Aid Efficacy Core

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 1 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core
Aid Efficacy Neg
Aid Fails
Laundry List
Laundry list of reason for the failure of foreign aid wasted, embezzled, mistargeted, and counter-acted by other donor policies Shah, Global Issues Director and Founder, 12
(Anup. 4-8-12, Foreign Aid for Development Assistance. Global Issues, foreign policy news source, http://www.globalissues.org/article/35/foreign-aid-development-assistance, accessed 7-8-13, QDKM) Foreign aid or (development assistance) is often regarded as being too much, or wasted on corrupt recipient governments despite any good intentions from donor countries. In reality, both the quantity and quality of aid have been poor and donor nations have not been held to account. There are numerous forms of aid, from humanitarian emergency assistance, to food aid, military assistance, etc. Development aid has long been recognized as crucial to help poor developing nations grow out of poverty. In 1970, the worlds rich countries agreed to give 0.7% of their GNI (Gross National Income) as official international development aid, annually. Since that time, despite billions given each year, rich nations have rarely met their actual promised targets. For example, the US is often the largest donor in dollar terms, but ranks amongst the lowest in terms of meeting the stated 0.7% target. Furthermore, aid has often come with a price of its own for the developing nations: Aid is often wasted on conditions that the recipient must use overpriced goods and services from donor countries Most aid does not actually go to the poorest who would need it the most Aid amounts are dwarfed by rich country protectionism that denies market access for poor country products, while rich nations use aid as a lever to open poor country markets to their products Large projects or massive grand strategies often fail to help the vulnerable as money can often be embezzled away.
Aid fails Corporate capture, local crowd-out, bureaucracy, and lack of objectives. Ulrich, University of Michigan government professor, 2
(Marybeth, A Survey of Overall U.S. Democratization Programs and Military Democratization Efforts in the Postcommunist States, http://press.umich.edu/pdf/0472109693-02.pdf] , p. 48, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR)
Moreover, the emphasis on assistance aimed at bolstering trade and investment in the region, while governments stall on improving the business environment, has led to speculation that prime beneciaries of U.S. aid dollars are U.S. corporations optimizing the nancial backing of the U.S. government to participate in business enterprises. 26 Grass roots indigenous reform organizations are often ignored by the organizations receiving USAID contracts, which themselves have no experience in Eastern Europe or the FSU. 27 Consequently, much of the U.S. aid is wasted on contracts with Western companies that fund expensive feasibility studies and crowd out private sector investment, but do little to develop market institutions in Russia. 28 Assistance to the postcommunist states has also been generally criticized for lacking focus and strategic planning. Most democracy assistance organizations tend to assume that the denition of democracy is self-evident and that therefore the goals of democracy assistance organizations do not require extensive elaboration. The management of the assistance
programs to the transitioning states has featured duplication of effort, bureaucratic inghting, and weakly focused objectives. The result has been much activity of dubious merit. 29 Most of the aid to the postcommunist states has come from a much maligned joint effort of the Western democracies. In 1993 the Group of Seven (G-7) industrial countries
promised $43 billion in economic assistance to Russia to include $15 billion of debt relief. The West made good on only the debt relief portion of the offer plus $5 billion. Much of the aid was tied to International Monetary Fund (IMF) objectives that could not be met. 30 Overall,
Western aid to Russia has been criticized for being absent at times when Russian reformers were in a position to implement reforms (January 1992December 1993) and so tied to the achievement of IMF objectives that most of the promised aid was never delivered. 31 The combined effectiveness of the multilateral effort of Western democracies to assist the political and economic transition of the postcommunist states is beyond the scope of this study, but it is important to describe the magnitude and general impact of the overall effort in order to understand the relative contribution of the specic U.S. effort.
Foreign aid prevents economic growth, democracy, and relations Quadir, MIT's Legatum Center for Development and Entrepreneurship founder and director of founder and director, 9 (Iqbal, 1-30-09, founder and director of MIT's Legatum Center for Development and Entrepreneurship, Wall Street Journal, Foreign Aid and Bad Government, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123327734124831471.html, Accessed 7-8-13, RRR)
Barack Obama has talked a lot about changing the way America relates to the world, and few areas are as ripe for reform as our policies on foreign aid. They have contributed to economic stagnation in poor countries and deprived America of large export markets. Entrepreneurship, not aid, is essential to rejuvenate markets in the developing world and, in turn, help America prosper. During the Cold War, the U.S. instituted a policy of sending money to governments in poor countries to buy their political loyalty. While studies show that sending aid to foreign governments creates allegiance, it does not lead to economic progress. Instead, it makes governments in poor countries dependent on the U.S. rather than their citizens' taxes. Pakistan has been one of the key recipients of U.S. aid over the last six decades, but there has been no real progress as a result. Pakistan is riddled with problems that are rooted in the disproportionate power of the state. Aid has only boosted that power. In contrast, Malaysia saw its economy grow at twice the rate of Pakistan's over the same period of time. Fueled by trade rather than aid, Malaysian economic prosperity is decentralized, and its reliability as an ally much greater. Tragically, the Cold War aid approach actually preserves suffering in poor countries. Aid empowers bureaucracies, promotes statism, and weakens government incentives to boost tax revenues through growth. Economic assets are often kept in the hands of the state, leading to monopolies, stagnation and extortion. All of this hurts entrepreneurs, who have the potential to create wealth and promote governmental accountability. The history of Western economic and political advancement illustrates that it is the economic strength of citizens -- not governments -- that gives rise to checks and balances. A case in point is England, where a lack of outside money created real accountability. In the 13th century, after the advent of property rights, the British monarch was forced to convene a group of citizens as a tax-legitimizing device. This group, known as the parliament, capitalized on the monarch's chronic need for money and made sure the monarch did not gain financial independence. Every
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 5 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core time the monarch wanted to pass a new tax bill, the parliament obliged only after exacting more liberty from the crown. Over time, it was parliament that emerged as the more powerful branch of government. The monarch's shortage of money and a lack of outside aid were key to England's democratic success. President Obama now has the opportunity to adopt a new aid approach that will actually help citizens. Such an approach would demonstrate our faith in democracy and serve long-term American interests.
Economic Engagement Aid Fails Empirically

Aid fails- developmental aid like the affs plan has never worked in the past and will not work in the past Rahn, Cato adjunct scholar, 3 (Richard W., Washington Times, Turn Off Foreign Aid?, 9-2-03,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/turn-foreign-aid, accessed 7-10-13, QDKM) Why do we give foreign aid? We give aid for humanitarian reasons: that is, we wish to relieve human suffering because of famines or natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, etc.; and we give aid for economic development. The crisis in Iraq has again raised the issue of how much aid and in what forms is appropriate for the U.S. and other countries to provide.
Humanitarian aid at reasonable levels has a strong political constituency in the U.S. and is not going to be abolished. Development aid, on the other hand, has never been popular, and for good reason. Most of it has been a waste of money. The late great British economist, Peter Bauer, was the single most
important individual in discrediting the socialist orthodoxy that Third World countries were trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty that could only be broken by massive foreign aid. Bauer explained in his many articles and books, most notably, in his Dissent on Development (1972), that all countries were once poor, and that the rich countries did not become rich through foreign aid, but by having the rule of law and the proper incentives.
Bauer noted that all too often foreign aid simply turned out to be transferring money from poor people in rich countries to rich people in poor countries.
A country that establishes the rule of law and largely eliminates corruption, allows free markets to operate, establishes free trade, maintains low taxation and government spending, does not excessively regulate, and establishes a stable currency will attract sufficient domestic and foreign investment to grow rapidly, without foreign aid. Countries that do not provide the rule of law and
sound economic policies will not grow no matter how much foreign aid and development assistance they receive.
The great economic success stories of the last several decades, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, etc., received little or any aid, but they did put in the right policies to attract capital and provide economic growth. The post-World War II Marshall Plan in Europe is often cited as the great success of foreign aid. But, in fact, the German and other economic miracles in Europe only began after the Germans and others, despite opposition from the Allied Control Commission, removed their extensive price controls and other restrictions on trade, production and distribution.
Most development economists now realize Bauer and his disciples are correct, and as a result there has been a big shift in the nature of most foreign aid coming from the U.S. government.
However, the World Bank and many foreign governments continue to provide large governmentto-government loans, which are rarely used in cost-effective ways but often are stolen by the recipient countries corrupt rulers, which saddle the citizens of those poor countries with massive debts they repay to the lenders. The U.S. government provided $12.9 billion in official development assistance last year, most of it through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and has spent hundreds of
billions in aid since World War II. Sadly, many of the recipients of U.S. development aid are poorer now than they were before receiving assistance.
To break this dismal record, the Bush administration proposed the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which would reward countries for putting in proper economic policies and establishing the rule of law. Unfortunately, Congress is diluting the program so it may not operate any more effectively
than existing programs when finally put into operation.

Having spent part of my time working in economic development and transition economies over the last several decades, I have seen close up many failures and some successes in aid programs. USAID now has far fewer clearly counterproductive projects than it had in decades past. However, the
agency is still a bureaucratic nightmare of excessive paperwork and slow decisionmaking; it relies all too heavily on a few large contractors; and it does a terrible job of sound cost-benefit analysis. One low-cost success USAID has had in the last decade is the assistance it provided to establish training for economic public policy organizations, known as the Balkan Network, several of which have already become totally self-supporting. These independent think tanks are providing sound economic training and good policy advice, and are having a very constructive influence. Yet, it appears that complaints from the EU statist political establishment about, for example, a think tank in Montenegro being too free market are resulting in resources being diverted from it to the old types of aid programs. Such action sends all the wrong signals. A major part of Americas economic and political success was the formation of voluntary associations to take care of humanitarian, social, educational, infrastructure and public policy problems that are only done by governments in many other countries. Our tax code correctly encourages private support for such organizations by making them tax deductible. In most European and many other countries, support for such organizations is not only not taxdeductible, but donations are taxed. At the minimum, the Bush administration should demand that no country can receive U.S. aid unless it allows tax deductibility for contributions to private aid, educational and public policy organizations, because such groups will be needed to fill the vacuum when the U.S. and other donors eventually leave (as they should). The administration should also immediately reduce U.S. support for international organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations and the World Bank, which have programs that discourage economic growth.
Recipients Say No
Recipient will say no, they distrust the U.S. Carothers, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the founder and director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Program, and Youngs, director general of FRIDE (European think tank) and assistant professor at the University of Warwick in the UK, 7-14-11
(Thomas, a leading authority on democracy promotion and democratization worldwide as well as an expert on U.S. foreign policy generally, and Richard, Democracy Promotion in the Age of Rising Powers, http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=45029, accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Are rising democracies interested in democracy support? What are these states currently doing to support democracy? Are there any signs rising democracies are becoming less tolerant of dictators? What can Europe and the United States do to encourage these countries to do more to support democracy? IS A MORE MULTIPOLAR WORLD HELPFUL OR HARMFUL TO DEMOCRACY? There is reason for both anxiety and optimism. Democracy advocates fear that the rise of China will create a credible authoritarian alternative to liberal democracy. A more self-confident Russia may exert greater pressure against democratization in its neighborhood. Some emerging powers in the developing world see some international rules and organizations as disadvantageous to developing nations. This skepticism can extend to human rights norms and has led a number of people to argue that emerging powers will work against a liberal international order. On the other hand, a multipolar world entails the rise of important democratic states such as Brazil, Indonesia, India, South Africa, and Turkey. These countries serve as powerful examples of the broad appeal of democracy. They refute the notion that democracy is incompatible with non-Western societies or countries struggling with economic development. Their democratic transitions are compelling stories with both inspirational power and practical utility for citizens in authoritarian states or new democracies. At a time when international democracy support is facing a serious backlash and struggling to shed its image as a Western geostrategic project, the active participation of rising democracies could energize and lend new legitimacy to the effort. ARE RISING DEMOCRACIES INTERESTED IN DEMOCRACY SUPPORT? Ask foreign ministry officials in rising democracies whether they view democracy promotion as a priority and the answer will most likely be no. These states for the most part adhere to a pro-sovereignty, anti-interventionist approach to international politics. Their efforts to develop more proactive foreign policies and gain greater global influence are centered on cultivating friendly relations with other governments and increasing South-South cooperation. They are wary of undermining important economic and diplomatic ties by bringing up sensitive human rights and democracy issues. Furthermore, they are struggling with their own development challenges at home and do not want to spend scarce resources on democracy support. They are also deeply suspicious of Western, especially U.S., intentions in the developing world.
No Recipient Reform
Aid fails removes incentive for recipient governments to reform
Moyo, Goldman Sachs economist, 9

(Dambisa, author of "Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa.", Wall Street Journal- Africa News, 3/21/09 Why Foreign Aid Is Hurting Africa, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123758895999200083.html2, accessed 7/8/2013, QDKM) A constant stream of "free" money is a perfect way to keep an inefficient or simply bad government in power. As aid flows in, there is nothing more for the government to do -- it doesn't need to raise taxes, and as long as it pays the army, it doesn't have to take account of its disgruntled citizens. No matter that its citizens are disenfranchised (as with no taxation there can be no representation). All the government really needs to do is to court and cater to its foreign donors to stay in power. Stuck in an aid world of no incentives, there is no reason for governments to seek other, better, more transparent ways of raising development finance (such as accessing the bond market, despite how hard that might be). The aid system encourages poor-country governments to pick up the phone and ask the donor agencies for next capital infusion. It is no wonder that across Africa, over 70% of the public purse comes from foreign aid. In Ethiopia, where aid constitutes more than 90% of the government budget, a mere 2% of the country's population has access to mobile phones. (The African country average is around 30%.) Might it not be preferable for the government to earn money by selling its mobile phone license, thereby generating much-needed development income and also providing its citizens with telephone service that could, in turn, spur economic activity? Look what has happened in Ghana, a country where after decades of military rule brought about by a coup, a pro-market government has yielded encouraging developments. Farmers and fishermen now use mobile phones to communicate with their agents and customers across the country to find out where prices are most competitive. This translates into numerous opportunities for self-sustainability and income generation -- which, with encouragement, could e easily replicated across the continent. To advance a country's economic prospects, governments need efficient civil service. But civil service is naturally prone to bureaucracy, and there is always the incipient danger of self-serving cronyism and the desire to bind citizens in endless, time-consuming red tape. What aid does is to make that danger a grim reality. This helps to explain why doing business across much of Africa is a nightmare. In Cameroon, it takes a potential investor around 426 days to perform 15 procedures to gain a business license. What entrepreneur wants to spend 119 days filling out forms to start a business in Angola? He's much more likely to consider the U.S. (40 days and 19 procedures) or South Korea (17 days and 10 procedures). Even what may appear as a benign intervention on the surface can have damning consequences. Say there is a mosquito-net maker in small-town Africa. Say he employs 10 people who together manufacture 500 nets a week. Typically, these 10 employees support upward of 15 relatives each. A Western governmentinspired program generously supplies the affected region with 100,000 free mosquito nets. This promptly puts the mosquito net manufacturer out of business, and now his 10 employees can no longer support their 150 dependents. In a couple of years, most of the donated nets will be torn and useless, but now there is no mosquito net maker to go to. They'll have to get more aid. And African governments once again get to abdicate their responsibilities. In a similar vein has been the approach to food aid, which historically has done little to support African farmers. Under the auspices of the U.S. Food for Peace program, each year millions of dollars are used to buy American-grown food that has to then be shipped across oceans. One wonders how a system of flooding foreign markets with American food, which puts local farmers out of business, actually helps
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 10 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core better Africa. A better strategy would be to use aid money to buy food from farmers within the country, and then distribute that food to the local citizens in need. Then there is the issue of "Dutch disease," a term that describes how large inflows of money can kill off a country's export sector, by driving up home prices and thus making their goods too expensive for export. Aid has the same effect. Large dollar-denominated aid windfalls that envelop fragile developing economies cause the domestic currency to strengthen against foreign currencies. This is catastrophic for jobs in the poor country where people's livelihoods depend on being relatively competitive in the global market. To fight aid-induced inflation, countries have to issue bonds to soak up the subsequent glut of money swamping the economy. In 2005, for example, Uganda was forced to issue such bonds to mop up excess liquidity to the tune of $700 million. The interest payments alone on this were a staggering $110 million, to be paid annually. The stigma associated with countries relying on aid should also not be underestimated or ignored. It is the rare investor that wants to risk money in a country that is unable to stand on its own feet and manage its own affairs in a sustainable way.
No solvency aid wont cause real reform Toornstra, European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy Director, 10
(Dick, European Parliament Office For Promotion Of Parliamentary Democracy Director, 2010 Getting Acquainted: setting the stage for democracy assistance http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf, p.16, accessed 7/10/2013, QDKM) A major problem of the developmental approach is that it may lead to various reforms in intermediate areas, without showing any concrete results in the political domain. In the worst of
cases, it can help to strengthen rather than weaken or replace authoritarian rule, as nondemocratic leaders can take the credit for successful socio-economic reform and development in other sectors. Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Vietnam, major aid recipients of governance reform
programmes, show little sign of democratisation. It remains to be seen if governance reform and socio-economic development in Kazakhstan, which is sometimes cited as having successfully applied the developmental approach, will in turn lead to real democratisation. Thus, the developmental
approach assumes two types of causal links
Aid wont work too limited for a real change, there is more than one component needed to change a nation Toornstra, OPPD Director, 2010
(Dick, European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy Director, 2010, Getting Acquainted: setting the stage for democracy assistance http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf, p.16, accessed 7/9/13, QDKM)
The main advantage of the political approach is that it addresses the core of a democratic system of government. If the institutions, actors, and processes it supports free and fair elections,
political parties, parliaments, independent media, free civil society organisation are not in place, a system is not (yet) democratic, even if the target state shows positive trends in other sectors of governance, for instance decreasing levels of corruption. It thereby avoids clouding the goal that
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 11 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core is democratisation rather than just liberalisation, governance reform, or socio-economic development. Moreover, the political approach is more conscious of crucial moments in regime
change and consequently more prepared to recognise these and target assistance adequately. One recent example of timely support was the political assistance provided during revolutions in Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia.37 One potential problem of the political approach is its limited focus , especially if it concentrates solely on elections. Even if relatively free and fair elections are held, a democratic system can still suffer from weak participation and representation and lack widespread inclusion (the socalled fallacy of electoralism).38 Secondly, the focus on crucial moments might lead to single
interventions, which can be useful, but could divert attention from the need for long-term and wider reform, such as the judicial branch. Overall, the political approach might therefore be successful in assisting a transition to democracy, but less so in achieving consolidation. Thirdly, political assistance might be too confrontational for some target states causing outright opposition leading to a strong pushback and the denial of further access to the country, for instance in Burma,
Cuba and Turkmenistan.39 A donor could in such cases concentrate solely on the political opposition and civil society groups outside the country (if they exist), but whose potential for successful regime change is usually minor.
Aid wont solve Egypt proves reforms will only work if recipient wants to reform no amount of foreign money will cause real change Peters, Wesleyan University government professor, 11
(Anne Mariel, 2-14-11, Foreign Policy, Why Obama shouldn't increase democracy aid to Egypt, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/14/why_obama_shouldn_t_increase_democracy_aid_to_e gypt, accessed 7/9/12, QDKM) The United States should promote democracy in Egypt, and the Obama administration has shown itself to be receptive to the idea. Yet increasing democracy and governance funding (or cutting aid altogether) is not the way to do it. The great irony of democracy and governance programs is that they will only be followed by desired democratic outcomes precisely where they are not needed: in environments where society already faces positive incentives to collectively organize as an opposition movement. If nothing else, the past three weeks demonstrate that Egyptians do not need foreign money, consultants, or democracy and governance programs to collectively organize and exert their demands; they simply needed a pooled set of grievances, digital and print media for communication purposes, and a big push from the "Tunisia effect." Egyptian society is already mobilized, and the degree to which it can organize itself is a function of how well it can manage to coordinate a wide variety of interests. This is not a matter of writing party platforms, distributing newsletters, or observing Western parliaments, but Egyptians' ability to negotiate among themselves. And if the generals decide to hold on to power, there is little that democracy and governance funding can do.
The Affs one-sided economic engagement will fail empirically, genuine political will at all levels is key Diamond, Hoover Institution senior fellow, 2
(Larry, presently a professor of Sociology and Political Science (by courtesy) at Stanford University and served as a consultant to the U.S. Agency for International Development Hoover Institution, a conservative policy think tank, 3/02, Advancing Democratic Governance: A Global Perspective on the Status of Democracy and Directions for International Assistance, USAID,
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 12 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/papers/advancing_democ_%20governance.pdf, p.29-30, accessed 7/9/13,QDKM) Across a number of sub-sectors, one of the major lessons to emerge from DG assistance over the past decade has been the need to balance the demand and supply sides of the political reform equation. DG assistance cannot be successful if it only works on one side or the other. Even if state elites propose institutional reformsfor example, to privatize state industries, reform the tax system, or crack down on smuggling and bribery these reforms may not be sustainable unless society is educated about the need for them and mobilized to support them. Urgently needed reforms are often vitiated in implementation because of the failure to generate broader pro-reform constituencies among logical stakeholders. State officials who want to promulgate reforms need technical assistance within their ministries or agencies to accomplish the changes and to train and equip the new institutions. But sustainable reform also requires complementary programs targeted at interest groups (such as chambers of commerce and trade unions), advocacy NGOs, think tanks, and the mass media. And often, the momentum for systemic governance reform begins with the articulation and mobilization of these kinds of groups. By the same token, reform cannot be accomplished only with a strategy of pressure from below, in civil society. In the absence of genuine political will, that is a necessary place to begin, and in some countries at some historical junctures, it may be the only arena in which a DG program can work. But ultimately, it is the leaders of various governmental and political institutions who must enact and implement reform. And once new, more democratic and accountable institutions are constructed, they must be enabled to work and to respond. When DG programs focus too heavily for too long on civil society, to the neglect of political parties and formally democratic state structures, they may help to generate a level of demands and expectations with which the state and political system simply cannot cope. The resulting overload of political participation and consciousness can generate not better and more stable governance but heightened cynicism and frustration, a growing rupture between the people and their government. Development assistance must pay more attention to the supply side of reform, in programs to strengthen the capacities of the state and political parties to respond to citizen expectations and complaints and to deliver development and good governance.
Government Countermeasures
Governments actively adopt countermeasures to thwart the plan Youngs, director general of FRIDE and assistant professor at the University of Warwick, UK, 10
(Richard, FRIDE is an independent think-tank based in Madrid, focused on issues related to democracy and human rights; peace and security; and humanitarian action and development, June, How to Revitalise Democracy Assistance: Recipients Views http://www.fride.org/download/WP100_How_revitalise_democracy_ENG_jul2010.pdf, pages 8-9, accessed 7-10-13, RRR) This lesson has been taken on board. Indeed, the challenge today derives from governments ability to neutralise the genuine reform potential of many democracy assistance initiatives. A major complaint from our interviewees is that external democracy promoters have been insufficiently attentive to this problem. The issue here is that the way in which governments have been incorporated into reform projects has enabled them to smother the prodemocracy potential of such initiatives. Donors are correct to insist that the democracy agenda is as much about strengthening state as civic capacity. But the way this is being done tilts the balance too far away from the latter. In Egypt, those donors who did attempt some tentative engagement with the opposition Muslim Brotherhood were leant on heavily by the regime and in response have stepped back. Local stakeholders are highly critical of the fact that European Commission and US Middle East Partnership Initiative projects on judicial and administrative reform are agreed with the government and include mainly regime-backed partners. Democratic recession in Egypt is leading to reductions in funding, for example under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, when locals say exactly the opposite reaction is required. Funding for election monitoring is felt by many activists to have been a waste, because the international community unhesitatingly accepts the results of profoundly and expertly manipulated polls. Indeed, monitoring has been carried out in such alignment with the regime that it has merely served to provide the latter with a pretext for restricting domestic monitoring (after the 2005 elections the Egyptian government crucially reversed a provision that allowed judges scrutiny over elections). Interviewees in Egypt were also strongly critical of budgetary support provided directly to the regime and support for GONGOs; they do not accept donors arguments that backing GONGOs offers a useful way of engaging governments in reform-oriented initiatives. In Yemen, donors have funded womens rights NGOs closely linked to the ruling party, to the chagrin of fastrising Islamist groups; at the same time they have 8 Working Paper followed government strictures to cease funding a small number of more critical and independent organisations. This is a particularly narrow approach given the density and vibrancy of civic networks in Yemen. Donors have also declined to support civic bodies in the south of Yemen, at the behest of the central government the latter fearing that such organisations agitate for succession.
Adversarial governments will squash democracy promotion National Endowment for Democracy 6
(June 8, The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance: A Report prepared by the National Endowment for Democracy for Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, http://www.ned.org/docs/backlash06.pdf, pages 7-8, accessed 7-10-13, RRR)
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 14 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core The range of legal and extra-legal measures designed to undermine democracy assistance range from constraints to cooptation, from coercion to closure. Many states are manifestly repressive toward independent NGOs and other organizations representing autonomous civil society. But other countries maintain a more ambiguous position, adopting a posture of repressive tolerance by allowing civil society groups to operate with a degree of autonomy but in a context of operational and political restrictions, including the threat of arbitrary interference or even dissolution. The regimes of the broader Middle East have almost perfected this model, softening the reality of authoritarian rule by permitting a degree of political space for relatively tame or managed NGOs while undermining or harassing genuinely independent or assertive groups. In Egypt, for example, the government is adept at selective enforcement of laws, reports one democracy promotion group.10 We and others are monitored by the security and intelligence offices, this group reports. In every event or conference, security officers are there, sometimes announcing their identity and many other times without identifying themselves.
Elite backlash outweighs solvency Barkan, Center for Strategic and International Studies senior associate & University of Iowa political science emeritus professor, 11
(Joel, Perceptions of Democracy Assistance, http://www.un.org/democracyfund/Docs/PDAseminar.pdf, page 30, accessed 7-10-13) No matter how great its impact, DA is no substitute for political will and strong leadership within societies attempting to democratize. Without such leadership, especially at the elite level, democratization will not move forward. Citizens must also value democratic governance though, as noted previously, the demand for democracy by ordinary citizens arguably exceeds the supply provided by the political leaders of their societies. DA requires strong domestic partners to succeed. Unilateral efforts by providers should be kept to a minimum, or arguably ended altogether. Even where they may succeed, unilateral efforts are not cost-effective compared to providing DA elsewhere where viable partners are present. Unilateral efforts also pose risks for recipients and for the enterprise of DA generally.
Political Will Key

Assistance can only help countries make transitions that they already wanted to, internal impetus is key to spark change Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Volume 4 Issue 1, What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict approaches to democratization http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.191-2, accessed 7-10-13, RRR] The imbalanced focus on democracy in post-conflict peacebuilding is amplified by a tendency of democracy assistance organisations to focus on success stories and overestimate their capacity to initiate change. Until recently, the USAID website declared that (quoted in Knack 2004: 252): There were 58 democratic nations in 1980. By 1995, this number had jumped to 115 nations. USAID provided democracy and governance assistance to 36 of the 57 nations that successfully made the transition to a democratic government during this period. Although the need to emphasise the positive aspects of their work in order to secure future funding may be understandable, such statements can severely skew the reality of democracy assistance. As Stephen Knack (2004: 252) explains, obviously the fact that many aid recipients have become more democratic does not by itself imply cause and effect. Indeed, democratisation studies have historically focused on internal considerations as the key factors in a countrys democratic transition, with attention given to areas such as: economic modernisation (Lipset 1959: 17; Przeworski et al . 2000); a history of pluralism (Reychler 1999); class structures (Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer et al . 1992); levels of education (Hadenius 1992; Rowen 1995); degree of ethnic fragmentation (Linz and Stepan 1996); religion (Hadenius 1992; Zakaria 2004: 148-150); the legacy of colonialism (Bernhard et al . 2004; Bratton et al . 2004); the prevalence of Western values (Huntington 1997: 6) . Democracy assistance, therefore, is rarely the overriding reason, but it can help a country move more quickly in a direction that it is already going. As Carothers (2004: 60) reminds us, democracy assistance is at most a facilitator of locally rooted forces for political change, not the creator of them. These sentiments are particularly salient to collapsed post-conflict states which offer few favourable internal pre-conditions for democratisation .192 | Richard Lappin Additionally, within a post-conflict context, democracy assistance may have to play a subordinate role to the aims of the broader peace process (Lyons 2002: 221) . As Krishna Kumar and Jeroen de Zeeuw (2006: 14) stress, the promotion of democracy is not necessarily the only goal, and there are circumstances under which the international community has to make compromises in pursuit of competing objectives, such as avoiding a resumption of war. Indeed, it is worth stressing that although democracy assistance may have assumed amore central and influential role in the foreign policy of western states, it has not become the central organising principle (Carothers 1999: 37; Smith 2007: 132) . Sometimes, democracy assistance may be complementary to a wider foreign policy, but at times it will also come into competition with other, stronger economic and security interests. For example, in the US, democracy assistance funding remains a fraction of other areas of public spending such as defence,4 whilst the country maintains strong relations with several undemocratic, but strategically important, regimes such as Saudi Arabia, China and Egypt.
Assistance fails, cant force democratization Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace research and Strategic Studies PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Volume 4 Issue 1, What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict approaches to democratization http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.184-5, accessed 7-10-13, RRR] The period of decolonisation during the 1950s and 1960s provided a further precursor to contemporary democracy assistance, with many European countries exporting their own models of democracy to their former colonies. At the same time several countries began to introduce democracy and human rights clauses into their foreign aid packages, such as Title IX of the 1966 US Foreign Assistance Act, which linked foreign aid to participatory politics. The profile of democracy assistance was significantly enhanced by the election of Ronald Reagan to the US presidency. In 1983 Reagan established the first specific US democracy promotion institution, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and consistently spoke with passion about the values of democracy and his vision of a global democratic revolution (Reagan 1988). However, despite the rhetorical enthusiasm of Reagan, perceptions of external support for democracy during the Cold War were typically viewed with pessimism. Samuel Huntington (1984: 218) declared that the ability of the US to affect the development of democracy elsewhere is limited, whilst Robert Dahl (1971: 209-210), argued that: Policy makers in a country like the United States who may wish to transform a country from a hegemonic or mixed regime into a polyarchy [i .e . a liberal democracy] face formidable and complex problems, not least of which is our lack of knowledge about the long causal chains running from outside help to internal conditions to changes of regimes.
No Short-Term Solvency
Reform isnt an overnight project Cohen and p , New America Foundation,
(Michael A. and Maria F., April, Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Promotion: A Comprehensive Plan for Reform, http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/Revitalizing_US_Democracy_Promotion.pdf, page 5, accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Democratization is the work of generations. While there are occasionally exceptions to the rule, democratic evolution does not occur overnight. It can take years, even decades, for democratic practices to become embedded. Nor, in general, does the occurrence of a free and fair election signal the ascendancy of democratic rule. Indeed, while free and fair elections are an important benchmark, they are only a beginning step on the road to democratization. It bears noting that, from a programmatic standpoint, U.S. democracy assistance funds are now being oriented more toward governance, rule of law, and civil society programs as opposed to direct electoral supporta wise allocation of resources. Yet, while it is generally understood that democratization takes time, the rhetoric of U.S. political leaders does not always reflect this fact, resulting in heightened expectations, and then dismay when events begin to move in the wrong direction. Worse still, policymakers too often lose interest after a first free and fair election, and fail to maintain the level of support fragile democracies need. Democracy occasionally manifests itself in great historical moments, but most often it is the accumulation of small, but critical, advancements. When it comes to democracy promotion, the United States must recognize its limitations. Despite the media attention that often surrounds American efforts abroad, the ability of the U.S. to affect democratic transitions is more constrained than is generally understood. Although U.S. funding can help transitioning countries continue to move in a positive direction, create breathing space for civil society actors, and identify and empower local democratic leaders, it cannot change an illiberal regime into a democracy overnight.
Opposition Aid Fails

Covert aid taints solvency if uncovered, overt aid leads to conflicts of interest Rubin, American Enterprise Institute resident scholar, 6
(Michael, December, American Enterprise Institute, Is American Support for Middle Eastern Dissidents the Kiss of Death?, http://www.aei.org/outlook/25243, accessed 7-10-13, RRR) But how should the U.S. aid dissidents? Covert aid often backfires. Once exposed, the taint becomes overwhelming.[60] Overt foundation support is an option, but the involvement of embassies--as is the case both with Middle East Partnership Initiative and Foundation for the Future funds--often leads to conflicts of interest, as the diplomats' desire for stability trumps their willingness to support effective reform.
Aid Doesnt Help Those In Need

Africa proves, money never goes to the people to alleviate the issues, throwing money down a hole will have more of an effect then the plan

(Dambisa, author of "Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa.", Wall Street Journal- Africa News, 3/21/09 Why Foreign Aid Is Hurting Africa, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123758895999200083.html2, accessed 7/8/2013, QDKM) A month ago I visited Kibera, the largest slum in Africa. This suburb of Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, is home to more than one million people, who eke out a living in an area of about one square mile -- roughly 75% the size of New York's Central Park. It is a sea of aluminum and cardboard shacks that forgotten families call home. The idea of a slum conjures up an image of children playing amidst piles of garbage, with no running water and the rank, rife stench of sewage. Kibera does not disappoint. What is incredibly disappointing is the fact that just a few yards from Kibera stands the headquarters of the United Nations' agency for human settlements which, with an annual budget of millions of dollars, is mandated to "promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all." Kibera festers in Kenya, a country that has one of the highest ratios of development workers per capita. This is also the country where in 2004, British envoy Sir Edward Clay apologized for underestimating the scale of government corruption and failing to speak out earlier. Giving alms to Africa remains one of the biggest ideas of our time -- millions march for it, governments are judged by it, celebrities proselytize the need for it. Calls for more aid to Africa are growing louder, with advocates pushing for doubling the roughly $50 billion of international assistance that already goes to Africa each year. Yet evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that aid to Africa has made the poor poorer, and the growth slower. The insidious aid culture has left African countries more debt-laden, more inflationprone, more vulnerable to the vagaries of the currency markets and more unattractive to higherquality investment. It's increased the risk of civil conflict and unrest (the fact that over 60% of subSaharan Africa's population is under the age of 24 with few economic prospects is a cause for worry). Aid is an unmitigated political, economic and humanitarian disaster. Few will deny that there is a clear moral imperative for humanitarian and charity-based aid to step in when necessary, such as during the 2004 tsunami in Asia. Nevertheless, it's worth reminding ourselves what emergency and charity-based aid can and cannot do. Aid-supported scholarships have certainly helped send African girls to school (never mind that they won't be able to find a job in their own countries once they have graduated). This kind of aid can provide band-aid solutions to alleviate immediate suffering, but by its very nature cannot be the platform for long-term sustainable growth. Whatever its strengths and weaknesses, such charity-based aid is relatively small beer when compared to the sea of money that floods Africa each year in government-to-government aid or aid from large development institutions such as the World Bank. Over the past 60 years at least $1 trillion of development-related aid has been transferred from rich countries to Africa. Yet real per-capita income today is lower than it was in the 1970s, and more than 50% of the population -- over 350 million people -- live on less than a dollar a day, a figure that has nearly doubled in two decades. Even after the very aggressive debt-relief campaigns in the 1990s, African countries still pay close to $20 billion in debt repayments per annum, a stark reminder that aid is not free. In order to keep the system going, debt is repaid at the expense of African education and health care. Well-meaning calls
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 20 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core to cancel debt mean little when the cancellation is met with the fresh infusion of aid, and the vicious cycle starts up once again. In 2005, just weeks ahead of a G8 conference that had Africa at the top of its agenda, the International Monetary Fund published a report entitled "Aid Will Not Lift Growth in Africa." The report cautioned that governments, donors and campaigners should be more modest in their claims that increased aid will solve Africa's problems. Despite such comments, no serious efforts have been made to wean Africa off this debilitating drug. The most obvious criticism of aid is its links to rampant corruption. Aid flows destined to help the average African end up supporting bloated bureaucracies in the form of the poor-country governments and donor-funded non-governmental organizations. In a hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in May 2004, Jeffrey Winters, a professor at Northwestern University, argued that the World Bank had participated in the corruption of roughly $100 billion of its loan funds intended for development.
AT Aid Solves
AT Technical Assistance Solves

Aid fails political will necessary for reforms proves even technical assistance cant solve Santiso, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, senior officer, 1
(Carlos, currently Sector Manager of the Governance Division at the African Development Bank, based in Tunis since 2007, 6-2001, International Co-Operation For Democracy And Good Governance: Moving Toward A Second Generation? European Journal of Development Research, vol.13, no.1, p. 14-5, http://www.eldis.org/fulltext/secondgeneration.pdf, accessed 7/9/13, QDKM) The introduction of the democratic governance agenda within the policies of major bilateral aid agencies and multilateral development institutions signals an increased willingness to take the political dimension of development and aid effectiveness into account. On a broader level, there is increasing recognition that international assistance to democratisation can only have limited impact unless there is a genuine political will and a strong commitment to democracy within the countrys ruling elite and society at large. As Riddell [1999:333] argues, if donors wish to make a real difference, they will need to focus more explicitly and more rigorously on issues of power, politics and interest groups, as they have tried to do in the past messy and difficult though these things often are. Zimbabwe, Belarus or Paraguay immediately come to mind. There is no way around it: politics matters. Promoting good governance entails democratising the state and building genuine democracy. Indeed, learning has often been faster on the recipient side: political leaders in transitional countries with a legacy of or a tendency towards autocracy have learned faster to neutralise and manipulate external influences than democracy promoters have learned to influence decisively power relations and political processes in nascent democracies. Traditionally, democracy aid has operated ignoring the realities of power and the intricacies of politics. It has relied on technical solutions to address political problems, adopting somehow a therapeutic approach. This has been, for example, the case concerning justice reform and legislative strengthening. It has become painfully evident that without addressing the underlying distribution of power, parliaments will likely remain passive and judiciaries emasculated. Technical assistance or training for leaders, judges, parliamentarians and civil servants is, at best, a hopeless illusion unless the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, the autonomy of the parliament and the depolitisation of public administration are effective. The existence of a democratically elected autocrat and the prevalence of a predominant majority party in all spheres of power, which characterise many emergent democracies, are fundamental hindering factors. Unless the underlying reality and distribution of power is affected, democracy aid and governance support will likely remain ineffective, only achieving superficial impact. Democracy assistance providers operate as though it is possible to change the basic functioning of key institutions to render a parliament representative and effective, to help unions become genuinely powerful and independent, to increase substantially the role of local government without grappling with the deep-seated interests of the actors involved [Carothers, 1997b:122]. A fundamental lesson learned is that, to promote democracy and good governance in emerging democracies, donors will need to address the underlying interests and power relations in which institutions are embedded. This will entail thinking development cooperation as a political endeavor and establishing development partnerships grounded in pacts for governance reform. Democracy assistance can have a real influence in the shape and direction of democratisation. It can do so in subtle but significant ways, by facilitating political dialogue between polarised actors, fostering consensus and compromise, influencing the contours of the political debate, delineating the contents of the reform agenda and changing the incentive structure. However, it must be accepted that many of the most important results of democracy programs are intangible, indirect, and time-delayed,
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 23 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core their greatest impact often being the transmission of ideas that will change peoples behaviour [Carothers, 1999:341]. The current crisis of development aid and debate on aid effectiveness should not overshadow the significant and decisive influence international assistance to democracy and good governance has had on the shape and direction of democratisation.
AT Empirical Solvency
No solvency cant measure success of programs Even if they can prove that aid will lead to political reforms, there is no plausible way to measure that Peters, Wesleyan University, assistant professor, 11
(Anne Mariel, Foreign Policy, Why Obama shouldn't increase democracy aid to Egypt, 2/14/11, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/14/why_obama_shouldn_t_increase_democracy_aid_to_e gypt, accessed 79/13, QDKM) Most of the debate around these programs has focused on the dollar amounts and the terms of delivery. But a more useful debate might focus on the fundamental question of whether they work. And here, the evidence is thin. Between 2005 and 2009, when democracy and governance funding was at its peak, in the widely used Freedom House ratings Egypt retained a steady "6" in political rights and a "5" on civil liberties, placing it squarely in the "not free" category. On media freedom, between 2005 and 2008 Egypt vacillated between "partially free" and "not free." If anything, the 2005-2009 period saw greater crackdowns -- with the detention of journalists, revelations of police brutality, the imprisonment of Ayman Nour, and amendments to the Constitution that expanded the use of military courts, restricted political party activity, and prohibited independent candidates for president. Of course, it may be unreasonable to expect that the micro-level work of democracy organizations would affect the macro-level results captured by Freedom House scores. Most staff with whom I have spoken emphasize that their work is a "drop in the pond." One alternative, then, is the technique employed in a 2009 USAID audit of democracy and governance programs in Egypt, which evaluates these projects based on a mix of 1) actual versus projected policy inputs, such as the number of public-policy advocacy campaigns supported by the U.S. government, and 2) project-specific impacts, such as percentage of U.S.assisted courts with better case management. Unfortunately, metrics for project impact are difficult to identify, and all but one of the audit's indicators for civil society projects are measured purely in terms of inputs, such as the number of journalists trained or number of media outlets receiving training. This may be why the report concludes that civil society projects were among the most effective, despite the overall dismal finding that democracy and governance programs only achieved 52 percent of planned results.
No measurement instrument assessing efficacy of aid in relation to the economy is notoriously difficult Werker, Harvard Business School, professor, et al., 8
(Eric, Associate Professor in the Business, Government and International economy Unit and Martin Bower Fellow at Harvard Business School, Faisal Z. Ahmed, prized research fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford University, and Charles Cohen, Professor of History and Religious Studies at UW-Madison, Harvard Business School, July, 2008, How is Foreign Aid Spent? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/07074.pdf, p. 1, accessed 7-10-13, QDKM) It is notoriously difficult to measure the causal impact of foreign aid on the economy. The "micro-macro paradox" (Mosley 19S6) renders it impossible to add up the effects of individual aid projects, since foreign aid is fungible. Thus, researchers are left to conduct crosscountry
analyses to capture the effect of aid on economic growth and other outcomes, net of the recipient governments' domestic budget reshuffling. This large literature has produced mixed results and much disagreement, largely due to different interpretations over causal inference (Roodman 2007). After all. since donors may reward countries for good performanceor bail out basket casesconcerns of endogeneity are justified. Not surprisingly, the literature has employed a number of instrumentation strategies (see Raj an and Subramanian. forthcoming). Existing instrumental-variable approaches use the literature on the determinants of aid (e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000) to isolate variables that predict foreign aid. broadly, and then use the best candidates to predict aid in a two-stage aid-on-growth regression. But each existing instrument for aid (see Boone 1996: Hansen and Tarp 2001) can be criticized for one of three broad reasons: one. it is highly collinear with aid itself (e.g. lagged aid. lagged aid squared): two. it stands a good chance of not being truly exogenous to the economy (e.g. lagged arms imports, lagged "policy", lagged GDP per capita, policy interactions); or three, it is basically time-invariant and thus limits the temporal inferences that can be drawn from the analysis s (e.g. Egypt, Africa Franc zone, population).
AT NGOs Solve
Foreign aid isnt always necessary NGOs undermine local authority and hampers effective action Dupuy, University of Washington political science doctorate student, Ron, University of Minnesota Stassen Chair of International Affairs, and Prakash, University of Washington political science professor, 12
(Kendra, James, and Aseem, 11/15/12, Open Democracy, Foreign aid to local NGOs: good intentions, bad policy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/kendra-dupuy-james-ron-aseem-prakash/foreign-aid-tolocal-ngos-good-intentions-bad-policy, accessed 7/13/13, JZ) Hold on, however. Arent developing and former Communist countries too poor to support a local NGO community? Isnt external aid utterly necessary? In some cases, yes. In other cases, however, the answer is no. Israel, for example, is a relatively rich country, but over 90% of its local human rights activities, according to a scholarly survey, are funded from Europe and America. And according to our survey of 235 human rights workers from 61 countries, local experts median estimate of rights groups receiving substantial foreign aid is 75%. There is no statistical correlation, moreover, between these estimates and country wealth, as measured by per capita GDP. Some countries, in other words, are sufficiently wealthy to support local NGOs. And most countries have a strong charitable tradition of some kind. The problem, however, is that the kinds of issues that liberal NGOs work on dont attract many donations from local individuals, communities and businesses in the developing world. This makes local NGOs vulnerable to cut-offs in aid, and exposes them to governments arguing that local NGOs are agents of foreign forces. How did this happen? During the 1990s, many countries experienced a dramatic upsurge in voluntary activism, and international donors understandably responded with enthusiasm. Donors goals, for the most part, were laudable. The money was meant to help local NGOs promote democratization, markets, gender equality, good governance, and respect for human rights. In some cases, this support helped an already-vibrant civil society grow stronger. In other instances, however, money from the outside turned civil society into a vulnerable, externally oriented community. Over time, many local NGOs became top-down groups nourished from abroad, rather than local products of a popular, grass-roots civic movement. Understandably, foreign-supported NGOs began to adopt the issues, language, and structures their foreign donors wanted, rather than those preferred by local people. Few realize that while foreign aid gives NGOs the wherewithal to operate independently, it also undermines their incentives to generate local revenue. Like governments afflicted with the so-called resource curse, foreign aid to NGOs reduces the need to raise money locally. Why raise small sums at home when so much more is available abroad? Tragically, plentiful foreign aid also promotes briefcase NGOs, fake groups that exist only on paper and provide few services. In one recent study, surveyors discovered that some 75% of registered NGOs in Uganda s capital, Kampala, did not really exist. According to our research, there are reasons to suspect that a similar rate obtains in Ethiopia. More worryingly, foreign aid inadvertently undermines NGOs ties to local populations, handing angry governments an opportunity for successful crackdowns. In 2010, for example, the Ethiopian governments new anti NGO law, the Charities and Societies Proclamation, blocked foreign funded
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 27 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core groups from working on Ethiopian human rights and democracy. Shortly thereafter, most briefcase and rights groups disappeared, while most surviving NGOs stopped working on human rights altogether.
AT Loans Different from Grants

The distinction between grants and loans is meaningless, the loans are too highly concessional to avoid the link Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 8, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Large systematic cash transfers from rich countries to African governments have tended to be in the form of concessional loans (that is, money lent at below market interest rates, and often for much longer lending periods than ordinary commercial markets) or grants (which is essentially money given for nothing in return). There is a school of thought which argues that recipient countries view loans, which carry the burden of future repayment, as different from grants. That the prospects of repayment mean loans induce governments to use funds wisely and to mobilize taxes and maintain current levels of revenue collection. Whereas grants are viewed as free resources and could therefore perfectly substitute for a government's domestic revenues. This distinction has led many donors to push for a policy of grants instead of loans to poor countries. The logic is that much of the investment that poor countries need to make has a long gestation period before it starts to produce the kinds of changes in GDP growth that will yield the tax revenues needed to service loans. Indeed, many scholars have argued that it was precisely because many African countries have, over time, received (floating rate) loans, and not grants, to finance public investments that they became so heavily indebted, and that aid has not helped them reach their development objectives. Yet ultimately the question becomes how strongly recipient governments perceive loans as being different from grants. If a large share of foreign loans are provided on highly concessional terms, and loans are frequently forgiven, policymakers in poor economies may come to view them as roughly equivalent to grants, and as such the distinction between (aid) loans and grants as practically irrelevant . Over recent decades, the pattern of aid to Africa seems to gel with this view of the world one in which loans are not seen as distinct from grants.
AT Aid Reforms
Aid Cuts Now

Currently, USAID is being cut Kadden, InterAction Senior Legislative Manager, 13
[Jeremy, 4-11-13, Huffington Post, The Good, the Bad, and the Budget: What President Obama's Plan Means for Foreign Aid, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-kadden/obama-budget-foreignaid_b_3056552.html, accessed 7-10-13, QDKM) The $3.77 trillion budget proposal[1] that the Obama Administration rolled out today contains mixed news for supporters of international aid. His plan includes boosts to some health and development programs, and overall higher funding levels for foreign assistance than what Congress has put forward. But his funding recommendation is still a decrease from previous years, and specific cuts he proposes to humanitarian programs are cause for concern. Obama proposed $52 billion for the International Affairs Budget, or 150 account, of which $48.2 billion is in the "base" budget and $3.8 billion is in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). This overall funding level compares favorably to both the House and the Senate budget committee blueprints: The House and Senate have allocated significantly less for the base budgets, $38.7 billion and $45.6 billion, respectively. But the administration's recommendation is lower than previous requests and past funding levels. In FY13, for example, President Obama requested $56.2 billion for the 150 account -- 7 percent more than he has requested this year. The FY14 request for 150 is also 11 percent lower than the $58.6 billion that was enacted just four years ago in FY10. Digging in to the details of the budget plan, the mixed news continues. Health and development accounts would receive a boost under the president's plan, but there are serious concerns that the humanitarian accounts may be receiving steep cuts. As a result, there are concerns that the president's funding levels may not be adequate to meet global needs, especially as the world faces ongoing crises in places such as Syria and Mali. On the positive side, the president's recommendations for health and development accounts are mostly higher than previous enacted levels as well as the post-sequestration levels for FY13. Under the president's plan, for example, Global Health ($8.3 billion overall) would receive a 3.4 percent bump over FY13, and several other accounts would receive 5 percent to 6 percent increases, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the International Development Association, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the McGovernDole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition program. However, the overall Development Assistance (DA) number, while higher than last year's at first blush, is actually somewhat inflated by the president's proposed food assistance reform. So while the overall DA allocation of $2.84 billion is 5 percent higher than in FY13, without the additional funding for food aid, it would be just $2.59 billion, 4 percent less than the FY13 funding level. Perhaps most alarming are the proposed cuts in humanitarian programs. Overall, the four humanitarianfocused accounts of International Disaster Assistance, Migration and Refugee Assistance, Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance and Food for Peace Title II would receive $1.5 billion less in FY14 than in FY13, even after sequestration. The Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account would receive the largest cut, coming in $900 million lower than even the post-sequestration funding level in FY13 ($2.66 billion in FY13 compared with $1.76 billion in FY14). And while the overall number for the International Disaster Assistance account has been increased to $2.045 billion, it is in reality a smaller allocation than last year because it now includes $1.416 billion for food assistance and just $629 million for the primary function of the account, the
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 31 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The OFDA allocation for FY13 was approximately $1.17 billion in FY13, so the FY14 funding level for OFDA would represent a $540 million cut. While the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance account is increased nearly nine-fold, it is a relatively small account, contributing just $250 million under the president's plan. The last of these four humanitarian accounts, Food for Peace Title II, has probably received the most attention in the run-up to the budget's release. The administration has proposed reforms[2] to U.S. food aid programs which would reportedly allow life-saving assistance to reach an additional two to four million people, as well as make gains in flexibility, timeliness and efficiency. The reforms would zero out the Food for Peace account and transfer funding from the jurisdiction of the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee to three USAID accounts under the jurisdiction of the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee. Leading NGOs, including InterAction, have endorsed a set of principles[3] around food assistance reform. As Congress considers the President's proposal, these groups are urging lawmakers to retain the focus of the program on people suffering from acute and chronic hunger. Now that the administration's proposal is on the table alongside House and Senate budget plans, it is up to Congress to hash out where spending will fall. In doing so, they must remember[4] that poverty-focused development and humanitarian accounts make up less than 1 percent of the U.S. budget. Cutting these programs will not address the deficit, but supporting them is a wise investment and makes a real difference for people around the world working to improve their lives. [1]: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Overview [2]: http://www.usaid.gov/foodaidreform [3]: http://www.interaction.org/document/ngo-alliance-endorses-food-assistance-reform-principles [4]: http://www.interaction.org/document/interaction-fy14-funding-letter-house
Aid Bad
Kiss of Death
Foreign aid fails cant engineer social change perceived as interfering Bandow, Cato Institute senior fellow, 11
(Doug, and former special assistant to Ronald Reagan, Cato Institute, libertarian think tank, 8/1/11 Meet Washington's Foreign-Policy Fools, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=13515, accessed 7/9/13, QDKM) Instead of constantly filling the atmosphere with more hot air or worse, attempting to back the hot air with force U.S. officials should shut up. They should say little or nothing as crises inevitably develop in other nations. Washingtons principle objective should be to stay out of foreign conflicts. The U.S. government should reaffirm its general commitment to democracy and human rights. But American officials should drop their pretense of micromanaging events. Unlike God, who cares for the smallest sparrow that falls to earth, they need not worry about every event that happens on the earth, issuing uninformed opinions hither and yon. Washington might usefully offer private advice, including to opposition groups and figures. In rare cases, promises of support and aid might help advance reform, so long as U.S. officials remember the poor record of past foreign assistance and their consistent inability to predict, let alone control, foreign events. Such a nuanced approach would be a far cry from policy today. U.S. officials must fight the very American desire to Do Something. We want people the world over to enjoy political liberty and economic prosperity. We want to help them succeed. But social engineering is hard enough in the United States. Transcending differences in culture, tradition, history, religion, ethnicity politics and more makes the international task even more daunting. Moreover, people want to rule themselves. They will always be skeptical of outsiders who show up seeking to direct events. Taking public positions proves even more painful when hypocrisy becomes obvious. Theres a perfectly understandable realpolitik reason for Washington to prefer Saudi tyranny to Iranian tyranny, but if U.S. officials are preaching democracy around the globe, bombing some regimes and criticizing others, its not easy to explain why Washington doesnt care if the Saudi (and now Bahraini) people suffer under tyranny. A more modest and quiet approach would allow American officials to adapt to practical reality without so obviously compromising fundamental principles. When the next crisis erupts somewhere around the globe, the president might helpfully respond: Who cares? The point is not that Americans shouldnt care about tragedy elsewhere as human beings. But Americans shouldnt automatically care as a matter of government policy. This truly would be an unnatural reaction in Washington. But it would be a far better strategy than what passes for foreign policy in the Obama administration.
Aid Causes Corruption

Aid dependency incentivizes the talented to go abroad or become corrupt Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 50, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Development agencies would have us believe that aid helps build a lasting, credible and strong civil service. Indeed, the World Bank recommends that by providing more aid rich countries actually assist in the fight against corruption. Thanks to aid, poor governments can afford to support ethics training, increase the salaries of their public-sector employees (police, judges, medical staff, tax collectors), thereby limiting the need for corruption. Moreover, higher salaries will attract competent and higherquality employees to the civil service. Unfortunately, unfettered money (the prospect of sizeable ill-gotten gains) is exceptionally corrosive, and misallocates talent. In an aid-dependent environment, the talented - the better-educated and more-principled, who should be building the foundations of economic prosperity - become unprincipled and are drawn from productive work towards nefarious activities that undermine the country's growth prospects. Those who remain principled are driven away, either to the private sector or abroad, leaving the posts that remain to be filled by the relatively less-educated, and potentially more vulnerable to graft.
Aid fosters corruption, poverty, and economic collapse Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 49-50, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) With aid's help, corruption fosters corruption, nations quickly descend into a vicious cycle of aid. Foreign aid props up corrupt governments - providing them with freely usable cash. These corrupt governments interfere with the rule of law, the establishment of transparent civil institutions and the protection of civil liberties, making both domestic and foreign investment in poor countries unattractive. Greater opacity and fewer investments reduce economic growth, which leads to fewer job opportunities and increasing poverty levels. In response to growing poverty, donors give more aid, which continues the downward spiral of poverty. This is the vicious cycle of aid. The cycle that chokes off desperately needed investment, instills a culture of dependency, and facilitates rampant and systematic corruption, all with deleterious consequences for growth. The cycle that, in fact, perpetuates underdevelopment, and guarantees economic failure in the poorest aid-dependent countries. Corruption and growth Ultimately, Africa's goal is long-term, sustainable economic growth, and the alleviation of poverty. This cannot occur in an environment where corruption is rife. There are, of course, any number of ways in which corruption retards growth. In a context of high degrees of corruption and uncertainty, fewer entrepreneurs (domestic or foreign) will risk their money in business ventures where corrupt officials can lay claim to its proceeds, so investment stagnates, and falling investment kills off growth.
Aid fuels corruption- empirical evidence proves Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 52-53, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Aid and corruption The donor community is publicly airing concerns that development assistance earmarked for critical social and economic sectors is being used directly or indirectly to fund unproductive and corrupt expenditures (UNDP's Human Development Report, 1994). At a hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in May 2004, experts argued that the World Bank has participated (mostly passively) in the corruption of roughly US$100 billion of its loan funds intended for developments. When the corruption associated with loans from other multilateral development banks is included, the figure roughly doubles to US$200 billion. Others estimate that of the US$525 billion that the World Bank has lent to developing countries since 1946, at least 25 per cent (US$130 billion) has been misused. Vast sums of aid not only foster corruption - they breed it. Aid supports rent seeking - that is, the use of governmental authority to take and make money without trade or production of wealth. At a very basic level, an example of this is where a government official with access to aid money set aside for public welfare takes the money for his own personal use. Obviously, there cannot be rent-seeking without a rent. And because foreign aid (the rent) is fungible easily stolen, redirected or extracted - it facilitates corruption. Were donor conditionalities remotely effective, this would not be the case. But, as described previously, conditionalities carry little punch. In 'Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?', Alesina and Weder conclude that aid tends to increase corruption. Svensson shows how aid fosters corruption by reducing public spending; that by increasing government revenues, aid lowers the provision of public goods (things that everyone benefits from, but no one wants to pay for - for instance, a lamppost). In a similar vein, foreign aid programmes, which tend to lack accountability and checks and balances, act as substitutes for tax revenues. The tax receipts this releases are then diverted to unproductive and often wasteful purposes rather than productive public expenditure (education, health infrastructure) for which they were ostensibly intended. In Uganda, for example, aid-fuelled corruption in the 1990s was thought to be so rampant that only 20 cents of every US dollar of government spending on education reached the targeted local primary school.6
Corruption Bad Aid Diversion

Corruption means that money for infrastructure projects will be diverted to officials pockets Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 50-1, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Endemic corruption also targets public contracts. In these environments, contracts which should be awarded to those who can deliver on the best terms, in the best time, are given to those whose principal aim is to divert as much as possible to their own pockets. What ensue are lower-quality infrastructure projects, and enfeebled public services, to the detriment of growth. Similarly, the allocation of government spending suffers as corrupt officials are likely to choose projects less on the basis public welfare and more on the opportunities for extorting bribes and diverting funds. The bigger the project, the greater the opportunity. Projects whose exact value is difficult to monitor present lucrative opportunities for corruption - it is easier to siphon money from large infrastructure projects than from textbooks or teachers' salaries.
Corruption Bad Economic Growth

Corruption is terrible for growth studies Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 51, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) So how badly does corruption actually affect growth? Every year since 1995, Transparency International has published a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Using surveys reflecting the perceptions of business people and country analysts, the CPI ranks over 100 countries, from 0 to 10, the most corrupt to the least. Using the Transparency International CPI, Graff Lambsford found that a one-point improvement in a countrys corruption score was correlated with an increase in productivity of 4 per cent of GDP. This implies that were Tanzania (placed at 3.2 out of 10 on the 2007 Transparency International index) to improve its corruption score to the level of the UK (ranked 84 out of 10), its GDP could be more than 20 per cent higher, and net annual per capita inflows would increase by 3 per cent of GDP. Joel Kurtzman found that every one-point increase in a country's opacity index (the degree to which a country lacks clear, accurate and easily discernible practices governing business, investment and government) correlated to a lower per capita income by US$986 and a 1 per cent decrease in net foreign direct investment as a share of GDP.4 Moreover, corruption was also related to a 0.5 per cent increase in the country's average borrowing rate, and a 0.5 per cent increase in its rate of inflation.
Corruption Bad Instability

Corruption undermines solvency and makes instability more likely Diamond, Hoover Institution senior fellow, 2
(Larry, presently a professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University and served as a consultant to the U.S. Agency for International, Hoover Institution, a conservative policy think tank, 3/2002Advancing Democratic Governance: A Global Perspective on the Status of Democracy and Directions for International Assistance, p.13-16, http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/papers/advancing_democ_%20governance.pdf, accessed 7/9/13,QDKM) In most countries outside Western Europe and the four other Anglophone states, democracy (where it exists) is not functioning very well. Serious deficiencies of governance are heightening public cynicism about parties and politicians in general, and diminishing public esteem for democracy. Three generic problems of governance underlie this malaise and obstruct the consolidation of democracy. The most urgent and pervasive problem is the weakness and frequently the decay of the rule of law. No problem more alienates citizens from their political leaders and institutions and undermines political stability and economic development than gross, endemic corruption on the part of government and political party leaders, judges, and officials up and down the bureaucratic hierarchy. The more endemic the problem of corruption, the more likely it is to be accompanied by other serious deficiencies in the rule of law: smuggling, drug trafficking, criminal violence, personalization of power, and human rights abuses. Even in the wealthy, established democracies of North America, Europe, and Japan, scandals involving political party and campaign finance have eroded public confidence in parties and politicians. In the less established democracies, where the legitimacy of democracy is not so deeply rooted, political corruption scandals are much more likely to erode public faith in democracy itself and thereby to destabilize the entire system. This is particularly so where corruption is part of a more general syndrome involving the growing penetration of organized crime into politics and government, the misuse of executive and police powers to intimidate and punish political opposition, and the politicization and inefficacy of key institutions of horizontal accountability, such as the judiciary, the audit agency, and even the electoral commission. In many countries today, democracy is weak and insecure because political leaders lack sufficient democratic commitment political willto build or maintain institutions that constrain their own power. And civil society is too weak, or too divided, to compel them to do so. The second broad source of malaise is economic. Economic reforms insofar as they have even been implementedhave not yet generated rapid, sustainable economic growth in most of the developing and post-communist states. A few states have experienced rapid growth, and some others are at least growing modestly. However, in most new and troubled democracies, economic growth is not rapid enough, and is not broadly distributed enough, to lift large segments of the population out of poverty or a very tenuous economic existence. In most of Latin America, in some parts of Africa (such as South Africa), and in some Asian countries (Pakistan, the Philippines), the problem is compounded by extreme levels of inequality in income and wealth (especially, in rural areas, land). Very little progress has been made in these countries in reducing poverty and tempering massive inequalities of income and wealth. It is inconceivable that democracy can be consolidated in these countries unless substantial progress is made toward reduction of poverty and inequality. The third problem is the inability to manage ethnic, regional, and religious differences in a peaceful and inclusive way. Cultural diversity is not, in itself, an insurmountable obstacle to stable democracy. With all of its problems, India has learned how to manage this diversity through complex institutions of federalism. Spain largely contained its secessionist pressures with the
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 39 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core adoption of a system of asymmetrical federalism, and, like the United States, Canada, and Australia, Europe is learning to adapt its democratic institutions to assimilate immigrants from a wide range of other countries and cultures. The problem arises when one ethnic or religious group seeks hegemony over others, or when some minorities perceive that they are being permanently and completely excluded from power, including any meaningful control of their own affairs. These three problems indeed, crisesof governance intensify and reinforce one another. Highly visible corruption accentuates the sense of injustice and grievance associated with poverty, unemployment, and economic hardship. Corruption has also been a major obstacle to the successful implementation of economic reforms, especially privatization. Poverty and economic stagnation reinforce the resentment of discrimination and political marginalization felt by the indigenous peoples of the Andes (and many other parts of Latin America). The entrenchment of political corruption and clientelism as the principal means of economic advancement aggravates ethnic and regional conflict in Africa and Asia, by raising the premium on control of the state and rendering politics a more desperate, zero-sum struggle for control of economic opportunity. The weakness of the rule of law makes it easier for leaders of different ethnic and sectarian groups to mobilize violence at the grassroots as part of their efforts to win power for themselves. It also facilitates electoral fraud and violence. Underlying all of this in many countries is a weak commitment to the public good and the rule of law. Citizens and lites have low levels of trust in one another and in the future. Thus, they strategize on how to take from a stagnant stock of resources, rather than on how to cooperate and produce to enlarge that stock. They focus on ends rather than means securing power and wealth by any means possible, rather than doing so with respect for the constitution and the law.
Mexican Corruption Impacts

Corruption fuels local vigilante justice groups, potentially further undermining institutional legitimacy Asfura-Heim, CNA Center for Strategic Studies, and Espach, CNA Latin American Affairs, Director, 13
(Patricio, specialist on irregular warfare at CNAs Center for Strategic Studies. He served as an adviser on civilian governance and the rule of law for the U.S. Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan, Ralph, is a coauthor, with Joseph Tulchin, of Latin America in the New International System, 07-2013, Foreign Affairs, The Rise of Mexicos Self-Defense Forces Vigilante Justice South of the Border, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139462/patricio-asfura-heim-and-ralph-h-espach/the-rise-ofmexicos-self-defense-forces?page=show, accessed 7/12/13, QDKM) Even as Mexico continues to struggle with grave security threats, its steady rise is transforming the country's economy, society, and political system. Given the Mexico's bright future and the interests it shares with the United States in energy, manufacturing, and security, Washington needs to start seeing its southern neighbor as a partner instead of a problem. On a Tuesday morning in March, with rifles slung over their shoulders, some 1,500 men filed into the Mexican town of Tierra Colorada, which sits on the highway from Mexico City down to the Pacific coast. They seized at gunpoint 12 police officers and a local security official, whom they believed responsible for the murder of their commander. They set up roadblocks, and when a car of Acapulco-bound beachgoers refused to stop, they opened fire and injured a passenger. This was not the work of a drug cartel. The men were members of a self-defense group, one of a growing number of vigilante organizations aiming to restore order to Mexican communities. We have besieged the municipality, said a spokesperson for the group, because here criminals operate with impunity in broad daylight. Mexico has suffered staggering levels of violence and crime during the countrys seven-year-long war against the cartels. The fighting has killed 90,000 people so far, a death toll larger, as of this writing, than that of the civil war in Syria. Homicide rates have tripled since 2007. In an effort to stem the carnage, Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto announced last December that the federal government, having struggled to defeat the cartels using corrupt local police and an inadequate military, would create an elite national police force of 10,000 officers by the end of this year. Many Mexicans are unwilling to wait. In communities across the country, groups of men have donned masks, picked up rifles and machetes, and begun patrolling their neighborhoods and farmland. As in the Tierra Colorada incident, their behavior is not always pretty. Several months ago, another such group in the state of Guerrero detained 54 people for over six weeks, accusing them of crimes ranging from stealing cattle to murder. After a series of unofficial trials, they handed 20 of them over to local prosecutors and let the rest go free. It would be wrong to dismiss the utility of self-defense groups altogether, particularly in an age rife with civil conflict. In other communities, detainees have been beaten, forced into labor, or even lynched. Members of these fuerzas autodefensas (self-defense forces) say that they have no choice but to take matters into their own hands: criminals and gangs have become more brazen and violent than ever, and the police and the government are either absent, corrupt, or themselves working with the criminals. Extralegal local self-defense groups have long been common in rural Mexico, particularly in indigenous communities in the south. In recent months, however, such groups have emerged with alarming frequency across the country, suggesting that many Mexicans have lost faith in the governments willingness or ability to protect them. They have formed in the Pacific states of Michoacn and Jalisco, in the northern
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 41 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core border state of Chihuahua, in the eastern states of Veracruz and Tabasco, and on the outskirts of Mexico City. They now operate openly in 13 different states and at least 68 municipalities. According to the government, 14 new groups have formed since January; Mexican security analysts say the real number is likely much higher. The motives of these self-defense groups vary from town to town, as do their relationships with local governments and the police. The majority of them seem to draw on local outrage against the rising crime and violence in their communities. For others, the impetus is less clear. Some may represent instances of political opportunism. One local self-defense force in a small town in Oaxaca dissolved after 48 hours once the state government agreed to improve public services and oversight of the police. In other cases, the groups have taken advantage of political vacuums to advance illicit interests, even working as fronts for local gangs or trafficking networks. La Familia Michoacana, for example, originally claimed that its mission was to fight the Zetas and other drug cartels -- and then became a drug cartel itself. These groups often consist of well-intentioned citizens, unknowing pawns in a criminal networks scheme to hobble a rival. The lawlessness spawned by Mexicos drug wars has contributed to the spread of self-defense groups, and the groups regularly blame the cartels and the governments war on drugs for the lack of security. But they are not mainly concerned with stopping the drug trade. With a few exceptions, such as the Mata Zetas (Zeta Killers) in Monterrey, their focus tends to be on local crimes, particularly robberies, rapes, and other violent attacks. Their actions have until now been limited to seizing alleged delinquents and criminals and either punishing them publicly or handing them over to the police. As one group leader in Tierra Colorada explained, Narcotraffickers as a rule usually keep things under control in their territories, but lately theyve been getting involved in extortion and murders, and thats not right. The drug problem is for the state to resolve, but kidnapping and robbery touches us. The rapid proliferation of these groups poses a challenge to the Pea Nieto government just as it is trying to reform Mexicos security policies. In a basic way, armed extralegal groups undermine the formal rule of law, and left unchecked, they could morph into criminal organ-izations themselves. But they have long played a role Mexico and in many regions enjoy a degree of public legitimacy that the police lack. Rather than try to dissolve these forces, Mexican officials must discern between those acting legitimately with local public support and those with ulterior motives and seek ways in which the former can contribute to public security -- at least until the government gets its act together. GRASS-ROOTS SECURITY Around the world, community-based crime-fighting groups have sprung up in places where formal security forces are absent or inadequate, often with the approval and support of governments. Despite their sometimes noble intentions, these organizations can pose a challenge to the authority and legitimacy of the state. In some cases when they have operated without oversight, they have killed wantonly, displaced thousands from their lands, or themselves taken up crime. The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, for example, came into existence purportedly to protect rural communities from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, but transformed over time into a paramilitary network that committed massacres, trafficked drugs, and engaged in corruption at the highest levels. Selfdefense groups have often proved vulnerable to co-optation by criminal and insurgent groups.
AT No Corruption We Cooperate With State Goverments

Every level of government is rippled with corruption, aff using the state as their actor fails the entire plan Castillo, Huffington Post, 06/26/13
(E. Eduardo, Mexico Corruption: State Government Scandals Reveal Lack Of Disclosure, Enforcement, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/26/mexico-corruption-scandals-disclosure_n_3505478.html, accessed 7/12/13, QDKM) Scandals are nothing new to Mexican politics, but the pace of revelations is accelerating as a more robust democracy and social media have emboldened Mexico's watchdogs, who are increasingly trying to bring the officials to justice or at least publicly shame them. And much of the new attention focuses on scandals in states, where the powerful grip of governors often had masked wrongdoing in the past. In the latest case, the former governor of the southern state of Tabasco went before a judge at a Mexico City prison Wednesday and was arraigned on charges of tax evasion and use of illicit resources. He declined to enter a plea. Andres Granier left his state of Tabasco with a financial disaster, according to the governor who replaced him and launched an investigation. As allegations of missing millions flew across the media, radio and television stations began broadcasting a recording of Granier boasting about owning hundreds of suits and pairs of shoes and about shopping at Beverly Hills luxury stores. The 65-year-old politician and chemist said his statements were merely drunken boasts at a party, and were untrue. He denies having anything to do with the alleged embezzlement of about $156 million (2 billion pesos) in federal funds. But when he returned from a Miami home to testify in the case, prosecutors grilled him for hours and then detained him. Even officials of his Institutional Revolutionary Party, which holds Mexico's presidency, distanced themselves from Granier. Granier's reputation was not helped when state prosecutors last month reported finding about $7 million (88.5 million pesos) in cash at an office used by the man who had been his state treasurer. The official's attorney insisted the bundles of cash had been come by legitimately, that his client is independently wealthy. But it is just one of many scandals swirling around officials from all of Mexico's major parties. The daily newspaper Reforma this month reported that the federal Attorney General's Office was investigating the 26-year-old son of the former governor of Aguascalientes over bank deposits of at least $4.3 million during the last three years of his father's term. An official with federal prosecutors, who was not authorized to be quoted by name, confirmed that the son, Luis Reynoso Lopez, was being investigated for possible money laundering. The official said there is also an open investigation of the former Gov. Luis Reynoso Femat, who was elected to office as a member of the conservative National Action Party. Mexican news media reported that the son had bought four homes and two lots in San Antonio, Texas. In a search of San Antonio property records, The Associated Press found three properties in the name of Luis Armando Reynoso Lopez: a lot with an estimated value of $126,350, another valued at $19,330 and a home valued at $999,460. The former governor has insisted the money is legitimate, product of the family real estate business he left in the hands of his son when he began serving as governor. Four days after the probe in Aguascalientes was made public, Mexican newspapers reported that federal senators from National Action had mysteriously received bank deposits of $32,000 (430,000 pesos) each, just at a moment when the group was embroiled in a power struggle with their party's
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 43 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core national leader, who had removed the bloc's coordinator, Ernesto Cordero, against their will. The man installed to replace him, Jorge Luis Preciado, alleged the money came from Cordero. The lawmakers said they were shocked by the discovery and several announced they would immediately return the money. Cordero, a former treasury secretary, denied he ordered the deposits. "The most important thing about all of these cases is how they are examples of the weakness in the checks and balances in each of the states," said Alejandra Rios Cazare, of the Center for Research and Education in Economics, known as CIDE. When it comes to holding public officials accountable, there have been some improvements in the last 15 years at the federal level. The salaries of public federal officials are published online as is the progress of public programs. At the state level, however, checks and balances remain murky. While Mexico's congress has passed a law requiring state governments to disclose how they are spending the federal money they receive, the measure's enforcement has been put off until at least next year. For decades, Mexicans associated corruption with the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI. That was largely because no other party held power even at the state level for 60 years, until 1989. The presidency remained in PRI hands until 2000, and it returned to the PRI last year. Mexico's gradual political opening meant politicians of other parties would face the temptations of power. This month, the media again focused on a YouTube video, allegedly recorded in 2010, in which Cancun Mayor Julian Ricalde appears to be taking wads of cash from his predecessor, Jaime Hernandez. Ricalde, of the leftist Democratic Revolution Party, acknowledged taking the money but said it was to pay for the government transition. Hernandez told reporters it was extortion money. For Ricardo Corona, of the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness, the problem goes beyond parties and people and comes from how public resources are managed at the local and state level. "You have a discretional and opaque margin of action ... You have incentives as a government official because you know the sanction level is low," said Corona, who has focused on reviewing the management of state and municipal public finances. So far, there has been spotty progress in punishing corrupt officialsm and that has generated distrust and alienation among citizens and the political class. An example of that, said political analyst Jose Antonio Crespo, was the campaign to run a cat for mayor of Xalapa, the Veracruz state capital. The spoof has drawn more than 140,000 likes on Facebook. "This society has been so hurt by corruption and so hurt from seeing situations that are so shameful that I think we are looking for blood," said Rios. "We want to see Granier hanging from a toe and we're not necessarily looking for justice."
Corruption at all levels in many instances engaging with one of the state governments would be even worse Zabludovsky, New York Times, 6/23/13 (Karla, Official Corruption in Mexico, Once Rarely
Exposed, Is Starting to Come to Light, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/world/americas/officialcorruption-in-mexico-once-rarely-exposed-is-starting-to-come-to-light.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed 7/12/13, QDKM) MEXICO CITY Andrs Granier has a sumptuous wardrobe and lifestyle. He has bragged about owning 400 pairs of shoes, 300 suits and 1,000 shirts, collected from luxury stores in New York and Los Angeles. His purchases barely fit in his several properties, scattered throughout Mexico and abroad. Cash that was found on a property linked to Jos Manuel Saiz, Mr. Graniers treasurer. Mr. Saiz was arrested this month. A tape recording of Mr. Graniers boasts, making him sound like a highflying corporate executive, was leaked to a local radio station last month. But his job title, until December, was governor of a midsize southeastern Mexican state, a position that currently pays about $92,000 a year after taxes.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 44 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core We go to Fifth Avenue and buy a pair of shoes; $600, Mr. Granier is heard saying about one of his trips abroad. I took clothes to Miami, I took clothes to Cancn, I took clothes to my house, and I have leftovers, he added, saying, Im going to auction them off. (The day after the recording was made public, he said that he had been inebriated while making those statements in October.) But just as eye-opening as the extravagances of a public official now under investigation after Mr. Graniers successor discovered that about $190 million in state funds was unaccounted for, the state government said this month is that they came to light at all in a country where state and local corruption, a serious drag on Mexicos development, run deep and are rarely exposed. The case of Mr. Granier, who was taken into custody on June 14 at a Mexico City hospital where he is being treated for a heart ailment, is just the latest among several former governors and public officials who have recently found themselves under investigation or facing public scorn. Watchdog groups are gaining strength, opposition parties are challenging and exposing the faults of the status quo, and social and traditional news media organizations are increasingly seeking to hold officials accountable. There will be more of these because the issue has taken off, said Ricardo Corona, a public finance expert at the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness, a research group in Mexico City. There is encouragement on the issues of transparency, accountability, access to information. Mr. Graniers case is one of the more closely followed political spectacles here in recent years. By January, when the new government in his state, Tabasco, found holes in the budget, Mr. Granier, 65, had retreated into obscurity. This month, after public shock and outrage over the recording reached a fever pitch, he suddenly resurfaced on television, saying he was in Miami. Im going back to Mexico, he declared in an interview on one of Mexicos most-watched morning shows, Primero Noticias. I dont owe absolutely anything. Upon his arrival at the airport in the capital the following day, a chaotic news media swarm engulfed Mr. Granier at one point he stumbled before the cameras before he was whisked away in a white S.U.V., with camera crews on motorcycles giving chase. Three days later, the Tabasco state attorneys office issued an arraignment order for Mr. Granier on suspicion of embezzlement and improper exercise of public service. His treasurer, Jos Manuel Saiz, already had been arrested this month on suspicion of embezzlement as he tried to cross the border into the United States, after boxes containing nearly $7 million in unexplained cash were discovered on a property linked to him. A decade ago, such suspicious accounting would have most likely been kept under wraps, as Mexican officials tended to protect one another and the public took their malfeasance for granted. During the uninterrupted 71-year rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, governors, who often secured their appointments based on friendly ties with the autocratic presidents, were almost expected to pillage state treasuries. When the party lost the 2000 presidential election, it left a political vacuum across the states. Governors around the country acquired unprecedented autonomy and almost no oversight, said Alfonso Zrate, the president of Grupo Consultor Interdisciplinario, a political consulting firm in Mexico. State debt rose to $30 billion in 2012 from about $15 billion in 2008, according to the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. Accounting for inflation, that was a 70.4 percent increase, according to an article in the online publication Animal Poltico by Marco Cancino, a political analyst in Mexico City. Governments have reported scant details of how they have spent the money from these loans. But with governors from opposing political parties succeeding one another and doing away with the unspoken pact of the PRI years, in which incoming leaders protected departing ones, a system of checks and balances some have called it political retribution is emerging. Freedom of information laws, recent legislative overhauls demanding more accountability from state governments and an increasingly technologically engaged society have been more successful at preventing murky finances from going unquestioned. As a result, tales of disgraced former governors are becoming a staple of the news here, and are part of what Mr. Zrate calls an incipient democracy.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 45 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core In 2011, the federal attorney generals office opened an investigation into a $3 billion debt in the state of Coahuila, acquired mostly during the administration of Humberto Moreira, a former president of the PRI, which recovered the presidency in December. The former governor of the state of Aguascalientes, Luis Armando Reynoso, is being investigated over improper exercise of public service, news organizations have reported. Last year, Mario Ernesto Villanueva Madrid, the former governor of the state of Quintana Roo who was extradited to the United States in 2010, pleaded guilty to conspiring to launder millions of dollars in bribes he received from the powerful Jurez drug organization, to ensure that its cocaine moved safely through his state, undisturbed by law enforcement. Inroads in transparency, however, have yet to change the culture and mentality of El que no tranza, no avanza, or He who does not cheat, does not get ahead, a popular motto here. And these victories have yet to transform the countrys image abroad: Mexico fell in Transparency Internationals corruption perception index to 105th place in 2012 from 57th in 2002, with a lower ranking indicating that the country is seen as more corrupt. We still dont have accountability, said Mr. Cancino, the political analyst, who warned that progress in transparency practices at the federal level would slowly make their way down to the local and state levels. There are still 32 battles that we have to wage, he said, referring to Mexicos 31 states and one federal district. Small gains in transparency, seen through scandals like the one enveloping Mr. Granier, have not translated into justice served, experts say. Governors are investigated but rarely charged. We know what is going on, said Sergio Aguayo, a political analyst at the Colegio de Mxico. But no measures are being taken. Mexicans who are active on Twitter discuss these scandals for days and sometimes weeks, shaming politicians and pressing traditional news media to cover them extensively. But political analysts argue that there are no effective mechanisms yet to translate citizen participation into structural change. What do we do so that society goes from indignation to action? Mr. Cancino asked. In the meantime, former politicians who endure public scrutiny and a dose of humiliation often come out of these scandals largely unscathed. In April, the newspaper Reforma reported that Mr. Moreira, the repudiated former Coahuila governor, was living with his family in an upscale neighborhood in Barcelona, Spain, while attending a local university.
Aid Hurts Economy

Foreign aid kills the middle class, which is the key internal link into a sustainable economy Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 57-8, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Africa needs middle class: a middle class that has vested economic interests; a middle class in which individuals trust each other (and have a court to go to if the trust breaks down) and that respects and defends the rule of law; middle class that has a stake in seeing its country run smoothly and under a transparent legal framework; a middle class (along with the rest of the population) that can hold its government accountable. Above all, a middle class needs a government that will let it get ahead. This is not to imply that Africa does not have a middle class it does. But in an aid environment, governments are less interested in fostering entrepreneurs and the development of their middle class than in furthering their own financial interests. Without a strong economic voice a middle class is powerless to take its government to task. With easy access to cash a government remains allpowerful, accountable only (and only then nominally) to its aid donors. Inhibited in its growth, the middle class never reaches that critical mass that historically has proven essential for a country's economic and political success. In most functioning and healthy economies, the middle class pays taxes in return for government accountability. Foreign aid short-circuits this link. Because the government's financial dependence on its citizens has been reduced, it owes its people nothing. A well-functioning civil society and politically involved citizenry are the backbone of longer-term sustainable development. The particular role of strong civil society is to ensure that the government is held accountable for its actions, through fundamental civil reforms other than simply holding elections. However, foreign aid perpetuates poverty and weakens civil society by increasing the burden of government and reducing individual freedom. An aid-driven economy also leads to the politicization of the economy so that even when a middle class (albeit small) appears to thrive, its success or failure is wholly contingent on its political allegiance. So much so, as Bauer puts it, that aid 'diverts people's attention from productive economic activity to political life, fatally weakening the social construction of a country.
Developing economies dont have the absorption capacity to effectively use the aid money, prevents growth Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 64-5, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Aid causes bottlenecks: absorption capacity Very often, poor countries cannot actually use the aid flows granted by rich governments, At early stages of development (when countries have relatively underdeveloped financial and institutional structures) there is simply not enough skilled manpower, or there are not enough sizeable investment opportunities, to put the vast aid windfalls effectively to work. Economic researchers have found that countries with low financial development do not have the absorptive capacity for foreign aid. In
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 47 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core countries with weak financial systems, additional foreign resources do not translate into stronger growth of financially dependent industries. What happens to this aid money that can't be used? In the most honest of outcomes, if the government did nothing with the aid inflow, the country would still have to pay interest on it. But given the policy challenges of large inflows discussed earlier (for example, inflationary pressure, Dutch disease effects), policymakers in the poor country must do something. Since they cannot put all the aid flows to good use (even if they wanted to), it is more likely than not that the aid monies will be consumed rather than invested (as before, thereby raising the risk of higher inflation). To avert this sharp shock to the economy, African policymakers have to mop up the excess cash; but this costs Africans money. In addition to having to pay the interest on the aid the country has borrowed, the process of sterilizing the aid flows (again, issuing local-country debt in order to soak up the excess aid flows in the economy) can impose a substantial hit to the government's bottom line. Uganda offers a telling example of this. In 2005, the Ugandan central bank issued such aid-related bonds to the tune ofUS$700 million; the interest payments alone on this cost the Ugandan taxpayer US$110 million annually. Naturally, the process of managing aid inflows is particularly painful when the interest costs of the debt the government pays out are greater than the interest it earns from holding all the mopped-up aid money.
Aid Causes Inflation

Aid leads to inflation and erodes the economy Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 61-2, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Aid can be inflationary Price pressures are twofold. Aid money leads to increased demand for locally produced goods and services (that is, non-tradable such as haircuts, real estate and foodstuffs), as well as imported (traded) goods and services, such as tractors and TVs. Increased domestic demand needn't be harmful in itself, but a disruptive injection of money can be. There are multiple knock-on effects. For example, take this very basic and simplistic story. Suppose a corrupt official gets US$10,000. He uses some of the cash to buy a car. The car seller can now afford to buy new clothes, which places cash the hands of the clothes trader, and so on and so forth down the line, at each point putting more pressure on domestic prices as there are now more people demanding more cars, clothes, etc. This is at least an example of positive corruption. But in a poor environment, there aren't any more cars, there aren't any more clothes, so with increased demand prices go up. Eventually, there may be more cars and there may be clothes, but by that time inflation will have eroded the economy, all the while with even more aid coming in. Perhaps ironically, because of the deteriorating inflationary environment more aid is pumped in to 'save the day; were on the cycle again. As if that was not bad enough, in order to combat the cycle of inflation, domestic policymakers raise interest rates. But, at a very basic level, higher interest rates mean less investment (it becomes too costly to borrow to invest); less investment means fewer jobs; fewer jobs mean more poverty; and more poverty means more aid.
Aid crowds out investment and triggers inflation, collapsing the economy Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 61, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) As foreign aid comes in, domestic savings decline; that is, investment falls. This is not to give the impression that a whole population is awash with aid money, as it only reaches relatively few, very select hands. With all the tempting aid monies on offer, which are notoriously fungible, the few spend it on consumer goods, instead of saving the cash. As savings decline, local banks have less honey to lend for domestic investment. Economic studies confirm this hypothesis, finding that increases in foreign aid are correlated with declining domestic savings rates. Aid has another equally damaging crowding-out effect. Although aid is meant to encourage private investment by providing loan guarantees, subsidizing investment risks and supporting co-financing arrangements with private investors, in practice it discourages the inflow of such high-quality foreign monies. Indeed, in some empirical work, it is shown that private foreign capital and investment fall as aid rises. This may in part reflect the fact private investors tend to be uncomfortable about sending their money to countries that are aid-dependent, a point elaborated on later in the book.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 49 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core An outgrowth of the crowding-out problem is that higher aid-induced consumption leads to an environment where much more money is chasing fewer goods. This almost invariably leads to price rises - that is, higher inflation.
Aid Causes Dutch Disease

Aid chokes off the export sector, leading to Dutch disease and killing growth Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 62-4, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Aid chokes off the export sector Take Kenya. Suppose it has 100 Kenyan shillings in its economy, which are worth US$2. Suddenly, US$10,000 worth of aid comes in. No one can spend dollars in the country, because shopkeepers only take the legal tender - Kenyan shillings. In order to spend the aid dollars, those who have it must convert it to Kenyan shillings. All the while there are only still 100 shillings in the economy; thus the value of the freely floating shilling rises as economy as people try to offload the more easily available aid dollars. To the detriment of the Kenyan economy, the now stronger Kenyan currency means that Kenyan-made goods for export are much more expensive in the international market , making the traded goods sector uncompetitive (if wages in that sector do not adjust downwards). All things being equal, this chokes off enyas export sector. The Silent Killer of Growth This phenomenon is known as Dutch disease , as its effects were first observed when natural gas revenues flooded into the Netherlands in the 1960s, devastating the Dutch export sector and increasing unemployment. Over the years economic thinking has extended beyond the specifics of this original scenario, so that any large inflow of (any) foreign currency is seen to have this potential effect. Even in an environment where the domestic currency is not freely floating, but rather its exchange rate remains fixed, the Dutch disease phenomenon can occur. In this case, the increased availability of aid money expands domestic demand, which again can lead to inflation. Aid flows spent on domestic goods would push up the price of other resources that are in limited supply domestically - such as skilled workers- making industries (mainly the export sector) that face international competition and depend on that resource more uncompetitive, and almost inevitably they close. The IMF has stated that developing countries that rely on foreign capital are more prone to their currencies strengthening. Accordingly, aid inflows would strengthen the local currency and hurt manufacturing exports, which in turn reduces long-run growth. IMF economists have argued that the contribution of aid flows to a country's rising exchange rate was one reason why aid has failed to improve growth, and that aid may very well have contributed to poor productivity in poor economies by depressing exports. In other work, their research finds strong evidence consistent with aid undermining the competitiveness of the labour-intensive or exporting sectors (for example, agriculture such as coffee farms). In particular, in countries that receive more aid, export sectors grow more slowly relative to capital-intensive and non-exportable sectors. Aid inflows have adverse effects on overall competitiveness, wages, export sector employment (usually in the form of a decline in the share of those in the manufacturing sector) and ultimately growth. Given the fact that manufacturing exports are an essential vehicle for poor countries to start growing (and achieving sustained growth), any adverse effects on exports should prima facie be a cause for concern. Moreover, because the traded goods sector can be the main source of productivity improvements and positive spillovers associated with learning by doing that filter through to the rest of the economy, the adverse impact of aid on its competitiveness retards not just the export sector, but also the growth of the entire economy.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 51 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core In the most odd turn of events, the fact that aid reduces competitiveness, and thus the traded sector's ability to generate foreign-exchange earnings, makes countries even more dependent on future aid, leaving them exposed to all the adverse consequences of aid-dependency. What is more, policymakers know that private to-private flows like remittances do not seem to create these adverse aid-induced (Dutch disease) effects, but they largely choose to ignore these private capital sources.
Aid fails fosters Dutch Disease

(Dambisa, author of "Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa.", Wall Street Journal- Africa News, 3/21/09 Why Foreign Aid Is Hurting Africa, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123758895999200083.html2, accessed 7/8/2013, QDKM) A constant stream of "free" money is a perfect way to keep an inefficient or simply bad government in power. As aid flows in, there is nothing more for the government to do -- it doesn't need to raise taxes, and as long as it pays the army, it doesn't have to take account of its disgruntled citizens. No matter that its citizens are disenfranchised (as with no taxation there can be no representation). All the government really needs to do is to court and cater to its foreign donors to stay in power. Stuck in an aid world of no incentives, there is no reason for governments to seek other, better, more transparent ways of raising development finance (such as accessing the bond market, despite how hard that might be). The aid system encourages poor-country governments to pick up the phone and ask the donor agencies for next capital infusion. It is no wonder that across Africa, over 70% of the public purse comes from foreign aid. In Ethiopia, where aid constitutes more than 90% of the government budget, a mere 2% of the country's population has access to mobile phones. (The African country average is around 30%.) Might it not be preferable for the government to earn money by selling its mobile phone license, thereby generating much-needed development income and also providing its citizens with telephone service that could, in turn, spur economic activity? Look what has happened in Ghana, a country where after decades of military rule brought about by a coup, a pro-market government has yielded encouraging developments. Farmers and fishermen now use mobile phones to communicate with their agents and customers across the country to find out where prices are most competitive. This translates into numerous opportunities for self-sustainability and income generation -- which, with encouragement, could e easily replicated across the continent. To advance a country's economic prospects, governments need efficient civil service. But civil service is naturally prone to bureaucracy, and there is always the incipient danger of self-serving cronyism and the desire to bind citizens in endless, time-consuming red tape. What aid does is to make that danger a grim reality. This helps to explain why doing business across much of Africa is a nightmare. In Cameroon, it takes a potential investor around 426 days to perform 15 procedures to gain a business license. What entrepreneur wants to spend 119 days filling out forms to start a business in Angola? He's much more likely to consider the U.S. (40 days and 19 procedures) or South Korea (17 days and 10 procedures). Even what may appear as a benign intervention on the surface can have damning consequences. Say there is a mosquito-net maker in small-town Africa. Say he employs 10 people who together manufacture 500 nets a week. Typically, these 10 employees support upward of 15 relatives each. A Western governmentinspired program generously supplies the affected region with 100,000 free mosquito nets. This promptly puts the mosquito net manufacturer out of business, and now his 10 employees can no longer support their 150 dependents. In a couple of years, most of the donated nets will be torn and useless, but now there is no mosquito net maker to go to. They'll have to get more aid. And African governments once again get to abdicate their responsibilities. In a similar vein has been the approach to food aid, which historically has done little to support African farmers. Under the auspices of the U.S. Food for Peace program, each year millions of dollars are used to buy American-grown food that has to then be shipped across oceans. One wonders how a system of
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 52 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core flooding foreign markets with American food, which puts local farmers out of business, actually helps better Africa. A better strategy would be to use aid money to buy food from farmers within the country, and then distribute that food to the local citizens in need. Then there is the issue of "Dutch disease," a term that describes how large inflows of money can kill off a country's export sector, by driving up home prices and thus making their goods too expensive for export. Aid has the same effect. Large dollar-denominated aid windfalls that envelop fragile developing economies cause the domestic currency to strengthen against foreign currencies. This is catastrophic for jobs in the poor country where people's livelihoods depend on being relatively competitive in the global market. To fight aid-induced inflation, countries have to issue bonds to soak up the subsequent glut of money swamping the economy. In 2005, for example, Uganda was forced to issue such bonds to mop up excess liquidity to the tune of $700 million. The interest payments alone on this were a staggering $110 million, to be paid annually. The stigma associated with countries relying on aid should also not be underestimated or ignored. It is the rare investor that wants to risk money in a country that is unable to stand on its own feet and manage its own affairs in a sustainable way.
Aid causes Dutch Disease undermining manufacturing sector Subramanian, Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics 9
(Arvind, Center for Global Development, and Senior Research Professor at Johns Hopkins University, 12-18-09, The effects of foreign aid: Dutch Disease, http://aidwatchers.com/2009/12/the-effects-offoreign-aid-dutch-disease/, accessed 7/13/13. QDKM) The voluminous literature on the effects of foreign aid on growth has generated little evidence that aid has any positive effect on growth. This seems to be true regardless of whether we focus on different types of aid (social versus economic), different types of donors, different timing for the impact of aid, or different types of borrowers (see here for details). But the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Perhaps we are just missing something important or are not doing the research correctly. One way to ascertain whether absence of evidence is evidence of absence is to go beyond the aggregate effect from aid to growth and look for the channels of transmission. If we can find positive channels (for example, aid helps increase public and private investment), then the absence of evidence conclusion needs to be taken seriously. On the other hand, if we can find negative channels (for example, aid stymies domestic institutional development), the case for the evidence of absence becomes stronger. One such channel is the impact of aid on manufacturing exports. Manufacturing exports has been the predominant mode for escape from underdevelopment for many developing countries, especially in Asia. So, what aid does to manufacturing exports can be one key piece of the puzzle in understanding the aggregate effect of aid. In this paper forthcoming in the Journal of Development Economics, Raghuram Rajan and I show that aid tends to depress the growth of exportable goods. This will not be the last word on the subject because the methodology in this paper, as in much of the aid literature, could be improved. But the innovation in this paper is not to look at the variation in the data across countries (which is what almost the entire aid literature does) but at the variation within countries across sectors. We categorize goods by how exportable they could be for low-income countries, and find that in countries that receive more aid, more exportable sectors grow substantially more slowly than less exportable ones. The numbers suggest that in countries that receive additional aid of 1 percent of GDP, exportable sectors grow more slowly by 0.5 percent per year (and clothing and footwear sectors that are particularly exportable in low-income countries grow slower by 1 percent per year).
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 53 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core We also provide suggestive evidence that the channel through which this effect is felt is the exchange rate. In other words, aid tends to make a country less competitive (reflected in an overvalued exchange rate) which in turn depresses the prospects of the more exportable sectors. In the jargon, this is the famous Dutch Disease effect of aid. Our research suggests that one important dimension that donors and recipients should be mindful of (among many others that Bill Easterly has focused on) is the impact on the aid-receiving countrys competitiveness and export capability. That vital channel for long run growth should not be impaired by foreign aid.
Aid Funds Conflict

Foreign aid foments conflict and civil war Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 59, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Aid and civil war According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Africa is the most conflict ridden region of the world, and the only region in which the number of armed conflicts is on the increase.' During the 1990s there were seventeen major armed conflicts in Africa alone, compared to ten (in total) elsewhere in the world. Africa is also the region that receives the largest amount of foreign aid, receiving more per capita in official development assistance than any other region of the world. There are three fundamental truths about conflicts today: they are mostly born out of competition for control of resources; they are predominately a feature of poorer economies; and they are increasingly internal conflicts. Which is why foreign aid foments conflict. The prospect of seizing power and gaining access to unlimited aid wealth is irresistible. Grossman argues that the underlying purpose of rebellion is the capture of the state for financial advantage, and that aid makes such conflict more likely. In Sierra Leone, the leader of the rebel Revolutionary United Front was offered the vice-presidential position in a peace deal, but refused until the offer was changed to include his chairmanship of the board controlling diamond-mining interests. So not only would it appear that aid undermines economic growth, keeping countries in states of poverty, but it is also, in itself, an underlying cause of social unrest, and possibly even civil war.
Foreign aid fuels conflict - it creates and funds military culture Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 60, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Furthermore, in an indirect manner, by lowering average incomes and slowing down economic growth (according to Collier, both in themselves powerful predictors of civil wars), aid increases the risk of conflict.9 In the past five decades, an estimated 40 million Africans have died in civil wars scattered across the continent; equivalent to the population of South Africa (and twice the Russian lives lost in the Second World War). Beyond politicization of the political environment, aid fosters a military culture. Civil wars are by their very nature military escapades. Whoever wins stays in power through the allegiance of their military. Thus, the reigning incumbent, anxious to hang on to power, and manage competing interest groups and factions, first directs what resources he has into the pockets of his army, in the hope that it will remain pliant and at bay.
NGO Aid Backfires

Foreign aid to NGOs causes backlash, crushing solvency Dupuy, University of Washington political science PhD candidate, et al., 12
(Kendra, James Ron, Harold E. Stassen Chair of International Affairs at the University of Minnesota's Humphrey School of Public Affairs, and Aseem Prakash, professor of political science at the University of Washington, Seattle, 11-16-12, MinnPost, Foreign aid to local NGOs: good intentions, bad policy, http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2012/11/foreign-aid-local-ngos-good-intentions-bad-policy, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) This neglect is unfortunate, given the current global backlash against externally supported NGOs. The time has come for western and international donors to reconsider the way in which they support human rights, democracy, gender equality, and other liberal causes in the developing and former Communist world. Supporting liberal NGOs can be useful, but it must be done carefully and modestly, lest it undermine the same agendas it seeks to promote. Here's the background. For years, it was received wisdom in western and international donor circles that aid to local civil society in the developing and former Communist world would promote democracy and other liberal ideals. In some cases, that has been true. In others, however, foreign aid has provoked a real backlash. Sometimes part of problem Today, many governments, and some citizens, are enraged by foreign-funded NGOs, and are mobilizing conservative ideas and policies to strike back. In these cases, international assistance to liberal NGOs has become part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. Consider Russia, where new, anti-NGO legislation is ringing alarm bells at home and abroad. If NGOs want to engage in political activities, a broad category that includes any attempt to change state policy, they must now register with a special agency before receiving foreign money, declare themselves "foreign agents," engage in onerous reporting, and prepare for unannounced audits. To drive the point home, Russia recently ordered official U.S. aid workers to leave the country and stop funding local NGOs. In Israel, similarly, legislators have debated rules close to Russia's, and may yet turn them into law. In Canada, a former bastion of liberal thinking, the government has bitterly protested foreign-funded environmental groups, claiming, as always, that they undermine national sovereignty.
Foreign aid to NGOs fails, it kills public support for NGOs because of antiAmericanism and prompts governments to cut off aid Dupuy, University of Washington political science PhD candidate, et al., 12
(Kendra, James Ron, Harold E. Stassen Chair of International Affairs at the University of Minnesota's Humphrey School of Public Affairs, and Aseem Prakash, professor of political science at the University of Washington, Seattle, 11-16-12, MinnPost, Foreign aid to local NGOs: good intentions, bad policy, http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2012/11/foreign-aid-local-ngos-good-intentions-bad-policy, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Both democratic and authoritarian governments are increasingly incensed at western donors' attempts to reshape local politics and values through NGOs. In some cases, they have successfully mobilized conservative politicians, social movements, and organizations, many of whom are angered by the very same thing. Governmental opposition matters, because the local NGO
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 56 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core community is highly dependent on foreign money. States can easily twist the screws by blocking or threatening to block the aid pipeline. Hold on, however. Aren't developing and former Communist countries too poor to support a local NGO community? Isn't external aid utterly necessary? In some cases, yes. In other cases, however, the answer is no. Israel, for example, is a relatively rich country, but over 90 percent of its local human rights activities, according to a scholarly survey, are funded from Europe and America. And according to our survey of 235 human rights workers from 61 countries, local experts' median estimate of rights groups receiving substantial foreign aid is 75 percent. There is no statistical correlation, moreover, between these estimates and country wealth, as measured by per capita GDP. Some countries, in other words, are sufficiently wealthy to support local NGOs. And most countries have a strong charitable tradition of some kind. The problem, however, is that the kinds of issues that liberal NGOs work on don't attract many donations from local individuals, communities and businesses in the developing world. This makes local NGOs vulnerable to cut-offs in aid, and exposes them to governments arguing that local NGOs are agents of foreign forces.
Aid to NGOs undercuts legitimacy and accountability at local level Dupuy, University of Washington political science PhD candidate, et al., 12
(Kendra, James Ron, Harold E. Stassen Chair of International Affairs at the University of Minnesota's Humphrey School of Public Affairs, and Aseem Prakash, professor of political science at the University of Washington, Seattle, 11-16-12, MinnPost, Foreign aid to local NGOs: good intentions, bad policy, http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2012/11/foreign-aid-local-ngos-good-intentions-bad-policy, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) During the 1990s, many countries experienced a dramatic upsurge in voluntary activism, and international donors understandably responded with enthusiasm. Donors' goals, for the most part, were laudable. The money was meant to help local NGOs promote democratization, markets, gender equality, good governance, and respect for human rights. In some cases, this support helped an already-vibrant civil society grow stronger. In other instances, however, money from the outside turned civil society into a vulnerable, externally oriented community. Over time, many local NGOs became top-down groups nourished from abroad, rather than local products of a popular, grassroots civic movement. Understandably, foreign-supported NGOs began to adopt the issues, language, and structures their foreign donors wanted, rather than those preferred by local people. Few realize that while foreign aid gives NGOs the wherewithal to operate independently, it also undermines their incentives to generate local revenue. Like governments afflicted with the so-called resource curse, foreign aid to NGOs reduces the need to raise money locally. Why raise small sums at home when so much more is available abroad?
Foreign Assistance promotes the creation of fake NGOs Dupuy, University of Washington political science PhD candidate, et al., 12
(Kendra, James Ron, Harold E. Stassen Chair of International Affairs at the University of Minnesota's Humphrey School of Public Affairs, and Aseem Prakash, professor of political science at the University of Washington, Seattle, 11-16-12, MinnPost, Foreign aid to local NGOs: good intentions, bad policy, http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2012/11/foreign-aid-local-ngos-good-intentions-bad-policy, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Tragically, plentiful foreign aid also promotes "briefcase NGOs," fake groups that exist only on paper and provide few services. In one recent study, surveyors discovered that some 75 percent of registered NGOs in Uganda's capital, Kampala, did not really exist. According to our research, there are reasons to suspect that a similar rate obtains in Ethiopia. More worryingly, foreign aid
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 57 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core inadvertently undermines NGOs' ties to local populations, handing angry governments an opportunity for successful crackdowns. In 2010, for example, the Ethiopian government's new antiNGO law, the Charities and Societies Proclamation, blocked foreign funded groups from working on Ethiopian human rights and democracy. Shortly thereafter, most briefcase and rights groups disappeared, while most surviving NGOs stopped working on human rights altogether. The Ethiopian public, sadly, proved unable or unwilling to help. Closure of 90 percent of the country's 125 local rights groups prompted few popular demonstrations, and not many ordinary citizens offered financial support.
Aid cant create public support for NGOs, prevents real reform Dupuy, University of Washington political science PhD candidate, et al., 12
(Kendra, James Ron, Harold E. Stassen Chair of International Affairs at the University of Minnesota's Humphrey School of Public Affairs, and Aseem Prakash, professor of political science at the University of Washington, Seattle, 11-16-12, MinnPost, Foreign aid to local NGOs: good intentions, bad policy, http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2012/11/foreign-aid-local-ngos-good-intentions-bad-policy, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Some Ethiopians didn't demonstrate or contribute because they feared government retaliation; Ethiopia has become very repressive of late. Others, however, were unmoved by local NGOs' plight. As one report argued, Ethiopians have come to view NGOs as entities who give them money, not as groups needing their help. Many Ethiopians will help family and strangers in need, and some will donate their time, money, and effort to charitable causes. Local NGOs working on liberal causes, however, are generally viewed as something for outsiders, rather than Ethiopians, to support. Generous foreign funding of local NGOs is a classic example of good intentions causing perverse outcomes. International solidarity is a wonderful idea, and the notion of transferring resources from North to South for good causes is morally attractive. The mechanics of doing this properly, however, are far more complex. Creating or sustaining local NGOs from outside, with little local support, is bad public policy. There are always exceptions, but civil society should, ideally, remain a bottom-up affair. Outsiders can help, but they should do so carefully and sparingly, lest their embrace prove lethal. You can't buy love, and you can't buy a vibrant civil society either.
AT Aid Good
AT Aid Good/Necessary for Relations

Aid not key diplomatic relations can solve Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute 11
(Doug, and former special assistant to Ronald Reagan, Cato Institute, libertarian think tank 5-30-11 A Foreign Policy Fit for a Republic, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=13150, accessed 7/9/13, QDKM) President Barack Obama says Washington supports democracy, and with the Arab Spring, his administration is abandoning its realpolitik ways. Of course, President George W. Bush said Washington was for democracy. And it was sometimes. President Obamas high-sounding promises arent likely to survive the next geopolitical crisis. U.S. foreign policy has long been driven by an unstable mix of idealism and pragmatism. Pragmatism led us to ally with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, support authoritarian South Korea against totalitarian North Korea, and subsidize a host of third-world dictatorships during the Cold War. The end of the global Great Game between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. reduced the pressure on Washington to back the worst third-world kleptocracies. But September 11th provided a dramatic reminder that difficult choices remain to be made. American policymakers wanted the assistance of Pakistan, a military dictatorship. The U.S. based troops in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, Islamic monarchies antagonistic to individual liberty. Perhaps Washingtons most important Arab ally was Egypt, a dictatorship that maintained a cold peace with Israel. Authoritarian Jordan and Yemen cooperated with America. The U.S. trusted other monarchies from Qatar to Morocco to maintain stability rather than promote democracy. An element of this policy reflected unabashed national self-interest. But there was more to it. Democracy that is, holding regular elections does not guarantee a liberal society that protects life and liberty. Indeed, popular attitudes in many Arab states look decidedly illiberal. Religious minorities are always at risk, as is most anyone outside of the political or social mainstream. Unfortunately, U.S. hypocrisy has often been embarrassingly ostentatious. The Bush administration chided Russias Vladimir Putin for his excesses while ignoring far worse abuses in Central Asia. American officials demanded that President Hosni Mubarak relax his rule even as they lavished aid on his regime. Washington insisted on elections in the occupied territories but refused to recognize Hamas when it won. U.S. policymakers cozied up to the Saudi royals and their de facto totalitarian dictatorship. The Arab Spring created dramatic contrasts between Americas professed ideals and its actual behavior. As the Egyptian crisis heated up, the Obama administration embraced President Mubarak. Then Washington suggested an orderly transition to democracy. Officials next suggested a faster transfer of power. With Mubaraks ouster, the U.S. enthusiastically embraced change. It was a shameless performance that fooled no one. Nor did the administration do much better after Egypt. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared Syrian President Bashar Assad to be a reformer. With more than 1,000 Syrians shot dead by security forces, the administration eventually raised its voice, but only a little, telling Assad that his time to repent was short. In Bahrain the ruling Sunni elite, with the aid of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, brutally stifled democracy protestors representing the majority Shia population. The administration barely cleared its throat, urging a peaceful resolution of the issue. Even today there are no sanctions, let alone war plans, for Bahrain, which hosts a major U.S. naval base, or Saudi Arabia, which sells the West much of its oil. Nor has Washington done much to push Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, or other authoritarian states toward greater democracy. The argument that the current regimes are better than the likely alternatives is
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 60 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core plausible, though also convenient. In fact, U.S. policymakers dont want to further unsettle an already unstable region, even if doing so would be morally right. Finding a way to manage such a policy hodge-podge without discrediting America would be tough for the best international operator, and Americas recent presidents cant claim that accolade. At least President Obama appears to care about the reality on the ground, unlike his predecessor. But Barack Obamas success in formulating and implementing an effective strategy is no better. Rather than attempting to micromanage the internal policies of other nations, Washington should stay out of other nations conflicts. America should stop turning its fantasies into policies and pretending that it can enforce its preferences on the rest of the world. The Middle East would be a good place to start. Consider Egypt. The demonstrators in the streets cared not at all about Washingtons rapidly changing opinions. They didnt stop protesting when the U.S. endorsed President Mubarak. They didnt agree that he should stay in power for a time after American officials urged that outcome. By the same token, President Mubarak did not yield because the Obama administration wanted him to do so. American policy would have been more effective if U.S. policymakers had simply shut up. U.S. foreign policy should eschew promiscuous meddling and constant micromanagement. But noninterventionism is not the same as isolationism. Washington should indicate that Americans stand for individual liberty. Democracy usually is an important means of protecting freedom, but the liberal society is much broader than the opportunity to vote. Washington should encourage other governments to respect basic human rights. But it should offer its most detailed advice in private, in the way most likely to be accepted, or at least listened to. At the same time, U.S. policymakers should recognize their limited power. The secretary of state (every secretary of state!) constantly tells other nations what they should do Libyas Muammar Qaddafi should leave, North Korea should abandon nuclear weapons, Iran should do the same, Venezuelas Hugo Chavez should respect the rule of law, Vladimir Putin should liberalize Russian politics, and more, much more. But what country ever follows Washingtons orders? Foreign aid rarely makes a difference, even in promoting economic growth. No government, at least if not a veritable client state, is likely to sell perceived vital interests for a mess of pottage. For instance, Washington has not been able to change Pakistans focus on India as an enemy and view of the Taliban as an ally. Washingtons $20 billion in aid over the last decade has just subsidized a frenemys continued double-dealing. It is especially hard to find instances where aid caused a transition from autocracy to democracy. Aid often becomes a permanent policy, irrespective of changing circumstances. After the heavily subsidized Mubarak government fell, the Obama administration immediately offered assistance to the new Egyptian government, even before the latter held an election. Should the current authorities be overthrown, Washington undoubtedly would promise a new aid package to the next regime. Sanctions have little better record. They didnt force Iraqs Saddam Hussein from power or even change his behavior. They have not caused North Korea or Iran to abandon their nuclear ambitions. They havent forced Burmas generals or President Assad to liberalize. And they arent likely to have any more effect the next time they are imposed. Only through war can the U.S. impose its will, and even then Washington faces severe limitations. The NATO allies half-hearted assault on Qaddafis government is an embarrassment, prolonging the conflict and increasing civilian suffering. The Bush administration had many illusions when it invaded Iraq, such as expecting to choose that nations president and maintain permanent bases, which did not survive the occupation and ensuing insurgency. With 100,000 troops backing the Karzai government, Washington still cannot get Americas ally to stop persecuting Afghan Christians. Official relations should be limited to important matters of state; much of what Washington does now can instead be done by individuals and companies. For instance, there is no need for presidents to routinely claim great affection for and friendship with the Saudi royals. Private oil purchasers can do the genuflecting.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 61 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core Moreover, nongovernmental organizations can organize to advance human rights and other ends. Publicly embarrassing repressive regimes helps Washington in its efforts. Activists also can pressure companies and individuals doing business with dictatorships. While the effect of such campaigns will remain limited, official U.S. government pressure often has been no more effective. The Obama administration has been trying to simultaneously reassure dictatorial allies, threaten dictatorial enemies and mollify dictatorial neutrals, while convincing the rest of the world of its commitment to democracy. This confused effort has advanced neither Americas interests nor its reputation. The U.S. has much at stake in the world, but it only has limited ability to shape nations and events. Washingtons policy of promiscuous intervention has proved to be an expensive and violent dead end. Washington should adopt a more realistic and measured strategy essentially engagement without illusions. It would be an appropriate foreign policy for a republic, especially one that is essentially bankrupt.
Counterplans
Multilateral Aid CP
Bilateral aid fails - Doing the plan with a multilateral actor is far more likely to succeed in the long run Barder, Center for Global Development, Europe Director, 12
(Owen, the Europe Director at the Center for Global Development. He writes about development, economics, politics, and computers, 10-29-12, Is multilateral aid better?, http://www.owen.org/blog/6128, Accessed July 8, 2013, QDKM) I gave evidence to the House of Commons Committee on Public Accounts last week, about a recent audit of DFIDs approach to allocating multilateral aid. This gave me the opportunity to challenge what I think is a common misconception: that aid given through multilateral agencies is less efficient or more expensive than aid given through the bilateral aid programme. During the hearing, the chair of the Committee said: if you are trying to work through the plethora of EU and UN-type agencies, you waste one heck of a lot of a money on the way in bureaucracy, and less gets to the front line The Committee was a bit taken aback when I put forward the opposite case. I said: when you look at value for money, there are theoretical reasons for thinking that multilaterals would be more effective and, in practice, such data as we have tend to support that idea. The Committee gave me a good opportunity to explain this, though I am not sure I persuaded them. Here is why I think the big multilateral aid organisations through which the vast majority of multilateral aid is spent such as the World Bank, European Union, regional development banks, and larger global funds such as GAVI are generally more efficient than bilateral aid. Why would multilateralism be more cost-effective? 1. Relative immunity from capture bilateral donors are prone to being captured by commercial interests (eg the beltway bandits), lobbying by vocal NGOs, or short-term political pressures from legislators on a hobby-horse. Multilateral donors have more diverse stakeholders, so they are are less susceptible to capture by individual campaigns. 2. Untied aid a particular example of capture is that bilateral donors generally tie their aid to their own suppliers, either explicitly or implicitly. This greatly reduces the value for money of aid. 3. Returns to scale larger organisations can spread overhead over more projects. This is especially important for overseas offices, the duplication of which is very expensive. Bulk procurement can bring down prices (for example, of medicines). 4. Specialisation It makes no sense to have lots of bilateral donors each trying to build up expertise in each subject. 5. Diversity and breadth of membership multilateral organisations include a broader range of members, including some countries which have themselves recently successfully industrialised their economy and so can draw on and synthesize a wider range of experiences. This diversity gives developing country partners access to a greater range of ideas. 6. Improved aid allocation by ineffective donors If a relatively effective donor (say, the UK or Ireland) increases their contribution to the multilateral system, that creates pressure on other, less effective bilateral donors (say, Italy or South Korea) to do the same in order to maintain their relative fair burden. So if DFID shifts money from its (relatively effective) bilateral programme to a multil ateral programme (also effective, but perhaps not markedly more so than DFID) this can other push other countries to spend less through their woefully ineffective and wasteful bilateral programmes and greatly increase overall aid effectiveness. 7. Reduced spillover effects When we think about the effectiveness of bilateral aid, we often forget about the cumulative effects on developing countries and governments of coping with hundreds of
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 64 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core different donors. Knack (2006) refers to a forestry project in Vietnam jointly funded by 5 donors: it took 18 months and the involvement of 150 government workers to buy five project vehicles, because of the different procurement requirements of the different donors. That is why Simon Maxwell often says dont harmonise, multilateralize. We might all individually prefer to drive from our home to the office, but the roads would be impossibly congested if we all did that, so we are all better off if we pool our resources into an effective public transport system. It is similar for aid: we are all better off if we invest in a collective mechanism and resist the temptation to cause congestion by running our own individual aid projects.
Microfinancing CP - Solvency
Microfinance in Latin America solves extremely well - empirically Christen, Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Professor of Practice & President of the Boulder Institute of Microfinance and Sustainable Development, 12 (Robert Peck, 11-1-12, Microfinance in Latin America, http://www.foromic2012.com/china/panelista/doc/Microfinance_in_Latin_America.pdf , p. 4, Accessed 7-12-13, RRR)
Microfinance in Latin America is diverse, dynamic, profitable, and innovative. Since 1972, when the term micro-enterprise was first coined and the first loans of the modern-day microcredit movement were granted in Recife, Brazil, microfinance has emerged as an accessible, reasonably priced, demand driven product used by millions of small and micro businesses. Along the way, many microloan techniques were developed that have spanned the globe: Accion internationals solidarity group, Fincas village banking, and IPCs individual lending. Latin America has led with a more commercialized approach to microcredit, obtaining higher profits sooner than elsewhere in the world, and funding its operations from local capital markets earlier than elsewhere. In the region, microfinance has operated successfully off a wide variety of institutional platforms. The top programs in Latin America are operated by state owned banks, private banks, non-bank financial intermediaries, credit unions, and non-profit organizations. It is operated by financial institutions that serve exclusively the micro and small business sector and by those that reach a broad general population with retail banking services. This diversity is a hallmark of Latin American microfinance and suggests that a broader cross-section of lower income families may be served with a wider variety of types of loans than elsewhere in the world.
Microfinancing solves, trust and group dynamics ensure loans repaid Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 126-7, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) The mechanics of Grameen Bank's solidarity lending are pretty straightforward. Take a small village with five traders for a basic illustration. Through its micro-lending programme, the Grameen Bank lends the group US $100. Within the group the US$100 is passed on to trader A for a prespecified period (a loan period currently runs for about one year). At the end of this time, she (97 per cent of Grameen's loans are made to women) has to pay back to the Grameen Bank the loan amount plus interest (which can be between 8 and 12 per cent). Trader A is solely responsible for repaying her loan. When the loan is repaid, the next US$100 loan is made to the group, which is then passed on to trader B. But if trader A does not repay, the group is extended no further loans. Although, technically speaking, there is no group joint liability (the group as a whole is not responsible for the loan when one member defaults), the group is implicitly liable in the sense that the behaviour of each individual member affects the group as a whole. So very often when difficulties in repayment do arise, the group members contribute the defaulted amount (with an intention of collecting the money from the defaulted member at a later time), thus keeping the loan-cycle turning. In this sense microfinance in poor countries works much like credit cards in rich countries borrowers repay their loans because they know that if they don't pay the loans they have today,
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 66 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core their lender will blacklist them, and they won't be able to borrow more tomorrow. The bonds of trust extend not only between the members of the group, but also between the group and the bank there is no legal instrument between Grameen Bank and its borrowers. The Grameen model has met with resounding success. At least forty-three countries around the world have adopted some version of it. Grameen Bank initially offered micro-finance to 36,000 members with a portfolio of US$3.1 million when it became a bank in 1983. By 1997, it had 2.3 million members and a portfolio of U5$230 million. Perhaps most impressively, its default rates are at less than 2 per cent and, with its success, the bank now provides a host of other financial services (beyond also insurance and pension schemes) to the poor- micro-enterprise, scholarships and housing programmes.
Microfinancing CP AT Not Enough Funding

Microfinancing institutions are sustainable can run off of their own deposits Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 128, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) The most truly extraordinary aspect of this extraordinary tale is their 'No Donor Money, No Loans' policy. In 1995, Grameen Bank decided not to receive any more donor funds, and today funds itself 100 per cent through its deposits. Although recognized as the grandfather of micro-credit and microlending, Grameen Bank has spawned numerous variations all over the world, all targeting the segment of the population that has fallen through the high-street banking cracks. The BKI in Indonesia, Accin in Latin America, BRAC in Bangladesh and K-REP in Kenya are just a sample of the growing and expansive list.
Microloans have a multiplier effect encouraging investment Jeanty, Demand Media, 8

(Jacquelyn, Houston Chronicle, Function of Microfinance Banks, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/function-microfinance-banks-13236.html, Accessed 7-13-13, RRR) Microfinance banks exist in a variety of forms that provide needed financial help in underdeveloped economies. Microfinance banks exist in different forms, some of which include nongovernmental organizations, credit union-type businesses, wire services, and commercial and state banks. These banks specialize in providing small loans --- also known as microloans --- to people who would otherwise have limited or no access to financial assistance. Both individuals and businesses within underdeveloped countries can use microfinancing to fund small-business enterprises within their local communities. Access to Credit Underdeveloped regions, such as areas in Kosovo, Latin America and certain sub-Saharan African countries, typically have little to no access to traditional banking organizations, which limits a community's capacity for economic development. Because of the lack of resources and assets available in underdeveloped regions, no markets exist for traditional banking institutions in terms of profit-making potential. Microfinance banks provide individuals and businesses with access to credit, which opens up opportunities for investment using the skills and talents within a community or region. Small-Business Development The microloans made available by microfinance banks enable communities and regions with limited resources to develop small-business opportunities. Small businesses often develop out of the existing skills and talents within a community, including businesses dealing with food preparation and clothing manufacturing. Microfinance banks play a different role than their traditional counterparts through the types of interactions they have with their borrowers. In effect, microfinance banks play an active role in supporting individual businesses, working to stimulate each community's existing potential for economic growth. Microfinance agencies use different methods of engaging with borrowers and developing incentives for business success. One such method works with groups of borrowers within a community. Each group works together as a unit in matters concerning loan repayments and sharing business ideas with members, holding each other accountable for meeting their financial obligations.
Aid Efficacy Aff
AT Aid Fails
Aid Reforms Solve

Government aid programs have evaluation processes to ensure the efficient allocation of funds Lawson, Congressional Research Service Foreign Assistance analyst, 13
(Marian Leonardo, 2/13/13, Federation of American Scientists, Does Foreign Aid Work? Efforts to Evaluate U.S. Foreign Assistance, pg. 17-18, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42827.pdf, accessed 7/12/13, JZ) The new State and USAID policies share much in common, balancing the costs and expected gains from evaluation. For example, both require performance evaluations of all larger-than average projects and experimental/pilot projects, but not all projects. Both also include a target allocation of funds for program evaluation: 3% for USAID and 3%-5% for State. The policies share an emphasis on accessibility of information, with provisions to promote consistent and timely dissemination of evaluation reports. In their introductory language, both policies emphasize the learning benefits of evaluation, in addition to accountability. The USAID policy is notably more detailed than States on many of the issues. The USAID policy establishes required features for evaluation reports, and specifies that evaluation questions be identified in the design phase of projects, issues which the State policy does not address. USAID states that most evaluations will be conducted by third party contractors or grantees, to promote independence, while States policy does not explicitly mention use of independent evaluators. States evaluation reporting requirements also focus on internal dissemination, while USAID requires public availability. According to State officials, however, many of these issues are fleshed out in subsequent internal guidance documents and the State and USAID policies, in practice, differ only on the use of impact evaluation. USAIDs policy calls for impact evaluation whenever feasible, while the State policy sets a clear expectation that impact evaluation will be rare.83 MCCs evaluation policy shares many elements of the State and USAID policies, but goes farther in many respects. MCC requires independent evaluations of all compact projects, using indicators and baselines established prior to project implementation. It may be, however, that first-hand experience with the challenges of evaluation is bringing MCC policy and practice closer to that of USAID over time. MCCs 2012 policy revision adopts definitions from USAIDs 2011 evaluation policy and includes a new section on institutional learning. The update also appears to move closer to the USAID model with respect to impact evaluation, calling for impact evaluations when their costs are warranted, whereas the previous iteration referred to independent impact evaluations as an integral part of MCCs focus on results.84 The MCC policy still appears to have the strongest enforcement mechanism among the three agency policies, conditioning the release of quarterly disbursements on substantial compliance with the policy. USAIDs policy, in contrast, calls only for occasional compliance audits, and States policy does not address compliance at all.
A variety of measures including increasingly specific evaluation practices ensure that governmental foreign aid is efficiently appropriated Lawson, Congressional Research Service Foreign Assistance analyst, 13
(Marian Leonardo, 2/13/13, Federation of American Scientists, Does Foreign Aid Work? Efforts to Evaluate U.S. Foreign Assistance, pg. 19-21, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42827.pdf, accessed 7/12/13, JZ) Reform Authorization Legislation. In the 112th Congress, legislation was introduced that focused specifically on foreign aid evaluation. The Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2012
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 72 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core (H.R. 3159; S. 3310) sought to evaluate the performance of U.S. foreign assistance programs and improve program effectiveness by requiring the President to establish guidelines on measurable goals, performance metrics, and monitoring and evaluation plans for foreign assistance programs that can be applied on a consistent basis across implementing agencies.89 The legislation also called for the creation of a website that would make detailed, program-level information on foreign assistance, including country strategies, budget documents, budget justifications, actual expenditures, and program reports and evaluations available to the public. The general focus of these proposals was similar in many respects to the F Process initiated years ago by the State Department, but would codify the requirements and extend them across the various federal and agencies that administer aid programs. The benefit of such broad uniformity, arguably, is that it could enable policymakers, the public, and other stakeholders to better compare the activities of various agencies and get a more comprehensive picture of total U.S. foreign assistance. A potential drawback is the effort and expense required to impose such uniformity on agencies with different objectives, management structures, and information technology systems. These proposals also focused on transparency and accountability rather than effectiveness, and did not promote the use of impact evaluation. If performance evaluation continues to comprise the vast majority of aid evaluations, such a cross-agency requirement may provide comparable information on aid management from agency to agency, but is not likely to facilitate comparative analysis of what aid is most effective. H.R. 3159 was approved by the House in December 2012, but no action was taken by the Senate before the 112th Congress adjourned. Similar legislation has not yet been introduced in the 113th Congress, but likely will be. Appropriations for Enhanced Evaluation. Increasing the number and quality of foreign aid evaluations, while potentially cost effective in the long run, requires an investment of resources. For the most part, evaluation costs are integrated into program accounts at the various implementing agency budgets and are not scrutinized specifically by Congress. However, USAID, in conjunction with its new policy, started in the FY2012 budget request to identify resource needs for a centralized evaluation and learning through a Learning, Evaluation and Research (LER) line item. LER is one of the seven focus areas of the USAID Forward reform agenda, and is intended to both enhance USAIDs ability to conduct rigorous evaluations, as well as apply the knowledge gained through evaluation to improve future assistance strategies and design. The Administration requested $19.7 million for this purpose, through the Development Assistance appropriations account, for FY2012. Congress provided $12.26 million. For FY2013, USAID requested $26.67 million, to expand the number of priority evaluations it can carry out, improve staff training, and support evaluation collaborations with international partners. The ultimate funding level established by Congress, together with any related legislative directives, may play a role in determining the extent of the Administrations efforts to strengthen evaluation practice. Impact of Evidence Based Approach on Congressional Priorities. Congress has long exerted control over foreign assistance not only through appropriated funds and restrictions, but also by directing foreign assistance funds to certain sectors, countries, or even specific projects through bill or report language. For example, the committee reports accompanying the FY2013 House and Senate State-Foreign Operations appropriation proposals (H.Rept. 112-494; S.Rept. 112-172), like most of their predecessors, provide specific funding levels for microfinance, basic education, water and sanitation, womens leadership training, people-to-people reconciliation programs in the Middle East, and other sectors of particular interest to Members of Congress. Should credible information about the relative effectiveness of these programs be made available as a result of improved evaluation practices, Congress can weigh the importance of the data, among other drivers, in establishing aid priorities. Some congressional directives on aid are less likely than others to be affected by evaluation results. The availability of actionable evaluation data may not result in a maximization of aid effectiveness, but may allow Congress to make more deliberate trade-offs between effectiveness and other objectives. Conclusion The primary U.S. agencies charged with implementing foreign assistance have made significant steps in the last two years to address ongoing deficiencies in evaluation practices that make it
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 73 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core difficult to judge whether foreign assistance is achieving its various objectives. There is widespread agreement, reflected in new policies, on the need for consistent performance evaluation of aid programs . The value of rigorous impact evaluation is broadly recognized as well, though the agencies differ in their capabilities and aspirations in this respect. Past policies and evaluation reform efforts, however, have been similarly focused but not sustained in the face of persistent challenges, many of which remain today. Other reforms, such as the establishment of centralized evaluation processes or the creation of an independent evaluation entity, have been proposed in legislation yet not addressed in agency policies. Growing emphasis in Congress and the Administration on results-based budgeting, as well as movement within the international aid donor community toward more rigorous aid evaluation practices, may provide the context for future change. The 113th Congress will have multiple opportunities to influence how U.S. foreign assistance is evaluated through legislative proposals, appropriations, and oversight activities.
Organizations are prioritizing transparency measures ensures that foreign aid is not wasted Shah, USAID administrator, 12
(Rajiv, 3/15/12, The White House blog, Effective Aid Is Transparent and Accountable Aid, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/03/15/effective-aid-transparent-and-accountable-aid, accessed 7/12/13, JZ) For over five decades, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has saved lives and improved human welfare around the world. As a leader in global development, our Agency has amassed a wealth of knowledge that we believe is important to share publicly. By making our data, programs and evaluations easily accessible, were helping to create a global commons that grounds development practice in evidence and shares knowledge to inform significantly new approaches in development. President Obama, Secretary Clinton and I take transparency and accountability in foreign aid seriously, and were working hard to ensure that we effectively communicate our efforts to the American people, our stakeholders and our partners at home and abroad. As we celebrate Sunshine Week, here are just a few examples of USAIDs commitment to implementing the principles of transparency, participation and collaboration that were outlined in the Administrations Open Government Initiative. Foreign Assistance Dashboard: Working with the U.S. Department of State, we launched an easy-touse dashboard that anyone in the world can use to track how American foreign aid dollars are spent. The dashboard doesnt just apply to USAID. Soon, every U.S. Government agency that distributes foreign aid will be incorporated into the Dashboard. Open Government Partnership: Last year, the President and Secretary Clinton launched the Open Government Partnership, a multilateral initiative that secures concrete commitments from countries around the world to promote transparency and fight corruption. The U.S. National Action Plan includes a commitment to making our foreign aid transparent and updating the information on a regular basis. In one recent example of the power of open data and government, USAID launched the FWD campaign to raise awareness across America about the destructive combination of famine, war and drought that led to the recent food crisis in the Horn of Africa. Through interactive maps and tool kits, we are providing people with the latest information about the situation and giving them a powerful way to respond. The campaign represents our efforts across the Agency to strengthen open communication and partnership with a range of partners, including universities, companies and communities of faith. International Aid Transparency Initiative: In November, Secretary Clinton and I travelled to the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, where she announced that the
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 74 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core U.S. had become a signatory to the International Aid Transparency Initiative. This commits us to publish up-to-date data in a common format so that citizens of any country can better track the aid dollars that flow in and out of their countries. Rigorous New Evaluation Policy: Through our ambitious set of reforms called USAID Forward, we have introduced a world-class evaluation policy that the American Evaluation Association called a model for the federal government. Under this policy, we are ensuring performance evaluations are completed for every major project and conducted by independent third parties. By January 2013, we aim to complete 250 high quality evaluations. And we will release the results of all our evaluations within three months of their completion (see our current evaluation showcase). USAIDs Annual Letter: On March 9, USAID released its second annual letter to directly communicate our Agencys work with the millions of Americans who care about our mission overcoming poverty, hunger, illness and injustice around the world. The letter also shares our thinking behind some of the strategic choices we have made to advance Americas key diplomatic and national security priorities. You can print and download a copy of the 2012 annual letter. Freedom of Information Act: As part of our renewed commitment to the principles embodied by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), we implemented an aggressive strategy to process FOIA requests. In just the past fiscal year, weve reduced the Agencys backlog from previous years by 51 percenta rate that far surpasses the annual reduction goal of 10 percent. As you can see, weve made tremendous progress in ensuring that our information, programs and results are easily accessible and transparent. By setting a high standard across the Agency, we can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of our efforts, delivering meaningful results for the American people and the communities we serve.
Aid Reforms Now

USAID reform now Status Quo solving for USAID ineffectiveness means normal means checks prior aid failure Brownstein, National Journal Group, Editorial Director, 6/20/13
(Ronald, , a two-time finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of presidential campaigns, is National Journal Group's Editorial Director, The National Journal, How to Reinvent Foreign Aid, June 20, 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/political-connections/how-to-reinvent-foreign-aid-20130620, accessed July 10, 2013, QDKM) Not long ago, the industrialized world interacted with developing nations mostly through the decisions of heads of state like President Obama and others who gathered for the G-8 meeting of major economies in Northern Ireland this week. The choices those leaders make about foreign aid still have huge ramifications for developing countries. But that money is no longer the principal lever through which the United States and other rich countries affect life in nations across Africa, Asia, and elsewhere that are poised between rising opportunities and enduring challenges. Around the time that President Kennedy signed the 1961 law creating the U.S. Agency for International Development, government-assistance represented about 85 percent of all the capital flowing into the developing world. Today, that aid represents only about one-tenth of the capital entering those countries. The combined total of private business investment, philanthropic initiatives, and money sent home by immigrants now dwarfs the direct government transfers. If the U.S. government can help coordinate and deepen those flows, it could vastly magnify the impact of its own dollars in confronting some of the planet's most intractable problems. With little notice, Rajiv Shah, the dynamic young USAID administrator, is reengineering his agency around that critical insight. Since arriving in late 2009, Shah has broadened USAID's focus from its traditional mission of funding direct services toward a role of catalyzing and leveraging the diverse "constellation" of groupsfrom multinational corporations to globe-spanning nonprofit groups, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundationnow operating in many of the world's neediest places. "We have tried to put in place a new model as so many more actors have gotten involved," Shah says. "There's a new constellation of engagement on these issues that make possible great outcomes." Shah's approach may be most clearly embodied in the open competitions the agency has launched to find fresh ideas for development. These efforts follow the same strategy as the Obama administration's Race to the Top Fund, which leveraged federal education dollars by providing grants to states that proposed the most-inventive reforms. In that spirit, USAID has encouraged innovation by creating "grand challenges" that fund start-up ideas to improve infant mortality, increase literacy, promote clean energy, and fight corruption. The agency's Development Innovation Ventures program extends that idea by funding not only start-ups but also projects intended to reach country-wide size. Three years in, the effort has received more than 3,000 applications and has invested, in venture capital-style, more than $25 million in 60 projects. From the outset, USAID required applicants to show that their ideas could be scaledand could develop sustainable funding sources to replace the government dollars. The results produced initiatives tackling challenges from improving water sanitation to treating children for intestinal worms that have also attracted millions of corporate and philanthropic dollars. The same instinct is evident in the agency's proliferating public-private partnerships, which have ranged from agreements with high-tech companies such as Cisco and Google to improve digital access in Myanmar to an ingenious effort to fight corruption by promoting digital transfers of money in countries such as Afghanistan. This push to partner has peaked in the "New Alliance" for African
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 76 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core agricultural development that Obama introduced at last year's G-8 meeting at Camp David. Under that initiative, six African governments (including Ethiopia, Ghana, and Mozambique), donor countries, and private companies formed partnerships to accelerate private investment in those nations' agricultural development, and ultimately to lift 50 million people from poverty over 10 years. So far, the approach has generated both reforms to local-government policies impeding production (Tanzania, for one, revoked an export ban) and an estimated $3.7 billion in private investment pledges; the first year showed enough promise that three more African nations, led by Nigeria, joined the alliance this month. To Shah, a former chief scientist at the Agriculture Department and senior official at the Gates Foundation, all of these projects extend USAID's reach and allow it to channel investments far beyond those available through its direct aid budget. Unlocking more private resources for development goals, Shah says, "is an absolute game changer." Development groups have generally welcomed this strategy, although not without qualification. Advocates caution that these partnerships require close attention to ensure they serve local communities as much as global companies (for instance, to guarantee that the African agriculture deals protect small farmers). Eric Muoz, senior policy adviser at Oxfam America, says it's also critical that governments don't view private dollars as a substitute for traditional foreign aid, which often meets needs that private investors won't address. "At best, these things can work together," he says, "but, at worst, they can completely contradict each other." Those concerns are valid. But at its most effective, Shah's approach reflects the Bill Clinton-era insight of authors David Osborne and Ted Gaebler that government works best when it seeks to "steer, not row." At a time of Washington stalemate, USAID is recharging by connecting with the undiminished dynamism of American society beyond the Beltway. Not a bad lesson for everyone else in the capital.
Normal Means check the status quo has reforms in place for USAID Fosset. Inter Press Service special correspondent, 4-12-13
(Katelyn, special correspondent to Al Jazeera and IPS, U.S.: Obama's Budget Lays out Transformative Change in USAID, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/obamas-budget-lays-out-transformative-change-inusaid/, accessed 7-9-13, QDKM) Civil society groups here are praising parts of President Barack Obama's newly unveiled budget proposal, saying it appears to build on momentum gathered in recent years toward a robust overhaul of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the country's main foreign aid agency. They point particularly to long-demanded changes to the structuring of the U.S. food aid programme, one of the largest in the world. Under the president's new proposal, released Wednesday, U.S. food assistance would no longer be sourced from U.S. farmers and then sent abroad but would be purchased in local markets. Proponents suggest the changes will save significant money for Washington while simultaneously helping to bolster local markets and economies in crisis-hit regions. Advocates say the food aid changes are in line with a broader reforms process under way at USAID. "Oxfam was very critical of what USAID was doing [in 2008] - we questioned its very existence," Paul O'Brien, vice-president of policy and advocacy at Oxfam America, a humanitarian group, said at a policy discussion here Thursday. "But we think what we're seeing [now] is a quiet renaissance." Over the past half-decade, a new government initiative, known as USAID Forward, has worked to strengthen links between the agency and local institutions and to forge stronger partnerships between the United States and host countries. Supporters point to the development of Country Development
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 77 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core Cooperation Strategies, detailed plans in which the host country lays out goals and unique needs to chart a path forward. "U.S. policy is changing," a new Oxfam report, released Thursday, states, "allowing more U.S. government development officials to work more closely with leaders in developing countries, in government, civil society, and the private sector." In a survey of 257 non-U.S. government officials in recipient countries, the report found that 83 percent saw the United States today as a better donor than it was five years ago. According to the report, "Respondents reported that their interactions with the US have improved, allowing them more opportunities to decide how aid is spent and to work together towards mutuallyshared results." Taking on aid inefficiency While USAID Forward began as a direct response to criticisms spurred by the dwindling reputation and alleged mishandling of USAID programmes during the first decade of the 2000s, President Obama's new budget proposal - which has not yet been approved by Congress - seems to draw on these successes in moving towards a more full-scale modernisation of the country's foreign assistance model. The budget request spotlights sweeping changes to food assistance in particular, allocating 1.6 billion dollars for the Feed the Future initiative to combat chronic food insecurity and 2.65 billion dollars to the USAID Global Health Programmes. It would also shift 1.8 billion dollars from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to the State Department, using funds currently allocated for a process known as "monetisation" to instead go toward disaster- and crisis-related food assistance accounts. Monetisation is the term given to the process by which Washington has traditionally given U.S.-grown grains to local organisations, which can then sell them for cash. Critics say this process is notably inefficient, a finding corroborated by a 2011 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the U.S. Congress's main investigative arm. "The president's 2014 budget includes reforms to food aid that will enable us to feed an estimated four million more hungry children every year with the same resources," Rajiv Shah, the head of USAID, said in a major address Wednesday. That optimism has been mirrored by NGOs and aid modernisation advocates. "We are encouraged by the administration's proposal, and believe that if it is implemented correctly and authorised by Congress that it could meet the principles that NGOs have called for," Mark Lotwis, senior director of public policy at InterAction, a coalition of U.S.-based NGOs, told IPS. "[Those calls] include keeping the core focus of food assistance on those who have acute hunger needs, increasing the number of people who are helped, and providing the administration with flexibility to meet the needs of people in the field." Some key food assistance changes in Obama's budget request include the use of cash vouchers that broaden the reach of food assistance in disaster areas and the end of inefficient "monetisation". This process, known for returning little more than half of invested funding, has become synonymous in the NGO community with inefficiency. "The truth is that for years our practice in food assistance has lagged behind our knowledge," Shah said Wednesday. "In the last decade, more than 30 different studies a have revealed the inefficiencies of the current system."
AT No Reform Coming
Reforms coming now: bipartisan support guarantees passage Publish What You Fund 7-11-13
(A Global Campaign for Aid Transparency, New bill aims to open American aid spending http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/updates/news/new-bill-could-open-american-aid-spending/ accessed 7-14-13 KR) A bipartisan bill which aims to ensure American tax dollars do a better job of helping fight global poverty was put before Congress yesterday. The Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act 2013 was introduced by Representatives Judge Ted Poe (R-TX) and Gerry Connolly (D-VA) and its companion bill in the Senate was introduced by Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Ben Cardin (D-MD). US aid efforts are spread across at least 22 different agencies, and while some US government agencies, like the MCC, have been taking bold steps to make aid more effective and accountable. The bill would ensure that all US foreign assistance is evaluated for how well it serves its purpose.But in order to make American aid truly transparent, all agencies must now deliver on the Administrations commitment to publish to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). It is too hard for American taxpayers and people in recipient countries to see where aid dollars are going and how well they are being spent. Greater aid transparency and accountability for results helps people in developing countries do more to lead their own development, and use US help more effectively to solve poverty challenges.
Reform coming now, this a is nonpartisan issue, solves all their impacts Marchal, Oxfam Americas Aid Effectiveness Team Partnership Advisor, 7-10-13
(Mary, Oxfam, Did you say there was an agreement about something in Washington? http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2013/07/10/did-you-say-there-was-agreement-aboutsomething-in-washington/ accessed 7-14-13 KR) The US gives a lot of money in foreign aid, though not as much as the average Americans think we do. And there isnt enough that is devoted to poverty relief. The issue is not about whether or not the US should be giving aid. (Check these out if youre not yet convinced: Another Great American Tradition: Foreign Aid from Catholic Relief Services CEO, Carolyn Woo, in the Baltimore Sun, or the recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on private sector interests in supporting economic development abroad, or Sen. Graham Urges Religious Groups to Rally Support for Foreign Aid to Combat AIDS from the Christian Post.) The fact is, money is coming from the US for the purpose of helping people fight poverty in other countries, and there are ways we could be doing it better. Thats what this legislation does. The bill would require the US government to: (1) provide more information about how much, what, and where our foreign aid dollars go, as well as (2) strengthen processes to track and evaluate the projects and programs towards which those dollars go. Sound familiar? A similar bill was introduced during the last session of Congress. Whats most exciting this time around is that there seems to be bipartisan and cross-agency agreement that more transparency and better monitoring of US foreign aid is the right thing to do. This may be one thing that Congress, the White House, and USAID can agree on. The Administration has already taken steps to increase information available about US foreign assistance investments, from the launch of the Foreign Assistance Dashboard to the co-founding of the Open Government Partnership. In November 2011 the US became a signatory to the
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 79 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). In May the President issued an executive order on open data and we saw aid data from the US Treasury Department and Department of Defense added to foreignassistance.gov. Big changes at USAID over the past four years include a new evaluation policy to improve monitoring and evaluation, and the reintroduction of Country Development Cooperation Strategies, which are detailed in-country plans that must be made publicly available within two months of finalization. The impacts of these changes are starting to show. You can see how in USAID Forward Progress Report released in March and in the impressive improvement of the US ranking among other international donors. The US jumped from the bottom 36% of most transparent international donors in 2011 to the top 37% in just one year , though some at Oxfam still worry about Raj Shahs commitment to transparency. Oxfams favorite part is that people who live and work in developing countriesthose that US foreign assistance is designed to supportthink this is a good idea too. During the Obama familys recent visit to Africa, we heard this loud and clear from colleagues in Tanzania and South Africa. This is nothing new, we hear all the time from partners outside of the US that they simply need more information about how much, when, and for what US aid is coming into their country. This is not only necessary for planning, but also helps advocates to hold their own government accountable and fight corruption. As Semkae Kilonzo, Coordinator of the Policy Forum in Tanzania, told me last year, From the civil society perspective, what is crucial more than anything else is transparency of budget information, including its timeliness, relevance and usefulness. The donors should be transparent about what it is that they have given the Tanzanian government and for what purpose, so that people in communities like ours can track the money. Back on Capitol Hill, in addition to the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2013, last month a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders sent a letter to the White House calling on the administration to ramp up progress on foreign aid transparency efforts. So if Semkae Kilonzo, USAID, the White House, and Congressional Republicans all agree lets lock it in.
AT Aid Benefits Not Measurable

Reforms enhancing accountability and verifying effectiveness of aid
Foreign Policy Initiative 2-25-13 (Analysis: Foreign Aid Advances U.S. Security, Prosperity, And Global Leadership, 2-252013, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-analysis-foreign-aid-advances-us-securityprosperity-and-global-leadership, accessed 7-913, QDKM)
Make no mistake: the goal of results-driven foreign assistance is to help Americas partners become self-reliant. Towards that end, the United States is working to provide foreign aid in ways that are more transparent, accountable, and more effective. While it is true that certain
development programs faced challenges in the past, over the last decade Washington has increasingly embraced newand arguably revolutionaryapproaches to foreign aid reform.
Today, new and innovative programs are using measurable and verifiable metrics to ensure development funds are received and effectively used by the projects and people they were intended to assist.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) provides a powerful example of an innovative approach to foreign assistance. Established under the Bush administration in 2004, the MCC only forms partnerships with nations that objectively meet 20 critical criteria and standards, broadly grouped into three categories: commitment to good governance, economic freedom, and investments in their citizens. Moreover, MCC posts all assessment reports, program expenditures, and selection criterions online, with the explicit aim of maximizing public scrutiny and program understanding. The MCCs focus on results and accountability not only encourages partner countries to take ownership of projects, but also to work with the United States to achieve mutually beneficial, long-lasting development goals.
Successful transparency and accountability efforts can still be expanded across all foreign assistance programs. Legislation such as the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of
2012 (H.R. 3159), originally introduced by Congressman Ted Poe (R-TX) and later passed by the House of Representatives in December 2012, would expand innovative performance metrics
and evaluations to all U.S. foreign assistance programs.
Still, some politicians continue to opportunistically target these programs for deep reductions or outright elimination, with seemingly little regard for the consequences of their proposals.
Eliminating foreign assistance to troubled statessuch as Egypt, Libya, and Pakistanwould be counterproductive and would cripple Americas ability to shape and influence the choices of these emerging governments. Our assistance to these countries should be packaged in order to promote a successful transition to democracy and build appropriate capabilities, but we should not undermine our own influence by turning away from these relationships. Nor would eliminating foreign assistance solve Americas fiscal imbalances. Rather, it would severely restrict Americas ability to respond to global security challenges and events. As Senator
Marco Rubio (R-FL) said at the Foreign Policy Initiatives 2011 Forum in Washington, D.C.: theres this urban legend out there that somehow, if we just eliminated foreign aid, wed have all the money we need to wipe out our debt. Foreign aid is very small. Its a significant number of dollars, no doubt about it, and one dollar of waste is too much. But if you wiped out
all the foreign aid in the world, you wouldnt notice it in terms of the debt conversation. It is no wonder Americas national security leaders have urged the Executive Branch and Congress to find a way forward to rein in the federal deficit without undermining statecraft tools like
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 81 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core development. Of note, even though Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta is responsible for
Americas military, he nevertheless made it a point to defend foreign assistance during a February 2012 hearing before the House Budget Committee: Strong national security is dependent on having a strong diplomatic arm, a strong development arm, a strong intelligence arm, a strong capability to try to have strong economies in the world. I mean, all of this is related to our national security. And I think if any one of these areas suffers cuts above and beyond others its going to damage our security just by virtue of the kind of broad approach we need to have to beto maintain the leadership position we have in the world. Conclusion No nation can solve all the problems of the world. But a nation that believes human dignity is universalthat affirms that all men and women are created equalwill do what it can. In the U.S., foreign humanitarian assistance, including AIDS relief, represents less than 1% of our federal budget. It is not the cause of our fiscal problems. Reducing our commitment would only succeed in increasing the sum of suffering.... There is no effective way to oppose the enemies of freedom without also opposing the shared enemies of humankinddisease and poverty.
President George W. Bush Over the past decade, the United States has ushered in a new era of foreign assistance. With the
creation of innovative and more effective programs like the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the United States is taking strides to make foreign assistance more transparent, accountable, and effective. As a result, civilian foreign assistance programs are playing a renewed and revitalized
role in advancing the nations security, prosperity, and global leadership.
While U.S. lawmakers must examine every dollar spent by the federal government to ensure that it is used judiciously and well, and begin to make the tough political decisions necessary for fixing our fiscal woes, they should recognize that the returns from the nations foreign assistance programs are far more than their costs.
AT Lacks Transparency
Status quo reform will solve all of the impacts transparency Rusu Policy and Campaigns Media Menager 7-10-13
(Laura, Oxfam, Congress Seeks to Open the Books on Foreign Aid http://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/pressreleases/congress-seeks-to-open-the-books-on-foreign-aid, accessed 7-14-13 KR) Washington, DC International relief and development organization Oxfam America praised the introduction of the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2013 introduced by Representatives Judge Ted Poe (R-TX) and Gerry Connolly (D-VA) and its companion bill in the Senate introduced by Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Ben Cardin (D-MD). Oxfam America urged members of Congress to quickly pass the bipartisan bill, which will ensure American tax dollars do a better job of helping fight global poverty. Transparency is the lowest hanging fruit on the aid reform tree, said Gregory Adams, Oxfam Americas director of aid effectiveness. While the US government has this data, and American taxpayers and people in poor countries need it, President Obama has yet to release it. This legislation will hold the Administrations feet to the fire, so that they follow through on the Presidents promise to open the books on US foreign aid. Under current law, it is too hard for American taxpayers and people in recipient countries to see where aid dollars are going and how well they are being spent. Global poverty is a challenge to Americas national interest and values; yet the US government is only one piece of the puzzle. Greater transparency and accountability for results helps people in developing countries do more to lead their own development, and use US help more effectively to solve poverty challenges. The Obama Administration and USAID under Raj Shah have been leaders in making aid more transparent and accountable, said Adams. The Administrations Foreign Assistance Dashboard, for example, is a real breakthrough for transparency; likewise, USAIDs cutting-edge Monitoring & Evaluation policy promises to make US aid dollars deliver better results. But promises of real numbers in other agencies have not been delivered on. US aid efforts are Balkanized across at least 22 different agencies, and while some US government agencies, like the MCC and USAID, have been taking bold steps to make aid more effective and accountable, shockingly little data is currently available. Agencies like the State Department and Pentagon rank 46th and 56th on the leading international ranking of donor transparency, leaving huge information gaps that breed confusion and distrust. In these times of fiscal constraints, we must ensure that every cent of taxpayer dollars spent on foreign aid is delivering results in the fight against global poverty, continued Adams. Publicly available public information on how taxpayer dollars are being spent is key to making sure American generosity leads to real results for America and the worlds poor. The bill as written would rightly ensure that all US foreign assistance is evaluated for how well it serves its purpose. Oxfam feels that efforts to exempt any particular category of assistance from monitoring and evaluation will make that assistance less accountable to American taxpayers and recipient countries. Oxfam urges Congress to protect the principle that this bill applies to all foreign assistance, regardless of source or purpose. It took great bipartisan effort to move this bill forward and we hope it sets a constructive precedent for further reform, said Adams. When people in developing countries know what the US is doing in their communities, they can take action themselves to amplify the results. And when the US government has better information and tools for measuring the impact of our programs, we can help make sure they are delivering better results for America and our partners.
AT Lacks Local Management

Reforms already happened Internal complications are being solved Oxfam 12
(international confederation of a movement for change, and a future free form injustice and poverty, 5-712, Oxfam, Reforms put foreign aid to work fighting corruption and waste http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/reforms-put-foreign-aid-to-work-fighting-corruption-andwaste accessed 7-14-13, KR) USAID is changing the way it implements US foreign aid programs to put local actors in the drivers seat. Called Implementation and Procurement Reform, or IPR, this effort will invest more money directly by partnering with country governments, local businesses, and local organizations. The effort is designed to help countries deliver for their own people, and help people hold their governments accountable. The agency plans to spend 30% of its funds through local actors, whether theyre local nonprofits, businesses, or governments, by 2015 (up from 11% in 2011). USAID officials say they are moving cautiously but deliberately to change their practices. After assessing public financial management systems to manage for risks, USAID will boost its funding through host country systems to reach 25 country governments directly; they will cut out the middleman by hiring 576 local nonprofits directly instead of spending through contractors. Thus far, USAID has finished risk assessments to evaluate public financial management systems in Liberia, Rwanda, Uganda, and elsewhere; USAID is training their officials on how to better engage local organizations to help them build their competencies and compete for US assistance.1
AT Aid Bad Args
AT Corruption/Waste
The past few years have been dedicated to reform status quo solves issues like corruption, wasteful spending, and policy Ingram, Brookings Global Economy and Development Program Senior Fellow 7-102013
(George, Brookings, The Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act: A Nonpartisan Bill that Upholds the Core Principles of Good Government http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/upfront/posts/2013/07/10-foreign-aid-transparency-accountability-act-ingram, accessed 7-12-13, KR) The U.S. government has for the past 10 years, over two administrations, been on a deliberate path to improving the accountability and transparency of U.S. assistance. The take-off was in 2003 with the Bush administrations creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), with accountability and transparency embedded in its DNA public availability of information and data on the criteria for country eligibility, its analytic methodologies, and evaluations; focus on results; and consultation with stakeholders and experts on policy issues. The Obama administration has sought to integrate these two principles throughout its assistance programs. Transparency and accountability are prominent in the first-ever Presidential Policy Directive on Development, which sets forth the Administrations approach to development. It has restored to USAID its former practice of conducting evaluation of its programs, this time emphasizing that evaluations be rigorous, independent, and a source for learning. It also has begun to shore up USAIDs capability and responsibility in policy, planning, and budgeting so it can now be held accountable for its programs and results. It has created on-line the Foreign Assistance Dashboard to which all agencies are to post data and information on their foreign assistance programs. It committed to and has made an initial data posting to the registry of the International Aid Transparency Initiative. Leaders of both USAID and MCC have spoken to the need to be held accountable. MCC has made public its first project impact evaluations and USAID has released a series of evaluations and an accounting of the first-year progress on its suite of internal reforms called USAID Forward. Why accountability and transparency? Accountability is critical to ensuring that public policy and decisions are consistent with the national interests and reflect the commitments that public officials have made to their citizens. Transparency is correctly acknowledged for its disinfectant effect corruption does not flourish in sunlight. Beyond that, it contributes to better informed government policy, makes citizens better informed by providing them a window inside their government processes and policies, builds ownership and support for government policies and action, and has in certain instances (e.g., GPS methodology and data) made available data and other information that has been a boon to the private sector and citizens generally.
AT Corruption Bad
Positive corruption promotes economic growth Moyo, international economist with a PhD in Economics from Oxford, 9
(Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way For Africa, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ganapati/6838/02_15_10_Moyo.pdf, p. 56, Accessed 7-10-13, RRR) Corruption: Positive or Negative Maybe it wouldn't be so bad if African leaders, like some of their Asian counterparts, reinvested stolen money domestically, instead of squirrelling it away in foreign bank accounts. This notion of positive corruption goes a long way to explaining why many Asian countries, perceived to have high levels of corruption (in some cases, such as Indonesia, exceeding those of Africa), nevertheless post enviable levels of economic growth. For example, despite ranking just 3.5 out of 10 on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (2007), China continues to attract the greatest amount of foreign direct investment (US$78 billion in 2006, according to the IMF's International Financial Statistics), which undoubtedly has contributed to its stellar growth. Similarly, although in the 1980s Thailand registered a strong economic performance, in the same decade it was ranked the most corrupt country in the world.
Alleviates Suffering
Foreign aid is good- it is a tool to alleviate the suffering of millions, proven by Africas revival Gates, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, co-chair, 12
(Bill, billionaire philanthropist, New York Times, Op-ed Contributor, The Truth About Foreign Aid, January 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/opinion/the-truth-about-foreign-aid.html?_r=0, accessed July 10, 2013, QDKM) Last week, Oxfam and Save the Children released a report saying that emergency relief in the Horn of Africa came months late, costing thousands of lives and millions of dollars. Oxfam and Save the Children conclude that humanitarian assistance should be done differently. The anti-foreign aid establishment is using the report to argue that aid doesnt work and should be cut across the board. The very fact that $2.1 billion has been donated to help the victims of the famine is a testament to human beings generosity. But that fact of our generosity also explains why I am so frustrated by the increasing opposition in many rich countries to foreign aid. We know people care about the suffering of others. Not only that. They are willing to express their caring by making significant donations, even in very hard times. So what keeps them from supporting government investments to alleviate extreme suffering? According to public opinion research, many people believe aid is either stolen by corrupt leaders or wasted on ineffective programs. Naturally, no one is eager to make investments theyre convinced wont pay off. There is also the argument that aid doesnt work even when it gets to its intended recipients. This claim is not convincing either. In the past 50 years, the number of children who die every year has gone down from 20 million to fewer than 8 million. Meanwhile, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty has declined by more than half. These massive improvements are due in large part to aid-funded programs to buy vaccines and boost farmers productivity. I am confident that we can get the price of AIDS drugs down to $300 per person per year in the very near future. That will mean that every $300 a country gives to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and malaria represents a person who will stay alive for another year. Every $300 thats not forthcoming represents a human being who will almost certainly die. That is a stark but realistic way to think about the choices were making when we debate aid budgets. My hope is that we can convert some of the generosity that goes into humanitarian relief into stronger support for foreign aid programs. Many of those suffering in the Horn of Africa were going hungry before there was a recognized emergency in the region. In fact, more than 1 billion people in the world dont have enough food to eat. One of the most powerful solutions to this problem is to help poor farmers get more out of their tiny plots of land. In parts of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa especially, farmers plant low-yielding seeds, climate change is starting to shrink their harvests, and plant diseases are invading their fields. New seeds and other tools can help farmers cope with these challenges. For example, my foundation helped fund the development of a variety of rice that can survive flooding and will feed an extra 30 million people every year in Bangladesh and India. That additional rice will not only prevent starvation but also help farmers earn more so they can take sick children to the doctor and pay school fees. The question is, how do we continue to do the research needed to develop these new tools? Poor countries are investing more in their own agricultural sectors, but they dont have the resources to lead on R&D. Aid is a key piece of the puzzle, and right now the entire research budget of the group
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 89 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core responsible for agricultural science for the poorest is just $300 million per year. Its a shame to see such a high-leverage opportunity generate such ambivalence. I am proud to live in a world where a strangers suffering matters. Yet foreign aid, the best way to address that suffering, has a growing legion of critics. That is a contradiction we must remedy, and the best way to do it is to tell the truth about aid.
Aid is needed now- in the past 15 years our aid to the world has helped more than anything, we need to keep it up Gates, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 1-25-13
(Bill, the co-founder of Microsoft, philanthropist, Wall Street Journal-The Saturday Essay, 1/25/13, 8:12 p.m. ET, My Plan to Fix The World's Biggest Problems, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323539804578261780648285770.html, accessed 7/9/13, QDKM) Another place where measurement is starting to lead to vast improvements is in education. In October, Melinda and I sat among two dozen 12th-graders at Eagle Valley High School near Vail, Colo. Mary Ann Stavney, a language-arts teacher, was leading a lesson on how to write narrative nonfiction pieces. She engaged her students, walking among them and eliciting great participation. We could see why Mary Ann is a master teacher, a distinction given to the school's best teachers and an important component of a teacher-evaluation system in Eagle County. Ms. Stavney's work as a master teacher is informed by a three-year project our foundation funded to better understand how to build an evaluation and feedback system for educators. Drawing input from 3,000 classroom teachers, the project highlighted several measures that schools should use to assess teacher performance, including test data, student surveys and assessments by trained evaluators. Over the course of a school year, each of Eagle County's 470 teachers is evaluated three times and is observed in class at least nine times by master teachers, their principal and peers called mentor teachers. The Eagle County evaluations are used to give a teacher not only a score but also specific feedback on areas to improve and ways to build on their strengths. In addition to one-on-one coaching, mentors and masters lead weekly group meetings in which teachers collaborate to spread their skills. Teachers are eligible for annual salary increases and bonuses based on the classroom observations and student achievement. The program faces challenges from tightening budgets, but Eagle County so far has been able to keep its evaluation and support system intactlikely one reason why student test scores have improved in Eagle County over the past five years. I think the most critical change we can make in U.S. K12 education, with America lagging countries in Asia and Northern Europe when it comes to turning out top students, is to create teacher-feedback systems that are properly funded, high quality and trusted by teachers.
And there are plenty of other areas where our ability to measure can improve people's lives in powerful waysareas where we are falling short, unnecessarily.
In poor countries, we still need better ways to measure the effectiveness of the many government workers providing health services. They are the crucial link bringing tools such as vaccines and education to the people who need them most. How well trained are they? Are they showing up to work? How can measurement enable them to perform their jobs better?
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 90 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core In the U.S., we should be measuring the value being added by colleges. Currently, college rankings are focused on inputsthe scores and quality of students entering collegeand on judgments and prejudices about a school's "reputation." Students would be better served by measures of
which colleges were best preparing their graduates for the job market. They then could know where they would get the most for their tuition money.
In agriculture, creating a global productivity target would help countries focus on a key but neglected area: the efficiency and output of hundreds of millions of small farmers who live in poverty. It would go a long way toward reducing poverty if we had public scorecards showing
how developing-country governments, donors and others are helping those farmers. And if I could wave a wand, I'd love to have a way to measure how exposure to risks like disease, infection, malnutrition and problem pregnancies impact children's potentialtheir ability to learn and contribute to society. Measuring that could help us quantify the broader impact of those risks and help us tackle them.
The lives of the poorest have improved more rapidly in the past 15 years than ever before. And I am optimistic that we will do even better in the next 15 years. The process I have describedsetting clear goals, choosing an approach, measuring results, and then using those measurements to continually refine our approachhelps us to deliver tools and services to everybody who will benefit, be they students in the U.S. or mothers in Africa. Following the path of the steam engine
long ago, thanks to measurement, progress isn't "doomed to be rare and erratic." We can, in fact, make it commonplace.
Microfinance Counterplan Answers
No Solvency Scale
Microfinancing works on small scales, but fails on a large scale like affirmative- Had ZERO effect on infrastructure or institutions Morris, Tuft Fletcher School and writer at Verbal Vanguard, 11
(Aaron, 8-11-11, Building Markers Blogs, Has Microfinance failed? Evaluating the current state of microfinance http://buildingmarkets.org/blogs/blog/2011/08/11/has-microfinance-failed-evaluating-thecurrent-state-of-microfinance/ accessed 7-13-13 KR) A rose by any other name Microfinance is a form of finance, and at the heart of finance lies risk management. To mitigate risk, MFIs must understand the markets in which they operate and make decisions based on sound analysis. The fact that terms like due diligence and reporting are only now beginning to make their way into the microfinance parlance suggests that the thousands of MFIs created during the heyday of microfinance were not well attuned to this reality. Like everyone, the poor benefit from access to financial services, including loans, but this does not give MFIs or policymakers free license to distribute such services without careful consideration of underlying market and borrower risk. As is the case in the developed world, financial services can just as easily function as a catalyst for economic expansion or serve as a harbinger of greed and destruction if managed irresponsibly. (Just ask Lehman Brothers.) Microfinance is neither inherently good nor bad. It is simply a tool. The ever-elusive dual bottom line The original allure of microfinance was not simply that it alleviated poverty, but that it did so using an efficient and sustainable market-based approach. Microfinance was said to deliver a dual bottom line: social return (help the world) and financial return (profit). In recent years, this social component has been the source of considerable debate. Over-indebtedness is quickly becoming a large problem in the developing world. Not only do many MFIs charge irresponsibly high interest rates, but the widespread proliferation of MFIs in recent years has provided the poor with the ability to overextend themselves by borrowing from multiple MFIs at the same time. Additionally, not all poor people are entrepreneurs, and failed or failing business ventures generate significant additional financial burden as borrowers attempt to pay off unproductive loans. The promise of microfinance is financial independence and improved livelihoods, yet too often microloans lead to deepening financial dependencies and decreased income. Moreover, because these loans are targeted so low on the economic pyramid, there is little opportunity for microfinance to efficiently generate macro-level economic growth. Even in the most successful of scenarios, microfinance creates income opportunities one person at a time, having little impact on infrastructure, institutions, or the capacity of the private sector as a whole.
No Solvency Reform/Development
Microfinances fail- even in developing countries. Only benefit people willing to take the risk on the loans and often make poverty worse for those looking for relief Karnani, University of Michigan Ross School of Business Strategy professor, 7
(Aneel, Summer, Stanford Social Innovation Review, Microfinance Misses its Mark http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/microfinance_misses_its_mark accessed 7-13-13 KR) Despite the hoopla surrounding microcredit, few have studied its impact.10 One of the most comprehensive studies reaches a surprising conclusion: Microloans are more beneficial to borrowers living above the poverty line than to borrowers living below the poverty line.11 This is because clients with more income are willing to take the risks, such as investing in new technologies, that will most likely increase income flows. Poor borrowers, on the other hand, tend to take out conservative loans that protect their subsistence, and rarely invest in new technology, fixed capital, or the hiring of labor. Microloans sometimes even reduce cash flow to the poorest of the poor, observes Vijay Mahajan, the chief executive of Basix, an Indian rural finance institution. He concludes that microcredit seems to do more harm than good to the poorest.12 One reason could be the high interest rates charged by microcredit organizations. Acleda, a Cambodian commercial bank specializing in microcredit, charges interest rates of about 2 percent to 4.5 percent each month. Some other microlenders charge more, pushing most annual rates to between 30 percent and 60 percent.13 Microcredit proponents argue that these rates, although high, are still well below those charged by informal moneylenders. But if poor clients cannot earn a greater return on their investment than the interest they must pay, they will become poorer as a result of microcredit, not wealthier. Another problem with microcredit is the businesses it is intended to fund. A microcredit client is an entrepreneur in the literal sense: She raises the capital, manages the business, and takes home the earnings. But the entrepreneurs who have become heroes in the developed world are usually visionaries who convert new ideas into successful business models. Although some microcredit clients have created visionary businesses, the vast majority are caught in subsistence activities. They usually have no specialized skills, and so must compete with all the other self-employed poor people in entry-level trades.14 Most have no paid staff, own few assets, and operate at too small a scale to achieve efficiencies, and so make very meager earnings. In other words, most microenterprises are small and many fail contrary to the United Nations hype that microentrepreneurs will grow thriving businesses that lead to flourishing economies. This should not be too surprising. Most people do not have the skills, vision, creativity, and persistence to be entrepreneurial . Even in developed countries with high levels of education and access to financial services, about 90 percent of the labor force is employees, not entrepreneurs.15 The reality of microcredit is less attractive than the promise.16 Even a stalwart proponent of neoliberal policies like The Economist is beginning to conclude that the few studies that have been done suggest that small loans are beneficial, but not dramatically so.17 Jobs, Not Microcredit Microcredit is certainly a noble idea and a genuine innovation that has provided some positive impact to its clients, particularly to womens noneconomic empowerment. It also helps the poor during cyclical or unexpected crises, and thus reduces their vulnerability.18 But the critical issue is whether microcredit helps eradicate poverty. And on that front, it falls short.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 94 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core China, Vietnam, and South Korea have significantly reduced poverty in recent years with little microfinance activity. On the other hand, Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Indonesia havent been as successful at reducing poverty despite the influx of microcredit. The fact is, most microcredit clients are not microentrepreneurs by choice. They would gladly take a factory job at reasonable wages if it were available. We should not romanticize the idea of the poor as entrepreneurs. The International Labour Organization (ILO) uses a more appropriate term for these people: own-account workers. Creating opportunities for steady employment at reasonable wages is the best way to take people out of poverty. Nothing is more fundamental to poverty reduction than employment, states the ILO. And the United Nations Development Programme agrees: Employment is a key link between economic growth and poverty reduction. Productive and remunerative employment can help ensure that poor people share in the benefits of economic growth.
Micro financing fails- cant solve the problems of the borrowers Karlan, Yale Economics professor, 11
(Dean, 6-19-11, Freakonommics, What Percentage of Microfinancing Loans Actually Go to Business Investment http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/09/19/what-percentage-of-microfinance-loans-actuallygo-to-business-investment/ accessed 7-13-13 KR) In a paper, forthcoming in the Journal of Development Economics, Jonathan Zinman and I apply this approach to the question of how the poor spend their microfinance loans. Now, to be clear, we are not for a moment passing a value judgment on how people use their loans, or comparing sneaky borrower behavior to racism or crime. But we do expect from other research that whilst borrowers are heavily encouraged or even required to spend their loan on business investment, often they just want to use it for everyday expenses. So what we did was this: We asked clients in Group A how many of these three statements apply to them: I used part of my Arariwa loan to buy merchandise for my economic activity. I used part of my Arariwa loan to buy equipment for my economic activity. I shared my loan with another person. Clients in Group B received these three statements with one additional statement: I used at least a quarter of my Arariwa loan on household items, such as food, a TV, a radio, etc. Given that we expect the number of answers to the first three statements to be the same on average in both populations, we can do a simple comparison of means to figure out how many people in group B said yes to that final statement. So we did this with a few variations of questions, and we also asked people these questions individually and directly on a separate occasion, so we can compare the list randomization method with a regular survey. When asked directly, less than 10% of people admitted to spending their loan on household expenses, health, or education. Using the list randomization, this number jumped to between 30% and 20%. Clearly borrowers feel a need to pretend to their loan officers, and even independent surveyors, that they are spending more of their loan on business investment than they actually are. Research from other studies increasingly suggests that actually microfinance loans do not have that huge an impact on business productivity anyway, and that much of their benefit is to help smooth out unpredictable income for day-to-day spending. Microloans can have a positive impact even without new business investment or dynamic entrepreneurism. Entrepreneurism is sexy in America. In developing countries, for most, it is synonymous with I dont have a job.
No Solvency Defaults
Micro-loans fail people will default Cohen, Rutgers history professor, 10 10 (Ed, 12-1-10, Too much microfinance can be a bad thing, expert says, Accessed 713-13, RRR)
One of the lessons of the first 30 years of microfinance is that too much credit is bad for everyone, including poor people, a microfinance expert says. Someone once put it that microfinance is like good food, consultant Gretel Figueroa-Guzmn told a meeting of Notre Dames Net Impact MBA Club on Dec. 1, 2010. The second you get to the table you really want to eat. But then you have a chance to overindulge. Figueroa-Guzmn was talking about two recent crises in the microfinance world one in Nicaragua starting in 2009, the other more recently in India. In both cases, the rapid growth of microfinance institutions and overheated lending practices led to economic turmoil. Microfinance involves making very small loans smaller than offered by traditional banks to poor people, often in developing countries. Their clients are usually household-based entrepreneurs involved in simple ventures such as street vending. The microfinance movement began in the late-1970s through the efforts of advocates such as Bangladeshi economist Muhammad Yunus, winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. As of December 2007 there were 3,552 microfinance institutions worldwide serving nearly 155 million borrowers, said Figueroa-Guzmn, formerly a relationship manager for Womens World Banking, a microfinance network based in New York City. The consultant, who now lives in Granger, Ind., near South Bend, told the MBA students how microfinance institutions operate and how access to basic financial services including a safe place to deposit cash has improved lives in impoverished communities. But crises periodically develop. Nicaragua, one of the poorest countries in Central America, had the regions largest number of microfinance institutions in 200 , she said. Lenders there served a combined 450,000 clients and had $400 million in portfolio, she said. But an influx of charitable aid coupled with explosive growth in micro-lending led to huge numbers of borrowers becoming overly indebted, she said. People refused to pay back loans and began to blockade roads and burn tires in protest. The government supported this popular movement, at one point considering a law to extend repayment terms by 10 years. This was with an average loan being $140, said Figueroa-Guzmn. It was just getting out of control. As default rates skyrocketed, funders of Nicaraguas micro-lenders pulled out of the country, and many lenders, including the largest, crumbled, she said. Micro-entrepreneurs were left without money to run their businesses.
No Solvency Loan Sharking

Microfinancing in Mexico has turned into loan sharking, gutting solvency MacFarquhar, New York Times United Nations bureau chief, 10
(Neil, 4-13, New York Times, Banks Making Big Profits From Tiny Loans, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/14/world/14microfinance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, Accessed 7-1313, RRR) But the phenomenon has grown so popular that some of its biggest proponents are now wringing their hands over the direction it has taken. Drawn by the prospect of hefty profits from even the smallest of loans, a raft of banks and financial institutions now dominate the field, with some charging interest rates of 100 percent or more. We created microcredit to fight the loan sharks; we didnt create microcredit to encourage new loan sharks, Mr. Yunus recently said at a gathering of financial officials at the United Nations. Microcredit should be seen as an opportunity to help people get out of poverty in a business way, but not as an opportunity to make money out of poor people. The fracas over preserving the fields saintly aura centers on the question of how much interest and profit is acceptable, and what constitutes exploitation. The noisy interest rate fight has even attracted Congressional scrutiny, with the House Financial Services Committee holding hearings this year focused in part on whether some microcredit institutions are scamming the poor. Rates vary widely across the globe, but the ones that draw the most concern tend to occur in countries like Nigeria and Mexico, where the demand for small loans from a large population cannot be met by existing lenders. Unlike virtually every Web page trumpeting the accomplishments of microcredit institutions around the world, the page for Te Creemos, a Mexican lender, lacks even one testimonial from a thriving customer no beaming woman earning her first income by growing a soap business out of her kitchen, for example. Te Creemos has some of the highest interest rates and fees in the world of microfinance, analysts say, a whopping 125 percent average annual rate. The average in Mexico itself is around 70 percent, compared with a global average of about 37 percent in interest and fees, analysts say. Mexican microfinance institutions charge such high rates simply because they can get away with it, said Emmanuelle Javoy, the managing director of Planet Rating, an independent Paris-based firm that evaluates microlenders. They could do better; they could do a lot better, she said. If the ones that are very big and have the margins dont set the pace, then the rest of the market follows. Manuel Ramrez, director of risk and internal control at Te Creemos, reached by telephone in Mexico City, initially said there had been some unspecified misunderstanding about the numbers and asked for more time to clarify, but then stopped responding. Unwitting individuals, who can make loans of $20 or more through Web sites like Kiva or Microplace, may also end up participating in practices some consider exploitative. These Web sites admit that they cannot guarantee every interest rate they quote. Indeed, the real rate can prove to be markedly higher.
No Solvency Corruption
Microfinances fail to solve for the corruption just because someone has money doesnt mean they can use it to get water if their corrupt government doesnt sanitize the water in the first place Karnani, University of Michigan Ross School of Business Strategy professor, 7
(Aneel, Summer, Stanford Social Innovation Review, Microfinance Misses its Mark http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/microfinance_misses_its_mark accessed 7-13-13 KR) The States Responsibilities Poverty alleviation cannot be defined only in economic terms; it is also about addressing a much broader set of needs. Amartya Sen, the Nobel Prize-winning economist, eloquently argues that development can be seen as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy.22 Social, cultural, and political freedoms are desirable in and of themselves, and they also enable individual income growth. Services such as public safety, basic education, public health, and infrastructure nurture these freedoms and increase the productivity and employability of the poor, and thus their income and well-being. The governments of all developing countries claim to accept responsibility for these functions. Yet they have failed dismally to deliver on their promises. Consider the case of India: The economy is growing rapidly, the stock market is at an all-time high, Indian companies are expanding abroad, and a large middle class is emerging. It is, for many, the best of times. Contrast this image with that of another India, where 79 percent of the population still lives on less than $2 per day, 39 percent of adults are illiterate, 31 percent of rural households and 9 percent of urban households do not have safe drinking water, 81 percent of rural households and 19 percent of urban households do not have a toilet, 10 percent of boys and 25 percent of girls do not attend primary school, 49 percent of children are underweight, 9 percent of children die in the first five years of their lives, and 400,000 children die of diarrhea every year. The boom in Indias private sector has been accompanied by an outright failure of the state, and the poor have borne the brunt of this failure. The rich can purchase services from private enterprises, and the middle class are the main beneficiaries of limited public services. But the poor have little or no access to public services and cannot pay the high prices for private services. For instance, children of the rich go to exclusive private schools, children of the middle class use a mix of private and public schools, and children of the poor often do not go to school at all or go to low-quality public schools.
No Solvency Mismanagement
Micro financing fails- mismanagement and bad practices is the industry doom solvency Morris, Tuft Fletcher School and writer at Verbal Vanguard 11
(Aaron, 8-11-11, Building Markers Blogs, Has Microfinance failed? Evaluating the current state of microfinance http://buildingmarkets.org/blogs/blog/2011/08/11/has-microfinance-failed-evaluating-thecurrent-state-of-microfinance/ accessed 7-13-13 KR) Once viewed as a silver bullet for combatting poverty, microfinance burst into the consciousness of development practitioners in the 1970s and 1980s as early pioneers like recently-ousted Grameen Bank founder Muhammad Yunus and FINCAs John Hatch demonstrated the social and financial value of providing financial services to the poor. In the years that followed, microfinance took hold as aid agencies, NGOs, and even for-profit microfinance institutions (MFIs) began to establish operations in all corners of the developing world. By the mid-2000s, the euphoria surrounding microfinance had reached its apex. The UN declared 2005 the year of microfinance, Muhammad Yunus won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, and Kivas peer-to-peer lending platform connected North to South and East to West as never before. Kiva provides a platform for people to provide microloans to entrepreneurs like Alexandra Castro of Guayaquil, Ecuador This period of infallibility was not to last, and in recent years the microfinance industry has experienced significant backlash . In 2007 Banco Compartamos, which transitioned from a publically funded non-profit to a lucrative for-profit business, garnered the ire of observers including microfinance father Muhammad Yunas. According to critics, its excessive interest rates and profiteering allowed its charismatic founders to get rich on the backs of its poor clients. More recently, the suicide epidemic and regulatory changes in India have ignited a media maelstrom as allegations of irresponsibility, stifling over-indebtedness, and questionable social impact have led to a global microfinance meltdown. What began as a silver bullet has quickly transformed in the public eye into something no less nefarious than payday loan usury. The baby vs. the bath water Given the lofty and unreasonable expectations placed on microfinance, it was bound to fail. Microfinance is not a silver bullet: it is but one weapon in a larger arsenal of poverty reduction tools that must be wielded strategically and selectively. The current tide of discontent surrounding the microfinance industry is not wholly unwarranted, but the underlying problem is not microfinance itself. Rather, its gross mismanagement, over-proliferation, and the outsized emphasis that it has received from aid agencies, development practitioners, and policymakers have rendered it less effective and on occasion, harmful. Microfinance has not failed, but the microfinance industry, in large part, has. Somebody catch the baby!
Permutation Solves
Permutation Solves- investment in both microfinances and larger enterprises solves if the government is prioritizing development Karnani, University of Michigan Ross School of Business Strategy professor, 7
(Aneel, Summer, Stanford Social Innovation Review, Microfinance Misses its Mark http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/microfinance_misses_its_mark accessed 7-13-13 KR) Consider the patterns of poverty and employment over time in China, India, and Africa, whose populations make up about three-quarters of the worlds poor (see graphs on p. 39). Each region has pursued a different path to economic development, and the results so far have been markedly different. In China, a large and growing percentage of the population is employed in a job. At the same time, the percentage of people living in poverty has declined significantly in recent decades. In Africa, a small and shrinking fraction of the population is employed, and the incidence of poverty has remained unchanged during the same period. Indias performance lies somewhere between the two: The number of people in jobs has grown some, and the number of people in poverty has shrunk a little. Many people who have jobs in these regions are still stuck below the poverty line the working poor. Whether an employee is poor depends on her wages, the size of her household, and the income of other household members. Increased productivity leads to higher wages, which in turn lead to employees earning enough to rise above poverty. That is why it is not enough to create jobs; regions must also increase labor productivity through the use of new technology, management techniques, specialization, and the like. When it comes to increasing labor productivity, Indias performance is mediocre and the situation in Africa is dismal. One reason for Indias poor productivity growth is that its enterprises are often too small. The average firm size in India is less than one-tenth the size of comparable firms in other emerging economies.19 The emphasis on microcredit and the creation of microenterprises will only make this problem worse.20 It is possible for an economy to invest in both microenterprises and larger enterprises. But governments need to prioritize development approaches that have a higher payoff. As Amar Bhide and Carl Schramm wrote in The Wall Street Journal: Governments in fragile states have only so much political capital and capacity. So it is crucial to proceed in a disciplined sequence.21
Permutation solves- you cannot replace states with the market, the two need to complement each other Karnani, University of Michigan Ross School of Business Strategy professor, 7
(Aneel, Summer, Stanford Social Innovation Review, Microfinance Misses its Mark http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/microfinance_misses_its_mark accessed 7-13-13 KR) Markets Arent Enough India isnt the only country whose government is failing to meet its responsibilities. Much of the developing world is likewise missing a vibrant public sector. In response to these shortcomings, a growing number of people believe that markets would do a better job of providing these same services. That is one of the reasons why microcredit has such widespread appeal: Its a market -based approach to eliminating poverty.23
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 100 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core Even those who advocate a market-based approach to providing basic services dont argue that the state can totally abdicate its responsibilities. The late economist Milton Friedman, who advocated a school voucher system, did not want the state to withdraw totally from the field of education. The state must provide basic education for the sake of intergenerational equity. The state must also be responsible for providing services when there is a market failure. Free markets do not work well when economies of scale are very large and there is a natural monopoly, as in the case of piped water, and when the commodity is a common good, as in the case of public health . In such cases, the market might be a partial complement to the state, but it cannot be a total substitute. For example, if a region has a private water supply, the government must still regulate rates and ensure that the poor have enough purchasing power to buy water. The business guru C.K. Prahalad says, If people have no sewage and drinking water, should we also deny them televisions and cell phones?24 Writing about the slums of Mumbai, he argues that the poor accept that access to running water is not a realistic option and therefore spend their income on things that they can get now and that will improve the quality of their lives.25 This opens up a market, and he urges private companies to make significant profits by selling to the bottom of the pyramid (BOP). Yet the BOP proposition glosses over the real issue: Why do poor people accept that they cannot expect running water? Even if they do accept this bleak view, why should we? Instead, we should emphasize the failure of government and attempt to correct it. Giving a voice to the poor is a central aspect of the development process. The business community, bureaucrats, politicians, and the media are very busy congratulating themselves on the booming private sector in India. Sure, more Indians have cell phones. But what many remember about India is not all the people using cell phones. Its all the people defecating in public because they do not have toilets. Even in Mumbai, the business capital of India, about 50 percent of the people defecate outside. The current celebration of private sector successes should be met, and perhaps chastened, with anger at the failure of the state to provide basic services. Overall, governments, businesses, and civil society would be well advised to reallocate their resources and energies away from microfinance and into supporting larger enterprises in laborintensive industries. This is what is alleviating poverty in China, Korea, Taiwan, and other developing countries. At the same time, they should also provide basic services that improve the employability and productivity of the poor. Otherwise, they will miss the mark of lifting people out of poverty.
Perm do the CP solves- NGO development programs are economic engagement Kartman Former Director, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, Shirk, Director, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation 9
(Charles, Susan, North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic Engagement, http://asiasociety.org/files/pdf/North_Korea_Inside_Out.pdf, Accessed 7-13-13, RRR) The final section, Channels of Engagement, provides recommendations for how to initiate the new policy approach . The report identifies official contacts, Track Two dialogues, academic exchanges, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) development programs as the first steps in economic engagement. We also recommend that the U .S . government adopt a new visa policy to increase contacts significantly . We further suggest how the U .S . could help enable international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank to begin to interact with North Korea
Multilateral Counterplan Answers
No Solvency No Coordination
Lack of coordination between multiple donor countries overwhelms recipient countries making projects ineffective Radelet, Center for Global Development senior fellow, 6
[Steven, July 2006, Center for Global Development A Primer on Foreign Aid http://www.cgdev.org/files/8846_file_WP92.pdf p. 15 7/13/13 EYS] Managing aid flows from many different donors is a huge challenge for recipient countries, since different donors usually insist on using their own unique processes for initiating, implementing, and monitoring projects. Recipients can be overwhelmed by requirements for multiple project audits, environmental assessments, procurement reports, financial statements, and project updates. According to the World Bank, developing countries typically work with 30 or more aid agencies across a wide variety of sectors, with each sending an average of five missions a year to oversee their projects.13 The donors all want to meet with the same top government officials, leaving them with much less time to deal with pressing matters. These concerns have led to numerous suggestions for donors to more closely coordinate their activities; harmonize their systems; or pool their funds (Kanbur and Sandler, 1999). But while there has been some progress, the pace of change amongst the donors seems glacial.
Poor coordination between countries in gathering information means aid fails Williamson, Mississippi State University assistant economics professor, 9
[Claudia R, 11 July 2009, Exploring the failure of foreign aid: The role of incentives and information http://dri.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/12361/WilliamsonRAEAid.pdf 7/13/13 EYS] In addition, Tullock (2005) notes that the more monumental task requires greater amounts of coordination, resulting in a lower chance that government will be able to complete the goal effectively. Ending world poverty is perhaps one of the most monumental goals that governments and other bureaucratic agencies have undertaken. The lack of coordination among donors is paramount. Easterly (2007a, p. 13) states A maddening problem in foreign aid for all concerned is the huge administrative costs on both recipient and donor sides from the duplication of donor efforts and their failure to coordinate their efforts with each other. For example, it is estimated that a medical officer in Tanzania spends 5070% of the time writing reports and missions. Donor agencies are calling for more coordination among donors to relieve developing countries of administrative requirements (United Nations Millennium Project 2005; Commission for Africa 2005) but Easterly (2007a) notes that there is little sign of improvement. This lack of coordination hinders the ability to gather necessary information and contributes to the failure of aid.
Suspicion between multilateral countries means no coordination or effective framework to implement strategies World Bank 1
[2001, Making International Aid and Debt Relief More Effective http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GDFINT/Resources/334952-1257197824814/CH4--84-107.pdf 7/13/13 p. 96 EYS]
There is much too little coordination of effort, much too much suspicion between participants and in many cases a simple absence of a framework to coordinate and bring together under government guidance an agreed set of objectives and effective and accountable programs. (Wolfensohn 1999, p. 21) As the previous section documented, better policy performance in recipient countries is important, as is greater ownership by recipient countries of their own development agendas. But while recipients are doing their part, donors can also do more to ensure the effectiveness of aid. The inefficiency that arises from lack of donor coordination is a familiar and long-standing problem. It in part reflects, but also exacerbates, the ill effects of aid allocation based on strategic interests. Yet although the problem is well recognized, solutions have not been forthcoming. Past attempts to improve coordination have occurred in the context of individual projects, not aid programs more broadly, and the focus was on harmonizing requirements such as those for reporting and procurement. These efforts made little headway. Indeed, the proliferation of donor agencies, ever more thinly spread over many countries and many activities, continued.
Mulitilateral aid bad the more countries, the less coordination and higher transaction costs. Williamson, NYU Development Research Institute Professor 10 [Claudia, 4/19/10, Aid Data Conference, Fixing Failed Foreign Aid: Can Agency Practices Improve?, http://s3.amazonaws.com/aiddata/Williamson_aiddata.pdf, p. 1011, accessed 7/13/13, ALT]
One of the biggest complaints in aid effectiveness is donor specialization. A main tenet to make aid more effective, as outlined in the Paris Declaration (2005), encourages donors (to) coordinate their activities and minimise transaction costs. In the aid literature this is know as donor harmonization or specialization, and most agree that too many donors in too many countries, stretched across a large number of sectors or projects should be avoided (Commission for Africa 2005; IMF and World Bank 2005, 2006; Knack and Rahman 2004; Easterly 2007; Frot and Santiso 2009). This argument should 10not be surprising as most government bureaucracies tend to specialize as a way of coordinating activities, lowering overhead and transactions costs, and to improve incentives and accountability to the intended beneficiaries.8
No Solvency Competing Interests

Political lobbies ensure that countries place their own interests before others Williamson, Mississippi State University assistant economics professor, 9
[Claudia R, 11 July 2009, Exploring the failure of foreign aid: The role of incentives and information http://dri.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/12361/WilliamsonRAEAid.pdf 7/13/13 EYS] Donor countries and aid agencies face their own incentives when developing foreign aid policy that ranges from special interest groups, bureaucrats, and government strategic interests. This section explores how the incentives faced by these groups shape the effectiveness of foreign aid. Politicians within donor governments are constrained to some extent by public opinion and by a larger extent, special interests. Individual voters do not have the incentive to become informed about foreign aid policy and remain rationally ignorant. However, special interests groups within the donor countries do have the incentive to become informed in order to secure large benefits while dispersing the costs among the larger population. It follows that we should not expect politicians in donor countries to actually form foreign aid policies that will promote development due to special interests influence. To illustrate this point, consider the following example. Producers in the donor countries are interested in affecting various development supplies and projects. They are interested in securing rights to supply aid-allocated resources in recipient countries. These producers find it in their best interest to lobby the donor government for projects that will benefit their specific purpose. These lobbying efforts need not align with the best aid projects being implemented or with the most efficient producer securing the rights to provide these services. In fact, if the producers are very successful, they may even be able to secure unnecessary, expensive projects. Donor governments submit to these lobbying efforts to appease politically important domestic producers. Supporting this argument, Younas (2008) provides empirical evidence indicating that aid allocation motivation stems partly from potential trade benefits that accrue to the donor country. Foreign aid is dispersed more to recipient nations who import capital goods from the donor country.
Multilateral aid fails because of competing interests Williamson, Mississippi State University assistant economics professor, 9
[Claudia R, 11 July 2009, Exploring the failure of foreign aid: The role of incentives and information http://dri.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/12361/WilliamsonRAEAid.pdf 7/13/13 EYS] This section illustrates how donor agencies, both bilateral and multilateral, may have many different objectives for foreign aid besides poverty reduction, such as rewarding allies, promoting donor country exports, or maximizing budgets. Multiple objectives often work against each other and weaken each other, so that aid may end up serving none of its multiple goals especially well. The potential for donor incentives to be misaligned with general development goals is quite large, leading to the adoption of ineffective policies and contributing to the failure of foreign aid. The next section applies the same public choice analysis to the role of recipient
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 105 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core incentives in shaping the outcome of foreign aid
No Solvency No Accountability
Multiple aid agencies means no one agency is held accountablerampant mismanagement Williamson, Mississippi State University assistant economics professor, 9
[Claudia R, 11 July 2009, Exploring the failure of foreign aid: The role of incentives and information http://dri.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/12361/WilliamsonRAEAid.pdf 7/13/13 EYS] Not only do special interests influence aid policy but bureaucracy does as well. Bureaucracies face their own set of incentives. Aid agencies operate in a perverse environment that hinders their abilities to succeed. These perverse incentives stem from such problems as negligible feedback from beneficiaries, hard to observe outcomes, and low probability that bureaucratic effort will actually translate into favorable outcomes. To respond to these incentives, aid bureaucracies organized themselves as a cartel of good intentions, suppressing critical feedback and learning from the past, suppressing competitive pressure to deliver results, and suppressing identification of the best channel of resources for different objectives (Easterly 2003, p. 34). Rashid (2005) provides support for this argument, stating that aid agencies suffer from considerable mismanagement, and questioning their performance is equally important. Due to multiple donor agencies, incentives to be held accountable for aid failures are weak, and thus, no one agency is held responsible. In other words, there are too many principles, and multiple principles weaken the incentives to achieve results (Easterly 2006c). For example, the World Bank, IMF, Inter-American Development Bank, United States Agency for International Development, US Drug Enforcement Administration, British Department for International Development, plus several more agencies, are all operating in Bolivia. Each of these agencies affects the outcome but no one agency is ultimately held responsible.
Multiple aid agencies means a lack of accountability Easterly, NYU economics professor, 6
[William, December 1, 2006, Council on Foreign Relations, The Effectiveness of Foreign Aid http://www.cfr.org/foreign-aid/effectiveness-foreign-aid/p12077 7/13/13 EYS] What a contrast with the world of foreign aid! Each foreign aid bureaucracy is responsible for everything, all the aid bureaucracies together are collectively responsible for all this everything,and in this bureaucratic maze with no exits, nobody is individually responsible for anything. All an aid critic asks is that there be REAL accountability, not the meaningless kind that the eternally clueless aid agencies talk about when they collectively set big Goals with no consequences when the Goals are not met. All one can ask is that somebody in the aid system takes individual responsibility for seeing that oral rehydration salts reach dying babies, that twelve-cent doses of medicine reach dying malaria victims, that wells get drilled and maintained to give clean water so babies dont get sick in the first place. With individual accountability, Searchers in foreign aid will find a way to make these things work.
Multilateral aid agencies do less complete aid-reporting. Williamson NYU Development Research Institute Professor 10 [Claudia, 4/19/10, Aid Data Conference, Fixing Failed Foreign Aid: Can Agency Practices Improve?, http://s3.amazonaws.com/aiddata/Williamson_aiddata.pdf, p. 8-9, accessed 7/13/13, ALT]
The first transparency index presented in Table 2 (part 1) is based on 2008 OECD reporting as described above. All bilateral agencies fully report to all five OECD tables. Most multilaterals do some reporting but with much more variance. Nine agencies fully report, ten report 67% of the time, one reports to only one out of the three tables, while only two do no reporting (FAO and UNIFEM).
Bilateral Aid Good

Bilateral aid is betterbuilds off of standing relations, and tied aid increases effectiveness. Ehrenfeld, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance Writer 4
[Daniel, 2/1/2004, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, Foreign Aid Effectiveness, Political Rights and Bilateral Distribution, http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/75, accessed 7/13/13, ALT] Bilateral aid has many advantages. Countries often are peculiarly well placed to assist others with which they have long-standing relationships. They have specific technical skills often developed in, or because of association with, the countries concerned. They often times, as is the case with imperialist/colony relationships or other historical ties, have linguistic and personal affinities which may facilitate the ability to render appropriate technical assistance. Their institutional structures are often derived one from the other, as well. [37] Moreover, some factors neutralize bilateral aids negative points. Tied aid, for example, can be seen as a tool to increase effectiveness in a way, as it is contractible. That is, contrary to many international agreements where there are no third party or institution that can enforce contracts, tied project aid is contractible within the donor country. Furthermore, such a contract is credible not only because of the use of legal institutions within the donor country, but because the third party involved, i.e., private firms within the donor country, is likely to enforce the contract for profitmaximizing reasons. By introducing a third party into the game between the donor and the recipients, a conflict of interest between the beneficiaries of aid is created. This in turn constrains the donors ex post incentives, thereby providing the necessary incentives for the recipient governments to induce effort. [38]
Criticisms of bilateral aid are biased research shows it solves better than multilateral aid agencies. Ehrenfeld, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance Writer 4
[Daniel, 2/1/2004, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, Foreign Aid Effectiveness, Political Rights and Bilateral Distribution, http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/75, accessed 7/13/13, ALT] The effectiveness of aid has recurrently been a subject of much investigation. Though results have been mixed, a consensus that foreign assistance does not generally benefit its recipients sufficiently has emerged. Many in the past have focused the blame for this reality on the donors, insisting that aid-tying practices and conditionality has redirected aid to benefit the North. It has been charged that bilateral aid (aid transferred from one single state to another) is especially culpable for being structured to reap gains for the benefactor and not for humanitarian purposes. Conversely, multilateral aid (aid transferred by alliances of multiple states) was thought to be more geared toward assisting the South through the development process. Yet, research indicates that this effectiveness bias is not in fact the case; in actuality it is bilateral aid that has had a more significant positive effect on development in the South. The following essay will attempt to demonstrate that the presence or absence of political and civil rights in the recipient country has one of the greatest effects on the efficiency with which aid promotes development. It will also link this finding to the aforementioned greater effectiveness of bilateral aid. The essay concludes that while aid may aggregately benefit the North more than the South at this point in time, progress relating to the political rights variable could extensively alter this balance of aid value.
Bilateral aid better multilateral agencies cant be held culpable. Williamson, NYU Development Research Institute Professor 09
[Claudia, 2009, Springer Science,Exploring the failure of foreign aid: The roleof incentives and information, http://dri.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/12361/WilliamsonRAEAid.pdf, accessed 7/13/13, ALT] Due to multiple donor agencies, incentives to be held accountable for aid failures are weak, and thus, no one agency is held responsible. In other words, there are too many principles, and multiple principles weaken the incentives to achieve results (Easterly 2006c). For example, the World Bank, IMF, Inter-American Development Bank, United States Agency for International Development, US Drug Enforcement Administration, British Department for International Development, plus several more agencies, are all operating in Bolivia. Each of these agencies affects the outcome but no one agency is ultimately held responsible. Bureaucrats in both government and aid agencies face their own incentives. Donors, especially aid agencies, prefer to focus on aid disbursements as the preferred measure of success. Not only are disbursements observable but they are also the agencys budget, and an agencys budget is its source of existence. Bureaucracies are budget maximizers. Bureaucrats face the incentives not only to exhaust their current budget but also to ask for increases in their budget in order to increase the size of the agency. Given the larger development goals foreign aid seeks to promote, there is no reason to assume that bureaucracies found in donor governments and aid agencies will choose to pursue the most efficient policies and strategies, given the incentives that they face.
All inclusive studies based on international agreement favor bilateral aid over multilateral agencies. Williamson NYU Development Research Institute Professor 10
[Claudia, 4/19/10, Aid Data Conference, Fixing Failed Foreign Aid: Can Agency Practices Improve?, http://s3.amazonaws.com/aiddata/Williamson_aiddata.pdf, p. 25-26, accessed 7/13/13, ALT] This study attempts to understand if donors follow best practices, as outlined in the Paris Declaration, and attempts to explain why agencies behave the way they do. Overall, bilateral agencies tend to perform better than multilateral agencies, although there is significant variation from the top agency to the worst. Aid continues to flow through ineffective channels, to corrupt autocrats, and is splintered among many donors, many 25countries, projects and sectors. However, better data is needed to gain a more accurate description of the state of aid and aid agencies.
Multilateral Aid Bad Democracy

Bilateral aid is better for democracy more ability to negotiate, India proves. Ehrenfeld, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance Writer 4
[Daniel, 2/1/2004, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, Foreign Aid Effectiveness, Political Rights and Bilateral Distribution, http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/75, accessed 7/13/13, ALT] With respect to democratic considerations, studies show that security-driven goals have become less critical and ideological goals more important with the passing of the Cold War, prompting the United States to increasingly reward democratic states with foreign aid. US policy makers are likely to believe that the more the nation can do to promote democracy, human rights and development, the more stable and peaceful the world will become, which ultimately benefits the donors , as mentioned above. [57] In contrast, multilateral conditionalities threaten to undermine democratic prospects for developing nations. In so far as they are responsible for social discontent that produce divisions in society, the consolidation of stable democratic government is made more difficult. [58] The example of Egypt again seems pertinent here, as the 1977 riots following required economic restructuring led to strict suppression by the military and the assigning of greater authority to then-president Sadats supporters in the managerial elite. [59] For a more contemporary illustration, one can point to India, which is actually rejecting bilateral aid, though is less discriminating with regards to multilateral aid, since bilateral assistance had often been accompanied by sermons about human rights, corruption and good governance [60] , which the state preferred to avoid.

Aid Efficacy Core

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Aid Efficacy Core

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Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 1 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core

Aid Efficacy Neg

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Economic Engagement Aid Fails Empirically

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than existing programs when finally put into operation.

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Moyo, Goldman Sachs economist, 9

approach assumes two types of causal links

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Political Will Key

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Opposition Aid Fails

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Aid Doesnt Help Those In Need

Moyo, Goldman Sachs economist, 9

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 21 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core

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AT Technical Assistance Solves

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AT Loans Different from Grants

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Aid Cuts Now

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Aid Causes Corruption

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Corruption Bad Aid Diversion

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Corruption Bad Economic Growth

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Corruption Bad Instability

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Mexican Corruption Impacts

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AT No Corruption We Cooperate With State Goverments

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Aid Hurts Economy

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 48 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core

Aid Causes Inflation

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Aid Causes Dutch Disease

Aid fails fosters Dutch Disease

Moyo, Goldman Sachs economist, 9

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 54 Brovero-Lundeen Aid Efficacy Core

Aid Funds Conflict

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NGO Aid Backfires

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AT Aid Good/Necessary for Relations