will merely add to these problems and will tend to perpetuate the present disorders. We do not exclude the urgent necessity of advice and guidance from countries which are able and wiling to give it, and advice to the young Republicans in order to enable them to compose among themselves their political difficulties and conflicts, and try to establish unity and harmony among themselves. It is for these reasons that we support and will continue to support the view that the United Nations, and the United Nations alone, should be the fountain of guidance, assistance and advice to the Government of the Congo. We wish to reaffirm that it is for these reasons that we not only voted in favor of, but joined with Tunisia in sponsoring, each of the three resolutions adopted by the Security Council. . . .

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Document No. 203 Congo: Statement by the Sri Lanka Delegate*

12 October 1960. Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): I should like, in the first place, to make only a few comments on the Congo question, to try to clarify the United Nations position in the light of the relevant facts. It is not necessary to go fully into this question now, as it is included as an item on our agenda. Until the question came before the Fourth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on 17 September 1960, it was dealt with by the Security Council, whose decisions are to be found in three resolutions adopted by it unanimously on 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960. These decisions have not been criticized or challenged as lacking in any way in regard to the situation as it first emerged and as it developed during that period. I think it necessary to point out that the Soviet Union itself, which supported the position taken up in these resolutions, has not at any time impugned the action taken by the Security Council and has conceded that the action taken by the Security Council was right and proper. That the Security Council s decisions were right has been borne out also by the convincing vote taken during the Fourth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly which upheld these decisions by adopting the resolution 1474 (ES-IV), the original draft of which was co- sponsored by all the African States and several Asian States. . . . The situation in the Congo still continues to be far from satisfactory, and it is incumbent on us to take such further action as may be needed to bring about speedily the restoration and functioning of a stable government which will be able to ensure security and law and order and to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo. At its Fourth Emergency Special Session the General Assembly called for the appointment of a good offices committee. I hope that this committee will be appointed soon. The Secretary-General personally has come in for some criticism on the ground that he was biased or prejudiced in the implementation of the Security Councils decisions. We do not think that, except for some errors of judgment, he has failed honestly to carry out those decisions. We are satisfied with his bona fides. We have known his views on and his work for the freedom and independence of dependent peoples, and we know that he has worked hard and with an admirable single-minded devotion to duty to carry out the Security Councils decisions on the Congo. It must be noted that, whenever he was in doubt, Mr.Hammarskjold did not hesitate to come to the Security Council, as for example when, in attempting to send the United Nations forces to Katanga Province, he encountered resistance and felt that he should not push his way through by the use of force. This, he felt, he was precluded from doing according to the principles on which

* Source: U. N. G. A. O. R., 15th Session, 901st Pl. Mtg.

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the United Nations Force had been assembled, principles which had been followed in previous operations and principles which had been approved by the Security Council in respect of the Congo. He therefore did the only thing he could do in case of doubt. He returned to New York and submitted the position to the Security Council . The Councils resolution of 9 August is well known The United Nations Force was authorized to enter Katanga province but not to interfere in the internal conflicts, constitutional or otherwise, in the Congo. On that same occasion, after considering his report, the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-Generals position and actions.

Document No. 204 Congo : A Statement by Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike (General Policy Statement in the United Nations)*
27 September 1961. Mr. [F.R.D.] Bandaranaike (Ceylon): I have already spoken of the situation in the Congo and should like now to deal briefly with one or two aspects of the position in Katanga. Ceylon was one of the nations, which offered support to the Government of Mr. Lumumba. It was also one of the many nations to ask the United Nations to give effective support to the lawful Prime Ministers desire to restore law and order and maintain the territorial integrity and unity of the Congolese Republic. When the Prime Minister Mr. Lumumba died, the people of my country were deeply shocked. We deplored what had happened, and had no difficulty in identifying the forces responsible for the crime. Following Mr. Lumumbas death, our Government took up the position that it could not recognize any other person as Head of the Congolese Government unless the National Parliament, under the Loi-fondamentale, validated such appointment. In our view, the Congo has today a Government with parliamentary backing and we are prepared to give it all possible support in helping it to maintain law and order, and the unity and integrity of the Congolese Republic. Its Government has asked for the support of the United Nations in achieving these objectives, and it is our task to see that the resolutions of the Security Council are fully implemented. There is strong evidence that insidious forces still remain in Katanga Province and these forces would do everything in their power to resist the implementation of the Security Council resolutions. A cease-fire agreement has been concluded, but my Government does not consider it of any significance unless it leads to such implementation. The territorial integrity of the Congo must be maintained. The dissidence in Katanga must be eliminated and the Provincial Government of Katanga brought within the framework of the Congolese Constitution.
* Source : U.N.G.A.O.R., 16th Session, 1017th Pl. Mtg., Paras. 178-180.

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I regret that I cannot accept the view propounded by the British Foreign Secretary that the situation is analogous to one of provincial autonomy in which the forces of the United Nations have become an external instrument for interfering in nations private affairs. Surely it is much more than that. Surely it must remain much more while foreign elements within Katanga province, receiving assistance from neighbouring territories, wage war - let us call a spade a spade - against the forces of the United Nations with, it seems, some degree of success. This is the country that we were told had only eleven or so university graduates when it assumed its independence. Are we to believe seriously that Katanga province is defying the authority of the Congolese Government unaided? Could it, standing alone, withstand with considerable effect the armies of the United Nations? The Government of Ceylon refuses to take up an attitude so nave as that.

Document No. 205 Congo: Sri Lankas Plea for the Complete Withdrawal of All Foreign Advisers, Military and Para-Military Personnel and Mercenaries and the Stoppage of the Flow of Arms to the Military Groups in the Congo*
4 April 1961. Mr. [T.B.] Subasinghe (Ceylon): One of the major questions confronting the world today is the struggle of the colonial peoples for their freedom. Quite naturally, the United Nations, as an organization devised to deal with world problems, must be seized of the colonial question too. Willingly or unwillingly, the United Nations has had to consider various aspects of the colonial question from time to time in recent years. The Fourth Committee has done some very useful work in the defense of the rights of the people in the trust territories. The General Assembly has met in emergency session on a number of occasions in recent years to deal with various crises, many of which arose out of the attempts of colonial powers to suppress the emergence of independent governments with independent policies in former semi-colonial territories. Algeria, Cyprus and Angola have been the subject of discussion in the various organs of the United Nations. Apart from these specific questions of colonialism, a Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples [resolution 1514(XV)] was accepted by the General Assembly without a single dissenting vote in the first part of the current session. Let us make no mistake about it. Questions such as these will be haunting the World Organization from time to time in the future too, just as the Congo question has been haunting it for the last eight months. It is not an incident that colonial questions should enter these respectable chambers in rather a brusque manner. People struggling to be

* Source: U.N.G.A.O.R., 15th Session, 975 th Pl. Mtg., Paras 1-52.

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free invariably court the wrath of their rulers. Acts of inhumanity and repression are committed by those who want to continue the subjugation of the colonial peoples. The peoples themselves react with acts of violence. In this closely knit world of today, such events in the colonial territories readily assume an international importance. The attitudes of different countries and their Governments to these questions depend on their own political outlook and the character of their political systems. My Government believes strongly in the principle of the right of subject peoples to selfdetermination. We also believe that the attainment of independence by the subject peoples is essentially their own task. However, since the United Nations itself has accepted this principle of the right of self-determination, it is in the nature of things that we must discuss these questions no matter how long it takes and find peaceful and, I would emphasize, correct solutions. We cannot evade these issues merely because their discussion and their solution may hurt one set of nations or the other. If the Congo question continues to be a major preoccupation of this Assembly, we are ourselves to blame. We have failed to find the solution. Or, I might say, it may be more accurate to state that the solution is not difficult to find or that it is obvious. But it does not suit some nations to accept the solution in good faith. In the opinion of my delegation, the resolutions so far adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, despite all their limitations, if allowed to be implemented without overt and covert obstructions from member nations, would have prevented this tragedy for the Congolese people. They would have saved the prestige of Belgium and established healthy relations on a basis of equality between the Congo and Belgium. They would have helped to avoid this challenge to the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia and, above all, they would have relaxed the stress and strain that the United Nations is subjected to today. . . . The presence, the interference and the political grip of the Belgians represent perhaps the only constant factor in the Congo situation. The factors that were intended to contribute to a unified independent and democratic Congo have been eliminated. The Loi-Fondamentale, which had its birth from the joint efforts and consultations of the Congolese leaders and the Belgian Government, is set aside. Parliament, in which the sovereign power of the people is vested, is suspended. The man who represented the genuinely nationalist aspirations of the Congolese people and his closest associates have been cruelly murdered. One of the functionaries who was appointed by Parliament and who, in association with Prime Minister Lumumba, invited the United Nations to intervene, in order to save the Congo from Belgian colonialism, has turned hostile to the United Nations action and is held up by the Belgians as the sole depositary of the peoples sovereignty. The army, which was intended to maintain law and order, is today the very breaker of that law and order.

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Is this the situation, which Mr. Lumumba and the Congolese people expected to be created when they invited United Nations intervention? Is this the situation that small member states like ours expected in the Congo when they gave their full backing to the United Nations action? No. Perhaps we were mistaken because we had certain illusions. The present relationship of forces in the United Nations has made it impossible for the Security Council and the General Assembly to take clear-cut decisions which correspond with reality . Too readily and quite cynically some great Powers assumed that this was a clear -cut issue between nationalism and colonialism, with a cold war content. A section of the national government led by Mr. Lumumba and others was falsely accused of desiring to establish a communist state in Africa. These bogeys, however, had the necessary effect. Because of the projection of the cold war into the Congo, the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly were given a highly formalistic and narrowly legalistic interpretation, least there be international complications. While the United Nations was being narrowly legalistic and playing for safety, highly illegal acts were being committed under the very nose of the United Nations by the enemies of Congolese independence, both foreign and domestic. In the face of illegality, one of two possible courses could be pursued. Firstly, the legal Government of the Congo and the people could have been permitted to master their enemies with whatever means they could gather from all sources. Secondly, the United Nations could have taken all measures to eliminate the elements that were attacking Congolese unity and integrity. The United Nations prevented the first course and was helpless in fulfilling the second. The helplessness of the United Nations in the Congo enabled the colonialists bedevil the Congo scene and reduce the young state to a shambles. In the opinion of my delegation the question of the Congo was then, as it is now, one of a people struggling to establish its independence against the maneuvers and intrigues of a colonial power which was unwilling to loosen its grip on the politics, the economy and the life of the Congolese people. Somehow this cardinal fact has been forgotten. Certain powers are obsessed by the bogey of communism. They doubt the motives of African and Asian countries, which have stood, squarely with the aspirations of the Congolese people to have a united, independent and progressive national state. And these same powers, even now, are trying to play midwife to the birth of a set-up in the Congo, which will ensure the acceptance of their own particular international policies and guarantee their economic interests. The Prime Minister of Ceylon Mrs. Bandaranaike has made the position of Ceylon quite clear to the world on more than one occasion. We have no material, economic or military interest in the Congo, but we firmly believe in the right of the Congolese people to independence and their right to work out their own future. We, however, oppose any foreign power attempting to determine the character of the Government of the Congo. We believe in the territorial integrity of the Congo, and we are convinced

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that the Loi-Fondamentale, which came into being after agreement with the representatives of the Congolese people provides the basic constitutional law of the country. The Government of Ceylon also recognizes the parliament of the Congo as the one institution in which the sovereign power of the Congolese people rests. It is also our view that any attempt to create separate states in the territory of the Congo in collusion with individuals who have always opposed the central government and a unified Congo and who have worked for the secession of the provinces - is contrary to the provisions of the Loi Fondamentale. Apart from the constitutional aspect, there is a grave danger in the fragmentation of the Congo into separate, non-viable, economically untenable states held together by a loose confederation. This would be most detrimental, not only to the people of the Congo but also to the whole of Africa. Experience shows us that part of the strategy of colonialism is to promote divisive tendencies in colonial territories and the newly independent countries. The present attempts by some politicians to establish a host of sovereign states within the framework of a nebulous confederation serves only the colonial interests. The creation of such small independent states can only help to encourage tribal rivalries and heighten the clash of states in a country so backward will only enable countries with economic, political and military ambitions in Africa to set these states one against the other, disturb the peace and prevent any national development. If the fragmentation is condoned, the process started in the Congo will spread to other parts of Africa and thus prevent the building up of modern progressive and viable states in the colonial territories, which are regaining their independence. We hear a great deal of talk about the necessity for regional plans for economic development in Africa. My delegation agrees that comprehensive, coordinated planning on a regional basis is very necessary. Such planning must also have a certain political basis and the most important political prerequisite is that there should be co-operation between states, which are viable, territorial, economic and political units with governmental stability. My delegation fails to understand how advocacy of regional planning on a large scale can be reconciled with the implied support for the balkanization of countries like the Congo. Of course, we admit that the structure of a state must be such as to enable all the component parts of a country to participate fully in the governance of the country. We admit that linguistic, cultural and other differences must be taken into account in determining the structure of the state. One section of the people must not be placed in a domineering position over another. The respective cultures must have the opportunity to develop fully.

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But we, the United Nations, do not have the right to impose any constitution or framework for a state structure on the Congolese people; nor do a few people who have gained power by illegal means have that right. It is the Congolese people themselves who must decide what the structure of their future state should be. . . . We believe that this situation prevails because of the attitude of the old colonial power and some of its friends. We believe that pressure is being exercised on the Congolese authorities by the colonial power through Belgian personnel and their foreign friends in the Congo. Political advisers, military advisers and mercenaries of all sorts are participating in political intrigues and planning military adventures. The Belgian colonialists are determined to keep the Congo under their rule in perpetuity, directly or indirectly. But the forces of nationalism in Africa and the Congo are too powerful for them. Under pressure, the colonialists were compelled to agree to the transfer of power and, through the election, the genuinely nationalist elements in the Congo gained ascendancy and formed a government. The policies of the Government were not in the interests of Belgian vested interests. Therefore, the Belgians made up their minds to make it impossible for the nationalist Government to continue. Hence the maneuvers and the intrigues, which culminated in the ousting of Mr. Lumumba, the suspension of Parliament and the establishment of secessionist states. These maneuvers, intrigues and stratagems continue even today. Encouraged by their successes, the Belgians are flocking back to the Congo. While the United Nations, time and again, called on the Belgians to withdraw, not one iota of attention do they pay to United Nations decisions. And why not? For the colonialists, no success has been greater in Africa than the continued subjection of the Congolese people. And no greater proof is needed than that colonizers find it opportune to return to gather the fruits of their exploitation. . . . Can we permit the Belgians, who once accepted the independence of the Congo, to subvert that independence and impose an indirect rule over the country in order to safeguard their very considerable vested interests? If we permit it any longer, the United Nations would have failed miserably. Unfortunately, there is no cause for optimism, even today. Failure seems to be well on the way, unless the United Nations acts without delay and in a more determined fashion. The Security Council adopted its resolution of 21 February 1961, without a single dissenting vote. This resolution laid down certain objectives as the minimum of prerequisites necessary for bringing about peace, tranquility and the re-establishment of independence. Despite all the efforts of the Secretary-General, assisted by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, we are far from achieving a single one of the objectives. The Belgian advisers, military personnel and Para-military personnel are still there in large numbers.

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Mercenaries hired from Western countries and South Africa are playing a leading role in fostering civil strife. This morning we heard the news of the incidents in Manono, and in that military action the leadership was taken by Belgians and South Africans. The Belgian Government evaded responsibility by insisting that it had no control over these elements in the Congo. None of the requests for the re-summoning of Parliament have been heeded by the authorities whose unlawful acts continue to perturb the genuine friends of the Congolese people. . . . Therefore, there are two conditions that must be fulfilled without further delay and the United Nations operation in the Congo must be given all the powers necessary to accomplish this task. These two conditions are firstly, the complete withdrawal of all foreign advisers, military and para-military personnel and mercenaries, and, secondly, a stoppage of the flow of arms to the military groups in the Congo. Only thereby can the Congolese people peacefully solve their own affairs through the legally established parliament. . . .

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